Santos, Miles Nicko M.

City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.

G.R. No. 118127
Reddendo Singula Singulis

1. City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance prohibiting the establishment and operation of
businesses providing amusement and entertainment in the Ermita-Malate area.
2. The purpose of this ordinance is to do away the use of women as tools in entertainment
which tends to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
3. It listed among others imposed a penalty equivalent to permanent closure of the business.
those engaged to motels and inns in the said area to be a violation of the enacted ordinance
and it
4. Malate Tourist Development Corporation which has an establishment of motels and inns, the
Victoria Court, in the said area filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying for the
injunction of the Ordinance.
5. MTDC argues that its Victoria Court is neither engaged in amusement and entertainment
nor used women as tools for entertainment and further advanced that the Ordinance is
invalid and unconstitutional.
6. The corporation based its claim of invalidity and unconstitutionality for reasons such as that
(1) the City has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and inns but can only regulate
it in accordance to the Local Government Code, (2) that the Ordinance is void as it is
repugnant to PD 499 which declares the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone, and that
(3) the enactment of the Ordinance is not a proper exercise of police power because there
is no reasonable relation to the interest that the City of Manila sought.
7. The City of Manila contended that the power to regulate stated in the Local Government
Code also means as a power to control, govern and restrain places of amusement and
entertainment.
8. Also, the City of Manila invokes the Sec. 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government which read
that the Sangguniang Panglunsod has the power to prohibit certain form of amusement and
entertainment in order to maintain the social and moral welfare of the community.
9. The City likewise contended that the Ordinance is not repugnant to PD 499 because it
simply disauthorize certains forms of business and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain
as a commercial zone.
10. Judge Laguio, the respondent and in his capacity as a presiding judge of the RTC, rendered
a decision declaring that the Ordinance is null and void.
11. In their appeal, the City of Manila, herein petitioner, contend that the
assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the
State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in
Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4
(vii) of the Code.
12. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
13. The SC ruled that if it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the
power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would
have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit
under the Section 458 of the Local Government Code and such Ordinance is attempting to
classify the establishments it prohibits as “houses of ill-repute” which can be a valid
prohibition under the Code.
14. However, the Local Government Code also considers the establishments engaged to
amusement and entertainment as legitimate enterprises and activities.
15. Thus, applying reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a
statute must be referred to their appropriate connection would not mean that the
establishments in question can be regarded also as houses of ill-repute.

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Santos, Miles Nicko M.

Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 222838
Casus Omissus

1. The PhilHealth BOD passed a series of resolution to grant its members and their authorized
representatives of reimbursement of their expenses in the discharge of their respective
functions and responsibilities outside board meetings as part of the Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expense (EME).

2. COA Supervising Auditor observed EME were charged to Representation Accounts under
sub-accounts of Institutional Meeting Expenses (IME) and Committee Meetings since EME
has already far exceeded the prescribed limitation of General Appropriations Act (GAA).

3. The COA Supervising Auditor viewed the charging of EME to other accounts to be irregular
because the nature and purpose of these expenses fall under the budgetary controls in the
disbursement of EME and not as IME nor Committee Expenses.

4. This observation led to issuance of Notice of Disallowance to PhilHealth BOD which disallows
the payment for IME in the amount of ₱2,965,428.59 for lack of legal basis.

5. PhilHealth BOD appeal before the COA-Corporate Government Sector but were denied on
the basis that nowhere in RA 7875 Section 18 (d) can it be found that PhilHealth is
authorized to grant additional compensation, allowances or benefits to its BOD other than
per diems.

6. They also filed a petition before the COA-Proper but consequently denied because the
petition was filed out of time, that is, beyond the reglementary period of 6 months after the
receipt of COA-CGS Decision.

7. The PhilHealth asserted that it may grant additional benefits on the strength of its fiscal
autonomy under Section 16 (n) of RA 7875.

8. In its appeal to Supreme Court, the Court ruled in favor to COA-CGS that it correctly
disallowed the IME on the ground of lack of legal basis.

9. It held that while Section 18(d) of RA No. 7875 is entitled "allowances and per diems," its
body significantly fails to mention any other allowances or benefits besides per diems.

10. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est means that a person, object or thing omitted must
have been omitted intentionally.

11. If the legislature intended to give PhilHealth the authority to grant allowances to the BOD
other than the per diems, it could have facilely mentioned so.

