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Proposal or Offer: Synopsis
Proposal or Offer: Synopsis
Synopsis:
• General comments
• Invitation to treat
• Intention to create a legal relationship
• Communication of offer
• Cross offers
• General offers
• Standing, open or continuing offers
General
‘Proposal’ lies at the very root of the formation of a contract. A contract has been defined in
Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act as “every agreement enforceable by law is a contract.”
An agreement is ‘every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each
other’. [ Section 2(e)]. A ‘promise’ has been defined in Section 2(b) as: “When the person to
whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A
proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise. Proposal has been defined in Section 2(a) of the
ICA, 1872: “When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing
anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to
make a proposal.”
As in Appleson v. Littlewood Ltd. (1939), the parties may expressly mention that there is no
intention to create a legal relationship. In other cases, the intention has to be derived from the
nature of the agreement. Generally, in social engagements, such an intention is presumed to be
lacking.
Intention not to create a legal relationship was expressly mentioned in the contract in Rose and
Frank Co. v. Crompton and Brothers Ltd. (1925).
In the case of Balfour v. Balfour (1919), intention not to create legal relationship was found to
be implied. Therein, the defendant, a husband employed in Ceylon, had promised to send 30
pounds to his wife, the plaintiff till she was in England (on account of illness). The husband
failed to send the money and the wife sued for the same. Atkin, LJ delivered the judgment. He
held that the agreement in the case was not intended to create a legal relationship. There are
certain agreements which are not contracts in the legal sense viz. an agreement to go for a walk
etc. An agreement between a husband and a wife generally lacks such an intention (to create
legal relationships) as the parties (husband and wife) can be presumed not to have intended to be
attended by legal consequences.
Later on, the above rule (between husband and wife) was extended to other close relationships
e.g. parents and children, in the case of Jones v. Padavatton (1969). Therein, Mrs. Jones
persuaded her widowed daughter to leave her job at Washington and offered to pay her a
monthly allowance for the study in England. The daughter got admitted at the bar in 1962. In
1964, Mrs. Jones bought a house in England and rented a part of it, the other part being occupied
by the daughter. The rent was to go to the daughter as her allowance. Later on, on account of
some difference, Mrs. Jones sued her daughter for eviction. The daughter contended that on
account of her promise Mrs. Jones was legally bound to pay the allowance till she completed her
studies.
It was held that as the contract had not been reduced to writing nor the duration for which she
was to be maintained had been mentioned No intention to create a legal relationship could be
implied.
However, there is nothing that prevents persons in close relationship from entering into a legal
relationship. In Merrit v. Merrit (1970) the husband and wife were joint owners of a house which
was subject to mortgage to a building society. Husband went to live with another woman and by
signing a note agreed to transfer the house property to wife if she cleared all outstanding amount
with respect to the house. Here, it was held that there was a clear intention to create a legal
relationship.
Tests
(1) Intention important To create legal relationship.
(2) Objective test Facts to be seen.
(3) Intention at the time of the agreement is important.
Cross Offers
A contract can arise only if a party having the knowledge of an offer from the other party, has
accepted the same e.g. A, through a letter, offers to B to sell his radio to B for Rs. 500/-; B
receives the letter and validly accepts the offer. A valid contract results here (provided the other
conditions of Section 10 are satisfied). However, if A makes the offer through a letter on 1 st
January and B also makes the same offer on the same date, there will ensue no binding contract
as neither had the knowledge of the offer from the other party and as a result there was no valid
acceptance. Such offers are called cross offers.
In Tinn v. Hoffmann (1873), A wrote a letter to B indicating his willingness to sell 800 tons of
iron at 69 sq. per ton. On the same day, B wrote a letter to A offering to buy 800 tons of iron at
69 sq. per ton. The two letters crossed each other in post. Later on, B sued for specific
performance of contract. It was held that the two offers were only cross offers and there was no
binding contract.
A cross offer should be distinguished from a counter offer and a general offer. (discussed later).
It is also notable that to be a cross offer, it is not necessary that the two offers should have been
posted on the same date, one should have been posted before the communication of the first offer
was completed. (There can be changed terms also). Cross offers do not cancel each other.
The law has been explained by Lord Goddard, CJ in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v.
