Millena v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. NO. 127797
January 31, 2000
FACTS:

The subject land herein was owned by Gregoria listana after the cadastral proceedings filed
by her and her sister, Potenciana Maramba and the children of the latter. Gregoria is
seriously ill which compel her to execute special power of attorney to sell his land in favor of
the father of the respondent, Gaudencio Jacob. On the same date of the sale, Gregoria
Listana also died. After that sale, Gaudencio immediately take the possession of the said lot
and proceed in harvesting the crops therein including the coconut. Potenciana Maramba
filed ejectment case against Gaudencio. The court ruled in favour of Gaundencio. After the
death of the wife of Gaudencio, he and his daughter extrajudicially settled the said lot.
Sometimes in November 1981 Felisa Jacob, discovered that one of the children of
Potenciana acquired free patent certificate from the bureau of land including the subject
land. Thereafter immediately filed an opposition and the certificate be annulled as she is the
lawful owner of the land. Notwithstanding of ownership by listana and the possession of the
respondent of the said land,

Potenciana’s son sold the subject land to the herein petitioner. The lower court rendered
decision in favor of the respondent which was affirmed by the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether prescription has now barred the action for reconveyance

HELD:

An action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. When an action for
reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the
fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original
certificate of title.]On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. For the rule is that the registration of an
instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole
world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of
registration The petitioner cannot claim the prescription because it must be stressed that
prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed. Article 523 of the Civil Code states that possession
is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. In order to possess, one must first have
control of the thing and, second, a deliberate intention to possess it.
 Jose De Luna v. CA
GR NO. 94490
Aug 6, 1992

FACTS:

Jose De Luna alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel land with an area of
30,856 square meters, located in Babon San Juan, Botolan, Zambales, since 1938.
Sometime in December 1971, defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and private
respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble entered the land and began plowing it.
defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised as his special and affirmative defense that petitioner was not
the owner of the property, alleging instead that the owner thereof was Agustin Dequiña, Jr.,
Dimaano, Jr. contended that the property was originally owned by Agustin Dequiña, Sr., who
had declared the property in his name for taxation purposes in 1906.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is the rightful possessor of the unregistered land

HELD:

Yes, petitioner has shown that he had prior possession of the property. The prior possession
of petitioner was established by the testimony of his witnesses, notably that of his tenant
Epigenio Dilag and Victor dela Cruz.

Jose De Luna possessed the property beginning 1953 at the very latest, when he leased the
same to Epigenio Dilag, who in turn possessed the same until respondent Dimaano, Jr.
entered upon the property in 1972. The possession of the property by Dilag since 1953
redounds to the benefit of petitioner since possession may be exercised in one’s own name
or in that of another.
 Heirs of Extremadura v. Extremadura
G.R. No. 211065
June 15, 2016

FACTS:

Jose, now deceased, filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession against his
brother, Manuel, and his nephew, Marlon, claiming that Jose purchased 3 parcels of
agricultural land from his aunt, Corazon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Since Jose
resided in Manila, he placed one parcel, in Manuel's care, in exchange for which, the latter
and his son, Marion, religiously delivered the produce of said land from 1984 until 1995.
Unfortunately, respondents Manuel and Marlon continuously refused to deliver the produce
of the land or vacate the same.

ISSUE:

Was the possession for almost 50 years of the subject land, where the residential house
stands, by the respondents in the concept of an owner?

HELD:

No.

Art. 524 of the NCC provides that “possession may be exercised in one‘s own name or in
that of another.” It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy
the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real
estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or
when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy," as the
parties in this case. Jose not only through the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
favor, but also as evinced by his exercise of the rights and obligations as owner thereof was
able to prove his title over the subject land. Therefore, the action for quieting of title should
prosper to the benefit of his heirs, herein petitioner.
 Jose Garcia v. CA
GR NO. 113140
Aug 10, 1999

FACTS:

A lot had been registered and sold to SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO by Luisa’s
father Atty. Pedro Garcia along with the consent on his wife, Remedio Garcia. Subsequently,
said spouses entered the aforementioned lot into mortgage by Philippine Bank of
Communications to secure a loan. Consequently, spouses had failed to pay the loan upon its
maturity and PBCom ordered the mortgaged lot to be extrajudicially foreclosed and entered
into auction where they were the highest bidders. Later on the lot was issued under PBCom.
PBCom then filed for a writ of possession against Jose Garcia, Luisa Magpayo’s brother,
who was currently in possession of the land. Jose assailed that he was the true owner of the
land as he inherited it from his mother Remedio Garcia and he then filed for a suit for realty
and damages. PBCom, however, averred that the land was not among those listed in
Remedio’s Intestate of Estate and was therefore not inherited by Jose. The lower court ruled
in favor of Jose and declared the subsequent mortgage of the lot null and void. However, the
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals asserting that at the time of the transfer and
registration of the land to Magpayo, Remedio Garcia and Pedro Garcia were the true owners
and could therefore enjoy the right to dispose of such. Though Jose Garcia was in
possession of the land time after that is of no hindrance to the ownership truly belonging to
the Magpayo’s who then later on enjoyed their right to mortgage said land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not The Court of Appeals erred in resolving the issues of “ownership” and
“possession”

HELD:

No, the higher court assailed that at the time of the transfer of ownership, spouses Pedro
and Remedios Garcia were the true owners of the land and had the right to dispose of such
and Jose Garcia although being in possession of the said land does not vest ownership
upon him. The SC held, “one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a
superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." and
the records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner, for his
stay was merely tolerated by his parents. ”Additionally, the SC held that the petitioner’s claim
of inheritance against the lot is invalidated by the exclusion of the land in his mother’s
Intestate Estate which proves that his parents at the time were no longer owners of the land
and therefore could not be inherited by petitioner.
 SERVANDO MANGAHAS vs CA and SPS CAYME
G.R. No. 95815
March 10, 1999

FACTS:

April 1955- Sps. Rodil occupied and possessed the subject property and later sold to sold
the land to Sps. Cayme where the same day the latter applied for Free Patent and was
approved by the Bureau of Lands. So, ROD issued an OCT in their favor.
Prior to the sale, Sps. Rodi and Sps Cayme allowed Mangahas to possess and cultivate the
land until on February 5, 1985, when Sps. Cayme commenced the present action for
recovery of possession and the possession of real property. Sps. Cayme demanded from
Mangahas the return of the land but Mangahas refused to vacate the place.
Mangahas contended that he entered into the possession of the land under controversy
sometime in 1969 with the Sps. Rodil, and since then, he has been in continuous occupation
and possession in concepto de dueo up to the present, enjoying the fruits thereof to the
exclusion of all others, his right thereto being evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Pagtangap ng
Salapi dated December 7, 1969.
He further theorizes that with the length of possession of his predecessors-in-interest, the
Sps Rodil, tacked to his own possession, the total period of possession in his favor would
suffice to vest in him the ownership of the property under the law on prescription.
ISSUE:
WON Mangahas has acquired the property through ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
WON Mangahas held it in the concept of an owner. RULING: NO

RULING:

As to ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION…
The possession of Sps. Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his supposed title,
commenced only in April 1955. The complaint was filed on February 25, 1985. Hence, the
requirement of at least 30 years continuous possession has not been complied with even if
we were to tack Rodils period of possession.
As to POSSESSION… (in re 525 and 540).
The possession of Mangahas here is not in the concept of an owner, therefore, it could not
ripen into acquisitive prescription.
The requisites for acquiring dominion are the ff:
Possession must be actual or constructive.
It must be in the concept of an owner.

