North Korea and The Non-Aligned Movement: From Adulation To Marginalization

The Journal of American-East Asian Relations
28 (2021) 41-71
“North Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement: From

Adulation to Marginalization”
Nate Kerkhoff
Indepedent Scholar, Seoul, South Korea
nkerkhoff10@gmail.com
Abstract
The diplomatic history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk) is

intrinsically tied to Cold War politics, often in the context of the Communist versus
capitalist paradigm regarding competition with the Republic of Korea (rok). However,
North Korea’s actions outside of this scope were significant to understanding the full
spectrum of its foreign policy of the Cold War era. This article explores the dprk’s
relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement in an attempt to shed light on this largely
under-studied aspect. As arguably the most important institution for the Global South
during the Cold War, North Korea hoped to influence its members into isolating the
rok politically and diplomatically. However, while it remains a member to this day,
North Korea’s relevancy within the organization lasted for only a few short years. The
following examination explores this phenomenon and argues that despite built-in
advantages, North Korea’s own policy decisions led to its demise among significant
voices in the organization and failure to achieve even any part of its overall goal.
Keywords
North Korea – Non-Aligned Movement – Cold War politics – Global South – Kim Il
Sung – juche – South Korea – United Nations
Since the beginning of 2018,1 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(dprk) has been attempting to shed its pariah status in the international
community. Decades of staunch resistance to foreign influence, loan defaults,
1 The author performed direct translations for this article.
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42 kerkhoff
military provocations, and, most recently, the development of weapons of

mass destruction have resulted in modern North Korea maintaining rela-
tions with only a handful of nations, as well as falling far behind its existential
rival, the Republic of Korea (rok), in economic strength and world stature.
However, “the DPRK has not alway been a global outcast”. In the throes of the
Cold War, leadership in P’yŏngyang expanded its relations beyond the Soviet
Union and its bloc and the People’s Republic of China (prc), North Korea’s ide-
ological comrades and financial and security guarantors, in attempts to secure
the nation’s interests. The height of this activity came in the 1970s, when North
Korea and South Korea engaged in fierce diplomatic competition to earn the
status of being the only legitimate Korean state in the eyes of the greater inter-
national community. Many scholars justifiably have identified the year 1975
as the apex of the dprk’s diplomatic achievements. That year, P’yŏngyang’s
efforts to adjust its foreign relations posture, increase commercial and diplo-
matic ties, and gain a foothold in international institutions, specifically joining
the Non-Aligned Movement, all bore fruit.
When discussing the dprk’s post-1975 diplomatic decline and consequences
in the years beyond, most scholarship focuses on bigger-picture concepts, such
as inter-Korea competition as a paradigm for the East-West ideological clash,
P’yŏngyang’s balancing act between Beijing and Moscow, and initial forays into
trade with capitalist nations, including Western European countries, such as
France and Scandinavian nations, as well as Japan. However, the declassifica-
tion and digitization of government documents from both sides of the Iron
Curtain presents an opportunity for new post-Cold War insight to dprk dip-
lomatic history. This article takes a deep look at the dprk’s relationship with
the Non-Aligned Movement (nam). It argues that North Korea’s movements in
the organization, particularly the first ten years of membership, had significant
implications in its international collapse, as well as playing an important role
in the emergence of the tremendous development gap with South Korea. At
that time, North Korea intended to use global institutions to become a leader
of the developing or Third World to isolate the rok politically.2 Joining the
2 In this article, the phrase “Third World” adheres to Vijay Prashad’s definition, which he
lays out in his seminal work The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World.
According to Prashad, the Third World is a project, not a place:
Galvanized by mass movements and by the failures of capitalist maldevelopment,
leaders in the darker nations looked to one another for an alternative agenda.
Politically they wanted more planetary democracy. No more the serfs of their colonial
masters, they wanted to have a voice and power on the world stage.
The majority of these Third World states were in Asia and Africa, but they also existed in
Latin America. Vijay Prashad, “The Third World Idea,” Global Organizations, 4 June 2007,
https://www.thenation.com/article/third-world-idea/ (accessed 13 November 2020).
The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 28 (2021) 41-71

north korea and the non-aligned movement 43
nam provided North Korea with the best opportunity to pursue this goal due
to a combination of the open nature and anti-West slant of the association,
its influence in other intergovernmental organizations (igos), and the dprk’s
relatively blank slate in terms of foreign relations and overall parity with South
Korea.
This article will demonstrate that despite these favorable conditions,
P’yŏngyang could not abandon the narrow and short-sighted political moti-
vations that fueled its foreign policy calculations. This ultimately resulted in
marginalization within the Non-Aligned Movement, declining sympathetic
voices at the United Nations, and loss of any diplomatic leverage over Seoul.
Coverage will begin with an examination of the background of the formation
and goals of the Non-Aligned Movement and the dprk’s path to membership.
An in depth description of the nature of the relationship and litany of mis-
takes P’yŏngyang committed in its dealings with the nam will follow. The final
section discusses the consequences of these blunders and how they fit in the
overall picture of North Korea’s foreign relations during the Cold War.
The Non-Aligned Movement, which remains active early in the 21st
Century, began with a gathering of 25 nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia at the
First Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries
that met from 1 to 6 September 1961. Seeing it as the institutionalization of the
landmark 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, the founders of
the nam were primarily Third World nations that had been subject to Western
(and in some Asian cases, Japanese) colonialism.3 Though not a collective
defense pact or trading bloc, the Non-Aligned Movement sought to practice
assertive neutrality in the Cold War. Its five founding principles—respecting
national sovereignty, supporting national independence movements, prohibit-
ing the joining of multilateral military alliances, condemning great power con-
flicts, and opposing the hosting of great power military bases—were appealing
to developing nations seeking an alternative to the bipolar U.S.-Soviet Union
spheres of influence.4 Homer A. Jack, a founder of the National Committee
3 The Bandung Conference in April 1955 was a pivotal event in contemporaneous

international relations. Not only did it serve as a stage for many former colonial states to
express solidarity against great power competition, it was also where some of the future
leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement began their relations. For further reading, see J. A.
C. Mackie Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore: Editions
Didier Millet, 2005); George McTurnan Kahin The Asian-African Conference: Bandung,
Indonesia 1955 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1972); Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya
(eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International
Order (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009).
4 “1st Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,”
Belgrade, Serbia, 6 September 1961, Middlebury Institute of International Studies,
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44 kerkhoff
for a Sane Nuclear Policy and observer at the Belgrade meeting, described the
nam as a “formal political force in the world and the United Nations, if not a
third block.”5
Membership in the Non-Aligned Movement increased rapidly. To accom-
modate the myriad of issues of interest to its politically and culturally diverse
adherents, the organization maintained a decentralized governing structure.
Official Heads of State summits took place every three years, and the head
of each summit’s host country served as chairperson, holding the post until
the next Heads of State gathering. Foreign Minister and Coordinating Bureau
meetings took place annually. The Coordinating Bureau originally comprised
representatives from 25 member states (the Coordinating Bureau eventually
opened to all member states) and based itself at the United Nations in New
York City. Its primary purpose was to discuss policy agenda at the United
Nations and nam summits.6
Though the Non-Aligned Movement was composed primarily of nations
belonging to the Third World, the two were not synonymous. Rival states did
not put disagreements on hold for nascent multilateral institutions. Prime
examples would be India and Pakistan, who fought political battles across all
arenas, including in the Non-Aligned Movement and elsewhere. Also, coun-
tries such as Josip Broz Tito-led Yugoslavia were not Third World. In fact, as this
article later discusses, by the time the dprk joined, it was more industrially
advanced than most Third World nations. However, the thread that tied the
members of the nam was an aversion to great power politics. This came as a
result of the legacy of colonial subjugation, the world wars, and the nuclear
arms race. As such, the nam’s most important mission was to represent and
mobilize its members in international organizations to bring attention to
issues affecting the Global South. Some of the most prominent issues included
protecting natural resources, influencing global economic policy, and promot-
ing peaceful conflict resolution.7 All charters from nam summits explicitly
stated the importance of effecting change at the United Nations and associ-
ated institutions.
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/1st_Summit_FD_Belgrade_
Declaration_1961.pdf (accessed 14 November 2020).
5 Homer Alexander Jack, Belgrade: The Conference of Non-Aligned States (New York: National
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1962), 3.
6 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, Institutions of the Global South (Milton Park, Abingdon,
Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 23.
7 K. P. Misra, “Towards Understanding Non-Alignment,” International Studies 20, no. 1–2
(January 1981): 23–37.