Boots Cash Chemists Ltd. (1952). Therein the defendants were having a business in retail sale of
drugs. Medicines were displayed on the shelves and their retail prices were also indicated under a
self-service system. The selected goods were to be taken to the cash counter when there was
placed a registered pharmacist who had been authorized to stop any customer removing any
drugs from the premises. The question was whether the display of the goods with their prices
amounted to an offer?
Lord Goddard, CJ observed that “it is a well-established principle that the mere exposure of
goods for sale by a shopkeeper indicates to the public that he is willing to treat but does not
amount to an offer to sell.... that principle (cannot) be completely reversed merely because there
is self-service scheme, such as this, in operation.” He further held that the display of goods was
an invitation to treat and the selection and taking to the counter, of the goods amounted to an
offer on the part of the customer. It is only when the shopkeeper accepted the offer (i.e. agreed to
sell) that the contract was complete. However, the shopkeeper was free to reject the offer, and
this view is reinforced by the presence of a registered pharmacist at the cash counter.
The reason given by the learned CJ was one of the ordinary principles of common sense and of
commerce. Strange consequences would flow if the above stated principle is negated – a
customer picks up a good and the property passes on to him, and the shopkeeper cannot refuse to
sell the good. On the other hand, a customer cannot keep the good back (even if it is defective)
and the shopkeeper would be successfully able to insist upon him to purchase the article. Both
the above consequences are undesirable.
In Harvey v. Facey (1893), the plaintiffs interested in purchasing a plot of land called Bumper
Hall Pen, owned by the defendants, sent a telegram to the defendant: “Will you sell us B.H.P.?
Telegraph the lowest cash price.” Reply of the defendant was: “Lowest price for B.H.P. is 900
pounds.” The plaintiff again sent a telegram: “We agree to buy B.H.P. for 900 pounds, asked by
you. Please send us your title deeds.”
The question was whether the telegram of the defendants amounted to an offer. The judicial
committee of the Privy Council held that the defendants had replied to only the second question
of the plaintiff’s first telegram. It amounted only to an invitation to treat, and the plaintiff’s
second telegram amounted only to an offer by the plaintiffs and not an acceptance to an offer.
For a binding contract there was needed a further acceptance of this offer by the defendants.
In Mac Pherson v. Appanna (AIR 1951 SC 184), the plaintiff offered to pay Rs. 6000 to the
defendant for his property. He again wrote to the defendant’s agent asking whether the earlier
offer had been accepted and also offering to pay a higher price if found reasonable. The agent
replied that the defendant would not accept anything less than Rs. 10000. The plaintiff wrote that
he was willing to pay Rs. 10000.
It was held that the agent’s letter only amounted to an invitation to treat and the defendant
needed to accept the ‘offer’ made by the plaintiff in the second letter in order to constitute a
binding contract.
In Badri Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1970 SC 76), the divisional forest officer
wrote to the plaintiff to communicate whether he agreed to pay a further sum of Rs.17000 for the
contract of big trees. The plaintiff replied that he agreed to pay provided that his earlier claim for
a refund of Rs.17000 was accepted. The Supreme Court held that, first, the divisional forest
officer’s letter was a mere invitation to treat and secondly, even if it were considered to be an
offer, the plaintiff’s acceptance was a conditional acceptance. Hence, there was no contract in
any case.
General Offers
A general offer is an offer to the public at large and anyone who performs the conditions of the
offer is deemed to have accepted the offer e.g. A makes an offer that he would reward any person
who finds his lost child. This is general offer. Anyone who finds the child is deemed to have
accepted the offer and there ensues a valid contract. There is no need to communicate the
acceptance of such an offer. The offeror can be informed after the conditions have been fulfilled.
In Har Bhajan Lal v. Har Charan Lal (AIR 1925 All 539), it has been held that if the plaintiff
had the knowledge of the advertisement/announcement, and he finds out the lost son of the
defendant, he can successfully claim the reward.
In Williams v. Carwardine [(1833) 1 B & Ad. 621], the plaintiff knew that an award has been
announced to be given to any person who gives information leading to the conviction of an
assailant for murder. She gave an information which led to the conviction but then she said that
she did not intend to claim a reward. Later on, she changed her mind and sued for the reward. It
was held that she could successfully sue.
