Ottoman-Solomonic war

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Ottoman-Solomonic War was a military conflict between the Ottoman Empire allied
with Medri Bahri rebels and the Solomonic Dynasty-led forces of the Ethiopian Empire. It
started when the Ottoman forces led by Özdemir Pasha captured Debarwa in 1557[1] and
ended when Ottoman commander Kedwert pasha sent gifts to Emperor Sarsa the Great,
thus making peace.[2]

Ottoman-Solomonic War

Date 1557-1589

Location Ethiopia, Eritrea

Solomonic military victory

Ottomans maintain control of Massawa island
Result

Territorial Ottomans maintain Massawa

changes

Belligerents

Ethiopian Empire Ottoman Empire

Medri Bahri rebels

Commanders and leaders

Gelawdewos (1557–1559) Özdemir Pasha(1557-1561)

Menas (1559–1563) Ahmad Pasha †(1561–1578)
Sarsa the Great (1563–1589) Kedwart pasha (1578–1589)
Yeshaq (1557–1561) Yeshaq †(1572–1578)
Ga'ewa

Background
The proclamation of the eyalet of Habesh in 1554 (although conquest of the territories did
not begin until 1557), was preceded by several generations of conflict between the
Ottomans, who had been primarily concerned themselves with Anatolia and Eastern
Europe, and the Portuguese, who were the major power in the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean. The Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 brought the two powers into direct
conflict. In an attempt to monopolize the spice trade from Asia to Europe, the Portuguese,

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led by the newly appointed Governor Afonso de Albuquerque, "blockad[ed] the entrance
to the Red Sea and the [Persian] Gulf", and made an unsuccessful attempt to capture
Hormuz.[3]

The spice trade had existed in the early 16th century before the Ottoman conquests of the
Muslim states, but Portugal was able to do it around Africa to Western Europe.[4] Despite
Ottoman control of Egypt, Portugal continued to rule the seas for a number of decades;
not until the Ottoman conquest of Aden in 1538 did the Portuguese grip begin to loosen,
which led to direct conflict between the two powers, and a revival of the Red Sea spice
trade, allowing the Ottomans to influence the Red Sea.[5]

The first clash between the Ottomans and Portuguese came in 1538, when the beylerbey
of Egypt, Süleyman Pasha, was given 74 ships with 3000 men and big guns and charged
with taking Portugal-held Diu in India.[6] This first attack failed, but Ottoman forces
under Süleyman Pasha were able to win a decisive victory at Aden later that year in the
largest naval attempt by the Ottomans in the war.[7] Aden, located in Yemen on the Indian
Ocean, was and still is a major port in the region for transshipment of goods destined for
the Levant and the Red Sea; the Ottoman capture was a major blow to the Portuguese
blockade. Later attacks by both the Ottomans and Portuguese failed to achieve any
advantage; not until 1552 were the Ottomans able to launch a second large campaign,
when they attempted to seize Hormuz with 25 galleys, 4 galleons, and 850 men, but were
ultimately defeated.[8]

Both sides struggled under the weight of this war, which was carried out over such a great
area (and strained tiny Portugal's resources), resulting in the end of large-scale
campaigning.[8] The final, and perhaps only, "serious naval confrontation in the Indian
Ocean" took place in 1554.[9] The next year the Lahsa (al-Hasa) and Habesh eyalets were
proclaimed, with Özdemir Pasha assigned the task of conquering Habesh.[8]

The Ottoman activities in Ethiopia proper preceded their invasion. They had supported
the campaign of Imam Ahmad Gragn (which had begun in 1527), and following the
Imam's reverse after the Battle of Jarta in 1542 they had sent him badly needed aid in the
form of matchlockmen sent to Adal at a time when firearms in the region were rare: 10
cannons with artillery men, as well as many as 900 gunmen in 1542.[10] This support led
to the destruction of almost all the Portuguese force under Christopher da Gama, and had
Ahmad Gragn not dismissed these reinforcements soon afterwards, their help might have
helped him to prevail at the decisive Battle of Wayna Daga.

