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Operation Wintergewitter
Operation Wintergewitter
During Christmas 1944 the Italians and Germans carried out their last combined
offensive of the war. Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm) was a limited offensive in
the Apennine Mountains of Italy, but was one of the last examples of German tactical
Recent Articles and operational mastery in Italy. The offensive badly mauled an American infantry
division and achieved some minor results, slightly improving the Axis situation over the
Assembling the T-34
western Apennines Gothic Line sector.
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Assembling the sMG42 SS Machine-Gun During a meeting on 20 October 1944 between General Mario Carloni (commander
Platoon (GE797)
Italian Monterosa Alpini Division) and German General Jost (commander 42. Jäger
Assembling the Armoured SS Division deployed in the western sector of the Gothic Line) briefly went over a plan
Panzergrenadier HQ (GBX138)
being considered by Kesselring’s German Italy command and Mussolini and the RSI
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Assembling The 12cm SS Mortar Platoon The plan envisioned a strong offensive to be launched against the left (western) wing of the US 5th Army in the Garfagnana
(GE799) mountain region (between Emilia and Tuscany). It would be an all-out attack carried out by 40,000 men, one German and
Assembling The 8cm SS Mortar Platoon two Italian Divisions, with heavy tank, artillery and air support. Its aim was to breakthrough the US 5th Army lines and retake
(GE798) Lucca, Pisa and the strategically important port of Livorno, resulting in the Allies being forced to withdraw units from the
Assembling the SS Panzergrenadier Platoon central and eastern sectors of the front and call off their offensive in the critical Ravenna-Bologna area. In the British 8th
(GBX141) Army sector, where the German defence wasn’t benefited by favourable terrain, the drawing off of attacking Allied units
Assembling the SS Reconnaisance Platoon would ease pressure on the German defenders.
(GEAB19)
Of the three required divisions, the Italian "Italia" still had to arrive, just 50% of the Monterosa was available, and the
German 148. Infantry Division was in poor shape. There were no tanks, aircraft, or fuel and only a few extra German artillery
batteries were available. Any attempts to move armoured units to the area, or to strengthen the infantry divisions already
deployed, would have been quickly detected by Allied reconnaissance or partisan observers.
Tactical and operational surprise could never have been achieved (not
to mention the fact that the Allied air forces would have quickly made
mincemeat of those reinforcements).
The revised plan was accepted and preparations began. The attack
would invest the American front line between the town of
Sommocolonia (east of Serchio River) and Mount Pania Secca (west
of the river) 20 kilometres distant. While General Fretter-Pico would
be the overall commander, General Carloni would lead the attack
operationally.
4,600 men of the Monterosa and 148. Infantry Divisions plus attached units were split up into three attack columns.
1st Column:
Italian "Intra" Alpine Battalion
Regimental HQ Company of the 1st Alpine Regiment
Monterosa Division "Cadelo" Recon Group (plus a company of the Italia Division)
2nd Battalion, 6th "San Marco" Marine Regiment
1st Battalion, German 285th Grenadier Regiment (in fact, the latter unit operated alongside the second column)
2nd Column:
Italian "Brescia" Alpine Battalion
2nd Battalion, German 285th Grenadier Regiment
3rd Column:
German "Mittenwald" Mountain Battalion
elements, German "Kesselring" Machinegun Battalion
Artillery:
80 field guns (including some additional German artillery batteries: 1 x 150 mm, 3 x 105 mm, 2 x 75 mm, 1 x 88mm) plus the
divisional light infantry guns and mortars.
The best and most experienced units were the two German assault battalions of the 3rd column, attached to the 148.
Infantry Division, and called "special battalions" in Italian sources. They were entirely made up of well-trained and fast-
moving assault troops. However, the two under-strength German battalions of the 285th Grenadier Regiment were of poor
quality. Most of their men came from Alsace, and had been forcibly enlisted in the Wehrmacht after the 1940 campaign and
the German annexation of their native land. The desertion rate was high and on 26-27 November an Italian Alpini company
had to be sent to keep them under control and to thwart any attempts at mass desertion or mutiny.
The first attack column would operate on the right of the Axis attack front, carrying out diversionary attacks and taking the
American first line and the towns of Vergemoli and Calomini. The second, central column (left and right of Serchio river)
would break through the American defences and would head for the rear area towns of Gallicano, Treppignana and Fornaci
di Barga.
