1.

HOLIDAY INN MANILA vs NLRC

G.R. No. 109114, Sept. 14, 1993

FACTS:
Honasan was accepted by Holiday Inn for on-the-job training. After 3 weeks of
training, she was employed on a probationary basis for a period of 6 months.

4 days before the expiration of the contract, Holiday Inn informed her of her
dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the
standards of the Hotel.

Honasan filed for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular EE at
the time of her separation and was entitled to full security of tenure.

ISSUE:
Whether Honasan was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal.

HELD:
YES.

Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first during her on-
the-job training for 3 weeks, and next during another period of six months. Her
probation clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by the LC.

Probation is the period during which the ER may determine if the EE is

qualified for possible inclusion in the work force.

When her services were continued after the period of her on-the-job training,
the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was
qualified to be a regular EE. Her services were continued, presumably because
they were acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on
probation. She had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full
security of tenure. The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily
separated on the ground unsatisfactory services and is entitled to full security
of tenure.

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2. NITTO ENTERPRISES vs NLRC
G.R. No. 114337, Sept. 29, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner hired Capili in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder, and
core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement for a period of 6
months.

On Aug. 1990, Capili operated one of the power machines without authority
and injured his left thumb, for which petitioner incurred medical expenses. He
was asked to resign in a letter afterwards.

Capili filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC reversed the LA and held
that Capili was a regular EE. It held that the apprenticeship agreement filed
with DOLE on June 7, 1990 could not be validly used as basis to conclude that
respondent was hired on May 1990 as a plain apprentice.

ISSUE:
Whether Capili can be considered an apprentice.

HELD:
No. Prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a
condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into.

The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and respondent was

executed and enforced on May 28, 1990. On the same day, petitioner
submitted an apprenticeship program to DOLE.

Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. The
apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program approved by
DOLE, private respondent should rightly be considered as a regular EE as
defined by Art. 280, LC.

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3. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs IAC
G.R. No. 75112, Aug. 17, 1992

FACTS:
Funtencha was a working scholar, a part-time janitor for petitioner-school. On
his way home one late afternoon, he requested Allan, and was allowed, to take
over the vehicle. In order to avoid collision with a fast moving truck, he
swerved to the right of a curb and hit Kapunan, who was walking in his lane.

Kapunan filed for damages against Funtencha and the ER – Filamer.

ISSUE:
Whether Filamer is correct that it cannot be held liable for Funtencha’s
negligence as the latter was merely a working scholar and not considered an EE
under the Labor Code.

HELD:
NO.

Funtencha is an EE of petitioner. He was not driving for the purpose of his

enjoyment or for a frolic of his own, but for the service for which the jeep was
intended by the petitioner school. His act was one done for and in behalf of his
ER. The petitioner-school is liable by virtue of its vicarious liability for negligent
acts or omissions of persons under its control. Furthermore, as ER, it has failed
to show proof that it exercised the required diligence of a good father of a
family over its EEs, Funtencha and Allan.

Sec. 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the LC, on which the
petitioner anchors its defense,was promulgated by the SOLE only for the
purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the LC on conditions
of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the
manner by which the powers of the Labor Sec. shall be exercised; on what
records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the
exclusion of working scholars from and inclusion of resident physicians in the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged EE and alleged ER. It invokes a claim by
brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of
a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance
on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an ER
under Art. 2180 of the NCC is misplaced. An implementing rule of labor cannot
be used by an ER as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions
of the NCC.
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4. BERNARDO vs NLRC
G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1992

FACTS:
Complainants were deaf-mutes who were hired by respondent Far East bank as
money sorters. The employment was covered by an Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers for a period of 6 months, several of which were
renewed a couple of times. Later on, the respondent bank decided not to
renew the special contract. Hence, the illegal dismissal complaint of the
petitioners.

Respondent submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and
their employment was merely an accommodation to requests of government
officials and civic-minded citizens. They could not become regular EEs because
there were no plantilla positions for money sorters. Their contracts were
renewed merely for humanitarian reasons and that the special positions
created for them no longer exists.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are regular employees.

HELD:
YES. Viewed in light of the LC and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,
petitioners should be deemed regular employees and have acquired legal
rights to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a
consequence of law and justice.

The stipulations in the employment contracts conform with Art. 80 of the LC.
Succeeding events and the enactment of RA 7277 (the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons), however, justify the application of Art. 280 of the LC.

The renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of
others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to
the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to
perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability
did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a
qualified able-bodied person. As such, they are covered by Art. 280, LC, as to
regular employment. Being regular employees, they are entitled to security of
tenure and may only be terminated for just or authorized causes.

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5. SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG vs DSWD
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore
operation. It assails the constitutionality of RA 9257 “Expanded Senior Citizens
Act of 2003” and Sec. 32 of RA 9442 which amends the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons. It is their contention that the 20% sales discount granted to
senior citizens and PWDs is violation of the equal protection clause, since they
do not fall as “substantial distinctions” and that “PWDs” and “disability” were
not sufficiently defined by the law.

ISSUE:
Whether RA No. 9257 “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” and RA No. 9442
which amends the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause.

HELD:
No. There is reasonable classification on which the subject laws were based.

For a classification to be valid:

a. it must be based upon substantial distinctions;
b. it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c. it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. it must apply equally to all members if the same class.

To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinctions as to income, is

a valid classification. RA 9257 caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. It is
based on age and qualifies all who reached the age of 60. Senior citizens
constitute a class of their own. The grant of mandatory discount is germane to
the purpose of the law which is to adopt a comprehensive approach to health
development and to make essential goods and services available to all people
at affordable cost. The welfare of senior citizens and PWDs is also an actual,
continuing and pressing concern that requires preferential attention. The said
laws apply to all senior citizens and PWDs without further distinction or
reservation. Without a doubt, all the elements for a valid classification were
met.

The definitions of “disabilities” and “PWDs” are clear and unequivocal.

Sec. 4(a) of RA 7277, the precursor of RA 94421 provides:

DISABLED PERSONS are those suffering from restriction or different

disabilities, as a result of mental, physical or sensory impairment, to

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 perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being.

Sec. 5.1 of the IRR of RA 9442 also provides:

PERSONS WITH DIABILITY are those individuals defined under Sec. 4 of

RA 7277 as amended and their integration into the Mainstream of
Society and for Other Purposes.

DISABILITY shall mean

1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical
function of an individual or activities of such individual;
2) a record of such impairment; or
3) being regarded as having such an impairment.

The definition recognizes that “disability is an evolving concept” and

appreciates the “diversity of PWDs”. The terms were given comprehensive
definitions so as to accommodate the various forms of disabilities, and not
confine it to a particular case as this would effectively exclude other forms of
physical, intellectual or psychological impairments.