CONCEPTUALIZATION OF COOPETITION IN BUYER-SELLER

RELATIONSHIPS AND THE NOTION OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION:
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Clarinda Mathews-Lefebvre and Poul Houman Andersen

Abstract
This article presents a conceptualization of vertical coopetition that builds on previous coopetition
research, on markets shaping and on business relationship literature. A theoretical framework is
proposed, showing, firstly, the institutional settings of the coopetition, and secondly, the boundaries
of coopetition as a balance between cooperation and competition. Pilot interviews are conducted in
the textile sector. From a managerial point of view, the article provides a better understanding of the
rationale of buyer-seller coopetition relationships and practices. From an academic perspective, it
adds knowledge to research on coopetition and institutional contexts and how they influence
diversity in international marketing.

Keywords: institutional theory, competition, cooperation, coopetition, practices, boundaries

Competitive paper

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 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF COOPETITION IN BUYER-SELLER
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE NOTION OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION:
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION
There is much debate in the literature on buyer-seller relationships around cooperation and
competition (Ford et al., 2011). Relationships frequently terminate (Ritter and Geersbro, 2011) or
become disrupted by different interests among co-dependent partners. Some authors even talk about
business relationships as burdens or problems (Håkansson & Snehota, 1998; Ford et al., 2011).
Buyer-seller relationships can be viewed as a coalition between organizations with compatible and
conflicting interests (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987). In these relationships, conflict, collaboration and
co-existence occur, both as an expected consequence of relationship evolution and from critical
episodes that happen more or less unexpected. Moreover, these relationship variations, which result
from either diverging or converging logics, can unfold at the same time. Bengtsson & Kock (1999)
labels the phenomenon coopetition, where collaboration and competition occurs at the same time in
a relationship. Indeed, coopetition can be seen as a middle ground between collaboration and
competition co-existing in relationships (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).

A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF PRIOR RESEARCH ON COOPETITION

Coopetition literature so far has explored horizontal relationships, at the firm level (e.g. Bengtsson
& Kock 1999, 2000; Luo, 2007; Ritala et al, 2011), at the industry level (Rusko, 2011), and within
firms accross functional areas (Luo et al., 2006). However, vertical relationships i.e. between buyer
and seller have been neglected (Lacoste, 2011). In vertical or buyer-supplier relationships actors on
the one hand collaborate for a joint beneficial outcome, but each of them also seek to organize
relationship activities so they best fit their ongoing activities, capabilities and strategies (Jacobides
& Hitt, 2005). Capabilities, strategies and activities for each actor constantly change as network
dynamics unfold. Consequently, there is no given natural order that will pre-arrange the division of
work between buyers and sellers in relationships. Rather, there is an ongoing negotiation regarding
responsibilities and domains, leaving the dispersion of activities taken on by the actors as an
unsettled and dynamic field. This article focuses on vertical relationships and presents a theoretical
model of coopetition between buyer and seller. Literature so far has focused on the firm level and
dyads were rarely studied (Kim et al., 2010). In order to investigate the phenomenon from both
partners’ perpectives, the first unit of analysis is the dyad.

Underlying the business relationships, differences in values and norms stem from different
managerial perceptions. Differences in norms and perceptions again rest on the expectations
managers have to relationship partners, or what Bengtsson & Kock refer to as logics of interaction.
However, what has not been discussed so far in literature is the institutional relativity of these
norms and values. It is the objective of this article to highlight coopetition and its background using
the institutional lense. As pointed out by Whitley (1999), expectations regarding roles and
responsibilities in business exchange are far from universal. Rather, they are shaped by and reflect
the underlying norms and values of institutional contexts. In this article, we call institutional

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contexts, firstly, the firm level and, secondly, the country level. We consider that culture issues
related to the country of origin are dealt with within the institutional perspective.

In previous literature, coopetition has been conceptualized as encompassing both cooperation and
competition simultaneously. Bengtsson and Kock (2000) and Kock et al. (2010) recognize that
competitors can cooperate within some activities and at the same time compete with the same actor
within other activities. What we wish to do in this article is to address the boundaries between
cooperation and competition in a dyad and to explore the institutional relativity of these boundaries
further. We believe that the expectations of what may be a contest area in the collaboration and thus
subject to coopetitive behaviour will differ across institutional contexts because of the differences in
norms and values and the corresponding differences in relationship expectations that buyers and
sellers hold.

We believe this exploration holds value for both managers and for research. For managers,
understanding the institutional relativity may help become aware of the situated rationale of the
boundaries between collaboration and competition in buyer-seller relationships (for example when
starting a new business relationship, expanding or downsizing existing ones) in institutional
contexts in which norms and expectations differ from those they are socialized into and typically
also taken for granted. For research, we may add knowledge, firstly, to the understanding of
coopetition conceptualization and coopetition management, and secondly, to the growing research
on institutional contexts and how they influence diversity in international marketing. Indeed,
authors have highlighted the need for further research on the theoretical foundations of coopetition
(Nisuls, 2011). Furthermore, recent research has shown the explanatory potential of the institutional
environment perspective (Andersen et al, 2009; Ren et al, 2010).