Course of War
The Ottomans invaded the Kingdom of Medri Bahri, now modern day Eritrea, in 1557
with a force of perhaps 1400–1500 under Özdemir Pasha. First they captured Massawa
and Hirgigo, then moved inland and occupied the regional capital of Debarwa, where he
"established a fort [...] with 'a long wall and very high tower... filled with vases of gold and
silver, precious stones", and other valuables that were obtained by looting, extractions on
trade, and the imposition of a poll tax on the local population.[11] A fort was also
constructed at Hergigo; a planned fort at Massawa had to be abandoned due to a lack of

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suitable building materials.[12] Debarwa was then given to the local noble Ga'éwah, the
sister of Ahmed Gragn's mother-in-law. According to Cengiz Orhonlu, Debarwa was
intended to be the "base of penetration of [...] Ethiopia", but had to be abandoned for
several reasons.[13] Most important were that the invading force had run out of provisions,
and the water cisterns that they had dug had dried up. Lastly, the local population, who
"were beginning to have access to fire-arms" put up fierce resistance.[13] As a result, the
Ottoman force abandoned the fort and retreated to Massawa, but was attacked and
defeated by the local peasants who "captured all their goods".[13]

The Ottomans at this point made a change in tactics, opting to pit Ethiopian rulers against
each other in order to achieve their conquest, rather than invading unilaterally. They had
employed this same tactic earlier in the Balkans: absorbing local entities through local
rulers due to a shortage of manpower (here because of its peripheral nature and problems
with the Safavids and in the Mediterranean) rather than direct conquest.[7] The Bahr
negash Yeshaq had bad relations with Emperor Menas, who had just assumed the throne,
so in 1561 he revolted against Menas, but the following year he was defeated in battle.
Yeshaq then fled to the Ottomans and promised to cede them Debarwa, Massawa, Arqiqo,
and all the land in between in return for their help. Yeshaq and the Emperor later made
peace, and the Ottomans withdrew from Debarwa in 1572, which Yeshaq quickly
occupied, but he returned it to the Ottomans as a result of the earlier agreement.[13]

Sarsa Dengel, Menas' successor as Emperor, was angered by this and campaigned against
Yeshaq in 1576, defeating an alliance of the Ottoman army under Ahmad Pasha and the
Bahr negash in 1578 as well as killing their leaders at the Battle of Addi Qorro.[14]Emperor
Sarsa Dengel then retook Debarwa, which surrendered to him and some of whose soldiers
were absorbed into the army.[15] According to Ottoman sources, the force took Arqiqo and
managed to destroy Massawa's fort as well as kill 40 of its 100 defenders, though it failed
to take the city.[12] As a result, 100 musketeers and 100 cavalrymen were sent to Massawa
from Egypt.[16] Given Debarwa's importance as a staging point for the conquest of the rest
of Ethiopia, further Ottoman advances on the city were inevitable. Massawa was
reinforced by 300 musketeers, 100 cavalry, 10 canonneers, 10 large guns, and 5 builders
to repair the fort, all from Egypt.[16] Again employing their earlier tactic of fighting with
local leaders, the Ottomans appointed a man named Wad Ezum as Bahr nagash, and in
1588 moved inland where they were defeated by a local lord.[17] Emperor Sarsa Dengel
was alarmed by the Ottoman expansion, and replied with an attack on Hergigo in 1589
which captured the Ottoman fort at arqiqo.[18]

The Ottoman commander Kedwart Pasha sent several lavish gifts to the Emperor,
appeasing his anger and gaining his permission to stay on the small island.[19]

End of expansion
Though pivotal to the control of the Red Sea, Habesh as a whole was less important than
the Mediterranean or Eastern border with the Persian Safavids.[7] After the death of
Ozdemir Pasa, much of the Ottoman conquests were reversed, and the Yemeni revolt in
1569 – 70 further reduced the importance of Habesh.[20] Recognizing the difficulty of

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expanding its territories and the minimal gain from success, in 1591 Habesh was put
under the jurisdiction of a local Beja Na'ib, or deputy, who was to pay an annual tribute to
the Ottomans, with a small Ottoman garrison left in Massawa.[21]

Further relations between the Ethiopian emperor and the Ottoman Na'ib were marked by
periods of relative peace and others of confrontation. The first major conflict came in
1615, in the reign of the Portuguese-influenced (he would later convert to Roman
Catholicism) Ethiopian Emperor Susenyos. During the reign of the Na'ibs, Ottoman
raiding parties from the garrison at Massawa would periodically raid the surrounding
hinterland for cattle, slaves, and other booty.[22] One such raid was defeated, which
angered the Pasha of Massawa, who decided to impound goods at the port meant for the
Emperor until 62 muskets taken from his men were returned. As a result, Susenyos
ordered the governor of a northern province to cut the Na'ib off from Ethiopian supplies,
as the eyalet of Habesh had no supplies of its own. Though the Pasha told his men to
acquiesce in case of such an event before leaving on a hajj, he was replaced by another
Pasha who was unyielding.[23] Susenyos later commented that if he wished to retake
Arqiqo, he could do it quickly, but could not hold it against retaliatory Ottoman assaults.