While it may be true that Mangahas was in actual possession of the property, he was not
holding it in the concept of an owner. He was in possession of the property by mere
tolerance.
 Embrado versus Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 51457
FACTS:

Spouses Lucia and Oreste Torregiani filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract,
annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against the spouses Santiago and Eda
Jimenez, Marcos Salimbagat, and Pacifico Cimafranca. They allege that the sale of Lot 564
by Lucia to Eda was void because Oreste did not consent to the sale, which consent was
necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal property. In addition, they claim that Lucia was
misled into signing the deed of sale on the belief that Lot 564 was merely intended as
security for a loan that spouses JImenez were then negotiating. They further claim that
since spouses Jimenez did not acquire valid title to the land, the subsequent sales in favor
of Marcos and Pacifico were without legal effect.
ISSUE:

Whether or not vendees Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca were buyers in good
faith despite the defect in the title of spouses Jimenez.
RULING:

No, Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca were not buyers in good faith.
The Court found that spouses Jimenez are financially incapable to acquire said property
supporting the fact that the sale with Lucia Torregiani was fictitious.
Cimafranca is a close relative of Santiago Jimenez and at the same time godfather to one of
his children. As such, there can be no doubt that Cimafranca was aware of the personal
circumstances and financial standing of spouses Jimenez, including their financial ability to
acquire any property.
Also, Salimbagat has a daughter who occupied a building along with spouses Torregiani
and spouses Jimenez. There can be no doubt that the daughter was aware of the factual
background of the property and the personal circumstances of the owners thereof especially
that they are all occupying the same building.
A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard.
His mere refusal to believe that a defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor’s title will not make him an innocent
purchaser for value if it is later determined that the title is in fact defective.
Also, the rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of persons
other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.
Hence, Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca are buyers in bad faith and are not
entitled to protection under the Torrens system of registration.
 Editha Alviola and Porferio Alviola vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 117642
FACTS:

On April 1, 1950, Victoria Tinagan purchased from Mauro Tinagan two (2) parcels of land
which she and her son Agustin, took possession of said parcels of land. Sometime in 1960,
petitioners occupied portions thereof whereat they built a copra dryer and put up a store
wherein they engaged in the business of buying and selling copra. When Victoria and her
son died, they are survived by herein private respondents.
On March 29, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession
against Editha and her husband Porferio, praying, among others, that they be declared
absolute owners of the said parcels of land, and that petitioners be ordered to vacate the
same, to remove their copra dryer and store, to pay actual damages, moral and punitive
damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. In their answer, petitioners contend that
they own the improvements in the disputed properties which are still public land; that they
are qualified to be beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program and that
they are rightful possessors by occupation of the said properties for more than twenty years.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are rightful possessors of the property by occupation for more
than 20 years?
RULING:

No, the petitioners are not the rightful possessors of the property because their occupation
for 20 years was not in good faith.
Article 526 of the Civil Code provides that he is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not
aware that there exists in his title or more of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. He is
deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
In the case at bar, there was bad faith on the part of the petitioners when they constructed
the copra dryer and store on the disputed portions since they were fully aware that the
parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan. Their stay thereon was merely by tolerance on
the part of the private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, they even
filed a petition demanding share of the estate of the deceased Agustin Tinagan but was later
on dismissed.
Hence, the petitioners are not rightful possessors and private respondents’ action for
recovery of possession was the suitable solution to eject petitioners from the premises.
 DBP V. CA
Gr. No. 111737, October 13, 1999

FACTS:

Spouses Piñedas are registered owners of a parcel of land in Capiz. They mortgaged the
land to DBP to secure a P20, 000.oo loan. Piñedas eventually failed to pay on time,
prompting DBP to extra-judicially foreclose and take possession of the property. The
Ministry of Justice, then, opined through its Opinion No. 92 (’78) that lands covered by P.D.
No. 27, to which the subject property was included, may not be the object of foreclosure
proceedings. The Piñedas sought to redeem the property with P10, 000 as downpayment
but it was denied since the land was allegedly tenanted. Thus, they sought the cancellation
of the title and specific performance, stating that DBP acted in bad faith when it took
possession of the property and caused the consolidation of its title in spite of the fact that
the 5-year redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale had not yet
lapsed and that their offer to redeem was within the redemption period.
ISSUE:

Whether or not DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of the property?
RULING:

NO. DBP’s act of consolidating its title and taking possession of the property after the
expiration of the redemption
period was in accordance with Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, which states that if no redemption of
a foreclosed property is made within one year, the purchaser (DBP) is entitled as a matter of
right to consolidate and to possess the property. In addition to this, it was in consonance
with Sec. 4 of the mortgage contract between DBP and the Piñedas where they agreed the
appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold possession of the mortgaged
property in case of foreclosure. In fact, without DBP’s act of consolidating its title, the
Piñedas would not be able to assert their right to repurchase the property within 5 years,
which would begin to run after the expiration of the one-year period. Thus, its acts cannot be
tainted with bad faith nor did it impair Piñedas’ right to repurchase.
It may also be argued that P.D. No. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed the
property. However, the legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was questioned only
after Opinion No. 92 (’78) was issued, which happened almost 2 months after DBP
consolidated its title to the property. By law and jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or
difficult question of law may properly be the basis of good faith.
Art. 526 of NCC states that “a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it.” Moreover, Art. 527 of
NCC provides “good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the
part of the possessor rests the burden of proof.” Thus, it is incumbent on the Piñedas to
prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title (nullity of the foreclosure), but this they
failed to do.
 Alejo v. Spouses Cortez
GR No. 206114
[June 19, 2017]
Facts:
In March 1996, Jorge's father, Ricardo, approached his sister, herein petitioner Dolores
Alejo, to negotiate the sale of the subject property. Accordingly, on March 1996, Jacinta
executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale of the property. for a purchase price of
PhP500,000. Under the Kasunduan, Dolores was to pay PhP70,000 as down payment,,
while PhP230,000 is to be paid on April 1996 and the remaining balance of PhP200,000 was
to be paid before the end of the year 1996. The Kasunduan was signed by Jacinta and
Ricardo as witness. Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement.
However Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying knowledge and consent to the Kasunduan.
Jorge informed Dolores that Jacinta was retracting her consent to the Kasunduan due to
Dolores' failure to comply with her obligations. According to Dolores, she was being
compelled by Jorge to sign the agreement but that she refused to do so Dolores tendered
the balance of PhP200,000 but Jorge refused to accept the same.
However, during the pendency of said cases, the subject property was sold by Jorge and
Jacinta to respondents Spouses Ernesto Cortez and Priscilla San Pedro (Spouses Cortez)
under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 4, 1998 for a purchase price of
PhP700,000. A new transfer certificate of title was Issued in the latter's names. At the time of
said sale, Dolores was in possession of the subject property.
Issue: Whether or not Dolores is a possessor in good faith?
Held:
While the Kasunduan was void from the beginning, Dolores is, in all fairness, entitled to
recover from the Spouses Leonardo the amount of PhP300,000 with legal Interest until fully
paid. Moreover, the CA correctly appreciated Dolores' standing as a possessor in good faith.
It appears that Dolores acted in good faith in entering the subject property and building
improvements on it. Ricardo represented that "Jacinta and Jorge wanted to sell the subject
property. Dolores had no reason to believe that Ricardo and Jacinta were lying. The
signatures of Jacinta and of Ricardo (as witness) as well as her successful entry to the
property appear to have comforted Dolores that everything was in order. Article 526 of the
Civil Code provides that she is deemed a possessor in good faith, who is not aware that
there exists in her title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it.
Likewise, as correctly held by the CA, Dolores, as possessor in good faith, is under no
obligation to pay for her stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment.
She is further entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements introduced on the
property with a right of retention until reimbursement is made. The Spouses Leonardo have
the option under Article 546 of the Civil Code of indemnifying Dolores for the cost of the
improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by
reason of such improvements.
 Somodio v. CA
GR NO. 82680
Aug 13, 1994
Facts:
On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a Transfer of
Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mabugat the possession of a residential lot situated at Rajah
Muda, Bula, General Santos City and described in the said instrument as: "Lot No.
(Unnumbered), bounded on the North by Temporary Road, on the South by Customs Zone
(Sarangani Bay), on the East by Public Land, and on the West by Public Land."
Somodio, petitioner, contributed one-half of the purchase price. On October 1974, Mabugat
executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half
undivided portion of the lot. Later, petitioner discovered in the District Land Office that the lot
was numbered "6328-X, Csd 2281-D." Thereafter, petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the
property into two portions, with petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the
partition, petitioner took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut
trees and other fruit-bearing trees.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was in actual possession of over Lot No. 6328-X?
Held:
Upon a review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner indeed enjoyed priority of
possession over Lot No. 6328-X, notwithstanding respondent Purisima's claim to the
contrary.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to
the action of his will.
Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to
coconut trees, ipil-ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building
on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for
Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession
in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175 [1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his
will. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
"Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right."
Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing
improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because
respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983. It should be emphasized that the
Court of Appeals noted that none of the parties had produced tax declarations or
applications as public land claimants. As such, what should have been scrutinized is who
between the claimants had priority of possession.