The Non-Aligned Movement’s influence on the world stage grew as mem-

bership increased. Jurgen Dinkel, author of The Non-Aligned Movement:
Genesis, Organization, and Politics 1927–1992, asserts that the nam became a
truly institutionalized movement in the 1970s, calling it a “protagonist that
precipitated further international institutionalization.”8 “No foreign policy in
the second half of the twentieth century,” Peter Willets boldly states, “has had
a greater impact on relations between small countries and Big Powers than
non-alignment.”9 The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (cia) released a report
before the 1979 Heads of State summit in Havana, Cuba stating that the Non-
Aligned Movement had adhered to its principal mission of improving the
political and economic positions of Third World states, while influencing “the
priorities and tone of the international agenda through sustained iteration of
the positions of the less developed countries [ldc].” The report highlighted
some of the nam’s accomplishments in this regard, namely achieving greater
ldc representation in various UN bodies such as the UN Security Council
(unsc), Economic and Social Council, and International Atomic Energy
Agency and serving as the “driving force” for the creation of the igos, includ-
ing the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad).10
The situation on the Korean peninsula following the Korean War (1950–1953)
was both physically and figuratively distant from the Non-Aligned Movement.
Driving Kim Il Sung, the dprk’s leader, founding father, and chief revolution-
ary, was his mission of completing the socialist revolution in the southern part
of the peninsula to unite the two Koreas under his leadership, independent
of foreign interference. He made all decisions with this singular objective in
mind and pursued it with reckless abandon.11 P’yŏngyang staunchly refused to
8 Jurgen Dinkel, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the North-South Conflict,” Wilson
Center Blogs, 15 April 2019, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [hereafter
wwics], https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-non-aligned-movement-and-the-
north-south-conflict (accessed 14 November 2020).
9 Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London:
Bloomsbury Publishing, 1983), 8.
10 Central Intelligence Agency [cia], An Intelligence Assessment, “The Non-Aligned
Movement: Dynamics and Prospects,” 30 March 1979, cia Electronic Reading Room,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00942A000900060001-9.pdf
(accessed 14 November 2020).
11 Of course, with the brand new state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk)
reeling in the aftermath of the Korean War, leader Kim Il Sung also faced obstacles at
home. Some members of P’yŏngyang’s ruling class wanted a new direction for the country.
Both Beijing and Moscow each expressed doubts about Kim’s leadership; Moscow was
opposed to the “cult of personality” style leadership after Nikita S. Khrushchev’s “secret
speech” denouncing former Premier Joseph Stalin, and both Beijing and Moscow reacted
negatively to Kim’s purges of officials in P’yŏngyang with close ties to the People’s Republic

(2021) 41-71
46 kerkhoff
accept the Republic of Korea as a legitimate state and operated on the notion
that the imperialist United States provided the only lifeline propping up the
government in Seoul.12 Accordingly, removing the U.S. military from the penin-
sula would ignite the flame needed to foment a people’s revolution that would
eliminate the illegitimate leaders of the rok. “The basic tasks of our revolution
at the present stage,” as Kim himself declared, “are to overthrow the aggressive
forces of U.S. imperialism … and traitors to the nation in the southern half and
to free the people … thereby achieving the country’s unification.”13
Outside of ideological and material support from the Soviet bloc and the
prc, Kim Il Sung did not engage in serious diplomacy to realize his vision.
P’yŏngyang showed interest in Third World gatherings in the 1950s and 1960s,
but was not a serious player.14 When the non-aligned countries first met in
1961, the dprk had formal relations with only four of the 25 members—Al-
geria, Cuba, Guinea, and Mali. The nam, in turn, viewed the distant Korean
peninsula as an arena for great power competition. As for the United Nations,
Kim held steadfastly to the stance that only a Korean Federation, one nation
with two political systems, which was in reality a spurious way to instigate
a revolution of the “oppressed” people of the south, should be eligible for
membership at the United Nations.15 Joining as separate Koreas would mean
formal acceptance of permanent division. P’yŏngyang’s Communist backers
raised their voices in support of the dprk at UN gatherings in regards to the
of China (prc) and the Soviet Union. See Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure
of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007); Zhihua Shen and
Yafeng Xia, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino-North Korean
Relations, 1949–1976 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
12 This was a mutual policy. The government of South Korea also did not regard North Korea
as alegitimate country either.
13 Kim Il Sung, “Every Effort for the Country’s Unification and Independence and for Socialist
Construction in the Northern Half of the Republic: Theses on the Character and Tasks of
Our Revolution,” in Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea: Selected Writings of Kim
Il Sung (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 16–18.
14 North Korea hosted some minor conferences and was a participant in the “Tricontinental
People’s Solidarity Organization,” an offshoot of the organization from Africa that was
aligned with the leftist governments of the world and failed to remain cohesive after its
1966 summit in Havana, Cuba.
15 “We have proposed time and again,” Kim Il Sung wrote in 1965, “that if the South Korean
authorities cannot accept the Confederation, the nation’s tribulations caused by the
division should be lessened even a little by effecting North-South economic and cultural
heritage, leaving aside political questions for thetime being … [and] improving the living
conditions of the South Korean people, who are in a dire plight.” Kim, Revolution and
Socialist Construction in Korea, p. 73.

“Korea Question,” calling for a “unified, independent, and democratic Korea.”16

However, the United States used its clout within the organization to prevent
passage of legislation favoring the P’yŏngyang narrative over that of Seoul in
the international body. Moreover, North Korea had fought a U.S.-led UN coa-
lition in the Korean War, and the United Nations Command (unc) and the
United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(uncurk) oversaw the uneasy division of the Korean peninsula. In 1965, Kim
wrote that the United Nations held “no competence whatsoever to involve
itself in the Korean question.”17
The North Korean leader’s worldview changed in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The rift between P’yŏngyang and Beijing spilled out into the open when
North Korea denounced the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China,
and the Chinese Red Guard’s public criticism of Kim Il Sung.18 Furthermore,
escalation of the Vietnam War and global East-West détente in the early 1970s
led Kim to begin viewing foreign affairs in the dichotomy of large states ver-
sus small states. “It is too obvious,” he indeed stated, “that one cannot make
revolution if he depends on big countries and sits idle.”19 With Washington,
Beijing, and Moscow negotiating the politics of East Asia in the early 1970s,
Seoul and P’yŏngyang were concerned about their potential declining say in
affairs in their own neighborhood. In response, the Koreas pursued a détente of
their own. Initial communications through the Red Cross led to talks between
high-ranking officials in North and South Korea in 1971, the first such instance
since the Korean War. The two nations signed the landmark Joint Communiqué
on 4 July 1972, codifying three principles of unification that required the pro-
cess to be free of foreign influence, peaceful, and respectful of each nation’s
political system.20 But inter-Korean détente fizzled out quickly and, by late 1972,
the dprk and the rok returned to their adversarial postures.21 This time, the
16 “The Korean Question: Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea,” 11 January 1957, United Nations Digital Library, https://
digitallibrary.un.org/record/667932 (accessed 15 November 2020).
17 Kim Il Sung, “On the Question of the United Nations,” in Revolution and Socialist
Construction in Korea, p. 71.
18 James Person, “Chinese-North Korean Relations: Drawing the Right Historical Lessons,” 19
October 2017, Insights & Analysis, wwics, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/chinese-
north-korean-relations-drawing-the-right-historical-lessons (accessed 3 March 2020).
19 cia, Intelligence Report, “Kim Il-Sung’s New Military Adventurism,” 26 November 1968,
cia Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5077
054e993247d4d82b6a8b (accessed 15 November 2020).
20 “The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué,” United Nations Peacemaker, https://
peacemaker.un.org/korea-4july-communique72 (accessed 15 November 2020).
21 In all likelihood, these talks were doomed from the start. Dae-sook Suh eloquently
describes the nature of these exchanges when he writes that Seoul and P’yŏngyang

