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THIRD DIVISION

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK G.R. No. 196323

(MAYBANK PHILIPPINES,
INCORPORATED), Present:
Petitioner,
LEONEN,J,
Chairperson,
HERNANDO,
- versus - LAZARO-JAVIER,*
DELOS SANTOS, and
LOPEZ, J. Y., JJ

Promulgated:

REMEDIOS SIAN-LIMSIACO,
Respondent. February 8, 2021
~\~"i>C\S0.1\t
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the April 30,
2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80268
denying the appeal of petitioner Maybank Philippines, Inc. (Maybank;
formerly known as PNB-Republic Bank), as well as its March 16, 2011
Resolution3 denying Maybank's Motion for Reconsideration. 4

* Designated as additional Member per raffle dated September 30, 2020 vice J. Inting who recused himself
since his sister (then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Socorro B. Inting) penned the assailed
,Decision of the Court of Appelas.
1 Rollo, pp. 27-60.
2 Id. at 10-19; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Edwin
D. Sorongon and Ramon A. Cruz.
3
Id. at 20-21.
4
CA rollo, pp. 110-119.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 196323

The antecedents as culled from the assailed CA Decision are as follows:

Sometime in 1979, respondent Remedios Sian-Limsiaco (Remedios)

obtained a Pl42,500.00 sugar crop loan from Maybank which was payable
within one year. 5 Through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Remedios
executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on the following parcels of land:

(a)Lot 8, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-74488,

which is owned by Sian Agricultural Corporation;

(b)Lot I, covered by TCT No. 55619, which is owned by spouses

Sebastian and Marina de la Pena. 6

Subsequently in 1982, Remedios and her son Roy Sian-Limsiaco (Roy)

obtained another sugar crop loan for P:307,700.00 which was likewise due
after one year. Through another SPA, Roy executed a REM on the following
parcels of land owned by Spouses Jerome Gonzales and Perla Sian-Gonzales:

(a) Lot 214, covered by TCT No. T-121539;

(b) Lot 215, covered by TCT No. T-121540;

(c) Lot 213-B, covered by TCT No. T-121541;

(d) Lot 96, covered by TCT No. T-80515. 7

Likewise, in 1984, Remedios obtained another sugar crop loan for

Pll0,000.00 also secured by a REM on Lot 8 owned by Sian Agricultural
Corporation. 8

Maybank never demanded payment of the above sugar crop loans nor
filed a case to collect or foreclose the mortgage. 9

Thus, on June 29, 2001 or after a lapse of 17 years, Remedios and Roy
filed a Petition10 before the Regional Trial court (RTC), Branch 56 of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, to cancel the liens annotated on the titles of
the mortgated properties on grounds of prescription and extinction of their
loan obligation.

Maybank referred the case to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to

which it had assigned its assets and liabilities including its receivables. 11

5
Rollo, p. 11.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 11-12.
8
Id. at. 12.
' Id.
10, Records, pp. 1-17.

" Id. at 34-36; see Motion for Substitution and Motion to Dismiss.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 196323

Hence, by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated July 20, 1998, 12 Maybank
argued that PNB should be treated as substitute respondent. Unconvinced and
not satisfied with the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, the RTC required
additional documents to justify the substitution, which PNB failed to
provide. 13 Consequently, the RTC denied the Motion for Substitution. 14

Thereafter, Atty. Kenneth Alovera (Atty. Alovera), for and on behalf of

the PNB, filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence 1' which the trial
court denied, in view of Atty. Alovera's failure to submit proof that he was
authorized to appear on Maybank's behalf. 16 Subsequently, the receivables
were transferred to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). 17

Ruling of the Regional Trial

Court:

On June 24, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 18 in respondent's favor,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is

hereby GRANTED. The mortgage contracts hereinunder enumerated as
annotated in the respective Certificates of Title of the properties mortgaged, are
hereby declared unenforceable and of no force and effect due to prescription.

xxxx

The Register of Deeds of Bacolod City is hereby directed to cancel Entry

Nos. 99726, 122381, 130934 as annotated at the back of TCT No. T-74488
covering Lot 8 and the same entries annotated at the back ofT-55619 covering
Lot 1, without need of presenting the original owner's duplicate title.

