(G.R. NO. 184915: June 30, 2009) Nilo T. Pates, Petitioner, V. Commission On Elections and Emelita B. ALMIRANTE, Respondents. Resolution Brion, J.

1.) [G.R. NO.
184915 : June 30, 2009]
NILO T. PATES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMELITA

B. ALMIRANTE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 dismissed the petition in caption

pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.' The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final
order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which
shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of
denial.
taking into account the following material antecedents:
A. February 1, 2008 - The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution

(assailed in the petition);
b. February 4, 2008 - The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (Petitioner)

received a copy of the February 1, 2008 Resolution;
c. February 8, 2008 - The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration (MR)
of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of the February 1,
2008 Resolution)
d. September 18, 2008 - The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying

the petitioner's MR (also assailed in the petition).
e. September 22, 2008 - The petitioner received the COMELEC en banc

Resolution of September 18, 2008
Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a Petition
for Certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC Resolution, fell on
a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner only had the remaining
period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and
filing his Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was
Special Civil Actions

October 20, 2008 - the following Monday or the first working day after October
18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition with us on October 22, 2008
or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008.
The Motion for Reconsideration
The petitioner asks us in his "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with

Reiteration for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order" to reverse the
dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition was seasonably filed
under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number
of cases decided beginning the year 2005. The "fresh period" refers to the
original period provided under the Rules of Court counted from notice of the
ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the tribunal below, without
deducting the period for the preparation and filing of the motion for
reconsideration.
He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the prevailing rule in
filing petitions for certiorari. This Court, he continues, changed this rule when
it promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which
both provided for the filing of petitions within the remainder of the original
period, the "remainder" being the original period less the days used up in
preparing and filing a motion for reconsideration. He then points out that on
September 1, 2000 or only three years after, this Court promulgated A.M. No.
00-02-03-SC bringing back the fresh period rule. According to the petitioner,
the reason for the change, which we supposedly articulated in Narzoles v.
National Labor Relations Commission,1 was the tremendous confusion
generated by Circular No. 39-98.
The fresh period rule, the petitioner further asserts, was subsequently applied
by this Court in the following cases:
(1) Neypes v. Court of Appeals2 which thenceforth applied the fresh
eriod rule to ordinary appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals;
(2) Spouses de los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat3 reiterating Neypes;
(3) Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez4 which, following

Neypes, applied the fresh period rule to ordinary appeals from the decisions of
the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court; andcralawlibrary
(4) Romero v. Court of Appeals5 which emphasized that A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC

is a curative statute that may be applied retroactively.
A reading of the ruling in these cases, the petitioner argues, shows that this
Court has consistently held that the order or resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration or new trial is considered as the final order finally disposing of
the case, and the date of its receipt by a party is the correct reckoning point
for counting the period for appellate review.
The Respondent's Comment
We asked the respondents to comment on the petitioner's motion for

reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing Section 5,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and its related cases, asked via a "Manifestation
and Motion" that it be excused from filing a separate comment. We granted
the OSG's manifestation and motion.
For her part, respondent Emelita B. Almirante (respondent Almirante) filed a

comment stating that: (1) we are absolutely correct in concluding that the
petition was filed out of time; and (2) the petitioner's reliance on Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 00-02-03-
SC) is totally misplaced, as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle for
review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC.
Respondent Almirante points out that Rule 64 and Rule 65 are different; Rule
65 provides for a 60-day period for filing petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64
provides for 30 days.
OUR RULING
We do not find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.
A. As a Matter of Law
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise

provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only
to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a Petition
for Certiorari, subject to the exception clause - "except as hereinafter
provided."6
Even a superficial reading of the motion for reconsideration shows that the
petitioner has not challenged our conclusion that his petition was filed outside
the period required by Section 3, Rule 64; he merely insists that the fresh

period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise
apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly

refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons
as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two
- i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to - is Section 3 which
provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from
notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion
for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days
(instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
Thus, as a matter of law, our ruling of November 11, 2008 to dismiss the
petition for late filing cannot but be correct. This ruling is not without its
precedent; we have previously ordered a similar dismissal in the earlier case
of Domingo v. Commission on Elections.7 The Court, too, has countless times
in the past stressed that the Rules of Court must be followed. Thus, we had
this to say in Fortich v. Corona:8
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in
the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of
rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall
have a right to the speedy disposition of their before all judicial, quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies," the adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case
are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances wherein
this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility
was "never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity." A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
As emphasized above, exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may

have existed in the past when we either suspended the operation of the Rules
or exempted a particular case from their application.9 But, these instances
were the exceptions rather than the rule, and we invariably took this course of
action only upon a meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the Rules of
Court based on attendant exceptional circumstances. These uncommon
exceptions allowed us to maintain the stability of our rulings, while allowing for
the unusual cases when the dictates of justice demand a correspondingly
different treatment.
Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party asking for the suspension
of the Rules of Court comes to us with the heavy burden of proving that he
deserves to be accorded exceptional treatment. Every plea for a liberal
construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an explanation of
why the party-litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for
the requested liberal construction.10
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any

compelling reason to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his
petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to
history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
To us, the petitioner's omissions are fatal, as his motion does not provide us
any reason specific to his case why we should act as he advocates.
B. As a Matter of Policy
In harking back to the history of the fresh period rule, what the petitioner
apparently wants - for reasons of uniformity and convenience - is the
simultaneous amendment of Section 3, Rule 64 and the application of his
proposed new rule to his case. To state the obvious, any amendment of this
provision is an exercise in the power of this Court to promulgate rules on
practice and procedure as provided by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. Our rulemaking, as every lawyer should know, is different from
our adjudicatory function. Rulemaking is an act of legislation, directly assigned
to us by the Constitution, that requires the formulation of policies rather than
the determination of the legal rights and obligations of litigants before us. As a
rule, rulemaking requires that we consult with our own constituencies, not
necessarily with the parties directly affected in their individual cases, in order
to ensure that the rule and the policy that it enunciates are the most
reasonable that we can promulgate under the circumstances, taking into
account the interests of everyone - not the least of which are the constitutional
parameters and guidelines for our actions. We point these out as our
adjudicatory powers should not be confused with our rulemaking
prerogative. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

We acknowledge that the avoidance of confusion through the use of uniform
standards is not without its merits. We are not unmindful, too, that no less
than the Constitution requires that "motions for reconsideration of [division]
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc."11 Thus, the ruling of
the Commission en banc on reconsideration is effectively a new ruling
rendered separately and independently from that made by a division.
Counterbalanced against these reasons, however, are other considerations no

less weighty, the most significant of which is the importance the Constitution
and this Court, in obedience to the Constitution, accord to elections and the
prompt determination of their results. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly requires that the

COMELEC's rules of procedure should expedite the disposition of election
cases. This Court labors under the same command, as our proceedings are in
fact the constitutional extension of cases that start with the COMELEC.
Based on these considerations, we do not find convenience and uniformity to

be reasons sufficiently compelling to modify the required period for the filing of
petitions for certiorari under Rule 64. While the petitioner is correct in his
historical data about the Court's treatment of the periods for the filing of the
different modes of review, he misses out on the reason why the period under
Section 3, Rule 64 has been retained. The reason, as made clear above, is
constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance our Constitution
accords to the prompt determination of election results. This reason far
outweighs convenience and uniformity. We significantly note that the present
petition itself, through its plea for the grant of a restraining order, recognizes
the need for haste in deciding election cases.
C. Our Liberal Approach
Largely for the same reason and as discussed below, we are not inclined to
suspend the rules to come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has
blundered by reading the wrong applicable provision. The Rules of Court are
with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice; litigants cannot,
after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for the liberal construction of
these rules.12 Our ruling in Lapid v. Laurea13 succinctly emphasized this point
when we said:
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the
rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of
procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided
to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and, thus,

effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
[Emphasis supplied.]
We add that even for this Court, liberality does not signify an unbridled
exercise of discretion. It has its limits; to serve its purpose and to preserve its
true worth, it must be exercised only in the most appropriate cases.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the motion for reconsideration

for lack of merit. Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 is hereby
declared FINAL. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

2.) G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy
is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, assailing the order dated
August 13, 2010 (denying the affirmative defenses raised by the petitioner), and the order dated October 7, 2010
1
(denying his motion for reconsideration), both issued by the COMELEC First Division in EPC No. 2010-42, an
2
election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista, protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee. 3
Antecedents
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of
Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results led
to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner
was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes. 4
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista
filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42). The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First
5
Division.
In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010, the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista
6
did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts
or omissions complained of.
On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner, viz:
7
After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission (First Division) makes the following
observation:
1. Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) on June 3, 2010
as evidenced by O.R. No. 1118105; and
2. Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the Protestant set forth the specific details of
the acts and omissions complained of against the Protestee.
It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June 3, 2010 is a substantial compliance with the
requirement of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, taking into consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of said Resolution.
Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise essentially complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the above-
mentioned Resolution.
In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DENY the Protestee’s special affirmative
defenses.

SO ORDERED. 8
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the
alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph 2, Rule 19 of COMELEC
9
Resolution No. 8804, requiring all decisions to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which they
10
were based; and that it also contravened Section 7(g), Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a
11
detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that the matter be certified to the
COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1, Section 5, and Section 6, all of Rule 20 of COMELEC Resolution No.
12 13 14
8804.
The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced the requirement for the "detailed
specification" to prevent "shotgun fishing expeditions by losing candidates;" that such requirement contrasted with
15
Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, under which the protest needed only to contain a
16
"concise statement of the ultimate facts" constituting the cause or causes of action; that Bautista’s protest did not
meet the new requirement under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804; and that in Peña v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, the Court upheld the dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
17
(HRET) for not specifically alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.
In his opposition, Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be
18
elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC; that the rules of the
19
COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral frauds,
anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was based;
and that Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not apply because, firstly, Peña had totally
different factual antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the omission of material facts from Peña’s protest
prevented the protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised of the issues that he must meet and made it
eventually impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot boxes had to be collected.
On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioner’s
20
motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:
The Protestee’s August 28, 2010 "Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Certify the Case to the Commission En
Banc" relative to the Order issued by the Commission (First Division) dated August 13, 2010 is hereby DENIED for
failure to show that the assailed order is contrary to law
Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the protestant’s petition have substantially
complied with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the opening of the ballot
boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised in the protest but also those set forth in the Protestee’s
answer. When substantial compliance with the rules is satisfied, allowing the protest to proceed is the best
way of removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the electorate. All other issues laid down in
the parties’ pleadings, including those in the Protestee’s special and affirmative defenses and those
expressed in the preliminary conference brief, will best be threshed out in the final resolution of the instant
case.
The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the Commission En Banc is DENIED
considering that the 13 August 2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of the instant
case with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.
Issue
The petitioner submits that:—

THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND
CONTENT.
The petitioner argues that Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First
21
Division to summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and content; and that the insufficiency in
substance arose from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state how the various irregularities and anomalies
had affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the protested precincts were "pre-shaded bogus-
ballots" used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to accurately account for the votes in
favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to receive for each of the
grounds he protested. He concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in allowing the
protest of Bautista despite its insufficiency.
Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere fishing expedition to be outrightly dismissed
in light of the elections being held under an automated system. In support of his urging, he cites Roque, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, where the Court took judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of the PCOS machines
22
and CCS computers, such that allegations of massive errors in the automated counting and canvassing had
become insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to entertain or to give due course to defective election protests. He 23
submits that a protest like Bautista’s cast doubt on the automated elections.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bautista both posit that the COMELEC had the
power and prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest; and that certiorari did not
lie because the COMELEC First Division acted within its discretion. Additionally, the OSG maintains that the
assailed orders, being interlocutory, are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. The following cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections are enlightening, viz:
24
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution,
as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." [emphasis supplied]

"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or
resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The
Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in
Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.xxx 25
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest
on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the
COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on
Elections. In that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First Division admitting an answer with
26
counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition for certiorari directly in this Court on the
ground that the order constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division. The Court
granted the petition and nullified the assailed order for being issued without jurisdiction, and explained the exception
thuswise:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the
respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that no final
decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the case and its
records to the Commission en banc. No less than the Constitution requires that election cases must be heard
and decided first in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February 28, 1996 and
the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in
division and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental issue regarding the admission
of Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave
something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority
to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the
division itself, and not on the Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
explicitly provides for this,
Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx
xxx
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division
which issued the order. (emphasis provided)
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that the subject case does
not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:

Section 2. The Commission en banc. — The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided,
or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other cases where
a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an
interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the
Commission en banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that
the present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the
members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc.
Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum
which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and
the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en
banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to
review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being
made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction ` Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the
COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be
reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the COMELEC First
Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of
as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright
dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving not only
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the
resolution and determination of election controversies. The breadth of such powers encompasses the authority to
27
determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election protest and to decide based on such allegations
whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with
Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The Court has upheld the COMELEC’s determination of the sufficiency of allegations contained in election protests,
conformably with its imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means within its command, who was
the candidate elected by the electorate. Indeed, in Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, we brushed aside the
28 29
contention that the election protest was insufficient in form and substance and was a sham for having allegations
couched in general terms, stating:
In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioner’s argument that the protestant had no cause of action, as
the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient to order the
opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court states the rules in election protests cognizable by the
COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical pronouncements, we
have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal,
examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the
ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.
In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court considered the allegations in an election protest,
similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.

Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient grounds for
opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in accordance with Section
255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. – Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or
whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of
voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it and that
the ballots be examined and the votes recounted. lawphi1
In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and counter-protest warranted
the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the conflicting
claims of petitioner and private respondent.
The petitioner adds that with the Court having noted the reliability and accuracy of the PCOS machines and
consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) computers in Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, Bautista’s election
30
protest assailing the system and procedure of counting and canvassing of votes cast in an automated system of
elections should be immediately dismissed.
We are not persuaded.
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an election protest to challenge the outcome
of an election undertaken in an automated system of elections. Instead, the Court only ruled there that the system
and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines and CCS computers met the
minimum system requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436. The Court did not guarantee the
31
efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections, as can be gleaned from the following pronouncement
thereat:
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successful automation
election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010.
Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the
counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part
of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true,
possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road,
however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is
laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest
elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears
expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to
succeed, credibly.32
In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the other submissions of the petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

3.) G.R. No. 212953 August 5, 2014
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This treats of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Order dated June 3, 2014 of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014.
1
The Facts
Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de Mesa Festin (Festin) were two of the four
rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections. On May 15, 2013, private respondent was proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes, edging
out petitioner who obtained 19,557 votes.
With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the elections. Specifically, petitioner brought to the
attention of the court the complaints of various voters who claimed that several ballots were pre-marked or that the
ovals appearing on the face of the ballots corresponding to the name of petitioner were embossed or waxed to
prevent them from being shaded. As a consequence of the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities in the
92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, private respondent, so petitioner claimed, was illegally
proclaimed.
In his answer, private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in the precincts, particularly the
number of votes credited to petitioner.
With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical recount of the ballots were
conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Ruling of the RTC
On November 7, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the proclamation of respondent Festin void, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby DECLARESthe Protestant, JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSAas
the duly elected mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Election and
VOIDSthe Proclamation of Protestee Romulo De Mesa Festin as elected Mayor by the Board of Election Inspectors
of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. 2
The RTC justified its ruling by deducting 2,050 votes from private respondent that were allegedly pre-marked or
tampered.
Following this development, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted by the RTC
on January 15, 2014. On January 23, 2014, respondent Festin’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
3
Meanwhile, on February 3, 2014, private respondent Festin elevated the case to public respondent COMELEC via a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief. Petitioner immediately moved for its dismissal on the ground
that the petition’s verification is allegedly defective.