As we move into the era of “the network economy”, where communities thrive as an organizational
form and still more activities are organized projects by temporary coalitions of firms that span
industrial and geographical boundaries, the importance and impact of coopetition increases
(Castells, 1996; Miles et al, 2009). Managing coopetition in business relationships is however
complex, because the underlying logics of interaction, with respect to trust, knowledge sharing, etc
differ (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999). It is unrealistic to think of coopetition as a “same” problem
whatever the context, that can be done away with through proper alignment of incentives. Rather, it
is what has been characterized a “wicked” managerial problem in the sense, that relationships are
inherently evolving and with them tension continues to occur (Rittel & Webber, 1973). At the same
time, if unchecked, business relationships may be derailed from the destructive forces of
competition or stifle from lack of healthy conflicts and challenges to the existing way of doing
things. In stifled relationships activities are based on taken for granted assumptions or “industry
codes of practice” which may have relatively little to do with commercial considerations” (Ford,
1980, p349). Coping with the dynamics of coopetition is therefore important for buyers and sellers
and increasingly so.

In a broader perspective, what we suggest here is a perspective where the exchange practices in
buyer relationships are socially constructed and must be understood as such, rather than as universal
mechanisms driven by a uniform ideology (Whitley, 1991; Aspers, 2007). Building on Kjellberg
and Helgesson work (2007), this article suggests that coopetition relationships induce practices for
simultaneously managing the different modes of interaction associated with coopetition and the
potential paradoxes. Indeed, role conflicts can be seen as part of what has been labelled an

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organization’s network competence: the qualifications, skills or processes necessary to accomplish
achieve a desired aim (Day, 1994; Ritter & Gemünden, 2003). Such qualifications build on
knowledge about underlying norms and expectations of the exchange party in a specific context but
also vary with the institutional background that produces these. In other words they reflect a
specific ordering of exchange that reflects the institutional setting which they have co-evolved with.
Becoming aware of the links between coopetition practices and institutional background is
important for firms in a growing Europeanisation context.

We begin by underlining the managerial background of the research. Then, we present the
conceptual model we build on. The next section is devoted to the relativity of institutional settings.
Finally, we suggest avenues for further research applying this model on a specific industry sector to
understand the interplay between coopetition practices, coopetition representations and institutional
backgrounds.

MANAGERIAL CONTEXT
In order to situate a context where coopetition relationships may unfold, we use the example of the
fashion industry in Denmark and France. How do coopetition and coopetition practices vary across
buyer-seller relationships in institutional contexts? The fashion industry in France and in Denmark
is both internationally oriented in terms of partner networks and activities but also has a strong
domestic base. For these reasons the fashion industry is a well suited context for analyzing the
institutional relativity of coopetition rationale and practices. Coopetition as a balance between
competition and cooperation develops in the fashion industry. For example, suppliers of fashion
brands do not only sell their products to Department Stores and multibrand fashion specialists, but
also run their own stores (sometimes along with franchising networks), whereby their products
directly compete with the ones sold at retailers.

Another example of buyer-seller competition in the fashion sector is related to private own brands
offered by Department Stores, whereby the retailer is likely to directly threat or cannibalize
manufacturer brands within the same stores. This vertical integration of supply chain (Dornier and
Fender, 2001) and the growing diversity of offerings (Gadde and Ford, 2008) result in a less clear
limit between producers and sellers functions. The complexity of interactions is also related to the
fact that firms are more and more often manufacturers and retailers at the same time. A further
explanation is linked to diverging expectations from both partners (Andersen et al., 2009). As
stressed by Andersen et al (2009, p814), “many firms assume that partnerships may allow them to
strengthen their overall competitiveness” in cross-cultural business relationships and fail to increase
their market performance due to divergences in expectations and relationship norms.

COOPETITION AS PRACTICES, REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL NORMS

The term “coopetition” is more and more often used to describe an ongoing exchange relationship
between organizations, reaching from cooperation to conflict and competition (e.g. Bengtsson and
Kock, 1999, 2000). The scope of the concept is quite wide, including a variety of possible
interactions between joint action (or synergy), alliance, and rivalry. Previous research has shown
that coopetition can unfold at different levels, depending on the degree of cooperation (Bengtsson
and Kock, 2000; Kock et al., 2010; Walley, 2007). We believe that the evolving reality of
interorganizational exchange relationships does require us to explore coopetition conceptualization
more in depth. Various evolutions have revived both the question of conflict and competition and
the question of cooperation. As mentioned above, conflict and competition between retailers and

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manufacturers tend to increase due to the vertical integration of supply chain (Dornier and Fender,
2001; Filser, 2004; Paché, 2005), the growing diversity of company types and product offerings
(Gadde and Ford, 2008), and the development of global sourcing practices as well as multichannel
routes to consumer (Ganesan, George, Jap, Palmatier and Weitz, 2009). On the other hand,
cooperation in distribution channels is beeing fostered by the increasing activity interdependencies
across firms (Gadde, 2004).

