Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-8922-24             February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENTINO ENGUERO, JOSE TARIMAN, NAZARIO NARVARTE and DIONISIO
BUENO, defendant-appellants.

Manuel Bilog for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno were charged with the
crime of robbery in band in three separate informations and after a joint trial the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur found them guilty as charged and sentenced them as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 2714, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate

penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than 14
years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and
Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years
and 2 months of prison correccional nor more than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and
all of them to indemnify Florentina Ogarte de Binaday in the amount of P36.75 and to pay
the costs;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 2715, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prisons mayor nor more than 14
years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and
Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years
and 2 months of prison correccional or more than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and
all of them to indemnity Creseciano Magistrado and Juan Margarte in the amount of P38.88
and P17.80 respectively, and to pay the cost; and

(c) In Criminal Case No. 2716, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than 14
years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and
Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years
and 2 months of prison correccional nor more than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor;
and all of them to indemnify Anatolia Bragais in the amount of P3 and to pay the cost. In the
three cases, they shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency on account
of the nature of the principal penalty.

The one bottle of Siutong wine, Exh. B, shall be returned to Cresenciano Magistrado; the
pair of red leather shoes; Exh. H; the Jacket, Exh. G; the blue pant, Exh. H; and the hammer,
Exh. I to Anatolia Bragais; and the birthstone ring, Exh. E, to Juan Margarte. The balisong,
Exh. M, and the bolo, Exh. C, and its scabbard Exh. C-1, are confiscated. The Pistol, Cal. 45,
 W/SM-394701, by decision of this court in Criminal Case No. 2729, is already confiscated.
The gray skin suit marked Exhs. K and K-1; the pair of tennis shoes Exh. D; the raincoat,
Exh. L; and the flashlight, Exh. N, shall be refused to Florentino Enguero. The towel, Exh. O;
the skin pant Exh. P; and the pair of shoes, black and white, Exh. Q, shall be returned to
Nazario Narvarte.

They appealed. Jose Tariman withdrew his appeal. As no question of fact is raised, the only error
assigned to have been committed by the trial court being the conviction and sentence of the
defendants for three robberies in band instead of only one, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal
to this Court.

The trial court found the following:

At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 9, 1952 the four defendants met at Yabo River,
Lupi, Camarines Sur, after Florentino Enguero had previously provided himself with a pistol.
From the river they went to the house of Enguero where they took their supper. After eating
Enguero issued to Nazario Narvarte a bolo, to Jose Tariman a balisong and to Dionisio
Bueno, a piece of hardwood, while he himself had the pistol. Thus armed sagan, Lupi, but
before reaching the barrio itself, they passed at the house of Teodulo Banta where Enguero
ordered him and his brother-in-law, Francisco Bugagao, at the point of his pistol to guide
them to the barrio. At the instance of Eugenio, their hands were tied behind their backs. With
the two as guides, the group proceeded towards the barrio, and on the way they met Pedro
Bragais by the stairs of his house. Pointing his pistol at him, Enguero had his hands tied
behind his back and ordered him to go with them. They continued on their way and later they
met again one Ernesto Belgado whose hands they also tied behind his back. They took him
along with them too. They arrived in the barrio at about 8:00 in the evening and went directly
to the store of Cresenciano Magistrado which adjoins his house. They made the four tied
men sit on the ground in front of the store guarded by Narvarte who had the bolo in his hand,
while Enguero entered the store. Pointing his pistol at Magistrado, Enguero demanded
money from him. Fearing for his life, Magistrado ordered his wife who was in the house to
give their money to them. Enguero, Bueno and Tariman then went up the house and took
P4.80 from Magistrado's wife. And upon finding Juan Margarte, the barrio school teacher
who was lodging with the Magistrados, in one of the rooms of the house, Bueno, who had
the open balisong in his hand brought him down to the ground and there tied his hands
behind his back. Upon seeing a birthstone ring in Margarte's finger, Bueno forcibly took it
away from him. After a while Enguero and Tariman went down to the store and told
Magistrado to give them wine which they drank. After drinking Enguero took the goods
displayed in the store and passed them on to Bueno and Tariman who piled them on the
ground in front of the store. The goods consisted of one dozen bottles of Coca-Cola worth
P1,20; one dozen cans of Sardines worth P7.20; one dozen bottles of wine, Hoctung, worth
P3; one dozen Sardine at P4.80; one dozen bottles Pomade worth P4.80; two pairs of gold
ear-rings worth P10; one dozen cartons Purico, valued at P3; and one package of Matches
worth P0.33. The total value of these articles together with the sum of P4.80 taken from the
wife of Magistrado amounts to P39.13. The defendants also carried away the following
articles belonging to Juan Margate; one birthstone ring worth P70; one pair of tennis shoes
worth P5.50; one pair of sock worth P2; one cake of soap worth P.30; a medal and a crucifix
worth P10, all with total value of P87.80.