Likewise, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Negros Occidental, is

also directed to cancel Entry No. 288015 annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
121539 covering Lot 214; the same entry annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
121543 covering Lot 215; the same number of entry annotated at the back of
TCT No. T-121541 covering Lot 213-B; and the same number of entry
annotated at the back ofTCT No. T-80515 covering Lot 96, all ofHimamaylan
Cadastre, without the need of presenting the original owner's duplicate copies
of the respective titles.

SO ORDERED. 19

12
Id. at 44-50.
13 Id. at 81; see March 12, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Himarnaylan, Negros Occidental,
Branch 56.
14 Id. at 137; see June 6, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court ofHimarnaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch
56.
15 Id. at I25-126.
16 Records, pp. 143-145; see February 5, 2003 Order.
17
Rollo, p. 13.
18 Records, pp. 166-172; penned by Presiding Judge Edgardo L. Catilo.
19 Id.atl71-172.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 196323

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Aggrieved, Maybank raised the following issues in its appeal with the
CA: 1) Did the trial court err in taking cognizance of the case and in granting
the petition even if the same was not filed in the name of the real parties in
interest, e.g. the registered owners of the properties mortgaged and BSP as the
assignee of the receivable assets-in violation of Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court?; 2) Did the trial court err in granting the petition even if
Remedios had no cause of action against Maybank; and 3) Are the owners of
the properties mortgaged bound by the trial court's judgment despite the
failure to make them parties to the case?20

On April 30, 2010, the CA issued a Decision21 denying Maybank's

appeal, the dispositive portion of the ruling states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Order dated June 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th
Judicial Region, Branch 56, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental in Cadastral
Case No. 21 granting the petition is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. 22

Maybank filed a Motion for Reconsideration challenging the above

23

Decision but the same was denied in a Resolution24 dated March 16, 2011
issued by the appellate court.

Hence, Maybank filed the instant petition, which, in essence, raised the
following-

Issues:

1) Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed in toto the RTC's

judgment despite the respondent being not the real parties-in-interest, hence
having no cause of action against petitioner;

2) Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed in toto the RTC's

judgment despite the respondents lacking authority to institute the instant suit,
hence, lacking the legal capacity to sue; and

3) Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed in toto the RTC's

judgment cancelling the mortgage liens of Maybank despite the non-inclusion
ofan indispensable party, the BSP. 25

20
See rol/o, pp. 13-14.
21
Id. at 10-19.
22
Id. at 18-10.
23
CA rollo, pp. 110-119.
24
Rollo, pp. 20-21.
25
Id. at 40-41.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 196323

Our Ruling

We deny the Petition.

Petitioner raised questions of law

which may be reviewed by this
Court.

Before delving into the substantive issues of the case, we find it proper
first to discuss the sole argument raised in respondent's Comment, which is
that this petition must be dismissed for not raising questions oflaw. 26

Particularly, respondent posits that the questions raised by petitioner as to

"who are the real parties in interest and who are the indispensable parties" are
questions of fact outside of the scope of a Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari. 27

Indeed, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only

questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth, shall be raised, to wit:

Section 1. Filing ofpetition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to

appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise onlv questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The
petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Underscoring
supplied)

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact has been
clear-cut. In Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escano,
Jr., 28 we held that:

In Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, a question of law arises

when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites
a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus. the
test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to
such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the

26 Id. at 198-203.
27 Id. at 200.
28 672 Phil. 747 (201 I).
Decision 6 G.R. No. 196323

evidence, in which case, it is a question of law: otherwise it is a question of

fact. 29 (Underscoring supplied)

Here, the petition raised questions of law, contrary to respondent's broad

assertions, which oversimplified and misunderstood some of the issues raised,
such as the question as to who are the real-parties-in-interest. The said
question begs us to discuss the legal definitions of "real[-]parties[-]in[-]
interest" as applied to the undisputed facts.