These issues of coopetition in buyer-seller relationships are found in several guises. For instance,
Donaldson (1996) showed that collaborative practices associated with TQM and tendering are
found side by side in relationships between suppliers and buyers of electronic components in
Scotland. As a result, the main challenging issue for firms is to understand how to achieve a balance
between constantly changing diverging and converging interests, and how the activities and
attitudes of both partners can “make the relationship real”. Indeed, the processes that shape
coopetition and its management have to be furher highlighted so that actors can better perform
within ongoing relationships.

Building on social sciences and marketing literature (Kjellberg and Helgesson, 2007), we
conceptualize coopetition as constituted by coopetition practices, in the same sense as Kjellberg and
Helgesson (2007) see markets as market practices. They suggest that identifying what is the reality
of exchanges and how the exchanges are shaped provides us with a better understanding of the
processes that lead to performance (or in their terms to “performativity”).

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We draw on Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007) conceptual model to analyse coopetition relationships
as constituted by “practices”, “representations” and “norms” (Figure 1). In such a perspective,
“coopetition practices” are reflected in activities such as specifying product assortment and design,
negotiating prices, merchandising and space organization in stores, promotion and branding
investments, organizing the distribution of goods etc. These concrete activities correspond to
“coopetition representations”, in the sense that each actor has his own perception and evaluation
about how the mix between conflict and cooperation unfolds. Such representations and individual
evaluations of roles, expectations, power and underlying contexts contribute to shape and reinforce
the nature of the exchange relationship itself. Finally, coopetition also refers to “norms” as far as
guidelines are established for how the exchange should be, if norms of collaboration, rules of
competition, common or diverging objective establishment by actors. As stressed by Kjellberg and
Helgesson (2007), exchange practices, representations and norms are interlinked. In other terms, all
types of elements may interfer: concrete activities and interactions, the image that actors hold about
these interactions and the objectives that they establish commonly or for themselves.
We now specify how we conceptualize institutions, representations and practices and how they
unfold.

Institutional norms Coopetition representations

Coopetition practices

Fig 1. After Kjellberg and Helgesson, 2007

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 INSTITUTIONS
“Institutions” is the first element in the model. Following institutionalist research, institutions are a
way to grasp the “basics” of any institutional context, such as a society. They stabilize patterns of
human interaction and thus make societies possible.

However, they do not determine interaction patterns. Rather, institutions restrict opportunities and
alternatives perceived by actors interacting and thereby increase the probability of certain types of
(inter)action. Barley & Tolbert (1997, p96-97) compare the relationship between institutions and
behavior (here practices) to the relationship between grammar and speech. According to them:
Speech allows for an infinite variety of expressions, yet to be comprehensible, every expression
must conform to an underlying set of tacitly understood rules that specify relations between
classes of lexemes. Similarly, social actions may vary in their particulars, but to be
interpretable, their contours must conform to taken-for-granted assumptions about the
activities and interactions appropriate for different classes of actors.

There is a wide range of approaches for analyzing societies and how they impact on human
interaction. We concur with Scott's (1995, p. 33) perspective that “Institutions consist of cognitive,
normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social
behavior”. These three underlying structures – although widely used in research - come with a
certain level of abstraction and we need to elaborate them further in order to make them useful in
the present discussion. The regulative pillar reflects incentives and sanctions in an institutional
setting. They may be formally expressed through a society’s legislation but may also be espoused
informally through exclusion and inclusion in particular groups. Thus, they may be carried out by
formal regulatory bodies but also by less formal and distributed bodies of regulatory constituents.
The normative pillar concerns what is seen by an institutional context’s members as ideal and
desirable. They are typically reflected in norms and values shared among those belonging to an
institutional context. For instance, a context’s heroes or more abstract ideals and principles known
among such persons express such notions and may reflect often quite complex logics that are
transparent for insiders and less so from actors outside, seeking to interact with this particular
context and decipher how this is done. Finally, the cognitive pillar concerns what is regarded as
known in an institutional context. It comprises fundamental beliefs of what is conceivable means-
ends relationship among (business) actors and may be expressed formally in forms like: in order to
achieve A, one must do B,,,,x. Such formulas can be used to explain specific business practices,
such as how to motivate employees or retain relationships with business partners and – according to
institutional theory these are not universalistic logics but differ across institutional contexts,
suggesting that although insights from specific understandings may be versatile and to some extent
transferrable across institutional contexts, they are not universal and therefore hardly replicable.

COOPETITIVE PRACTICES
By practices, we mean the type of actions that are performed by the actors, the way they are
performed and their underlying contexts or meanings. In our understanding, practices also relate to
a specific distribution of roles (here between retailer and manufacturer) and to who is entitled
(legitimate) to do what, in terms of decisions, responsabilities, moves, competences.