Equatorial Realty v. Mayfair

GR NO. 133879
Nov 21, 2001
Facts:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings.,On June 1,
1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. for 20 years. The
lease covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey building which
respondent used as a Theater. Two years later, on March 1969, Mayfair entered into a
second Lease with Carmelo for another portion of the latter’s property this time, a part of the
second floor of the two-storey building. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease
term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc.
for eleven million smackers, without their first being offered to Mayfair. As a result of the sale
of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and
Equatorial, specific performance, and damages
Issue: Was there actual possession of the property by Equatorial?
Held:
Obviously, this Court acknowledged the delivery of the property from Carmelo to Equatorial.
As aptly described by Justice Panganiban himself, the sale between Carmelo and Equatorial
had not only been "perfected" but also "consummated". That actual possession of the
property was turned over by Carmelo to Equatorial is clear from the fact that the latter
received rents from Mayfair. Significantly, receiving rentals is an exercise of actual
possession. Possession, as defined in the Civil Code, is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. It may either be by material occupation or by merely subjecting the
thing or right to the action of our will. Possession may therefore be exercised through one's
self or through another. It is not necessary that the person in possession should himself be
the occupant of the property, the occupancy can be held by another in the name of the one
who claims possession. In the case at bench, Equatorial exercised possession over the
disputed property through Mayfair. When Mayfair paid its monthly rentals to Equatorial, the
said lessee recognized the superior right of Equatorial to the possession of the property. And
even if Mayfair did not recognize Equatorial's superior right over the disputed property, the
fact remains that Equatorial was then enjoying the fruits of its possession. At this juncture, it
will be of aid to lay down the degrees of possession. The first degree is the mere holding, or
possession without title whatsoever, and in violation of the right of the owner. Here, both the
possessor and the public know that the possession is wrongful. An example of this is the
possession of a thief or a usurper of land. The second is possession with juridical title, but
not that of ownership. This is possession peaceably acquired, such that of a tenant,
depositary, or pledge. The third is possession with a just title, or a title sufficient to transfer
ownership, but not from the true owner. An example is the possession of a vendee of a piece
of land from one who pretends to be the owner but is in fact not the owner thereof. And the
fourth is possession with a just title from the true owner. This is possession that springs from
ownership. Undoubtedly, Mayfair's possession is by virtue of juridical title under the contract
of lease, while that of Equatorial is by virtue of its right of ownership under the contract of
sale.

Dela Rosa v. Carlos

GR NO. 147549
Oct 23, 2003
Facts:

Dela Rosa filed a complaint for forcible entry, alleging that they are the owners of a house
and lot in Bulacan by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Dela Rosa and
Carlos. They also asserted that they renovated the house and occupied it from 1996 to
present, and that they built a fence to separate the property from the road. Subsequently
however, Carlos built a house of strong materials on a vacant lot of the property through
stealth and without their knowledge and consent. On the other hand, respondents averred
that they had been occupying the lot in the concept of a co- owner since birth.

Issue:

Whether or not Dela Rosa were in possession of property notwithstanding their absence
from the same.

HELD:

Yes, Dela Rosa were in possession of property. In a forcible entry case, the principal issue
for resolution is mere physical or material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of the property involved.

In the case at bar, Dela Rosa continued visiting the property even if they resided in Manila,
and that constitutes maintenance of possession. Improving the house were also acts of
dominion indicating possession
 COLITO T. PAJUYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 146364             June 3, 2004
Facts:

In June 1979, petitioner Pajuyo paid ₱400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-
square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of
light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December
1985.

On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra ("Guevarra")

executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to
live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness
of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyo’s
demand. In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and
demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused. Guevarra claimed that
Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because
the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing.
Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up
or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the
lot.

Issue:
Who has the right over the property.
Held: Pajuyo.
Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is entitled to remain
on the property until a person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is
certainly not that person. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude Pajuyo and
Guevarra from introducing evidence and presenting arguments before the proper
administrative agency to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law.
In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone squatting. The ruling on
the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a binding
and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. The owner can still go
to court to recover lawfully the property from the person who holds the property without legal
title. Our ruling here does not diminish the power of government agencies, including local
governments, to condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in
accordance with existing laws.
 HEIRS OF JOSE EXTREMADURA vs. MANUEL EXTREMADURA AND MARLON
EXTREMADURA G.R. No. 211065, June 15, 2016
Facts:
Jose, now deceased, filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession, rendition of
accounting, and damages, against his brother, Manuel Extremadura (Manuel), and his
nephew, Marlon Extremadura (Marlon), claiming that he (Jose) purchased three (3) parcels
of agricultural land located in Sitio Ponong, Barrio Rizal, Casiguran, Sorsogon from his aunt,
Corazon S. Extremadura (Corazon), the widow of his uncle, Alfredo H. Extremadura
(Alfredo), through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 18, 1984. Since Jose resided in
Manila, he placed one parcel, with an area of 3.4945 square meters (subject land), in
Manuel's care, in exchange for which, the latter and his son, Marlon, religiously delivered the
produce of said land from 1984 until 1995. Unfortunately, respondents continuously refused
to deliver the produce of the land or vacate the same despite his repeated demands; hence,
the complaint. In their defense, respondents averred that they have been in open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, where their
residential house stands, and in the concept of owner for almost fifty (50) years; thus, Jose's
action was already barred by prescription or laches. They further claimed that the fact that
they gave Jose portions of the land's produce was merely in keeping with the Filipino culture
of sharing blessings with siblings and relatives. Also, they argued that the deed of absolute
sale presented by Jose is not the legal or beneficial title contemplated by Article 476 of the
Civil Code.
Issue:
WON respondent acquired ownership of the subject land.
Held:
In this case, the prima facie presumption of constructive delivery to Jose was not
successfully negated by proof that the subject land was not actually placed in the latter's
control and possession. Primarily, it should be stressed that "[possession is acquired by
the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is
subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established
for acquiring such right." Jose exercised possession of the subject land through Manuel
(and eventually, his son, Marlon) whom he allowed to stay and care for the land in
exchange for the delivery of the produce thereof. Article 524 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
In this relation, case law teaches that "[i]t is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land
should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other
words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in
occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in
such occupancy," as the parties in this case.

Notably, the fact that respondents delivered the produce of the land to Jose, which Manuel
admitted in open court, can only be construed as his recognition of Jose's ownership of the
land despite his tenuous claim that he merely did so because Jose is his brother.