To put it simply, some of the questions raised by petitioner are more

geared towards the application of the law on civil procedure and civil law
rather than simply identifying specific persons, which respondent seems to
imply. Such legal questions obviously do not require an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented in order to come up with an answer
to them.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised by petitioner

are questions of facts, we are not totally precluded from reviewing the same.
In Salcedo v. People, 30 we enumerated some exceptions to the general rule
that only questions of law are reviewable in a Rule 45 petition, namely:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

( 5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1s premised on

misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; and

29
Id. at 756.
30 400 Phil. 1302 (2000).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 196323

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record. 31

Thus, if any of the situations above are found to be present, this Court
may validly review the factual findings of the lower courts notwithstanding
the general rule that questions of facts are not allowed in a petition filed under
Rule 45 as this Court is not a trier of facts. In this case however, there is no
need to review the facts as the questions interposed by petitioner can be
answered without disturbing the factual findings of the lower courts.

The issue of whether or not BSP

is an indispensable party is a
question of fact.

In Gatan v. Vinarao, 32 we have laid down the paramaters of a Rule 45

petition and reiterated the ruling in Diokno v. Cacdac, 33 that a reexamination
of factual findings is outside the province of a petition for review on certiorari,
to wit:

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done

through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts[.] xx x. The Supreme
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in
the proceedings below. Tbis is already outside the province of the instant
Petition for Certiorari. 34

In view of the foregoing, we disregard the argument of whether the BSP

is an indispensable party for being a question of fact.

While the question of "who is an indispensable party?" is not necessarily

a question of fact per se, the instant petition hinges its assertions that the BSP
is an indispensable party on the Deed of Assignment" dated July 20, 1998,
which it presented to the RTC. 36 Both the appellate court" and the trial court"
found nothing of probative value in the said Deed of Assignment, which was
the sole piece of evidence presented as proof that BSP is an indispensable
party.

Weighing the probative value of a piece of evidence is clearly a question

of fact that calls for an appreciation of the evidence on record, and is
obviously something that cannot be reviewed in a Rule 45 Petition. This is in

31 Id. at 1308-1309.
32
820 Phil. 257 (2017).
33 553 Phil. 405 (2007).
34
Gatan v. Vinarao, supra at 266.
35
Records, pp. 44-50.
36
Rollo, at p. 12.
37 Id.
38
Records, pp. 168-169.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 196323

contrast to the other two main issues raised, both of which only call for a legal
analysis of the undisputed facts and evidence on record.

Therefore, there being no compelling reason for us to depart from the

factual findings of the lower courts that the Deed of Assignment was
irrelevant, we do not see the necessity of discussing the issue of "whether or
not BSP is an indispensable party" any further.

In any event, upon perusal of the Deed of Assignment" dated July 20,
1998, it was not even clear if the sugar crop loans in question were indeed
assigned to BSP as no further evidence was presented. Moreover, at the time
of assignment, the sugar crop loans (the latest of which was due and
demandable after one year) were already unenforceable since nowhere in the
petition did the petitioner deny ever demanding the respondent to pay her
loans.

Respondent acted on behalf of

the mortgagors-principals when
she initiated the action to cancel
the mortgages. There was no
need to join such principals as
the subject mortgage contracts
were merely accessory contracts
that were entered into for the
purpose of securing respondent's
loans and merely involved the
right to foreclose upon the lands
specified therein upon the
fulfillment of certain
contingencies, such as when
there is default.

Petitioner essentially argues that the real parties-in-interest in the present

action are the registered owners of the lands mortgaged and thus, since they
were not impleaded in the case, any judgment resulting from such case should
be considered as null and void. 40

This argument is bereft of merit.