Ruling of the COMELEC
Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss, the COMELEC, acting through its First Division, on February 13, 2014,
issued an Order requiring petitioner to file his answer to the petition. Through the same Order, the COMELEC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin the RTC from implementing its Decision during the pendency
of the case. Without waiving the grounds relied on his motion to dismiss, petitioner timely filed his answer to the
petition.
To petitioner’s surprise, on April 10, 2014, public respondent COMELEC granted private respondent’s request for a
preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC Decision’s execution pending appeal. What petitioner considered
questionable was that the injunction was issued by a newly-constituted Special First Division, which was allegedly
formed due to the absence of several COMELEC commissioners who, at that time, were personally attending to the
concerns of the overseas absentee voters abroad. Petitioner points out that the special division was constituted only
on April 8, 2014 through Resolution No. 9868 and was composed of only two members, Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreño, with the former presiding.
In response to the issuance of the injunction, petitioner filed an urgent motion praying for its quashal, which was
denied by public respondent COMELEC First Division through the assailed June 3, 2014 Order. Thus, the instant
petition.
The Issues
In ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent COMELEC, petitioner relied on the following
grounds:
1. Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it did not find that the Special First Division did not have jurisdiction to issue an
injunction;
2. Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the urgent ex-parte motion to quash the writ of preliminary injunction.
Concisely stated, the issue in this case is the legality of the formation of the Special First Division and the
validity of the Orders it issued, specifically the April 10, 2014 Order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
According to the petitioner, the COMELEC First Division acquired jurisdiction over the case on February 13, 2014
when it directed him to file an answer relative to the appeal filed by private respondent Festin, and when it issued a
TRO enjoining the execution pending appeal. Thus, petitioner insists that this precluded the Special First Division
from acquiring jurisdiction over the same case and, consequently, from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. As
argued by the petitioner, the mere absence of two of the commissioners in the division is not sufficient to oust it of
jurisdiction and confer the same on a new one.
The Court’s Ruling
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
Propriety of certiorari in assailing COMELEC rulings
Petitioner’s recourse, aside from being unsound in substance, is procedurally infirm. The governing provision is
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or rulingof each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty daysfrom receipt of a copy thereof. (emphasis added)
In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections, We have interpreted the provision to limit the
4
remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling,or
5
decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As elucidated in the case:
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, orany plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. (emphasis added)
6
The above doctrine further gained force when it was reiterated in Our recent ruling in Cagas v. COMELEC, in which
7
We held that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest
may not directly assail the said order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek
the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.8
The exception in Kho v. COMELEC is inapplicable
As an exception to the cases of Ambil and Cagas, We have ruled in Kho vs. COMELEC that when it does not
9
appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the challenged final order or
decision is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, the aggrieved party can, by necessity, directly
resort to the Court as the proper forum for reviewing the ruling. Thus, We have granted, in the said case, the petition
assailing an interlocutory order of a COMELEC division.
The exception, however, does not obtain herein. Noteworthy is that in 1997, when Kho was resolved, what was then
in force was the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated on February 15, 1993 (1993 COMELEC Rules). As
expressly provided in Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules:
Section 2. The Commission en banc. –The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided,
or in pre proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a commission, or in all other cases where
a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an
interlocutory matter or issue relative an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the commission en
banc.
xxxx
Section 5. Quorum; Votes required. x x x
x x x x (c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division
which issued the order.
Patent in the above-cited provisions is that the COMELEC en banc, at that time, did not have the power to resolve
motions for reconsideration with respect to interlocutory orders issued by a division. This circumstance was a
controlling factor in Our ruling in Kho.
On the other hand, applicable in the instant petition is COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, promulgated on March 22,
10
2010. As expressly provided:

Rule 20
Motion for Reconsideration
Section 1.Grounds of Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that
the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, is contrary to law.
xxxx
Section 5.How motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the ECAD Clerk concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing
thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
xxxx
Section 7.Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc. - The motion for reconsideration shall be decided within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case or matter is deemed submitted for decision, unless otherwise provided by
law. (emphasis added)
Stark is the contrast between the two cited rules. To reiterate, under the 1993 COMELEC Rules, the COMELEC en
banc is strictly prohibited from entertaining motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders unless unanimously
referred to the en banc by the members of the division that issued the same, whereas under COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, all motions for reconsideration filed with regard to decisions, resolutions, orders and
rulings of the COMELEC divisions are automatically referred to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, in view of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804’s applicability in the instant petition, a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc is available to petitioner herein unlike in Kho.
From the foregoing, petitioner’s procedural lapse becomes manifest. With the availability of a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at petitioner’s disposal, his hasty resort to certiorari to this Court cannot be justified. On this
ground alone, the instant petition canand should be dismissed outright.
The assailed Order was not issued in grave abuse of discretion
Even delving into the merits of the case, it cannot be said that the issuance of the assailed Order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion since public respondent’s actions findsufficient constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. (emphasis added)
Evidently, it is pursuant to this mandate that the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7808 on January 16,
11
2007. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the said Resolution, in part, provides:
Sec. 6. Substitution of members of a Division. –
(a) Temporary vacancy. – Whenever a member of a Division is on leave, seriously ill, temporarily disabled, isabsent,
inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the junior member of the other Division shall substitute such
Commissioner, participating therein in an acting capacity, in addition to his regular membership in his own Division.
xxxx
Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is assigned shall be
designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division," as the case may be, for purposes of the
pertinent casestherein pending."
Thereafter, with the retirement of Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and Commissioner Armando Velasco, the
above-quoted rule was amended by Resolution No. 9636 on February 13, 2013 to now read as:
12
Sec. 6 Substitution of member of a Division. –
(a) Temporary vacancy. - Whenever a member of a Division is on Leave, seriously ill, temporarily disabled, is
absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the Chairman shall substitute him with another
Commissioner,or the Chairman shall sit in place of said member, and in that event he will preside. 1âwphi1
xxxx
Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is assigned shall be
designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division" as the case may be, for purposes of the pertinent
case therein pending.
Invoking the rule, as amended, the COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9868 on April 8, 2014. The Resolution
13
sought to address the temporary vacancies in both Divisionsof the COMELEC in view of the pressing matters
concerning overseasabsentee voting that required the attention and presence abroad of Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Christian Robert S. Lim of the COMELEC First Division, and of Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph of the
Second Division. 14
Due to the absences of the aforementioned Commissioners, and to constitute a quorum for the Divisions, Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat as presiding Chairman for both Divisions until his colleagues’ return. Thus, pursuant to
15
Section 6, Rule 3 as amended, Special Divisions were created with the following compositions: 16
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. – Presiding

Commissioner Al A. Parreño – Member Commissioner
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. – Presiding

Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca – Member Commissioner
Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia – Member Commissioner
With the foregoing discussion, it becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special Divisions is not only
sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules but also by the Constitution no less.
No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special First Division
issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First
Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the
case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and
temporarily filled in the vacancies inboth of its Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merelyindicates
that the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. The
COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before the substitution was
made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special
First Division since this only entailed a change in the Division’s composition of magistrates. Indeed, the case was
not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If anything, it was only petitioner’s naivety that misled him into interpreting the
designation of the division as a "special" one, meaning it is distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also
mistaken in claiming that the jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division from the Special First
Division by ruling on the motion to quash since the First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with.

Petitioner raises a fuss anent the temporary or permanent shuffling of members in the Commission when, in fact,
this is not a novel practice. In instances such as this, exigencies justify the substitution of members and the
designation of special divisions to prevent paralysis in the administration of justice. This is also resorted to in order
to ensure that the speedy disposition of cases is not impeded and that docket systems are unclogged. Obviously,
these advantages far outweigh petitioner's baseless cry of violation of due process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition 1s hereby DISMISSED.

4.) G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO, Petitioner, v. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

EDGAR “EGAY” S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA
No. 13-306 (DC), which affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division
granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar “Egay” S. San Luis (San
Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito (Ejercito).
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was
filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow
gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.3 Alleged
in his Petition are as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
5. [Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the
province of Laguna the so-called “Orange Card” with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters in voting for his favor. Copy thereof is hereto attached and marked as Annex “C” and made as
an integral part hereof;
6. In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna, [Ejercito] and his
cohorts claimed that the said “Orange Card” could be used in any public hospital within the Province
of Laguna for their medical needs as declared by the statements of witnesses which are hereto
attached and marked as Annex “D” as integral part hereof;
7. The so-called “Orange Card” is considered a material consideration in convincing the voters to cast
their votes for [Ejercito’s] favor in clear violation of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides and I quote:
“Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws.” (emphasis ours)
8. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of the aforesaid law, [Ejercito] should be disqualified;
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
9. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522
registered electorate. A certification issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached
and marked as Annex “E” as an integral part hereof;

10. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the
Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:
“Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. – The aggregate amount that a candidate or party
may spent for election campaign shall be as follows:
a. For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
b. For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political
party – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the
candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring
mine for emphasis)
11. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to
incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
12. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito]
exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign
commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our party’s official
monitoring on the following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.
Network Date Program Time Duration Amount*
4 minutes
ABS-CBN April 28, 2013 TV Patrol 5:58 p.m. P3,297,496
(approximately)
Sundays Best 4 minutes
ABS-CBN April 28, 2013 10:40 p.m. P3,297,496
(local specials) (approximately)
Sunday Night 3 minutes
GMA April 28, 2013 10:46 p.m. P2,635,200
Box Office (approximately)
GMA April 28, 2013 11:06 p.m. P2,635,200
GMA April 28, 2013 11:18 p.m. P2,635,200
GMA April 28, 2013 11:47 p.m. P2,635,200
4 minutes
ABS-CBN May 4, 2013 TODA MAX 11:26 p.m. P3,297,496
(approximately)
4 minutes
ABS-CBN May 5, 2013 Rated K 8:06 p.m. P3,297,496
(approximately)
Total P23,730.784
* Total cost based on published rate card;
13. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act,
he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum of P16,611,549;
14. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed an election offense
as provided for under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote:
“Election Offense. – Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall constitute an election
offense punishable under the first and second paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code
in addition to administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x”
15. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides and I quote:
“Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
in the election laws.” (emphasis ours)
16. On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is provided under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, which states and I quote:
“Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of [his] guilt is strong.” (emphasis mine)
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Upon filing of this petition, a declaration by the Honorable Commission of the existence of probable
cause be made against [Ejercito] for violating the afore-quoted provisions of laws;
2. In the event that [Ejercito] will be able to get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of
Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until further order of the Honorable
Commission pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646;
3. Lastly, a criminal case for VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS be filed against [Ejercito] before the
proper court[;] [and]
4. Other relief, just and equitable under the premises, are also prayed for.4
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of
Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue
Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent.5 However, these were not acted upon by the
COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna.6 Based on the
Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’
471,209 votes.7 chanrobleslaw
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013.8 Ejercito
then filed his Verified Answer on June 13, 2013 that prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to
procedural and substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Provincial
Governor.9 He countered that the petition was improperly filed because, based on the averments and
relief prayed for, it is in reality a complaint for election offenses; thus, the case should have been
filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar, provincial election supervisor or
regional election director, or the state, provincial or city prosecutor in accordance with Laurel v.
Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 10.10 Assuming that the petition could be given due course, Ejercito
argued that San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia,11 that he
(Ejercito) was previously convicted or declared by final judgment of a competent court for being
guilty of, or found by the COMELEC of having committed, the punishable acts under Section 68 of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended
(OEC).12chanrobleslaw
As to the acts he allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed that the same are baseless, unfounded, and
totally speculative. He stated that the Health Access Program or the E.R. “Orange Card” was a
priority project of his administration as incumbent Governor of Laguna and was never intended to
influence the electorate during the May 2013 elections. He added that the “Orange Card,” which
addressed the increasing need for and the high cost of quality health services, provides the
Laguneños not only access to medical services but also the privilege to avail free livelihood seminars
to help them find alternative sources of income. With respect to the charge of having exceeded the
total allowable election expenditures, Ejercito submitted that the accusation deserves no
consideration for being speculative, self-serving, and uncorroborated by any other substantial
evidence.
Citing Sinaca v. Mula,13 Ejercito asserted that the petition questioning his qualification was rendered
moot and academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected Provincial Governor of Laguna for the
term 2013-2016. He perceived that his successful electoral bid substantiates the fact that he was an
eligible candidate and that his victory is a testament that he is more than qualified and competent to
hold public office.
Lastly, Ejercito considered San Luis’ petition for disqualification as purely frivolous and with no plain
and clear purpose but to harass and cause undue hardship. According to him, the fact that it was
filed only a few days before the May 13, 2013 elections evidently shows that it was lodged as a last-
ditch effort to baselessly derail and obstruct his assumption of office and function as the duly-elected
Laguna Governor.
The scheduled case conference between the parties on June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27,
2013.14 In the latter date, all the documentary exhibits were marked in evidence and the parties
agreed to file their respective memorandum within ten (10) days.15 chanrobleslaw
San Luis substantially reiterated the content of the Petition in his Memorandum.16 Additionally, he

alleged that:
15. After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure documents from the Information and Education
Department of the Commission on Elections showing that [Ejercito] have incurred advertising
expenses with ABS-CBN in the amount of [P20,197,170.25] not to mention his advertisement with
GMA 7. Copies of the summary report, media purchase order, advertising contract[,] and official
receipt are marked as EXHS. “B-1”, “B-2”, “B-3”, and “B-4” (Annexes “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D”,
supplemental to the very urgent ex-parte motion)[.]17
It was stressed that the case is a “Special Action for Disqualification” seeking to disqualify Ejercito as
gubernatorial candidate for violation of Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC. He prayed that “[t]he Petition
BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding office as
Governor of Laguna.”18 In refutation of Ejercito’s defenses, San Luis argued that it is precisely
because of the commission of the election offenses under Section 68 of the OEC that he (Ejercito)
should be disqualified. Also, citing Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,19 San Luis contended
that Ejercito’s proclamation and assumption of office do not affect the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to
continue with the trial and hearing of the action until it is finally resolved.
For his part, Ejercito filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Memorandum)20 restating all the arguments set
forth in his Verified Answer.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) GRANT the Petition for Disqualification filed against respondent Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito;
(2) DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna,
pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(3) ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(4) DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(5) DIRECT the duly elected Vice Governor of Laguna to assume the Office of the Provincial Governor by
virtue of succession as provided in Section 44 of the Local Government Code; and
(6) DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with the Law Department of this Commission for the
conduct of a preliminary investigation into the alleged violations of campaign finance laws, rules and
regulations committed by respondent Ejercito.
SO ORDERED.21
On procedural matters, the COMELEC First Division held that the title of San Luis’ petition and its
reliance on Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC as grounds for his causes of action clearly show that the
case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,22 as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523,23 which allows petitions for disqualification to be filed “any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.” No credence was
given to Ejercito’s contention that the petition was mooted by his proclamation as Governor of
Laguna. The COMELEC First Division opined that the case of Sinaca is inapplicable, because it was not
about Sinaca’s eligibility or whether he committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 68 of the
OEC. Consistent with Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,24 it was declared that Ejercito’s garnering
of more votes than San Luis in the May 2013 elections is not tantamount to condonation of any act or
acts that he committed which may be found to be a ground for disqualification or election offense.
The COMELEC First Division settled the substantive issues put forth in the petition for disqualification
in this wise:
Anent [San Luis’] first cause of action, [San Luis] presented the Sworn Statement dated [May 7,
2013] of a certain Mrs. Daisy A. Cornelio, together with the “Orange Card” issued to Mrs. Cornelio,
marked respectively as Exhibits “A-4” and “A-3” as per [San Luis’] Summary of Exhibits – to prove
that [Ejercito] committed the act described in Section 68 (a) of the OEC. After reviewing Mrs.
Cornelio’s Sworn Statement, we do not find any averment to the effect that the Orange Card was
given to the affiant to influence or induce her to vote for [Ejercito]. Affiant only stated that she was
given the Orange Card “last April of this year” and that she was “not able to use it during those times
when [she] or one of [her] family members got sick and needed hospital assistance.” Aside from Mrs.
Cornelio’s Sworn Statement, there is no other evidence to support [San Luis’] claim, leading us to
reject [San Luis’] first cause of action.
With respect to the second cause of action, [San Luis] presented Exhibits “B-1” to “B-4”, which are
submissions made by the ABS-CBN Corporation as mandated by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006
(“RA 9006” or the “Fair Election Act”), implemented through Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615.
Exhibit “B-3” is an Advertising Contract between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. (“SCI”). The details of the Contract are as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Payor/Advertiser Scenema Concept International, Inc.

