1.

Refusal to Assume Jurisdiction – Principle of Forum Non Conveniens 

G.R. NOS. 178382-83 THIRD DIVISION September 23, 2015

CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Petitioner, vs.

JOSEPH BASSO, Respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation

organized and existing under the laws of and domiciled in the United States of
America (US). It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Basso, a US
citizen, resided in the Philippines prior to his death.

In 1990, Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr. Braden), Managing Director-Asia of

Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), offered Basso the position of General
Manager of the Philippine Branch of Continental. Basso accepted the offer.

Mr. Braden, who had returned to the US sent Basso the employment
contract dated February 1, 1991, which Mr. Braden had already signed. Basso
then signed the employment contract and returned it to Mr. Braden as
instructed.

On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of

Continental, with Basso retaining his position as General Manager.

Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who was then
CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that he has
agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an "as needed basis" effective
February 1, 1996 to July 31, 1996.

On March 14, 1996, Basso wrote another letter addressed to Ms. Marty
Woodward (Ms. Woodward) of CMI’s Human Resources Department inquiring
about the status of his employment. On the same day, Ms. Woodward
responded that pursuant to the employment contract dated February 1, 1991,
Basso could be terminated at will upon a thirty-day notice. This notice was
allegedly the letter Basso received from Mr. Schulz on December 20, 1995.
 Ms. Woodward informed Basso that CMI terminated his employment
effective January 31, 1996.

Basso filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary
Damages against CMI. CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss dated February 10, 1997
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject
matter of the controversy. In an Order dated August 27, 1997, the Labor
Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss.

On appeal, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the
determination of certain facts to settle the issue on jurisdiction.

Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan in his Decision dated September 24,

1999 dismissed the case for lack of merit and jurisdiction.

On appeal, the NLRC Third Division promulgated a Decision dated 24

September 1999 which vacated and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Basso filed a Petition for Certiorari dated April 16, 2004 with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA declared that Basso was illegally dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the local forum is the convenient forum in light of the
facts of the case.

Ruling:

Yes. The local forum is the convenient forum in light of the facts of the
case. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a
conflict-of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided,
that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in
a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
All these requisites are present here.

Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had
physical presence in the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a
Philippine branch, while Basso, before his death, was residing here.
 Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures
were needed for the parties to make arrangements in advocating their
respective cases.

The labor tribunals can make an intelligent decision as to the law and
facts. The incident subject of this case (i.e. dismissal of Basso) happened in the
Philippines, the surrounding circumstances of which can be ascertained
without having to leave the Philippines. The acts that allegedly led to loss of
trust and confidence and Basso’s eventual dismissal were committed in the
Philippines. As to the law, we hold that Philippine law is the proper law of the
forum, as we shall discuss shortly. Also, the labor tribunals have the power to
enforce their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
both parties.

G.R. No. 162894            

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs.

STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.

Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United
States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American
citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in
the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11
March 1992, Rouzie secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. Labor
Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to
pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The latter elevated the case to the Supreme Court and
the it dismissed the case through a Resolution which became final and
executory.

On 8 January 1999, Rouzie, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action

for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The
complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc.
(Raytheon) as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the
earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the
labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of
services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on
behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI
verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the
Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint
also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and
functioned as one company.

Raytheon filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on

Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of
action. RTC denied Raytheon’s omnibus motion and held that the factual
allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient
for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the
principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court
could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to
do business in the Philippines.

Raytheon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order and the RTC denied
said motion. Raytheon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). However, the CA denied its petition for lack of merit and subsequently, its
motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to resolve the case
even though there is a stipulation in the contract that it shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut.

2) Whether or not the foreign element of the dispute necessitates the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Ruling:

1) Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to resolve the case even though
there is a stipulation in the contract that it shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. In Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined three
consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems,
namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Thus, in the instances where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the
following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that
the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is

filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein. The civil case filed is an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the
action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant)
was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the
Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing
on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

2) No. The foreign element of the dispute does not necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere. Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are
not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the civil case filed
and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum

non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals
respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to
the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on
this Court.

1. When the law of the forum expressly provides for the application of internal law
G.R. No. L-22595             EN BANC
November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,

administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Facts:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question
in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre

Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Andre Brimo was excluded as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons

designated as such in will, such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen,

this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by
free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for
a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my
will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in
this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws shall govern the partition of the estate or
Joseph G. Brimo, who is a Turkish national.