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In such a perspective, coopetition is a hybrid sort of practice, encompassing a wide array of possible
interactions depending on the exchange partners’ respective expectations, attitudes and actions.
First, on the competition side, coopetition includes potential tensions or “turbulences”, resulting
from each partner’s change in objectives, constraints or attitudes that are likely to hinder or question
the relationship quality and efficiency. On the other hand, coopetition can involve coordination,
cooperation or complementarity (Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996), resulting from common goals
(or goals compatibility), reciprocity, joint efforts and sharing of information or resources, that may
enhance the exchange relationship quality and performance. As stressed by Nalebuff and
Brandenburger (1996, p36), “you may want to work together with your competitors in order to
develop common complements”. In such a case firms may organize win-win and win-lose
interactions at the same time with their competitors, which implies coopetition. Coopetition
practices are win-win interactions when the interests of the dyad converge, and win-lose
interactions when their interests diverge. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) argue that this
combination makes the relationship more dynamic. In Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s view (1996,
p4), business is not peace or war, it is peace and war, with all possible alternatives in practices:
“business is cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and competition when it comes to dividing
it up[...], it is simultaneously war and peace”.
We view coopetition practices as the practices that constitute coopetition and that make coopetition
real. This is what Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007) call the performativity of markets. In their
opinion, ideas about markets (here ideas about coopetition practices) take part in the shaping of
interactions. Their approach of market practices is reflective in that market theories contribute to
shape the reality of exchanges. In a similar line of thought, Orlikowski (2002, p251) insists on the
mutual constitution (or generation) of knowing and practice, which is a “key premise underpinning
Giddens’ theory of structuration (1984)”. As she puts it “our knowing is in our action”. In other
words, our representations about coopetition shape coopetition practices that, in turn, nurture our
tacit knowing about them (Polanyi, 1967). As Orlikowski (2002, p252) underlines, “knowing is an
ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted in everyday practice”. As a result, she
insists that “continuity of competence, of skillful practice is thus achieved, not given”. A
consequence of this approach is that “best practices” are hardly transferrable. As Orlikowski argues
(2002, p253): “when practices are defined as the situated recurrent activities of human agents, they
cannot simply be spread around as if they were fixed and static objects”.

COOPETITION REPRESENTATIONS
Including “coopetition representation” in our framework builds on the idea, that socio-material
practices are critical for understanding by which means social reality is co-constructed through
interaction. Drawing on Kjellberg & Helgesson (2007, p.143), representational practices “bridges
temporal and spatial distances between individual exchanges”. We understand coopetitive
representations as entities, typically of symbolic nature that signifies a certain meaning and thus
helps actors co-align their understanding of the script followed and the intentions of “the other”
involved in the coopetitive practice. They provide the signs which signify specific intentions and
thus make interaction possible.
We already insisted on the mutal shaping of representations and practices. Orlikowski (2002, p252)
argues that “knowing is enacted in the moment”. In her opinion (p253), “knowing are capabilities
generated through action. [...] They emerge from situated and ongoing relationships of context (time
and place), activity streaming, agency (intentions, actions), and structure (normativen authoritative,
adn interpretive)”. As a result, representations cannot be understood as stable or enduring. For
Orlikowski (2002, p254) knowing’s “existence is virtual, its status provisional”. This provisional

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status is linked to the fact that the representation is always to be achieved: “as people continually
reconstitute their knowing over time and accross contexts, they also modify their knowing as they
change their practices” (p 253). In a similar vein, according to Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007)
concrete activities undertaken by various actors affect the images of market practices that are
produced and the objectives that actors establish for themselves and others. In Kjellberg and
Helgesson’s view (2007), representing markets is much more than a simple reflection of exchanges.
They argue that central to representations are ideas concerning what to measure and how to
measure. In other words (p149), representations “thrive on measures and methods of measurements
devised by normalizing practices and applied on exchange practices”. As a result, representations
are not simply elements describing exchanges, they are involved in producing exchanges, as are
individual practices.

THE COGNITIVE, NORMATIVE AND REGULATIVE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONS

As suggested by the above quote by Barley & Tolbert (1997), institutional pillars are not
transferrable directly to behavior (or practices) but interact upon them much in the same way as
grammar stipulate rules for the spoken language. Interactions espouse and may be traced back to
specific configurations of these pillars, which operate on a fundamental level. In the following, we
focus both on direct and indirect effects of the institutional pillars. Directly, we are concerned with
co-opetitive practices whereas indirectly we are concerned with the mediating roles of coopetition
representations. We begin by focusing on the relationship between institutional contexts and
coopetition practices and then add another layer on our model to grasp how indirect effect such as
those emanating from coopetitive representations influences the interaction patterns that can be
witnessed. In particular, we need to understand the importance of this mediating level, when
extending our conceptual model to coopetitive interactions that straddles across institutional
contexts. We suggest the following table to illustrate this reasoning in a parcimonious way.

Institutions Coopetition Coopetition practices

Representations
Institutions Business Etiquette Laws
Ideal types of Professions and task
coopetition boundaries
Contracts and Values and ethics
regulations Sanctions and rewards

Coopetition Meditative impacts Symbolic actions

Representations
Coopetition practices Unlikely direct Viral ideas
More likely via
coopetition practices

The cognitive, normative and regulative pillars of institutions impact on the signs and symbols used
for representing coopetition representations in different ways. Cognitive, regulative and normative
axioms influence coopetition representations in terms of the schemas that can be used to signify
aspects of the coopetition as well as the meaning they might have – and the precautions of
following them. Normatively, codes of behavior or (etiquettes) that signal collaborative and

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competitive intent across spatial and temporal distances are specific for an institutional context.
They draw on underlying conventions and values to underlie what is conceived as both practices
and ideals for balancing collaboration with competition in business relationships.