Beneficiary Jeorge “ER” Ejercito Estregan
Broadcast Schedule April 27, 28, May 3, 4, 10 & 11, 2013
Number of Spots 6 spots of 3.5 minutes each
Unit Cost per Spot PhP 3,366,195.04
Total Cost of Contract PhP 20,197,170.25 plus VAT
The Contract contains the signature of [Ejercito] signifying his acceptance of the donation by SCI, the
latter represented by its Executive Vice President, Ms. Maylyn Enriquez. In addition to the advertising
contract, Exhibit “B-4” was submitted, which is a photocopy of an Official Receipt issued by ABS-CBN
for the contract, with the following details: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Date of the Receipt [April 26, 2013]

Received From Scenema Concept International, Inc.
Amount Received PhP 6,409,235.28
Official Receipt No. 278499
Upon verification of the submitted Exhibits “B-1” to “B-4” with this Commission’s Education and
Information Department (EID), the latter having custody of all advertising contracts submitted by
broadcast stations and entities in relation to the [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections, we find
the said Exhibits to be faithful reproductions of our file copy of the same. A comparison of [Ejercito’s]
signature on the Advertising Contract and that on his Certificate of Candidacy show them to be
identical to each other, leading us to the conclusion that [Ejercito] had indeed accepted the PhP
20,197,170.25 donation in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s Channel
2. Even if we were to assume that only PhP 6,409,235.28 was actually paid out of PhP 20,197,170.25
advertising contract, this amount is still more than PhP 4,576,566.00, which is [Ejercito’s] total
authorized aggregate amount allowed for his election campaign, computed as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Number of registered voters for Authorized expense per voter Total amount of spending
x =
the whole Province of Laguna registered in the constituency allowed for election campaign

1,525,522 registered x PhP 3.00 per voter = PhP 4,576,566.00
While not presented as evidence in this case, we cannot deny the existence of another Advertising
Contract dated [May 8, 2013] for one (1) spot of a 3.5-minute advertisement scheduled for
broadcast on [May 9, 2013], amounting to PhP 3,366,195.05. This Contract also contains the
signature of [Ejercito] accepting the donation from SCI and is accompanied by an ABS-CBN-
issued Official Receipt No. 279513 dated [May 7, 2013] in SCI’s name for PhP 6,409,235.28. If we
add the amounts from both contracts, we arrive at a total cost of PhP 23,563,365.29, which,
coincidentally, is the product of:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Number of spots x Unit cost per spot = Total contract cost

Seven (7) spots x PhP 3,366,195.04 = PhP 23,563,365.28
This matches the data gathered by the Commission’s EID from the reports and logs submitted by
broadcast stations as required by the Fair Election Act. According to the 99-page Daily Operations
Log for Channel 2 submitted by ABS-CBN covering the period of [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013],
[Ejercito’s] 3.5-minute or 210-second advertisement was aired seven (7) times. The specific details
on the dates of airing, program or time slot when the advertisements were aired, and the time when
the advertisements as culled from the 99-page Daily Operations Log are summarized as thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Date aired Program/Time Slot Airtime

28 Apr 2013 TV Patrol Linggo/5:20-5:30 pm 05:54:40 PM
28 Apr 2013 Harapan: Senatorial Debate/9:30-11:30 pm 10:40:13 PM
04 May 2013 TODA MAX/10:30-11:15 pm 11:26:43 PM
05 May 2013 Rated K-Handa Na Ba Kayo/7:15-8:15 pm 08:06:42 PM
09 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:35:56 PM
10 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:44:50 PM
11 May 2013 TV Patrol Sabado/5:30-6:00 pm 06:12:30 PM
Source: Pages 6, 8, 43, 47, 75, 84, and 93 of ABS-CBN Channel 2 Daily Operations Log for [April 27,
2013] to [May 11, 2013].
Assuming arguendo, that the actual cost of both contracts only amounted to PhP 12,818,470.56 as
substantiated by the two (2) Official Receipts issued by the ABS-CBN on [April 26] and [May 7,
2013], or even if we were only to consider Exhibit [“B-4”] or the Php 6,409,235.28 payment to ABS-
CBN on [April 26, 2013], it nevertheless supports our finding that [Ejercito] exceeded his authorized
expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68 (c) and
concurrently an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code.25
Only Ejercito filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.26 After the
parties’ exchange of pleadings,27 the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was unanimously
affirmed on May 21, 2014.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action
to disqualify Ejercito, reasoning that:
x x x First, the title of the petition indicating that it is a petition for disqualification clearly expresses
the objective of the action. Second, it is manifest from the language of the petition that the causes of
action have relied primarily on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC[,] which are grounds for
disqualification x x x. Third, notwithstanding that the relief portion of the petition sounded vague in
its prayer for the disqualification of Ejercito, the allegations and arguments set forth therein are
obviously geared towards seeking his disqualification for having committed acts listed as grounds for
disqualification in Section 68 of OEC. Lastly, as correctly observed by the COMELEC First Division,
San Luis’ Memorandum addresses and clarifies the intention of the petition when it prayed for
Ejercito to “be disqualified and prevented from holding office as Governor of Laguna.” While there is
a prayer seeking that Ejercito be held accountable for having committed election offenses, there can
be no doubt that the petition was primarily for his disqualification.
Section 68 of the OEC expressly grants COMELEC the power to take cognizance of an action or
protest seeking the disqualification of a candidate who has committed any of the acts listed therein
from continuing as one, or if he or she has been elected, from holding office. One ground for
disqualification listed in Section 68 is spending in an election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by law. It is exactly on said ground that San Luis is seeking the disqualification of Ejercito.
The jurisdiction of COMELEC over the petition, therefore, is clear.28
The alleged violation of Ejercito’s constitutional right to due process was also not sustained:
Ejercito insists that he was deprived of his right to notice and hearing and was not informed of the
true nature of the case filed against him when San Luis was allegedly allowed in his memorandum to
make as substantial amendment in the reliefs prayed for in his petition. San Luis was allegedly
allowed to seek for Ejercito’s disqualification instead of the filing of an election offense against him.
As discussed above, the allegations in the petition, particularly the causes of action, clearly show that
it is not merely a complaint for an election offense but a disqualification case against Ejercito as well.
San Luis’ memorandum merely amplified and clarified the allegations and arguments in his petition.
There was no change in the cause or causes of action. Ejercito[,] therefore, cannot claim that he was
not aware of the true nature of the petition filed against him.
Likewise, Ejercito cannot complain that he was deprived of his right to notice and hearing. He cannot
feign ignorance that the COMELEC First Division, throughout the trial, was hearing the petition as a
disqualification case and not as an election offense case. He was served with Summons with Notice
of Conference on [June 4, 2013] and was given a copy of the petition. He likewise submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Verified Answer. He also participated in the
Preliminary Conference on [June 27, 2013] wherein he examined evidence on record and presented
his own documentary exhibits. Lastly, he filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Memorandum) incorporating
all his allegations and defenses.
Ejercito contends that amending the reliefs prayed for is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 9 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He asserts that the relief prayed for in the memorandum is not
the same as that in the petition. However, a scrutiny of said amendment shows that no new issues
were introduced. Moreover, there was no departure from the causes of action and no material
alterations on the grounds of relief. The amendment[,] therefore[,] is not substantial as it merely
rectifies or corrects the true nature of reliefs being prayed for as set forth in the petition.
The records of the case will show that Ejercito has been afforded the opportunity to contest and rebut
all the allegations against him. He was never deprived of his right to have access to the evidence
against him. He was adequately aware of the nature and implication of the disqualification case
against him. Thus, Ejercito cannot say that he was denied of his constitutional right to due process.
It is important to note at this point that Ejercito, in his motion for reconsideration, deliberately did
not tackle the merit and substance of the charges against him. He limited himself to raising
procedural issues. This is despite all the opportunity that he was given to confront the evidence
lodged against him. Therefore, there is no reason for the COMELEC En Banc to disturb the findings of
the COMELEC First Division on whether Ejercito indeed over-spent in his campaign for governorship
of Laguna in the [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections.29
Anchoring on the case of Lanot v. Commission on Elections,30 the COMELEC En Banc likewise
debunked Ejercito’s assertion that the petition was prematurely and improperly filed on the ground
that the filing of an election offense and the factual determination on the existence of probable cause
are required before a disqualification case based on Section 68 of the OEC may proceed. It held:
As discussed in the case of Lanot vs. Comelec, each of the acts listed as ground for disqualification
under Section 68 of the OEC has two aspects – electoral and criminal which may proceed
independently from each other, to wit:
x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be
disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in character and
require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified even
without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral
aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a
candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department,
which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through
its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before the
proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A
criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office.” (Emphasis supplied)31
The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending before the Commission is
heard and resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68 of the OEC. It is an administrative
proceeding separate and distinct from the criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made
to undergo in order to determine whether he can be held criminally liable for the same act of over-
spending. It is through this administrative proceeding that this Commission, initially through its
divisions, makes a factual determination on the veracity of the parties’ respective allegations in a
disqualification case. There is no need for a preliminary investigation finding on the criminal aspect of
the offenses in Section 68 before the Commission can act on the administrative or electoral aspect of
the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a petition. As enunciated in Lanot, “(a)n erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-
versa.”
Moreover, Ejercito’s reliance on Codilla is misplaced. The COMELEC En Banc opined that the portion
of the Codilla decision that referred to the necessity of the conduct of preliminary investigation
pertains to cases where the offenders are charged with acts not covered by Section 68 of the OEC,
and are, therefore, beyond the ambit of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction. It said that the decision refers to
this type of cases as criminal (not administrative) in nature, and, thus, should be handled through
the criminal process.
Further rejected was Ejercito’s argument that the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification the moment he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor of Laguna. For the
COMELEC En Banc, its First Division thoroughly and sufficiently addressed the matter when it relied
on Maquiling instead of Sinaca. It maintained that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, not
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050,32 is relevant to the instant case as it states that the COMELEC shall
continue the trial and hearing of a pending disqualification case despite the proclamation of a winner.
It was noted that the proper application of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 was already clarified
in Sunga v. COMELEC.33 chanrobleslaw
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on one of San Luis’ contentions in his Comment/Opposition to

Ejercito’s motion for reconsideration. He argued that he becomes the winner in the gubernatorial
election upon the disqualification of Ejercito. Relying on Maquiling, San Luis declared that he was not
the second placer as he obtained the highest number of valid votes cast from among the qualified
candidates. In denying that Maquiling is on all fours with this case, the COMELEC En Banc said:
In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a non-candidate by reason of his disqualification
under Section 68 of the OEC. He was a candidate who filed a valid certificate of candidacy which was
never cancelled.
Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not because of any ineligibility existing at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but because he violated the rules of candidacy.
His disqualifying circumstance, that is, his having over-spent in his campaign, did not exist at the
time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. It did not affect the validity of the votes cast in his
favor. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he remains the candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes.
Ejercito cannot be on the same footing with Arnado in the Maquiling case. Arnado was disqualified
from running for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Sur because he was a dual citizen not qualified to
run for election. His disqualification existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The effect, pursuant to the Maquiling case, is that the votes he garnered are void, which in turn
resulted in having considered the “second placer” – Maquiling – as the candidate who obtained the
highest number of valid votes cast.
San Luis is in a different circumstance. The votes for the disqualified winning candidate remained
valid. Ergo, San Luis, being the second placer in the vote count, remains the second placer. He
cannot[,] thus[,] be named the winner.
Section 6, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which governs Section 68 petitions for
disqualification, enunciates the rule succinctly, to wit:
Section 6. Effect of Granting of Petition. – In the event a Petition to disqualify a candidate is granted
by final judgment as defined under Section 8 of Rule 23 and the disqualified candidate obtains the
highest number of votes, the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be
proclaimed and the rule of succession, if allowed by law, shall be observed. In the event the rule of
succession is not allowed, a vacancy shall exist for such position.34
On May 23, 2014, Ejercito filed before this Court a Petition for certiorari with application for the
issuance of a status quo ante order or temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI).35 Without issuing a TRO/WPI, the Honorable Chief Justice, Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, issued on May 28, 2014 an order to respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.36 Such order was confirmed nunc pro tunc by the
Court En Banc on June 3, 2014.37 chanrobleslaw

Meantime, on May 26, 2014, Ejercito filed before the COMELEC En Banc an Omnibus Motion to
suspend proceedings and to defer the implementation of the May 21, 2014 Resolution.38 On the same
day, San Luis also filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Declare COMELEC En Banc Resolution of May
21, 2014 and First Division Resolution of September 26, 2013 Final and Executory and to Issue
Forthwith Writ of Execution or Implementing Order 39 invoking Paragraph 2, Section 8 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, in relation to Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.40 On
May 27, 2014, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order denying Ejercito’s omnibus motion, granted
San Luis’ extremely urgent motion, and directed the Clerk of the Commission to issue the
corresponding writ of execution.41 On even date, Vice-Governor Hernandez was sworn in as the
Governor of Laguna at the COMELEC Main Office in Manila. The service of the writ was deemed
completed and validly served upon Ejercito on May 28, 2014.42 chanrobleslaw
In his petition before Us, Ejercito raised the following issues for resolution:
THE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(I) IT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT RULED FOR THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF PETITIONER EVEN IF IT WAS NEVER PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION. WORSE,
THERE IS YET NO FINDING OF GUILT BY A COMPETENT COURT OR A FINDING OF FACT STATING
THAT PETITIONER ACTUALLY COMMITTED THE ALLEGED ELECTION OFFENSE OF OVERSPENDING;
(II) IT RELIED ON A DOCUMENTARY EXHIBIT (ADVERTISING CONTRACT) WHICH WAS NOT EVEN
FORMALLY OFFERED AS EVIDENCE; [AND]
(III) IT DISQUALIFIED PETITIONER FOR AN ACT DONE BY A THIRD PARTY WHO SIMPLY EXERCISED
ITS RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF PETITIONER[.]43
The petition is unmeritorious.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an independent
action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of
jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple errors of judgment.45 More importantly, it will
only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would
amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. x x
x.47
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave abuse of
discretion.
We now explain.
The petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is for the latter’s disqualification and
prosecution for election offense
Ejercito insists that his alleged acts of giving material consideration in the form of “Orange Cards”
and election overspending are considered as election offenses under Section 35 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615,48 in relation to Section 1349 of R.A. No. 9006, and punishable under Section
26450 of the OEC. Considering that San Luis’ petition partakes of the nature of a complaint for
election offenses, the COMELEC First Division has no jurisdiction over the same based on COMELEC
Resolution No. 938651 and Section 26552 of the OEC.
Still, Ejercito contends that the COMELEC erroneously sanctioned a change in San Luis’ cause of
action by the mere expedient of changing the prayer in the latter’s Memorandum. According to him,
San Luis’ additional prayer for disqualification in the Memorandum is a substantial amendment to
the Petition as it constitutes a material deviation from the original cause of action – from a complaint
for election offenses to a petition for disqualification. Since such substantial amendment was effected
after the case was set for hearing, Ejercito maintains that the same should have been allowed only
with prior leave of the COMELEC First Division pursuant to Section 2, Rule 953 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which San Luis never did.
The arguments are untenable.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.54 A petition to disqualify a
candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. -- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election
propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and
regulations on election propaganda through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]);
threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (Section 261
[e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds
(Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election
within the restricted areas (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). All the offenses mentioned in Section 68
refer to election offenses under the OEC, not to violations of other penal laws. In other words,
offenses that are punished in laws other than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a Section 68
petition. Thus, We have held:
x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
Section 68 of the [OEC]. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.
They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the [OEC],
the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of
justice, viz:
“Section 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on
any complaint within four months from its filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the
office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.”55

