Jerusalem The Contested City

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬
‫‪JERUSALEM‬‬
‫‪THE CONTESTED‬‬ ‫‪CITY‬‬

M E N A C H E M KLEIN
JERUSALEM
The Contested City
T R A N S L A T E D BY H A I M W A T Z M A N
HURST & COMPANY, L O N D O N

in association w i t h the
J e r u s a l e m I n s t i t u t e f o r Israel Studies

© the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2001
A l l rights reserved
First published in the United Kingdom by
C . Hurst & C o . (Publishers) Ltd.,
38 King Street, London W C 2 E 8JZ
Typeset in Bembo by Bookcraft Ltd, Stroud, Gloucestershire
Printed in England
The right o f Menachem Klein to be identified as the author of this
work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
ISBNs
1-85065-575-8 casebound
1 -85065-576-6 paperback

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
M a n y fine people have assisted me i n preparing this book for p u b l i -

cation and all deserve m y heartfelt thanks. O r a A h i m e i r , director o f
the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, initiated the project and
followed its progress both closely and from a distance. She is to be
thanked together w i t h the entire staff o f the Institute, led by Prof.
Avraham (Rami) Friedman, head o f the Institute, Prof. S h l o m o
Hasson, Yisrael (Lulik) K i m c h i , D r . M a y a Choshen, and Reuven
Merchav. I also received m u c h assistance from D r . R o n P u n d i k o f
the Economic Cooperation Foundation ( E C F ) ; attorney Dani Seide-
man; C o l . (ret.) Shalom Goldstein, political adviser to the mayor o f
Jerusalem; Yaffa Rosenberg o f the American Cultural Center i n
Jerusalem; D r . Gershon Baskin o f the Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information ( I P C R I ) ; and from M u h m a d al-Nakhal.
I owe special thanks to D r . Riad a l - M a l k i o f the Panorama organi-
zation; to R a m i Nassarallah o f the International Peace and C o o p e r -
ation Center; and to the staff o f Orient House, especially D r . Khalil
al-Tafugji, director o f the M a p p i n g D i v i s i o n o f the Arab Studies
Society, and to the staff o f the Orient H o u s e library and document
center. T h e chapter on the political profile o f East Jerusalem's inhab-
itants could not have been written without the assistance o f the
Center for Palestine Research and Studies under the directorship o f
D r . Khalil al-Shikaki. T h e director o f the Center's survey unit, D r .
Nader Said, and M r s . Raja Taher, were kind enough to make avail-
able to me findings that were not included i n the survey papers they
published. I received similar help from Jamil Rabah, w h o is respon-
sible for surveys at the Jerusalem M e d i a and C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Center ( J M C C ) , w h i c h is headed by Ghassan al-Khatib.
T h i s book was translated into E n g l i s h by H a i m W a t z m a n ,
whose contribution can be felt i n every w o r d . O f course, none o f
these helpful people bears any responsibility for the contents o f
the book. T h e analysis o f events, the interpretation o f survey find-
ings, and the errors are all mine.
Jerusalem M.K.
January 2001

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements page v
Maps between pages 8-9
Introduction 1
Transliteration and terminology 6
1. T h e Arena: a Frontier C i t y 9
F r o n t i e r cities a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l cities 9
Soft, f l e x i b l e a n d p e r m e a b l e borders 18
— J e r u s a l e m versus T e m p l e M o u n t 57
A city u n i t e d i n theory a n d d i v i d e d i n p r a c t i c e 65
2. T h e C u r t a i n Rises: Jerusalem i n the Israeli-Egyptian

Peace Negotiations 85
T o Sinai via Jerusalem 85
The C a m p D a v i d conference: peace despite J e r u s a l e m 90
J e r u s a l e m a n d the a u t o n o m y negotiations: a dialogue i n t w o
languages 94
The C a m p D a v i d m o d e l : t h e i n d i r e c t approach a n d its
limitations 101
3. T h e P L O - from the W i n g s to Center Stage 104

The P L O : p o l i t i c s stops a t t h e gates of J e r u s a l e m 104
D e t o u r i n g a r o u n d Jerusalem a n d the P L O 107
A consensual l i e : t h e P L O does n o tf u n c t i o n i n J e r u s a l e m 118
F r o m J e r u s a l e m to T u n i s , M a d r i d , W a s h i n g t o n , O s l o
and Back 129
The I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n D e c l a r a t i o n of P r i n c i p l e s 152
4. T h e Choruses: the Arab League and the O I C 158

The A r a b s u m m i t conferences 159
— A n old refrain i n a new song 159
vi

Contents vii
The O r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e I s l a m i c Conference (OIC) 162

— The W a s h i n g t o n D e c l a r a t i o n a n d t h e peace agreement
between J o r d a n a n d Israel 162
— The O I C : December 1994-January 1995 170
— The A g r e e m e n t between t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y
and Jordan 172
— The I s l a m i c holy places - a p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m 174
5. T h e P L O and the Palestinian Identity of East Jerusalem 183
B o y c o t t s of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d p o l i t i c a l processes 186
B u i l d i n g counter institutions 188
J e r u s a l e m versus G a z a 194
6. A n East Jerusalem Political Profile 205

Public Opinion 205
— Political support: organizations a n d parties 206
— Support f o r presidential candidates 208
Candidates f o r vice-president 211
— P o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s as o n g o i n g issues 211
— E v a l u a t i o n of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y 212
— A r m e d a c t i o n s by t h e I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s 212
"Soft" p r o t e s t i n J e r u s a l e m 213
P o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r : t h e elections to t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y ' s
Legislative C o u n c i l a n d Presidency 214
W i l l i n g n e s s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n elections 216
— E l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , slates of c a n d i d a t e s , p r e p a r a t i o n s
and propaganda 218
The elections 234
The w i n n e r s 237
The c o n t o u r s of P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n 242
7. Israeli Policy i n East Jerusalem 247

Keeping Palestinians i n line 247
— The J e r u s a l e m m u n i c i p a l i t y versus t h e I s r a e l i g o v e r n m e n t 255
J e r u s a l e m : escape hatches f r o m t h e O s l o accords 260
The contest f o r A r a b space 261
— Israel challenges the demographic balance 266
Construction against O s l o 271
H a r H o m a : a n obstacle to t h e O s l o accords 278

Vlll Contents
8. C o n c l u s i o n : Bridges over a D i v i d e d C i t y 294

The b e g i n n i n g of t h e p e r m a n e n t status n e g o t i a t i o n s 294
The B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g s 301
A r e a s of f u n c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n between fews ands A r a b s 310
— The s p a t i a l i d e n t i t y of t h e residents of E a s t J e r u s a l e m 310
— Israel's possession of t h e official symbols of i d e n t i t y ,
affiliation a n d sovereignty 311
— I n s t i t u t i o n s a n d services 312
— I s l a m i c holy sites a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s 315
— S h a r i a courts 315
— A l - H a r a m al-Sharif 316
A r e a s of l o w - l e v e l c o m p e t i t i o n 317
— L a w a n d order 317
— The a u t o n o m y of t h e local P a l e s t i n i a n e s t a b l i s h m e n t 318
— P o l i t i c a l ties a n d p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 320
A r e a s of h i g h - l e v e l c o m p e t i t i o n 322
— P l a n n i n g a n d construction 322
— P o p u l a t i o n a n d demographic balance 324
Peace i n s m a l l doses 327
Bibliography 336
Index 351

INTRODUCTION
Jerusalem is hardly just another city and is far from being a local
urban phenomenon. N o r is it just one more national capital. It is
also more than just the most political city i n Israel and the West
Bank. T h e cliche is that Jerusalem is a mosaic o f sparkling gem-
stones, a splendid city whose inhabitants live side by side i n har-
mony. T h e reality, as everyone knows, is far less idyllic. A l l the
fault lines that cut through Israeli society intersect i n Jerusalem,
and as i f that were not enough, the city lies o n the front line o f the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It is the capital o f
Israel, but East Jerusalem is the future Palestinian state's capital-
in-the-making. M o s t Palestinians feel a personal relationship w i t h
Jerusalem even i f they have not visited it for years (Segal & Sa'id,
1997). T h i s is m u c h the same as Jews feel about the city. Q u o t i n g
the Jewish poet Zelda, M e r o n Benvenisti called the city "a place o f
fire" (Benvenisti, 1996).
T h e front lines i n Jerusalem are not only national and ethnic.
T h e city's holiness to Jews, M u s l i m s , and Christians adds a reli-
gious dimension to its tangle o f conflicting and contradictory
identities, making the city a focus o f w o r l d w i d e interest. T h e
city's holiness to the monotheistic religions is often inseparable
from its national sanctity, and these two forms o f the sacred feed
each other's flames. Jerusalem is also saturated w i t h historical
memories, w i t h existential anxieties and Utopian hopes, all b u b -
bling together i n a steaming stewpot.
Jerusalem is a frontier city, even though it has not been thought
o f as such since 1967. T h e physical barrier, the fence that divided
Israeli and Jordanian Jerusalem over w h i c h Israeli and Jordanian
army outposts faced each other, no longer exists. B u t the city's
national and ethnic barriers have remained i n place, and have
become even more impervious since 1967. T h e confrontation,
w h i c h was intercommunal between 1917 and 1948, became inter-
national between 1948 and 1967. D u r i n g these years Jerusalem
was a frontier city divided between two countries. In many ways,
1
2 J e r u s a l e m : the Contested C i t y
the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians has

returned since 1967 to its previous intercommunal form. Since
Israel annexed East Jerusalem, the city has had two ethnic-
national groups ranged against each other without any physical
barrier separating them. A s a frontier city, Jerusalem was, and to a
large extent still is, a locus o f competition for control o f the city,
w i t h each group being u n w i l l i n g to accept the governance o f the
other. T h e opposite side is a rival, not a partner. T h e Palestinian
Authority's partial penetration ofjerusalem since September 1993
has inserted a dimension of statehood into East Jerusalem. U n l i k e
the chaotic nature o f intercommunal relations, relations between
countries have a more institutionalized and ordered character. It is
m u c h easier to locate and manage conflicts between states than
between communities. T h e resolution o f the confrontation
between Israel and the Palestinians, and its stabilization, requires
institutionalization, and institutionalization cannot be built w i t h -
out political foundations.
W h e n this b o o k was written, the O s l o accords were the most
important factor i n shaping Israel-Palestinian relations. T h e O s l o
process reached its climax at the C a m p D a v i d summit of J u l y 1 1 -
24,2000. It was there that Jerusalem's status i n the permanent set-
tlement was first discussed at a decisive stage o f the negotiations.
Expectations were high, so there was great disappointment w h e n
the top-level Israeli-Palestinian-American talks produced no
agreement. Subsequent talks, w h i c h went on for about a m o n t h
after C a m p D a v i d ended, were also fruitless.
W h e n violence - the A l - A q s a Intifada - broke out it d e m o n -
strated, i n a way not seen since 1967, that Jerusalem was the center
of the conflict, and that it is a frontier city. Shots were fired from
the Palestinian city o f Beit Jala at the southern Jerusalem neigh-
borhood o f G i l o , where the Israeli army deployed tanks both as a
deterrent and to return fire. M a n y roads leading into Jerusalem
and i n East Jerusalem itself were closed off to Israeli Jews. T h e
tight closure cut off the eastern city's links to the Israeli interior,
and Israel severely limited Palestinian access to the A l - A q s a
M o s q u e for Friday prayer services.
T h e C a m p D a v i d conference produced several oral under-
standings, not put into writing. It also focused the points o f dis-
pute i n Jerusalem: the T e m p l e M o u n t / a l - H a r a m al-Sharif; the
O l d C i t y ; the crescent o f Palestinian neighborhoods adjacent to