When the low cost fashion retailer Hennes & Mauritz signs a “guest designer” partnership with
highly prolific designers and popstars, they draw on a set of assumptions and practices for the
shared (collaborative) and individual (competitive) gains with respect to public awareness, which
has both normative and cognitive connotations and draws on such repertories. These may
incorporate widely shared values such as “fairness” or “redistribution” or “win-win partnerships”
that both H&M and – say - Madonna wants to be associated with. Also, there are a number of
cognitive aspects represented, that complements the normative issue. The collaboration is short-
lived (i.e. one collection of clothing for one season) it is often out of the ordinary type of clothing
that H&M is associated with and some element of exclusivity is retained by limiting the volume
produced and sold. The guest designer partnership installed by H&M has worked as a template for
other fashion houses such as Adidas, co-branding a fashion collection Stella McCartney, which also
demonstrates the socially constructed nature of institutions.

Also regulative institutions find expressions in coopetition representations. For instance societal
values can be expressed in what is regarded as reasonable or ethical behavior to be expected from
others (as expressed for instance in bonus pater familias concept, which is an attempt to formalize a
moral standard). Normative and regulative institutions often work together. Closer to the
coopetition issue, representative practices may be in the “legal work” in the form of contracts or
regulations that specifies sanctions and rewards for not living up to certain expectations or which
formally expresses collaborative intent, where the normative dimensions set certain bounds on the
modality and nature of sanctions.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND PRACTICES:

Institutions also impact directly coopetition practices by shaping values and expectations of the
participants as well as by specifying sanctions for actions (or lack of actions). One principal concern
relates to the social construction of activity boundaries and task structures between actors, which
co-evolve with institutional mechanisms such as educational systems, struggles between
constituencies, etc. From these interplays evolve specific institutional logics that influence task
boundaries between actors – both with respect to what can be done and ideally should be done as
well as with respect to sanctions and benefits. Such boundaries with respect to task structures and
legitimization of capabilities are shaped by institutional settings.

The quote from Winch, helps to illustrate these differences in the context of what the position and
the corresponding tasks of an architect evolve across contexts in Europe: “Although architecte,
architect, arkitekt, architetto, and Architekt appear to mean the same thing, they do so only in a
limited sense. All are designers of buildings, and all share a common root in the Greek architekton,
but the historical evolution of the contracting systems means that their social meanings are very
diverse, and that even their functional meanings are not coextensive. The French architecte has a
much more constrained and limited role in the construction process than the British architect; the
German Architekt has a state-derived role in obtaining building permits which the British
counterpart does not, and so on. In the case of some actors such as the German Prufstatiker, the
British quantity surveyor, and the French bureau de controle, there is simply no close comparator
in other systems.” (Winch, 2000). This impacts on all aspects of coopetitive practices as well; both

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with respect to the legal constraints, the role of informal sanction systems, the question concerning
who are complementors and who are rivals for taking on specific value adding activities in the
context you are in, etc.. [ex from Jacobides] Institutions may also directly impact on coopetitive
practices through means of regulation, both by restricting who may form (or not form) coopetitive
arrangements in the form of cartels, etc.. Another example of direct interference from institutions on
coopetitive practice is regulations specifying the rules of engagement for firms entering a country.
For instance, it has long been the policy in India that entry of a foreign firm into India had to be
accompanied by a joint venture with a local Indian company. Similar regulations have been or are
currently in action in a number of other countries.

Coopetitive representations are not simply mirroring institutional contexts but co-produce these as
well, and thus also have the potential to change them. Means for representation in certain
coopetitive practices influences how coopetition is conceptualized and may be a source of
inspiration and learning that eventually effect entire belief systems. Through widespread use,
representational practices for coopetition can modify or even eliminate institutions. For instance,
digital technologies for managing collaboration and competition, as seen in the case of on-line
innovation contests the representative practice allows for new forms of interaction, which breach
with more traditional conceptions of collaboration and competition among suppliers and buyers.
A contract can be seen as more than an explicit specification of a coopetitive intent. By specifying
what criteria must be fulfilled in order to live up to the coopetitive intentions, it influences behavior
and reifies measurable indicators of the coopetition at the expense of others – less measurable as
attention and resources is diverted to what is measurable, as has been pointed out (Hauser & Katz,
1998). Likewise, technologies for supporting virtual collaboration (and competition) impact on
institutional work, as has been shown in for instance studies of organization and strategy practice
(Orlikowski, 2010; Kaplan, 2011). One example of a coopetitive representation that both bridges
actors across time and space but also have behavioral implications that may feed back to
institutional contexts is the growing use of virtual innovation competitions, such as innocentive. In
this sense, coopetitive presentations entangle with practice by standardizing specific behaviors and
ways of representing reality to issue coordination.