In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition
filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification
as well. Indeed, the following are clear indications:
1. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.56 This expresses the
objective of the action since Rule 25 is the specific rule governing the disqualification of
candidates.
2. The averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for
its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the candidate
shall be disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from holding
the office.
3. Paragraph 2 of San Luis’ prayer in the petition states that “[in the event that [Ejercito] will be
able to get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of Laguna on May 13, 2013, his
proclamation be suspended until further order of the Honorable Commission.” San Luis
reiterated this plea when he later filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of
Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent. The relief sought is actually
pursuant to Section 657 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 5 Rule 2558 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, both of which pertain to the effect of a disqualification case when the petition is
unresolved by final judgment come election day.
4. San Luis’ Memorandum emphasized that the case is a “Special Action for Disqualification,”

praying that “[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and
PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of Laguna.”
With the foregoing, Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition.
This considering, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss the applicability of Section 2, Rule 9 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, there being no substantial amendment to San Luis’ petition that
constitutes a material deviation from his original causes of action. Likewise, COMELEC Resolution No.
9386 and Section 265 of the OEC do not apply since both refer solely to the prosecution of election
offenses. Specifically, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 is an amendment to Rule 34 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure on the prosecution of election offenses, while Section 265 of the OEC is found
under Article XXII of said law pertaining also to election offenses.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case
Assuming, arguendo, that San Luis’ petition was properly instituted as an action for disqualification,
Ejercito asserts that the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether the acts
enumerated under Section 68 of the OEC were indeed committed is a requirement prior to actual
disqualification. He posits that Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the
matter of preliminary investigation; hence, the clear import of this is that the necessity of preliminary
investigation provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 remains undisturbed and continues to be
in full force and effect.
We are not persuaded.
Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states:

Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. – If a Petition for
Disqualification is unresolved by final judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner may file a
motion with the Division or Commission En Banc where the case is pending, to suspend the
proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided that the evidence for the grounds to disqualify is
strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to any election, the Clerk of the Commission
shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all Commissioners copies of said the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition to disqualify is proclaimed winner,
the Commission shall continue to resolve the said Petition.
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation
because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals
with disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC may designate any of its
officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in
cases involving barangay officials.59 As aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary
investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the
COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region ("NCR"), Provincial Election
Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election
Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them,
or which may be indorsed to them by the COMELEC.60 chanrobleslaw
Similarly, Ejercito’s reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is misplaced. COMELEC Resolution No.
2050, which was adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification filed
by virtue of the provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases
of this nature and the manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition [of] disqualification cases
contemplated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act
6646, there is a strongly felt need to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of this specific class
of disqualification cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases
of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the
grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with
the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by
the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the
respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the
disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or
[on] motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the [Law] Department of the Commission as
the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary
investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be
availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been
proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate,
the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint
shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the
Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been
filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said
court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en
banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima
facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the Information for filing with the appropriate
court.61
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC,62 the Court stated that the above-quoted resolution covers two (2)
different scenarios:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which
must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained
of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the
COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before
the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said
complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a
candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as
winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred
to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation. However, if before
proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong.63
However, with respect to Paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which is the situation in this
case, We held in Sunga:
x x x Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,
which provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (italics supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word “shall”
signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which
must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with
the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect
disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the
COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of
its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be
in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general
provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law
itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter
cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of
election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the
disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason
caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ
delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not
the main intent and purpose of the law.64 chanrobleslaw
The “exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to
the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an election
offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain
whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative
proceeding that is summary in character. This Court said in Sunga:
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal
aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any
other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to
secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a
determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of
evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall
be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with,
under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.65
and equally in Lanot:
x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be
disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in character and
require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may
proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a
candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department,
which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through
its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before the
proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A
criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include
disqualification from holding a future public office.
The two aspects account for the variance of the rules on disposition and resolution of disqualification
cases filed before or after an election. When the disqualification case is filed before the elections, the
question of disqualification is raised before the voting public. If the candidate is disqualified after the
election, those who voted for him assume the risk that their votes may be declared stray or invalid.
There is no such risk if the petition is filed after the elections. x x x.66
We cannot accept Ejercito’s argument that Lanot did not categorically pronounce that the conduct of
a preliminary investigation exclusively pertains to the criminal aspect of an action for disqualification
or that a factual finding by the authorized legal officers of the COMELEC may be dispensed with in the
proceedings for the administrative aspect of a disqualification case. According to him, a close reading
of said case would reveal that upon filing of the petition for disqualification with the COMELEC
Division, the latter referred the matter to the Regional Election Director for the purpose of
preliminary investigation; therefore, Lanot contemplates two referrals for the conduct of investigation
– first, to the Regional Election Director, prior to the issuance of the COMELEC First Division’s
resolution, and second, to the Law Department, following the reversal by the COMELEC En Banc.
For easy reference, the factual antecedents of Lanot are as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 19, 2004, a little less than two months before the May 10, 2004 elections, Henry P.
Lanot, et al. filed a Petition for Disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the OEC against then
incumbent Pasig City Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio. National Capital Region Director Esmeralda Amora-
Ladra conducted hearings on the petition. On May 4, 2004, she recommended Eusebio’s
disqualification and the referral of the case to the COMELEC Law Department for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the possible violation of Section 261 (a) of the OEC. When the COMELEC
First Division issued a resolution adopting Director Ladra’s recommendations on May 5, 2004, then
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos informed the pertinent election officers through an Advisory
dated May 8, 2004. Eusebio filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 9, 2004. On election day,
Chairman Abalos issued a memorandum to Director Ladra enjoining her from implementing the May
5, 2004 COMELEC First Division resolution. The petition for disqualification was not yet finally
resolved at the time of the elections. Eusebio's votes were counted and canvassed. After which,
Eusebio was proclaimed as the winning candidate for city mayor. On August 20, 2004, the
COMELEC En Banc annulled the COMELEC First Division's order to disqualify Eusebio and referred the
case to the COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation.
When the issue was elevated to Us, the Court agreed with Lanot that the COMELEC En
Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the disqualification case
pending preliminary investigation of the COMELEC Law Department. Error was made when it ignored
the electoral aspect of the disqualification case by setting aside the COMELEC First Division's
resolution and referring the entire case to the COMELEC Law Department for the criminal aspect. We
noted that COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC En Banc based its ruling, is
procedurally inconsistent with COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, which was the governing rule at the
time. The latter resolution delegated to the COMELEC Field Officials the hearing and reception of
evidence of the administrative aspect of disqualification cases in the May 10, 2004 National and Local
Elections. In marked contrast, in the May 2013 elections, it was only in cases involving barangay
officials that the COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar,
to hear the case and to receive evidence.67 chanrobleslaw
The COMELEC En Banc properly considered as evidence the Advertising Contract dated

May 8, 2013
Ejercito likewise asserts that the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013 should not have been relied
upon by the COMELEC. First, it was not formally offered in evidence pursuant to Section 34, Rule
13268 of the Rules and he was not even furnished with a copy thereof, depriving him of the
opportunity to examine its authenticity and due execution and object to its admissibility. Second,
even if Section 34, Rule 132 does not apply, administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions
are nonetheless proscribed from rendering judgment based on evidence that was never presented
and could not be controverted. There is a need to balance the relaxation of the rules of procedure
with the demands of administrative due process, the tenets of which are laid down in the seminal
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.69 And third, the presentation of the advertising
contracts, which are highly disputable and on which no hearing was held for the purpose of taking
judicial notice in accordance with Section 3, Rule 12970 of the Rules, cannot be dispensed with by
COMELEC’s claim that it could take judicial notice.
Contrary to Ejercito’s claim, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules is inapplicable. Section 4, Rule 171 of
the Rules of Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to election cases except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. In fact, nowhere from
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 requires that documentary evidence should be formally offered in
evidence.72 We remind again that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case is done through an
administrative proceeding which is summary in character.
Granting, for argument’s sake, that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court applies, there have been
instances when We suspended the strict application of the rule in the interest of substantial justice,
fairness, and equity.73 Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, it is well recognized that the Court is empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a
particular case from the application of a general rule, when the rigid application thereof tends to
frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.74 The fact is, even Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure fittingly declare that “[the] rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission” and
that “[in] the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.”
This Court said in Hayudini v. Commission on Elections:75
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The
COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of
justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for
the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the
electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its
command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.76
Further, Ejercito’s dependence on Ang Tibay is weak. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.77 Any
seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who had the opportunity to be heard
thereon.78 In this case, it is undisputed that Ejercito filed a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc. Despite this, he did not rebut the authenticity and due execution of the
advertising contracts when he decided not to discuss the factual findings of the COMELEC First
Division on the alleged ground that it may be construed as a waiver of the jurisdictional issues that
he raised.79chanrobleslaw
We agree with San Luis and the Office of the Solicitor General that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule
129,80 the COMELEC has the discretion to properly take judicial notice of the Advertising Contract
dated May 8, 2013. In accordance with R.A. No. 9006, the COMELEC, through its Campaign Finance
Unit, is empowered to:
a. Monitor fund raising and spending activities;
b. Receive and keep reports and statements of candidates, parties, contributors and election
contractors, and advertising contracts of mass media entities;
c. Compile and analyze the reports and statements as soon as they are received and make an
initial determination of compliance;
d. Develop and manage a recording system for all reports, statements, and contracts received by
it and to digitize information contained therein;
e. Publish the digitized information gathered from the reports, statements and contracts and
make them available to the public;
f. Develop a reportorial and monitoring system;
g. Audit all reports, statements and contracts and determine compliance by the candidates,
parties, contributors, and election contractors, including the inspection of Books and records of
candidates, parties and mass media entities and issue subpoenas in relation thereto and
submit its findings to the Commission En Banc;
h. Coordinate with and/or assist other departments/offices of the Commission receiving related
reports on Campaign Finance including prosecution of violators and collection of fines and/or
imposition of perpetual disqualification; and
i. Perform other functions as ordered by the Commission.81
The COMELEC may properly take and act on the advertising contracts without further proof from the
parties herein. Aside from being considered as an admission82 and presumed to be proper
submissions from them, the COMELEC already has knowledge of the contracts for being ascertainable
from its very own records. Said contracts are ought to be known by the COMELEC because of its
statutory function as the legal custodian of all advertising contracts promoting or opposing any
candidate during the campaign period. As what transpired in this case, the COMELEC has the
authority and discretion to compare the submitted advertising contracts with the certified true copies
of the broadcast logs, certificates of performance or other analogous records which a broadcast
station or entity is required to submit for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and
duration of advertisements aired.
To be precise, R.A. No. 9006 provides:

Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda. –
xxxx
4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall not be
printed, published, broadcast or exhibited without the written acceptance by the said candidate or
political party. Such written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be
submitted to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall
have equal access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the
COMELEC:
xxxx
6.2
xxxx
(b.) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled
to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the
COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and verification
of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political
party.
6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising,

promoting or opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five
(5) days after its signing. x x x.
The implementing guidelines of the above-quoted provisions are found in Rule 5 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9476 –
Section 2. Submission of Copies of Advertising Contracts. – All media entities shall submit a
copy of its advertising and or broadcast contracts, media purchase orders, booking orders, or other
similar documents to the Commission through its Campaign Finance Unit, accompanied by a
summary report in the prescribed form (Annex “E”) together with official receipts issued for
advertising, promoting or opposing a party, or the candidacy of any person for public office, within
five (5) days after its signing, through:
a. For Media Entities in the NCR
The Education and Information Department (EID), which shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign
Finance Unit of the Commission.
b. For Media Entities outside of the NCR
The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned who shall furnish copies thereof to the Education
and Information Department of the Commission within five (5) days after the campaign periods. The
EID shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the Commission. cralawred
xxxx
It shall be the duty of the EID to formally inform media entities that the latter’s failure to comply with
the mandatory provisions of this Section shall be considered an election offense punishable pursuant
to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006. [RA 9006, Secs. 6.3 and 13]
and in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 –
SECTION 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through
Mass Media. – All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space
for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject to the following requirements
and/or limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda
xxx
Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement contract be furnished to the
Commission, thru the Education and Information Department, within five (5) days from contract
signing.cralawred
xxx
d. Common requirements/limitations: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
(3) For the above purpose, each broadcast entity and website owner or administrator shall submit to
the Commission a certified true copy of its broadcast logs, certificates of performance, or other
analogous record, including certificates of acceptance as required in Section 7(b) of these
Guidelines, for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of
advertisements aired for any candidate or party through: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For Broadcast Entities in the NCR –
The Education and Information Department (EID) which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five days from receipt thereof.
For Broadcast Entities outside of the NCR –
The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in turn, shall furnish copies thereof to the
Education and Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall furnish copies
thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt
thereof.
For website owners or administrators –
The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in turn, shall furnish copies thereof to the
Education and Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall furnish copies
thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt
thereof.
All broadcast entities shall preserve their broadcast logs for a period of five (5) years from the date
of broadcast for submission to the Commission whenever required.
Certified true copies of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and certificates of acceptance, or
other analogous record shall be submitted, as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3 weeks after start of