Introduction 3
the O l d C i t y that constitute the historical and religious cores o f

Jerusalem, and the city as defined by the Jordanians between 1949
and 1967. T h e dispute focused less o n the management o f these
areas and more o n the symbolic and political issue o f sovereignty.
In contrast, the two sides reached understandings about a signifi-
cant number o f questions o f principle. These understandings are
based o n irreversible geographic and demographic reality and o n
the national interests o f each side. O n a fundamental level, then,
this was a w i n - w i n situation.
First o f all it was understood, as Israel demanded, that there was
no returning to the reality ofjerusalem prior to the war o f 1967. A t
the same time, it was understood that the municipal boundary
unilaterally established by Israel as Jerusalem could not remain.
Secondly, all agreed that Jerusalem w o u l d grow i n both direc-
tions. T h e Jewish city w o u l d be larger than that defined by Israel
immediately after the 1967 war, and the Palestinian city w o u l d
also grow to include the suburbs ofjerusalem that, i n 1967, were
villages not physically connected to the city. T h e two parts o f the
city w o u l d be larger than its current territory.
T h i r d , this enlarged Jerusalem was seen to be a single metro-
politan unit w i t h c o m m o n characteristics and needs, and w o u l d
remain open. A n international border, i n the c o m m o n sense o f
the w o r d , w o u l d not r u n through it. In order to avoid damaging
the c o m m o n fabric o f the city and the two-way flow between the
two parts o f the city, appropriate security measures w o u l d have to
be taken that w o u l d keep Jerusalem from t u r n i n g into a focus o f
terror, crime, and violence. Furthermore, a series o f agreements
w o u l d have to be reached to lay out the day-to-day functioning o f
the metropolitan area. Some o f these arrangements w i l l apply to
the entire area and w i l l require coordination between the two
sides i n solving problems that span the administrative borders -
for example, air pollution and sewage. A n o t h e r k i n d o f special
arrangement grows out o f the need to preserve c o m m o n interests
such as the appearance o f the O l d C i t y and its sites. Legal and eco-
n o m i c arrangements are required because o f the freedom o f
movement between the eastern and western cities. These special
arrangements w i l l apply largely to the seam where the two p o p u -
lations w i l l be i n intensive contact.
F o u r t h , both sides agreed to the establishment o f two m u n i c i -
palities i n the enlarged territory o f Jerusalem. A Palestinian

4 Jerusalem: theContested C i t y
municipality w i l l be established as a separate administrative unit

under full Palestinian sovereignty. It w i l l serve as the capital o f the
Palestinian state (Barak to the J e r u s a l e m Post, 28 Sept. 2000). T h e
debate at the C a m p D a v i d conference centered on the powers o f
the Palestinian municipality i n the historical and religious heart o f
the city, the municipal commercial center, and the adjacent neigh-
borhoods. Everyone agreed, however, that the Palestinian m u n i c i -
pality w o u l d have full powers i n most parts o f metropolitan East
Jerusalem. Agreement on the principle o f establishing two m u n i c i -
palities and an open municipal space requires, i n turn, agreement on
the establishment o f a super-municipal administrative framework,
whether it is a coordinating committee or umbrella municipality.
Fifth, both sides realized that an exchange o f neighborhoods is
necessary. Israel w i l l exclude from its sovereign territory neigh-
borhoods i n its outer belt, such as Sur Baher i n the southeast and
Sho'afat and Bait H a n i n a i n the north. These w i l l be j o i n e d to the
suburbs that n o w lie outside the m u n i c i p a l boundary drawn by
Israel i n 1967.
In exchange, Israel w i l l receive sovereignty over settlements
adjacent to Jerusalem - M a ' a l e h A d u m i m , Givat Ze'ev, and G u s h
E t z i o n . Israel can decide whether G u s h E t z i o n w i l l remain an
independent entity or whether it w i l l be integrated into the Jewish
Jerusalem municipality. In addition, the Palestinians w i l l officially
recognize the Jerusalem neighborhoods that Israel built after 1967
on former Jordanian territory. A s far as the Palestinians are c o n -
cerned, these neighborhoods are illegal settlements just like any
other i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. It w i l l be hard for the Pal-
estinians to make the distinction between the Jerusalem neigh-
borhoods and other settlements, but, realistically, this is what they
must do. A b o u t half o f the residents o f the former Jordanian area
are Israeli Jews, and their inclusion i n the Palestinian city, even i f
they were to remain Israeli citizens, w o u l d give the eternal capital
o f Palestine a binational character. T h e same is true i n Israel's
case. A s hard as it w i l l be for Israel to retract its unambiguous and
determined statements about Jerusalem i n its 1967 borders
b e i n g the united Israeli capital forever, the fact that a third o f the
city's residents are Palestinian Arabs makes such rhetoric
hollow.
In short, both sides reached the conclusion that it is people,
more than anything else, that determine the identity o f the land on

Introduction 5
w h i c h they live. In this sense, the foundation laid at C a m p D a v i d

w i l l constitute a reference framework for all future agreements,
since its base is solid. W h e n guns are blasting and people d y i n g it is
hard to see h o w the two sides can begin to negotiate again, i n order
to complete what they began at C a m p D a v i d . T h e C a m p D a v i d
conference closed a period i n w h i c h Jerusalem was discussed w i t h
the use o f slogans. T h e national agenda o f Israel and the Arabs
now includes the understanding that in Jerusalem mutual conces-
sions w i l l have to be made. W i t h o u t a resolution o f the Jerusalem
question and the inclusion o f an arrangement for Jerusalem i n the
general Israeli-Palestinian agreement, there can be no peace.
M a n y books have been written about the conflict in Jerusalem
and some o f their authors believe that the antagonism prevailing
in the city has long since become a law o f nature. In contrast w i t h
the prevailing view, this book's subject is h o w the Israelis and P a l -
estinians i n Jerusalem have m o v e d closer to each other despite
their differences. It chronicles the attempts that have been made
since 1977 to resolve the conflict and find a solution that w i l l
enable the communities to live together. E v e n though each side to
these negotiations has declared that Jerusalem cannot be bar-
gained for or be the subject o f compromise, agreements have been
made and understandings have been reached. T h e search for a
political arrangement acceptable to all parties to the conflict is a
new experience, c o m i n g after long years o f fanning the flames o f
hostility i n the city. T h i s book follows these attempts at resolution
and notes what differences remain.
It is not m y intention to write a history o f Jerusalem since June
1967 or to present the reader w i t h the entire spectrum o f solutions
that have been proposed over the years. I begin where the theoret-
ical proposals turn into political facts laid face up o n the negotiat-
ing table, or where both sides have adopted them. T h i s b o o k
differs from others o n the same subject i n two ways. First, it inte-
grates the political status o f the city o n the negotiating table w i t h
the urban reality that influences the negotiations; second, it exam-
ines both parties to the conflict in Jerusalem.
I have tried to provide the reader w i t h the most comprehensive
and reliable information I could gather o n what has been done i n
East Jerusalem. There still is no reliable information resource for
this; m y hope is that the data contained here is sufficiently reliable

6 Jerusalem: the Contested C i t y
for m y purposes. I w i l l happily correct i n the future what is dis-

torted or missing.
T h e reader enters the gates of Jerusalem through m y first chap-
ter, w h i c h presents the geographical and urban reality and its his-
torical background. T h e remaining chapters address the political
reality that has taken shape o n the negotiating table. Chapter 2
describes h o w the Jerusalem question was handled during the
peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt from 1977 to 1979.
Chapter 3 analyzes the negotiations between Israel and the Pales-
tinians from the beginning of the 1980s to the Declaration of P r i n -
ciples signed by Israel and the P L O i n September 1993. Chapter 4
discusses the status of the Arab League and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, as well as the status of Jordan i n the negotia-
tions o n Jerusalem and o n the Islamic holy sites i n the city.
T h e final chapters return to the urban reality and analyze the
patterns o f competition and the de f a c t o arrangements that Israel
and the Palestinians have reached i n Jerusalem since September
1993. Chapter 5 analyzes the Palestinians' moves in Jerusalem and
the tension between the local and national institutions. Chapter 6
examines whether the uniqueness o f East Jerusalem also finds
expression i n its politics by analyzing the political profile o f East
Jerusalem's inhabitants and o f their representatives i n the Pales-
tinian Authority's Legislative C o u n c i l .
Chapter 7 addresses Israeli policy and actions, first under the
Labor and then under the L i k u d administrations. T h e concluding
chapter follows the permanent status negotiations, i n c l u d i n g the
unofficial understandings that were reached between Yossi B e i l i n
and A b u - M a z i n . Whatever the final shape o f the permanent set-
tlement, it w i l l largely be m o l d e d to fit the prevailing reality i n
Jerusalem. T h i s reality, I believe, w i l l impose itself on the negotia-
tors, i n c l u d i n g those w h o unsuccessfully try fundamentally to
change it.
TRANSLITERATION AND TERMINOLOGY
Arabic and Hebrew terms and place names have generally been translit-
erated according to the accepted rules in works of general scholarship.
Exceptions have been made, however, when transliteration according to
these rules might confuse the reader or where there is a familiar English
spelling. I have spelled proper names according to the preferences of the
person bearing them. This seems only fair, despite the inconsistencies it

Introduction 7
produces (for example, Yitzhak Rabin, but Itzchak Mordechay). Finally,

all apostrophes before Arab and Hebrew names have been omitted as
have most occurrences of al- before well-known names.
I have tried to be even-handed in my terminology as well, even
though East Jerusalem terminology is inevitably laden with political
implications. The Arabs tend to emphasize the fact that East Jerusalem is
populated largely by Arabic-speaking Palestinians. Their official docu-
ments largely call the area "Arab Jerusalem" in English, in order to dis-
tinguish it from the other part of Jerusalem where Hebrew rules. Israelis
habitually call the Arab-inhabited part of Jerusalem "East Jerusalem,"
since it lies on the east side of a single large entity, Jerusalem. So, with
regard to the city's name, I have adopted three rules: 1. In texts translated
from Arabic the city's name will remain as it was in the Arab source.
"Sublime Jerusalem" is my translation of the Arabic " A l - Q u d s al-Sharif,"
which occurs frequently in Palestinian texts. This literal translation
enables it to be distinguished from " a l - M a d i n a al-Muqadasah" - the Holy
C i t y - w h i c h also appears in Palestinian texts. 2.1 have generally used the
term "East Jerusalem" for the Arab part of Jerusalem, because this is the
familiar term in English. In fact, even Arafat uses "East" rather than
"Arab" in his speeches. I have, however, preferred to use the term
"Jewish Jerusalem" instead of the misleading "West Jerusalem," since a
number of the Jewish neighborhoods built since 1967 are not actually
west of East Jerusalem. 3. The holy site where the Dome of the Rock and
the Al-Aqsa Mosque are located is called H a r H a - B a y i t in Hebrew
(whence the common English term, "the Temple Mount"), and a l -
H a r a m al-Sharif i n Arabic. Each of these names is historically charged and
significant in the present. I have therefore used both terms, each where
the context seemed to require it.