After having committed the acts narrated above and when it was about 10:00 in the evening,
the four defendants, together with Magistrado, Margate whose hands were still tied behind
his back and the four other tied individuals, all of whom they forced to go with them, went to
the nearby house of Victorino Togno about 14 meters from the house of Magistrado (See
Exh. R). Upon arriving Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman and Clementino Carulla (this last
one was originally accused with the four defendants, but the case against him was later
dismissed upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal) went up the house. while their abovenamed
companions remained on the ground guarded by Bueno and Narvarte. Anatolia Bragais, wife
of Victorino Togno, and her son were in the house. Pointing at the neck of Anatolia a sharp
instrument, Enguero demanded money from her. Carulla opened a trunk and took P3 from it.
Enguero asked Anatolia where she kept the rest of her money, and to make her reveal it, he
threatened to cut her throat with the sharp instrument. She told him that she had no other
money. However, Enguero took and carried away from her house a pair of shoes worth P18,
a jacket worth P12, a blue pant worth P12 and a hammer. These articles including the P3 in
cash have a total value of P45. Then they left the house.

After committing the acts mentioned in the next proceeding paragraph, the four accused and
Carulla, together with Magistrado, Margate and the four tied men whom they again forced to
go with them, proceeded to the house of Florentina Ogarte, wife of Ireneo Binday, located
about 54 meters from the house of Cresenciano Magistrado (See sketch, Exh. R). The time
was about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Upon arriving Enguero and Carulla went up the
house while, Tariman, Narvate and Bueno again stood as guard on the ground. Enguero
pointed his pistol at Florentina and ordered her to produce her money and jewels. She
replied that she had none; but Enguero nonetheless searched her waistline. Not having
found anything, he began to hold her private parts, but she begged for pity and said they
could get instead the goods in her store. Enguero left her and took from the store 2 dozen
cans of Sardine worth P8.20; 15 tins of Salmon worth P11.15; 14 tins of tinapa worth P4.20;
2 dozen bottles of Hoctung wine worth P8.40 besides money amounting to P4.80. He threw
the goods to his co-defendants on the ground through the door. The value of the goods and
money taken makes a total of P36.75. Enguero and Carulla then asked Florentina to provide
them with empty sacks which she did. Bueno, Tariman and Narvarte gathered the goods and
put them inside the sacks. They then left the house after cautioning Florentina not to report
them to the authorities.

From this last house the four defendants, together with those whom they forced to follow
them, returned to the store of Magistrado. Upon arriving they gathered the other stolen
goods and put them inside the sacks. Then they looked for some one who could carry goods
for them. They found Glicerio Buensalida and Absalon Medrano, after which they untied the
hands of Margate, Bragais, Belgado, Banta and Bugagao. After warning them out to report to
the authorities, the four defendants left and went away with the stolen goods carried by
Buensalida and Medrano.