12. It further ruled that even on the fair assumption that RA No. 7875 grants PhilHealth the
power to fix compensation, the same is limited to; as expressly worded in Section 16(n);
the personnel of PhilHealth and not to the members of its Board of Directors.

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Santos, Miles Nicko M.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 220598
Noscitur a sociis

1. In its former Decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal case convicting former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benito Aguas of the crime of plunder for
insufficiency of evidence.
2. The State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, filed a motion for reconsideration to
Supreme Court holding that the Court gravely erred on its decision among others to require
the additional elements of (1) identification of main plunderer and (2) personal benefit to
him/her as these were not provided in the context of RA 7080.
3. Because of this, the State complains that it was not given the opportunity to establish such
additional elements; that the imposition of new elements further amounted to judicial
legislation in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
4. The State, however, failed to allege in the Information filed to convict GMA of plunder of the
type of conspiracy she was involved in whether express, wheel and therefore the
identification of the main plunderer was not fulfilled.
5. Moreover, the State insisted that the definition of raids in public treasury as a mode in
committing plunder is the taking of public money through fraudulent or unlawful means,
and such definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of plunderer
or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be convicted for plunder.
6. The State also raised the deliberations of the Senate that in any event, 'knowingly benefited'
has already been stricken off as the element of convicting a public official of the case of
plunder.
7. The Supreme Court considered the contentions of the State to be unfounded and therefore
denied the petition.
8. It ruled that the law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as
the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states
that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
9. In the case at bar, the individuals charged in the criminal case - including the Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main
plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed,
accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
10. The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which
provides the schemes of ill-gotten wealth were “through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.”
11. To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at
the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds and the common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public
officer used the property taken.
12. Noscitur a sociis means that the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by
considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it
is associated.
13. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to
use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

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14. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Senate deliberations removed the element of
personal benefit on the person who was not the main plunderer or co-conspirator and that
the requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators
by virtue of their plunder was not removed.

Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet

G.R. No. 183137
Ejusdem Generis

1. The Provincial Board of Benguet approved a Provincial Tax Ordinance of which Section 59
thereof levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.
2. Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort located at the Municipality of Tuba,
Province of Benguet., which is designed for recreation and which has facilities like swimming
pools, a spa and function halls. 
3. Pelizloy argued that Section 59, of the Provincial Tax Ordinance imposed a percentage tax in
violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local government units (LGUs) under
Section 133 (i) of the LGC and thus, it was null and void ab initio.
4. Section 133 of the Local Government Code provides that provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays shall not levy percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or
exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services.
5. Province of Benguet invokes Section 140 of the Local Government Code which provides the
Province of the taxing authority to levy amusement taxes of not more than 30% of the
gross receipts on admission fees.
6. The Province also insisted that the phrase “other amusement places” which is provided in
the same section encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots.
7. The Province was also in consistent disposition that such levying of 10% amusement tax is
not to be considered as percentage tax because the imposition was based on gross amount
of admission fees and not to the gross receipts of sales of services.
8. Disagreeing to the Provincial Tax Code, Pelizloy filed a petition to the Secretary of Justice
but the inaction of the latter prompted Pelizloy to file for a petition in the Regional Trial
Court.
9. The RTC ruled in favor to the Province of Benguet and noted that the imposition of
percentage taxes is prohibited only by the Local Government Code on sales, barter, etc. on
goods and services.
10. Aggrieved, Pelizloy filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the legality of
Section 59 of the Provincial Tax Code where it imposes a percentage tax as clearly being
limited by Section 133 of the Local Government Code.
11. The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared Section 59 of the Provincial Tax
Ordinance of Benguet to be null and void in so far as it imposes amusement taxes on
admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.
12. The Court clarified that amusement taxes are a form of percentage tax as it is imposed
based on certain percentage of a gross receipt, however, the Court also expressed that
Province is not barred from levying amusement taxes because Section 140 of the LGC
provided the Province of such taxing authority.
13. In relation to considering to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots to be other places of amusement, the Court disagreed to the Province because even
applying the statutory construction of ejusdem generis in the Section 140 of LGC such
places will not fall under the same classification of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
and boxing stadia.

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14. The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and
general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the
particular words. 
15. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court didn’t have to apply ejusdem generis because Section
131 of the LGC clearly provides the definition and scope of amusement places and that
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be regarded as
such.