MAPS
T h i s first map shows the changes i n Jerusalem's, municipal

boundaries made by Jordan and Israel. In the period 1949-67 each
state ruled its o w n share o f the divided city and implemented
boundary changes i n that part. In 1967 Israel occupied Jordanian
Jerusalem, and decided unilaterally to enlarge the city's municipal
boundaries. T h e most far-reaching and dramatic change was
made o n 28 June 1967, w h e n Israel decided to increase the former
6 sq. k m o f the Jordanian city by some 70 sq. k m o f West Bank ter-
ritory and annex the w h o l e to the Israeli city. B y this act Israel laid
d o w n the geographical foundation o f metropolitan Jerusalem.
T h e following maps show the demographic components o f the
metropolitan area and its undesigned results.
In the thirty years between the annexation and 1997 the popula-
tion o f Jerusalem grew by 126%. D u r i n g this period the Jewish
and Arab populations increased by 113% and 164% respectively.
T h e more rapid increase o f the Arab population was due both to
natural increase (a higher birth rate among the Arabs) and migra-
tion movements (lower Arab migration from the city and many
new arrivals). T h e Arab growth was also driven by the large j o b
market open to Arab blue-collar workers due to the massive
b u i l d i n g o f Jewish neighbourhoods. Since 1988, there has been a
sharp rise i n the negative J e w i s h migration balance o f Jerusalem
v i s - a - v i s its environs. Parallel to this, more Arabs returned from
the suburbs outside the municipal boundaries to live i n the city
under Israeli jurisdiction.

‫‪1. Changes in the M u n i c i p a l Area‬‬

‫‪2. Jewish and Arab populations, 1997‬‬

4. Distribution o f Jewish and Arab population, 1997

1
THE ARENA
A FRONTIER CITY
F r o n t i e r cities a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l cities
A c c o r d i n g to the c o m m o n w i s d o m i n Israel, o n June 4, 1967, the

eve o f the Six D a y War, the country had boundaries; d u r i n g that
war the state stood on its frontiers and expanded them. It settled
Jerusalem, the "desolate city," and improved the lot o f its Arab
inhabitants by bringing them progress and prosperity.
T h e term "frontier" is characteristically distinct from the term
"boundary." "Frontier" suggests open spaces available for settle-
ment and conquest. "Frontierity" motivates people and states to
expand their borders. A state's frontiers lie not only at its geo-
graphical and physical limits; there is also, for example, a frontier
o f outer space and a frontier o f knowledge. A frontier is thus any
place where the state seeks to expand or extend itself, where it
seeks to move a geographical or intellectual boundary. F r o m this
perspective, the movement is unidirectional - forward i n the
name o f enlightenment, civilization, and progress. A t some fron-
tiers, the state is a more salient presence than it is o n its h o m e
ground because it is exerting a national w i l l to expand. A t other
frontiers, the state's control is looser than it is i n the center, since
the expansion is being accomplished by individuals or by groups
acting o n their o w n initiative. In both cases, however, the frontier
region lacks a local character and is rather an extension and opera-
tional instrument o f national policy. In contrast, the term
"border" designates something static, a place where one must halt.
A border is inward directed and marks the existing situation and
the limit o f current possibilities. T h e frontier faces outwards, and
marks the place at w h i c h a stationary, l i m i t i n g border can be
9
10 J e r u s a l e m : the C o n t e s t e d C i t y
moved. A frontier is inclusive and implies an open future, while a

border is exclusive, a buffer between foreigners and ourselves
(Barth, 1969; G a l - N u r , 1995; Hasson, 1996; K e r w i n , 1997;
K i m m e r l i n g , 1977; K o t e k 1997b).
A c c o r d i n g to more recent thinking, however, there is little dif-
ference between a frontier and a boundary. T h e frontier is n o w
thought to mark confrontation between conceptions or c o m m u -
nities, not finality or unidirectional movement. In contrast w i t h
the classical view, the new conception no longer assumes a c o n -
frontation between the enlightened and the uncultured, the igno-
rant, or the primitive, but rather a confrontation between two
cultures. A boundary, according to this new view, marks the point
to w h i c h each collective reaches, while the frontier directs its gaze
to the other side of the boundary, to encounter and confrontation
w i t h an opposing entity or culture. Each side has an empiric his-
tory and a mythic past; each has its o w n religion and values, norms
and aspirations. Each group defines h o w it distinguishes itself
from others, and each group continually revises or updates its
w o r l d v i e w i n the light o f political and historical circumstances.
The confrontation o n the frontier does not take place o n a broad
front, but rather is concentrated i n a specific'territory. Each of the
contending groups seeks to control or defend its territory against
being physically taken over by the "other," the "invader." In the
conflict over territory, each group develops holy sites o f its o w n
and turns certain sites into symbols o f struggle and defense, or
enhances the value o f the territory and defines it as a strategic
asset. T e r r i t o r y thus has symbolic value, i n the name of w h i c h the
group can mobilize its members i n defense o f their territory
against the "other" that threatens it. T h e iconographic characteris-
tics o f a territory carry great weight i n a frontier area. T h e c o m m u -
nity creates a set o f sacred symbols that l i n k its members to each
other and motivate them to defend and hold fast to their home-
land. T h i s is a static situation that is opposed to the activity that
takes place i n "regular" areas, w h i c h are characterized by mobility
and cyclicity. In "regular" areas there is a constant flow o f ideas,
people, commerce, capital, and knowledge, and the connection
w i t h the territory is secondary. A c c o r d i n g to this view, i n East
Jerusalem there is a confrontation between two cultures and c o m -
munities that are competing for a single space, yet also divide it
between them. Jerusalem, as w i l l be shown, has several boundary

The A r e n a : a F r o n t i e r C i t y 11
lines that separate the Arab east from the J e w i s h west. T h e two
sparring entities i n the city have developed mutual relations o f
exchange alongside confrontation and animosity (Hasson, 1977a;
Hasson, 1996; Hasson, 1998; K i m m e r l i n g , 1989; Kotek, 1997a;
Stotkin, 1996).
T h e term "frontier" also designates the relations between those
i n the rear and those w h o bear the burden o f the confrontation.
T h e term "frontier city" denotes not only the confrontation
between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem, but also the connection that
each o f them has to its center. T h e place held by J e w i s h Jerusalem
in the State o f Israel, and the place held by East Jerusalem i n Pales-
tinian consciousness and action, reflects the distinction between
the frontier and the center. In order to close the distance between
frontier and center, the national leadership w i l l turn the frontier
area, and the confrontation w i t h the other side, into unifying axes
around w h i c h the nation and the state are constructed, thus
achieving "national unity." Despite vows o f loyalty and declara-
tions about the mobilization o f the entire center behind the
people o f the frontier, the lines o f contact and friction - the bor-
derlines - lie i n the frontier area not i n the interior. T h e lines o f
confrontation distinguish the heartland from the frontier and pas-
sionate declarations cannot bridge that gap.
T h e concept o f the frontier designates a deeper fissure than that
o f a multicultural and multi-ethnic city. Today, all m o d e r n cities
i n the Western w o r l d , such as Paris, N e w Y o r k , and L o n d o n , are
multinational because o f the large-scale i m m i g r a t i o n o f members
o f other national groups and speakers o f other languages. M u l t i -
cultural cities are composed o f different linguistic-cultural
minorities and o f one dominant culture, whereas a frontier city is
a city i n w h i c h there is an ethnic-national confrontation between
two communities. U n l i k e a multicultural city, i n w h i c h the
minority feels disadvantaged because o f its linguistic-cultural dif-
ference, i n a frontier city the m i n o r i t y group does not see itself as
inferior. First o f all, this distinction derives from the fact that i n a
multicultural city the minorities v i e w themselves as part o f a
c o m m o n system that they share w i t h the majority. T h e i r dispute
w i t h the majority is about the legitimacy o f their m i n o r i t y status,
about the regime's policy towards them, and about the just d i v i -
sion o f resources. T h e members o f the m i n o r i t y do not seek to
break away from the system, but rather to integrate into it as a

legitimate entity w i t h equal rights. In a frontier city, by contrast,

the m i n o r i t y seeks to delegitimize the rule o f the majority, and to
disengage itself i n one way or another from that rule. E a c h o f the
communities i n a frontier city sees itself to be o f equal, i f not
higher, status than the other groups. Therefore, i n a frontier city
the principal question preoccupying the rivals is w h o the ruler is
and w h o has the right to define the government's agenda. F o r the
minority, the majority's policies, aimed at stability and continuity,
are simply a means for perpetuating the majority's pre-eminence.
In many cases, the government o f the majority is incapable o f
d i v i d i n g assets equitably, thus reinforcing the minority's demand
for separation. Furthermore, i n a frontier city, the demographic
minority's case against the majority is not local, but rather repre-
sents one facet of the national confrontation. T h e national-ethnic
gap prevails over the m u n i c i p a l boundaries defined by urban
management, borders, the supply o f services, demographics and
territory. It takes o n national significance, and becomes part of the
identities o f each side. In contrast, the multicultural city does not
embody a confrontation between national groups - at most it
reflects a social problem that characterizes the country itself. T h e
multicultural city is heterogeneous and there can be different
coalitions between the ethnic groups that comprise it. These
coalitions vary according to the issue at hand. In a frontier city,
however, the polarization is deep and dichotomous, and the fis-
sures that characterize it largely coincide w i t h national fissures
(Bollens, 1998a; Kotek, 1997b; R o m a n , 1997a). Some o f these
sources call the frontier city the "polarized city" but this is only a
difference i n terminology; all the characteristics of a polarized city
are shared by the frontier city.
Jerusalem, a frontier city, differs from Brussels, w h i c h is
divided along linguistic-cultural lines. T h e tension there is
between speakers o f F l e m i s h , w h o are a majority i n the region
though not i n the city itself, and speakers of French, whose n u m -
bers have grown from 13.5 per cent o f the city's population i n
1846 to 66.5 per cent i n 1968. In Brussels there is a mechanism for
compromise, a superstructure that bridges the gaps and formally
organizes the confrontation.
In Jerusalem, i n contrast, there are no official compromise
arrangements and there are no institutions whose goal it is to
manage the confrontation; the result is that the level o f tension

between the two ethnic national groups is m u c h higher. P u b l i c

institutions function as two entirely separate systems i n the two
parts o f the city. T h e y have different days off, different currency
laws, and different dominant languages. T h e m i n o r i t y group has a
different legal-civil status than the majority group. In Brussels,
bridging and compromise mechanisms have reduced disputes to
questions such as whether F r e n c h should be recognized as the
primary language i n the new suburbs and i n additional neighbor-
hoods outside the 16 suburbs i n w h i c h it is already the official lan-
guage. T h e segregation between Jews and Arabs i n Jerusalem,
w h i c h has its origins i n the Mandatory period (when Britain ruled
Palestine between 1917 and 1948) is more profound than the sep-
aration o f the two national groups i n Brussels, where both sides
enjoy equal status and divide the positions o f power. In Brussels
there is a tendency for Flemings to adopt F r e n c h as their language,
but i n Jerusalem there is no such flow from one identity to
another. There are no intercommunal marriages, as there fre-
quently are i n Brussels, where there are also m i x e d residential
neighborhoods. In Jerusalem there is almost complete ecological
segregation between Jews and Arabs, and the two sectors maintain
separate public and private institutions and professional organiza-
tions. There are no partnerships i n the ownership o f land nor
between commercial and economic organizations, and day-to-day
contact is largely utilitarian rather than social. T h e J e w i s h sector
enjoys demographic, economic, and political supremacy and takes
advantage o f this to establish facts unilaterally i n its favor. In
Brussels the bilingual identity is grounded i n law and is reflected
in local symbols. It is consensual and explicit and has developed i n
to a political culture o f compromise. In Jerusalem the situation is
completely different. There are no institutions i n w h i c h the
minority enjoys equal status. T h e city is dominated by Jews, and
Arabs are relegated to the margins. Critically, the French-speakers
in Brussels are a majority i n the city but a m i n o r i t y i n the country,
whereas the Palestinians i n Jerusalem are a m i n o r i t y i n both the
city and the state (Demant, 1997; G u t m a n n & K l e i n , 1980;
R o m a n , 1997a).
Another example of a divided multicultural city that is very dif-
ferent from Jerusalem is M o n t r e a l , Canada's largest municipality.
Metropolitan M o n t r e a l is home to 44 per cent o f the residents o f
the province o f Quebec, where F r e n c h is the language o f law,