IGNACIO WONG vs. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO

G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991
Facts:

This Court finds that plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in
litigation from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was
executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00. Then, in 1973, William Giger again asked
an additional amount of P2,500.00 from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to sign a
new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale on November 5,1973 at Davao City. In 1972, plaintiff
began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land for Mr. Giger. He
went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any person on the land in
litigation to watch it. Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation
to find out if there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he
found none. So, in July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation
from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela. Defendant Ignacio Wong asked for the
delivery of the title to him and so he has in his possession of the title. Mr. Wong declared the
land in suit for taxation purposes in his name. He tried to register the pacto de retro sale with
the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee but due to some technicalities, the pacto
de retro sale could not be registered. The defendant Wong placed laborers on the land in
suit, built a small farm house after making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. But on
November 29, 1976, defendant received a copy of plaintiff's complaint for forcible entry with
summons to answer which is the case now before the Court. During the pendency of this
instant complaint for forcible entry, spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a
case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of Digos, Davao del Sur
against plaintiff Mercado.

Issue:
Who has the better right.
Held: Mercado.

It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or

the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper
acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." (Art. 531, Civil Code); and that the
execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing,
unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then
delivery has not been effected.
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed
from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a
retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the
possession of the property because there is an impediment the possession exercised by
private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one
who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE

G.R. No. 137944 April 6, 2000
Facts:
The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to
Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. (Petitioners) were the daughters of Margarito
Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. The respondent is the present occupant of
the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, respondent and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of
(petitioners), during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of the land.
Issue:
Who is in possession of the subject property.
Held: Respondent.

We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal
possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.  To all intents
and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal
possessor.  Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character,
may recover such possession. 

However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent.
Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before
1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent
and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.

Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father
(Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 26425.  When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land
and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued
residing on the lot.

When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948.
Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning
1952. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the
respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until
1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. 

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in
possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired
possession only in 1952.

Cequena v. Bolante
GR NO. 137944 Apr 6, 2000

Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930.
[Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and
subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are
brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975,
[respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral
survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the land.
The Trial Court rendered that the rightful owners and possessors of the land are
Cequena and Lirio. However an appeal was made to the court of appeals, whereby the
decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the lawful owner and possessor of the parcel of
land.

Ruling: Yes the respondents are the lawful owner and possessor of the parcel of land.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt
that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her
father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married,
she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed
the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful,
and uninterrupted— had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore, she herself, after her
father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not
acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.
Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use,
however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the
petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), This
supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed.

Spouses Recto v. RP
GR NO. 160421 Oct 4, 2004

Facts:
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an application for registration of title
over a 23,209 square meter lot, designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan
Ap-04-010485, situated in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
Batangas, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. They also prayed in the alternative that their petition for registration be
granted pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that petitioners failed to - (1) offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the
land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the period required by law; and (3) overthrow the
presumption that subject property forms part of the public domain.

The RTC decided to grant the petition for registration of Spouses Recto. However, an appeal
was initiated in the court of appeals which eventually reversed the decision of the trial court
basing on the failure to offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land.

Issue: WON Sps. Recto lawfully possesses ownership.

Ruling: Yes. Sps. Recto lawfully possesses ownership.

There is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public domain having been
released and certified as such onDecember 31, 1925. As further certified by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an
agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor
within a forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed, and
riverbank protection.28 Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet the requisite for
original registration of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17, 2003 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 are reversed and set aside. the September 7,
1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
Registration Case No. T-320, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 806,
Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners
is REINSTATED.

Gamos v. Frando
GR NO. 149117 Dec 16, 2004

Facts:
Juliana Frando, respondents predecessor-in-interest, was in possession of the
abovedescribed property. Since 1925, she had planted several trees and other plants
thereon, including coconuts, pili, bananas and cacao. Sometime in 1946, the property was
traversed by a national
road that effectively divided it into two portions, denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855,
respectively.

Evident from certified copies of existing records of the Bureau of Lands introduced in
evidence
is the fact that on February 14, 1952, Frando filed Insular Government Property Sales
(IGPS)
Application No. 162 for the parcel in question. Pursuant thereto, a representative of the
Bureau of Lands inspected the area and found it to be inside an agricultural zone, free from
private claims and conflicts. After the secretary of agriculture appraised the property at P240,
a notice calling for bids was published. At the auction sale conducted on April 22, 1955, the
only bidder was Frando. On even date she deposited P24, which represented 10 percent of
the appraised value, as evidenced by Official Receipt (OR) No. 9654851 dated April 22,
1955. On August 3, 1988, the heirs of Juliana Frando filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a complaint against Cerila Gamos and the director of the Bureau of Lands. The
complainants challenged the validity of Free Patent No. 459501 and OCT No. P-10548. In
their Answer, Cerila Gamos and her co-defendants alleged that they had been in actual and
open possession of the land as early as 1952;

In its Answer, the Bureau of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
admitted that Juliana Frando had filed an IGPS application for a parcel of land with an area
of 2.4969 hectares located at Poblacion, Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Admittedly,
she won the public bidding and deposited the amount of P24 under OR No. 9654851 dated
April 22, 1955, but allegedly failed to pay the balance price of P216.

The trial court eventually ruled against Cecilia Gamos, ordered her and her heirs to execute
a deed of reconveyance and surrender their possession of the property and remove
whatever the improvements they introduced to the land. Unsatisfied with the trial court’s
decision Gamos appealed to the court of appeals which also upheld the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not action of the heirs of Juliana Frando has already been barred by
laches/prescription

Ruling: No. The action of the heirs of Juliana Frando is not barred by prescription or
laches.

Prescription and Laches In their last assignment of error, petitioners argue that private
respondents action to annul the free patent issued to Cerila Gamos has already prescribed
and is barred by laches. We do not agree. As testified to by the Gilda Bongais -- one of
Juliana Frandos heirs -- when petitioners first invaded the property in 1979 by constructing a
house thereon, her aunt (Paciencia Gallenosa) filed an action contesting such intrusion. The
action was later dropped due to the financial burdens of the litigation, definitely not because
of any concession of rights by private respondents. Thus, the legal inaction on their part was
due, not to their lack of vigilance, but merely to their lack of resources to defend their
property. On the witness stand, Guatno himself recognized Juliana Frando and her heirs as
the true owners of the property, even as he admitted that it was Galag -- one of herein
petitioners -- who had given him permission to erect a house on the land in 1980. Petitioners
possession of the disputed property, based as it was on mere tolerance, could neither ripen
into ownership nor operate to bar any action by private respondents to recover absolute
possession thereof.

Cequena v. Bolante
GR NO. 137944 Apr 6, 2000

FACTS:

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land. Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married
to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito
Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the
land. Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of the property. The TC rendered judgment
ordering respondent to surrender possession to the heirs of petitioner. On appeal the CA
reversed the TC’s finding because the genuiness and due execution of the affidavit allegedly
signed by respondents had not been sufficiently established.

Issue: WON the respondent Honorata Bolante possesses a better right.

Ruling: No. Honorata Bolante does not posses a better right.

The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the
contrary is proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this
provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the
question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case
should be established in one of the ways provided by law.

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession

for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt
that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her
father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married,
she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed
the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful,
and uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her
father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. 

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not
acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.
Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use,
however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the
petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985),  this
supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed.

Mario Titong v. CA
GR NO. 111141
Mar 6, 1998

FACTS:

The case originated from an action for quieting of title over a 20, 000 hectares parcel of land filed by
Mario Titong. petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
3.2800 hectares. He claimed that private respondents, with their hired labor laborers, forcibly entered
a portion of land containing an area of approximately 2 hectares; and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation and averred that the disputed
property formed part of the 5.5- hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor in interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981. The land was adjudged by the lower
court in favor of private respondents, and Angeles Laurio, as to the true and lawful owners of the
disputed land. Court Appeals affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was
denied for lack of merit. Petitioner comes to the supreme court for a favorable reversal hence this
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may enjoy the presumtion of good faith and just title hence,
possession for more than twenty (20) yearsvested him of the ownership over the disputed land.