1st Report March 4 - 11
campaign period
3 weeks after 1st filing
Candidates for National 2nd Report April 3 - 10
week
Positions
3rd Report 1 week before election day May 2 - 9
Last Report Election week May 14 - 17
1 week after start of
1st Report April 15 - 22
campaign period
Candidates for Local 2nd Report 1 week after 1st filing week April 30 - May 8
Positions 3rd Report Election week May 9 - 15
Last Report 1 week after election day May 16 - 22
For subsequent elections, the schedule for the submission of reports shall be prescribed by the
Commission.
Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess
of what is allowed by the OEC
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in
fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that such contract benefited him,
Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their
own without his consent. Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 83 decided by the US
Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in
accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which is
guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.84 He believes that an advertising
contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent must be considered
a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or
inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC Resolution No. 947685 distinguishes
between “contribution” and “expenditure” and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of
contribution.86 He also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set
by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third
parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is
presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the government.
We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema
Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the
COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those
in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising
contracts is actually a must because non-compliance is considered as an election offense.87 chanrobleslaw
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate
shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to
the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized
representative of the political party.88 Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution
No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated to a candidate shall not be
broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in
the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the
items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media
purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly
authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by a
written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized representatives.89 COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda
donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written
acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words “airtime for this
broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the true and correct name and address of the
donor.90chanrobleslaw
This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito’s representation that his signature on the advertising
contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition
for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the
Supreme Court.91 It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to
raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC.92 While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that elementary considerations of due process require that a
party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered.93 chanrobleslaw
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent,
and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no
place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence
and determine the truth of factual allegations.94 Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC,
or by any other administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are
binding on the Court. As enunciated in Juan v. Commission on Election:95
Findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded
great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made
from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of
stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as an administrative
agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally
respected and even given finality. x x x.96
Having determined that the subject TV advertisements were done and broadcasted with Ejercito’s
consent, it follows that Citizens United does not apply. In said US case, a non-profit corporation sued
the Federal Election Commission, assailing, among others, the constitutionality of a ban on
corporate independent expenditures for electioneering communications under 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b.
The corporation released a documentary film unfavorable of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a
candidate for the Democratic Party's Presidential nomination. It wanted to make the film available
through video-on-demand within thirty (30) days of the primary elections, and it produced
advertisements to promote the film. However, federal law prohibits all corporations – including non-
profit advocacy corporations – from using their general treasury funds to
make independent expenditures for speech that is an "electioneering communication"97 or for
speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate within thirty (30) days of a
primary election and sixty (60) days of a general election. The US Supreme Court held that the ban
imposed under § 441b on corporate independent expenditures violated the First
Amendment98 because the Government could not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's identity as a non-profit or for-profit corporation. It was opined:
Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a
"restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during
a campaign," that statute "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Were the Court to uphold
these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the
various points in the speech process. See McConnell, supra, at 251, 124 S. Ct. 619, 517 L. Ed. 2d
491 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (Government could repress speech by "attacking all levels of the
production and dissemination of ideas," for "effective public communication requires the speaker to
make use of the services of others"). If § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is
merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to
the people. See Buckley, supra, at 14-15, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 ("In a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for
office is essential"). The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.
The First Amendment "'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1971)); see Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d
659 ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution").
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by
design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are "subject to strict scrutiny," which
requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest." WRTL, 551 U.S., at 464, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329
(opinion of Roberts, C. J.). While it might be maintained that political speech simply cannot be
banned or restricted as a categorical matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S., at 124, 112 S. Ct.
501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), the quoted language from WRTL
provides a sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case.
We shall employ it here.
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to
disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000) (striking down content-based
restriction). Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech
by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407,
55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). As instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit
a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to
speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class
of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice.
The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine
for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects
speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of
certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to
perform their functions. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S.
Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) (protecting the "function of public school education"); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629
(1977) (furthering "the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439
(1974) (ensuring "the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 93 S. Ct.
2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1973) ("[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious performance
rather than political service"). The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case,
however, would not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are inapposite. These
precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain governmental functions that cannot
operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By contrast, it is inherent in the
nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in
order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not allowed the
exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public dialogue.
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.
The previous decisions of the US Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce99 (which ruled that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate
identity) and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission100 (which upheld the
limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge) were, in effect, overruled by Citizens
United.
Like Citizens United is the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo.101 In this much earlier case, the US
Supreme Court ruled, among other issues elevated to it for resolution, on a provision of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, (FECA)102 which limits independent political
expenditures by an individual or group advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office to $1,000 per year. Majority of the US Supreme Court expressed the view
that the challenged provision is unconstitutional as it impermissibly burdens the right of free
expression under the First Amendment, and could not be sustained on the basis of governmental
interests in preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption or in equalizing the resources of
candidates.103chanrobleslaw
Even so, the rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find bearing only on matters related to
“independent expenditures,” an election law concept which has no application in this jurisdiction. In
the US context, independent expenditures for or against a particular candidate enjoy constitutional
protection. They refer to those expenses made by an individual, a group or a legal entity which are
not authorized or requested by the candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent
of the candidate; they are expenditures that are not placed in cooperation with or with the consent of
a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate.104 In contrast, there is no
similar provision here in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its implementing rules and
regulations106 specifically make it unlawful to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any print, broadcast
or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate without the written acceptance of said
candidate.
If at all, another portion of the Buckley decision is significant to this case. One of the issues resolved
therein is the validity of a provision of the FECA which imposes $1,000 limitation on political
contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and authorized campaign committees.107 Five
justices of the nine-member US Supreme Court sustained the challenged provision on the grounds
that it does not violate First Amendment speech and association rights or invidiously discriminate
against non-incumbent candidates and minority party candidates but is supported by substantial
governmental interests in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. It was held: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the primary First Amendment problem raised
by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of
political association. The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of
association is a "basic constitutional freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 57, that is "closely
allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free
society." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
522-523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 460-461; NAACP v. Button, supra, at 452 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental "action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP
v. Alabama, supra, at 460-461. Yet, it is clear that "<[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute." CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973). Even
a "significant interference' with protected rights of political association" may be sustained if the State
demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, at 488; NAACP v.
Button, supra, at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 488.
Appellees argue that the Act's restrictions on large campaign contributions are justified by three
governmental interests. According to the parties and amici, the primary interest served by the
limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on
candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. Two "ancillary" interests underlying the
Act are also allegedly furthered by the $ 1,000 limits on contributions. First, the limits serve to mute
the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative
ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections. Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some
extent act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the
political system more widely to candidates without access to sources of large amounts of money.
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose -- to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions -- in order to find a constitutionally
sufficient justification for the $ 1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of
elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial
contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. The
increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling
operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential
ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions are given to secure
political quid pro quo's from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never
be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate
that the problem is not an illusory one.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in
a regime of large individual financial contributions. In CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, the Court found
that the danger to "fair and effective government" posed by partisan political conduct on the part of
federal employees charged with administering the law was a sufficiently important concern to justify
broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan political association. Here, as there, Congress
could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence "is also
critical... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent." 413 U.S. at 565.
Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and
narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with "proven
and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." But laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes
deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental
action. And while disclosure requirements serve the many salutary purposes discussed elsewhere in
this opinion, Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and
that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or
appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even
when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed.
The Act's $ 1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign
contributions -- the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for
corruption have been identified -- while leaving persons free to engage in independent political
expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but
nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.
Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material
degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by
individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty
interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient
to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $ 1,000 contribution
ceiling. (Emphasis supplied)
Until now, the US Supreme Court has not overturned the ruling that, with respect to limiting political
contributions by individuals and groups, the Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance was “sufficiently important” or “compelling” so that the interest would
satisfy even strict scrutiny.108
chanrobleslaw
In any event, this Court should accentuate that resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only
if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy and that even in the absence of
local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence are merely persuasive authority at best since they
furnish an uncertain guide.109 We prompted in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric
Company:110 chanrobleslaw
x x x American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they
are persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must be construed in
accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the
language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they
must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws.
And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.111 chanrobleslaw
and once more in Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas:112 chanrobleslaw
x x x [A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.... [I]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs.” Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged.113 chanrobleslaw
Indeed, in Osmeña v. COMELEC,114 this Court, in reaffirming its ruling in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections115 that Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646116 does not invade and violate the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression, remarked in response to the dissent of
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the present case, in batting for an “uninhibited
market place of ideas,” quotes the following from Buckley v. Valeo: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was
designed to “secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources” and “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.” ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a limit on
campaign expenditure on the theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the view that
government may not restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others also
think that the campaign expenditure limitation found in our election laws is unconstitutional? How
about the principle of one person, one vote, is this not based on the political equality of voters?
Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of the people – even of God. The notion that
the government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others may
be foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the Philippine Constitution, being in fact an
animating principle of that document.
Indeed, Art. IX-C, §4 is not the only provision in the Constitution mandating political equality. Art.
XIII, §1 requires Congress to give the “highest priority” to the enactment of measures designed to
reduce political inequalities, while Art. II, §26 declares as a fundamental principle of our government
“equal access to opportunities for public service.” Access to public office will be denied to poor
candidates if they cannot even have access to mass media in order to reach the electorate. What
fortress principle trumps or overrides these provisions for political equality?
Unless the idealism and hopes which fired the imagination of those who framed the Constitution now
appear dim to us, how can the electoral reforms adopted by them to implement the Constitution, of
which §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to §§90 and 92 are part, be considered infringements on
freedom of speech? That the framers contemplated regulation of political propaganda similar to
§11(b) is clear from the following portion of the sponsorship speech of Commissioner Vicente B.
Foz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or utilization of
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges or concessions granted by the
Government, there is a provision that during the election period, the Commission may regulate,
among other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and time allotments for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and
peaceful elections. This has to do with the media of communication or information.117 chanrobleslaw
Proceeding from the above, the Court shall now rule on Ejercito’s proposition that the legislature
imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations. He vigorously asserts that COMELEC Resolution
No. 9476 distinguishes between “contribution” and “expenditure” and makes no proscription on the
medium or amount of contribution made by third parties in favor of the candidates, while the limit
set by law, as appearing in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election expenditures of
candidates.
We deny.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166118 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political
parties for election campaign, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount that a
candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates,
Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any
candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the
Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.119 chanrobleslaw
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166.120 These provisions, which
are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned, read: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. – No candidate shall spend for his election
campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein
referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or
in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus
and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the
total expenses incurred by the candidate.
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties. – A duly accredited political party may
spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has official
candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the equivalent of one peso and fifty centavos for
every voter currently registered therein. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters, or committees of
such political party shall be included in the computation of the total expenditures of the political
party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as expenses of their respective
individual candidates and subject to limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures. – No person, except the candidate,
the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall make
any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate or political party. Expenditures duly
authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such
candidate or political party.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the
Commission signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party and showing the expenditures so
authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis
supplied)121chanrobleslaw
The focal query is: How shall We interpret “the expenses herein referred to shall include those
incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate” and “except the candidate, the treasurer of a
political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer” found in Sections 100 and
103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions exclude from the allowable election expenditures
the contributions of third parties made with the consent of the candidate? The Court holds not.
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead
to absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory construction may be resorted to
such as the legislative history of the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that courts may take
judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as
prior laws on the same subject matter in order to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law.122 chanrobleslaw
Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are substantially lifted
from P.D. No. 1296,123 as amended. Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which specifically provide: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for his election
campaign an amount more than the salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one year
attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to
shall include those incurred by the candidate, his contributors and supporters, whether in cash or in
kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That, where the land, water or air craft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or
supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the
total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more than sixty
thousand pesos for their election campaign.
Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or aggrupations. A political party,
group or aggrupation may not spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of fifty
centavos for every voter currently registered therein: Provided, That expenses incurred by such
political party, group or aggrupation not duly registered with the Commission and/or not presenting
or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be considered as expenses of its candidates and
subject to the limitation under Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters or
committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be included in the computation of the total
expenditures of the political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures. No person, except the candidate or
any person authorized by him or the treasurer of a political party, group or aggrupation, shall make
any expenditure in support of, or in opposition to any candidate or political party, group or
aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate of the treasurer of the party, group or
aggrupation shall be considered as expenditure of such candidate or political party, group or
aggrupation.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the
Commission, signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation and
showing the expenditure so authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the person
so designated. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known as the “Election Code of 1971”) was
enacted.124 Sections 41 and 42 of which are relevant, to quote: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates. – No candidate shall spend for his election
campaign more than the total amount of salary for the full term attached to the office for which he is
a candidate.
Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties and Other Non-political Organizations. – No
political party as defined in this Code shall spend for the election of its candidates an aggregate
amount more than the equivalent of one peso for every voter currently registered throughout the
country in case of a regular election, or in the constituency in which the
election shall be held in case of a special election which is not held in conjunction with a regular
election. Any other organization not connected with any political party, campaigning for or against a
candidate, or for or against a political party shall not spend more than a total amount of five
thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No. 6132,125 which implemented the resolution of both Houses of
Congress calling for a constitutional convention, explicitly stated:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. The following provisions shall govern
election spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
(G) All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures, contributions or donations
which in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose the candidacy of any
candidate, shall file a statement of all such expenditures and contributions made or received on such
dates and with such details as the Commission on Elections shall prescribe by rules. The total
expenditures made by a candidate, or by any other person with the knowledge and consent of the
candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said, therefore,
that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the
election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by
including in the aggregate limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter. The
phrase “those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover
those expenses which are contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal
requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer.” Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.126 (Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should We.) There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none
is indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression
under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation,127 the law’s concern
is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to
ensure equality between and among aspirants with “deep pockets” and those with less financial
resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary
to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political
advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in
Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.128 Indeed,
to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which
skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA
No. 13-306 (DC), which upheld the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar “Egay” S. San Luis against
petitioner Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, is hereby AFFIRMED.

5.) G.R. No. 188818 May 31, 2011
TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, in his personal capacity and in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu City, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Certiorari1 filed by Tomas R. Osmeña, former mayor of the City of Cebu, under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The petition seeks the reversal of the May 6, 2008 Decision2 and the June 8, 2009
Resolution3 of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA), which disallowed the damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses awarded in favor of two construction companies in the collection cases filed against the City of
Cebu, and made these charges the personal liability of Osmeña for his failure to comply with the legal requirements
for the disbursement of public funds.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The City of Cebu was to play host to the 1994 Palarong Pambansa (Palaro). In preparation for the games, the City
engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc. (WTCI) and Dakay Construction and Development Company
(DCDC) to construct and renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex. Osmeña, then city mayor, was authorized by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Cebu to represent the City and to execute the construction contracts.
While the construction was being undertaken, Osmeña issued a total of 20 Change/Extra Work Orders to WTCI,
amounting to ₱35,418,142.42 (about 83% of the original contract price), and to DCDC, amounting to
₱15,744,525.24 (about 31% of the original contract price). These Change/Extra Work Orders were not covered by
any Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior authorization from the Sanggunian. Nevertheless, the work
proceeded on account of the "extreme urgency and need to have a suitable venue for the Palaro."4 The Palaro was
successfully held at the Cebu City Sports Complex during the first six months of 1994.
Thereafter, WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in the construction and
renovation of the sports complex. A Sanggunian member, Councilor Augustus Young, sponsored a resolution
authorizing Osmeña to execute the supplemental agreements with WTCI and DCDC to cover the extra work
performed, but the other Sanggunian members refused to pass the resolution. Thus, the extra work completed by
WTCI and DCDC was not covered by the necessary appropriation to effect payment, prompting them to file two
separate collection cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City (Civil Case Nos. CEB-170045 and
CEB-171556 ). The RTC found the claims meritorious, and ordered the City to pay for the extra work performed. The
RTC likewise awarded damages, litigation expenses and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱2,514,255.40 to
WTCI7 and ₱102,015.00 to DCDC.8 The decisions in favor of WTCI and DCDC were affirmed on appeal, subject to
certain modifications as to the amounts due, and have become final. To satisfy the judgment debts, the Sanggunian
finally passed the required appropriation ordinances.
During post-audit, the City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the payment of litigation expenses,
damages, and attorney’s fees to WTCI and DCDC.9 The City Auditor held Osmeña, the members of the
Sanggunian, and the City Administrator liable for the ₱2,514,255.40 and ₱102,015.00 awarded to WTCI and
DCDC, respectively, as damages, attorney’s fees, and interest charges. These amounts, the City Auditor
concluded, were unnecessary expenses for which the public officers should be held liable in their personal
capacities pursuant to the law.
Osmeña and the members of the Sanggunian sought reconsideration of the disallowance with the COA Regional
Office, which, through a 2nd Indorsement dated April 30, 2003,10 modified the City Auditor’s Decision by absolving
the members of the sanggunian from any liability. It declared that the payment of the amounts awarded as
damages and attorney’s fees should solely be Osmeña’s liability, as it was him who ordered the change or
extra work orders without the supplemental agreement required by law, or the prior authorization from the

