RULE 109 APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
In contrast,
Testate Estate of Maria Manuel Vda.de Biascan vs. Biascan
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila. These
orders dismissed the appeal of petitioner from the orders dated April 2, 1981
and April 30, 1985 of the same RegionalTrial Court.
Rosalina (acknowledged natural child) was appointed as Regular
Administriatrix (RA) in the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea
Zulueta. Maria (legal wife) intervened, filed an opposition and a motion to set
aside Rosalina’s appointment. The RTC order declared that Maria, Rosalina
and German(brother of rosalina) were entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings and the motion to set aside the order appointing Rosalina as RA
was denied on April 2, 1981 which Maria received through her counsel on
April 9, 1981. On June 6, 1981, or fifty-eight (58) days after the receipt of the
April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed her motion for reconsideration which Rosalina
opposed. The records of the settlement proceedings were among those lost
in the November 15, 1981 fire in the Manila City Hall. Thus, on January 2,
1985, private respondent filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said
records. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the
records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying
Maria’s June 6, 1981 MR. Maria died and in the settlement of her estate, the
law firm (Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office) engaged by
the by the interim Special Administrator was allegedly made aware of and
given notice of the April 30, 1985 Order only on August 21, 1996 when its
associate visited Branch 4 of the Manila RTC to inquire about the status of
the case.
April 22, 1996- A Notice of Appeal was filed by petitioner from the Orders
dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the trial court. The stamp of the trial
court on the first page of the notice indicated that it was received by the trial
court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September 20,
1996 was likewise filed.
On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the appeal on
the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the mode of appeal was proper
YES. An appeal is allowed in the cases mentioned in Section 1, Rule
109 as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special
proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so
appealing.—An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders,
decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a
final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing.
interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to
judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains
control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same on
sufficient grounds atanytime before final judgment.
In the instant case, the Order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court
decreed, among others, that Maria, Rosalina and German are entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings. Moreover, the said Order likewise
denied Maria’s motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent
as regular administratrix of the estate. These rulings of the trial court were
precisely questioned by Maria in her Motion for Reconsideration dated June
6, 1981. The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina
Biascan and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of
the Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial
court has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of
the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an appeal.
The ruling of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the
order appointing private respondent as the regular administratrix of the estate
of Florencio Biascan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal. We have
previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a regular
administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the
rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in contrast
with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for a
limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character
and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for
any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. Considering however
that private respondent has already been appointed as regular administratrix
of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her appointment as such may be
questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal.
2. Whether the appeal was filed out of time
YES. In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of
estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein
is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required.
The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or
a motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or
order becomes final.
With respect to the Order dated April 2, 1981 issued by the trial court,
petitioner admits that Maria received a copy of the same on April 9, 1981.
Thus, Maria or her counsel had thirty (30) days or until May 9 within which to
file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file a motion for
reconsideration, in which case the appeal period is deemed interrupted.
Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or a full fifty-eight (58) days
after receipt of the order, that a motion for reconsideration was filed, it is
clear that the same was filed out of time. As such, when the said motion for
reconsideration was filed, there was no more appeal period to interrupt as
the Order had already become final.
3. Whether the order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court did not
become final and executory as no opposition on its timeliness was
filed and no ruling as regards its timeliness was made (petitioner
concludes, any procedural defect attending the MR was deemed
cured when the trial court, in its April 30, 1985 order, took
cognizance of the same and rendered its ruling thereon)
YES, it became final and executory. It is well-settled that judgment or orders
become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial
declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce
the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. In
fact, the trial court could not even validly entertain a motion for
reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal. As
such, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the
timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same
on grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was
filed, the Order dated April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory.
Being final and executory, the trial court can no longer alter, modify, or
reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing of the motion for
reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment or order.