HELD:

NO.

Petitioner's claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than
twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
"(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of
the same Code. This article states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of tea years
unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through
one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed
by the trial court, the plaintiff's admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a
ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of
others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith." To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would
run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can allowed to found a claim upon his
own wrongdoing).

Spouses Garcia v. Santos

G.R. No. 228334
[June 17, 2019])

FACTS:

As alleged in the Complaint, the Sps. Garcia are the registered owners of the (subject property),
covered by TCT. The subject property, which has been occupied by the Sps. Garcia for about eleven
(11) years, has a one-storey residential house erected thereon and was purchased by them from the
Sps. Santos in October 1998. At the time of the purchase of the subject property from the Sps.
Santos, the one-storey house was already constructed. Also, at the time of the acquisition of the
subject property, the adjoining lot, Lot 1, which is owned by the Sps. Santos, was an idle land without
any improvements. Lot 1 is covered by TCT registered under the name of the Sps. Santos. Lot 1
remained empty until the Sps. Santos started the construction of a two-storey residential house
therein on January 24, 2009. Upon inquiry from the construction workers, Tedy was erroneously
informed that Tan was the new owner of Lot 1. In their Complaint, aside from asking for damages, the
Sps. Garcia prayed that: the RTC declare them as having acquired the easement of light, air, and
view against Lot 1; the respondents be prohibited from constructing any structure on Lot 1 taller than
the Sps. Garcia's one-storey residential house

ISSUE: Whether the applicablle is the two-meter requirement under Article 670 or Article 673.

HELD:

 Article 673 is the applicable rule as it contemplates the exact circumstance attendant in the instant
case, i.e., wherein an easement of view is created by virtue of law.

The mode of acquiring an easement under Article 624 is a "legal presumption or apparent sign,  an
apparent visible sign of an easement exists. According to Article 624, there arises a title to an
easement of light and view, even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the owner of the
dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a door and windows, continues
to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, ( 1) the contrary
should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (2) the sign aforesaid should be
removed before the execution of the deed..This is precisely the situation that has occurred in the
instant case.

To reiterate, as Article 673 states a special rule covering a situation wherein a dominant estate has
acquired a right "to have direct views, balconies or belvederes, overlooking the adjoining property, the
owner of the servient estate may not build on his own property except at a distance of at least three
meters from the boundary line," 76 the two-meter distance as provided in Article 670 is not enough. The
distance between the structures erected on the servient estate and the boundary line of the adjoining
estate must be at least three meters.

In the instant case, the records show that Roberto Planton Baradas (Baradas), the construction
project engineer who supervised the construction of the Sps. Santos' house located on Lot 1, testified
that "[t]here is a distance of two meters between [the Sps. Garcia's] fence and the wall of [the
respondents] spouses Santos."77 Simply stated, the distance between the structure erected by the
Sps. Santos on Lot 1 and the boundary line is only two meters, which is less than the three-meter
distance required under Article 673.

Therefore, considering that the Sps. Garcia have acquired by title an easement of light and view in
accordance with Article 624 of the Civil Code, the Sps. Santos should necessarily demolish or
renovate portions of their residential building so that the three-meter distance rule as mandated under
Article 673 of the Civil Code is observed.

Pada-Kilario v. CA
GR NO. 134329
Jan 19, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against sps. Kilario. The latter
occupies a portion of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada, Grandfather of Silverio. The
Kilario’s have been living therein since 1960 by sheer tolerance. When Jacinto Pada
dies, his heirs entered into extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1951. As a result
thereof, lot 5581 was allocated to Ananias and Marciano who became co-owners of said
lot.

Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-owner. Eventually,
Juanita sold her right in the co-ownership to Engr. Paderes. Mariaon the other hand,
heir of Marciano, sold her share to her cousin respondent Silverio Pada. The latter
demanded sps. Kilario to vacate but the sps. refused.On June 1995, a complaint for
ejectment was filed against sps. Kilario. On July1995 a deed of donation in their favor
was executed by heirs of Amador Pada.

ISSUE: Whether or Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of necessary expenses.

HELD:
NO.

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its
owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who
occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.26 Thus, they cannot be
considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 44827 and Article
54628 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of
the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.29 Verily, persons whose occupation of a
realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of
Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners
convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the premises,
such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership that may or may not be
realized.30 More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners
cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.

Chua v. CA
301 S 357
GR NO. 109840
Jan 21, 1999

FACTS:

Jose L. Chua and Co, Sio Eng releases of a commercial unit in Baclaran Parañaque for 5 years. Prior
to the expiration of the lease the parties discuss the possibility of renewing it. they exchange proposal
and counter proposal but they failed to reach agreement. On 24 July 1990, Ramon Ibarra filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner in the MTC Parañaque, which rendered a decision
giving a period of 2 years extension of occupancy to the petitioner and Sio ordering them to pay Ibarra
back rentals and monthly rental of 10,000 thereafter until the expiration of extensional their occupancy
or until the subject premises is actually vacated.

On appeal by both parties, the RTC Makati ruled that the lease was for a fixed period of 5 years and
that upon its Chua's and Co Sio continued to stay in the premises became illegal. The Court ordered
Chua's and Co Sio to vacate the premises and to turn over possession thereof. Chua's and Co Sio
appealed to CA which affirmed the decision of the lower court, found petitioners guilty of bad faith in
refusing to leave the premises. But petitioners contend that they acted in good faith under the belief
that they were entitled to an extension of the lease because they had made repairs and improvements
on the premises. Hence this peition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were in good faith and therefore entitles them to reimbursement.

HELD:

NO. This contention is devoid of merit. The fact that petitioners allegedly made repairs on the
premises in question is not a reason for them to retain the possession of the premises. There is no
provision of law which grants the lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on that ground.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546, which provides for full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. In a number of
cases, the Court has held that this right does not apply to a mere lessee, like the petitioners,
otherwise, it would always be in his power to "improve" his landlord out of the latter's property.13 Art.
1678 merely grants to such a lessee making in good faith useful improvements the right to be
reimbursed one-half of the value of the improvements upon the termination of the lease, or, in the
alternative, to remove the improvements if the lessor refuses to make reimbursement.

Petitioners were thus correctly ordered to pay attorney's fees considering that private respondent had
to go to court to protect his interest.14 The award of P10,000.00 is reasonable in view of the time it
has taken this rather simple case for ejectment to be decided.

Florentino vs Supervalue
Gr No. 172384
Sept. 12, 2007

Facts:
Florentino is doing business under the name Empanada Royale. The latter
executed three Contract of Lease with SM North Edsa and SM Southmall and a
store space at SM Megamall. Florentino introduced improvements therein on the
leased premises. Before the expiration of the Lease, Florentino was charged by
Supervalue alleging that Florentino did not abide by the terms of the contract.
Supervalue took possession of the store space and confiscated the equipment and
personal belongings of Florentino after the expiration of the date. Florentino
demanded that Supervalue release the equipment and personal belongings. The
latter refused.

Issue:
Whether or not Supervalue is liable for the sum of the improvements
introduced by Florentino

Ruling:
 Partly yes.

The lessor is under the obligation to pay the lessee one-has of the
value of the improvements made should the lessor chooses to appropriate the
improvements. Wherefore, Article 546 states of the Necessary and Useful expenses.
Thus, to be entitled to reimbursement for improvements introduced on the property,
the petitioner must be considered a builder in good faith. And to be entitled to full
reimbursement, one who builds on land must believe that he is the owner thereof. In
this case, it was not shown that Supervalue unjustifiably refused to grant the
demands of the petitioner so as to compel the latter to initiate legal action to enforce
her right.

G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009

Heirs of Joaquin Limense
vs Rita Vda. De Ramos

Facts:

Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his property into
five and gave the divided lots to his daughters through a deed of donation on March
9, 1932.

Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent ignored both
oral and written demands.

RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent easement of right
of way existed in favor of respondents.

Issue:

Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding

that respondent's ot has an easement of right of way.

Held:

In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action
for removal of obstruction and damages.  Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as
the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may enclose or
fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by
any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.

Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C
has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents for a long period
of time.

The portions of Lot No. 12-D are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by their
donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a showing that
respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-
C.

1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between
petitioners and respondents. 

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA SEEDLING

BANK FOUNDATION, INC., RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of a 120-hectare piece of government property in Diliman,

Quezon City, reserved for the establishment of the National Government Center. By
virtue of Proclamation No. 1670 issued on 19 September 1977, President Ferdinand
Marcos reserved a seven-hectare area thereof and granted respondent usufructuary
rights over it. Respondent occupied a total of 16 hectares, thereby exceeding the
seven-hectare area it was allowed to occupy. It leased the excess to private tenants.

President Fidel Ramos subsequently issued Executive Order No. 58 on 15 February

1993 creating an inter-agency executive committee (Executive Committee)
composed of petitioner and other government agencies to oversee the
comprehensive development of the remaining 50 hectares, therein referred to as the
North Triangle Property.
As respondent occupied a prime portion of the North Triangle Property, the
Executive Committee proposed the transfer of respondent to areas more suitable to
its operations.

Issue

whether or not NHA is entitled to recover rent, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses from respondent

Ruling

A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides. Since respondent had no right to act beyond the confines of the seven-
hectare area granted to it, and since it was fully aware of this fact, its encroachment
of nine additional hectares of petitioner's property rendered it a possessor in bad
faith as to the excess. The court ruled that a person whose occupation of realty is by
sheer tolerance of the owner is not a possessor in good faith.

Under Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in
bad faith has a specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for
everything that the former received, and that the latter could have received had its
possession not been interrupted. Article 549 states that The possessor in bad faith
shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor
could have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned in
paragraph 1 of article 546 and in article 443. Article 546. Necessary expenses
shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention. Respondent, however, shall be entitled to a refund of the
necessary expenses it incurred.
United States vs Laurente Rey
Gr No. L-3326
September 7, 1907

Facts:Laurente was charged with the crime of robbery for taking possession the
sum of 15,000pesos in legal tender of the Philippine Islands which was owned by
Urrutia & Co. and of Muñoz & Co. Laurente argued that the steamer, where the
alleged money was taken, sucked and was abandoned by the owners, hence, he
cannot be held liable for robbery.

Issue:

Can one be charged with the abandonment of his property without even knowing that
the same has passed out of his possession or has been lost?

Ruling:

No.
 He who has a right may renounce it. This act by which thing is
voluntary renounced constitutes an abandonment. There is no real intention to
abandon a property when, as in the case of a shpwreck or a fire, things are thrown
into the sea upon the highway. Certainly the owner of the property cannot be held to
have abandoned the same until at least he has some knowledge of the OSs of its
possession or of the loss of the thing. Property cannot be considered abandoned
under the law and the possession left vacant for the finder until the spec recuperandi
is gone and the animus reverendi is finally given up.

YU vs. DE LARA
G.R. No. L-16084 November 30, 1962

Facts:

Lot No. 14, block No. 51-C of the Gram Park subdivision, which was a 682.5-meter property,
was originally registered in 1916. Subsequently, it was acquired by the Philippine Realty
Corporation.

In 1945, several persons settled on the property and constructed houses thereon without
permission from the Philippine Realty Corporation. On various dates thereafter, between
1947 and 1952, respondents MAXIMO DE LARA, JUAN PANLILIO, LUCIA RIVERO,
FLORENTINO ROQUE and DOMINGO SAMSON bought the houses of those settlers and
continued in occupancy thereof without paying any rents to the owner of the land.

Later in 1956, Philippine Realty Corporation sold said property to petitioner JOHN O. YU,
who later obtained a TCT in his name. In 1957, YU advised DE LARA ET AL. to vacate the
property within 30 days. Because of the latter’s refusal, UY filed a complaint of unlawful
detainer.

Issue:
Whether or not the property was abandoned by Philippine Realty Corporation.

Held:
NO, the circumstances adverted to are insufficient to constitute abandonment, which
requires not only physical relinquishment of the thing but also a clear intention not to reclaim
or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof.

Indeed, abandonment which according to converts the thing into res nullius, ownership of
which may be acquired by occupation, can hardly apply to land, as to which said mode of
acquisition is not available, let alone to registered land, to which "no title in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession".

No possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized in favor of appellants, because they are
in fact nothing but squatters, who settled on the land without any agreement with the owner,
paying neither rents to him nor land taxes to the government, and who impliedly recognized
their squatters' status by purchasing only the houses built by the original settlers. Their
occupancy of the land was at the owner's sufferance, and their acts were merely tolerated
which could not affect the owner's possession.

G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN
VALDEZ, respondents.

Facts:

Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province filed an application for registration of title
over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Psu-194357, situated at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet,
docketed as LRC N-91, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents,
high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. On
March 22, 1963 the Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their
Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto.
In these two cases, Heirs of Octaviano and Valdez arque that the defendant Vicar is barred
from setting up the defense of ownership and/or long and continuous possession of the two
lots in question since this is barred by res judicata. On the other hand, Catholic Vicar claims
that it has been in possession of Lot 3, for seventy-five (75) years continuously and
peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.

Issue:

Whether or not Catholic Vicar is barred from acquiring ownership of Lots 2 and 3

Held:

No, the Catholic VICAR did not meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive
prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession
for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. By the very
admission of petitioner Vicar, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by Valdez and Octaviano. Both
Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent Application for those lots since 1906. The
predecessors of private respondents, not petitioner Vicar, were in possession of the
questioned lots since 1906.

Petitioner Vicar only declared Lots 2 and 3 for taxation purposes in 1951. The adverse claim
of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of
petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive
prescription because of the absence of just title.

Tuazon v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 200115

Facts:
Petitioners filed an Accion reinvindicatoria alleging that that they were the prior and actual
lawful possessors and bonafide claimants of a parcel of land identiFed as Lot No. 165, Ts-
308 situated at No. 83-18th Street, East Bajac, Olongapo City from 1968 up to the present.
They also averred that Lydia Respondents unlawfully occupied and withheld physical
possession despite repeated demands to vacate the premises, of which the last demand
was made on December 1998, respondents refused to do so.
Respondents denied the allegations and alleged that Lydia and her three sisters, now
deceased, owned the subject parcel of land in common, having purchased it using their own
funds sometime in 1965.
Held:
The cause of action is based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence
introduced is actually one for accion publiciana or for recovery of possession not accion
reinvidicatoria: (1) petitioners are not the owners but merely holders of possessory rights; (2)
more than one year has elapsed from the date of the last demand; and (3) while petitioners
have established their possessory rights over the property, their cause of action has
prescribed considering that more than 10 years have lapsed from the formal demand to
vacate on November 29, 1982.
Since the action before us is one of Accion publiciana, which seeks recovery of the real right
of possession, Article 1141 must be read in relation to established rules on prescription
governing the real right of possession. Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code provides that, "the
real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years." It is for this reason that we
have time and again ruled that the remedy of accion publiciana is no longer available after
the lapse of 10 years from dispossession.

Cullado vs Gutierrez

FACTS

A “Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo” covering a parcel of land was issued in favour of

Dominic Gutierrez (Dominic) in the year of 1995. Two years thereafter, due to the fact that
Dominic was still a minor, Dominic’s father Dominador Gutierrez (Dominador) filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for recovery of ownership, possession with damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction against Alfredo Cullado (Alfredo) and claims that
Alfredo had been squatting on the said land since 1977 and despite repeated demands,
Alfredo refused to vacate.