Sanggunian. The Sanggunian members cannot be held liable for refusing to enact the necessary ordinance
appropriating funds for the judgment award because they are supposed to exercise their own judgment and
discretion in the performance of their functions; they cannot be mere "rubber stamps" of the city mayor.
The COA Regional Office’s Decision was sustained by the COA’s National Director for Legal and Adjudication
(Local Sector) in a Decision dated January 16, 2004.11 Osmeña filed an appeal against this Decision.
On May 6, 2008, the COA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the notices of disallowance.12 Osmeña
received a copy of the Decision on May 23, 2008. Eighteen days after or on June 10, 2008, Osmeña filed a
motion for reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision.
The COA denied Osmeña’s motion via a Resolution dated June 8, 2009.13 The Office of the Mayor of Cebu City
received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June 29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmeña left for the
United States of America for his check-up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his office only on
July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmeña filed the present petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 to assail the COA’s Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009.
THE PETITION
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the COA. Section 3 of the same Rule provides for a 30-day period, counted from
the notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, to file the petition for certiorari. The
Rule further states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the said judgment or final order or resolution
interrupts the 30-day period.
Osmeña filed his motion for reconsideration, of the COA’s May 6, 2008 Decision, 18 days from his receipt thereof,
leaving him with 12 days to file a Rule 64 petition against the COA ruling. He argues that the remaining period
should be counted not from the receipt of the COA’s June 8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the Mayor of
Cebu City on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially reported back to his office on July 15, 2009, after
his trip abroad. Since he is being made liable in his personal capacity, he reasons that the remaining period
should be counted from his actual knowledge of the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Corollary, he
needed time to hire a private counsel who would review his case and prepare the petition.
Osmeña pleads that his petition be given due course for the resolution of the important issues he raised. The
damages and interest charges were awarded on account of the delay in the payment of the extra work done by
WTCI and DCDC, which delay Osmeña attributes to the refusal of the Sanggunian to appropriate the necessary
amounts. Although Osmeña acknowledges the legal necessity for a supplemental agreement for any extra work
exceeding 25% of the original contract price, he justifies the immediate execution of the extra work he ordered
(notwithstanding the lack of the supplemental agreement) on the basis of the extreme urgency to have the
construction and repairs on the sports complex completed in time for the holding of the Palaro. He claims that the
contractors themselves did not want to embarrass the City and, thus, proceeded to perform the extra work even
without the supplemental agreement.
Osmeña also points out that the City was already adjudged liable for the principal sum due for the extra work orders
and had already benefitted from the extra work orders by accepting and using the sports complex for the Palaro. For
these reasons, he claims that all consequences of the liability imposed, including the payment of damages and
interest charges, should also be shouldered by the City and not by him.
THE COURT’S RULING
Relaxation of procedural rules to give effect to a party’s right to appeal
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or
final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. [Emphasis ours.]
Several times in the past, we emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in
the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized
exceptions to the Rules but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would
defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be
accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a justification for the
requested liberal construction.14 Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, this
Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.15
Osmeña cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo in Houston, Texas after his cancer surgery in
April 2009 as reason for the delay in filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened state of health, he claims
that he could not very well be expected to be bothered by the affairs of his office and had to focus only on his
medical treatment. He could not require his office to attend to the case as he was being charged in his personal
capacity.
We find Osmeña’s reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the service of the June 8,
2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor
of Cebu City,16 we consider July 15, 2009 – the date he reported back to office – as the effective date when he
was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were to rule
otherwise, we would be denying Osmeña of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the merits of his
case.
Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified, and a verification requires
the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer that he has read the petition and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that Osmeña was out of the country to attend to his
medical needs, he could not comply with the requirements to perfect his appeal of the Decision of the COA.
While the Court has accepted verifications executed by a petitioner’s counsel who personally knows the truth of the
facts alleged in the pleading, this was an alternative not available to Osmeña, as he had yet to secure his own
counsel. Osmeña could not avail of the services of the City Attorney, as the latter is authorized to represent city
officials only in their official capacity.17 The COA pins liability for the amount of damages paid to WTCI and DCDC on
Osmeña in his personal capacity, pursuant to Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (PD 1445).18
Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition should be counted from
July 15, 2009, the date Osmeña had actual knowledge of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of the COA and given the opportunity to competently file an appeal thereto before the Court. The
present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary period.
Personal liability for expenditures of government fund when made in violation of law
The Court’s decision to adopt a liberal application of the rules stems not only from humanitarian considerations
discussed earlier, but also on our finding of merit in the petition.
Section 103 of PD 1445 declares that "[e]xpenditures of government funds or uses of government property in
violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible
therefor." Notably, the public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made
in violation of law. In this case, the damages were paid to WTCI and DCDC pursuant to final judgments rendered
against the City for its unreasonable delay in paying its obligations. The COA, however, declared that the
judgments, in the first place, would not be rendered against the City had it not been for the change and extra work
orders that Osmeña made which (a) it considered as unnecessary, (b) were without the Sanggunian’s approval, and
(c) were not covered by a supplemental agreement.

The term "unnecessary," when used in reference to expenditure of funds or uses of property, is relative. In Dr.
Teresita L. Salva, etc. v. Guillermo N. Carague, etc., et al.,19 we ruled that "[c]ircumstances of time and place,
behavioural and ecological factors, as well as political, social and economic conditions, would influence any such
determination. x x x [T]ransactions under audit are to be judged on the basis of not only the standards of legality but
also those of regularity, necessity, reasonableness and moderation." The 10-page letter of City Administrator Juan
Saul F. Montecillo to the Sanggunian explained in detail the reasons for each change and extra work order; most of
which were made to address security and safety concerns that may arise not only during the holding of the Palaro,
but also in other events and activities that may later be held in the sports complex. Comparing this with the COA’s
general and unsubstantiated declarations that the expenses were "not essential"20 and not "dictated by the demands
of good government,"21 we find that the expenses incurred for change and extra work orders were necessary and
justified.
The COA considers the change and extra work orders illegal, as these failed to comply with Section III, C1 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594,22 which states that:
5. Change Orders or Extra Work Orders may be issued on a contract upon the approval of competent authorities
provided that the cumulative amount of such Change Orders or Extra Work Orders does not exceed the limits of the
former's authority to approve original contracts.
6. A separate Supplemental Agreement may be entered into for all Change Orders and Extra Work Orders if
the aggregate amount exceeds 25% of the escalated original contract price. All change orders/extra work
orders beyond 100% of the escalated original contract cost shall be subject to public bidding except where the
works involved are inseparable from the original scope of the project in which case negotiation with the incumbent
contractor may be allowed, subject to approval by the appropriate authorities. [Emphases ours.]
Reviewing the facts of the case, we find that the prevailing circumstances at the time the change and extra work
orders were executed and completed indicate that the City of Cebu tacitly approved these orders, rendering a
supplemental agreement or authorization from the Sanggunian unnecessary. 1âwphi1
The Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC), upon the recommendation of the Technical Committee
and after a careful deliberation, approved the change and extra work orders. It bears pointing out that two members
of the PBAC were members of the Sanggunian as well – Rodolfo Cabrera (Chairman, Committee on Finance) and
Ronald Cuenco (Minority Floor Leader). A COA representative was also present during the deliberations of the
PBAC. None of these officials voiced any objection to the lack of a prior authorization from the Sanggunian or a
supplemental agreement. The RTC Decision in fact mentioned that the Project Post Completion Report and
Acceptance was approved by an authorized representative of the City of Cebu on September 21, 1994.23 "[a]s the
projects had been completed, accepted and used by the [City of Cebu]," the RTC ruled that there is "no necessity of
[executing] a supplemental agreement."24 Indeed, as we declared in Mario R. Melchor v. COA,25 a supplemental
agreement to cover change or extra work orders is not always mandatory, since the law adopts the permissive word
"may." Despite its initial refusal, the Sanggunian was eventually compelled to enact the appropriation ordinance in
order to satisfy the RTC judgments. Belated as it may be, the enactment of the appropriation ordinance,
nonetheless, constitutes as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. It serves as a confirmatory act
signifying the Sanggunian’s ratification of all the change and extra work orders issued by Osmeña. In National
Power Corporation (NPC) v. Hon. Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, etc., et al.,26 the Court considered the compromise
agreement between the NPC and the construction company as a ratification of the extra work performed, without
prior approval from the NPC’s Board of Directors.
As in Melchor,27 we find it "unjust to order the petitioner to shoulder the expenditure when the government had
already received and accepted benefits from the utilization of the [sports complex]," especially considering that the
City incurred no substantial loss in paying for the additional work and the damages awarded. Apparently, the City
placed in a time deposit the entire funds allotted for the construction and renovation of the sports complex. The
interest that the deposits earned amounted to ₱12,835,683.15, more than enough to cover the damages awarded to
WTCI (₱2,514,255.40) and the DCDC (₱102,015.00). There was "no showing that [the] petitioner was ill-motivated,
or that [the petitioner] had personally profited or sought to profit from the transactions, or that the disbursements
have been made for personal or selfish ends."28 All in all, the circumstances showed that Osmeña issued the change
and extra work orders for the City’s successful hosting of the Palaro, and not for any other "nefarious endeavour."29

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we hereby GRANT the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court. The respondent’s Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009 are SET ASIDE.

6.) G.R. No. 167219 February 8, 2011
RUBEN REYNA and LLOYD SORIA, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for certiorari,1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside Resolution No.
2004-046,2 dated December 7, 2004, of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) was engaged in a cattle-financing program wherein loans were
granted to various cooperatives. Pursuant thereto, Land Bank’s Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur Branch (Ipil Branch) went
into a massive information campaign offering the program to cooperatives.
Cooperatives who wish to avail of a loan under the program must fill up a Credit Facility Proposal (CFP) which will
be reviewed by the Ipil Branch. As alleged by Emmanuel B. Bartocillo, Department Manager of the Ipil Branch, the
CFP is a standard and prepared form provided by the Land Bank main office to be used in the loan application as
mandated by the Field Operations Manual.3 One of the conditions stipulated in the CFP is that prior to the release of
the loan, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the supplier of the cattle, Remad Livestock Corporation
(REMAD), and the cooperative, shall have been signed providing the level of inventory of stocks to be delivered,
specifications as to breed, condition of health, age, color, and weight. The MOA shall further provide for a buy-back
agreement, technology, transfer, provisions for biologics requirement and technical visits and replacement of sterile,
unproductive stocks.4 Allegedly contained in the contracts was a stipulation that the release of the loan shall be
made sixty (60) days prior to the delivery of the stocks.5
The Ipil Branch approved the applications of four cooperatives. R.T. Lim Rubber Marketing Cooperative (RT Lim
RMC) and Buluan Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries MPC (BARBEMCO) were each granted two loans. Tungawan
Paglaum Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Tungawan PFMPC) and Siay Farmers’ Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(SIFAMCO) were each granted one loan. Pursuant to the terms of the CFP, the cooperatives individually entered
into a contract with REMAD, denominated as a "Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing Agreement."6
In December 1993, the Ipil Branch granted six loans to the four cooperative borrowers in the following amounts:
Date of Name of Amount of Amount of Amount Paid

Release Borrower Loan Livestock to Cattle
Insurance Supplier
(REMAD)
12-10-93 RTLim RMC ₱ 795,305 ₱ 62,305 ₱ 733,000
12-10-93 BARBEMCO 482,825 37,825 445,000
Tungawan
12-16-93 482,825 37,825 445,000
PFMPC
12-22-93 SIFAMCO 983,010 77,010 906,000
12-22-93 RTLim RMC 187,705 14,705 173,000
12-22-93 BARBEMCO 448,105 35,105 413,000

TOTAL ₱3,375,775 264,775 3,115,0007
As alleged by petitioners, the terms of the CFP allowed for pre-payments or advancement of the payments prior to
the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD. This Court notes, however, that copies of the CFPs were not
attached to the records of the case at bar. More importantly, the very contract entered into by the cooperatives and
REMAD, or the "Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing Agreement"8 did not contain a provision authorizing
prepayment.
Three checks were issued by the Ipil Branch to REMAD to serve as advanced payment for the cattle. REMAD,
however, failed to supply the cattle on the dates agreed upon.
In post audit, the Land Bank Auditor disallowed the amount of ₱3,115,000.00 under CSB No. 95-005 dated
December 27, 1996 and Notices of Disallowance Nos. 96-014 to 96-019 in view of the non-delivery of the
cattle.9 Also made as the basis of the disallowance was the fact that advanced payment was made in
violation of bank policies and COA rules and regulations. Specifically, the auditor found deficiencies in the
CFPs, to wit:
The Auditor commented that the failure of such loan projects deprived the farmer-beneficiaries the opportunity to
improve their economic condition.
From the Credit Facilities Proposals (CFP), the Auditor noted the following deficiencies.
xxxx
4. No. 1 of the loan terms and conditions allowed prepayments without taking into consideration the interest of the
Bank. Nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD, the supplier/dealer.
There was no justification for the prepayment scheme. Such is a clear deviation from existing procedures on asset
financing under which the Bank will first issue a "letter guarantee" for the account of the borrower. Payment thereof
will only be effected upon delivery of asset, inspection and acceptance of the same by the borrower.
The prepayment arrangement also violates Section 88 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, to quote:
Prohibition against advance payment on government – Except with the prior approval of the President (Prime
Minister), the government shall not be obliged to make an advance payment for services not yet rendered or for
supplies and materials not yet delivered under any contract therefor. No payment, partial or final shall be made on
any such contract except upon a certification by the head of the agency concerned to have effect that the services
or supplies and materials have been delivered in accordance with the terms of the contract and have been duly
inspected and accepted.
Moreover, the Manual on FOG Lending Operations (page 35) provides the systems and procedures for releasing
loans, to quote:
Loan Proceeds Released Directly to the Supplier/Dealer – Proceeds of loans granted for the acquisition of farm
machinery equipment; and sub-loan components for the purchase of construction materials, farm inputs, etc. shall
be released directly to the accredited dealers/suppliers. Payment to the dealer shall be made after presentation of
reimbursement documents (delivery/ official receipts/ purchase orders) acknowledged by the authorized LBP
representative that same has been delivered.
In cases where supplier requires Cash on Delivery (COD), the checks may be issued and the cooperative and a
LBP representative shall release the check to the supplier and then take delivery of the object of financing."10
The persons found liable by the Auditor for the amount of ₱3,115,000.00 which was advanced to REMAD were the
following employees of the Ipil Branch:
1. Emmanuel B. Bartocillo – Department Manager II
2. George G. Hebrona – Chief, Loans and Discounts Division
3. Petitioner Ruben A. Reyna – Senior Field Operations Specialist
4. Petitioner Lloyd V. Soria – Loans and Credit Analyst II
5. Mary Jane T. Cunting11 – Cash Clerk IV
6. Leona O. Cabanatan – Bookkeeper III/Acting Accountant.12
The same employees, including petitioners, were also made respondents in a Complaint filed by the COA Regional
Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, before the Office of the Ombudsman for Gross Negligence, Violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Bank and Giving Unwarranted Benefits to
persons, causing undue injury in violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.13
On January 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the issuance of the Notice of
Disallowance was premature in view of the pending case in the Office of the Ombudsman. The Motion was denied
by the Auditor. Unfazed, petitioners filed an appeal with the Director of COA Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga
City. On August 29, 1997, the COA Regional Office issued Decision No. 97-001 affirming the findings of the Auditor.
On February 4, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Regional Office in
Decision No. 98-00514 issued on February 18, 1998.
Petitioners did not file a Petition for Review or a Notice of Appeal from the COA Regional Office Decision as
required under Section 3, Rule VI15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA. Thus, the Decision of the
Director of COA Regional Office No. IX became final and executory pursuant to Section 5116 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines. Consequently, on April 12, 1999, the Director of the COA Regional Office No. IX
issued a Memorandum to the Auditor directing him to require the accountant of the Ipil Branch to record in their
books of account the said disallowance.17
On July 12, 1999, the Auditor sent a letter to the Land Bank Branch Manager requiring him to record the
disallowance in their books of account. On August 10, 1999, petitioners sent a letter18 to COA Regional Office No.
IX, seeking to have the booking of the disallowance set aside, on the grounds that they were absolved by the
Ombudsman in a February 23, 1999 Resolution,19 and that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas had approved the writing
off of the subject loans.
The February 23, 1999 Resolution of the Ombudsman was approved by Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHERFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
SO ORDERED.20
COA Regional Office No. IX endorsed to the Commission proper the matter raised by the petitioners in their August
10, 1999 letter. This is contained in its February 28, 2000 letter/endorsement,21 wherein the Director of COA
Regional Office No. IX maintained his stand that the time for filing of a petition for review had already lapsed. The
Regional Director affirmed the disallowance of the transactions since the same were irregular and disadvantageous
to the government, notwithstanding the Ombudsman resolution absolving petitioners from fault.
In a Notice22 dated June 29, 2000, the COA requested petitioners to submit a reply in response to the
letter/endorsement of the Regional Office Director. On August 10, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance/
Reply23, wherein they argued that the Ombudsman Resolution is a supervening event and is a sufficient ground for
exemption from the requirement to submit a Petition for Review or a Notice of Appeal to the Commission proper.