(2021) 41-71
48 kerkhoff
two engaged in a full political bout for influence outside of the great powers,
hoping to build diplomatic coalitions to advance each government’s respective
narrative at the United Nations and beyond. Both sides began courting the Non-
Aligned Movement.22
To demonstrate ideological independence from the prc and the Soviet
Union, the dprk lessened emphasis on promoting the cause of global com-
munism and instead integrated the native ideological doctrine of juche into
its foreign policy.23 Adrian Buzo, former Australian diplomat who worked at
the embassy in P’yŏngyang and longtime North Korea scholar, has written that
North Korea “steadily became more active among newly independent coun-
tries and laid the groundwork for its active involvement in the Non-Aligned
would want to continue dialogue by maintaining confrontation with dialogue,

competition with dialogue, and coexistence with dialogue. To make his cause more
appealing to the leaders of the nonaligned nations, Kim [Il Sung] often used choice
words to counter the South Koreans, such as collaboration with dialogue, unity with
dialogue, and reunification with dialogue … [but] he hoped only for South Korean
cooperation in order to advance his programs.
Dae-sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1988), 261.
22 “The value of the Third World in promoting P’yŏngyang’s paramount objective of
Communizing South Korea” is a factor that Koh Byung Chul has emphasized. “Not only can
Third World nations lend moral support to P’yŏnyang and reinforce its propaganda,” he
adds, “they can also act as the guardians of North Korean interests in the United Nations.”
Koh Byung Chul, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1969), 167. Glyn Ford explains how the “nam [Non-Aligned Movement] seemed like an
ideal forum to promote [Kim Il Sung’s] own particular vision of the Third Way and to
promote himself as a Third World leader.” Glyn Ford, North Korea on the Brink (London:
Pluto Press 2008), 69–70.
23 The juche ideology roughly translates to “self-reliance.” Its true definition and purpose in
North Korean culture is debated highly among scholars and analysts, but the consensus
is juche was and remains a tool for consolidating the personality cult around the Kim
family, beginning with Kim Il Sung. Juche has been the subject of a litany of research
regarding the dprk. Making its first official appearance in 1955, juche has been the heart
of North Korean propaganda, which emphasizes self-reliance in defense, development,
and economics. For further reading on the various interpretations, see B. R. Myers, North
Korea’s Juche Myth (Scotts Valley, CA: Createspace Independent Publishers, 2015); Jae Jung
Suh, Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books. 2014); Mitchell Lerner, “‘Mostly Propaganda in Nature’: Kim Il Sung, the
Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War,” North Korea International Documentation
Project, Working Paper #3, December 2010, wwics, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/files/media/documents/misc/NKIDP_Working_Paper_3_Kim_Il_Sung_Juche_
Ideology_Second_Korean_War_web.pdf (accessed 16 November 2020).

Movement during the 1970s.”24 The Rodong Simun verbalized the dprk govern-
ment’s intent in a September 1973 article. Along with boasting of the numerous
new relations P’yŏngyang had established, Kim Il Sung had stated that juche
principles, particularly self-reliance in defense, were the driving force behind
the dprk’s foreign policy.25 The Rodong Sinmun also reported in great detail
on the Fourth nam Heads of State summit in Algiers, Algeria in September
of 1973. The Hungarian embassy in P’yŏngyang reported dprk objectives
with regard to this meeting were achieving “that an appropriate resolution on
the Korean question be passed …; that the standpoint of the dprk be given
support; and that a resolution suitable to the dprk be passed at the 28th UN
General Assembly.” North Korea, it continued, “also sought to create suitable
international conditions for the unification of the country, and the isolation
of South Korea.”26
P’yŏngyang’s lobbying efforts paid off. Previous nam summit charters
condemned foreign military bases in general, and the charter from the 1970
meeting in Lusaka, Zambia devoted one line to addressing the presence of
foreign troops on the Korean peninsula.27 The 1973 declaration from Algiers,
however, included the following clause: “The Conference supports the action
of independent and peaceful reunification undertaken by the Korean people,
requests the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and considers
24 Adrian Buzo, Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (London: I. B. Tauris,
1999), 60. Dae-sook Suh writes that Kim Il Sung
tried to ameliorate the situation in the name of the unity of the socialist and
Communist countries. But when he conceded that his call for unity was going
unheeded, the tune changed from unity of the socialist and Communist countries
to unity of the nonaligned nations… . Kim thought that his expansion into the Third
World was not only the way out of his perennial balancing act between the two but
also the most convenient way to escape servitude to his long-time masters.
Suh, Kim Il Sung, pp. 260–61.
25 Founded in 1948, the Rodong Sinmun (Workers’ Newspaper) is the official newspaper of
the Workers’ Party of Korea. Its articles have reflected the official stance of the dprk
government. Rodong Sinmun, “Our New Foreign Policy Line,” 10 September 1973, North
Korea Information Center, National Library of Korea [hereafter nlk], Seoul, Republic of
Korea.
26 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 27 September 1973. Subject: The dprk and the
Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers,” 27 September 1973, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive, wwics, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116004
27 “3rd Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,”
Lusaka, Zambia, 8–10 September 1970, Middlebury Institute of International Studies,
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/3rd_Summit_FD_Lusaka_
Declaration_1970.pdf (accessed 16 November 2020).

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50 kerkhoff
the Korean problem must be solved without foreign interference.”28 It also

called for submission of a “Resolution on the Problem of Korea” at the 28th
UN General Assembly (unga). P’yŏngyang achieved permanent observer sta-
tus at the unga in 1973 when it joined the World Health Organization. With
a growing number of supporters of the anti-imperialist cause, particularly in
Africa, Kim Il Sung began to advance his anti-Seoul legislation at the world’s
largest governing body.29 “From North Korea’s point of view,” as Choi Chong-ki
explains, “the United Nations forum provides a convenient place to condemn
the U.S. imperialist activities in Korea before a sympathetic audience of the
Third World.”30 North Korea proposed passage of a UN resolution that invoked
the three principles of the 1972 Joint Communiqué. In 1974, with broad interna-
tional interest in addressing the Korean issue (including from the United States
and the prc), the United Nations dissolved the uncurk. At the 1974 unga, 48
member states supported a dprk draft resolution calling for the withdrawal
of foreign troops in South Korea under the UN flag. Another resolution asking
the unsc to consider removing the unc from the Korean peninsula passed
with 61 votes in favor, 43 against, and 31 abstentions. At the 30th UN General
Assembly in 1975, the resolution on the Korea question again called for the two
Koreas to resume dialogue to facilitate dissolution of the unc and removal of
foreign troops from South Korea.31 Members of the Non-Aligned Movement at
the United Nations voted overwhelmingly in favor of this resolution.32
The diplomatic momentum continued. The Non Aligned Movement offi-
cially accepted North Korea as a member at the foreign ministers meeting in
Lima, Peru in August 1975. The organization rejected the rok’s bid for mem-
bership because of the continued presence in South Korea of thousands of
28 “4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,”

Algiers, Algeria, 5–9 September 1973, Middlebury Institute of International Studies,
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/4th_Summit_FD_Algiers_
Declaration_1973_Whole.pdf (accessed 16 November 2020).
29 “Africa had a controlling vote for which the two Korean states began to compete
vigorously,” Jide Owoeye writes. The dprk’s “desire to win Africa’s support in the U.N.
prompted North Korea’s inroads into Africa with a view to further destabilizing Seoul’s
position on the continent.” Jide Owoeye, “The Metamorphosis of North Korea’s African
Policy,” Asian Survey 31, no. 7 (July 1991): 630.
30 Choi Chong-Ki, “The Korean Question in the United Nations: rok’s [Republic of Korea’s]
Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification,” Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and
Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 8, no. 3/4 (1975): 395–406.
31 UN General Assembly, 2409th Plenary Meeting, 3390 xxx, Question of Korea, 18 November
1975, United Nations Digital Library, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/3390(XXX) (accessed 16
November 2020).
32 B. K. Gills, Korea Versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (New York: Routledge, 1996),
142–43.