The rules on special proceedings recognize that a motion for extension
of time to file the notice of appeal and record of appeal may be granted.—
Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioner’s notice of appeal
was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it
only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading. And
while the rules on special proceedings recognize that a motion for extension
of time to file the notice of appeal and record of appeal may be granted, no
such motion was ever filed by petitioner before the trial court. Consequently,
the trial court committed no error when it dismissed the appealof petitioner.
Republic vs. Nishina
FACTS:
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother
Zenaida Sumera Watanabe (Zenaida), filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record
and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan.
She alleged that she was born on October 31, 1987 2 in Malolos, Bulacan
to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who were
married on February 18, 1987. Her father later died. 4 On July 19, 1989, her
mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. 5
As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry,
respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under
the surname of her mother’s second husband, “Hakamada.”6 Her mother
and Hakamada eventually divorced. Her mother married another Japanese,
Takayuki Watanabe,8 who later adopted her by a decree 9 issued by the
Tokyo Family Court of Japan on January 25, 2001. The adoption decree was
filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila in 2006.
In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the
Malolos Civil Registry under the name “Nisaida Sumera Nishina,”11 hence,
her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth
certificate bearing the surname “Hakamada,” issued through late
registration in 1993, be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption,
her surname “Nishina” in the original birth certificate be changed
to “Watanabe.”12
RTC granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registry
of Malolos “to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada
issued in 1993 and to change it, particularly the surname of [respondent]
from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.”
OSG filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of
Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss 16 the appeal, alleging that
petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on
appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41
CA – dismissed the appeal of petitioner because respondent’s petition is
classified as a special proceeding petitioner should have filed both notice of
appeal and a record.
ISSUE: Whether a record of appeal is required
RULING:
NO. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the
orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an
appeal:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to
a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except
that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency
of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal
is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain
with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that
a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.
In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since
no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after
it issued the appealed order granting respondents petition for cancellation of
birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.
Special Proceedings; Appeals; Multiple Appeals; Record on
Appeal; The filing of a record on appeal is not necessary where no
other matter remains to be heard and determined by the trial court after
it issued the appealed order granting the petition for cancellation of
birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.—Section 1,
Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or
judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an
appeal, viz.: x x x The above-quoted rule
contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings.
A record on appeal—in addition to the notice of appeal—is thus required to
be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court
to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final. In the present
case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other
matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued
the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth
record and change of surname in the civil registry.
III. OTHER SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RULE 103 CHANGE OF NAME
VALID GROUNDS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.
Facts: Maximo Wong filed a special proceeding to change his surname to
Maximo Alcala, jr. which was his name prior to adoption by Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong.He averred that his use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a
Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The RTC granted his petition. CA affirmed.
The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of
ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and
cannot justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private
respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude
to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive,
despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor
General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates
Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to
use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by
nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with
his adoptive parents.
In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that
is, upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being
already emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by himself. It is
at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries causes him
undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social life. In
fact, his adoptive mother, being aware of his predicament, gave her consent
to the petition for change of name, albeit making it clear that the same shall
in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the rigors of trial to
substantiate her sworn statement. If his adoptive mother does not take
offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or insecurity about his desire to
change his name, private respondent avers that there can be no possible
prejudice on her, much less the State.
Issue: W/N the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for
change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of
said petition.
Ruling: Yes. Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority." The
application for change of name thereunder involves a special
proceeding governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court and one which involves substantial changes,
with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings being the
prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing
a change of personal name is simply to have, wherever possible, a
record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute,
court to which application is made should normally make its decree
recording such change of name.
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person
involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard
to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and, as such, strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is
essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. For this
purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register.
Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the jurisprudential dictum
that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons
adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which
may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason therefor.
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated by
the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest.
In granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all
the best evidence available is required. In the present case, We believe
that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously when it
granted the petition.
From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother
Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to file the
petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his
family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he
being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is
his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the
absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for
change of name. Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve
his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
injury to the interest of the State or other persons. Nothing whatsoever is
shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of
the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results
as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will
avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not
all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for
change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged
in the courts.