Petitioners also argued that by invoking the jurisdiction of the Commission proper, the Regional Director had waived
the fact that the case had already been resolved for failure to submit the required Petition for Review.
On July 17, 2003, the COA rendered Decision No. 2003-10724 affirming the rulings of the Auditor and the Regional
Office, to wit:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Commission hereby affirms both the subject disallowance
amounting to ₱3,115,000 and the Order of the Director, COA Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, directing the
recording of subject disallowance in the LBP books of accounts. This is, however, without prejudice to the right of
herein appellants to run after the supplier for reimbursement of the advance payment for the cattle.25
In denying petitioners request for the lifting of the booking of the disallowance, the COA ruled that after a
circumspect evaluation of the facts and circumstances, the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of the
complaint did not affect the validity and propriety of the disallowance which had become final and executory.26
On August 22, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the COA in a
Resolution27 dated December 7, 2004.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising the following grounds in support of the petition, to wit:
RESPONDENT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF

JURISDICTION IN DECLARING THE PREPAYMENT STIPULATION IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
BANK AND REMAD PROSCRIBED BY SECTION 103 OF P.D. NO. 1445, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
STATE AUDIT CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

JURISDICTION FOR HOLDING THE PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR HAVING
PROCESSED THE LOANS OF THE BORROWING COOPERATIVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
BANK’S MANUAL (FOG) LENDING OPERATIONS.

JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THE PETITIONERS LIABLE AND, THEREFORE, IN EFFECT LIKEWISE
OBLIGATED TO REFUND THE DISALLOWED AMOUNT EVEN AS AMONG OTHER THINGS THEY
ACTED IN EVIDENT GOOD FAITH. MORE SO, AS THE COLLECTIBLES HAVE BEEN ALREADY
EFFECTIVELY WRITTEN-OFF.28
The petition is not meritorious.
I.
Anent the first issue raised by petitioners, the same is without merit. Petitioners argue said issue on three
points: first, the COA is estopped from declaring the prepayment stipulation as invalid;29 second, the prepayment
clause in the Land Bank-REMAD contract is valid;30 and third, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that is not unusual
for winning bidders involving public works to enter into contracts with the government providing for partial
prepayment of the contract price in the form of mobilization funds.31
As to their contention that the COA is estopped from declaring the prepayment stipulation as invalid, petitioners
argue in the wise:
xxxx
The CATTLE BREEDING AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT sample of which is attached as Annex "I"
was a Contract prepared by the bank and REMAD, it was agreed to by the cooperatives. It was a standard Contract
used in twenty two (22) Land Bank branches throughout the country. It provided in part:

6.1 That the release of the loan shall be made directly to the supplier 60 days prior to the delivery of stocks per
prepayment term of REMAD LIVESTOCK COPORATION (supplier). Inspection shall be done before the 60th
day/delivery of the stocks.
Again, these Contracts were standard bank forms from Land Bank head office. None of the Petitioners participated
in the drafting of the same.32
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari, under Rule
64 of the Rules of Court. The office of the petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of judgment; any resort
to the said petition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues.33 Accordingly, since the validity of the prepayment scheme is inherently a question
of fact, the same should no longer be looked into by this Court.
In any case, even assuming that factual questions may be entertained, the facts do not help petitioners' cause for
the following reasons: first, the supposed Annex "I" does not contain a stipulation authorizing a pre-payment
scheme; and second, petitioners clearly violated the procedure of releasing loans contained in the Bank's Manual on
Field Office Guidelines on Lending Operations (Manual on Lending Operations).
A perusal of the aforementioned Annex "I,"34 the Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing Agreement, would show
that stipulation "6.1" which allegedly authorizes prepayment does not exist. To make matters problematic is that
nowhere in the records of the petition can one find a document which embodies such a stipulation. It bears stressing
that the Auditor noted in his report that, "nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme
with REMAD, the supplier/dealer."
Moreover, it is surprising that one of petitioners’ defense is that they processed the cooperatives' applications in
accordance with their individual job descriptions as provided in the Bank’s Manual on Field Office Guidelines on
Lending Operations35 when, on the contrary, petitioners seem to be oblivious of the fact that they clearly violated the
procedure in releasing loans which is embodied in the very same Manual on Lending Operations, to wit:
Loan Proceeds Released Directly to the Supplier/Dealer – Proceeds of loans granted for the acquisition of farm
machinery equipment; and sub-loan components for the purchase of construction materials, farm inputs, etc. shall
be released directly to the accredited dealers/suppliers. Payment to the dealer shall be made after presentation of
reimbursement documents (delivery/ official receipts/ purchase orders) acknowledged by the authorized LBP
representative that same has been delivered.36
However, this Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioners contend that the Legal Department of Land Bank
supposedly passed upon the issue of application of Section 88 of PD 1445. Petitioners argue that in an alleged
August 22, 1996 Memorandum issued by the Land Bank, it opined that Section 88 of PD 1445 is not applicable.37 Be
that as it may, this Court is again constrained by the fact that petitioners did not offer in evidence the alleged August
22, 1996 Land Bank Memorandum. Therefore, the supposed tenor of the said document deserves scant
consideration. In any case, even assuming arguendo that petitioners are correct in their claim, they still cannot hide
from the fact that they violated the procedure in releasing loans embodied in the Manual on Lending Operations as
previously discussed.
To emphasize, the Auditor noted that "nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme
with REMAD." It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally
accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their
expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.38 If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized,
petitioners should have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition.
However, as stated before, even this Court is at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as a
review of "Annex I," the document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not
contain such a stipulation or provision. Highlighted also is the fact that petitioners clearly violated the procedure in
releasing loans found in the Manual on Lending Operations which provides that payments to the dealer shall only be
made after presentation of reimbursement documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that the
same has been delivered.

In addition, this Court notes that much reliance is made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the CFP
allowed for prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier
REMAD. It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the
Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the
cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is
any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation
should exist in the loan contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed to
attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present petition.
Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the
commission of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented before the COA was insufficient to prove their
case. So also, even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity of petitioners' allegations as they did
not even present before this Court the documents that would serve as the basis for their claims.
II.
Anent the second ground raised by petitioners, the same is again without merit. Petitioners impute on the COA
grave abuse of discretion when it held petitioners administratively liable for having processed the loans of the
borrowing cooperatives. This Court stresses, however, that petitioners cannot rely on their supposed observance of
the procedure outlined in the Manual on Lending Operations when clearly the same provides that "payment to the
dealer shall be made after presentation of reimbursement documents (delivery/official receipts/purchase orders)
acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that the same has been delivered." Petitioners have not made
a case to dispute the COA's finding that they violated the foregoing provision. Any presumption, therefore, that
public officials are in the regular performance of their public functions must necessarily fail in the presence of an
explicit rule that was violated.
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA as petitioners were given all the opportunity to argue
their case and present any supporting evidence with the COA Regional Director. Moreover, it bears to point out that
even if petitioners' period to appeal had already lapsed, the COA Commission Proper even resolved their August
10, 1999 letter where they raised in issue the favorable ruling of the Ombudsman.
III.
Anent, the last issue raised by petitioners, the same is without merit. Petitioners contend that respondent’s Order,
requiring them to refund the disallowed transaction, is functus officio, the amount having been legally written-off.39
A perusal of the records would show that Land Bank Vice-President Conrado B. Roxas sent a Memorandum40 dated
August 5, 1998 to the Head of the Ipil Branch, advising them that the accounts subject of the present petition have
been written-off, to wit:
We are pleased to inform you that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in its letter dated July 20, 1998 has approved
the write-off of your recommended Agrarian Reform Loan Accounts and Commercial Loan Accounts as covered by
LBP Board Resolution Nos. 98-291 and 98-292, respectively, both dated June 18, 1998 x x x.41
The Schedule of Accounts for Write-Off42 attached to the August 5, 1998 Memorandum shows that the same
covered the two loans given to BARBEMCO, the two loans given to RTLim RMC, and the only loan given to
Tungawan PFPMC. The total amount approved for write-off was ₱2,209,000.00.43 Moreover, petitioners contend that
the last loan given to SIFAMCO was also the subject of a write-off in a similar advice given to the Buug Branch. The
total approved write-off in the second Memorandum44 was for ₱906,000.00.
In its Comment,45 the COA argues that the fact that the audit disallowance was allegedly written-off is of no moment.
Respondent
maintains that Section 66 of PD 144546 expressly granted unto it the right to compromise monetary liabilities of the
government.47 The COA, thus, theorizes that without its approval, the alleged write-off is ineffectual. The same
argument was reiterated by the COA in its Memorandum.48

The COA’s argument deserves scant consideration.
A write-off is a financial accounting concept that allows for the reduction in value of an asset or earnings by the
amount of an expense or loss. It is a means of removing bad debts from the financial records of the business.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,49 this Court ruled that Land Bank has the power and
authority to write-off loans, to wit:
LBP was created as a body corporate and government instrumentality to provide timely and adequate financial
support in all phases involved in the execution of needed agrarian reform (Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, Sec.
74). Section 75 of its Charter vests in LBP specific powers normally exercised by banking institutions, such as the
authority to grant short, medium and long-term loans and advances against security of real estate and/or other
acceptable assets; to guarantee acceptance(s), credits, loans, transactions or obligations; and to borrow from, or
rediscount notes, bills of exchange and other commercial papers with the Central Bank. In addition to the
enumeration of specific powers granted to LBP, Section 75 of its Charter also authorizes it:
12. To exercise the general powers mentioned in the Corporation Law and the General Banking Act, as amended,
insofar as they are not inconsistent or incompatible with this Decree.
One of the general powers mentioned in the General Banking Act is that provided for in Section 84 thereof, reading:
xxxx
Writing-off loans and advances with an outstanding amount of one hundred thousand pesos or more shall require
the prior approval of the Monetary Board (As amended by PD 71).
It will, thus, be seen that LBP is a unique and specialized banking institution, not an ordinary "government agency"
within the scope of Section 36 of Pres. Decree No. 1445. As a bank, it is specifically placed under the supervision
and regulation of the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to its Charter (Sec. 97, Rep. Act No. 3844, as
amended by Pres. Decree No. 251). In so far as loans and advances are concerned, therefore, it should be deemed
primarily governed by Central Bank Circular No. 958, Series of 1983, which vests the determination of the frequency
of writing-off loans in the Board of Directors of a bank provided that the loans written-off do not exceed a certain
aggregate amount. The pertinent portion of that Circular reads:
b. Frequency/ceiling of write-off. The frequency for writing-off loans and advances shall be left to the discretion of
the Board of Directors of the bank concerned. Provided, that the aggregate amount of loans and advances which
may be written-off during the year, shall in no case exceed 3% of total loans and investments; Provided, further, that
charge-offs are made against allowance for possible losses, earnings during the year and/or retained earnings.50
While the power to write-off is not expressly granted in the charter of the Land Bank, it can be logically implied,
however, from the Land Bank's authority to exercise the general powers vested in banking institutions as provided in
the General Banking Act (Republic Act 337). The clear intendment of its charter is for the Land Bank to be clothed
not only with the express powers granted to it, but also with those implied, incidental and necessary for the exercise
of those express powers.51
In the case at bar, it is thus clear that the writing-off of the loans involved was a valid act of the Land Bank. In
writing-off the loans, the only requirement for the Land Bank was that the same be in accordance with the applicable
Bangko Sentral circulars, it being under the supervision and regulation thereof. The Land Bank recommended for
write-off all six loans granted to the cooperatives, and it is worthy to note that the Bangko Sentral granted the same.
The write-offs being clearly in accordance with law, the COA should, therefore, adhere to the same, unless under its
general audit jurisdiction under PD 1445, it finds that under Section 25(1) the fiscal responsibility that rests directly
with the head of the government agency has not been properly and effectively discharged.
On this note, the reliance of respondent on Section 66 of PD 1445 is baseless as a reading thereof would show that
the same does not pertain to the COA’s power to compromise claims. Probably, what respondent wanted to refer to
was Section 36 which provides:
Section 36. Power to compromise claims. -
1. When the interest of the government so requires, the Commission may compromise or release in whole
or in part, any claim or settled liability to any government agency not exceeding ten thousand pesos and with
the written approval of the Prime Minister, it may likewise compromise or release any similar claim or liability
not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, through
the Commission and the Prime Minister, with their recommendations, to the National Assembly.
2. The respective governing bodies of government-owned or controlled corporations, and self-

governing boards, commissions or agencies of the government shall have the exclusive power to
compromise or release any similar claim or liability when expressly authorized by their charters and
if in their judgment, the interest of their respective corporations or agencies so requires. When the charters
do not so provide, the power to compromise shall be exercised by the Commission in accordance with the
preceding paragraph.
x x x x52
Under Section 36, the use of the word "may" shows that the power of the COA to compromise claims is only
permissive, and not mandatory. Further, the second paragraph of Section 36 clearly states that respective
governing bodies of government-owned or controlled corporations, and self-governing boards, commissions or
agencies of the government shall have the exclusive power to compromise or release any similar claim or liability
when expressly authorized by their charters. Nowhere in Section 36 does it state that the COA must approve a
compromise made by a government agency; the only requirement is that it be authorized by its charter. It, therefore,
bears to stress that the COA does not have the exclusive prerogative to settle and compromise liabilities to the
Government.
The foregoing pronouncements notwithstanding, this Court rules that writing-off a loan does not equate to a
condonation or release of a debt by the creditor.
As an accounting strategy, the use of write-off is a task that can help a company maintain a more accurate inventory
of the worth of its current assets. In general banking practice, the write-off method is used when an account is
determined to be uncollectible and an uncollectible expense is recorded in the books of account. If in the future, the
debt appears to be collectible, as when the debtor becomes solvent, then the books will be adjusted to reflect the
amount to be collected as an asset. In turn, income will be credited by the same amount of increase in the accounts
receivable.
Write-off is not one of the legal grounds for extinguishing an obligation under the Civil Code.53 It is not a compromise
of liability. Neither is it a condonation, since in condonation gratuity on the part of the obligee and acceptance by the
obligor are required.54 In making the write-off, only the creditor takes action by removing the uncollectible account
from its books even without the approval or participation of the debtor.
Furthermore, write-off cannot be likened to a novation, since the obligations of both parties have not been
modified.55 When a write-off occurs, the actual worth of the asset is reflected in the books of accounts of the creditor,
but the legal relationship between the creditor and the debtor still remains the same – the debtor continues to be
liable to the creditor for the full extent of the unpaid debt.
Based on the foregoing, as creditor, Land Bank may write-off in its books of account the advance payment released
to REMAD in the interest of accounting accuracy given that the loans were already uncollectible. Such write-off,
however, as previously discussed, does not equate to a release from liability of petitioners.
Accordingly, the Land Bank Ipil Branch must be required to record in its books of account the Php3,115,000.00
disallowance, and petitioners, together with their four co-employees,56 should be personally liable for the said
amount. Such liability, is, however, without prejudice to petitioners’ right to run after REMAD, to whom they illegally
disbursed the loan, for the full reimbursement of the advance payment for the cattle as correctly ruled by the COA in
its July 17, 2003 Decision.57