The 1,500 man strong third column, on the left, was the pivotal one. It would start first, penetrating the US line, then outflank
it, and quickly seize the town of Sommocolonia and make for Barga - Fornaci di Barga - Pian di Coreglia (8km south of the
start line).
American OOB
The unit that would bear the brunt of the upcoming battle was the 370th Regimental Combat Team (Colonel Sherman) of the
92nd Infantry Division:
They knew that the partisans and Allied intelligence would at some point learn
of their plans prompt some counter or preparations. Vague information reached
the US IV Corps and 92nd Infantry Division (African-American "Buffalo"
Division), the American unit holding the Sommocolonia - Pania Secca line. An
attack was expected on or about 10 December. New trenches, fieldworks,
barbed wire entanglements, strong points and minefields strengthened the US
defences. Coincidently the IV Corps had also planned a Christmas attack,
which would start on 25 December at 08:00 hours. On 10 December nothing
happened, the 92nd Division commander (General Edward M. Almond)
ordered his troops to make ready their attack, while at the same time kept a
look-out for possible Axis actions. This ambiguous directive caused confusion
among 92nd Division’s officers and troops, and probably contributed to their
defeat.
The Attack
On 24 December the US 92nd Division was ordered to call off the scheduled attack and prepare to fend off an Axis offensive
which would be launched on 27 December. Unfortunately for the Americans the Axis third attack column was ready to go at
midnight, 25/26 December.
At 04:50 (03:00 according to some sources) hours, 26 December, elements of the two German assault battalions emerged
out of the darkness and suddenly attacked the Sommocolonia garrison (elements of F Company, 2nd Battalion, 366th
Regiment, supported by some partisans). Some authors state that the resistance there was tough, but quickly overwhelmed;
others say that it lasted all day and the attackers were even forced to call for artillery support.
The centre column in the Serchio valley (east of Serchio river), the two German Grenadier battalions together with the
attached company of the Italian Brescia Alpini battalion west of the same river, and the other Brescia companies overcame a
weak initial resistance. However, their opponents were falling back already and the attackers got to Fornaci smoothly,
meeting only minor resistance. Fornaci itself fell quickly, although the two German (Alsatian) battalions were heavily criticized
for their slow and un-aggressive advance.
The all-Italian right column, however, faced a much more vigorous defence. The San Marco easily seized the village of
Molazzano and pushed the defenders back, but the Regimental Headquarters Company suffered losses and could not take
the village of Brucciano. The Cadelo Group supported by the Intra battalion, which was engaging the enemy by launching
small diversionary attacks, occupied Calomini, but the Vergemoli garrison (370th Infantry Regiment elements and some
partisan groups) was tough nut to crack. A wide minefield, artillery barrages and deadly machine-gun and rifle fire stopped
the advancing Italian platoons and inflicted heavy casualties. Not even the intervention of the Axis artillery could dislodge the
Americans from their positions. On the evening of 26 December the town still was in American hands, but the Cadelo Group
broke off its attacks because the whole US line had elsewhere crumbled. The stout Vergemoli garrison could be encircled
and cut off. It eventually retreated, leaving in place a partisan group as a covering party.
Even the Allied air forces were caught off guard and the usually ubiquitous USAAF P-47s did not seriously oppose the Axis
advance until the morning of 27 December.
As for the 92nd Division, the low prisoners statistics indicate that in its defeat managed to retreat, sometimes after having
held out to the last, to take shelter in the Allied second lines. It also would have been a difficult task for the Axis forces, a few
infantry battalions in rugged terrain, under air threat, to capture thousands of prisoners. They simply didn’t have the
resources or men to transport and guard large numbers of prisoners.
During the American retreat episodes of panic, low resistance and utter disorganization took place, as witnessed by
Gallicano civilians. The responsibility for these episodes, as General Clark himself pointed out, rests almost entirely with the
high level commanders, not with the 92nd troops or with the majority of their platoon, company and battalion leaders.
A night assault took them by surprise, they did what they could do, and many fought
valiantly; a number of 92nd soldiers were later awarded decorations. In the Italian and
German officers’ opinion, the American black soldiers were not consistently aggressive,
but in defence they proved themselves stubborn and tough. In several local attacks
during the months of October and November the Buffalo soldiers had fought fairly well.