While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we
find the same to be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old
name, private respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited
by law from using. True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may
employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of
any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obstention of the
requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the
Philippines, respondent.
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and
his sex from “male” to “female.” The trial court ruled in his favor.
The Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alledging that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that
the that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing
the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner is allowed to change of name and sex in
the birth certificate under Art. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court, and RA 9048 on grounds of sex reassignment.
RULING: No. The petition lacks merit. Before a person can legally
change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 now
governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue, form, and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction
as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept.
Words employed in a statute are presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context says otherwise. When words are not defined in a statute
they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex
is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and
female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is
“the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus,
the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that
are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted
in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
“sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category “female.”
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others.
These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend
it. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it. Statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. In our system of government, it is for
the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need
for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where
the claims asserted are statute-based. It might be theoretically possible for
this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412
of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no
correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined
at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is
immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.  JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, respondent.
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries in Birth Certificates; Clerical Error 1. Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries
Law (R.A. No. 9048); R.A. No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 in Birth Certificate before the RTC branch in Laguna.
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors—Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.—The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
2. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a
up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical  errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Jennifer to Jeff.

3. The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three

(3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
and 408 of the Civil Code; The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.—Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of a
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule doctor from and the doctor testified that respondent’s condition is permanent
108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events be advantageous to her.
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) 4. The RTC granted respondent’s petition
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or
5. However the OSG contends:
factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the
FACTS:
local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar. The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally defective
since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or
gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition
known as CAH does not make her a male.
According to Cagandahan:
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003
and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,
respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, change of sex or gender is allowed
under Rule 108, and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender from female to
male on the ground of her medical condition and her name from Jeniffer to
Jeff under Rules 103 and 108 of the ROC
HELD:. No the trial court did not err.
A. Rule 108 Ruling
1. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry.
2. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified
of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of
the requirements of the rules. The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may
have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. 
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. Court held that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of
the petition to the local civil registrar.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries
in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:
“ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.”
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
“inappropriate” appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone.
3. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial. In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change
in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.
5. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
6. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision
to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make
his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
B. Rule 103 Ruling
7. As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow.
The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
Note: Ininclude ko lang din yun Ruling sa 108 just in case. Super iksi kasi
ruling sa 103. Thanks!
PROCEDURE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. FLORENDO P.
AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and JOHN
LI KAN WA, respondents.
Change of Name;  Failure to include the name sought in title of the
petition is substantial jurisdictional infirmity; Facts to be stated in
notice of publication.—Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of
Court, the petition for change shall set forth inter alia, the name asked for.
The requirement is mandatory and compliance therewith is essential, for it is
by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction. It was held in Republic vs.
Reyes, that failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the
petition, and consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a
substantial jurisdictional infirmity. As enunciated in Go Chiu Beng vs.
Republic, for publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To
inform the publication should recite, among others, the following facts: (a) the
name or names of applicant; (b) the cause for which the change of name is
sought; and (c) the new name asked for.
Rationale of requirement to include in the title of petition the name to
be adopted.—In Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, the rationale of the requirement
to include in the title of the petition the name sought to be adopted was
expressly made clear, thus: “x x x Notices in the newspaper, like the one
under consideration, usually appears in the back pages. The reader as is to
be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has
satisfied himself that the title interests him that the proceeds to read down
further. The probability that the portion heretofore quoted will escape the
reader’s notice. The purpose of which the publication is made, that is, the
inform, may thus be served.”
FACTS:
1. Records disclose that John Li Kan Wa filed a petition for change of his
name to John Sotto, alleging
(a) change of his status from Chinese to Filipino as a result of his election of
Filipino Citizenship; and
(b) the previous confusion resulting from being registered as John Li Kan Wa
and using a different name since childhood which is John Sotto.