American soldiers.33 The year 1975 was indeed a good year for dprk diplo-
macy.34 North Korea joined nam from a position of strength. For example,
noted Korea historian B. K. Gills concludes that, at that juncture, North Korea’s
industrial reconstruction was a “marvel in its time, and widely admired.”35 The
1976 cia report The Two Koreas asserted that “North Korea, along with South
Korea, ranks among the more advanced ldcs.”36 It highlights the dprk’s
average of ten percent annual growth of industrial production for the prior
decade, balanced agricultural/population growth, and a per capita income
similar to the rok, resulting in overall comparable living standards. In fact,
noted historian Koh Byung Chul contends that dprk’s ability to conduct Third
World diplomacy was tied to its economic development and modernization at
home.37 The dprk continued to receive ideological and financial support from
the Soviet Union and the prc, both of whom were then permanent members
of the unsc. Moreover, at a time when both Koreas saw the major powers as
undermining them, the dprk’s patrons expressed a stronger commitment to
their beneficiaries in P’yŏngyang than the United States did for South Korea.38
Meanwhile, the global trend of national liberation throughout the 1960s
and 1970s favored P’yŏngyang’s anti-colonialist message, while the presence of
American forces in South Korea served as an imperial obstacle to Korean uni-
fication. The cia’s The Two Koreas also points out that in 1969, P’yŏngyang had
33 This was according to extensive liaisons between Non-Aligned Members and the U.S.
Department of State. See Access to Archival Database, National Archives, https://aad.
archives.gov/aad/index.jsp (accessed 3 March 2020).
34 A memorandum from the East Germans dated 9 September 1974 made this observation:
“The dprk is interested in participating in international organizations, including special
U.N. organizations even though South Korea is a member…. South Korea will not leave
those organization; accordingly the dprk has to join them.” “Information about a Visit by
Comrades Gericke and Stritzke to the dprk,” 9 September 1974, History and Public Policy
Program Digital Archive, wwics, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114279
(accessed 3 December 2020). “From this time on [Lima, 1975],” Chaegyu Pak adds, “North
Korea could work more actively to gain the support of the nonaligned countries for its
cause of communist unification of the peninsula as a Third World leader.” Chae-gyu Pak,
“Korea and the Third World,” in The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea, Young-nok Koo
and Sung-joo Han (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 221.
35 Gills, Korea Versus Korea, p. 100.
36 cia Report, “The Two Koreas,” 2 August 1976, cia Electronic Reading Room, https://www.
cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81T00700R000100050011-7.pdf (accessed 16
November 2020).
37 Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 166.
38 Victor Cha discusses the Carter administration’s growing displeasure with Pak Chŏng-hŭi’s
military government in Seoul and its deliberations about removing U.S. troops from South
Korea. Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Harper
Collins, 2012), 33–34.

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52 kerkhoff
diplomatic relations with only 28 countries, half of which were Communist

nations, but by 1976, the number had increased to 88, as compared with
Seoul’s 93. “North Korea’s campaign to improve its international standing at
the expense of South Korea … has met with increasing success,” the report
concluded.39 Overall, the dprk was on par with the rok in the diplomatic,
economic, and political realms in its quest to delegitimize the government
in Seoul in the international area.40 Now, as a member of the Non-Aligned
Movement, North Korea was well positioned to continue this success. Tito, one
of nam’s founders and most influential leaders, had these welcoming words
for the dprk:
Our Korean friends today must fight for the reunification of Korea. In this
respect, we agree fully and we shall extend to them full support both in
our mutual relations and on the international plane.41
With the proverbial wind in its sails, what then led to the dprk’s rapid decline
in the Non-Aligned Movement and diplomacy overall?
P’yŏngyang’s shortcomings were not for a lack of effort. North Korea was
committed fully to using membership in the Non-Aligned Movement to influ-
ence the world community and isolate the rok. “Emancipate South Korea
from this (imperialist) bondage,” Kim Il Sung stated diplomatically as a suita-
ble alternative.42 dprk state media covered the nam’s movements extensively.
Government officials commenced an elaborate public relations campaign to
appeal to nam power brokers. On a visit to P’yŏngyang in 1980, one Japanese
scholar noted the increased frequency of Third World leader visits to the North
Korean capital. Another in the same delegation, after speaking with local offi-
cials, stated North Korea was “concentrating its energies on the nonaligned
39 cia Report, “The Two Koreas.”

40 There has been much literature comparing the economic situation of the two Koreas in the
1970s. Scholars have interpreted the data in various ways. For example, Byung-Yeon Kim,
Suk Jin Kim, and Keun Lee argue that there has been an overestimation of its numbers in
the 1960s and 1970s. However, there is consensus that the respective economies of each
country were on a level of relative parity at this time. Byung-Yeon Kim, Suk Jin Kim, and
Keun Lee, “Assessing the Economic Performance of North Korea, 1954–1989: Estimates
and Growth Accounting Analysis,” Journal of Comparative Economics 35, no. 3 (September
2007): 564–82.
41 Quoted in Malcolm Brown, “North Korea Gets Belgrade Backing,” New York Times, 11 June
1975, p. 15.
42 Kim Il Sung, The Non-Aligned Movement (P’yŏngyang: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1976), 255.

movement ….”43 These energies manifested in two main objectives as a mem-

ber—obtaining summit hosting duties to project Kim Il Sung’s image as a Third
World leader and cultivating a network of nations to garner political support
for the dprk narrative at the United Nations. North Korea’s strategy was essen-
tially to repackage its U.S.-directed anti-imperialist message and present it to
the new key demographic of nonaligned nations, which it did through appeal-
ing at the institutional and individual state level with relentless propaganda.
P’yŏngyang initiated its strategy when it sent a one hundred member-plus
delegation to the 1976 Heads of State conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the
dprk’s first as an nam member. Its mission, according to Kim Il Sung biog-
rapher Dae-sook Suh, was to carry out an “[e]laborate propaganda campaign
… to project him (Kim) as a leader of the Third World.”44 Though Kim viewed
himself as a global revolutionary icon, many countries did not share this lofty
view of the dprk head. Besides earning a reputation for being a perpetual
loan defaulter, North Korea’s image suffered further humiliation when the gov-
ernments of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden expelled twelve dprk
diplomats in 1976 for smuggling alcohol.45 That same summer, in a shocking
display of violence, North Korean soldiers brutally murdered two American
soldiers with axes over a dispute about a tree along the military demarcation
line in the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. Despite these inter-
national embarrassments, dprk officials pressed their case in Colombo and
then went on the offensive to host the next conference. Holding the Heads
of State summit in P’yŏngyang not only would have provided valuable optics
for the attention-starved North Korean capital, but also made Kim the tempo-
rary chairman of the organization, a position that Peter Lyon writes wielded a
substantial amount of power in meetings.46 Through 1979, chairs had included
Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Houari Boumédiène of Algeria, and Fidel
Castro of Cuba, all of whom were prominent Cold War protagonists and suc-
cessful in steering the priorities of nam in positive directions.
43 Foreign Broadcast Information Service [fbis], “Korean Affairs Report,” 22 October

1980, jprs [Joint Publications Research Service] L/9360, cia Electronic Reading Room,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000300040040-0.pdf
44 Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 265.
45 Charles Kraus, “North Korea: The Smuggler State,” 18 September 2017, Insights & Analysis,
wwics, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/north-korea-the-smuggler-state
46 Peter Lyon, “Non-Alignment at the Summits: From Belgrade 1961 to Havana 1979—A
Perspective View,” Indian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (March 1980): 149–50.

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54 kerkhoff
“Our respected leader President Kim Il-song,” a North Korean official told one
of the previously mentioned Japanese scholars, “will be the center of the move-
ment of post-Tito nonalignment diplomacy.”47 Unsuccessful in deposing Cuba
as host of the 1979 summit, the dprk sought to oversee the following gathering.
In 1982, the Hungarian embassy, with input from other diplomatic missions in
P’yŏngyang, reported that dprk delegations had been lobbying to move the next
nam summit from Baghdad, Iraq to P’yŏngyang.48 Additionally, North Korea
desperately wanted the prestige associated with being the site of a world event
as South Korea already would be host of the 1988 Summer Olympics. Iraq had
broken relations with the dprk over P’yŏngyang’s substantial support for Iran in
the Iran-Iraq War. Baghdad did lose hosting privileges, but the next conference
took place in New Delhi, India in March 1983. Before the New Delhi summit even
occurred, North Korea attempted to secure hosting duties for the 1986 Heads of
State summit. In a meeting with Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in
November 1982, Kim reportedly pressed his counterpart for support, to which
Zia “gave an evasive reply by saying that [the 8th summit] was still far away, and
thus one should first make preparations for the 7th one.”49 dprk officials made a
similar request to Indonesia’s government, but Jakarta’s response corresponded
to that of the leader of Pakistan.50 Ultimately, Harare, Zimbabwe hosted the 8th
Non-Aligned Movement Heads of State summit in 1986.
The purpose behind the dprk’s frantic desire to lead the nam and elevate
Kim Il Sung to the upper echelons of Third World leaders was to maintain an
anti-rok agenda as a priority of the organization. North Korea tied the Korean
issue with the greater global cause of fighting imperialism to buttress this nar-
row political aim. In the months prior to the 1976 Colombo conference, Kim
told a Yugoslavian newspaper that the issue “of Korean reunification … is a
link in the common cause of the non-aligned countries against imperialism
and for independence.”51 After the 1976 conference, dprk media devoted
47 fbis, “Korean Affairs Report,” 22 October 1980.