Coopetitive representations affect coopetitive practices by means of channeling, standardizing and

restricting behavior. A specific aspect relates to acknowledging the coopetition partner and to
convey signals that may entail both collaborative and competitive intents. In some countries, social
gatherings between key influencers or decision makers play a key role in this respect. Here
collaborative intents may be demonstrated to alleviate more public competitive moves. In other
institutional contexts, the social aspects are downplayed for other means of representing the
coopetitive intents. Sharing information, providing certain benefits or otherwise convey
representative tools are of importance. For instance, setting up a shared web page for a coopetitive
joint venture between two firms may be seen as an example. Referring to contractual
representations in dialogues with other business actors is a setting. In contexts where sanctioning is
less implicitly tied to the formal regulatory framework or otherwise concentrated in formal
regulatory bodies, there are other ways to represent the regulatory aspects of a coopetitive
relationship to partners. One being the ability to put forward connections to powerful constituents
which may hurt (or help) in cases where regulation is called for. Other examples relate to the ability
for representative practices to only convey intents but also actively co-shape practices of
coopetition. For instance, when buying companies shows track records to suppliers or compare their
performances to those of other suppliers, or develop ranking systems for their “supplier
partnerships” they install a representative practice for coopetition. Likewise certification systems,

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ranking of customers in award programs, etc. are all ways to address for collaborative and
competitive intents and to bring them to the fore.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COOPETITION PRACTICES

As pointed out already in other studies of institutional change, the micro-structural ordering that
unfolds in coopetitive practices among buyers and sellers are socially constructed, routine-
reproduced programs or rule systems" (Jepperson, 1991: 149) and thus stable.
An example of a social construction in the Danish fashion industry may help to exemplify this
institutional genesis and how this interacts with practices and representations: Since 2006, the event
“Copenhagen fashion week” is held twice a year in February and August. It is a major event in the
Northern European apparel industry and with representative from fashion houses, designer schools,
textile suppliers and major retailers – among others (www.copenhagenfashionweek.dk). The
initiative to this event was taken by the foundation “the Danish fashion institute” and the original
purpose of the new Copenhagen fashion week was to brand avant garde fashion internationally and
attract awareness from the international press. The fashion week is an open a public arrangement,
meant to increase the general awareness and interest towards fashion in general and Danish fashion
in particular.

However, as the fashion week has become recognized as an important event among actors in the
fashion business, it is also increasingly an ingrained and mandatory activity for fashion week actors,
used for organizing publicity around their collection and other offerings. Hence, the social
construction of a market practice is evident from the case. Decisions regarding what collections to
carry, which new materials to buy and use for next season and what is to be part of the Danish or
even Scandinavian fashion flavor is decided here, among movers and shakers of the fashion
industry – including purchasers from international retailers, fashion journalists and bloggers.
Moreover, activity patterns within the single firms – designs, production scheduling and marketing
activities are adjusted to this event and have become a coopetitive practice. The coopetitive element
of the Copenhagen Fashion week can be witnessed in a number of micro-activities around this
event. An example of a representative practice that entails both competition and collaboration
concerns the allotment of exhibitor space in the fashion week’s main exhibition halls. Actors both
compete over getting “the right” booths at the event but do also collaborate in the sense that they
seek to be placed together with exhibitions from firms, they think have a similar or better status than
themselves. Likewise, by participating jointly actors may have a better shot at attracting powerful
buyers, but will rival on the limited spending budget that this buyer has.

THE PLASTIC NATURE OF COOPETITION

As stressed by Bengtsson et al (2010) and Nisuls (2011), the nature of coopetition is defined as a
process rather than a context. In line with Ford et al (2011), we view the relationship as the
development of an interaction process where network relations consist of exchanges, roles and
expectations. Furthermore, these authors underline (Ford et al, 2011, p30) that “managing
relationship assets is not a linear process of moving them in one direction towards some ideal state”.
They emphasize that its is much more about “coping with different circumstances at different times
with varying aims, expectations and ways of dealing with each other”. In a similar vein, Nisuls
(2011, p2) talks about an “underlying force influencing the formation of the balance and integration
of the cooperative and competitive interactions”.

12
A changing environment, modifications in organizations’ external and internal contexts are likely to
modify the exchange relationship terms. Individual contexts and attitudes transformations may also
affect a relationship. These changes refer to the “plastic” nature of exchange realitity (Kjellberg and
Helgesson, 2007). As a result, coopetition could be defined as a moving set of practices, in the
sense that it balances between rivalry and alliance, constantly questioning this balance and
(re)shaping actions, roles and responsabilities between the exchange partners (Figure 2). The
unstable nature of practices in coopetition is one of the reasons why the boundary between
cooperation and competition cannot be defined easily. Indeed, the relationship keeps balancing
between competition and cooperation, depending on how negotiations unfold and how each
partner’s logic of interaction evolves, whether converging or diverging.

