Austria v.

Lichauco
GR NO. 170080 Apr 4, 2007 

Facts:

Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio

Quintos, and defendant-appellant Consolacion Austria are siblings of full blood. Jose Alberto,
Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone, all surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of the
defendant-appellant.

The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate
area of six hundred sixty one (661) square meters located in Palanan, Makati City.

Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to partition the property, and
the inability of the co-owners to mutually agree on an arrangement acceptable to all of them, on
July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 142, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1485, against the defendant-
appellant Austria and two other defendants namely Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as
unwilling co-plaintiffs) for partition of the subject property.

A motion to dismiss was filed by Austria during the period for filing an answer, however it
was subsequently denied by the trial court. Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration was filed
but was also denied by the RTC. Unsatisfied with the trial court’s decision Austria appealed in
the Court of Appeals but the appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision.

Issue: WON the Trial Court’s decision ordering the partition of the subject property or
authorizing its sale is valid.

Held:
A defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a motion to set aside the
order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; (b) a motion for new trial under
Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available;
(c) a petition for relief under Rule 38 if judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an
appeal from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been resorted to.

There are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase is the determination of
whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does
not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a determination that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received by
the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if
they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon.

The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by
the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
 HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY ECARMA vs. CA AND RENATO A. ECARMA
G.R. No. 193374, June 08, 2016

FACTS:
Spouses Natalio and Arminda owned 4 properties consisting of 2 lots. They have 7 children
among them were Gerry Ecarma and provate respondent Renato Ecarma. Natalio predeceased
Arminda, and thereafter their children executed Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate. No
physical division of properties was effected and they remained in co-ownership even after the
death of Arminda. Renato Ecarma as the Special Administrator in the intestate proceedings filed
a Project of Partition because of the conflict between Gerry and the other heirs over actual
division of their inherited properties. The legal heirs except Gerry expressed their desire to have
property partitioned. Gerry objected because the proposed partition is not feasible, impractical
and detrimental. The planned partition is not accordance with the wishes of decedents, but
however, it was denied by the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Order of Partition is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such proposed partition on the ground that it is not feasible, impractical and
detrimental.

RULING:
Yes. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession (covering Arminda's share in the
subject properties) vested and their co-ownership over the subject properties has consolidated
by operation of law. Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory
heirs, herein parties (specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein
petitioners) all ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal proportion being compulsory
heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.
Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even Rodolfo
Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the subject
properties which are co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners, herein petitioners,
representing the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners
likewise compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all
incidences of their full ownership.
 VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Parañaque where their
father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially
agreed that Virgilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3 but they later agreed on equal shares.
After their father’s death Virgilio demanded from Senen that the latter vacate the house and that
the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused so Virgilio
filed to compel the sale of the property. In his complaint, Virgilio prayed that the proceeds of the
sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to Senen. He also
prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by the latter after their father died.
In his answer with counterclaim, Senen alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as
the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof
should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment
of the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property without paying
any compensation to petitioner.

RULING:
Yes. Being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest
of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the
same. 
 Reyes v. Concepcion

GR NO. 56550 Oct 1, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages,seeking to enjoin private
respondents from selling to a third party their pro-indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels
of land. Petitioner claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners,
had a preferential right to purchase these shares from private respondents for a reasonable
price. Respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application for awrit of preliminary injunction,
on the ground that petitioners’ registered notice of lis pendens was ample protection of their
rights.

ISSUE:

Whether the co-owners has a preferential right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-
owners.

RULING:

This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do
not grant to any of the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase
the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners’ reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil
Code is misplaced. Article 1620 provides:

A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the co-
owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common [Emphasis
supplied].

Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares

to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of “legal redemption”, a co-owner’s light to redeem
is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the
co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale
of the latter’s pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the
New Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar.

There is likewise no merit to petitioners’ contention that private respondents had acknowledged
the pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a “reasonable price”. Although it
appears that private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the
offer was made at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9,
1980, Annex “C” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents had
agreed, without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist
on a right to purchase the shares at a price lower than the selling price of private respondents.

HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY ECARMA vs. CA AND RENATO A. ECARMA

G.R. No. 193374, June 08, 2016

FACTS:
Spouses Natalio and Arminda owned 4 properties consisting of 2 lots. They have 7 children
among them were Gerry Ecarma and provate respondent Renato Ecarma. Natalio predeceased
Arminda, and thereafter their children executed Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate. No
physical division of properties was effected and they remained in co-ownership even after the
death of Arminda. Renato Ecarma as the Special Administrator in the intestate proceedings filed
a Project of Partition because of the conflict between Gerry and the other heirs over actual
division of their inherited properties. The legal heirs except Gerry expressed their desire to have
property partitioned. Gerry objected because the proposed partition is not feasible, impractical
and detrimental. The planned partition is not accordance with the wishes of decedents, but
however, it was denied by the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Order of Partition is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such proposed partition on the ground that it is not feasible, impractical and
detrimental.

RULING:
Yes. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession (covering Arminda's share in the
subject properties) vested and their co-ownership over the subject properties has consolidated
by operation of law. Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory
heirs, herein parties (specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein
petitioners) all ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal proportion being compulsory
heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.
Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even Rodolfo
Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the subject
properties which are co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners, herein petitioners,
representing the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners
likewise compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all
incidences of their full ownership.