In his Answer, Alfredo averred that he was in actual, continuous, adverse possession
of the land. He also asked for the reconveyance of property and claimed that Dominic and
Dominador obtained the title through fraud. During the pendency of the proceedings, Alfredo
died and was substituted by his heirs.

The CA then ruled that the allegations constitute a collateral attack against Dominic’s
title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in reversing the decision of the RTC and in granting Dominic’s petition for
annulment of judgment?

RULING:

No. The grant of reconveyance pertains to an issue of ownership, which the accion
publiciana may grant provisionally in some cases but is not binding due to the fact that what
is resolved in an accion publiciana case is “who has a better right of possession” Article 460
of the old Civil Code was amended and became Article 555 of the new Civil Code,

ART. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

(1) By the abandonment of the thing;

(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till
after the lapse of ten years.

Article 555 of the new Civil Code recognizes that a possessor may lose his
possession de facto by the possession of another when the latter's possession has lasted
longer than one year. More than that, the RTC's ruling that Cullado had become owner by
acquisitive prescription is likewise without basis. It was conjectural to conclude that Cullado
acquired the same by virtue of prescription in the absence of any clear indication as to when
the land claimed by him was declared alienable and disposable. To be sure, the land in
dispute can be said to have become private land only when Dominic was issued his OCT in
May 1995.

MARIA BICARME v. CA
G. R. No. 51914, June 6, 1990
FACTS:
Spouses Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two
parcels of land in Bangued, Abra. The spouses died intestate and were survived by three
children: Victoria who survived by Christina, her only daughter; Mari;a and Sebastian who
died when he was a letter boy.Christina claims that upon the death of her grandparents, her
mother and aunt became co-owners of the above mentioned parcels of land. Upon the death
of her mother, she insisted that she became co-heirs with her aunt Maria.Maria refused to
share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed land, claiming that she acquired there two
land in 1925 and 1926 from the deceased spouses Placido and Margarita Bidaya. She also
claimed that Crstina never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels
of land. Finally, She said that Cristina was presumed already dead.Trial court said ruled that
a provision which states that Maria is the sole owner of the lands having acquired the same
from her late father is in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Christina as co-
owner/heir.On appeal, Maria insisted that she acquired the land to spouses Bidaya but she
failed to present evidence, establishing the clam of Cristina to be a co-owner/heir. Finally,
Maria insisted that Cristina’s right are barred by prescription. She said that Cristina only
asserted her right after 34 years after her right of action accrued. (Cristina left Abra at age
11)
ISSUE: Whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question  under the
conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive
prescription in her favor. NO
RULING: NO. One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be
adverse against the whole world. In order that a possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust, or the other co-owner the following must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or
other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing. (A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phils., Ann., Vol. 11, p. 193) In the present case,
Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the
inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written
evidence that these were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose.
Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share
in the yearly taxes. Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in this case: Acts which
are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co- owners. A mere silent
possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection
of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes,
cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and
conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an
ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. (Mangyan v. Ilan, 28 O.G. 62;
Laguna v. Levantino, 40 O.G. (14th Suppl.) 136, cited in A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Ann., Vol. II, pp. 193- 194)
Additionally, it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent
acquisitive prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the
claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right of the others) the case is
not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on imprescriptibility of an action for
partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition wig therefore prosper.

DELIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 46296. September 24, 1991.
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the Court of appeals reversing the
decision of the trial court which declared the certificate of title null and void in the name of
the respondents’ predecessor. Lino Delima acquired Lot 7758 in Cebu but later died in 1921
leaving 3 brothers and a sister as his only heirs. They are Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima,
Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT 2744 of the property was issued in
the name of “The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima”. Respondent
Galileo Delima executed an affidavit of “Extra Judicial Declaration of Heirs.” Based on the
affidavit, TCT 2744 was cancelled and TCT 3009 was issued on February 4, 1954 in the
name of Galileo delima alone to the excclusion of the other heirs. Galileo Delima declared
the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965. On
February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita filed with
CFI Cebu an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of
TCT 3009.
CFI rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, each heir sharing a pro-indiviso share of
one fourth. CA reversed the decision of the trial court and upheld the claim of Galileo that all
other brothers and sister of Lino had already relinquished and waived their rights to the
property in his favor also considering the Galileo alone paid the remaining balance of the
purchase price of the lot and realty taxes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by prescription?

HELD: Yes. When the petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and or to compel
partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. An action to
compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual
possessor.. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as
exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription. In order that a
possession considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to repudiation of
ownership, the following elements must concur:
1. that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust
2. that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust
3. that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
The Supreme Court held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed
of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of
their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of
the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners
over their shares, the stature of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their
rights thereunder.
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) andLOURDES TRINIDAD,
respondents
 April 20, 1998
FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance and action
for partition of four (4) parcels of land. He was claiming that he was the son of the
deceasedInocentes Trinidad. Patricio Trinidad, the father of the deceased, owned four (4)
parcels of land,which he left to his three children namely, Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. The
refusal of the defendants, Lourdes and Felix, to the demand of Arturo to the partition of the
land into three (3)equal parts caused Arturo to file a case which was decided in his
favour.The Appellate court did not decide in favor of Arturo and reversed the ruling of the
lower court onthe ground that he was not able to present sufficient evidence to prove that his
parents were legally married to each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to present a marriage contract would mean that there was
no marriage that transpired.
RULING:
While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the failure
topresent it does not prove that no marriage took place because there are other
evidences thatcould have the same bearing as a marriage contract. He failed to present the
marriage contractdue to the destruction of such records. His act of presenting witnesses who
were present duringthe nuptial of his parents, his baptismal certificate and the affirmation of
the cohabitation of hisparents is enough evidence to prove the marriage of his parents.

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

 G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999.

FACTS:

Mariano de Castro sold a parcel of land to the petitioner represented him self as the sole heir
of the property. The private respondents contended that the sale was affected only to his
share inequivalent of 1/5 of the property. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss contending
prescription/laches and lack of jurisdiction but denied by the trial court. Petitioner filed with
Court of appeals a special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a. the
RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the case as the causes of action have
been decided with finality by the Supreme Court. b. the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition in a decision dated August 14, 1995.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mariano's sale affects the the shares of his co-owners.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent
to the sale. Under Art. 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the
seller's share pro indiviso and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's
share in the partition of the property owned in common. Thus, in the case at bar, the sale
made by Mariano while representing as "sole heir" will not affect the shares of his co-owners
which are the private respondents

PHILIP C. SANTOS and HEIRS OF ELISEO M. SANTOS vs. LADISLAO M. SANTOS

G.R. No. 139524, October 12, 2000
FACTS: 
Ladislao Santos is the co-owner of his brother Eliseo over a property they acquired upon the
death of their parents. Hence, he filed a Judicial Partition against his brother Eliseo and his
nephew Philip Santos. However, petitioners insist that acquisitive prescription has already
set in; and that estoppel lies to bar the instant action for partition. According to petitioners,
Virgilio Santos was already in possession of the subject property since after the death of
Isidra Santos on April 1, 1967. Thereafter, Philip Santos took possession of the subject
property on December 16, 1980 upon its sale on said date. They claim that more than 13
years had lapsed from April 1, 1967 to December 16, 1980; and that more than 12 years had
lapsed from the time Philip Santos took possession of the property on December 16, 1980
up to the time Ladislao Santos filed the action for partition on May 13, 1993. Petitioners
conclude that the instant action is already barred by ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten
years. 

ISSUE:  

Whether or not petitioner is barred by acquisitive prescription.