Standing/Open/Continuing Offer
An offer may be allowed to remain open for acceptance over a certain period of time. Such an
offer is a standing/open/continuing offer e.g. an offer to supply 1000 bales of cotton from 1.1.97
to 31.12.97 is an open offer. The contract is concluded only when an order is placed. If on 1.2.97
an order for 50 bales is placed, the contract is concluded only to that extent, the offer for the
remaining 950 bales can be revoked at any time before an order is placed.
Tenders for supply of goods are also open offers. Advertisements inviting tenders are only an
invitation to treat. Acceptance/approval of the tender constitutes a standing offer. As and when
an order is placed, it constitutes an acceptance of the offer binding contracts.
In Union of India v. Maddala Thathiah (AIR 1966 SC 1724), the Dominion of India, as an
owner of railways, invited tenders for the supply of 14000 maunds of cane jaggery to the railway
grain shops. Tender of the plaintiffs was accepted in the form of a standing offer. In the tender
there was a stipulation that the plaintiffs/appellants could cancel the agreement as regards the
supplies of jaggery about which no formal order has been placed. This stipulation was held to be
a valid one. It was held that the appellants are bound only for such quantities for which specific
orders have been placed.
However, if there is a stipulation in the contract that the offeror cannot revoke even that part of
the offer for which an order has not been placed, then the contract becomes void. The reason for
this is that an offeror has the right to revoke his offer any time before acceptance.
ACCEPTANCE
Section 2(b) of Indian Contract Act
EFFECT/IMPORTANCE OF ACCEPTANCE
A contract is created only after an offer is accepted. Before the acceptance, neither party
is bound thereby. After the offer has been accepted it becomes a promise, which if other
conditions of a valid contract are satisfied, binds both the parties to the promise.
Section 2(b) of Indian Contract Act says that the proposal is accepted only when the
person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto (i.e. to the proposal),
which makes the proposal, deemed to be accepted.
Another point of importance is that the offeror cannot impose upon the offeree a duty
to reply and therefore an offeror cannot say that failure to reply will be deemed to be
the acceptance of the offer.
CASE LAW: Felthouse v. Bindley – The nephew, without having replied to the
uncle’s letter had asked his uncle to take away the horse and pay the price, the position
of the uncle would have been curious, for, while the uncle could hardly have denied the
promise, the nephew could always say at his convenience whether by not
communicating his acceptance he had accepted the offer or not. It if for this reason that
the law has in such cases always insisted upon an overt act (external manifestation) of
acceptance than a mere mental determination. In a case of this kind before Denning LJ
a clause in the contract provided that the contract would be binding only when the
other party put his signature upon it. Even so his Lordship held:
c) Communication must be made by the offeree or his authorized agent: - (only offeree
can accept the offer) – This is a natural corollary to the above-mentioned principle. If
an unauthorized person makes the communication it does not result in a contract.
CASE LAW: Powell v. Lee – There must be notice of acceptance from the
contracting party in some way. Information by an unauthorized agent is insufficient.
d) Communication of acceptance to a wrong person is no acceptance: - The offeror
becomes bound as soon as the letter of acceptance is posted to him. If the letter of
acceptance is posted at a wrong address or to a wrong person, that will not bind the
offeror.
CASE LAW: Karan Singh v. The Collector Chattarpur
The offeror however becomes bound immediately on the posting of the letter to him
and it makes no difference that the letter is delayed in transits or it is even lost in the
post and the offeror never receives it. A complete contract arises on the date when the
letter of acceptance is posted or in due course. The only condition is that the letter
should be correctly addressed.
CASE LAW:
1. Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co. v. Grant – Letter lost in
post/never received. Held that the offeror is bound by the contract.
The defendant in this case had applied for allotment of 100 shares in the plaintiff
company. A letter of allotment addressed to the defendant at his residence was
posted in due time, but it never reached the defendant. Nevertheless he was held
bound by the acceptance.
Thesiger LJ stated the rule thus: “An acceptance which only remains in the breast
of the acceptor without being actually and by legal implication communicated to
the offeror, is no binding acceptance.... But if the post be treated as the agent of
both parties, then as soon as letter of acceptance is delivered to the post office, the
contract is made as complete and final and absolutely binding as if the acceptor had
put his letter into the hands of a messenger sent by the offeror himself as his agent
to deliver the offer and to receive the acceptance..... The acceptor, in posting the
letter has “put it out of his control and done an extraneous act which clinches the
matter, and shows beyond all doubt that each side is bound. How, then, can a
casualty in the post office, whether resulting in delay, which in commercial
transactions is often as bad as no delivery, or in non-delivery, unbind the parties or
unmake the contract?”