Preliminarily, it must be mentioned that the respondent has been acting

on behalf of the mortgagors-principals throughout the whole course of the
proceedings. Petitioner, despite having knowledge that respondent was not the
registered owner of the mortgaged properties and was merely acting in her
capacity as an agent of the mortgagors-principals, failed to raise the issue of

39
Id. at 44-50.
40 Rollo, pp. 45-47.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 196323

joining these mortgagors-principals at the earliest opportunity, which is during

the proceedings before the trial court.

Thus, the appellate court should not have even entertained the issue in the
first place as "it is axiomatic that issues raised for the first time on appeal will
not be entertained because to do so would be anathema to the rudiments of
fairness and due process." 41

Despite this, the CA, in its discretion, applied liberality and still ruled on
the said issue, albeit against the petitioner who brought it up. 42 But, even
assuming that it was proper to raise such issue at that stage, and for the CA to
entertain the same, we must maintain that petitioner's argument itself holds no
water.

Section 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court (the Rules) provides:

Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who

stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. (Underscoring supplied)

Pertinently, Section 3 of the same Rule provides:

Section 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to

be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by
law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, the Rules allow agents to bring actions for the principals in their
own name without joining their principals, provided that the contract does not
involve things belonging to the principal. As applied in this case, while it may
seem that the mortgage contracts "involve" real property of the principals,
such contracts are actually not of that nature.

To clarify, the mortgage contract itself does not involve real property, but
merely the right to foreclose upon such real property should the necessary
legal pre-conditions are met, such as a breach in the principal contract to
which the mortgage is merely an accessory of.

41 Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, 823 Phil. 212, 222-223 (2018).

42
Rol/o,pp.17-19.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 196323

In fact, jurisprudence has already held that the action to cancel the
mortgage is a personal action, as compared to an action to foreclose such
mortgage, which is a real action that involves real property. In Hernandez v.
Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. (Hernandez), 43 appellants therein contended that
the action of the Spouses Hernandez for the cancellation of the mortgage on
their lots was a real action affecting title to real property, which should have
been filed in the place where the mortgaged lots were situated.

We pointed out in Hernandez that with respect to mortgage, the rule on

real actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. 44
It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage. 45
Using the legal maxim of exclusio unios est inclusio alterius, it was concluded
that the latter thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions. 46

If only to drive this point even further, it must be emphasized that

whether or not the petition to cancel the mortgage liens was granted, no
transfer or disposition of real property rights would have occurred either way.
This is in contrast to a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage, wherein
property rights will clearly be transferred or at least be affected depending on
the ruling of the court hearing such a case.

Therefore, since neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant
case involved the mortgagors-principals' real property rights, there was no
need to join them and hence, respondent validly instituted the action in her
own name but still in her capacity as an agent of the mortgagors-principals.

In any event, we agree with the appellate court in its ruling that the
joining of the mortgagors-principals would be unneccessary and moot as the
evidence on record patently reveals that the main loan contracts have already
been rendered unenforceable by virtue ofprescription. 47 Given that the subject
mortgage contracts are mere accessory contracts to the said loan contracts,
then it follows that the action to foreclose on these mortgage contracts had
also already prescribed. Therefore, there is no necessity in including the
mortgagors-principals in the petition as the cancellation of the mortgages
annotated on the titles was a result of the unenforceability of the principal
loan.

The authority to encumber one's

land title naturally includes the
authority to perform acts to
disencumber such title.