After a few days the defendants were apprehended pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by
the Justice of the Peace Court of Lupi on July 16, 1952. After their arrest Enguero and
Tariman were investigated by Capt. Dominador M. Gutierrez of the 1st Camarines Sur PC
Company, and Narvarte and Bueno by First Lieut. Jaope Nobleza of the same company. The
investigation was made in question and answer from and reduced to writing which later was
subscribed and sworn to by the defendants before Mamerto M. Bonot, Justice of the Peace
of Lupi. Exhibit S is the sworn statement of Enguero, Exhibit T of Bueno, Exhibit U of
Narvarte and Exhibit V of Tariman. In there exhibits the four accused have admitted and
confessed among other statements, their respective participation in the three different
robberies, pointing to the investigators the whereabouts of some of the stolen articles.

Following the lead in the written confessions Sgt. Fernando Narvaes took the defendants to
their respective houses on July 22, 1952 and recovered from them some of the goods and
arms used during the robberies. From Florentino Enguero the following were recovered:
 1 suit, skin, gray, Exhibits K and K-1
1 bottle of Siu Tung wine, Exhibit B
1 pair of Tennis shoes (Elpo), Exhibit D
1 raincoat, rubber, used during the robbery, Exhibit L
1 Knife (balisong) used during the robbery, Exhibit M
1 flashlight used during the robbery, Exhibit N
1 Pistol, Cal. 45 W/SN-394701 with one magazine and one ammunition used during
the robbery.

From Nazario Narvarte, the following were recovered:

1 towel (white), Exhibit O

1 pant skin (Ceniza), Exhibit T
1 pair shoes, black and white, Exhibit Q
1 hammer (Steel) Exhibit I.

From Dionisio Bueno, the following were recovered:

1 ring, birthstone, Exhibit E.

1 pant skin (blue), Exhibit H
1 jacket, skin, light green, Exhibit G.
One pair of leather shoes (Red), Exhibit F, was recovered from Jose Tariman.

The above articles are listed in an inventory, Exhibit J, prepared by Sgt. Narvaez, in which all
the four defendants certified that the goods were taken from their custody. As evidence of
this fact, each and everyone of them signed Exhibit J below the articles recovered
respectively from them (Exhibits J-1, J-2, J-3 and J-4).

Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime only citing in support of his
contention the case of People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is without merit. In the case
cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he found two fighting this case,
after committing the first crime of robbery in band the appellants went to another house where they
committed the second and after committing it they proceeded to another house where they
committed the third. Obviously, the rule in the case cited cannot be invoked and applied to the
present.

The crime committed is robbery in band punished in articles 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, in connection with article 295 of the same Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 373, with prison correccional in its maximum period to prison
mayor in its medium period. As the robbery was committed in band, the penalty to be imposed is the
maximum period of the proper penalty, which is prison mayor in its medium period, or from 3 years
and 1 day to 10 years. The second paragraph of article 295 of the Revised Penal Code which
impose the penalty next higher in degree upon the leader of the band has been left out by Republic
Act No. 373, amending further article 295 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed upon each of the appellants
is the next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, or 4 months and 1
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor, as maximum, in each of
the three crimes committed, and the accessories of the law.

Modified as to the penalty to be imposed upon each of the three appellants, the rest of the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, with proportionate costs in each case against the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9205             February 28, 1957

JACINTA ABELLA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
G. K. CO BUN KIM, and QUIRINO D. CARPIO, defendants.
QUIRINO D. CARPIO, receiver-appellant.

Macario Guevarra for defendant.

Fortunato de Leon, S. D. Carpio, Jose T. Mercado and Guillermo B. Ilagan for appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an action for the recovery of unpaid rentals and damages, and the resolution of a contract of
lease of Lot No. 1, Block No. 338 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, situated in the
District of Ermita and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21988 of the
Register of Deeds for the City of Manila. The defendants are G. K. Co Bun Kim, the lessee, who had
constructed, on said lot, a building of seventeen (17) apartments (accessorias), and Quirino D.
Carpio, the receiver of said building.