48 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 11 March 1982. Subject: North Korean Activities
in the Non-Aligned Movement,” 11 March 1982, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, wwics, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116016 (accessed 17
November 2020).
49 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 17 November 1982. Subject: The Visit of
Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq in the dprk,” 17 November 1982, ibid., https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/116017 (accessed 17 November 2020).
50 “Hungarian Embassy in Indonesia, Ciphered Telegram, 9 February 1983. Subject: The
visit of a dprk Deputy Foreign Minister in Indonesia,” 9 February 1983, ibid., https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115829 (accessed 17 November 2020).
51 Quoted in R. R. Krishnan, “North Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement,” International
Studies 20, no. 1–2 (January 1981): 309.

disproportionate attention to the Non-Aligned Movement’s struggle against

imperialism over all other issues. “It stands out,” Kim stated in a November
1978 issue of the Rodong Sinmun, “as a more urgent problem for the non-
aligned countries to intensify the anti-imperialist struggle.”52 “The problem
of the Korean Peninsula,” the Rodong Sinmun reported during the run up to
the 1979 summit in Havana, Cuba, “is garnering great attention as one of the
world’s most pressing issues.”53 “The number of supporters and sympathiz-
ers of our nation’s revolutionary cause,” the summary of the Korean Workers’
Party 6th Congress in 1980 stated, “have increased in an unprecedented man-
ner, the active solidarity movement for the unification of Korea was expanded
worldwide.”54
But the revolutionary cause of Kim Il Sung did not reflect the contempo-
rary priorities of the Non-Aligned Movement. Though great power conflict
and struggle against imperialism remained cornerstones of the institution,
the nam since the early 1970s was in the midst of an operational shift from
emphasizing political issues to obtaining favorable economic conditions
for ldcs. At the 1973 summit in Algiers, nam leadership put forward an
initiative called the New International Economic Order (nieo). Later that
year, Algeria’s President Boumédiène, then chairman, requested a spe-
cial session at the United Nations to address the initiative, which it did in
April 1974 through the UN Special General Assembly on Natural Resources.
The Lima Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1975 featured the Solidarity
Fund for Economic and Social Development, and the charter from the
1976 Heads of State summit in Colombo included the Action Programme
for International Cooperation. “By the mid-1970s,” prominent Cold War
historian Lorenz Luthi remarks, “economic development among the non-
aligned had replaced many of their original goals.”55 In his evaluation on
nam before the New Dehli Conference in 1983, Satish Kumar registered this
conclusion: “Economic goals have come to dominate the deliberations of
the non-aligned conferences.”56
52 Rodong Sinmun, “Support for the Anti-Imperialist Struggle of Non-Aligned Nations,” 28

November 1978, North Korea Information Center, nlk.
53 Rodong Sinmun, “International Recognition of Our Juche,” 8 September 1979, ibid.
54 “The Closing Decree of the kwp [Korean Workers’ Party] Central Committee’s 6th
Congress,” 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, wwics, https://
55 Lorenz Luthi, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973,” Journal of Cold
War Studies 18, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 100.
56 Satish Kumar, “Nonalignment: International Goals and National Interests,” Asian Survey
23, no. 4 (April 1983): 449.

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56 kerkhoff
Statements from the dprk paid lip service to this economic aim and preached
unity in the organization. Nevertheless, it chose not to approach relations
with the Third World at large on a foundation of sustained small-state, social-
ist-driven development. Legitimacy it gained from entering the Non-Aligned
Movement did not prompt the leadership in P’yŏngyang to adopt broadly appli-
cable diplomatic tactics. In fact, it emboldened the dprk to act more brazenly
abroad in the pursuit of isolating the rok above all other issues. In his contem-
poraneous study of dprk-nam dynamics, Loh Keie-hyun points out that before
the 1970s, the dprk provided mostly “sacrificial aid,” in which P’yŏngyang ambi-
tiously pledged developmental assistance to growing nations. By 1977, though,
the main focus of trade was “exporting revolution” with arms and ideology.57
A majority of these trade partners were in Africa and the Middle East, regions
with developing countries P’yŏngyang hoped to cultivate political support for
its narrative at the United Nations and nam.58
By 1977, North Korea had ties with 42 African countries compared to South
Korea’s 27. On a visit to P’yŏngyang in September 1977, Yugoslavian leader
Tito expressed concern about the hostilities taking place in certain countries,
including the Non-Aligned Movement members of Egypt, Morocco, Angola,
and Zaire, which were, as he put it, “highly threatening both peace within
the region and the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement.” Kim agreed, report-
edly proposing to “mobilize all the Non-Aligned countries so as to defend and
strengthen the solidity of the movement.”59 Loh points out that, at that time,
the dprk was offering military aid to twelve non-aligned nations,60 and of
the non-aligned countries Tito mentioned alone, the dprk had been selling
equipment for Soviet-made MiGs to Egypt, had a military presence in Angola,
and was selling arms to Zaire.61 In fact, the cia report “North Korean Activities
Overseas” found that by the late 1970s, the dprk was earning about $300
57 Loh Keie-hyun. “Analysis of North Korea’s Diplomacy Toward the Non-Aligned Nations,”
Korea Observer 10, no. 1 (1979): 59.
58 Pak, “Korea and the Third World,” pp. 232–33.
59 “Regarding President Tito’s Official Visit to the dprk,” 4 September 1977, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, wwics, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/114857 (accessed 17 November 2020).
60 Loh, “Analysis of North Korea’s Diplomacy Toward the Non-Aligned Nations,” p. 66.
61 Julian Rademeyer, “Diplomats and Deceit: North Korea’s Criminal Activities in Africa,”
September 2017, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, https://
globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TGIATOC-Diplomats-and-Deceipt-
DPRK-Report-1868-web.pdf (accessed 17 November 2020).

million annually in arms sales, and called its ability to train guerilla fighters
“one of the North’s few salable commodities.”62
The other ideological component the dprk offered came in the form of juche.
P’yŏngyang established schools dedicated to juche thought, constructed mon-
uments and other grandiose structures of foreign leaders, and staged parades
across the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World in
general. The cia concluded that these “high visibility” projects were intended
to “maximize political benefit at minimal cost.”63 The Rodong Sinmun filled
its pages with pictures of foreign leaders making triumphant appearances in
the North Korean capital. In what B. K. Gills calls “an impressive technique of
image making,” visiting heads of state received elaborate welcomes and special
attention from Kim Il Sung, where they expressed solidarity in the fight against
imperialism.64 The report from the 6th Workers’ Party Central Committee
Industrial Plenum in 1980 includes the following statement: “Our party’s Juche
ideology is being evoked by like-minded citizens across the world.” There was
even an International Juche Seminar in P’yŏngyang in 1977.65
Through its approach to international relations, the dprk earned a repu-
tation for guerilla diplomacy. On a June 1976 visit to P’yŏngyang, the Malian
president discussed the upcoming nam summit and expressed support for
the dprk narrative at the United Nations, as well as praising juche and Kim Il
Sung. But despite bringing along economic advisors, the economic and techni-
cal agreement the two nations signed had “only political significance,” accord-
ing to the Hungarian mission in P’yŏngyang.66 In a similar evaluation, a 1984
report from the East Germans on African heads of state visiting P’yŏngyang
assessed that the dprk only could provide political, not economic help to
62 cia Report, “North Korean Activities Overseas,” 1 May 1984, cia Electronic Reading Room,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00310R000200050003-7.pdf
63 Ibid. The Mansudae Art Studio has been exporting “colossal” statues to African states
since the 1970s. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-06/mansudae-art-
studio-north-koreas-colossal-monument-factory (accessed 17 November 2020).
64 Gills, Korea Versus Korea, p. 117. For example, during a Josip Broz Tito visit in 1977, the
Romanian embassy in P’yŏngyang estimated around 300,000 people attended his
reception alone. “Regarding President Tito’s Official Visit to the dprk,” 4 September
1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, wwics, http://digitalarchive.
65 6th Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee Industrial Plenum, 1980, and The
International Seminar on the Juche Idea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1977), North Korea Information Center, nlk.
66 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Telegram, 2 June 1976. Subject: Visit of the president of
Mali in the dprk,” 2 June 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, wwics,
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115819 (accessed 18 November 2020).