administration, and business. T h e metropolitan area also contains

most of the province's E n g l i s h speakers, whose language is that o f
the country's majority. O n the municipal level, M o n t r e a l has a
m i n o r i t y o f English speakers surrounded by a French-speaking
majority o n the provincial level, w h o are themselves surrounded
by E n g l i s h speakers o n the national level. U n l i k e Brussels, where
bilingualism was consolidated after the minority language was
reinforced, M o n t r e a l has seen attrition i n the status o f both lan-
guages. In the one hundred years between 1871 and 1971, w i t h the
influx o f immigrants whose native language was neither English
nor F r e n c h , the percentage o f English speakers i n Montreal
declined from 38 per cent to 26 per cent. That was even though 10
per cent o f the latter were immigrants whose native language is
E n g l i s h . F r e n c h has not fared m u c h better. It has lost about four
per cent of its 64 per cent of speakers, as well as its exclusive status.
Furthermore, European F r e n c h speakers consider Quebecois
F r e n c h inferior, w h i l e the English o f the Canadian English-
speaking majority is considered standard by other speakers o f the
language; its speakers benefit from the increasing dominance o f
English i n the w o r l d and from its proximity to the U n i t e d States.
M o n t r e a l has thus gradually become bilingual and has established
official and unofficial arrangements to institutionalize this. T h e
result is that the points o f dispute between the two linguistic-
cultural groups have been reduced to questions o f detail - for
example, whether the legal primacy o f F r e n c h is compromised i f
children w h o are not native E n g l i s h speakers are allowed to enroll
in English-language schools, or whether the government can dic-
tate the use o f F r e n c h as an official language i n the private sector
( G u t m a n n & K l e i n , 1980). Again, Jerusalem is not a divided city
but rather a frontier city, and despite unofficial and semi-official
arrangements that have developed there, as w i l l be seen below, it is
more different than similar to M o n t r e a l .
There are also several important differences between Jerusalem
and Johannesburg i n South Africa, d u r i n g and after N e l s o n
Mandela's presidency. In Jerusalem the goal o f the regime is to
rule i n the eastern part of the city and to perpetuate Jewish d o m i -
nance. Since 1991, i n contrast, the goal in Johannesburg, where 60
per cent of the population is black and 31 per cent white, has been
to achieve conciliation, to erase the reality o f apartheid and the
geography o f black poverty. As Bollens (Bollens, 1998a) has

shown, a strategy o f aggressive urban planning has developed i n

Jerusalem. In his o p i n i o n , professionals were not disinterested,
and they supplied decision-makers w i t h technical methods o f
annexing the Arab space to Israel and of dominating it. A c c o r d i n g
to Bollens, w h e n professional urban planners became the tools o f
the politicians they were left frustrated and helpless from a profes-
sional point o f view, but at the same time they were proud o f their
contribution to a national goal w i t h w h i c h they identified. In c o n -
trast to the dominance in Jerusalem of the ethnic criterion i n plan-
ning and i n allocation o f resources, i n Johannesburg there has
been an egalitarian planning approach. T h e city was replanned o n
that basis w i t h the blacks empowered, their institutions upgraded,
and their living conditions considerably improved (Bollens,
1998a).
O n the other hand, Jerusalem as a frontier city is not physically
divided, and its two populations are not at war. It is thus distinct
from Belfast o f 1968-98, from Beirut d u r i n g the civil war o f
1975-91, and from N i c o s i a since 1974. Belfast is the principal city
in N o r t h e r n Ireland, containing 23.6 per cent of the inhabitants o f
the province, w h i c h is part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . T h e Irish
Catholics, a quarter o f the city's population, have wanted to
become part o f the Republic o f Ireland, whereas the Protestant
majority insists o n preserving the ties w i t h L o n d o n . T h i s has led
to a confrontation between Protestants and Catholics o n a l o n g
series o f questions principally involving political loyalty, national
identity, the division o f resources, and equitable political repre-
sentation. D u r i n g the period o f conflict Belfast was polarized and
divided horizontally and vertically; it was impossible to remain
neutral. There was a sharp ecological and institutional separation
between Protestants and Catholics i n their areas o f residence,
employment, and i n the educational system. A r m e d militias and
underground forces took responsibility for defense and public
order, preventing effective action by the municipality. G u t m a n n
and K l e i n concluded i n their study o f Belfast that, w h e n faced
w i t h national-ethnic confrontation, a city cannot be disassociated
from its surroundings. Implicitly referring to Jerusalem M a y o r ,
T e d d y Kollek, G u t m a n n and K l e i n stated that wise m u n i c i p a l
management can reduce tensions, i f only temporarily, but that the
larger conflict w i l l , i n the end, impinge on the city and sweep it
into the struggle. E v e n i f the rule o f the J e w i s h majority i n

Jerusalem was established through democratic procedures and the

majority d i d not overstep itself i n using its power, and even if we
assume that i n the future the structural discrimination against the
Arab m i n o r i t y i n Jerusalem is rectified and the Jewish majority
supplies effective services to the Arab minority and treats it fairly,
the conflict i n Jerusalem w i l l not be resolved. A t most, there w i l l
be a temporary respite. T h e r e w i l l be no peace unless the conflict
is dealt w i t h o n the level o f politics and symbols. In contradiction
o f the Israeli slogans to the effect that Jerusalem has, since 1967,
maintained exemplary J e w i s h - A r a b coexistence under Israeli
rule, Jerusalem cannot be an island o f peace i n a sea o f war
between Israel and the Arabs ( G u t m a n n & K l e i n , 1980). T h e
peace accord i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, signed i n 1998, opens new
opportunities for comparative study o f Belfast and Jerusalem,
especially i f the N o r t h e r n Ireland pact is realized w i t h fewer diffi-
culties than the O s l o accords between Israel and the P L O .
T h e T u r k i s h invasion o f C y p r u s i n 1974 turned N i c o s i a into
the heart o f the conflict between Greece and T u r k e y , a conflict
that has its roots i n the Greek struggle for independence from the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n the 1820s. C y p r u s is not a case o f a politically
divided nation, as Korea is and as were G e r m a n y and Vietnam.
Instead, it suffers from a conflict between two national, ethnic,
and religious communities that involves their connection to their
mother countries, their historical m e m o r y and culture, and to the
control o f financial systems, territory, and resources. N i c o s i a was
first divided by the B r i t i s h military demarcation line o f 1963-64;
the division was perpetuated by the links that T u r k e y established
i n the 1960s w i t h its loyalists i n C y p r u s , and by the provision o f
T u r k i s h services such as drivers' licenses, b u i l d i n g licenses, c o m -
mercial licenses, and postal facilities, as preparation for the possi-
ble failure o f the Greek-dominated federation. Afterwards, a dual
regime was created and, w i t h the T u r k i s h invasion, N i c o s i a was
divided physically into two parts. M a j o r population movements
created large areas o f demographic homogeneity i n Cyprus, and i n
N i c o s i a specifically. T h e two parts o f the,city are divided by
impassable border check posts and there is animosity between the
two national leaderships. N o t o n l y are the languages, the religious
and social institutions, and the regimes different i n the two parts
o f the city, so is collective m e m o r y and public space. Fostering the
expectation that the northern part o f the island w i l l be liberated

from the Turks, the public space i n the south preserves a historical
memory o f the T u r k i s h presence by retaining the names o f parks,
houses, and streets. In the north, i n contrast, there has been a
Turkification and Islamization o f the region, from w h i c h Greek
and Christian markings have been removed. Despite this, N i c o s i a
is not a completed divided city. There is cooperation between the
two municipalities i n certain areas. T h e supply o f electricity to the
north depends o n the Greek-ruled south, the supply o f water to
the south o n the T u r k i s h north. There are c o m m o n sewage,
drainage, and sanitation systems; and there is coordination i n the
planning o f urban space and i n certain health services (Kliot &
Mansfield, 1997). T h e case o f N i c o s i a leads to the conclusion that
a broad and profound conflict that divides a city into two parts,
even physically, does not prevent cooperation i n defined profes-
sional fields. T h e inverse is also true - professional cooperation i n
several areas connected to the j o i n t management o f the m e t r o p o l i -
tan area does not bridge the fissures o f the physically divided city.
Beirut shows that under certain circumstances a multicultural
and heterogeneous city can deteriorate to become a physically
divided city. In the 1960s, Beirut enjoyed economic prosperity
and a cultural flowering. It became a center for many intellectuals
and a focal point for Arab media, literature, and culture. T h e
flourishing economy broke d o w n ethnic divisions; economic l i b -
eralism, as well as a lack o f restriction o n banking activities and o n
political and cultural expression, made Beirut into the Paris and
Geneva o f the M i d d l e East. W h i l e residential patterns were not
based exclusively o n ethnicity, i n many neighborhoods a single
ethnic group had a sizeable majority. Yet i n no few neighborhoods
there were pockets o f different ethnic or religious groups; these
became death traps for outsiders d u r i n g the civil war. U n t i l the
civil war, Beirut reflected the openness o f the entire country and
Lebanon's multicultural character. It demonstrated h o w m e m -
bers o f different religious groups could live i n a c o m m o n political
framework that was culturally progressive and Western i n charac-
ter. Integration i n Beirut was at its strongest i n the city center and
became attenuated towards the periphery. T h e newer neighbor-
hoods o n the city's expanding edge, inhabited mostly by recently
arrived immigrants to the city, were the most segregated. Paradox-
ically, Beirut's prosperity, w h i c h was coterminous w i t h Lebanon's
prosperity, upset the fragile existence o f the city and the state.