2. Dunlop v. Higgins – Due to the frosty weather the letter of acceptance was delayed.
Held that the offeror is bound by the contract.
3. Adams v. Lindsell – The acceptance was delayed. Held that the offeror is bound by
the contract.
In this case, on September 2, 1817, the defendants sent a letter offering to sell
quantity of wool to the plaintiffs. The letter added “receiving your answer in course
of post”. The letter reached the plaintiffs on September 9th. The defendants waited
for the acceptance up to September 8th and not having received it, sold the wool to
other parties on that date. They were sued for breach of the contract.
It was contended on their behalf that till the plaintiff’s answer was actually
received there could be no binding contract and, therefore, they were free to sell the
wool on 8th. But the court said:
“If that were so, no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if the
defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs till the
answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not be bound till after they had
received the notification that the defendants had received their answer and assented
to it. And so it might go on ad infinitum (without end).”
The rule of postal communication stands differently from the Instantaneous communication
like Telex/Telephone where, the parties are deemed to be in each other’s presence or though
separated in space they are in direct communication e.g. by telephone.
No contract will arise until the offeror receives the notification of acceptance at his place.
CASE LAW:
i) Entores Limited v. Miles Far East Corporation – Telex – Denning J – The facts
of the case were that an offer was made from London by Telex to a party in
Holland and it was duly accepted through the Telex, the only question being as
to whether the contract was made in Holland or in England. The Court of
Appeal held that Telex is a method of instantaneous communication and “the
rule about instantaneous communications between the parties is different from
the rule about the post. The contract is only complete when the acceptance is
received by the offeror; and the contract is made at the place where the
acceptance is received.”
ii) Bhagwandas Kedia v. Girdhair Lal – Telephone – In this case, the plaintiffs
made an offer from Ahmedabad to the defendants at Khamgaon to purchase
certain goods and the defendants accepted the offer. The question was whether
the conversation resulted in a contract at Khamgaon or at Ahmedabad. A
majority of the judges (Hidayatullah J, afterwards CJ, dissenting) preferred to
follow the English rule as laid down in the Entores case and saw no reason for
extending the post office rule to telephonic communications. Shah J (afterwards
CJ) felt that “Section 4 does not imply that the contract is made qua the
proposer at one place and qua the acceptor at another place. The contract
becomes complete......when the acceptance of offer is intimated to the offeror.”
But, he continued to say, that the draftsman of the Indian Contract Act could
not have envisaged use of telephone because it had not yet been invented and,
therefore, the words of the section should be confined to communications by
post.
Hidayatullah J (afterwards CJ) dissenting opinion was, on the other hand,
convinced that though “the law was framed at a time when telephones,
wireless, telstar and early bird were not contemplated”, the language of Section
4 is flexible enough to cover telephonic communications. The courts should not
completely ignore the language of the Act. When the words of acceptance are
spoken into the telephone, they are put into the course of transmission to the
offeror so as to be beyond the power of the acceptor.
The acceptor cannot recall them. The communication being instantaneous, the
contract immediately arises.
In this case an offer to sell a farm for £ 1,000 was rejected by the plaintiff, who offered £
950 for it. This was turned down by the offeror and then the plaintiff agreed to pay £ 1,000.
The court held that the defendant was not bound by any such acceptances.
3. U.O.I. v. Maddala Thathiah – A clause is a tender authorizing the party inviting tenders
to terminate the contract at any time for the future supplies does not destroy the very
basis of the contract and the clause is valid.
3) MODE OF ACCEPTANCE
Usual/reasonable manner. In the manner prescribed or indicated by the offeror. An
acceptance given in any other manner may not be effective particularly where the offeror
clearly insists that the acceptance shall be made in the prescribed manner.
Illustrations
(a) A proposes, by letter, to sell a house to B at a certain price.
The communication of the proposal is complete when B receives the letter.
(b) B accepts A’s proposal by a letter sent by post. The communication of the acceptance is
complete,
As against A, when the letter is posted; As
against B, when the letter is received by A.
B revokes his acceptance by telegram. B’s revocation is complete as against B when the
telegram is posted, and as against A when it reaches him.
