Tañada, L. M. et al vs. Hon. J.C.
Tuvera et al as would it would punish the citizen for transgression of the
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
En Banc
Facts:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the
unpublished Executive Issuances such as; Presidential
Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders, general orders,
letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In
defense, respondents stated that the petitioners have no legal
personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a Writ of
Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches the
public and thereby does not require any special circumstance
to institute an action. On the other hand, respondents stated
that publication of the mentioned issuances is not a sine qua
non requirement as the Law provides its own affectivity date
as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive
Issuances.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to
publish the Executive Issuances of general application, and
further stated that failure for publication would render the
Issuances no binding force and effect.
It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives
basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia legis non
excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice
law which he had no notice.
The court declared that Presidential issuances with general
application without publication would be inoperative and null
and void. However, some justices in their concurring opinions
made a qualification stating that publication is not an absolute
requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated
that, publication is needed but it must not only confined in the
Official Gazette because it would make those other laws not
published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or
effect.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO
V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155.          August 28,2007.
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of
Primetown (respondent), applied for refund of the income tax
which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company
accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses
enabled them to be exempt from paying income tax, which
respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming
a refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the
petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents
filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court,
however, denied the petition stating that the petition was filed
beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for
tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
“no suit or proceedings shall be filed after the expiration of 2-
yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment. Respondents
paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of
the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days;
months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset to
sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date of filing a
petition fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive
period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on
April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000 considering that the last
payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was
a leap year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed
by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of the Administrative Code
of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals
a prior law, the new law shall apply. In the case at bar, Art 13
of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose
365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year shall be
composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a
month. Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period ends on
April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000
(which is the last day prescribed to file a petition.
Consunji v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137873       April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the
platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And
the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting
points of the chain block and platform but without a safety
lock.1
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.
M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision
of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of
the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages
with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed
in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering
damages under the civil code.
As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tort fees or for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. But There is an
exception is where a claimant who has already been paid
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first
remedy. The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or
a mistake of fact, nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under
the exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent
filed the civil complaint for damages using the police
investigation report to support her complaint may just be an
afterthought after receiving a copy of the Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. This court is more inclined to believe
appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s
negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits
under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case
fall under the exception
Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Laureano vs CA
[February2,2000]
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED,
respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiff was employed by the Singapore Airlines
Limited as an expatriate captain. Sometime in 1982 or
prior to the expiration of the five-year employment
contract however defendant, hit by a recession, initiated
cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate
captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant’s requirement. Consequently, defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time,
defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel. It
did not, however, immediately terminate it’s A-300 pilots.
It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to
the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots
reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
Plaintiff instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved,
the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the
instant case for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo.
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to
dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2)
that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and
in the course of plaintiff’s employment “thus it is the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 217 of the Labor Code” and that, since plaintiff
was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his
employment contract and/or documents executed in
Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore
laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N Singaporean laws should apply in the
instant case
HELD: NO. The trial court rightly ruled on the application
of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination
of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because
of the defendant’s failure to show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this case. The Philippine
Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. The defendant that claims the
applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has
the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so.
Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when
defendant filed its appeal before said court. On this
matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue
of jurisdiction.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN LIQUIDATION
OF INTERCITY SAVINGS v. STOCKHOLDERS OF
INTERCITY SAVINGS, GR No. 181556, 2009-12-14
Facts:
2004
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and
Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank)... alleging that, inter alia,
said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to depositors,
creditors and the general public.[1]
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court gave it due course.[2] Petitioner Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually
substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity
Bank.[3]
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)[4]
was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:
SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the
closed bank in accordance with the preferences
established by law, the Corporation shall periodically
charge against said assets reasonable receivership
expenses and subject to approval by the proper court,...
reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part
of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings and
collect payment therefor from available assets.
PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the
Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the
Liquidation Proceedings
The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses
P3,795,096.05;
The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the
implementation of this distribution and the winding-up of
the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
The write-off of assets in the total amount of
P8,270,789.99,... The write-off of liabilities in the total
amount of P1,562,185.35,... The Final Project of
Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank... to hold
as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated
in the project of distribution for creditors who shall have a
period of three (3) years from date of last notice within
which to claim payment therefor.
Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records
in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations
By Order of July 5, 2006,[6] Branch 134 of the Makati
RTC granted the motion except the above-quoted
paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer,
Issues:
whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied
retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to
surplus dividends,
Ruling:
it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter
to... prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice
Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been
paid their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of
RA 9302 in 2004.
PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals[7] before which
respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank (the
Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing
principally that the proper recourse should be to this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari... since
the question involved was purely one of law.[8]
By Resolution of October 17, 2007,[9] the appellate court
dismissed the appeal, sustaining in the main the position
of the Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied by Resolution dated January 24,
2008,[10] PDIC... filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs.
BENJAMIN MORIAL, defendant
G.R. No. 129295.            August 15, 2001
Facts:
On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were
killed and robbed. As a part of the investigation and as a
result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial
were asked several questions by the policemen and were
invited to the police station for continuing investigation.
They were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and
later interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in
the morning. That investigation conducted by SPO4
Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that
he was one of those who participated in the robbery with
homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements were
reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him
of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel,
whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in
court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a lawyer
for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty.
Aguilar was contacted by the former and he first met the
latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning.
After Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that
the same can be used against him as evidence in court,
the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez
with the presence of the counsel. After “all the material
points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if
he can leave due to very important engagement. The
latter agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before leaving,
Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer
questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and
despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez
continued with the investigation and propounded several
more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.
Issue:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was
waived during the investigation.
Ruling:
Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel
during the custodial investigation; therefore his quasi-
judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against
him and his other co-accused. The Court stressed out
that an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very
start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty.
Aguilar only left after Leonardo had admitted that he and
his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty.
Aguilar rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had
admitted the “material points”, referring to the
participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are
invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires that
“any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.”
Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states that
“in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation
shall be conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s
departure during the investigation and to answer
questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was
an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to
remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the
same is made in writing and in the presence of the
counsel. In the case at bar, no such written and
counseled waiver of these rights was presented as
evidence.
Magkalas vs. NHA
G.R. No. 138823 (2008)
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS:
On March 26, 1978, PD No. 1315 was issued,
expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. The National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project.
The decree also allowed NHA to take possession,
control, and disposition of the expropriated properties
through demolition.During NHA’s survey, it determined
that Caridad Magkalas’ (petitioner) property was located
in what would be classified as an area center or open
space. This is in compliance with the requirement of
having 30% open space in all types of residential
development.
The NHA even wrote a letter to Magkalas and two others
to explain why they had to leave their lots. The letter also
contained the Notice of Lot Assignment, saying that
Magkalas was being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2,
Barangay 132. But even after losing the case in RTC,
Magkalas did not dismantle her structure/home.
Sometime in March 1994, she was directed to remove
her structure in its present lot and transfer to Lot 77. A
judicial order was no longer necessary pursuant to PD
1472. At this point, the two others who appealed to NHA
have already transferred to their allocated lots.
Magkalas appealed on the basis of social justice. She
also questioned the implied repeal of PD 1472 and PD
1315.
ISSUE: W/N Magkalas could use social justice as a basis
to assert permanent residency
DOCTRINE: A vested right is one that is absolute,
complete, and unconditional and no obstacle exists
to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself
and not dependent upon any contingency. To be
vested, a right must have become a title – legal or
equitable – to the present or future enjoyment of
property.
HELD: NO. Magkalas cannot use the argument of social
justice in her case even if she has lived in her lot for 40
years already. She argued that the Social Justice clause
of the Constitution provided that a “poor and unlettered
urban dweller like her has a right to her property and to a
decent living”. The Constitution, however, provides that
such should still be in accordance with law. The SC also
said, “Social justice…should be used only to correct an
injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel
observed, social justice must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
diverse units of society, and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the State of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about ‘the greatest good to
the greatest number’”.
Furthermore, RA 7279 does not repeal PD No 1315 and
PD 1472 even if it, according to the petitioner,
discourages demolition. There is no provision RA 7279
that expressly repeals the two decrees. Repeals by
implication are not facored as laws are presumed to
be passed with deliberation and full knowlee of all
laws existing on the subject.