Ins titutional relativity

of boundaries

C ooperation C ompetition
(joint interes ts ) (diverging interes ts )

Negotiation
Fig 2. Boundaries between cooperation and competition
in the buyer-seller coopetition relationship

13
 THE INSTITUTIONAL RELATIVITY OF COOPETITION PRACTICES
In the previous section we identified coopetition as a practice between exchange partners and we
linked this practice to the wider normative systems and actors’ derived expectations. Rules, norms
and meanings are institutionalized systems in any society and are also reproduced by actors who
have internalized these systems and although they are socially constructed, they act “as if” they had
real existence (Berger & Luckman, 1967). Institutions are both constraints and enablers of social
action. They rise and are reproduced through interaction, for instance between economic actors as
they mutually shape the boundaries and practices for collaboration and competition in a business
relationship.

It follows from the socially constructed nature of rules, norms and meanings, that they are not
universal laws of conduct. Rather, they reflect internalized practices followed by actors but shaped
by past dealings among powerful economic constituents in a specific social setting. Scott (1987)
showed that different forms of interfirm relations in Britain, France and Germany could be traced
back to distinct patterns of historical development. Likewise, Håkansson (1986), in a study of
industrial market purchasing in five European countries showed, differences in collaborative
practices. The conducts of these or the truces made among them are reflected in legislation, as well
as in business practices and dominant ideas and philosophies. Although, particularly in business
life, some ideas, meanings and practices have reached some form of global presence, they also
differ in their implementation and meaning across settings. Such differences in meanings or in
norms reflect different genesis and how ideas have been enacted and installed, by whom and for
what purpose. For instance, the practices ingrained and shared among industry players have been
studied as the specific institutional logics of the publishing industry as a field (DiMaggio & Powell,
1991; Thornton, 2002) and institutional logics among constituents in social movements (McAdam
& Scott, 2005).

Recent research interest has gathered around the nation state as an arena for understanding the
emergence, preservation and reproduction of institutions (Scott, 2008). A specific branch of the
institutional approach focuses on comparative institutional differences and corresponding
differences in practices across nation-states (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). This is seen as a way to
understand both how specific practices emerges and how transfer of practices from one context to
another often beget resistance and challenge. For instance, Whitley (1994) discusses business
systems as distinct forms of business organization and business recipes as the practices followed by
actors with respect to the organization of intra- and interfirm coordination in countries. We adopt
this comparative approach as a viable route forward.

THE QUESTION OF MOVING BOUNDARIES OR THE INSTITUTIONAL RELATIVITY OF

BOUNDARIES
According to Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) a game has no boundaries. However these authors
insist (p54) that a game without boundaries is too complex to analyze and to grasp. They
demonstrate that “in practice, people draw boundaries in their minds to help them analyze the
world. They create the fiction that there are many separate games”. The authors underline that
everyone knows that it is a fiction. However analyzing individual games in isolation would be
treacherous since the world’s economies are highly interdependent- and increasingly so. Finally,

14
whether mental boundaries or real boundaries, every institution is linked to other institutions and
“every game is linked to other games: a game in one place affects games elsewhere, and a game
today influences games tomorrow” (p55). Therefore, we insist that the scope of coopetition
relationships may vary, according to the internalized mental schemata of actors accross
organizational fields, whether they are firm contexts or country contexts (see figure 3).

An organizational field is "a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning

system and whose participants interact more frequently and faithfully with one another than with
actors outside the field" (Scott, 2008: p56). In a field, we include key suppliers, resource and
product consumers as well as regulatory agencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Organizational
fields can be linked to arenas, where multiple constituents rival over the definition of issues and on
shaping and institutionalizing the norms, values and practices that guide organizational behavior.
Institutional beliefs and perceptions are situated both within individual organizations and in the
wider populations of organizations that are part of the field.

The notion of boundaries is linked both to the existence of mental representations and to the plastic
nature of coopetition. What we call boundaries is compatible with the simultaneous occurence of
both cooperation and competition, and doesn’t challenge previous literature. Rather, it is a
complementary view of coopetition exchanges and refers to the constant development of a balance
integrating various degrees of cooperation and competition at the same time. This notion refers to
the unequal and constantly evolving nature within the coopetition process over time (Bengtsson et
al, 2010; Luo, 2007; Nisuls, 2011). It is in line with the assumption by Nisuls (2011, p9) that
“certain boundaries and goals of the interorganizational relations can be imposed on the individual
from higher organizational levels”. Furthermore, it is coherent with the statement by Luo (2007,
p130), that “under coopetition scheme, rivals cooperate in some areas while competing in others”.
Coopetition boundaries refer to the emergent and unpredictable nature of a dialectical development
(Nisuls, 2011, Yami et al, 2010). As stressed by Luo (2007, p138), boundaries are territories for
cooperation and competition that have to be identified, defining “appropriate areas (products,
markets, or functions)” in which two players should cooperate and compete.

