CASES:

 Crespo vs. Mogul 151 SCRA 246

FACTS:
An information for estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary
of Justice for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, Leodegario Mogul denied the motion but the
arraignment was deferred to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. Crespo then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a writ of injunction in the CA to restrain respondent judge from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused. The Solicitor General recommended that the petition be given due course and
the CA granted the same.
Meanwhile, Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the RTC, but the respondent judge denied
the same and set the date and time for the arraignment. Crespo then filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with TRO to restrain Mogul from enforcing his judgment, which was again issued by the CA. Later on, the
CA rendered a decision and dismissed the petition of Crespo and lifted the TRO. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N a fiscal has the authority to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after the
information has been submitted to the court?
2. W/N Mogul acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the arraignment of the accused?
RULING:
1. Yes, but it must be with the permission of the judge.
2. No, the court acquires jurisdiction of the accused upon the filing of the information by the fiscal.
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie
case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control
of the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has
authority to do so and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his
guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, such authority is not without any limitation. The
same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of
Justice. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should
the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. In order to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review from the action of the fiscal, when the information has already been filed in Court.

 Salonga vs. Paño 134 SCRA 438

salonga-vs-cruz-pano-digest.pdf
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety
of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. The right to a preliminary investigation
is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. However, in order to satisfy
the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure
that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the
State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birth rights of all who live in
our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the
pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that
no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula
or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts
 are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.

 Landbank of the Philippines vs. Belista, G.R. No. 164631, June 26, 2009

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the
Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay
petitioner's petition for the determination of just compensation.
DARAB – Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

 Isip vs. People, G.R. No.. 170298, June 26, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Isip was charged with Estafa before the RTC of Cavite City, after he allegedly received from
complainant, Atty. Jose, a seven-carat diamond men’s ring valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same
on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the same if not sold. Petitioner denied
receiving the jewelry and failed to return the ring or proceeds of the sale even after repeated demand. On the other
hand, petitioner’s wife, Marietta Isip, was indicted before the same court for 7 counts of Violation of BP 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law) after she issued checks in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry she received from Atty. Jose which were
subsequently dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. The complainant alleged that the foregoing transactions
happened at his ancestral house in Cavite while he was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. In defense,
petitioner averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because he and his wife had transactions with the
complainant at the latter’s residence located at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila as both of them were also Manila
residents. Despite this, the trial court found them guilty of the said allegations. Upon appeal to the CA, Marietta Isip
 died before any decision could have been promulgated thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability.
However, the CA still affirmed Manuel Isip’s conviction for estafa, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense imputed to petitioner and for which he was convicted.
RULING:
Yes. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction took place in his home in Cavite. Since it has
been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to prove otherwise. In the instant case, petitioner
failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction happened in Manila due to the following
reasons: a. Even if petitioner lives in Manila and the issued checks were drawn against banks in Manila or Makati, it still
does not prove that the transactions did not happen in Cavite. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a
distant place where he can procure goods he can sell to earn a living; b. It is settled that when the RTC ’s findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court

 Mondejar vs. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S.
Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave
misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and
Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold departure
order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold
departure orders" shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the
questioned order.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be
issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." Clearly then, criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on
the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.

 Foz vs. People, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 167764

FACTS:
On or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court,
both the accused (VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO) as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of
Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular
issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."
ISSUE:
W/N RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction over said case.
RULING:
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case
in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information
filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar
Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that
he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was
actually residing in another place.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear
this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

 People vs. Sandiganbayan, August 25, 2009, G.R. No. 167304

 FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time
pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. No
liquidation was made after almost two years and so on December 22, 1995, a demand letter was issued by the City
Auditor asking respondent to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours from receipt of the demand. Upon
the recommendation of the Commission on Audit (COA), the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-
Visayas) resolved to file an Information for Malversation of Public Funds. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP)found probable cause to indict respondent Amante and thus on May 21, 2004, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D.
No. 1445 (The Auditing Code of the Philippines).
Respondent Amante in her MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION dated
November 18, 2004 stated that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent
Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds
a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
R.A. No. 6758.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante for lackof
jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan
to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive
branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as
consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