The record shows that on February 9, 1950, Rafael Alonso, the original owner of said lot, and Co
Bun Kim, executed the public instrument, Exhibit A, whereby the former leased the aforemention lot
to the latter, for a period of fifteen (15) years, at a monthly rental of P400. Said deed of lease was,
on March 17, 1950, duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. On January 9,
1953, Alonso sold and conveyed said lot, including his rights under said deed, Exhibit A, to plaintiff
Jacinta Abella (Exhibit B). The next day, Alonso wrote to Co Bun Kim the letter Exhibit F, advising
him of said conveyance, with the request that the rental of P400 a month be paid to Mrs. Abella or
her representative, beginning from said month of January, 1953.

It appears that prior thereto, or on April 23, 1952, Co Bun Kim had instituted Civil Case No. 16221 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, against one Natalio Enriques, for the annulment of a mortgage
on the building aforementioned, constituted by Co Bun Kim in favor of Enriques subsequently to the
execution of and registration of said Exhibit A. On motion of Enriquez, the Philippine Trust Company
was, on October 22, 1952, appointed receiver of said building. Soon later, or on January 24, 1953,
Quirino D. Carpio substituted the Philippine Trust Company as such receiver, and thereafter
collected the corresponding rentals from the lessee of said apartments or "accesorias", but did not
pay the rentals due under said Exhibit A, for the use of the lot, beginning form said month.
Accordingly, on February 21, 1953, counsel for Mrs. Abella wrote the letter Exhibit G, to Co Bun Kim,
demanding payment of the rentals, which were overdue since January, 1953, This demand was, on
March 2, 1953, reiterated, in vain, in plaintiff's communication to Co Bun Kim, Exhibit G-2. On March
15, 1953, counsel for Mrs. Abella wrote to Quirino D. Carpio, as receiver of said building, the letter
Exhibit I, advising him of the aforementioned letters to Co Bun Kim Exhibits G and G-2, which were
not heeded, and of the default in payment of rentals since January, 1953, and demanding payment
thereof, but appellant did not make such payment. Mrs. Abella sought, therefore, permission to
intervene in Civil Case No. 16221, for the purpose of collecting back rentals but, Quirino D. Carpio
objected to the intervention, which was denied. Hence, on April 25, 1953, Mrs. Abella instituted the
present action. After due trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants,

ordering said defendants to pay, jointly and severally, to plaintiff the monthly rent of P400 of
said land, from January, 1953 up to and including this month of January 1955, plus the
further sum of P1,500 as damages, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
this complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.

Defendant receiver's counterclaim is dismissed.

The case is now before us on appeal taken by defendant Carpio.

It is not disputed that Co Bun Kim had executed the aforementioned deed of lease (Exhibit A)
whereby he undertook to pay monthly the sum of P400 by way of rentals for the use and occupation
of said lot, which formerly belonged to Rafael Alonso; that the latter's interest in the lot, and in said
contract of lease, were acquired by plaintiff-appellee Mrs. Abella on January 9, 1953; and that said
rentals have not been paid since January, 1953. The main issue raised by appellant herein is the
propriety of his inclusion as defendant in this case, in his capacity as receiver of the building
aforementioned, without the consent of the court having jurisdiction over said case No. 16221, in
which such receiver was appointed.

It appears, however, that said case, like the one at bar, were assigned at Branch V of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, presided over by Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, who denied a motion to
dismiss of appellant herein, predicated, among other things, upon the absence of authority to sue
said appellant, as receiver of building belonging to Co Bun Kim, and rendered the decision appealed
from, despite the reiteration of appellant's pretense in his answer and, later on, on his motion for
reconsideration of said decision, which was, also denied. In other words, the court having jurisdiction
over the receivership had, thereby, impliedly, but clearly, given its consent to the present action
against the receiver, and sanctioned the same.

It is claimed that the lower court erred in sentencing the appellant to pay the rentals in question
jointly and severally with Co Bun Kim, for appellant was not a party to the deed Exhibit A, and
neither the same, nor the nature of the contract therein set forth, nor the law, make appellant
solidarily liable with Co Bun Kim for the rentals in dispute.

