Glenn Kirby A.

German
Liceo de Cagayan University
Legal Counseling
Wednesdays, 07:00-09:00 PM

Case Digests

G.R. No. 76216 September 14, 1989.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.

Doctrines:

a) Doctrine of self-help - The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (Article 429 of the New Civil Code)

b) The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession, and not when possession has already been lost.

c) When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, “(I)n
no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder
should refuse to deliver the thing.”

Facts:

Spouses Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA, are the owners of the parcel
of land being disputed in this case which is located in Antipolo, Rizal. They executed a
special power of attorney which in effect authorized petitioner German Management
Services to develop their said property into a subdivision; proper permits were acquired
for such intended development.

Spouses Jose, however, discovered that the land was occupied by the private respondents
with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.)
Accordingly, they have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the
 issuance of permits for development to Spouses Jose. Their actual possession of the land
was evidenced by their crops all over the property.

Private respondents along with the 20 other farmers were asked to vacate but they
refused. Thereafter, petitioner continued their development and construction. They tried
to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property.

Private respondents then filed a case for forcible entry. According to them, they were
deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and
bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA. Petitioners tried
to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal.

Issue:
Whether private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes, private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible
entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a
quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the spouses
Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and
fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of
title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual
possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may
be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents
on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code.
 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When
possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n
no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder
should refuse to deliver the thing."

G.R. No. 217656 November 16, 2020.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, petitioner, vs.

EDDIE MANALO, ET.AL, respondents.

Doctrines:

a) Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. (Article XIII,
Section 10 of the Constitution.)

b) In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court shall issue the
necessary writ of demolition for the purpose of dismantling any and all structures
found within the subject property.

Facts:

Eddie Manalo, et.al. are owners of residential structures on a parcel of land on Luzon
Avenue, Quezon City, owned by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. This
parcel of land is directly affected by the Department of Public Works and Highways' C-5
extension project, an endeavor that would link the South Luzon Expressway and the
North Luzon Expressway.

They filed a Complaint before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking the determination and
payment of just compensation from the DPHW. They alleged that despite its
expropriation power, the DPHW neglected to initiate an expropriation proceeding. They
averred that the Department was "cutting corners to hasten the completion of the project."

Moreover, Manalo, et al. claimed that while the DPHW made a voluntary offer of
financial assistance to them, the amount was "notoriously small" that they had to tum
down the offer.

Manalo, et al. claimed that the parties had acknowledged that they were informal settlers.
Hence, citing a Memorandum of Agreement, which the DPHW had entered into with the
Quezon City government, Manalo, et al. claimed that part of the responsibility of the
 DPWH is the clearing and relocation of squatters/illegal shanties affected by the
extension project.

Thus, Manalo, et al. prayed for the determination of just compensation due to them, and
that they be entitled to rights accruing to individuals whose properties were expropriated
for public use, and to moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Issues:
a) Whether petitioner can extrajudicially and summarily evict respondents
and demolish their structures; and

b) Whether respondents are entitled to just compensation for their structures.

Rulings:

a) No, there are laws that must be complied with since respondents admit that they are
informal settlers, not lot owners. This being said, the source of respondents' rights in the
Constitution is not Article III, Section 9 (just compensation), but rather, Article XIII,
Section 10 which states that “Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.”

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8974, or An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-Of-
Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other
Purposes, states that “In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court
shall issue the necessary writ of demolition for the purpose of dismantling any and all
structures found within the subject property.”

Apart from the above-cited law, Section 28 of Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992 expressly mandates that it shall be mandatory in the execution of eviction or
demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens to provide, “Adequate
relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned
and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies
within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after
which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation
not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to
the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local
government unit concerned.”

Also, Section 29 of Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 likewise expressly
mandates that “The local government unit, in coordination with the National Housing
Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities
and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs
of the affected families.”
 Here, there is no allegation that a writ of demolition was procured from the court, or that
the procedures provided in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279 were observed.
Instead, petitioner admits having offered financial assistance to respondents, pursuant to
Section 28(8) of Republic Act No. 7279. By doing' this, petitioner acknowledges that
respondents are underprivileged and homeless citizens, entitled to due process of law,
prior to their eviction and / the demolition of their structures.

b) Cannot be determined yet. According to the Supreme Court, the case should be remanded
to the trial court to determine whether respondents had been prejudiced by the eviction
and demolition of their structures, and if properly substantiated, whether they are entitled
to damages.