 Serrana vs. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059

FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was
appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.
Hannah Serana with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Hannah Serana moved to quash the information and posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not
receive any salary as a student regent.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Serana as she contended that she was not a public
officer.
RULING:
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the Court held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Hannah Serana falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she
is placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, Hannah Serana is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

 Esquivel vs. Ombudsman, September 17, 2002, G.R. 137237

FACTS:
Police officers Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, municipal mayor
of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal
arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. According to Eduardo, he was about to
eat lunch at his parents’ house at Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived who disarmed him of his Cal. 45 service pistol.
They then forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. On the way to the
town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a
gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!"
Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." He
was struck with a handgun and released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police
blotter that he was in good physical condition. PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely
maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law
enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he
arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor. Thereafter, separate informations docketed as
Criminal Case No. 24777 for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel,
and Criminal Case No. 24778 for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners submit that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offenses filed against petitioners, and thus
committed GAD when it assumed jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction?
RULING:
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions
excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned
therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,
we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can
Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of
the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that
"exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary
grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose
position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed NO grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the
writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

 Department of Justice vs. Liwag, February 11, 2005, G.R. No. 149311
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
 dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
in Civil Case No. 01-100934.
Mary Ong, a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the
Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials
of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different
offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-
00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary
Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the
charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges
against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI,
alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.
NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged
crimes:
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam
Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other
persons named in the witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The
subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and
Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should
dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman
alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Court’s
ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials
such as private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before
the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused.
RULING:
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the
cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. To allow the same
complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings.
It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before
every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies
exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of
valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 Lazatin vs. Desierto, June 5, 2009, G.R. No. 147097

 Castro vs. Deloria, January 27, 2009, G.R. No. 163586
 Antonino vs. Desierto, December 18, 2008, G.R. No. 144492
 Honasan vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004
 Sesbreno vs. Aglugub, February 28, 2005, A.M. No. MTJ 05-1581
 Punzalan vs. de la Pena, July 21, 2004, G.R. No. 158543
 People vs. Duca, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 171175
 People vs. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647
 Sasot vs. People, 462 SCRA 138
 Lasoy vs. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360
 Saludga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010
 Bonifacio vs. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
 Ramiscal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010
 Panaguiton vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008
 Pinote vs. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409 
 Bun Tiong vs. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008
 Community Rural Bank vs. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34
 Serag vs. Court of Appeals, 473 SCRA 590
 Soriano vs. People, G.R. No.162336, February 1, 2010
 Samuel Lee vs. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2011
 Okabe vs. Gutierrez, May 27, 2004, G.R.No. 150185
 People vs. De Leon , G.R. No. 169858, January 26, 2010
 People vs. Laguio, March 16, 2007, G.R. No. 128587
 Valdez vs. People, G.R.170180, November 23, 2007
 Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.101837, February 11, 1992
 Mabutas vs. Perello, A.M.-RTJ No. 03-1817, June 8, 2005.
 Leviste vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.181922, March 17, 2010
 Domingo vs. Pagayatan, A.M.-RTJ No.03-1751, June 10, 2003
 Lachica vs. Tormis, A.M.-RTJ No. 05-1609September 20, 2005
 Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003
 Crisostomo vs. Sandiganbayan, 456 SCRA 45
 Andrado vs. People, 452 SCRA 685
 Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 465
 Libuit vs. People, 469 SCRA 510
 Magtolis vs. Salud, 469 SCRA 439
 Herrera vs. Alba, 460 SCRA 197
 Yulo vs. People, 452 SCRA 705
 Quisay vs. People, G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016
 Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
 People vs. Bronola, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018
 People vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. 223009, January 11, 2018