43
171 Phil. 70 (1978).
44
Id. at 79.
45 Id.
46
Id. at 79-80.
47
Rollo, at 17.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 196323

In the assailed decision, the appellate court discussed that:

It also bears stressing that when mortgagors Sian Agricultural

Corporation, Sebastian and Marina de la Pena and Spouses Jerome Gonzales
and Perla Sian-Gonzales as registered owners of Lots 1, 8, 214, 215,213-B and
96, respectively, authorized petitioner-appellee and her son Roy Sian Liamsiaco
to mortgage their properties, they allowed a burden to be placed therein bearing
the risk of losing it if the loans were not paid. It is because of this risk that
mortgagors should be absolute owners, or, that special authority from the
owners of the properties must be given before their properties can be
encumbered through mortgage. Since the lifting of this encumbrance is a
benefit that would free the owners of the risk of losing their properties, it is
only a matter of course that the special power to mortgage includes the
authority to discharge it from the burden. 48

We share this logical view.

Article 1882 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Article 1882. The limits of the agent's authority shall not be considered
exceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous to the
principal than that specified by him.

Given this and considering that respondent was already given special
authority to encumber the mortgagors-principals' titles with the subject
mortgage contracts, then it is indeed implicit that respondent is also authorized
to do all the necessary acts to release the mortgagors-principals from such
encumbrance. Thus, the filing of the instant case to cancel the mortgage liens,
which were annotated in the mortgagor-principals' respective titles through
the special authority granted by them to respondent, should be considered
within the limits of respondent's authority since disencumbering the
mortagagors-principals' titles of the same mortgage liens are obviously
advantageous to the latter.

Moreover, records show that the registered owners of the mortgaged

lands (alleged to be the real parties-in-interest) never questioned the authority
of respondent all throughout the proceedings nor did they file any pleading or
motion to that effect. In short, the real parties-in-interest effectively ratified
the act of respondent of filing an action to cancel the mortgage.

To reiterate, unlike a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, which

involves real property rights, the cancellation of a real estate mortgage is
merely personal in nature. In fact, the mortgaged properties do not even come
into the picture until there is a default on the loan as the mortgage's purpose is
merely to secure such loan.

48
Id. at 17-18.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 196323

There is no dispute that

petitioner's right to collect from
the subject loans has already
prescribed. Thus, the RTC
correctly ordered the
cancellation of the mortgage
liens, regardless of whether it
acted as a cadastral court or a
court of general jurisdiction.

There was never an issue as to the prescription of the loans. Throughout

the proceedings, petitioner never refuted the fact that it never exercised its
right to collect on the subject sugar crop loans for almost 16 years after the
latest sugar crop loan's due date, nor did petitioner provide any proof that
demand was made to respondent within the prescriptive period.

We are well aware of Our ruling in Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. (Rehabilitation Finance Corporation), 49
that the Court of First Instance (the RTC in this case), in its special and limited
jurisdiction as a land registration court, does not have the power to adjudicate
issues properly pertaining to ordinary civil actions such as questions relating
to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a mortgage. We held that said
issue should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action. However, we are also
aware that such a rule does admit of some exceptions.

In Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, we cited previous cases that laid

down situations wherein the relief under Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act may be allowed:
The court a quo acted correctly in denying, under the circumstances, the
petition to cancel the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of the title
covering the property originally owned by Eustaquio Palma. It has been
consistently held by this Court, that the relief afforded by Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a unanimity among the
parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party
in interest;" otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed
out in an ordinary case. In another case, this Court has held that "Section 112
authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which do not impair rights recorded
in the decree, or alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are
consented to by all parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious
mistakes." 50 (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the situations above would not require a separate, ordinary

action in order for the RTC, while acting as a cadastral court, to have
jurisdiction to rule on the petition for the cancellation of the annotation of
mortgages on the land titles covering the mortgaged lots. As applied in this

49 107 Phil. 386,390 (1960).

50
Id. at 390.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 196323

case, there was no adverse claim or serious objection interposed by petitioner

on the issue of prescription.

Respondent clearly alleged that the petitioner failed to exercise its right
to collect on the subject sugar crop loans and that such failure rendered the
mortgage contracts functus officio, unenforceable, and of no force and effect
due to prescription and laches, 51 but nowhere in the records did petitioner deny
such allegations nor did it present proof rebutting the same.