Obviously, this argument is predicated upon the theory that the receiver represents an interest
completely distinct and separate from that of Co Bun Kim. It overlooks that fact that Co Bun Kim is
the owner of the building under receivership; that the rentals thereof, collected by appellant, belong
to Co Bun Kim; that appellant is a mere custodian of the funds thus collected and held by him; that
the judgment against appellant, for the rentals due under Exhibit A, merely enforces an obligation of
Co Bun Kim, to whom said funds belong; and that the liability of appellant under the decision
appealed from is nothing but the very same liability of Co Bun Kim. The rules concerning joint
obligations and solidary obligations (obligaciones mancomunadas y obligaciones solidarias) require
a plurality of subjects (creditors, debtors or both) and have no application when there is only one
creditor and one debtor, even if payment of the debt is to be made by several individuals,
representing one and the same interest or debtor.

Again, the records of case No. 16221 (Exhibit H) show that appellant's brother, Atty. S. D. Carpio —
who was counsel for defendant herein — knew that the lot in question is merely leased to Co Bun
Kim, and that the latter has bound himself, among other things, to pay rentals therefor, apart from
the corresponding taxes on said land. Moreover, on March 15, 1953, appellant was specifically
advised — by virtue of the letter Exhibit I — of said facts, yet he did nothing about it. He even
collected rentals from the lessees of the apartments (accesorias) under receivership. Thus, aside
from not repudiating the lease contract Exhibit A, he thereby indicated willingness to continue the
juridical relation thereby established, under the terms and conditions therein set forth. In other
words, — although subject to the control of the Court, having jurisdiction over the receivership —
appellant became a mere extension of the personality of Co Bun Kim, as regards the liability of the
latter under said contract. Indeed, the constitutional mandate to the effect that "no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed" imposed upon the court — and, hence, upon its officer,
appellant herein as receiver of said building — aside from Congress, the duty to respect the contract
of lease Exhibit A, it being free from any vice that may affect its validity.

It is lastly urged that the lower court erred in ordering the execution of its aforementioned decision,
during the pendency of this appeal, for want of jurisdiction and insufficiency of the reasons given
therefor. The first ground assumes that the appeal had been perfected prior to the order of execution
complained of, which is not a fact, said order having been issued on May 12, 1955, whereas the
record on appeal was approved on May 19, 1955. In fact, said order is mentioned in the record on
appeal, which would have been impossible had the latter been submitted and approved prior to said
order. The second ground is, also, untenable, it being obvious that this appeal has been taken
merely for the purpose of delay, the default in the payment of rentals being conceded. Worse still,
the property in question is in danger of being sold by the Government for delinquency in the payment
of taxes. At any rate, the appellant has no reason whatsoever to complain against the order of
execution, having been exempted from the operation thereof, by directing the execution of the
decision appealed from, insofar only as Co Bun Kim is concerned.

Wherefore, said decision is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against appellant herein.
It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10016             February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The
facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits
"1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the
name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27,
1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a
clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria
Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo.
As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in
Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the
coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she
worked as a teacher-nurse.

It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for
it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent
Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight.
During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact
of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said
marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors
of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A"
and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio,
defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of
his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the
nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th
edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H.
466, 69 A. 579.

Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10]
4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
 and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as
to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted
But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of
penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in
the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and
had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab
initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that
effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of
strict interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting
this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, A.J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved."

Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or
not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says, 'La satidad e importancia del
matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mosmos de su nulidad; esta ha de
someterse [precisamente al juicio del Tribunalcompetente, y cuando este declare la nulidad
del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la
presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, yde consiguiente, el que
contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracio de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la
pena de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)
 "This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas,
(CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of
adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set
aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exists."

I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would
frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.

Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

WRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9205             February 28, 1957

JACINTA ABELLA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
G. K. CO BUN KIM, and QUIRINO D. CARPIO, defendants.
QUIRINO D. CARPIO, receiver-appellant.

Macario Guevarra for defendant.