Beirut's flowering attracted hundreds o f thousands o f i m m i -

grants, i n c l u d i n g S u n n i M u s l i m s from Syria, M a r o n i t e Christians
from the villages o f M o u n t Lebanon seeking employment and
higher incomes, and Shi'ites from the south w h o were fleeing
from the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. O f course,
there were also numerous Palestinian refugees w h o had fled to the
Lebanese coastal cities and to Beirut i n the wake o f the war o f
1948.
In a census conducted i n 1932, two-thirds o f Beirut's inhabit-
ants were Christians, but Christians were but a narrow majority i n
the country as a whole. T h e results o f this census were used to
establish an ethnic key dividing up the country's positions o f
political power and administration. There had clearly been demo-
graphic changes i n the country since the 1932 census and these
were especially evident i n Beirut, where more and more elements
sought to undermine the existing order. T h e M u s l i m minority
and marginal groups, w h o constituted a demographic majority,
though not officially recognized as such, united i n a bloc that
sought to reallocate the positions o f power and the division o f
resources i n the country. T h e y applied most o f their pressure on
the political, economic, cultural, and symbolic fronts, all of w h i c h
were concentrated i n Beirut. W h e n fighting broke out i n Beirut it
spread from the refugee camps and the poverty belt at the periph-
ery to the urban center. T h e destructive force was so powerful that
it drew i n all the country's ethnic groups, and the war turned into
a battle between sub-groups w i t h i n each o f the communities.
T e r r o r i s m and the geography o f fear became a way o f life (Hanf,
1993: 66, 97, 103-6, 160-8, 194-202, 223, 242-3, 328, 339-47,
357). Beirut showed that multiculturalism and integration cannot
be maintained w h e n separated from their demographic and politi-
cal base. A n arrangement that establishes multiculturalism must
be updated and must answer to the dictates of reality, and the city
must adapt to the political context it finds itself in, lest it pay a
heavy price.
Soft, flexible a n d p e r m e a b l e borders
Jerusalem is the largest city i n the State o f Israel. It has the largest
population, the most Jews and the most non-Jews o f all Israeli
cities. In 1967, i n the wake of the Six Day War, Israel annexed East

Jerusalem and extended the m u n i c i p a l borders ( M a p 1). T h e

annexed territory included not o n l y what had been the Jordanian
sector of the city, w h i c h covered 6.5 square kilometers, but also an
additional 64.4 square kilometers of West B a n k villages and some
land w i t h i n the boundaries o f Bethlehem and Beit Jala. W i t h the
annexations, the Israeli government turned two peripheral cities -
the Jordanian and the Israeli, w h i c h itself covered 38.1 square
kilometers - into the country's largest city w i t h an area o f 108.5
square kilometers. U n t i l then, both cities had been at the end o f
narrow corridors o f territory. T h e Jordanian city had been a
peripheral city, far from the capital i n A m m a n and under its sway.
T h e Israeli capital was located at the end of the Jerusalem corridor,
a narrow strip of land that linked it to the coastal plain and the rest
of the country. A s w i l l be seen below, the change i n the area and
status of Jerusalem had far-reaching consequences. I n 1993 the
city's territory was enlarged still more to 123 square kilometers
(Benvenisti, 1996: 57; C h o s h e n , 1998).
T h e expansion of Jerusalem's geographical and m u n i c i p a l bor-
ders was accompanied by the growth o f its population. In June
1967, following the annexation, Israel conducted a census i n East
Jerusalem. A l l its inhabitants and their children, amounting to
some 66,000 people, received the status o f permanent residents.
O n l y 2,700 to 5,000 East Jerusalem Arabs assumed Israeli citizen-
ship and bear Israeli passports ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 M a y 1996, 28 M a y
1996). M o s t East Jerusalem Arabs rejected the offer o f Israeli c i t i -
zenship, preferring to retain Jordanian citizenship. A s residents o f
Jerusalem they received the right to h o l d Israeli identity cards and
to participate i n municipal elections. B u t they cannot bear Israeli
passports or participate i n Israel's general elections for the Knesset
and prime minister. In 1999 the city's population, according to the
Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, was 645,700, c o m p r i s i n g 10.5
per cent o f the Israeli total. There were 437,400 Jews (67.7 per
cent) and 208,300 non-Jews (32.3 per cent). Table 1.1 presents
data on the city's population.
T h e Jews o f Jerusalem constitute 9.1 per cent o f the J e w i s h
population o f Israel. T h i s is a ratio similar to that o f the inhabit-
ants o f East Jerusalem to the population o f the West B a n k and
Gaza Strip, 8.6 per cent. F o r the most part, the non-Jewish p o p u -
lation of Jerusalem is made up of people w h o are M u s l i m i n reli-
gion and Palestinian Arab i n nationality and culture. In 1997 the

Table 1.1. JERUSALEM'S POPULATION
D a t a of the
Central B u r e a u
D a t a of the Israeli P o p u l a t i o n of Statistics of the
J e r u s a l e m I n s t i t u t e of and Residential Palestinian
Israel Studies, 1997 Census, 1 9 9 5 Authority, 1997
Jews (000s) 421.2 417.1 (426.2*) no data

Arabs (000s) 180.9 182.7 (187.49*) 210.0
Proportion (%) 70:30 68:32 (69:31*) 65:35**
58:42f
Notes
* In parentheses: corrected figures from 1996 as a result of overcounting
** According to the number of Jews given by the Jerusalem Institute
‫ ־]־‬According to the number of Jews given by the Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics
Sources: A l - Q u d s , 26 Feb. 1998, 27 Feb. 1998; Choshen & Shahar, 1998: 30;
Chosen, 1998; State of Israel, Office of the Prime Minister, the Central Bureau
of Statistics, 1998. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
city's M u s l i m inhabitants numbered 164,300, or 90.8 per cent o f

the non-Jewish population. T h e r e were 16,500 Christians, w h o
constituted 9.1 per cent o f the non-Jewish population o f the city
(Choshen, 1998; C h o s h e n & Shachar, 1998: 30). T h e demo
graphic data show that i n the capital o f the State o f Israel there is a
large population, a third o f the city's inhabitants, w h o reject Israeli
citizenship. T h i s constitutes the largest geographical concentra
tion o f the Arab m i n o r i t y i n the entire country.
T h e central principle that guided the authors o f the 1967
annexation was to add as m u c b territory to the city as possible,
i n c l u d i n g strategic high points i n the region, w h i l e at the same
time h o l d i n g the additional Arab population at a m i n i m u m . T h e i r
assumption was that the ethnic-national composition w o u l d
determine whether the annexation w o u l d endure or become
merely a brief episode i n history. T h e ratio o f Jews to Arabs was
74.2 to 25.8 per cent at the time that the annexation boundaries
were drawn. T h e boundaries were drawn* i n accordance w i t h the
above principles, creating a number o f interesting distortions. Set
tlements such as A l - A z a r i a and most o f A b u - D i s i n the east and
H i z m a and A l - Z a ' i m i n the north, only five kilometers from Jeru
salem's city center, remained outside the municipal territory.

U n t i l the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y entered them at the end o f 1995,

A b u - D i s and A l - A z a r i a were under the Israeli civil administration
of Bethlehem, ten kilometers away, w h i l e H i z m a and A l - Z a ' i m
were under the civil administration district o f Ramallah, some 15
kilometers away (Benvenisti, 1996: 47-8, 57-60; C h e s h i n , 1992:
179).
T h e Israeli establishment has m o b i l i z e d itself, since the annex-
ation, to preserve the Jewish demographic advantage. A J e w i s h
majority of 74.2 per cent was almost identical to the situation that
prevailed in Jerusalem w h e n the State of Israel was established. A t
this time, after the first stage o f the war o f 1948, the percentage o f
Jews rose from 66.3 to 74 per cent (Cheshin, 1992). After the
annexation o f 1967 the Israeli authorities hoped to enlarge the
percentage of Jews i n the city to 80 or even 90 per cent by p r o v i d -
ing incentives for them to move to Jerusalem, and by encouraging
a construction b o o m . B u t the hoped-for influx of Jews d i d not
materialize. N o r d i d the idea o f settling large numbers o f i m m i -
grants from the former Soviet U n i o n i n Jerusalem i n the early
1990s produce results. A s early as 1973 the Israeli authorities had
realized that they w o u l d not be able to achieve their objective o f a
significant change i n the demographic balance i n Jerusalem. In
consequence, the government accepted the recommendation o f
an inter-ministerial committee that the goal should be to preserve
a ratio of 74.5 per cent Jews to 25.5 per cent Arabs (State of Israel,
1973: 12). T h i s became the primary justification for the J e w i s h
building b o o m o n the east side o f the city.
Israel's policy meant that the rate of growth of the city's J e w i s h
population had to be brought i n line w i t h the rate o f increase o f
the Arab population, and this demographic imperative took prece-
dence over all other considerations. In this respect it can be said
that Israel d i d not have the success it had hoped for. I n the 31 years
since the annexation, the demographic balance has changed for
the worse for the Jews, whose numbers had declined to 70 per
cent of the city's population by 1997, perhaps even less. M o r e o v e r ,
according to estimates o f the Israeli authorities, there are some
10,000 to 30,000 Arabs living i n East Jerusalem w h o remain
uncounted i n the official figures. T h i s means that the real balance
is even worse for Israel. T w o factors have influenced this. T h e
first is the reversal, since 1988, i n the Jewish i m m i g r a t i o n balance
to Jerusalem. In the five years from 1973 to 1978 and i n the period

from 1979 to 1987, the n u m b e r of Jews c o m i n g to Jerusalem was

larger, o n average, than the number leaving it by some 5,600. B u t
in the decade that followed, 1988-1997, a total o f 35,341 more
Jews moved out o f the city than moved i n - some 6,000 a year.
T h e second factor is the growth o f the Palestinian Arab popula-
tion in Jerusalem. F r o m 1967 to 1995 the Jewish population grew
by 110.9 per cent and the A r a b by 154.2 per cent (Choshen and
Shachar, 1997: 34—5). T h e demographic data has severe implica-
tions for Israel: it represents the failure o f a long-standing policy
in w h i c h the country had invested a great deal of effort, and it cast
doubt o n the state's claim to sovereignty i n East Jerusalem. F o r
this reason the municipality and government ministries have
begun to take steps to reduce the number of Arab residents i n East
Jerusalem (see below).
T h e major factor i n the growth of Jerusalem's Jewish popula-
tion has been the establishment of new neighborhoods i n the east-
ern part o f the city, w h i l e the Arab population has grown as a
result o f natural increase and immigration. Paradoxically, the
b u i l d i n g b o o m and the annexation have abetted the growth of the
Arab population of East Jerusalem. These two factors have turned
East Jerusalem into a metropolitan center, and inhabitants o f the
surrounding area have been drawn to it as settlers or day laborers
in a search for employment. A c c o r d i n g to figures from the m i d -
1980s, w h e n employment of Arabs was at its height, the Bethle-
h e m and Ramallah districts supplied most o f the day laborers to
Jerusalem. O f the West B a n k residents employed i n the capital, 99
per cent came from the two districts ( C o h e n and M a z o r , 1994). A t
the end of the 1980s some 20,000 people from the Jerusalem met-
ropolitan area worked i n the western part o f the city, constituting
some 15 per cent o f the combined J e w i s h - A r a b workforce. In
1994 an estimated 12,000 Arabs were employed by Jews i n the
Jewish part o f the city, making up some 40 per cent o f the Arab
workforce i n Jerusalem ( K i m h i , 1997).
T h e annexation made the economy of East Jerusalem depend-
ent o n resources i n the western part o f the city, such as employ-
ment and income from labor, as w e l l as tourism. In the period o f
Jordanian rule, too, the East Jerusalem economy was based on
commerce, services, and tourism. But, unlike the West Bank,
where a third o f the workforce was employed i n agriculture, i n
Jerusalem a third was employed i n services. A l s o , commercial

Table 1.2. B R E A K D O W N O F T H E W O R K F O R C E B Y S E C T O R (%)
A r a b s i n East Jews i n West

East J e r u s a l e m , Jerusalem, Jerusalem,
1961 1994 1994
Agriculture 1.0
Industry 19.0 16.6 11.0
Construction 7.4 15.6 3.7
Water and sanitation 1.4
Commerce 15.7 22.1 12.4
Transport 5.0 6.9 5.6
Public and private office 33.0 37.8 65.0
workers, banks, services,
and tourism
Other 17.5 1.0 2.3
Sources: Data from the Jerusalem Institute o f Israel Studies, 1996; K i m h i , 1997;
Dumper, 1997: 214-16.
employment was twice as high as i n the West B a n k as a w h o l e