Moreover, the deletion of the mortgage liens would not even result in any
prejudice to the petitioner, since its right to collect on the subject loans (of
which the mortgages were merely accessory contracts thereof) had already
prescribed.

Therefore, the RTC had acted well within its jurisdiction when it issued
the order directing the cancellation of the subject mortgage liens, and
consequently, the CA committed no error in affirming the RTC's decision
containing such order in toto.

The parties' right to due process

was not violated during the
proceedings as they were given
the same opportunities to
present their own side as in an
ordinary action. Technicalities
may be set aside if strict
application of the same would
defeat the disposition of
substantial justice.

Finally, it must be remembered that the rules of procedure was intended

to facilitate the disposition of justice and not to hinder it. 52 In the case of Ben
Line Agencies Phils., Inc. v. Madson, 53 we have reiterated this age-old
doctrine, to wit:

x x x [R]ules of procedure are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice

and that their rigid application resulting in technicalities tending to delay or
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. In other
words, procedural rules are set in place to ensure that the proceedings are in
order and to avoid unnecessary delays, but are never intended to prevent
tribunals or administrative agencies from resolving the substantive issues at
hand. 54

51
Rollo, at p. 221.
52 Mitra v. Sablan-Gu€!Varra, 830 Phil. 277,283 (2018).
53 823 Phil. 261 (2018).
54
Id. at 267-268.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 196323

Truly, the circumstances of the instant case do not call for a strict
application of the Rules of Court, especially considering that the basic tenets
of due process were observed during the proceedings. While cadastral
proceedings are normally summary in nature and would only require notice to
other interested parties, the RTC actually issued a summons to petitioner,55
and the latter was given ample opportunity to present its side and adduce
evidence supporting such. Moreover, the records would reveal that trial
ensued like in an ordinary civil action, and in fact, respondent was able to
present two (2) witnesses. 56

Despite being served summons and given more than enough

opportunities to defend itself, petitioner still failed to refute respondent's
allegations that the former failed to exercise its right to collect on the subject
sugar crop loans for almost 16 years and that such failure rendered the
mortgage contracts functus oficio, unenforceable, and of no force and effect
due to prescription and laches. 57 Neither did the petitioner present any iota of
evidence to even cast a doubt on such fact. Instead, petitioner have stubbornly
relied on mere technicalities for its defense, up until the instant petition before
us.

Clearly, the parties' right to due process had been substantially complied
with, given that both parties were given the opportunity to present their side
and adduce their own evidence to bolster their positions. To emphasize, it has
always been a basic principle in our jurisdiction that on balance, substantial
justice trumps procedural rules, 58 especially given that there is no prejudice to
the parties' right to due process. This axiom is especially true if the strict and
rigid application of such procedural rules would result in technicalities which
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. 59

While the proceedings of this case may have been riddled with
procedural infirmities, none have been so severe as to deprive the parties to
their right to due process and fair hearing. Indeed, it would be the height of
injustice for us to remand a roughly two-decades-old dispute to the trial court
just to unnecessarily thresh out matters that were not even issues in the first
place, based on a mere technicality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The

April 30, 2010 Decision and March 16, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80268 are AFFIRMED. Costs on petitioner.

55
Rollo, at p. 221.
56
Id. at 222.
57
Id. at 221.
58 De Roca vs. Dabuyan, 827 Phil. 99, 110-111 (2018).
59 Republic ofthe Philippines vs. Dimarucot, 827 Phil. 360,373 (2018).
Decision 15 G.R. No. 196323

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

'

Associate Justice
Chairperson

AZARO-JAVIER EDG.ni,,..uO L. DELOS SANTOS

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JHOSEmOPEZ
Associate Justice
Decision 16 G.R. No. 196323

ATTESTATION

I attest that conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

.PERALTA
tice