2. The court allowed such and issued an order giving notice to all interested
parties to appear before the court and state their objections, and directed that
the order be published in the Monday Post, a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Nueva Ecija and Cabanatuan City.
3. The Republic filed an opposition to the petition.
4. After due hearing, the court granted the petition for change of name.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge had acquired jurisdiction to hear
the petition filed by John Li Kan Wa.
HELD: NO!
1. Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the New Rules of Court, the petition for
change shall set forth the name asked for.
The requirement is mandatory and compliance therewith is essential, for it is
by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction. It was held in Republic vs.
Reyes, that failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the
petition, and consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a
substantial jurisdictional infirmity.
2. As enunciated in Go Chiu Beng vs. Republic, for publication to be
effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication should
recite, among others, the following facts:
(a) the name or names of applicant;
(b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and
(c) the new name asked for
The rationale of the requirement to include in the title of the petition the name
sought to be adopted was expressly made clear, thus:
“xxx Notices in the newspaper, like the one under consideration, usually
appears in the back pages. The reader as is to be expected, merely glances
at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title
interests him that he proceeds to read down further. The probability that the
portion heretofore quoted will escape the reader’s notice. The purpose of
which the publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be served.”
3. It appears only the name Li Kan Wa was given in the title, and the name
John Sotto was not mentioned. Omission in the title of the petition of the
name asked for is fatal, and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. Non-compliance with the rules did not vest the court with authority to
act on the petition and therefore, the questioned decision is null and void.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCOS
FACTS: A verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen
alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la
Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth
on January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang
Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May
Sia alias Manman Huang in the City of Manila;
She caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of
Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's father had
abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at
home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where she studies;
Petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter
has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her
own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in
addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang
De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by
signing at the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made for the
purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not
committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has never
been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause damage or
prejudice to any third person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed to
change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la
Cruz.
Respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and
inviting an interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be published at
the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a
newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be made as
soon as possible.
Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order
authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also
known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over
the case; NO
(2) Whether or not respondent Judge erred in granting the petition of
changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias "Manman Huang."
YES
RULING:
1. In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this
Court explained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the
name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of the
applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published
order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the
caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special
proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title
strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to
him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The
probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases
of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of the order or
petition.
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated
March 30, 1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April
4, 1968 read, thus:
"IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE
MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY
PANG DE LA CRUZ,
"PANG CHA QUEN,
"Petitioner." (p. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias — "Mary Pang" — in the
captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the
purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the
proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the
petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la
Cruz."
2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of
name:
(1) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(2) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation;
(3) When the change will avoid confusion
(4) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage or
(5) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs.
Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons
offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her
daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz
as her own father" (p. 23, Rollo); (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of
security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this
petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading" (p. 24,
Rollo).
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule
is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false
impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was
not filed by the proper party. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, provide:
"SECTION 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his
name shall present the petition to the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City
of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
"SEC. 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for change of
name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring
 his name changed, or some other person on his behalf,
and shall set forth:
"(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing;
"(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's
name is sought;
"(c) The name asked for."
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring
to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other
person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang
Cha Quen not by May Sia.
RA 9255 AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO
USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER
IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
FACTS: On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a
minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry
in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop
his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna
Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to
each other. When his parents subsequently got married they
executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child's name
was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore
for a long time because they will let him study there together with his
sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. . . .
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother are not carried in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his
current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his
sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since
they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R"
but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to
Julian Lin Wang. 1
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that
the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle name — did not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a
person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering
that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
RULING: NO.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment 11 positing that the trial
court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that
under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to
bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be
denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG,
there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is
in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to
support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. 12 The
OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to
justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that
matter. Petitioner's allegation that the continued use of the middle name may
result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The
OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of
the child's middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding
the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister
named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the
surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in
Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use
of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law. 
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has
an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that
before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause,
or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied. 