Unfortunately for their troops, General Almond and Colonel Sherman were the first US
soldiers to panic in Garfagnana, and although they later tried shamelessly to lay the
blame upon the troops, their company and platoon leaders some of the blame can be
laid at their feet. The 92nd Division’s commanders’ muddled orders, slow reaction and
misunderstanding of the situation gave wee some of the main causes of the American
setback. However the tactical surprise and the effectiveness of the left outflanking
column contributed considerably.
The Allies had also underrated the Monterosa troops’ morale. A mid-December US
intelligence report stated, "the morale in the [Monterosa] Division is very low". While the
Italian unit was not an elite force, and had its morale troubles, it was far from being a
total failure.
The success went to Mussolini’s and Graziani’s heads. They (and several RSI military and political representatives as well)
pressed for a continuation of the offensive, by pouring reinforcements in and directing the victorious columns southwards
(Lucca), south-west (Viareggio) or eastwards.
It was the realm of fantasy. During 27 to 30 December the USAAF aircraft strafed and bombed everything in sight. In the
town of Camporgiano, even a hospital where German, Italian and American wounded were being treated was attacked by
mistake. The few 20mm and 88mm anti-aircraft guns could not stop the waves of Allied planes.
Aftermath
All of the limited objectives of the Garfagnana offensive were captured. The US 5th
Army got a minor beating. Allied reserves were shifted to a secondary sector (8th
Indian Infantry Division) and the Wintergewitter operation worried the US Army so much
that it contributed to the fourth (and last) postponement of the attack on to Bologna and
the Padana plan.
The success cheered the Italian RSI troops, though just for a while. Some local Italian
partisan bands and groups were eventually scattered. The Axis gained a slightly better
defensive situation on the Western Appennines, and indeed, the new line stayed more
or less intact until April 1945 and the final Axis collapse.
Given the awful conditions under which the Axis units were operating in the Italian
theatre, and the disproportionate numbers and firepower, it’s unthinkable they could
achieve more than they historically did. Assuming it was a realistic proposition, which is
highly doubtful, an all-out Ardennes-style offensive if successful would probably have
led to the capture of Livorno and pushed 5th Army further back, but it would never have
"driven the Allies into the sea". An extra German effort in Italy would just have
quickened the collapse of the Western and Eastern fronts.
Western Alps defence was entrusted LXXV German Corp (34. Infantry division and 5. Gebirgsjäger division) to whom were
added the main part of Monterosa, Littorio Division and other units (Xa Mas, Cacciatori delle Alpi).
On September 1944, the Monterosa deployed Tirano and Bassano battalions and artillery group Vicenza on this front.
The Bassano occupied the 2,500-2,800 meter high hills of Colle dell’Agnello, St. Veran, Longet, and dell’Autaret di Maurin.
The zone was under marquis (French partisans) and Italian partisans control. The Monterosa troops had to undertake some
hard fighting to clear the area and prepare fortifications before winter.
Tirano battalion relieved the 5. Gebirgsjäger and
deployed from Rocca Clary, above Claviere, to
Punta Rascià, and Mount Gimont to Chenaillet. The
positions were well fortified, but under heavy mortar
and artillery fire. In mid October French troops, by a
coupe de main, occupied Chenaillet Fort, but on the
21 October the Alpini were able to re-conquer it with
a strong counter-attack. During the action Alpini
Renato Assante was killed, he had come from
Turkey to enlist. Assante was the first Alpini to reach
the mountaintop and launch himself at the
defenders.
On 23 December 1944 it was the Monterosa turn to attack. A patrol of 25 Alpini and 25 German Gebirgsjäger carried out a
raid on the enemy lines and destroy the Mont Janus fortifications.
Vicenza Artillery Group batteries were deployed at the start of the operation on the French side of the frontier, near
Maddalena hill. Unfortunately due to the bad weather and snow they had to be withdrawn towards the valleys. The positions
were then occupied by Aosta battalion coming from Garfagnana with Brescia battalion and Mantova artillery group.
Sources
Gazzi A., Operation Winter Storm, Comando Supremo
Pansa G., 1991, Il gladio e l’alloro, Mondadori, Milano
Pisanò G., 1994, Gli ultimi in grigioverde, C.D.L. Edizioni, Vareggio (MI)
Viazzi L., 1978, Gli Alpini, Ciarrapico Editore, Roma