Cognitive-contextual theories

Cognitive-contextual theories deal with the way

that cognitive processes operate in various settings. Two of the
major theories of this type are that of the American
psychologist Howard Gardner and that of Sternberg. In 1983
Gardner challenged the assumption of a single intelligence by
proposing a theory of “multiple intelligences.” Earlier theorists had
gone so far as to contend that intelligence comprises multiple
abilities. But Gardner went one step farther, arguing that
intelligences are multiple and include, at a minimum, linguistic,
logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic,
interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligence.

Some of the intelligences proposed by Gardner resembled the

abilities proposed by psychometric theorists, but others did not. For
example, the idea of a musical intelligence was relatively new, as
was the idea of a bodily-kinesthetic intelligence,
which encompassed the particular abilities of athletes and dancers.
Gardner derived his set of intelligences chiefly from studies of
cognitive processing, brain damage, exceptional individuals,
and cognition across cultures. He also speculated on the possibility
of an existential intelligence (a concern with “ultimate” issues, such
as the meaning of life), although he was unable to isolate an area of
the brain that was dedicated to the consideration of such questions.
Gardner’s research on multiple intelligences led him to claim that
most concepts of intelligence had been ethnocentric and
culturally biased but that his was universal, because it was based
upon biological and cross-cultural data as well as upon data derived
from the cognitive performance of a wide array of people.
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An alternative approach that took similar account of cognition and

cultural context was Sternberg’s “triarchic” theory, which he
proposed in Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Human
Intelligence (1985). Both Gardner and Sternberg believed that
conventional notions of intelligence were too narrow; Sternberg,
however, questioned how far psychologists should go beyond
traditional concepts, suggesting that musical and bodily-kinesthetic
abilities are talents rather than intelligences because they are fairly
specific and are not prerequisites for adaptation in most cultures.

Sternberg posited three (“triarchic”) integrated and interdependent

aspects of intelligence, which are concerned, respectively, with a
person’s internal world, the external world, and experience. The
first aspect comprises the cognitive processes and representations
that form the core of all thought. The second aspect consists of the
application of these processes and representations to the external
world. The triarchic theory holds that more-intelligent persons are
not just those who can execute many cognitive processes quickly or
well; rather, their greater intelligence is reflected in knowing their
strengths and weaknesses and capitalizing upon their strengths
while compensating for their weaknesses. More-intelligent persons,
then, find a niche in which they can operate most efficiently. The
third aspect of intelligence consists of the integration of the internal
and external worlds through experience. This includes the ability to
apply previously learned information to new or wholly unrelated
situations.

Some psychologists believe that intelligence is reflected in an ability

to cope with relatively novel situations. This explains why
experience can be so important. For example, intelligence might be
measured by placing people in an unfamiliar culture and assessing
their ability to cope with the new situation. According to Sternberg,
another facet of experience that is important in evaluating
intelligence is the automatization of cognitive processing, which
occurs when a relatively novel task becomes familiar. The more a
person automatizes the tasks of daily life, the more mental
resources he will have for coping with novelty.

Other intelligences were proposed in the late 20th century. In 1990

the psychologists John Mayer and Peter Salovey defined the
term emotional intelligence as
the ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to
understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as
to promote emotional and intellectual growth.

The four aspects identified by Mayer and Salovey involve (a)

recognizing one’s own emotions as well as the emotions of others,
(b) applying emotion appropriately to facilitate reasoning, (c)
understanding complex emotions and their influence on succeeding
emotional states, and (d) having the ability to manage one’s
emotions as well as those of others. The concept of emotional
intelligence was popularized by the psychologist and
journalist Daniel Goleman in books published from the 1990s.
Several tests developed to measure emotional intelligence have
shown modest correlations between emotional intelligence and
conventional intelligence.
Biological theories
The theories discussed above seek to understand intelligence in
terms of hypothetical mental constructs, whether they are factors,
cognitive processes, or cognitive processes in interaction with
context. Biological theories represent a radically different approach
that dispenses with mental constructs altogether. Advocates of such
theories, usually called reductionists, believe that a true
understanding of intelligence is possible only by identifying its
biological basis. Some would argue that there is no alternative
to reductionism if, in fact, the goal is to explain rather than merely
to describe behaviour. But the case is not an open-and-shut one,
especially if intelligence is viewed as something more than the mere
processing of information. As Howard Gardner pointedly asked in
the article “What We Do & Don’t Know About Learning” (2004):
Can human learning and thinking be adequately reduced to the operations of neurons, on
the one hand, or to chips of silicon, on the other? Or is something crucial missing,
something that calls for an explanation at the level of the human organism?

Analogies that compare the human brain to a computer suggest that

biological approaches to intelligence should be viewed as
complementary to, rather than as replacing, other approaches. For
example, when a person learns a new German vocabulary word, he
becomes aware of a pairing, say, between the German term Die
Farbe and the English word colour, but a trace is also laid down in
the brain that can be accessed when the information is needed.
Although relatively little is known about the biological bases of
intelligence, progress has been made on three different fronts, all
involving studies of brain operation.