NDC Policy Brief
No.15 - September 2021
European allies and the forthcoming
NATO strategic concept
Barbara Kunz *
T he forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept
will primarily serve the purpose of adapting
the definition of the Alliance’s core tasks to
21st century realities. This includes an updated threat
analysis, as well as a widening of priorities to include
matters and domains such as cybersecurity and soci-
etal resilience. It will, in many ways, also reflect the
considerable changes European security underwent
since the publication of its preceding Strategic Con-
cept in 2010. It will therefore be the first post-Crimea
Strategic Concept, and mark the end of a cooperative
security approach to Russia. The new text will also be
the first post-Trump administration document, one
elaborated after a period of profound doubts over US
commitment to the Alliance. Finally, the new Strate-
gic Concept will be adopted after years of sometimes
heated debates on European security, particularly on
the notion of European strategic autonomy. While a
consensus on this concept and its implications for the
Atlantic Alliance has thus far proved elusive, it seems
clear that Europeans increasingly understand the need
for a stronger, and in many ways more independent
Europe. To some, recent events in Afghanistan may
also have been a wake-up call. In reality, however,
most of these developments are structural in nature,
and have persisted for some time.
Against this backdrop, European thinking – both
among European NATO members, and partner
countries such as Sweden and Finland – about the
forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept should build
*
Senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy
at the University of Hamburg (IFSH).
Research Division – NATO Defense College
upon a number of observations. First, the United
States remains essential to defending Europe. Second,
finding a way to manage the various aspects of the
relationship with Russia is the single most important
aspect of Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century.
Third, strengthening Europe as a security and defence
actor is of primary importance. Whether this happens
under the European strategic autonomy label or an-
other catchphrase is secondary.
With this in mind, Europeans must not lose sight
of the fact that their continent’s security is at a cross-
roads. NATO’s new Strategic Concept must there-
fore not be considered
as an endpoint follow-
ing unpleasant devel- Keywords
opments, ratifying the
post-Trump return to NATO Strategic Concept
normal. Rather, the European security
Concept should be seen Transatlantic relations
as an intermediate step
EU Strategic Compass
in the overall process
of remaking European
security. Joe Biden’s election notwithstanding, the fu-
ture of US security guarantees seems uncertain over
the medium to long term. Some deeper thinking is
required, well beyond 2022. NATO’s new Strategic
Concept should be designed as a step in the right di-
rection. For it to fulfil this criterion, Europeans need
to consider three dimensions and keep them high on
their agenda.
2 NDC Policy Brief – No. 15 – September 2021
Continue working toward a more capable
Europe
Beyond the forthcoming Strategic Concept in the
NATO context, working toward a more capable Eu-
rope in the field of security and defence is key. In so
doing, Europeans still need to overcome divides and
disagreements on prior-
ities. The good news is
The Concept should be that after years of a rel-
seen as an intermediate atively unfruitful debate
step in the overall on European strategic
process of remaking autonomy, EU member
European security states are currently pur-
suing a more construc-
tive strategy process in
the so-called Strategic Compass1. The Strategic Com-
pass pertains to the EU’s Common Security and De-
fence Policy (CSDP) and seeks more coherence be-
tween means and ends, but also among the Union’s
various defence and security instruments. Parallels
with the formulation of a new Strategic Concept for
NATO are obvious, notably when it comes to ana-
lysing the strategic environment. After all, European
security is indivisible, regardless of the institutional
framework in which European countries cooperate.
All building blocks of European security therefore
need to be coherent and compatible with each oth-
er at all levels: from strategy to defence planning,
acquisitions, and operations. There is still room for
improvement here.
At the heart of the Strategic Compass, as well as
of the Strategic Concept, is threat perception. Vary-
ing threat perceptions and disagreement over security
priorities are one key reason for Europe’s failure to
emerge as one security actor. The goal can obvious-
ly not be to assign priority to one perceived threat.
Moreover, Europeans will not be able to afford the
luxury of picking their preferred threats anyway. They
will simply have to deal with all security threats and
challenges Europe is facing. This also means that NA-
TO’s core tasks will need to include both collective
defence and crisis management, even after Afghan-
istan. Key threats and challenges for Europe are in
its vicinity, potentially making crisis management any-
thing but obsolete.
This leads to a key issue that has been implicit to
many debates on European security: what should be
1  See N. Koenig, “The EU’s strategic compass for security and defence:
just another paper?”, Policy Paper, Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre,
10 July 2020.
the division of labour between NATO and the Euro-
pean Union (as well as other formats)? For decades,
Europeans and Americans have failed to provide an
effective and realistic answer to this question, essen-
tially dodging it by focusing more on political desir-
ability, rather than realities on the ground and realistic
scenarios.2 In the long term, and in light of the un-
certainties surrounding US involvement in European
security (see next section), defining such a division of
labour in both regional and functional terms seems
unavoidable. It should consequently be – materially
and intellectually – prepared now, during a period of
renewed willingness to cooperate across the Atlantic,
rather than in times of transatlantic tensions.