Possession

Cequena v. Bolante
GR NO. 137944 Apr 6, 2000

Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930.
[Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and
subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are
brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975,
[respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey
had a dispute on [the] ownership of the land.
The Trial Court rendered that the rightful owners and possessors of the land are
Cequena and Lirio. However an appeal was made to the court of appeals, whereby the decision
of the trial court was reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the lawful owner and possessor of the parcel of land.

Ruling: Yes the respondents are the lawful owner and possessor of the parcel of land.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for
ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she
had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in
1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her
husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the
land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted— had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore, she herself, after her father's
demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the
basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled
with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not
confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that
their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother
arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse
possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), This supposed ownership cannot extend to the
entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
Spouses Recto v. RP

GR NO. 160421 Oct 4, 2004

Facts:

On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an application for registration of title over
a 23,209 square meter lot, designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-
010485, situated in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas,
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. They also prayed in the alternative that their petition for registration be granted
pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.

The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals contending
that petitioners failed to - (1) offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2)
prove possession of the lot for the period required by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption
that subject property forms part of the public domain.

The RTC decided to grant the petition for registration of Spouses Recto. However, an appeal
was initiated in the court of appeals which eventually reversed the decision of the trial court
basing on the failure to offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land.

Issue: WON Sps. Recto lawfully possesses ownership.

Ruling: Yes. Sps. Recto lawfully possesses ownership.

There is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public domain having been
released and certified as such onDecember 31, 1925. As further certified by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an
agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor
within a forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed, and
riverbank protection.28 Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet the requisite for original
registration of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
 WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17, 2003 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 are reversed and set aside. the September 7, 1998
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case
No. T-320, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is REINSTATED.

Gamos v. Frando
GR NO. 149117 Dec 16, 2004 

Facts:
Juliana Frando, respondents predecessor-in-interest, was in possession of the abovedescribed
property. Since 1925, she had planted several trees and other plants thereon, including
coconuts, pili, bananas and cacao. Sometime in 1946, the property was traversed by a national
road that effectively divided it into two portions, denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855,
respectively.

Evident from certified copies of existing records of the Bureau of Lands introduced in evidence
is the fact that on February 14, 1952, Frando filed Insular Government Property Sales (IGPS)
Application No. 162 for the parcel in question. Pursuant thereto, a representative of the Bureau
of Lands inspected the area and found it to be inside an agricultural zone, free from private
claims and conflicts. After the secretary of agriculture appraised the property at P240, a notice
calling for bids was published. At the auction sale conducted on April 22, 1955, the only bidder
was Frando. On even date she deposited P24, which represented 10 percent of the appraised
value, as evidenced by Official Receipt (OR) No. 9654851 dated April 22, 1955. On August 3,
1988, the heirs of Juliana Frando filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against
Cerila Gamos and the director of the Bureau of Lands. The complainants challenged the validity
of Free Patent No. 459501 and OCT No. P-10548. In their Answer, Cerila Gamos and her co-
defendants alleged that they had been in actual and open possession of the land as early as
1952;

In its Answer, the Bureau of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
admitted that Juliana Frando had filed an IGPS application for a parcel of land with an area of
2.4969 hectares located at Poblacion, Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Admittedly, she
won the public bidding and deposited the amount of P24 under OR No. 9654851 dated April 22,
1955, but allegedly failed to pay the balance price of P216.

The trial court eventually ruled against Cecilia Gamos, ordered her and her heirs to execute a
deed of reconveyance and surrender their possession of the property and remove whatever the
improvements they introduced to the land. Unsatisfied with the trial court’s decision Gamos
appealed to the court of appeals which also upheld the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not action of the heirs of Juliana Frando has already been barred by
laches/prescription

Ruling: No. The action of the heirs of Juliana Frando is not barred by prescription or laches.

Prescription and Laches In their last assignment of error, petitioners argue that private
respondents action to annul the free patent issued to Cerila Gamos has already prescribed and
is barred by laches. We do not agree. As testified to by the Gilda Bongais -- one of Juliana
Frandos heirs -- when petitioners first invaded the property in 1979 by constructing a house
thereon, her aunt (Paciencia Gallenosa) filed an action contesting such intrusion. The action
was later dropped due to the financial burdens of the litigation, definitely not because of any
concession of rights by private respondents. Thus, the legal inaction on their part was due, not
to their lack of vigilance, but merely to their lack of resources to defend their property. On the
witness stand, Guatno himself recognized Juliana Frando and her heirs as the true owners of
the property, even as he admitted that it was Galag -- one of herein petitioners -- who had given
him permission to erect a house on the land in 1980. Petitioners possession of the disputed
property, based as it was on mere tolerance, could neither ripen into ownership nor operate to
bar any action by private respondents to recover absolute possession thereof.
Cequena v. Bolante
GR NO. 137944 Apr 6, 2000

FACTS:

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land. Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to
Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito
Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of
the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land.
Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of the property. The TC rendered judgment ordering
respondent to surrender possession to the heirs of petitioner. On appeal the CA reversed the
TC’s finding because the genuiness and due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by
respondents had not been sufficiently established.

Issue: WON the respondent Honorata Bolante possesses a better right.

Ruling: No. Honorata Bolante does not posses a better right.

The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the
contrary is proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision,
be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of
possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be
established in one of the ways provided by law.

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for

ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she
had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in
1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her
husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the
land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's
demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the
basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. 
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled
with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not
confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that
their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother
arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse
possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985),  this supposed ownership cannot extend to the
entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.