(Dumper, 1997: 214-16). After 1967 the East Jerusalem economy
continued to be based on these activities, but it became dependent
on the Jewish sector for m u c h o f its business. Table 1.2 presents
the breakdown o f the workforce i n Jerusalem, by sector.
T h e workforce i n East Jerusalem is y o u n g - some 79 per cent o f
the workers are between the ages o f 18 and 44 ( C o h e n & M a z o r ,
1994). In the age cohorts o f 25-34 and 45-54 employment is
higher i n the Palestinian district o f Jerusalem (an administrative
unit established by the Palestinian administration that includes
East Jerusalem and outlying areas) than i n other Palestinian
regions (Awartani, 1998). U n l i k e these other districts, the Jerusa-
lem district has fewer employees without formal education (0.5
per cent uneducated, as opposed to 4.3 per cent i n the rest o f the
country) and more w i t h an elementary-level education (31.9 per
cent as opposed to 26.2 per cent) (Awartani, 1998).
A c c o r d i n g to the 1995 data, some 90 per cent o f the employed
i n Jerusalem are wage earners, both among Jews and Arabs. B u t
the Jewish rate o f participation i n the workforce is higher than that
o f the Arabs - 53.2 per cent o f Jews as opposed to a range o f 35.3
per cent to 36.1 per cent among Arabs. A n even larger gap between
Jews and Arabs is evident i n the unemployment rate: 5.3 per cent
ofjews as opposed to a rate ranging from 10.9 per cent to 11.1 per

cent for Arabs. T h i s gap is largely due to the fact that the supply o f
workplaces for Arabs in Jerusalem is smaller than that for Jews, and
because the rate o f participation o f Arab w o m e n is m u c h smaller
than that of Jewish w o m e n (Friedman, 1998). According to Samir
H a z b o u n , the 1995 unemployment rate i n the Palestinian district
of Jerusalem was 15 per cent, and the rate o f participation i n the
workforce i n this district was 37 per cent (Hazboun, 1998).
E m p l o y m e n t for Arabs i n Jerusalem's Jewish sector is i n blue-
collar fields such as construction, automobile repair, sanitation,
and cleaning. In these fields, y o u t h is an advantage, and an aca-
demic education is not required. T h e incomes o f workers i n the
Jewish sector are higher than those of persons w h o are employed
in East Jerusalem and they are high i n comparison to what they
were i n the past. B u t the Arabs nevertheless earn less, and have
lower status, than do Jews i n the same fields. In part this is because
the Jews are generally on a higher professional and management
level than they are. T h e informal relations between worker and
employee i n the west are also very m u c h affected by ethnic affilia-
tion and by the inferior political status o f the Palestinians
(Benvenisti, 1996: 153-4).
T h e fact that Jerusalem is an open city has an effect on the
incomes o f the Arabs w h o live there. Tourists can move freely
from one side o f the city to the other, creating mutual, though
asymmetric, dependence between J e w i s h and Arab service pro-
viders i n this field. T h e strong Israeli sector needs Arab manual
laborers, and the Arabs are dependent o n incomes from
workplaces i n Jewish Jerusalem. A s a result, the average daily
income i n the Palestinian district of Jerusalem is higher than i n
the rest o f the West B a n k and Gaza Strip; i n 1997 - N I S ( N e w
Israeli Shekels) 82.6 in Jerusalem as opposed to N I S 61 elsewhere
(Awartani, 1998). M o r e o v e r , the health and welfare services that
residents o f East Jerusalem receive from Israel leave them w i t h
more take-home income than the Palestinians w h o are living
under the Palestinian Authority. E v e n though inhabitants of East
Jerusalem constitute only 8.6 per cent o f the Palestinian popula-
tion i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip, the income per person i n
East Jerusalem is 55 per cent higher than i n the West B a n k and 70
per cent higher than i n the Gaza Strip. It is, however, some 20 per
cent lower than incomes i n Israel (Jerusalem Institute o f Israel
Studies 1996).

Indices o f local production also underline the economic

dependence o f Arab Jerusalem o n J e w i s h Jerusalem. T h e gross
local product i n the Palestinian district of Jerusalem is more than
13 per cent higher than i n other Palestinian districts. T h e p r i n c i -
pal sectors on w h i c h the gross local product is based i n the Jerusa-
lem district consist o f services, 23 per cent i n 1995; real estate and
business services, 18.3 per cent; and manufacturing, 15 per cent
(Hazboun, 1998; Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, 1996). T h e
economic dependence of Jerusalem's Arabs o n the income that
they receive from Jewish Jerusalem is particularly evident i n the
tourism sector. B y the number of direct employers such as hotels,
tour guides, travel agencies, and so on, and indirect employers
such as stores and vendors, this is the largest employment sector
in East Jerusalem. B u t tourism i n East Jerusalem also depends o n
west Jerusalem. T h e number of hotel rooms i n East Jerusalem has
not grown since 1967 from 2,061, w h i l e i n the J e w i s h sector the
number o f rooms increased from 1,193 i n 1967 to 6,500 i n 1997.
D u r i n g this period the number o f travel agencies i n East Jerusa-
lem declined from 46 to 36, w h i l e in Jewish Jerusalem it rose from
35 to 436 (Hazboun, 1998). Palestinian dependence o n tourism
and o n w o r k i n Jewish Jerusalem has direct implications for
public security. Hamas, the M u s l i m fundamentalist movement,
has not been, for the most part, active in Jerusalem i n a direct way.
T h e terrorist acts it has perpetrated in Jewish Jerusalem have been
carried out not by Hamas activists from Jerusalem but rather by
outside agents infiltrated into the city w i t h the help o f local
confederates.
In addition to applying Israeli law and administration, Israel has
conducted a large-scale construction operation surrounding the
Arab city w i t h the goals of establishing control over the mountain
ridges that circle East Jerusalem and creating an irreversible
demographic change i n the former Jordanian area of Jerusalem.
Israel has maintained that control of the territory requires control
of the ridges, the blocking of Arab construction, bringing as many
Jewish settlers as possible to the former Jordanian area, and the
connection o f the new Jewish neighborhoods to the heart o f the
Western city w i t h a well-developed road system. These goals have
indeed been realized. W h i l e Israel continues to strive to achieve a
belt o f contiguous built-up areas around East Jerusalem, it has
succeeded i n l i n k i n g the new neighborhoods to the city center i n

terms o f demographics and transportation. T h i s makes up, to

some extent, for the fact that they are residential areas rather than
sources of employment, commerce, culture, and leisure activities.
In 1995, 55 per cent of Jerusalem's inhabitants were living i n the
part of the city that was annexed i n 1967. O f this number, 48.9 per
cent (125,000) were Jews. M o s t of them lived i n the new satellite
neighborhoods that Israel had built around the Arab city. In other
words, the city's population was equally divided between the
former Jordanian territory and Israel's pre-1967 city, and i n the
former Jordanian areas there was roughly an equal number o f
Jews and Arabs. T h i s silver l i n i n g was, however, beclouded. Israel
still has not succeeded i n breaking d o w n the religious, national,
and ethnic dividing lines between Jews and Arabs i n the eastern
city. T h e new Jewish neighborhoods are functionally part of west
Jerusalem, w h i l e East Jerusalem is an Arab city. Jewish residents
o f the Arab neighborhoods enjoy the benefit o f a road system
that links t h e m to west Jerusalem w h i l e c i r c u m v e n t i n g the A r a b -
populated areas. Arab inhabitants use a separate road system to
l i n k them w i t h their o w n compatriots. Geographically and topo-
graphically (with its c o m m a n d o f the heights), the Jewish pres-
ence beyond the June 4, 1967 borders is massive, dominant and
expressive of ownership. Israel has w o n Jerusalem w i t h construc-
tion, but victory is imperfect. T h e two populations on the eastern
side o f the city do not m i x , nor is the m i n o r i t y assimilating into
the majority.
T h e Israeli national government and the municipality have
employed a variety o f bureaucratic and administrative devices to
stamp Jerusalem as a J e w i s h city. I n M a r c h 1973 the Israel Lands
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n established a unit called Igum, whose goal in J e r u -
salem was to crack the nut of A r a b - M u s l i m residency i n the O l d
C i t y by purchasing properties that w o u l d become Jewish-Israeli
public institutions and a counterweight to M u s l i m and Christian
institutions i n the O l d C i t y . Igum purchased property from p r i -
vate individuals via straw m e n w h o presented themselves as
having a purely private interest i n the property. In contrast w i t h
actions taken by the L i k u d governments o f the 1980s and m i d -
1990s, Igum d i d not intend to purchase residential units i n order
to house individuals, since Labor governments and M a y o r Teddy
K o l l e k pursued a policy o f separation between Jewish and Arab
residential areas. Igum had only partial success i n Jerusalem, i n

contrast w i t h extensive purchases it made i n the West Bank. W h e n

the L i k u d came into power i n 1977, the unit's activity came almost
to a halt. There was no need for a government agency to continue
the purchases because the L i k u d governments allowed Jews to
privately purchase land and houses i n the Arab part o f the city, and
to live on property there owned by the state (Kol H a - I r , 2 9 N o v .
1996). H o w e v e r , organizations that established a goal o f settling i n
the Palestinian neighborhoods o f East Jerusalem copied Igum's
methods. A committee headed by M i n i s t r y o f Justice D i r e c t o r -
General H a i m K l u g m a n , revealed that the private organizations
that operated i n East Jerusalem until the beginning o f the 1990s
cooperated w i t h officials i n the M i n i s t r y o f C o n s t r u c t i o n and
H o u s i n g , the municipality, the Israel Lands Administration, the
Office o f the Trustee o f Abandoned Properties, the J e w i s h
National F u n d , and the M i n i s t r y of Justice. Illegally, and w i t h o u t
any oversight, these bodies had handed money and buildings over
to the settlement organizations and granted t h e m additional bene-
fits as well ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 M a y 1998, 29 M a y 1998).
T h e Israeli construction operation could not have been accom-
plished without large-scale land confiscation from the Arabs. A
confiscation of lands and assets i n M a y 1968 was intended to allow
construction o f the new Israeli neighborhoods o f R a m o t E s h k o l
and French H i l l , and to expand the J e w i s h Quarter o f the O l d
C i t y . It is interesting that the initial Israeli expansion plan was
similar to that conceived by the Z i o n i s t movement and the y o u n g
State o f Israel - l i n k i n g west Jerusalem to M o u n t Scopus via
French H i l l and Ramot E s h k o l , and p r o v i d i n g a firm foundation
for the O l d City's J e w i s h Quarter. E v e n earlier, a few days after
the O l d C i t y was occupied, Israel had demolished the M u g h r a b i
neighborhood that adjoined the Western W a l l . T h i s action had a
functional goal - creating a large open space for prayer and mass
events i n front o f the W a l l . Y e t it was no less intended to express
Israeli sovereignty and to get rid o f what had been a physical
obstruction to the Jewish sacred site, a h u m i l i a t i n g reminder for
many Jews o f the restrictions imposed on worship there d u r i n g
the Mandatory period. S u r r o u n d i n g East Jerusalem o n all sides
w i t h Jewish neighborhoods came later. It was not until 1970 that
Israel expropriated the land o n w h i c h the neighborhoods o f
Ramot, G i l o , and East Talpiot were built; Pisgat Z e ' e v was
founded on land expropriated by the L i k u d government a decade