Fortunato de Leon, S. D. Carpio, Jose T. Mercado and Guillermo B. Ilagan for appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an action for the recovery of unpaid rentals and damages, and the resolution of a contract of
lease of Lot No. 1, Block No. 338 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, situated in the
District of Ermita and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21988 of the
Register of Deeds for the City of Manila. The defendants are G. K. Co Bun Kim, the lessee, who had
constructed, on said lot, a building of seventeen (17) apartments (accessorias), and Quirino D.
Carpio, the receiver of said building.

The record shows that on February 9, 1950, Rafael Alonso, the original owner of said lot, and Co
Bun Kim, executed the public instrument, Exhibit A, whereby the former leased the aforemention lot
to the latter, for a period of fifteen (15) years, at a monthly rental of P400. Said deed of lease was,
on March 17, 1950, duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. On January 9,
1953, Alonso sold and conveyed said lot, including his rights under said deed, Exhibit A, to plaintiff
Jacinta Abella (Exhibit B). The next day, Alonso wrote to Co Bun Kim the letter Exhibit F, advising
him of said conveyance, with the request that the rental of P400 a month be paid to Mrs. Abella or
her representative, beginning from said month of January, 1953.

It appears that prior thereto, or on April 23, 1952, Co Bun Kim had instituted Civil Case No. 16221 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, against one Natalio Enriques, for the annulment of a mortgage
on the building aforementioned, constituted by Co Bun Kim in favor of Enriques subsequently to the
execution of and registration of said Exhibit A. On motion of Enriquez, the Philippine Trust Company
was, on October 22, 1952, appointed receiver of said building. Soon later, or on January 24, 1953,
Quirino D. Carpio substituted the Philippine Trust Company as such receiver, and thereafter
collected the corresponding rentals from the lessee of said apartments or "accesorias", but did not
pay the rentals due under said Exhibit A, for the use of the lot, beginning form said month.
Accordingly, on February 21, 1953, counsel for Mrs. Abella wrote the letter Exhibit G, to Co Bun Kim,
demanding payment of the rentals, which were overdue since January, 1953, This demand was, on
March 2, 1953, reiterated, in vain, in plaintiff's communication to Co Bun Kim, Exhibit G-2. On March
15, 1953, counsel for Mrs. Abella wrote to Quirino D. Carpio, as receiver of said building, the letter
Exhibit I, advising him of the aforementioned letters to Co Bun Kim Exhibits G and G-2, which were
not heeded, and of the default in payment of rentals since January, 1953, and demanding payment
thereof, but appellant did not make such payment. Mrs. Abella sought, therefore, permission to
intervene in Civil Case No. 16221, for the purpose of collecting back rentals but, Quirino D. Carpio
objected to the intervention, which was denied. Hence, on April 25, 1953, Mrs. Abella instituted the
present action. After due trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants,

ordering said defendants to pay, jointly and severally, to plaintiff the monthly rent of P400 of
said land, from January, 1953 up to and including this month of January 1955, plus the
further sum of P1,500 as damages, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
this complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.

Defendant receiver's counterclaim is dismissed.

The case is now before us on appeal taken by defendant Carpio.

It is not disputed that Co Bun Kim had executed the aforementioned deed of lease (Exhibit A)
whereby he undertook to pay monthly the sum of P400 by way of rentals for the use and occupation
of said lot, which formerly belonged to Rafael Alonso; that the latter's interest in the lot, and in said
contract of lease, were acquired by plaintiff-appellee Mrs. Abella on January 9, 1953; and that said
rentals have not been paid since January, 1953. The main issue raised by appellant herein is the
propriety of his inclusion as defendant in this case, in his capacity as receiver of the building
aforementioned, without the consent of the court having jurisdiction over said case No. 16221, in
which such receiver was appointed.

It appears, however, that said case, like the one at bar, were assigned at Branch V of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, presided over by Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, who denied a motion to
dismiss of appellant herein, predicated, among other things, upon the absence of authority to sue
said appellant, as receiver of building belonging to Co Bun Kim, and rendered the decision appealed
from, despite the reiteration of appellant's pretense in his answer and, later on, on his motion for
reconsideration of said decision, which was, also denied. In other words, the court having jurisdiction
over the receivership had, thereby, impliedly, but clearly, given its consent to the present action
against the receiver, and sanctioned the same.