Revocation
The Contract Act gives both proposer and acceptor the option of revoking their communication,
before a completed contract comes into existence. Thus, revocation is an option given to the
parties to stop the contract from coming into existence.
I. Revocation of Proposal
Section 6 lays down the circumstances when an offer lapses i.e. modes of revocation. A proposal
is revoked under the following circumstances:
Illustration: A proposes by letter sent by post, to sell his house to B. B accepts the proposal by a
letter sent by post. A may revoke his proposal at any time before or at the moment when B posts
his letter of acceptance, but not afterwards.
In Henthorn v. Fraser (1892) 2 Ch 27, the court observed that a person who has made an offer
must be considered as continuously making it until he has brought to the knowledge of the
person to whom it was made that it is withdrawn. Where an offeror gives the offeree (acceptor)
an option to accept within a fixed period, he may withdraw it even before the expiry of that
period. In Alfred Schonlank v. M. Chetti (1892) 2 Mad LJ 57, the defendant left an offer to sell
certain goods at the plaintiff’s office allowing him 8 days’ time to give his answer. On the 4 th
day, however, the defendant revoked his proposal. The plaintiff accepted it on the 5 th day.
However, where the agreement to keep the offer open for a certain period of time is for some
consideration (even one pound), the offeror cannot cancel it before the expiry of that period.
Notice of revocation shall be deemed to have been served when it reaches the acceptor’s
address. In the Brimmes (1974) 3 All ER 88, a notice of revocation was sent by telex and was
received by the plaintiff’s telex machine during normal business hours, but the plaintiff read the
message the next day. He was, however, held bound by the notice when his machine received it.
Under the Indian law, it is necessary that the communication of revocation should be from the
offeror or from his duly authorised agent. However, under the English law, it is enough if the
acceptor knows reliably that the offer has been withdrawn. Thus, in Dickinson v. Dodds (1876) 2
Ch D 463, the plaintiff was informed by a third person that the property (about which an offer
was made) had already been sold to another. Held that a sale to a third person, which came to the
knowledge of the person to whom the offer made was an effectual withdrawal of the offer.
(b) Lapse of time
An offer lapses on the expiry of the time, if any, fixed for acceptance. However, it is enough if
the acceptor has ‘posted the acceptance before the stipulated time’, even if it reaches the offeror
after the stipulated date. Where no time for acceptance is prescribed, the offer has to be accepted
within a reasonable time. Where the subject matter of the contract is an article, like gold, the
price of which rapidly fluctuates in the market, very short period will be regarded as reasonable,
but not so in reference to land.
Illustration: A proposes, by letter sent by post, to sell his house to B. B accepts the proposal by a
letter sent by post. B may revoke his acceptance at any time before or at the moment when the
letter communicating it reaches A, but not afterwards.
Thus, if the letter of acceptance and the letter of revocation reach together, then also the
acceptance will be deemed to have been revoked. However, some authors are of the view that in
such a case, the formation of contract will depend on the fact that which of the two letters is
opened first; if letter of acceptance is opened first, the revocation is not possible, and, if letter of
revocation is opened first, revocation is valid. Thus such contracts
CONSIDERATION
Importance of Consideration
(a) Section 25 ICA: ‘an agreement without consideration is void.’
(b) Section 10 ICA: Enumerates essentials for a valid contract – includes consideration.
Without consideration, an agreement cannot be there. For any contract to form, apart from
the other essential elements, one very important element is that the promise should be to
do something or to deliver something. This something is what is called the consideration.
Without the flow of the consideration, there cannot be an intention to create a legal
relationship which ripens into a contract.
Definition of Consideration
(a) Blackstone: Consideration is the recompense given by the party contracting to the other.
(b) Pollock: Consideration is the price for which the promise of the other is bought.
(c) Patterson: Consideration is something which is of some value in the eyes of law. It may be
some benefit to the plaintiff or some detriment to the defendant.
(d) Lush J. (in Currie v. Misa): A valuable consideration in the sense of law may consist either in
some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.
(e) Section 2(d) ICA: When at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has
done or abstained from doing, does or abstains from doing, promises to do or abstain from
doing something, such act, abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.
Essentials of a valid consideration [as construed from Section 2(d)]
1. Consideration should be given at the desire of the promisor.
2. It should be given by the promisee or any other person.
3. Consideration may be past, present or future.
4. There should be some act or abstinence.