On a final note, it bears to point out that a cursory reading of the Ombudsman's resolution will show that the
complaint against petitioners was dismissed not because of a finding of good faith but because of a finding of lack of
sufficient evidence. While the evidence presented before the Ombudsman may not have been sufficient to
overcome the burden in criminal cases of proof beyond reasonable doubt,58 it does not, however, necessarily follow,
that the administrative proceedings will suffer the same fate as only substantial evidence is required, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.59
An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa.60 The criminal case
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before
the COA. So also, the dismissal by Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, of the criminal
charges against petitioners does not necessarily foreclose the matter of their possible liability as warranted by the
findings of the COA.
In addition, this Court notes that the Ombudsman's Resolution relied on an alleged "April 6, 1992 Memorandum of
the Field Loans Review Department" which supposedly authorized the Field Offices to undertake a prepayment
scheme. On the other hand, the same Ombudsman's Resolution also made reference to a "January 19, 1994
Memorandum of EVP Diaz" and a "May 31, 1994 Memorandum of VP FSD" which tackled the prohibition on
advance payment to suppliers. All these documents, however, were again not attached to the records of the case at
bar. Particularly, the supposed "April 6, 1992 Memorandum of the Field Loans Review Department" was not even
mentioned nor raised by petitioners as a defense in herein petition. 1awphil
The decisions and resolutions emanating from the COA did not tackle the supposed April 6, 1992 Memorandum of
the Field Loans Review Department which allegedly authorized the Field Offices to undertake a pre-payment
scheme. While it is possible that such document would have shown that petitioners were in good faith, the same
should have been presented by them in the proceedings before the Commission proper - an act which they were not
able to do because of their own negligence in allowing the period to file an appeal to lapse. The April 6, 1992
Memorandum of the Field Loans Review Department would have been the best evidence to free petitioners from
their liability. It appears, however, that they did not present the same before the COA and it is already too late in the
day for them to present such document before this Court.
Petitioners' allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the COA implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.61 It is
imperative for petitioners to show caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the COA whose exercise of discretion is
being assailed. Proof of such grave abuse of discretion, however, is wanting in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Decision No. 2003-107 dated July 17, 2003 and
Resolution No. 2004-046 dated December 7, 2004, of the Commission on Audit, are hereby AFFIRMED.

7.) G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)

PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B,
PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the reconsideration1 of the resolution
promulgated on August 19, 2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for certiorari under Rule
64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court due to its non-compliance with the provisions of Rule
64, particularly for: (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service
and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents.3 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of
agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers
and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and subsequently
submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office
disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.5 On November 15, 2012,
the COA issued its decision denying the petition,6 holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of
the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power
to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply
with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,7 and filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the denial being
received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.10 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition
for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014
for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. cralawred
Issues
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within
the reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals;11 and that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance with
Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked the submission of a verified
declaration; and prays that the declaration attached to the motion for reconsideration be admitted by
virtue of its substantial compliance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule12 by previously submitting a
compact disc (CD) containing the petition for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court,
insisting that it showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the
assailed decision. cralawred

Ruling
We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.
I
Petitioner did not comply with
the rule on proof of service
The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied with
the requirement on proof of service.
The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall
be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of
the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be
appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no
proof of service if either or both are not submitted.13 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T.
Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail “under Registry
Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on
pages 64-65 of the petition.”14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared
to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves.
The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-
outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the
resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of
service.15
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes
did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a
petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh
period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.16 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final
order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such
appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given
due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an
error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or
final order.17 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition

for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. 18 Questions of fact cannot be
raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved
party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final
order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the
petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules
of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five
days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.20 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days
after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. 21 Pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on
July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the
petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated filing of the petition

for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the
recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that
the fresh period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a
litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the prescribed procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be
allowed to prosper.
III
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit
The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.
The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion, to
wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a
year before promulgating its decision, and more than a year in resolving the motion for
reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution; (3) the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4) the matter involved
a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza
made it appear that they knew the Local Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino
Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.25 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be

equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.26 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently disclose how the COA
committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not
approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in
deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local
Government Code in the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA
Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and
decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the
authority for that purpose.
It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the further
reason of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that light,
the COA acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.
IV
Petitioner and its counsel
exhibited harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members
The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner’s non-compliance with the
requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even “a perfunctory scrutiny” of the petition
for certiorari and its annexes could have easily shown that it had attached an affidavit of service to
the petition. It goes on to make the following statements, viz: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its annexes up to
its last page, thus, the erroneous finding that there was non-submission of the proof of service;
26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this Honorable Court who
took the observation from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in truth
and in fact, it is not;27
The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill consequences of
their own shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to readily lay blame on others
like the Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed harsh and disrespectful language that
accused the Court and its Members of ignorance and recklessness in the performance of their
function of adjudication.
We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the Court and its
Members. We consider the accusatory language particularly offensive because it was unfounded and
undeserved. As this resolution earlier clarifies, the petition for certiorari did not contain a proper
affidavit of service. We do not need to rehash the clarification. Had the petitioner and its counsel
been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and more contrite, they would have desisted from
their harshness and disrespect towards the Court and its Members. Although we are not beyond
error, we assure the petitioner and its counsel that our resolutions and determinations are arrived at
or reached with much care and caution, aware that the lives, properties and rights of the litigants are
always at stake. If there be errors, they would be unintended, and would be the result of human
oversight. But in this instance the Court and its Members committed no error. The petition bore only
cut reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere “perfunctory scrutiny” would
not pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully explain in writing
why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh and disrespectful
language towards the Court and its Members; and, in his case, Atty. Fortaleza should further show
cause why he should not be disbarred. chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit; ORDERS the
petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing within ten (10) days

from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court; and FURTHER
DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why he should not be disbarred.

8.) G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed
from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations
were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, the petitioner's
2
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's
3
omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in
the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct
No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 by the Department of
6
Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but 8
she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner
graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies. 9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband
10
who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. Her two 12
daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998
and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained U.S. Passport No.
14
017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy
for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika.
She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her
father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
17
stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate. 18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest
desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
19
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the
20
U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing
21
their pet dog into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
22 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
24
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed while her husband was
25
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. 26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of
2005. The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
27
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006. Meanwhile, her children of
28
school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings. She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
29 30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006. Petitioner's
31 32
husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working
for a major Philippine company in July 2006. 33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
they built their family home and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing. A Transfer
34 35
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she filed with the
36
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order,
37
the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued
38
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006. She also 40
secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999. This passport was renewed on 18
41
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA. 42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit
43
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a
notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
44
9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of
45 46
office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.
47 48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before
49
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010
with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. In the same questionnaire, the petitioner
50
stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July
1991 and from May 2005 to present. 51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010. 52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May
53
2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the 56
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to
57
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public
in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course
or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division. She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. Essentially, Elamparo's contention
59 60
is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to
the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on
account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born
62

status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
63
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin
with. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status
64
when she became a naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
65
continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she
made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she
reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire
lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there
any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where
they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for
President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been
withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake,
not binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide
a purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed
for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local
Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED. 69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En
Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same. 70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, docketed as SPA No.
71
15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He
73
averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove
74
that she is a natural-born citizen. 75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings
have a nationality. According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
76
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed
77
that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings. 78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she
was a foundling. 79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement. Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced
80
her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
81
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips
to the U.S. 82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born
citizen. He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires
83
only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.
84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to
her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, docketed as SPA No. 15-007
85
(DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be
cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and
that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
86
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before
87
18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as
an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which
89
are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office. 90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her
ineligibility for the Presidency. A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
91
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC. 92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents. Otherwise stated,
93
she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be
citizens of the country where they are found. Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of
94
the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the
right to reacquire her natural-born status. Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
96
presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. She 97
believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in
the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied
with. She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for
100
the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake
made in good faith. 102
In a Resolution promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a
103
natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for
a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC
First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the

Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-

LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9
May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23
December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent
prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC
and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court.
The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016.
Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA
No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May
2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled
"on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the
ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications
of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition
of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the
same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, which was 104
affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
105
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such
an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C,
§2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the
race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of
the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination
of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to
the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in
cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President
and Vice President, as the case may be. 106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment

through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version
of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided
for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily
dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other.
Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before
an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
"provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or
she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can
be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this
case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to
rule essentially that since foundlings are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
108
Constitution, they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted
109
that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after
saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain
that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to
prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there
110
is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents
are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975,
111
the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-
born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970,
also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against
730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens,
or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year,
there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found
in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.
112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
1âwphi1
straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
113
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence
on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor
General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant
and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling
would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our
questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners?
Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046
children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents.
Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means
that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means
that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is
99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the
statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by
whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might
even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine
foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly
doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical
chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9%
- that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court held that:
114
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural children of a
foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural
children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate
children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to
the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner
who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not]
refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.
116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account, cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
117
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino
citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and
also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already
clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual
and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing
rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of
redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of
the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to
invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is
silently vocal.
118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that
"they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate
against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this
across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice.
Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the
"State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is
a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens.
119
This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has
jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners. (Underlining supplied)
120
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children
who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by
the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the
121
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under
the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
122
petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. 123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
124
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are
125
accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as
to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
126
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the
127
"general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation." These are the same core principles which
128
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of
Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Article 15 thereof states:
130
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict
of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained
in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich effectively
131
affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that
132 133
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said
convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is
likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention
had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United
States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, where
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only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
135
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed
out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention.
The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which
are "basic to legal systems generally," support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the
136
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law"
under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have
137
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six
(26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed
out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law.
In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children."
In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that
the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the
executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were
drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship. 138
The COMELEC also ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
139
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform
an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general
and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:
140
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
141
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of
142
Appeals, where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
143
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship
144
(under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress
saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at
145
the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an
act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two
types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category
for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear:
as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives. 146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit
a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals
and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it
147
"should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while
the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to
its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected." 148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put
in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents,
and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required
were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to
sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse
of the adoptee." Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the
149
fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue." That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the
150
files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." The law therefore allows petitioner to
151
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate
anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken
by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day
of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of
the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according
to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are
three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to
remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
152
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival
on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting
in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how
to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium
and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts
dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's
family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from
the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-
up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident
since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she
and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the
U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its
Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005.
At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites,
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi. The 154
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the
earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application
under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC, Japzon 155
v. COMELEC and Caballero v. COMELEC. During the oral arguments, the private respondents also
156 157
added Reyes v. COMELEC. Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino
158
cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free
entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa)
until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC, the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
159
declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC did not involve a candidate who
160
wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence
is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish
residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only
161
visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC, the candidate was found to be an American citizen
162
who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She
was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as

provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court
had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking
the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as
a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after
one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training
163
to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country" in line with the government's "reintegration program." Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
164 165
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would
be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free
period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before
he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did -
she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband
and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is
no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC, and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to
166
a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-
the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that
petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC
itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of
her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
167
residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had
the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here
on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the
fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo
warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted
that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated
period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified
Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in
six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her
COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and
have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further,
as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility
and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one's qualifications to run for public office.
168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all
of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America.
The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts
to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in
November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not
the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional
requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions
of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number,
weight and substance than that presented by petitioner. It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary
169

reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even
considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her
COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13
May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was
satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time
the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016
and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President
in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have
never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon
School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in
Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San
Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled
[petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L.
Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
1a\^/phi1
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of
their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006
and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their
family home. 170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive
ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the
Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased
with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating
that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-
002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized
Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES

is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

(G.R. NO. 184915: June 30, 2009) Nilo T. Pates, Petitioner, V. Commission On Elections and Emelita B. ALMIRANTE, Respondents. Resolution Brion, J.

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(G.R. NO. 184915: June 30, 2009) Nilo T. Pates, Petitioner, V. Commission On Elections and Emelita B. ALMIRANTE, Respondents. Resolution Brion, J.

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1.) [G.R. NO.

184915 : June 30, 2009]

NILO T. PATES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMELITA

Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 dismissed the petition in caption

taking into account the following material antecedents:

A. February 1, 2008 - The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution

b. February 4, 2008 - The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (Petitioner)

d. September 18, 2008 - The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying

e. September 22, 2008 - The petitioner received the COMELEC en banc

Special Civil Actions

The Motion for Reconsideration

The petitioner asks us in his "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with

(1) Neypes v. Court of Appeals2 which thenceforth applied the fresh

(2) Spouses de los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat3 reiterating Neypes;

(3) Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez4 which, following

(4) Romero v. Court of Appeals5 which emphasized that A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC

The Respondent's Comment

We asked the respondents to comment on the petitioner's motion for

For her part, respondent Emelita B. Almirante (respondent Almirante) filed a

We do not find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise

Special Civil Actions

Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly

As emphasized above, exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may

Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any

Special Civil Actions

Counterbalanced against these reasons, however, are other considerations no

Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly requires that the

Based on these considerations, we do not find convenience and uniformity to

C. Our Liberal Approach

Special Civil Actions

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the motion for reconsideration

Special Civil Actions

election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista, protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee. 3

Special Civil Actions

The petitioner submits that:—

Special Civil Actions

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Special Civil Actions

Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx

Special Civil Actions

Special Civil Actions

We are not persuaded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Special Civil Actions

JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, Petitioner,

Nature of the Case

Ruling of the RTC

Special Civil Actions

The Court’s Ruling

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Propriety of certiorari in assailing COMELEC rulings

The exception in Kho v. COMELEC is inapplicable

Section 5. Quorum; Votes required. x x x

2010. As expressly provided:

Special Civil Actions

The assailed Order was not issued in grave abuse of discretion

2007. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the said Resolution, in part, provides:

Sec. 6. Substitution of members of a Division. –

Sec. 6 Substitution of member of a Division. –

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. – Presiding