 
RULING:

No.  Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao Santos executed any "Combined
Deed of Partition" in tandem with the Eliseo Santos, we rule that a co-ownership still subsists
between the brothers over the Isidra property. This being the case, we apply Article 494 of
the Civil Code which states that, "prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
Indeed, Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and considering that Virgilio
Santos was the ward of Isidra Santos ever since when Virgilio Santos was still an infant, it
was but natural that the Appellant did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of
Virgilio Santos and his family on the property and even acquiesce thereto. Appellant must
have assumed too, that his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to occupy
the property and use the same for the time being. Hence, such possession by Virgilio Santos
and Philip Santos of the property does not constitute a repudiation of the co-ownership by
the Appellee Eliseo Santos and of his privies for that matter

EDCA PUBLISHING VS SANTOS

184 SCRA 614
Facts: On October 05, 1991, a person identifying himself as a professor of De La Salle
University (dela Cruz) ordered several books from EDCA. EDCA prepared the corresponding
receipts and delivered the books as ordered for which dela Cruz issued a check in payment
of the same. After several days, he ordered again for several books. EDCA became
suspicious because the check was not yet cleared and here comes dela Cruz ordering
another set of books, so it inquired from DLSU of the existence of Dela Cruz and found out
that he was a bogus person. So EDCA went to the police and set a trap to arrest Dela Cruz.
Upon inquiry of the first set of books delivered to Dela Cruz, EDCA found out that the same
were already sold to a certain Santos. With the aid of police, EDCA went to Santos and
confiscated the books. EDCA contended that Santos did not acquire the books in good faith
and did not show receipt to prove that Santos bought them from Dela Cruz.

Issue: Whether or not Santos was in good faith

Held: SC said that the contention of EDCA is unacceptable, precisely the first sentence of
Art. 559 provides that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to title (rule of reinvindicability), therefore there is no need of showing further
proof. Santos acquired the books in good faith, she accepted the ownership of the books
from the EDCA invoice saying that it was sold to DC, who said he was selling them for a
discounted price as he was in financial need. Surely Santos did not need to go beyond that
invoice to satisfy herself that the books sold by DC belonged to him, which she did. Although
the title of Dela Cruz was being presumed under Art. 559, these being movable properties,
Santos nevertheless demanded proof before deciding to buy them.

By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious, in fact too trusting in dealing with the impostor. It
would certainly be unfair now to make Santos bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA as a
result of its own negligence. We cannot agree that justice is transferring such loss to the
Santoses who had acted in good faith and with proper care when they brought the goods
from DC.

LEDESMA vs. CA
G.R. No. 86051. September 1, 1992
Facts: In 1977, a person representing himself to be Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for
his father, a certain Rustico T. Consunji, 2 brand new motor vehicles from respondent
CITIWIDE MOTORS, INC. Thereafter, CITIWIDE delivered said vehicles to the person
representing himself to be Jojo Consunji. The latter issued a manager’s check worth
P101,000 was full payment of the value of the vehicles. However, when CITIWIDE deposited
the said check, it was dishonored by the bank on the ground that it was tampered with, the
correct amount of P101.00 having been raised to P101,000. Hence, CITIWIDE reported said
criminal act to the Philippine Constabulary, which found out that the real identity of the
impostor was Armando Suarez who had a long line of criminal cases against him for estafa
using his similar modus operandi. Later, CITIWIDE was able to recover one of the vehicles,
which was found abandoned. It also found out that the possession of the other vehicle was
transferred to petitioner JAIME LEDESMA. However, he claimed that he purchased said
vehicle and paid for it in good faith from its registered owner, one Pedro Neyra. After posting
the necessary bond, CITIWIDE was able to recover possession of the vehicle in possession
of LEDESMA. The lower court ruled in favor of LEDESMA. It ruled that LEDESMA was a
buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration. On appeal with the CA, said decision was
reversed. LEDESMA was ordered to return the possession of said vehicle to CITIWIDE. It
held that where the owner has lost the thing or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, the
good faith of the possessor is not a bar to recovery of the movable unless the possessor
acquired it in a public sale of which there is no pretense in this case. Contrary to the court's
assumption, the issues not primarily the good faith of LEDESMA, for even if this were true,
this may not be invoked as a valid defense if it be shown that CITIWIDE was unlawfully
deprived of the vehicle. Hence, this appeal by LEDESMA.

Issue: Whether or not CITIWIDE was entitled to repossess the vehicle.

Held: NO. LEDESMA had a better right to possess said vehicle.

It was therefore erroneous for the CA to declare that CITIWIDE was illegally deprived of the
car simply because the check in payment therefor was subsequently dishonored. It also
erred when it divested the LEDESMA, a buyer in good fait,h who paid valuable consideration
therefor, of his possession thereof. It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable
or (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present
possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under
the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are
three (3) requisites to make possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a)
the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner voluntarily parted with the possession
of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the concept of owner. Undoubtedly, one who has
lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily
parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the exceptions found under the
second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code. In the present case, there was a perfected
unconditional contract of sale between CITIWIDE and the original vendee impostor. The
former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of the first vendee even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a
fictitious name--and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate of registration
to the vendee's alleged representative. Non-payment only creates a right to demand
payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing
checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. The failure of the buyer
to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to revert in the seller until and
unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of
the new Civil Code
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC. vs. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014
FACTS: At around 11 o'clock in the evening of 6 June 1997, Bernard Fernandez's brother,
Ludwin Fernandez, visited the Legenda Hotel and Casino with several CCTV’s installed. The
monitors revealed that Ludwin changed $5,000.00 worth of chips into smaller
denominations. After Ludwin won $200.00 in a game of baccarat, he redeemed the value of
chips worth $7,200.00. A review of the CCTV recordings showed that the incident was not
the first time Ludwin visited the Casino. An operation was launched by Legenda to zero-in on
Ludwin. Thus, unbeknownst to him, he was already closely watched when he went with
another brother, Deoven, to the casino. After losing $100.00, the siblings had their chips
encashed at two separate windows. Since the cashiers were apprised of a supposed
irregularity, they "froze" the transaction. Legenda's internal security officers accosted Ludwin
and Deoven and ordered them to return the cash and they complied. The two were
eventually escorted to private rooms where they were separately interrogated about the
source of the chips they brought. The ultimatum was simple: they confess that the chips
were given by a certain employee, Michael Cabrera, or they would not be released from
questioning. The same line of questioning confronted them when they were later turned-
over for blotter preparation to the Intelligence and Investigation Office of the SBMA. Finally,
the brothers succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint statement implicating
Cabrera as the illegal source of the chips. Due to hunger pangs and fatigue, they did not
disown the statement even when they subscribed the same before the prosecutor. Bernard
Fernandez filed a Civil Case for recovery of sum of money with damages against petitioner,
on the premise he went to Legenda with his brothers Ludwin and Deoven; that he handed
over Legenda casino chips worth US$6,000.00, which belonged to him, to his brothers for
the latter to use at the casino; that petitioner accosted his brothers and unduly and illegally
confiscated his casino chips equivalent to US$5,900.00; and that petitioner refused and
continues to refuse to return the same to him despite demand. Petitioner alleged that right
after Ludwin and Deoven's transactions with the Legenda cashier were frozen, they
voluntarily agreed to proceed to the Legenda security office, where Ludwin voluntarily
informed security officers that it was a certain Michael Cabrera a Legenda table inspector at
the time who gave him the casino chips for encashment, taught him how to play baccarat
and thereafter encash the chips, and rewarded him with P1,000.00 for every $1,000.00 he
encashed; The tapes, however, do not show how these persons got hold of the chips. The
alleged source in the person of Mike Cabrera, a table inspector of the casino,was based on
the recanted declarations of the brothers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is the lawful owner of the chips.

RULING: Yes, there should be no basis that the casino chips found in Ludwin's and
Deoven's possession were stolen. Their Joint Affidavit merely states that the chips came
from Cabrera. Given this premise, the casino chips are considered to have been exchanged
with their corresponding representative value. The Court should require petitioner to prove
convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were
indeed stolen. The possession of the casino chips is presumed to have paid for their
representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559
cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.