It is claimed that the lower court erred in sentencing the appellant to pay the rentals in question
jointly and severally with Co Bun Kim, for appellant was not a party to the deed Exhibit A, and
neither the same, nor the nature of the contract therein set forth, nor the law, make appellant
solidarily liable with Co Bun Kim for the rentals in dispute.

Obviously, this argument is predicated upon the theory that the receiver represents an interest
completely distinct and separate from that of Co Bun Kim. It overlooks that fact that Co Bun Kim is
the owner of the building under receivership; that the rentals thereof, collected by appellant, belong
to Co Bun Kim; that appellant is a mere custodian of the funds thus collected and held by him; that
the judgment against appellant, for the rentals due under Exhibit A, merely enforces an obligation of
Co Bun Kim, to whom said funds belong; and that the liability of appellant under the decision
appealed from is nothing but the very same liability of Co Bun Kim. The rules concerning joint
obligations and solidary obligations (obligaciones mancomunadas y obligaciones solidarias) require
a plurality of subjects (creditors, debtors or both) and have no application when there is only one
creditor and one debtor, even if payment of the debt is to be made by several individuals,
representing one and the same interest or debtor.

Again, the records of case No. 16221 (Exhibit H) show that appellant's brother, Atty. S. D. Carpio —
who was counsel for defendant herein — knew that the lot in question is merely leased to Co Bun
Kim, and that the latter has bound himself, among other things, to pay rentals therefor, apart from
the corresponding taxes on said land. Moreover, on March 15, 1953, appellant was specifically
advised — by virtue of the letter Exhibit I — of said facts, yet he did nothing about it. He even
collected rentals from the lessees of the apartments (accesorias) under receivership. Thus, aside
from not repudiating the lease contract Exhibit A, he thereby indicated willingness to continue the
juridical relation thereby established, under the terms and conditions therein set forth. In other
words, — although subject to the control of the Court, having jurisdiction over the receivership —
appellant became a mere extension of the personality of Co Bun Kim, as regards the liability of the
latter under said contract. Indeed, the constitutional mandate to the effect that "no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed" imposed upon the court — and, hence, upon its officer,
appellant herein as receiver of said building — aside from Congress, the duty to respect the contract
of lease Exhibit A, it being free from any vice that may affect its validity.

It is lastly urged that the lower court erred in ordering the execution of its aforementioned decision,
during the pendency of this appeal, for want of jurisdiction and insufficiency of the reasons given
therefor. The first ground assumes that the appeal had been perfected prior to the order of execution
complained of, which is not a fact, said order having been issued on May 12, 1955, whereas the
record on appeal was approved on May 19, 1955. In fact, said order is mentioned in the record on
appeal, which would have been impossible had the latter been submitted and approved prior to said
order. The second ground is, also, untenable, it being obvious that this appeal has been taken
merely for the purpose of delay, the default in the payment of rentals being conceded. Worse still,
the property in question is in danger of being sold by the Government for delinquency in the payment
of taxes. At any rate, the appellant has no reason whatsoever to complain against the order of
execution, having been exempted from the operation thereof, by directing the execution of the
decision appealed from, insofar only as Co Bun Kim is concerned.

Wherefore, said decision is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against appellant herein.
It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

e the Kings - Sad Song

 Artist: We the Kings

 Featuring artist: Elena Coats

 Album: Somewhere Somehow (2013)

  Translations: Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Croatian, Finnish, French, Germ
an, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, Serbian
5 more
English
A A

Sad Song
You and I, we're like fireworks and symphonies exploding in the sky.
With you, I'm alive
Like all the missing pieces of my heart, they finally collide.
 
So stop time right here in the moonlight,
Cause I don't ever wanna close my eyes.
 
Without you, I feel broken.
Like I'm half of a whole.
Without you, I've got no hand to hold.
Without you, I feel torn.
Like a sail In a storm.
Without you, I'm just a sad song.
I'm just a sad song.
 