Ruling:

No. Philippine laws shall not govern the partition of the estate or Joseph G.
Brimo, who is a Turkish national. The institution of legatees in this will is
conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

The institution of legatees in the will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his
property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines.

If the condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
Article 792 of the Civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be

considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null
and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests
are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary
to the testator's national law.
2. When the proper foreign law has not been properly proven and proved 

B. Doctrine of Processual Presumption

G.R. No. 119602         SECOND DIVISION    

October 6, 2000

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.

Facts:

Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPLI), private
respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. He
was asked to pilot the said vessel boarding it at night.

The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot
(Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port. Captain
Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.

The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel
proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the
channel. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations. These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It
was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge. The master (captain) checked the position of the
vessel  and verified that it was in the center of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the
vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double
bottom tanks.

At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress
of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping
Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.

Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III
against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas)
for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees,
costs, and expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order
dated November 7, 1988.

Issue:

Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar and is properly proved.

Ruling:

No. The Venezuelan law is not applicable to the case at bar and is not properly proved. It is well-settled that foreign
laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign
law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.

The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness
to prove the existence of a written foreign law.

We take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A
photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.

The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No  1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
Venezuela.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be
attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a
certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. 35 The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended
to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial,  or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was
presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of
those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his
office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case.

With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence.
According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be
proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.

At this juncture, the Court has to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court. A foreign
law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its
import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue. A review of the Complaint  revealed that it was
never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a
fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as
our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.

G.R. No. 136804             FIRST DIVISION

February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners, vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.

Facts:

On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (Bank) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems;
and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Alyssa Walden’s affidavit stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in
New York authenticated the Walden’s affidavit.

The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6,
1996 and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On
December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not Walden’s affidavit constitutes as a proof of New York law on damages.

Ruling:

No. Walden’s affidavit does not constitute as a proof of New York law on damages. The Bank cannot rely
on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher which recognized the
exceptions to Section 24 of Rule 132 to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court
during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand,
the Walden’s affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The affidavit cannot be
considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
state the specific New York law on damages.

Walden’s affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis
a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the affidavit of various
U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank
attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24
of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.

The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However,
because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign
courts, the affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only
alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

G.R. No. 145587           SECOND DIVISION  

October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. (EDI) is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Expertise Search International (ESI) is another recruitment agency which
collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia.

Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) informed EDI that, from the applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it for
evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees
to the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal)
2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch.

After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that granted him a monthly salary
of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7,
1994.

After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through OAB's July 9,
1994 letter. On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay,
and on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards
him.

After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation, and Western Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City.

Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, to whom Gran's case was assigned, ruled that there was neither underpayment nor
illegal dismissal. Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal with the NLRC, Third Division. The NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision and rendered a new one and ordered the respondents ordered jointly and severally liable to pay
Gran his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract.

Issue:

Whether or not the Saudi Labor Laws should govern the contract.

Ruling:

No. The Saudi Labor Laws should not govern the contract. In the present case, the employment contract signed by
Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of
Gran.

However, in international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
G.R. No. L-12105             EN BANC January 30,
1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee, vs.

MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

Facts:

On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last
will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The testator was born in Nebraska
and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located.
Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he
continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the
rest of his days in that state.

The executor filed a project of partition.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing
of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of
the form concede to them.

It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his
Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction.

There is no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the
court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan,
the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

Issue:

Whether or not the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given
them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid despite the fact that according to the laws of the forum, it should
be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.

Ruling:

Yes. The testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the
Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid despite the fact that according to the laws of the forum, it should be two-thirds
of the estate left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and
the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil
Code.)

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the
State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence.

It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. It does not appear
that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was
the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the
legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

The Court, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing
on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as
Exhibits "2". Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B"
during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo.

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the
State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of
such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by
the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is
that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according
to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed.

G.R. No. L-32636             EN BANC

March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs.

ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.

Facts:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance
Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Annie
Coushing Hix is not authorized to carry on this appeal. The Court think, however, that A.W. Fluemer, who appears to
have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will
by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the
will.

It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix
who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2,
1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library should govern. The Court of First Instance
denied the probate of the will.

Issue:

Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should govern.

Rulings:

No. The laws of West Virginia should not govern. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.

The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to
indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these
witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to
require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty
of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 633.)