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58 kerkhoff
the visiting dignitaries.67 An April 1978 cable from the Hungarian mission in
P’yŏngyang describes an interaction between Zia, president of Pakistan, which
became a member of nam in 1979, who praised North Korea as an “outstanding
advocate of the cause of the Third World.” Then, the Pakistani side requested to
“increase the volume of economic relations in general, and the pace of Korean
arms shipments in particular.”68
The dprk’s approach to conducting relations within and without the Non-
Aligned Movement was a particularly poor choice for an organization with-
out a permanent hierarchy structure or governing mechanism. Lyon writes
that due to the size and complexity of the nam, there was “a considerable
premium on the quality of preparations ….”69 The dprk demonstrated lack
of preparation or willingness to attune itself with nam goals, despite the
opportunities available. In its 1979 assessment, the cia identifies two factions
that carried influence within the Non-Aligned Movement—the relatively
moderate states of Yugoslavia, Algeria, India, Egypt, and Sri Lanka and the
radical states of Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam.70 This was a simpli-
fied grouping. Belonging to a certain faction did not mean coordination on
political issues. Unlike the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement did
not have a permanent security council that encouraged member states to
bargain or form coalitions. This left an open path for the dprk to achieve
sustained relevancy in the institution.
However, P’yŏngyang, in what would become standard practice, did not grasp
the intricacies of the organization, and regarded acceptance of the dprk and
simultaneous rok rejection as international validation for its anti-Seoul foreign
policy. As nam membership swelled, the number of countries with the politi-
cal incentive to prioritize the dprk’s version of reunification dwindled. This
progression of the Korean question in the Heads of State or Government sum-
mits’ charters illustrates this sentiment. After receiving no mentions from the
1961 and 1964 summits, and scant acknowledgement in 1970, summit charters
from the 1973 and 1976 contained outwardly pro-dprk resolutions. Afterwards,
67 “Information About the State Visit of the General Secretary of the wpk [Workers’ Party
of Korea] cc [Central Committee] and President of the dprk, Kim Il Sung, to the gdr
[German Democratic Republic],” 7 June 1984, ibid., https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/208247 (accessed 18 November 2020).
68 “Hungarian Embassy in Pakistan, Report, ‘The visit of dprk Vice-President Pak
Seong-cheol in Pakistan’,” 7 April 1978, ibid., http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/116011 (accessed 18 November 2020).
69 Lyon, “Non-Alignment at the Summits: From Belgrade 1961 to Havana 1979—A Perspective
View,” p. 141.
70 cia, “The Non-Aligned Movement.”

the favorable dprk language experienced a steep drop. The charter from the
1976 Colombo conference expressed “firm solidarity with the Government
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” as well as a call for reliance
on the North Korean idea of a Great National Congress (Korean Federation)
conducting efforts to achieve a political solution. Additionally, the resolution
contained assertions of imperialism in South Korea, claiming the Seoul govern-
ment was guilty of “fascist oppression.”71 But at the Belgrade Foreign Minister’s
Conference just two years later, the dprk had to alter the wording of the reso-
lution it hoped to pass from “Unification of the People’s Democratic Republic
of Korea based on the Joint Statement of July 4, 1972” to “Korean people’s desire
for unification based on the Joint Statement of July 4, 1972.”72 The following
charter from the 1979 Heads of State summit in Havana leaves out the impe-
rialism overtones and specific language targeting either Korea, simply calling
for peaceful unification according to the 1972 inter-Korean statement and the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.73
Significantly, the Non-Aligned functionary meetings in 1981 dropped the
Korea question from its agenda, and in 1982, the Coordinating Committee, of
which the dprk was a member, voted down the dprk’s Korea proposal. This
prompted dprk officials to scramble. The P’yŏngyang narrative had fallen so
far from the priorities of the nam that in the run up to the 1983 Heads of State
summit in New Delhi, the North Korean delegation in Indonesia asked the gov-
ernment in Jakarta for support just to keep the issue of Korean unification on
the final charter.74 Failure to receive even marginal attention for the Korean
issue, the Hungarian delegation in P’yŏngyang assessed, would result in a “sub-
stantial loss of prestige for the dprk, because no such event has occurred ever
since it became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.”75 The final charter
from the 1983 Heads of State summit contained two paragraphs on Korea, the
smallest amount devoted to the issue since dprk became a member. It called

Colombo, Sri Lanka, 16–19 August 1976, Middlebury Institute of International Studies,
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/5th_Summit_FD_Sri_Lanka_
72 Loh, “Analysis of North Korea’s Diplomacy Toward the Non-Aligned Nations,” p. 72.
Havana, Cuba, 3–9 September 1979, Middlebury Institute of International Studies,
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_
74 “Hungarian Embassy in Indonesia, Ciphered Telegram, 9 February 1983. Subject: The visit
of a dprk deputy foreign minister in Indonesia.”
75 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 11 March 1982. Subject: North Korean activities
in the Non-Aligned Movement.”

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60 kerkhoff
for peaceful unification without foreign interference and a withdrawal of for-

eign troops.76 In what essentially had become boilerplate language, the charter
from 1986 Heads of State summit in Harare, Zimbabwe addressed the Korea
issue much in the same way as the previous documents, invoking the Joint
Statement of 1972, peaceful reunification, and the withdrawal of foreign troops
from the peninsula.
As for the leadership role, Kim Il Sung’s own antics ultimately prevented
him from obtaining the institutional legitimacy he coveted. His poor impres-
sions began at the outset. The enormous dprk delegation in Colombo only
could promote the image of the North Korean leader as Kim was not present
in person. That dprk guards had murdered the two U.S. soldiers at the demil-
itarized zone in Korea was disturbing to nations of all blocs, who also found
Kim’s reaction to be delayed and underwhelming. As a brand new member of
the Non-Aligned Movement, the dprk was showing disdain for the concept of
“peaceful conflict resolution.” The spike in tensions nearly triggered another
conflict on the peninsula, which, according to the East German delegation
in P’yŏngyang, “justified Kim Il Sung’s non-attendance at the Non-Aligned
Movement’s summit in Colombo.”77 Additionally, the dprk had no diplomatic
staff on the ground in Sri Lanka to coordinate preparations, as the government
in Colombo had expelled the dprk mission in 1971 for alleged support of an
anti-government insurrection.78 Even in absence, Kim did not endear him-
self to the leaders of the organization. At the Colombo conference, Tito, Koh
writes, was reportedly “irked by Pyongyang’s effort to accentuate political and
military issues at the expense of economic and energy problems.”79 And while
Kim continued to preach unity, stating that “non-aligned countries should …
endeavour to find common denominators and unite with each other,”80 the
Hungarian embassy reported in a telegram in June 1979 that the dprk “does
76 “7th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement.”

New Delhi, India, 7–12 March 1983. Middlebury Institute for International Politics,
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/7th_Summit_FD_New_Delhi_
Declaration_1983_Whole.pdf.
77 “Report on the ‘Axe Murder Incident’ from the gdr Embassy in North Korea,” 31 August
1976, ibid., http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114291 (accessed 29 November
2020).
78 Daniel Wertz, JJ Oh, and Kim Insung, “dprk Diplomatic Relations,” August 2016, Issue
Brief, National Committee on North Korea, https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/
issue-briefs/DPRK_Diplo_Relations_August2016.pdf (accessed 29 November 2020).
79 Koh Byung Chul, “North Korea 1976: Under Stress,” Asian Survey 17, no. 1 (January 1977): 65.
80 Quoted in Krishnan, “North Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement,” p. 306.