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
'proper and reasonable cause' for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.  The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. 20 The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, 21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father's surname. 22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child. EHDCAI
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would
make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches
the age of majority. 26 As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same
at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
In re: Stephanie Garcia
Facts:
1. Honorado B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt her illegitimate daughter
STEPHANIE ASTORGA GARCIA. He alleged in his petition that Stephanie is
using the surname and middle name of her biological mother. Catindig in his
petition, prays for his surname to be adopted and that the middle name of
stephanie will be "Garcia" or her mother's surname.
2. Upon granting the petition, the court declared Stephanie to be an adopted
daughter of the petitioner. However it declared the name of Stephanie as
"STEPHANIE CATINDIG". (Without a middle name) 3. So now, petitioner
filed for a motion for clarification/reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her mother as her middle name.
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of her biological mother as her middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father?
Held: YES. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law. As correctly submitted by both
parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article
17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father,” is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Also as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom
of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees,
the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Republic vs Capote.
 Facts:
1. The plaintiff-respondent, Trinidad Capote is the guardian ad litem of
GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, a 16 yr old boy and an illegitimate child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso.
2. Capote filed a petition for change of name of Giovanni from "GIOVANNI
N. GALLAMASO" to "GIOVANNI NADORES", contending that the father
never recognized the child.
3. The trial court ordered the publication of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. It also ordered the
notification of the LCR and the OSG.
4. Since there was no opposition, petitioner filed a motion to file her evidence
ex parte which was granted by the court. As a result, the trial court ordered
the change of name of Giovanni.
5. The Republic of the Phil, thru the OSG filed an appeal contending it erred
in granting the petition in a summary proceeding even if such type of
petition is considered as adversarial. Petitioner cites Republic of the
Philippines v. Labrador 11 and claims that the purported parents and all
other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of
name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.
Issue: Whether or not non-joinder of the parties renders the decision invalid?
Held: No. Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority. This is a reasonable requirement for those
seeking such change because a person’s name necessarily affects his
identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process
and decision to change the name of any of its citizens. The Rules of Court
provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here, the
appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, a separate and distinct
proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in
the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors
thereon). The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the
action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings
there. The point is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial. The
law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the
trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established
that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name
as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always
recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that
he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will
facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by
posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the
petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the
notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The
fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not
merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG
neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte
when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.” A proceeding is
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent
gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.25
With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave
due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all
interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were
afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
RA 9048 & 10172 CLERICAL ERROR LAW
In the Matter of the Petition for Correction of the Birth Certificates of
Minors, JORGE BATBATAN and his Sister DELIA BATBATAN vs.
OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAGADIAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
FACTS: Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two children, JORGE
Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The surnames of the two children
were taken from the name and the alias of their father, Ang Kiu Chuy, alias
Sioma Luy. Eligia Batbatan and Ang Kiu Chuy lived in a common-law
relationship and were never married. Ang was also allegedly married to
another woman. Eligia filed this petition for the correction of entries as
regards the names of the two children who were still minors. She wanted the
"Ang" and the "Luy" surnames dropped from her children's names such that
their corrected names would be Jorge Batbatan and Delia Batbatan,
respectively.
The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the records show that:
(1) it was the petitioner who supplied the information in the entries of the
certificate of birth of her son; and (2) that entries in the records of birth in the
Office of the local civil registrar are allowed only to correct clerical errors.
Corrections are not allowed when the effect is to change status, citizenship,
or any substantial alterations, which should be decided in an appropriate
proceeding.
ISSUE: WON court erred in holding that the corrections sought in the petition
are NOT allowable
HELD: Yes. The corrections sought in the petition would not change the
status, citizenship, genealogical relationship or filiation of the children nor
effect any substantial change or alteration which should be threshed out in a
proper action.
The certificate of live birth of Jorge Batbatan Ang clearly Identifies him as an
illegitimate child. In fact, his parents executed the "Affidavit To Be
Accomplished In Case of An Illegitimate Child" at the back of the printed
certificate filed with the local civil registrar. The certificate of live birth of Delia
Batbatan Luy identifies her as illegitimate because "Item 23. Legitimate" is
answered "No".
A clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or 'writing, the making
of wrong entries in the public records contrary to existing facts. An error is
not clerical and does not fall under the summary procedure contemplated in
Article 412 of the Civil Code if it affects substantial matters, if its correction
will bring about a substantial change.
We have tended to be strict in the application of Rule 108 on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry to avoid this summary procedure from
being unlawfully utilized as a shortcut method to bring about a change of
citizenship, paternity, status, other substantial attribute or qualification.
However, where justice and equity, dictate it and where no such change is
contemplated we have also readily, sustained its use.
The corrections sought in this petition do not go so far as to affect citizenship
or status. The error committed by the clerk have resulted in entries contrary
to law. The changes sought, if granted , would bring about a compliance with
article 363 of the Civil Code which provides: "Illegitimate children referred to
in Article 287 shall bear the surnames of the mother." Since the petitioner
children were born of a married man with a woman not his legitimate spouse
and are thus "spurious or adulterous", they should bear the petitioners or
mother surnames pursuant to the above provisions. Thus, judgement was
reversed; local civil registrar order to correct the records of birth of the
children to Batbatan.
MARCELO LEE vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondents herein are the 11 children of Lee Tek Sheng
and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. While the petitioners herein, are
allegedly 8 children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Respondents filed 2 separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of petitioners. Both petitions sought to cancel
and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth
of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok
Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu
Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother. Apparently, all the
birth certificates of petitioners indicated Keh Shiok Cheng (wife) as their
mother so as to conceal the result of the illicit relations between their real
mother Tiu Chan (mistress) and Lee Tek Sheng. This was later discovered
after Keh Shiok Cheng’s death. An NBI investigation showed that Keh Shiok
Cheng was not the mother of the 8 children. Thus, the filing of the petition.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds that:
(1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an
action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to
impugn has already prescribed. Motion was denied. Thus, they appealed to
CA. CA dismissed.
ISSUE: (1) WON the resort Rule 108 of ROC is proper
HELD: (1) Yes. The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a
particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said
proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of
certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or
otherwise deprived said persons of rights.
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for
the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to
establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh
Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in
their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before
the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is
nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok
Cheng and petitioners.
(2) WON private respondent’s suits amounted to a collateral attack
against petitioner’s legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding
HELD: No. In Republic vs. Valencia, it was held that even substantial errors
in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. A proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature
and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
complied with:
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are:
(1) the civil registrar, and
(2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby.
Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to:
(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the
petition, and
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:
(1) the civil registrar, and
(2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.”
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to
the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected
and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
CA was correct in ruling that the proceedings taken in both petitions for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in
the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial
does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108
which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New
Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.
If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as
repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes
which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted
to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x
x x."
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion.
But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only
has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is
contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires
publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all
persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation
or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also
required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last,
but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
(3) Whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register
may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the
New Civil Code.
HELD: Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive
rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. 'Where
the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of
petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be
granted except only in an adversarial proceeding.
ARTICLE 412: does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be
followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by
judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure
contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature. Thus, it
is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and
“changed.” In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set right”; “to
remove the faults or errors from” while to change means “to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute.
RA 9048: Amended Art. 412; Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the
civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial
order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The
obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or
changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for
the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections
in entries of the civil register.
RA 9048 is Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to
delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes
or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that
appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial
kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an
appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just
what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary
procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that
as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No.
9048 which has prospective application.
REPUBLIC vs. CARLITO I. KHO, et. al.
FACTS: Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed
before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in
the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin
and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate:
(1) the citizenship of his mother to “Filipino” instead of “Chinese”;
(2) the deletion of the word “married” because his parents, Juan Kho and
Epifania Inchoco were allegedly not legally married;
(3) that his second name of “John” be deleted from his record of birth; and
(4) the name and citizenship of his father in his marriage certificate be
corrected from “John Kho” to “Juan Kho” and “Filipino” to “Chinese,”
respectively.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that:
(1) the date of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to
January 21, 2000 (the date appearing in their marriage certificate); and
(2) to effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from “Maribel” to
“Marivel.”