later, i n 1980; the land o n w h i c h the neighborhood o f H a r H o m a

is n o w being built was expropriated from Jews and Arabs i n 1991.
Between 1967 and 1994 a total o f 24.8 square kilometers o f land
were expropriated, out o f 70.5 square kilometers annexed by
Israel i n 1967. A l l the expropriated land is i n East Jerusalem, and
80 per cent o f it was taken from Arabs. T h e great majority o f the
Arabs refused to accept compensation, so as not to acknowledge
the legitimacy o f the Israeli move and give it the stamp o f being
final. These Arabs paid a high price for this, because the Israeli
authorities thus d i d not have to pay large sums i n compensation,
making the expropriations m u c h simpler (Ir Shalem, 1998). F r o m
1967 to 1997 there was public construction o f 38,350 housing
units for Jews o n more than 25 per cent o f the area o f East Jerusa-
lem that was expropriated from Arabs (not i n c l u d i n g H a r H o m a ) ;
not a single apartment for Arabs was built on this land. O n l y 8,890
housing units were erected for Arabs d u r i n g this period, amount-
ing to o n l y 12 per cent o f total construction i n the city. O n l y 600
o f these were public housing units for Arabs, built at the begin-
n i n g o f the 1970s (Seideman, 17 A u g . 1997). T h e small scale o f
Arab construction was first and foremost a consequence o f the
political-demographic situation and the subdivision o f ownership
o f Arab land, combined w i t h the lack o f a modern title registry and
the absence o f procedures for unification and reparceling. Also,
the policy o f allocating open public spaces, an accepted practice i n
construction plans i n the Jewish sector, was alien to the Arab
sector. A t the beginning o f the 1990s Arabs i n Jerusalem faced a
shortage o f some 20,000 housing units. Since then there has been
a w i d e n i n g gap i n construction for the city's two populations.
F r o m a multi-year average o f 12 per cent the proportion o f c o n -
struction for Palestinians has declined to 4.8 per cent (B'tselem,
1995: 32-6).
M o r e o v e r , z o n i n g plans have been completed for only 39 per
cent o f the 45.5 square kilometers that were left under Arab o w n -
ership i n East Jerusalem after the expropriations. Since 1967 there
has been no general master plan for the Arab part o f the city, and
this makes it difficult for Palestinians to receive b u i l d i n g permits.
U n t i l the 1980s ad hoc b u i l d i n g permits were granted, and since
then neighborhood z o n i n g plans have been prepared. Yet there is
no master plan integrating the East Jerusalem neighborhoods into
the m u n i c i p a l system that answers the needs o f the population

above the neighborhood level. In addition, 40 per cent o f the

planned area is defined as open space, w i t h less than 37 per cent
designated for housing. In order to actualize residential construc-
tion, some of this land needs plans for unifying and reparceling, a
complex process that takes a great deal o f time because o f the
bureaucratic maze it must go through and the legal problems it
presents. It is also problematic because o f the special conditions i n
East Jerusalem, w h i c h has large areas i n w h i c h there is no m o d e r n
title registry and where not all landowners are registered. T h e res-
idents are not w i l l i n g to acquiesce i n the process o f unifying and
reparceling the land, and many landowners submit objections to
these plans. As a result only 7.3 per cent o f East Jerusalem is, i n
practice, available for construction for Palestinians. T h i s land lies
largely i n built-up areas, concentrated i n a region defined geo-
graphically as "northeast." In terms o f available housing units, it is
generally permitted to build only one or two floors, so, according to
the approved plans, it is possible to add fewer than 5,000 housing
units ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 Jan. 1996; Seideman, 17 A u g . 1997). L o w c o n -
struction density is an aspect o f the building plans for East Jerusa-
lem because of design considerations, a desire to preserve its village
character, and political and demographic considerations - that is, i n
order to keep a lid on the Arab city's population capacity (Ir Shalem,
1998). T h e average housing density i n East Jerusalem is 2.21 hous-
ing units per dunam (quarter acre), as opposed to 6.1 units i n
Jewish areas. It may be concluded that the residents of East Jerusa-
lem are relatively rich i n land, but poor i n floor space ( H a ' a r e t z , 15
Aug. 1995, 3 Sept. 1995,17 Aug. 1997; I r Shalem, 1998).
As noted, Israel imposed b u i l d i n g restrictions o n the Arabs
when it declared available land reserves i n East Jerusalem to be
public or green areas. In most o f the plans, some 40 per cent o f
East Jerusalem is designated as open spaces where construction is
forbidden. There are legitimate planning reasons for leaving this
land open, for example, the desire to preserve valleys as green
space as w e l l as the overall vista o f the O l d C i t y basin, but w i t h o u t
a doubt another reason is the desire to keep control o f the d e m o -
graphic ratio i n Jerusalem (Ir Shalem, 1998) and to ensure land
reserves for construction for Jews. T h e green area i n East Jerusa-
lem covers some 35,000 dunams, and since 1967 the J e w i s h
National F u n d has planted 11 m i l l i o n trees there. In the national
consciousness and according to Israeli m y t h , tree planting is a

central Z i o n i s t ritual, since it points up a contrast w i t h the desert

and the wasteland that symbolizes the Arab area. In response to
Israel's actions, Palestinians i n the West B a n k and Jerusalem envi-
rons began to plant olive trees, w h i c h for them symbolize their
enduring roots i n the land and i n their villages ( C o h e n , 1993: 5-8,
112-31, 186-9).
The story of the b u i l d i n g plan for the northern side of the city,
near the Arab neighborhoods o f Sho'afat and Beit H a n i n a , o n the
last large reserve of land that remained for the growing Arab pop-
ulation, demonstrates very w e l l the Israeli bureaucracy's method.
The municipality prepared the first plan i n 1980, proposing the
construction of 18,000 housing units, but the M i n i s t r y of the Inte-
rior rejected it, as w e l l as a reduced plan for the construction o f
11,500 housing units. In 1991, a plan for erecting only 7,500 units
was approved, at a time w h e n it was generally believed that there
was a shortage o f some 21,000 housing units i n East Jerusalem.
E v e n this m i n i m a l Arab construction program d i d not receive
final approval. Likewise, preparations for drawing up a zoning
plan for the Arab neighborhood of Jabel M u k a b e r began i n the
1980s and the plan was approved i n 1996. A c c o r d i n g to this plan,
70 per cent of neighborhood's land was designated as green areas,
w i t h only 20.5 per cent remaining for construction, most of w h i c h
had already been used. T h e residents o f Jabel M u k a b e r were
allowed to b u i l d only at 25 per cent housing density level at a time
w h e n the adjacent Jewish neighborhood was allowed 140 per cent
( H a ' a r e t z , 6 M a y 1999).
The use of b u i l d i n g plans to block the growth of the Arab pop-
ulation was also demonstrated i n the neighborhoods of U m T u b a
and Sur Bahir. A c c o r d i n g to the initial plans, the housing density
in these neighborhoods was to be 0.6 units per dunam, while the
plans for the adjoining J e w i s h neighborhood, H a r H o m a , stipu-
lated 3.5 units per dunam. T h e construction density assigned to
the Arabs ranged from 10 to 50 per cent, w h i l e Jews were allotted
100 to 200 per cent. It was only i n the wake o f the international
crisis caused by the construction of Har H o m a that percentages i n
one part o f Sur Bahir were raised to 70 per cent. T o put it another
way, the object o f the plans for J e w i s h neighborhoods is to settle
the m a x i m u m n u m b e r o f people o n a given piece o f land, while
for the Arabs it was the precise opposite (Benvenisti, 1996: 132-3;
B'tselem, 1995: 65-81).

T h e restrictions o n the Arabs created a severe housing shortage

in East Jerusalem. In 1995 the average housing density i n East
Jerusalem was twice as high as i n west Jerusalem - 2.1 people per
r o o m i n the Arab sector as opposed to 1.1 i n the J e w i s h sector. In
East Jerusalem, 27.8 per cent o f the Arabs live i n homes where
there are three or more people per r o o m , as opposed to o n l y 2.4
per cent i n Jewish Jerusalem (Benvenisti, 1996: 133; C h o s h e n &
Shachar, 1998: 130; H a ' a r e t z , 17 A u g . 1997). In 1994 only 95
building permits were granted to East Jerusalem Arabs, i n 1995
only 86 permits, and i n 1996 only 108 permits. A l l o f these were
for private construction, and i n the absence o f a z o n i n g plan it
took a very long time to process the requests. In comparison, the
building commission o f the Jerusalem district o f the Palestinian
Authority i n 1996 issued more than 20 permits a week to residents
o f the suburbs o f Jerusalem that are under its j u r i s d i c t i o n
{ H a ' a r e t z , 2 June 1997).
T h e demographic growth o f the city's Arabs, the l o w construc-
tion density that the municipality has approved for them, and the
skyrocketing cost o f housing i n Jerusalem have pressured m e m -
bers o f the Arab middle class to leave the city or to b u i l d illegally.
M a n y Palestinians have moved out o f Jerusalem, converting the
villages at the city's margins into suburbs. T h i s process has been
taking place since 1982. Since that year, most Arab construction i n
the Jerusalem area has been i n its suburbs (between 1967 and 1982
there was large-scale unlicensed construction w i t h i n the city)
( K i m h i , 1997). There are varying estimates o f the number o f P a l -
estinians w h o have moved from Jerusalem into the suburbs.
According to Sabella, between 1967 and 1997, some 12,000 m e m -
bers o f the middle class have moved to the West B a n k or out o f the
country (Sabella, 1997b). A l - N a k h a l estimates 32,000, w h i l e the
conventional estimate i n East Jerusalem is 80,000 (al-Nakhal,
1996: 7, 33; Friedland & Hecht, 1996: 175-92, A R I J 275). T h e
large-scale construction i n the suburbs, w h i c h Israel sees as part o f
the West Bank, has been abetted by the weak enforcement o f reg-
ulations i n these areas, w h i c h were under the control o f the Israel
civil administration. A n o t h e r factor attracting Palestinians f r o m
the city to the suburbs has been the l o w tax rates i n the West B a n k
as compared to Jerusalem and the fact that the cost o f land i n the
suburbs is about a tenth o f that i n the city. T h e demand for hous-
ing and land i n the suburbs has altered the status o f the established

residents. T h e y have enlarged their capital by selling their land for

housing and have thus become middle class, more strongly linked
than i n the past to the urban business and service center. Thus,
Jerusalem's surroundings have become more strongly linked to
the urban focal point, despite the movement to the suburbs. T h e
growth i n the numbers o f former East Jerusalem residents i n the
suburbs has brought about a historic change i n that it has weak
ened the previous connection that the suburbs had w i t h the Arab
cities around Jerusalem. These links were established during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries because o f large movements
from these cities, especially H e b r o n , into Jerusalem and its sub
urbs. T h e migration from H e b r o n began i n the 1920s, at the same
time that East Jerusalem's social, economic, and political elite
‫־‬
were leaving the O l d C i t y for the prestigious new neighborhoods

around it, such as Sheikh Jarah. A n o t h e r wave o f migration from
H e b r o n to Jerusalem occurred after the war o f 1948, w h i c h led
many members o f the o l d elite to move to Jordan's East Bank,
other Arab countries, and to the West. T h e newcomers from
H e b r o n were people o f the lower middle class and below. T h e i r
arrival, along w i t h the arrival o f a large number o f war refugees,
changed the city's character. T h e Hebronites brought w i t h them a
conservative Islamic bent that expressed itself i n things such as
separate M u s l i m social institutions and the use o f customary law
in resolving and mediating civil disputes. O v e r time, the
Hebronites were absorbed into the city, and today they are a sig
nificant component o f the merchant class. T h e i r representatives
have filled key positions i n religious institutions and i n the Jerusa
lem C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e (al-Nakhal, 1994; Z i l b e r m a n , 1997).
Officially, there was no change i n Jerusalem's demographic
balance as a result o f this movement to the suburbs because the
new residents d i d not declare their change o f address. T h e y
wished to continue to receive the benefits they were entitled to as
residents o f Israel, especially social security payments, health
insurance, and free passage d u r i n g closures. These were rights
they w o u l d have lost i f they had changed their status to that of res
idents o f the West B a n k (Cheshin, 1992:•• 182-4). Moreover, it is
reasonable to assume that immigrants from the West Bank were
filling the v a c u u m left by the emigrants. B y one estimate, there
were about 10,000 such immigrants (B'tselem, 1995: 31;
Z i l b e r m a n , 1997). A c c o r d i n g to unofficial estimates i n Israel,