its best to isolate Vietnam (and, together with it, Cambodia), and, if possible,
achieve its expulsion from the Non-Aligned Movement.”81
After all its politicking, the only leadership positions the dprk managed to
obtain were hosting duties of the nam Conference on Food and Agriculture
Affairs in June 1980, membership on the Coordinating Bureau in May 1982,
and hosting the Conference of Ministers of Education and Culture in 1983.
Unsurprisingly, at the meeting of Ministers of Education and Culture before
the 1983 Heads of State summit, the North Koreans attempted to impose the
principles of juche on attendees. The hosts reportedly prevented visiting del-
egations from meeting to discuss the final conference documents, and “force-
fully pressured the guests to place the adulation of the all-encompassing wise
leadership” of both Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il (Kim Il Sung’s son
and eventual successor), as well as the acceptance of the “international appli-
cability of the juche [idea].”82
The next year, Pyongyang lobbied the Indian government to host the
South-South Conference before the 8th nam summit. However, “according to
the Vietnamese, Cuban, and Indian diplomats, this proposal is not popular,
because … these countries need substantial economic aid, rather than theo-
retical debates.” Even though the dprk did obtain a seat on the Coordinating
Bureau in 1982, as the watered down charters demonstrate, it lost any ability
to exert influence on relevant matters. The neutered tone in the documents
and unwillingness to grant the dprk meaningful leadership roles show the
Non-Aligned Movement collectively had lost interest in the North Korean ver-
sion of the Korean question. The consensus had spoken and it clearly rejected
both Kim as a leading figure within the organization and his overtly political
agenda. In March 1983, the Hungarians illustrated the current state of affairs in
a report before the summit that year as the dprk was seeking help from the
Indian government to retain its seat on the Coordinating Bureau:
This is essential for it [the dprk] to preserve at least the position that
it has so far gained in the movement …. The dprk’s role and influence
within the movement failed to undergo any additional increase, since,
all their [sic] activities notwithstanding, in those questions that are so
81 “Hungarian Embassy in Canada, Ciphered Telegram, 8 June 1979. Subject: Vietnamese-

dprk relations,” 8 June 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, wwics,
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115837 (accessed 29 November 2020).
82 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Ciphered Telegram, 15 August 1983. Subject: Conference
of the ministers of education and culture of the Non-Aligned Movement in Pyongyang,”
15 August 1983, ibid., https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115831 (accessed 29
November 2020).

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important for them [sic] they [sic] do not receive any support, or only a
partial one, from the countries of the movement.83
The end result was rejection for the dprk’s unilateral vision on Korean
unification.
Compounding the dprk’s diplomatic incompetency was in turn the success
of the rok. Just as P’yŏngyang’s efforts were successful in the first half of the
1970s, Seoul was nearly equally as effective afterwards in strategically appeal-
ing for support in the Third World. Eventually, even prominent nam countries
rebuffed North Korea in its competition with South Korea. For example, the
Hungarian embassy in P’yŏngyang noted in 1982:
South Korea—thanks to its latest proposals for national unification,

which are supported by the majority of the Third World countries—has
gained an advantage over the dprk. In contrast, many countries have
failed to respond to the dprk’s proposal for national unification because
of the doubts [they harbored] about its practical applicability.84
Notably, the 1982 nam New Delhi Foreign Ministers conference decided
not to endorse the dprk’s view of Korean unification in part due to Seoul’s
relentless efforts to establish productive relations with some countries of the
Non-Aligned Movement.85 While North Korean officials were marauding
through Africa and the Middle East, in the words of Park Sang Seek, relying
“heavily on cultural diplomacy” (culture agreements, friendship associa-
tions, exchanging cultural missions),86 South Korea was using sustainable
83 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 5 March 1983. Subject: The dprk’s activities
before the 7th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement,” 5 March 1983, ibid., https://
84 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 11 March 1982. Subject: North Korean activities
in the Non-Aligned Movement,” 11 March 1982, ibid., https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/116016 (accessed 29 November 2020). The latest proposal for national
unification refers to Seoul dropping what was known as the “Hallstein Doctrine,” which
prevented countries with relations with P’yŏngyang to have simultaneous relations with
Seoul. Shedding this stance allowed for South Korea to compete directly with North Korea
in the same arena. On this issue, see Young-nok Koo, “Future Perspectives on South Korea’s
Foreign Relations,” Asian Survey 20, no. 11 (November 1980): 1152–63.
85 “Hungarian Embassy in Mongolia, Report, 2 March 1983. Subject: Vietnamese views about
North Korean policies,” 2 March 1983, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
wwics, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115830 (accessed 29 November
2020).
86 Park Sang-Seek, “Africa and Two Koreas: A Study of African Non-Alignment,” African
Studies Review 21, no. 1 (April 1978): 79.

commercial diplomacy to build cordial relations. Even though many newly

liberated states had adopted socialist-leaning government systems, making
the dprk a more ideologically attractive partner, the nature of relations was
not fundamentally productive to North Korea’s objectives. P’yŏngyang failed
to grasp the fundamental power of commerce and its impact on diplomacy,
while the leaders in Seoul demonstrated a firm understanding of this connec-
tion. Koh Byung Chul summarizes this phenomenon when he highlights the
“strategic importance of economic capability in the conduct of foreign policy,
particularly in diplomatic competition.”87
Seoul’s state-led industrial growth engines, conglomerates such as Samsung
and Hyundai, signed contracts with the non-aligned nations of Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, among others. In 1977 alone, South Korean corporations built
$2.5 billion worth of projects in Saudi Arabia.88 Alon Levkowitz points out
two important factors explaining the success of South Korean corporations in
the region—credibility through infrastructure projects and government back-
ing, as well as the absence of “perceived political agenda or ideological aspi-
rations.”89 These qualities were antithetical to P’yŏngyang’s pitch to foreign
clients. While North Korea attempted to use arms and ideology to enhance
its prestige, an important objective in any international competition, peddling
the indoctrination method of juche was not politically lucrative. The ideology
that emphasized the unique characteristics of the Korean race unsurprisingly
did not gain a solid foothold outside of North Korea.90 Ko Yong-hwan, head
of the Africa section in the dprk’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1985 to
1987, explained how “North Korea focused too little on the pursuit of economic
development, and too much on ideological development” in Africa.91 The
dprk could not convert whatever modest gains it received through cultural
87 Koh Byung Chul, Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984), 228.
88 Alon Levkowitz, “The Republic of Korea and the Middle East: Economic, Diplomacy, and
Security,” Korea Economic Institute, Academic Paper Series 2010, vol., 5 no. 6 (August 2010),
http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/APS-Levkowitz-FINAL%202010(MYM).pdf
89 Ibid.
90 Some leaders tried, the most notable being Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. He visited
P’yŏngyang many times hoping to learn the ways of cult-of-personality leadership. https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/07/17/north-korea-and-zimbabwe-a-friendship-explained.html
91 Quoted in Benjamin R. Young, “The Struggle for Legitimacy: North Korea’s Relations With
Africa, 1965–1992,” British Association for Korean Studies, 16, 2015, p. 102, https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/280599543_The_Struggle_for_Legitimacy_North_Korean-
African_Relations_1965-1992 (accessed 29 November 2020).

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diplomacy into the political currency necessary to affect change in the institu-
tions where they mattered most.
In 1976, P’yŏngyang remained steadfast against joining the United Nations
on the grounds that separate admission of the two Koreas would mean per-
manent division, but still hoped to use the United Nations to gain recognition
of its narrative of the Korean question.92 In his 1976 New Year’s speech, Kim Il
Sung reveled in the resolutions that the United Nations had passed between
1973 and 1975, calling them a “brilliant success … [and] epoch-making event
unprecedented in the history of the United Nations.” “We now have a larger
number of friends and sympathizers throughout the world,” he boasted.93 That
March, a Rodong Sinmun article, in its typical scathing style, claimed the rok
“stooges … sustained a fiasco in the debate on the Korean question at the 30th
United Nations General Assembly.”94 But the “fiasco” would end up coming full
circle. Countries supportive of the P’yŏngyang version of reunification at the
world’s largest governing body diminished. With the Non-Aligned Movement
as a global platform, the dprk had revealed its true colors, and its belligerence
had turned off even countries once sympathetic towards North Korea.
A 1978 report from the Romanian embassy in P’yŏngyang, with the input of
other missions, stated countries “especially in Africa and Asia show tendencies
of weakening support for the position of the dprk on the issue of the reunifi-
cation of the country.” The report continues that despite P’yŏngyang’s efforts
to consult certain countries about nam issues and the United Nations, many
were “re-orienting themselves towards establishing and developing relations
both with North and with South Korea.”95 The 31st UN General Assembly in
1976 withdrew a pro-North Korean resolution, making the resolution of 1975
the last time the “Korea Question” appeared on the official docket at the UN
General Assembly until 1991. In the end, P’yŏngyang failed to harness enough
of its “salable commodity” needed to maximize political benefits at the United
Nations. The Non-Aligned Movement’s most significant strength, providing a
92 Rodong Sinmun, “Our View of the United Nations,” 27 May 1976, North Korea Information
Center, nlk.
93 Kim Il Sung, “1976 New Year’s Address,” Selected Works, vol. 32 (P’yŏngyang: Foreign
Language Publishing House, 1965), ibid.
94 “Our Great Victories at the United Nations,” Rodong Sinmun, 1 March 1976, North Korea
Information Center, nlk.
95 “telegram 066.598 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 15 March 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, wwics, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116484 (accessed 30
November 2020).