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks, a
newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing.
The city civil registrar stated her observations and suggestions to the
proposed corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but
interposed no objections to the other amendments.
Carlito et al presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the petition.
The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the
entries in the record of birth of Carlito and to the correction of the birth
certificates of the minor children of Carlito.
Petitioner, Republic, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial
court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents
despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as
an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
corrections with regard to the questioned “married” status of Carlito and his
siblings’ parents, and the latter’s citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name
“Carlito John Kho” to “Carlito Kho” for non-compliance with jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were
substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial
proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respodents’
parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change
Carlito’s name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not
satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito’s prior three-
year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did
not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as “Carlito John I. Kho.”
Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the
change of name of Carlito’s father.
The CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the correction of entries, names, citizenship,
marital status could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings.
HELD: (1) No. It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to
change the citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth
certificate and delete the “married” status of Carlito’s parents in his and his
siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage
of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments. For the change involving the nationality of
Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important
matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not
only of the parents, but also of the offspring. Further, the deletion of the entry
that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents were “married” alters their filiation from
“legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with significant implications on their successional
and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an
adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic explains the philosophy
behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set
open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
ISSUE (2): Whether affirmative relieve cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature.
HELD (2): Yes. However, it can be remedied. In Republic v. Valencia,
however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108. “It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition
is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature,
but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
Adversary proceeding means one having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
Moreover, the enactment of R.A. No. 9048 has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections
to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
Thus, the obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first
name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court’s order setting the petition
for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to
oppose, it was posted and published for the required period; that notices of
hearings were duly served; and that trial was conducted during which the
public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-
examining Carlito and Epifania.
ISSUE (3): Whether or not the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s
parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the
trial court’s judgment void.
HELD (3): No. Publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule
108 cures the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing
and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is
the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ISSUE (4): Whether the trial court erred in ordering the change of the name
of “Carlito John Kho” to “Carlito Kho” despite non-compliance with
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.
HELD (4): No. With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his
name from “Carlito John” to “Carlito,” the same was properly granted under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under
letter “o” of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
“Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs
petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious College
in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and
voter registration record satisfactorily show that he has been known by his
first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the
second name.
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION et al vs. Executive Secretary EDUARDO R.
ERMITA & Sandiganbayan Justice GREGORY S. ONG
Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in
public and civic causes aimed at protecting the people’s rights to self-
governance and justice.
Respondent Eduardo Ermita is the head of the Office of the President and is
in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of SC
Justices.
Respondent Gregory Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill
up the vacancy in this Court.
FACTS: Petitioners contend that the appointment of Ong as Associate
Justice of the SC, through Executive Sec. Ermita, is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is
plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the
time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and
his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke Sec. 7 of Art. 8 of the Constitution: “No person shall be
appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for
itself and it states his nationality as “Chinese” at birth. They invoke Art. 410 of
the Civil Code which provides that “the books making up the civil register and
all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained.” Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth certificate indicating his
nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ong’s
citizenship at birth is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that “No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.” Thus, as long as
Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar
Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth
certificate.”
This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ong’s new
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration, stating that he
is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Sec. of Justice
Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the DOJ does
not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that
respondent Ong’s old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a
natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ong’s remedy is an action to
correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the
appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Respondent Executive Sec. accordingly filed his Comment, essentially
stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of SC
was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article
VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus: “SEC. 9. The Members of the
Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.”
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
HELD: No. As petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order,
and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.
“Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial
in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted.”
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth
certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to
the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should,
therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all
entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship.