With you, I fall.
It's like I'm leaving all my past and silhouettes up on the wall.
With you, I'm a beautiful mess.
It's like we're standing hand and hand with all our fears up on the edge.
 
So stop time right here in the moonlight,
Cause I don't ever wanna close my eyes.
 
Without you, I feel broken.
Like I'm half of a whole.
Without you, I've got no hand to hold.
Without you, I feel torn.
Like a sail In a storm.
Without you, I'm just a sad song.
 
You're the perfect melody,
The only harmony I wanna to hear.
You're my favorite part of me,
With you standing next to me,
I've got nothing to fear.
 
Without you, I feel broken.
Like I'm half of a whole.
Without you, I've got no hand to hold.
Without you, I feel torn.
Like a sail In a storm.
Without you, I'm just a sad song.
 
Without you, I feel broken.
Like I'm half of a whole.
Without you, I've got no hand to hold.
Without you, I feel torn.
Like a sail In a storm.
Without you, I'm just a sad song.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-43             February 27, 1946

PILAR DOMINGO VDA. DE BUHAY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARMEN COBARRUBIAS, defendant-appellant.

Cardenas and Casal for appellant.

Gregorio N. Garcia for appellee.

OZAETA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendant to
vacate the upper part of the house located at 563 Legarda, Manila, and to pay to the plaintiff the
rents, from February 1945 until the premises are vacated, at the rate of P27.50 a month, and the
costs.
For some years previous to 1945 the defendant had been occupying the premises in question,
paying a monthly rent therefor to the plaintiff and her predecessors in interest. On February 8, 1945,
the plaintiff, having lost her residence on Soler Street, notified the defendant to vacate the said
premises. The defendant not only failed and refused to do so but likewise failed to pay the rents for
the months of February and March 1945, for which reasons the plaintiff commenced in the Municipal
Court of Manila this action, which in the course of time was appealed to the Court of First Instance,
with the result already indicated above.

In her first assignment of error the appellant invokes article 1566 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows:

RT. 1566. If, on the expiration of the contract, the lessee, with the acquiescence of the
lessor, continues for fifteen days to enjoy the thing leased, it shall be deemed that there has
been an implied renewal for the time mentioned in articles 157.7 and 1581, unless notice to
vacate has previously been given.

Appellant's argument is that she having been permitted by the appellee to occupy the premises in
question during the months of February and March, there was an implied renewal of the contract
under the article above quoted. This contention is clearly untenable. Under article 1581 of the Civil
Code, in the absence of an agreement as to the duration of the lease it is understood as being from
month to month when the rent is on a monthly basis, and "the lease shall terminate without necessity
of a special notice, upon the expiration of the term." (Estrella and Estrella vs. Sangalang, p.
108, ante.) Moreover, the trial court found, and we find no basis in the record upon which to reverse
its finding, that on February 8 the plaintiff, "braving the perils incident to the war," went to the
defendant and told her to pay the rent for that month and vacate the premises. There is therefore the
additional consideration in this case that the plaintiff had given the defendant notice to vacate before
commencing the action. Furthermore, the defendant admits having failed to pay the rents
corresponding to February and March 1945. Hence plaintiff's right to eject the defendant is
indisputable.

In her second assignment of error the defendant and appellant contends that the trial court should
have held that under the circumstances of emergency and as a matter of equity she cannot be
deprived of the possession of the leased premises. A similar contention was advanced by the
appellant and rejected by this court in the case of Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. vs.
Prudencio, (p. 111, ante). In the instant case the defendant has been unlawfully withholding from the
plaintiff the possession of the premises in question for more than a year; and the plaintiff pleads
before us that she was compelled to bring the present action not so much to collect the rent as to
acquire a place where she and her nine children could live, "they being victims of the general
conflagration occasioned by the Japanese armed forces upon the liberation of Manila," and that "the
said appellee is a widow who, but for the accommodation extended to her by her sister-in-law, with
her nine children would be sleeping in the streets."

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

De Joya, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, JJ., concur.

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