vehicle in which small states could bring attention to the causes of its mem-
bers at the United Nations, turned out to be wasted on the dprk.
As the record shows, the dprk itself was most responsible for creating the
friction that caused North Korea’s diplomatic momentum to come to a halt
after 1975. While external factors certainly played a role, such as a turbulent
world economy in the 1970s and competing interests in the nam due to the
organization’s overall complex political nature and oscillating influence on
the world stage, as well as maneuvers of the rok, the dprk’s eventually mor-
ibund diplomatic measures were by and large the consequences of choices its
government made. North Korea did have success forming relations on a bilat-
eral basis. By 1985, it had diplomatic relations with 101 countries, compared to
South Korea’s 118.96 Nonetheless, at an institutional level, the results were a
failure. P’yŏngyang’s rigid approach of exclusively emphasizing political issues
revolving around the Korean peninsula, with the export of arms and ideology
underwriting it, failed to demonstrate the flexibility necessary to thrive in the
Non-Aligned Movement’s fluid environment, causing North Korea’s position
to change quickly from offense to defense. This occurred in spite of the phil-
osophical common ground that the dprk and the nam shared. The Korean
Confederation that P’yŏngyang proposed intended to be non-aligned and “ban
the presence of foreign troops and foreign military bases on its territory.”97
Both were fundamental characteristics of the nam. The Joint Communiqué
of 1972 was a legitimate set of principles that favored P’yŏngyang’s narrative of
Korean unification. Moreover, the leaders of a majority of nam members were
feverently anti-colonial strongmen initially sympathetic to P’yŏngyang’s cause.
Nevertheless, the nam collectively discarded Kim’s vision for the organ-
ization and his role in it, and membership mostly would serve to amplify
dprk incompetency in diplomacy and international institutions. This had an
understated effect on the vast economic and diplomatic disparity that quickly
engulfed South Korea and North Korea. One nation emerged from the Third
World competition as an economically vibrant and diplomatically successful
country, the other in a state of stagnated growth and largely shut out of the
global diplomatic and financial system. Though South Korea never joined the
nam (and still has not), the fact that the dprk had lost control of the narrative
on the Korean question inside and outside the organization so soon after gain-
ing membership underscored its foreign relations blunders. Self-destructive
96 Gills, Korea Versus Korea, p. 196.

97 “Review on the content of the Central Committee’s report,” 1980, History and Public Policy
Program Digital Archive, wwics, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123751

(2021) 41-71
66 kerkhoff
Third World relations meant that when crisis did befall its economy, the dprk
had burned many of the bridges that connected it to the international com-
munity, as countries rich and poor learned that P’yŏngyang was a poor invest-
ment choice. “The dprk,” the Hungarian embassy in P’yŏngyang aptly stated
in November 1982, “lacks a clear, progressive, direction-setting program for the
future of the [Non-Aligned] movement that the majority of the non-aligned
countries could unanimously accept.”98 Instead, the program P’yŏngyang
composed was one of tone-deaf political statements, attempts to hijack the
focus of the organization, isolate members, and commandeer hosting duties.
Ultimately, North Korea had to devote its energies within the nam just to keep
itself relevant in the ever-growing organization. Meanwhile, Kim Il Sung’s goal
of using politics to remove the United States from South Korea and isolate the
rok fell completely out of reach.
Perhaps it was due to the fact that the dprk wore out its welcome so quickly
in the Non-Aligned Movement and fell so far behind the rok that most main-
stream scholarship brushes over this relationship. Plenty of research acknowl-
edges Kim Il Sung’s ability to sit on the proverbial fence between the Soviet
Union and prc and reap benefits from both as the two Communist giants
bickered. However, when examining the dprk’s behavior in the diplomatic
arena beyond the Cold War powers, a different theme emerges—the lack of
capacity to adapt to its environment. To Moscow and Beijing, as recalcitrant
as it often was, the dprk was the eastern outpost of communism, protecting
the flank against capitalist South Korea and its American occupiers. However,
in the Non-Aligned Movement, North Korea did not serve the same geostrate-
gic purpose and its antics did not contribute to the collective interests of the
organization. In the run up to the 1986 Non-Aligned Heads of State conference
in Harare, Zimbabwe, Kim Il Sung stated the dprk’s government “will in the
future, too, remain loyal to the principles and ideal of the non-aligned move-
ment and will make every effort to strengthen and develop this movement.”99
By that point, however, North Korea had spent its political capital in the
Non-Aligned Movement with very little in return. A few short years later, the
dprk would be fighting for its existence with few foreign friends.
In the post Kim Il Sung era beginning with his death in 1994, Kim Jong Il,
his successor in P’yŏngyang, replaced the strategy of global anti-imperialist
campaigns against the United States with efforts to form normal relations with
98 “Hungarian Embassy in the dprk, Report, 17 November 1982. Subject: The visit of Pakistani
President Zia ul-Haq in the dprk,” 17 November 1982, wwics, https://digitalarchive.
99 Kim Il Sung, Selected Works, vol. 40 (P’yŏngyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1995), 144.

European countries. The goal, according to former North Korean diplomat T’ae
Yŏng-ho, was to counter potential American aggression in the aftermath of the
Cold War.100 North Korea, along with South Korea, finally had joined the United
Nations in 1991. However, by this time, the days when P’yŏngyang was able to
gather votes for favorable legislation were long gone. Regarding Third World
relations, U.S.-led sanction campaigns in response to P’yŏngyang’s develop-
ing and testing weapons of mass destruction had pressured African states to
cut commercial and military relations with the dprk, with varying degrees
of success.101 Interestingly, though, P’yŏngyang sent representatives to the
Non-Aligned Movement meetings in Teheran, Iran in 2012 and Baku,
Azerbaijan in 2019 under the guidance of Kim Jong Un, the dprk’s current
leader and Kim Il Sung’s grandson. Though not even remotely in a position to
gain diplomatic or political leverage over the rok, North Korea has been seek-
ing legitimacy from the international community at large. It is possible the
dprk is using the once familiar organization to test the waters of diplomacy.
If this is the case, the world will observe as P’yŏngyang attempts to avoid the
pitfalls of another era.
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The Journal of American-East Asian Relations

“North Korea and the Non-Aligned Movement: From

The diplomatic history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk) is

Since the beginning of 2018,1 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

1 The author performed direct translations for this article.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/18765610-28010003

military provocations, and, most recently, the development of weapons of

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3 The Bandung Conference in April 1955 was a pivotal event in contemporaneous

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The Non-Aligned Movement’s influence on the world stage grew as mem-

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“Korea Question,” calling for a “unified, independent, and democratic Korea.”16

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would want to continue dialogue by maintaining confrontation with dialogue,

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the Korean problem must be solved without foreign interference.”28 It also

28 “4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,”

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diplomatic relations with only 28 countries, half of which were Communist

39 cia Report, “The Two Koreas.”

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movement ….”43 These energies manifested in two main objectives as a mem-

43 Foreign Broadcast Information Service [fbis], “Korean Affairs Report,” 22 October

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47 fbis, “Korean Affairs Report,” 22 October 1980.

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disproportionate attention to the Non-Aligned Movement’s struggle against

52 Rodong Sinmun, “Support for the Anti-Imperialist Struggle of Non-Aligned Nations,” 28

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71 “5th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,”

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for peaceful unification without foreign interference and a withdrawal of for-

76 “7th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement.”

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81 “Hungarian Embassy in Canada, Ciphered Telegram, 8 June 1979. Subject: Vietnamese-

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South Korea—thanks to its latest proposals for national unification,

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commercial diplomacy to build cordial relations. Even though many newly

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96 Gills, Korea Versus Korea, p. 196.

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Central Intelligence Agency. An Intelligence Assessment. Intelligence Report. “Kim

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“Kim Il Sung’s New Military Adventurism,” 26 November 1968. Central Intelligence

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Misra, K. P. “Towards Understanding Non-Alignment.” International Studies 20, No. 1–2

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