Despite the relative weakness of the Na'ib and Ottoman garrison in the province, the
threat of real Ottoman presence and attack kept the territory safe from attack. Even with
the weakness of the Ottoman garrison, attacks continued with a number of soldiers and
Arabs raiding the countryside for cattle in 1624; this raid was defeated, and its weapons
(many firearms and scimitars) were captured and used against the fort at Hergigo.
Susenyos then once again prevented caravans from supplying the ports in order to get
more favorable terms in any future treaty.[24]

Peace and later relations

A peace treaty was finally brokered in which goods for the Emperor and the Ethiopian
Church would be exempted from taxes, imperial agents and Jesuits had free travel, and
the Ottomans would only purchase slaves by the Ottomans brought to the port by
caravan; the treaty was to be honored by the successors of the rulers as well and contained
provisions for breaking the treaty.[25] As a result of the peace and Ottomans' technological
superiority, Massawa, with its Ottoman garrison, was not fortified, while Hergigo was
defended by a fortress guarded by artillery.[26]

Relations under Susenyos's successor, Fasilides, were markedly better. Susenyos's

conversion to Catholicism had resulted in a backlash against the Catholic Portuguese.
Fasilides expelled or killed all Jesuits, burned their books, and in 1648 made agreements
with the Pashas of Massawa and Suakin to execute any Jesuits attempting to enter
Ethiopia through those ports.[26] Fasilides also forced the Ottomans to share taxes they
obtained from the caravans with him.[27] There was little change in the relatively good
(though obviously tense due to contrary intentions) relations until the reign of Iyasu I at
the end of the 17th century. The Na'ib seized gifts intended for the Emperor because of
their high value, and attempted to levy a tax on them.[28] Refusing to pay, Iyasu banned a
northern province from supplying Habesh with food on pain of death.[28] The Na'ib was

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forced to give back the goods, supplemented with rugs in order to prevent famine in
Habesh.[28] In later interactions in the mid-18th century, the Na'ib would prevail over
Iyasu II through his threat of killing Ethiopian clergy impounded in Massawa as a
retaliation for cutting off food.[29]

See also

Notes
1. ^ J.S Trimmingham, Islam in Ethiopia,pp. 96
2. ^ J.S Trimmingham, Islam in Ethiopia,pp.98
3. ^ Özbaran 1994, pp. 70–71, 81.
4. ^ Özbaran 1994, pp. 93–94.
5. ^ Özbaran, 68-9; C. R. Boxer 415
6. ^ Özbaran 1994, p. 71.
7. ^ Jump up to: a b c Özbaran 1994, p. 84.
8. ^ Jump up to: a b c Özbaran 1994, p. 72.
9. ^ Özbaran 1994, p. 86.
10. ^ The number of musketmen vary amongst the primary sources. Castanhoso states
there were 900 musketmen (R.S. Whiteway, editor and translator, The Portuguese
Expedition to Abyssinia in 1441–1543, 1902. [Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus
Reprint, 1967], p.55), the Emperor Gelawdewos in two different letters states there
were 600 (translated in Whiteway, pp. 117, 120).
11. ^ Özbaran, 67; Richard Pankhurst, Ethiopian borderlands (Asmara: Red Sea Press,
1997), p. 235
12. ^ Jump up to: a b Richard Pankhurst, History of Ethiopian Towns (Germany: Franz
Steiner Verlag GmbH Wiesbaden, 1982), p. 86
13. ^ Jump up to: a b c d Özbaran 1994, p. 68.
14. ^ J.S Trimmingham, Islam in Ethiopia, pp.97
15. ^ Özbaran 1994, p. 69.
16. ^ Pankhurst, History, pp. 69–70
17. ^ Richard Pankhurst, History of Ethiopian Towns, pp.86
18. ^ J.S Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, pp. 98
19. ^ H. A. R. Gibb, et al., The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1960); Özbaran, p.
194
20. ^ Pankhurst, History, p. 70; Özbaran, 87
21. ^ Özbaran 1994, p. 88.
22. ^ Özbaran 1994, pp. 88–89.
23. ^ Özbaran 1994, p. 89.
24. ^ Özbaran 1994, p. 89f.
25. ^ Jump up to: a b Özbaran 1994, p. 90.
26. ^ A reappraisal on the Impact of Firearms in the History if Warfare in Ethiopia, pp.
118
27. ^ Jump up to: a b c Özbaran 1994, p. 91.
28. ^ Özbaran 1994, pp. 91–92.

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References
Özbaran, Salih (1994), The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on
Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration
in the Arab Lands During the Sixteenth Century, Isis Press

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