Short of defining the division of labour between
the two organizations, strengthening EU-NATO co-
operation must also remain on top of the agenda. The
difficulties of such cooperation are well known, no-
tably pertaining to Turkey.3 Coherence between the
two contexts is without alternative in light of scarce
resources and given single sets of forces. Moreover,
while the newly established EU-US dialogue may ap-
pear to be a viable workaround for these difficulties,
Europeans should also make sure non-EU NATO
countries remain part of the discussion, in particular
Norway and the United Kingdom.
Focus on Europe and its priorities, not
those of the United States
A stronger Europe is not a plan B and needs to be
pursued for its own sake. It should also not merely be
seen as an investment in transatlantic burden-sharing
in order to keep the United States on board. While Joe
Biden’s election as US president may make the matter
appear less urgent to some, there remain a number of
reasons why Europe should reduce its dependence on
the United States.
These reasons are, first, linked to changing US
priorities, notably when it comes to Washington’s
focus on China as its systemic competitor. This sug-
gests that directing resources and attention towards
Europe will likely become less and less attractive to
US policymakers. Second, US domestic politics will
almost certainly remain volatile, with foreign policy
issues foreseeably at risk of being overwhelmed by
2  See T. Tardy, “For a new NATO-EU bargain”, Security Policy Brief n°138,
Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, February 2021.
3  See e.g. A. Brzozowski, “NATO chief admits ‘serious concerns’ over
Turkey, hopes for more NATO-EU cooperation”, Euractiv, 16 March 2021.
NDC Policy Brief – No. 15 – September 2021
partisan political dynamics. This may mean either less
US attention devoted to foreign policy, or worse, that
decisions regarding such issues will be driven solely by
these partisan political dynamics. Unpredictability ap-
pears unavoidable. Europeans simply have to prepare
themselves for the day when ‘‘transatlantic business as
usual” is no longer an option.
This does not necessarily imply the end of all US
engagement. Yet, as of now, even a reduced US en-
gagement would be a considerable problem for Eu-
ropean security. At the same time, Europeans should
not fall in the trap of excessively focusing on the
United States. In somewhat provocative terms: seek-
ing to please the Americans is not a strategy. This no-
tably applies to US approaches to China. While China
represents multiple challenges, including to European
interests and values, the US-China rivalry and support
for Washington must not determine European prior-
ities. Rather, Europeans need to continue their own
work on European security and defence priorities, in
particular in the context of the EU’s ongoing Stra-
tegic Compass process. Finally, Europeans must also
avoid a focus on China as a far-away and somewhat
elusive threat (at least from a military perspective) as
the easy way out of intra-European disagreement on
matters closer to home. They should not lose sight of
the fact that their key preoccupation must be Euro-
pean security.
A more differentiated approach vis-à-vis
Russia
Relations with Russia will continue to be the single
most important factor for Euro-Atlantic security –
the focus on China notwithstanding. Russia remains
a problematic actor and its actions should be watched
carefully. It is a welcome development that Europe-
ans, as well as the EU, have moved away from a rhet-
oric of partnership, thereby abandoning illusions on
the type of relationship that is realistic with Russia.4
But Europeans must also acknowledge that the
approach adopted after Russia’s 2014 annexation of
Crimea has not yielded the desired results. More of
the same is unlikely to lead to the relationship improv-
ing. As a result, Europe’s security environment keeps
deteriorating. Upon closer look, the reasons stem
4  As the most recent example at European level, see High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Com-
munication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the
Council on EU-Russia relations – Push back, constrain and engage”,
JOIN(2021) 20 final, Brussels, 16 June 2021.
3
from two different sources: while incidents such as
the poisoning of Alexej Navalny are Moscow’s stand
alone choices that are free of influence of the West,
other issues such as the collapse of arms control re-
gimes and the development and deployment of more
weapons occur in the context of the US-Russian and
NATO-Russian security dilemma. A security dilemma
is the result of distrust among the involved actors,
whose actions to increase their own security exacer-
bate the security dilemma by making the other side
feel less secure. The re-
sult is that these actions
lead to less security for Relations with Russia
both sides.5 What is will continue to be the
necessary, therefore, is single most important
a more differentiated factor for Euro-Atlantic
approach that distin- security – the focus on
guishes between matters
China notwithstanding
related to this security
dilemma – which needs
to be managed carefully – and unrelated Russian for-
eign policy behaviour.