15
 Fig 3. Dyad partners and their respective institutional contexts

Country context Country context

Firm context Firm context

P artner A P artner B
Institutional
contexts (buyer) (s eller)

EXPLORING THE LOGICS OF INTERACTION THAT PREVAIL BETWEEN A RETAILER

AND HIS SUPPLIER: A FIRST STUDY

In order to analyse coopetitive practices we try to identify and explain the logics of interaction that
prevail between a retailer and his supplier in a specific institutional background. More specifically,
four exploratory interviews of retailer-supplier dyads enable us to get insight into exchange
relationships and their contexts. As stressed by Anderson et al (1994), dyadic relationships between
firms and the embedded context within these relationships take place are of central importance. The
fact that we can confront each actor’s perspective on interactions and their underlying rules and
meanings seems promissing as a useful tool to better understand how coopetition boundaries
unfold. Interviews were conducted at French and Danish firms in the fashion sector, on the one
hand, fashion brand manufacturers and, on the other hand, their retailers (among them big fashion
chains and department stores). Dyads were identified and each partner of the dyads was
interviewed. The interview protocol reflected both areas of conflict and collaboration.

Our exploratory study uncovers three main findings that confirm previous research. First,
relationships are not to be seen as a set of discrete actions. They are rather a process of interactions.
As stressed by Gadde and Ford (2008, p49) “business is not a set of discrete activities, but is a
process over time where each episode affects and is affected by many others”. Furthermore, they
insist that “what happens between actors is a process of interaction rather than simple of exchange”
(p48). A second central element is the interdependence of actors. Typically, in Gadde and Ford’s
view, one of the main characteristics of the current reality is the “increasing specialization of and
interdepence between actors” (p47). In the same line of thought, Nalebuff and Brandenburger

16
(1996) talk about complementarity between firms. The strategy literature, assessing competitive and
collaborative dynamics, suggests that the resources that a firm possesses result in favorable strategic
and social positions that affect its ability to collaborate (Ang, 2008; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1996). Kumar (2010) insists on the fundamental role of ressources in influencing the dynamics of
interfirm collaboration.

A third important finding of our exploratory study is the emphasis on the end-user requirements.
The pilot interview of a dyad in France indicates that fashion companies today face increased
competition. Companies have clearly to be more reactive, service and customer centered, and are
forced to cope with shorter production cycles and permanent renewal of collections. This is in line
with Gadde and Ford’s article (2008) which insists that “the technology of use should determine
distribution configurations rather than the technology of production” (p46). The final customer is
nearly an additional actor within the retailer-supplier dyad since his requirements seem to dictate
the dyad’s moves.

More specifically, our study in the French textile sector shows that cooperation unfolds in specific
areas, such as logistics, assortment definition, advertising and merchandising (Figure 4). In such
areas, interests tend to converge. Conversely, issues were buyers and suppliers still compete
encompass pricing, facilities management and branding. Competing on pricing results from
diverging interests on quantities and price of merchandise. Facilities management issues are derived
from conflicting interests concerning the location of shops in the shops: the retailer’s interest is to
have the fashion companies changing places each year, while the fashion companies prefer to keep
good location places in the long run. Finally, branding issues relate to competition between the
fashion companies’ brands and the retailer’s private labels.

Ins titutional relativity

of boundaries
log is tic s fac ilities manag ement
as s ortment definition
pric ing
advertis ing
branding
merc handis ing

C ooperation C ompetition
(joint interes ts ) (diverging interes ts )

Negotiation
Fig 4: Boundaries between cooperation and competition in the French textile sector

17
The Danish and French companies studied seem to differ in terms of division of work and internal
coordination. They have specific internal interaction habits and processes. In the Danish firm, (a
manufacturer), the hierarchy is more flat, interaction and coordination processes occur frequently,
so that collection creation is done nearly collectively between the manufacturer and his agents. In
the French company (a retailer), the hierarchy is less flat and the interactions are described as both
conflictual and cooperative. In other words, downstream elements, such as the branding and
merchandising impact of shops do exert an influence on the negotiations, in addition to “pure
transactional elements”.

AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION

We have provided a number of managerial and theoretical insights on vertical coopetition.
However, further research should be scheduled in order to test our theoretical model, understand the
particular institutional contexts of firms and address the question of how institutions are either
converging or diverging. Further analyses at the dyad level should also explore in what way
managers should be aware of existing gaps in coopetition processes to cope with, e.g. when starting
new relationships or when moving abroad. The dialectical tensions accross dyads and the evolution
of coopetition during the various relationship stages could be further explored. Moreover, research
avenues should integrate a further analysis of the notion of coopetition moving boundaries accross
institutional settings in order to highlight how they influence diversity and strategic flexibility in
international marketing. Building on Kjellberg and Helgesson (2007), the concept of translation
(linking practices, institutions and representations) could be further explored in a coopetition
context. Network interactions could also be included in the research agenda (Nalebuff and
Brandenburger, 1996). As shown in the first part of the article, the fashion industry would be a well
suited context for learning about the institutional relativity of coopetition rationale and practices.

To conclude, the managerial contribution of this article is related to a better understanding of the
rationale of the boundaries between cooperation and competition in vertical relationships. From an
academic point of view, it shows that analyzing the reality of coopetition with models and concepts
from the institutional theory can be fruitful. Furthermore, it adds knowledge to research on the
conceptualization of coopetition and institutional contexts at the dyad level. Finally, it highlights
how coopetition relations unfold, both as a moving set of practices and depending on actor’s
institutional norms and representations.

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