The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent
Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the
records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his
alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For
this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
RULE 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
REPUBLIC VS. BELMONTE
FACTS
Private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao filed a Petition for the
change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao . For this purpose, she
also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her
father's name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her
mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At
the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old
minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother.
The petitioner alleged that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan
and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the
given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that
the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously written in her
birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns these
alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names. The
petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic priest and
that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given
name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that since her
childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to
as Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.
On the basis of these allegations, the petitioner asked the trial court to allow
her change of name and to order the correction of her records in the Local
Civil Registrar's Office to conform to the name Veronica Pao. She also asked
the trial court to order the correction of her father's name recorded in her birth
certificate from Po Yu to Pao Yu, as well as her mother's name appearing
as Pakiat Chan changed to Helen Chan.
The OSG opposed the petition and sought its dismissal. It argues that the
remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by the mere
submission of the said petition since a petition for change of name and a
petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register are
distinct and separate and provide for different requirements.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao
has presented a proper and reasonable cause for the change of her
name.
(2) Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain
entries in the civil registry be joined in the same proceeding?
HELD
(1) NO. An examination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the
supposed correct name of Veronica Pao is predicated on the
assumption that the correct name other father is  Pao Yu and not Po
Yu as recited in her own birth certificate. The assumption is
baseless, absent any proof that the name other father in her birth
certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown
to have been registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is
no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Pao.
The corrections sought by the petitioner involve the very
Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections
should first be determined in a different proceeding more
adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the
petitioner with the trial court.
(2) NO. Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a
correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her parents.
This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary
procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 is
confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material
change in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the
petitioner.  A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the
record and should be capable of being corrected by reference
to the record alone. The petitioner seeks more than just the
correction of a clerical error.
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should
be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings
filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar
concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar
being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be
made.
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in
Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted
one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise
would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the
change of one's name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only
upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same
proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied
with.
 TAN CO VS. CIVIL REGISTER
FACTS
Petitioners Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co filed a petition for correction of
entries in the Civil Register. They allege that they are born in the Philippines
and the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng. At the time of their birth, their
father was still a Chinese citizen. Thereafter, their father applied for
naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship
under P.D. No. 1055. They claim that since they were still minors at the time
their father was naturalized, then they became Filipino citizens as well
through the derivative mode of naturalization under C.A. No. 473. Petitioners
now pray for the correcting and changing of entries in their respective birth
certificates as to the citizenship of their father from CHINESE to FILIPINO.
The RTC dismissed their petition outright on the ground that the father was
conferred Philippine citizenship under P.D. No. 1055 and not C.A. No. 473,
hence they cannot claim derivative naturalization.
ISSUE: Whether the petition is proper.
HELD
YES. LOI No. 270 and C.A. No 473 are laws governing the naturalization of
qualified aliens residing in the Philippines, and while they provide for different
procedures, both have the same purpose and objective. They are statutes in
pari materia, thus, they should be construed together. C.A. No. 473 which
grants derivative naturalization to minor children should be similarly applied
to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270. The petitioners’
recourse to Rule 108, therefore, is appropriate.
The proceedings in Rule 108 are summary if the entries in the civil register
sought to be corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where
such entries sought to be corrected or changed are substantial, i.e., the
status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents, the
proceedings are adversarial in nature. Sec. 4 regarding notice and
publication will now apply in this case.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and
JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
FACTS: Ma. Cristina and Pablowere married. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s
co-petitioners Paolo Josef, Janelle Ann, and Gian Carlo.
Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
Lucille began introducing Patrick as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina
thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth
certificate. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and
Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to
Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing  to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated
in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
ISSUE: May the court a quo  may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil
registrar
HELD: No.
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108,the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis  Article 412 of the Civil Code charts
the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only
to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition
filed before the court a quo.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina.Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding.
He returned to the Philippines sometimeto surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s
petition for divorce.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.
She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a
similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.
ISSUE: Whether it stripped Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree
HELD: No. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. 
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can
be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
of a court recognition both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avv
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.