This is not to suggest that simplistic analysis ac-
cording to which NATO e.g. “caused” the annexation
of Crimea is correct. The lives of Russian opposition
politicians, and of course the integrity of national
borders in Europe, are under no circumstances nego-
tiable from a European perspective, nor can breaches
of the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe (that re-
asserts the principle of territorial integrity of States)
be excused. Rather, a more differentiated approach
means admitting that foreign and security policy does
not take place in a vacuum. Certain developments,
including some driven by NATO members and part-
ners, are perceived as a threat by Moscow. NATO and
the “West” should come to acknowledge that some
Russian concerns, for instance pertaining to the de-
ployment of high-precision weapon systems6, cannot
simply be discarded as invalid. Taking this seriously is
also in Europe’s security interest, given that these de-
5  For a detailed discussion, see B. Kunz, “Europe in the US-Russian
security dilemma: is there a way out?”, in B. Heurlin, N. Graeger, A. Wivel
and O. Waever, Polarity in international relations – Past, present, future, Palgrave
Macmillan, forthcoming.
6  For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed both the
matter of high-precision long-range non-nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile defense in his 2015 speech at Valdai (“Meeting of the Valdai In-
ternational Discussion Club”, 22 October). Official Russian doctrine con-
siders “deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a
potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and
shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and
hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy
weapons” as being among the main military risks (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of the Russian Federation, Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian
Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 8 June 2020).
4 NDC Policy Brief – No. 15 – September 2021
ployments represent likely targets for Russian attacks
should an armed conflict occur. In this sense, Europe-
ans should accept that Russia judges NATO members
by the same standards Europeans judge Russia: there
is simply not enough mutual trust for either side to
believe in the others’ claims of no bad intentions.
Historically, managing this security dilemma has
been left to the United States and Russia. As the Unit-
ed States’ allies, Europeans are directly concerned.
Therefore, matters pertaining to strategic stability
on the continent must
Europeans should be addressed in some
not fall in the trap of sort of a dialogue. This
excessively focusing does not necessarily
on the United States. In mean talks about disar-
mament. Managing the
somewhat provocative
security dilemma comes
terms: seeking to please before attempting to
the Americans is not a alleviate it. In other
strategy words, talking to Russia
is not per se incompati-
ble with deterrence. Within Europe itself, the debate
should reach a point at which such an argument can
be made without being considered “pro-Russian”.
Working toward a more stable security environment
on the continent is in fact a fundamental European
interest. In that sense, while Russia’s action must be
taken seriously as a security threat, “punishing” Mos-
cow by not talking cannot be the solution. The Biden
administration has made steps in the right direction.
But more needs to follow.7 Needless to say, a con-
structive attitude on Moscow’s part is also a prereq-
uisite.
Alleviating the US-Russian security dilemma ob-
viously runs through Washington, while Brussels
only matters on the fringes. Yet, European countries
should not forget that they do play an active part in
it. Not only do their own armament acquisitions and
their decisions on where and how they deploy and sta-
7 For concrete suggestions, see M. Ozawa, “Adapting NATO-Russia
dialogue”, NDC Policy Brief No.12, June 2021.
The views expressed in
this NDC Policy Brief are
the responsibility of the
author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the
opinions of the NATO
Defense College, NATO,
or any government or
institution represented by
the contributors.
tion their capabilities impact that security dilemma,8
their requests to the United States to bolster deter-
rence against Russia also matter in the wider context.
Keep the big picture in mind
NATO’s next Strategic Concept will not directly ad-
dress most of the matters of this Policy Brief, as these
go far beyond such a document. Yet, Europeans
should view the process leading up to the Concept as
an opportunity allowing them to refine their thinking
on the continent’s security at large. In ensuring the
future of Europe’s security and defence, dealing with
the issues raised in this paper is without alternative.
Europeans must keep the big picture in mind and
think beyond the completion of the Strategic Con-
cept.
European security is facing many challenges, and
the number is growing. The Reflection Group estab-
lished by NATO Secretary General in 2020 moreover
identified a number of challenges from within the Al-
liance itself in its “NATO 2030: United for a New
Era” report.9 Many of these challenges, notably to
alliance cohesion, have the potential to severely strain
the Alliance. After all, many of the reasons that led
French President Emmanuel Macron to call NATO
“brain-dead”10 in November 2019 still exist. Unfor-
tunately, even better and deeper consultation within
the Alliance cannot make up for all divides. The good
news, however, is that much of the homework for
Europe does not necessarily require consensus with-
in NATO. A shared willingness among Europeans to
move forward in the same direction would be enough.
Does it exist?
8 For example, Sweden, Finland and Poland decided to procure long-
range precision cruise missiles.
9 Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General, “NATO 2030:
united for a new era”, 25 November 2020.
10 “Emmanuel Macron in his own words (English)”, The Economist, 7
November 2019.
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