some 20,000 people returned from the West B a n k to live i n East

Jerusalem, making houses more crowded and providing an i m p e -
tus for illegal construction. A c c o r d i n g to Palestinian estimates,
some 30,000 people were involved ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 June 1998; K o l
H a - I r , 22 Aug. 1997; Rubinstein, 12 Feb. 1998).
As noted, along w i t h the migration to the suburbs, East Jerusa-
lem began to see a rise i n illegal construction. Yisrael K i m h i of the
Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies compared aerial photographs
from 1968 and 1995 as w e l l as figures provided by the m u n i c i p a l -
ity and reached the conclusion that, d u r i n g this period, the
number o f homes i n East Jerusalem has nearly doubled. H i s fig-
ures do not include the O l d C i t y and the neighborhood of Silwan,
where buildings are not easily discernible i n aerial photographs.
D u r i n g this period 13,600 houses were added to the 8,890 houses
that existed i n 1968 i n East Jerusalem and a belt o f about three
kilometers around it. O n average, 2,000 new houses were built
each year. A c c o r d i n g to K i m h i , this is the equivalent o f about
15,000 housing units; Ir Shalem says it equals 12,500 housing
units. Since 1968, K i m h i found that 40 per cent o f the construc-
tion starts were i n areas around the O l d C i t y , such as Isawiya,
Silwan, and Ras a l - A m u d ; 30 per cent were i n the northern part o f
the city; 20 per cent i n the south and 10 per cent i n Beit Safafa. B u t
in recent years construction starts have been concentrated solely
in the city's north, and i n northern Jerusalem there is a contiguous
Arab built-up area reaching to Ramallah ( H a ' a r e t z , 6 June 1997;
K i m h i , 1997). In the absence of b u i l d i n g permits, and for nation-
alistic reasons, Arab construction has been w i t h o u t legal sanction.
It should be noted that illegal construction is widespread, too,
because of a desire to save the time required for completion of the
bureaucratic procedures, and the fees involved. In the areas where
there is a master plan, the policy of the municipality and the courts
is to "grandfather" i n this construction i n exchange for a fine that
is smaller than the fees (Ir Shalem, 1998; S h a l o m Goldstein to the
author, October 1998). Israel cannot entirely prevent illegal c o n -
struction. It cannot demolish it all, but neither can it be ignored.
Israeli government authorities have sounded the alarm - M a y o r
O l m e r t claimed that between the summers o f 1995 and 1997 the
city identified 2,600 violations; the M i n i s t r y of the Interior i n M a y
1996 announced the discovery o f an additional 1,291 violations
( H a ' a r e t z , 25 M a r c h 1997, 9 A p r i l 1997,20 M a y 1997,1 J u n e 1997,

6June 1997, 2 3 J u l y 1997). But, paradoxically, the higher the esti-

mate o f illegal construction, the deeper the bankruptcy o f Israeli
policy, w h i c h has sought to preserve the 1967 demographic ratio.
Despite Israel's original intentions, Palestinian construction has
turned into a burden that the country does not k n o w h o w to bear.
It is important to note that the municipal boundary that Israel
established i n 1967 is different from the metropolitan boundary as
defined by the geographic distribution of the population and by its
economic, employment, and transportation networks. T h e legal
boundary established by the Israeli annexation is sharply defined,
but there are defacto boundaries that are more numerous and less
sharp. Since 1967 Jerusalem has been a focus o f employment,
shopping, commerce, services, leisure, and education for a large
population that lives i n the area around it, from the outskirts o f
H e b r o n i n the south to those o f Ramallah i n the north and from
the edge of Jericho i n the East to Beit Shemesh i n the West. T h e
annexation o f East Jerusalem has helped turn Jerusalem into a
metropolis.
O v e r the years the June 4, 1967 line, w h i c h divided the city
physically and politically, has become smudged, as has the annex-
ation line that Israel established just a few days later. T h e extent to
w h i c h the annexation has become a fact of daily life is testified to
by the fact that even Palestinians recognize the Israeli definition o f
Jerusalem. A c c o r d i n g to a public o p i n i o n poll conducted i n m i d -
1996, nearly 30 years after the annexation, 69 per cent of the Pales-
tinians consider the Jewish neighborhoods built i n the eastern
part o f the city after 1967 to be part of East Jerusalem, and 84 per
cent also include the Palestinian villages that Israel annexed, but
w h i c h were not included w i t h i n the city's boundaries before
1967. A m o n g the residents o f East Jerusalem, the findings are
even clearer: 74 per cent o f them consider the new Jewish neigh-
borhoods to be part o f the city, and 91 per cent also include the
Palestinian residential areas that were annexed after 1967 (Segal,
1997: 39-42; Segal & Sa'id, 1997: 37). Day-to-day reality has thus
vanquished the law books, and it has blurred Israel's annexation
lines. T h e border set by Israel i n 1967 d i d not encompass the
functional space o f Jerusalem, nor d i d it match the consciousness
o f many Palestinians. E v e n though Israel's annexation is o f ques-
tionable status under international law ( B l u m , 1971; B l u m , 1972-
73; B'tselem, 1997: 2 0 - 3 ; Dinstein, 1971; Lapidot, 1997; Lustick,

1997), daily life has functionally expanded the city's borders, and
this i n fact is the perception o f Israelis, as well as that o f most P a l -
estinians, especially those w h o live i n Jerusalem.
T h e most obvious fissure i n Jerusalem is the national-ethnic
divide between Jews and Arabs. T h i s cleavage spans not only the
city itself, but also the metropolitan area. W h i l e extensive data
concerning this divide are lacking, an observer o f the functioning
of the Jerusalem area w o u l d conclude that the city's metropolitan
services and activities are divided geographically and ethnically.
T h e public transportation lines from H e b r o n and Ramallah lead
to the central bus station at the N a b l u s Gate i n East Jerusalem,
while the bus lines that serve the Israeli settlements extend to the
central bus station i n west Jerusalem. Jews refrain from using the
Arab transportation system because its destinations are not theirs.
In contrast, Arabs w h o have no car and find that Arab public trans-
portation does not go to their destinations make use of the J e w i s h
public bus system to get to and from work, despite periodically
having to undergo security checks w h e n traveling o n a Jewish bus
(al-Nakhal, 1993). T h e interaction between the two ethnic groups
in the metropolitan area is very similar to the relationship that
exists between them i n the city itself, where there is, for all practi-
cal purposes, a division between east and west.
F r o m the point o f view o f the Palestinians, the importance o f
the metropolitan area increases w h e n one considers demography,
because Arab Jerusalem w i t h i n the Israeli m u n i c i p a l boundaries
contains only 30 per cent of the total number of Arabs i n the met-
ropolitan area. In contrast, i n the area extending f r o m Ramallah i n
the north to Bethlehem i n the south and from M a ' a l e h A d u m u m
in the east and the June 4, 1967 border i n the west, the Arab and
Jewish populations are almost equal. In 1992, the Jerusalem met-
ropolitan area contained 489,000 Jews and 467,000 Arabs. T h e
Arabs become a majority i f the area is expanded to include G u s h
E t z i o n i n the south, Jericho i n the east, Shilo i n the north, and Beit
Shemesh i n the West ( C o h e n & M a z o r , 1994; Hasson, 1997).
Ma'aleh A d u m i m , Beitar, Efrat, and Beit Shemesh are highly
dependent o n Jerusalem, but Bethlehem, Beit Jallah, and
Ramallah have developed as independent Palestinian cities o n the
margins of the metropolitan area. H o w e v e r , the existence of inde-
pendent, important Arab cities o f distinct character o n the edges
of the East Jerusalem metropolitan area poses no challenge to East

Jerusalem's pre-eminence i n Palestine eyes. M o s t of the Palestin-

ian elites are concentrated i n East Jerusalem: the religious elite,
the W a q f administration (which governs Islamic holy places and
properties, and w h i c h is a wealthy and powerful religious, eco-
n o m i c , and social organization), the central Palestine cultural
institutions, and the important political institutions. East Jerusa-
lem links the northern West B a n k to the southern West Bank, and
A m m a n , the capital o f the K i n g d o m of Jordan, to Gaza, i n w h i c h
the offices of the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y are located.
T h e lengthy closure that Israel has, since 1993, imposed on the
West B a n k and Gaza Strip severely hindered operations i n the East
Jerusalem metropolitan area. T h e closure lines were almost iden-
tical to Jerusalem's municipal boundaries, w i t h the exception that
the Atarot airport was left outside the city for this purpose. T h e
closure cut East Jerusalem o f f from the interior and the suburbs,
and triply hurt the Palestinians i n Jerusalem. First, just as Jewish
Jerusalem is not industrial, so East Jerusalem is a city o f services,
public offices, and commerce, and the closure cut off its ties w i t h
the larger area it serves. C l o s e to 90 per cent o f the employees o f
large East Jerusalem workplaces, such as the Arab electric c o m -
pany, the A l - M a g a s e d Hospital, and the W a q f offices are Palestin-
ians w h o live outside the city. These institutions could not
function properly because o f the inability o f employees to get to
w o r k regularly. Second, there was a loss of income because of the
b l o w to the tourist industry delivered by the terrorist attacks o f
Hamas, the M u s l i m extremist group, i n the winter o f 1996 and
the summer of the following year. T h i r d , the level of services and
income for the residents of the suburbs was also severely affected.
As a way o f overcoming at least some o f these problems, several
East Jerusalem companies opened branches i n those parts o f the
West B a n k close to the city. T h e Arab electric company opened
branches i n Ramallah and Bethlehem i n mid-1996, and East J e r u -
salem professional people d i d the same. Since clients could not get
to the offices of their lawyers, doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and
accountants, the professionals went to their clients. O w n e r s o f
restaurants and halls understood that if one had a w e d d i n g i n East
Jerusalem the guests from the rest of the West B a n k w o u l d not be
able to attend, so facilities were established i n the suburbs, i n the
neighborhoods of A l - R a m and Dahiat al-Barid, to w h i c h people
could get w i t h o u t a special permit. Transportation services also

The Arena: a Frontier City 37
had to adjust. T h e number of people using the central bus station

at the N a b l u s Gate, the major business center i n East Jerusalem,
declined by 60 per cent. T h e result o f this was that the surround-
ing businesses, w h i c h had benefited from the influx o f travelers,
were also severely affected.• A t the beginning o f 1996, improvised
bus stations were set up next to the Israeli roadblocks i n the south,
east, and north of Jerusalem, w h i c h compensated i n part for the
central station i n the city center. T h e closure also hurt the resi-
dents o f the suburbs that depend on the city. T h e y found it diffi-
cult to maintain their connections w i t h the city center. F o r this
reason, many o f them circumvented the roadblocks, and only a
few sought alternative employment or services i n the nearby P a l -
estinian cities, Ramallah and Bethlehem ( F l a ' a r e t z , 2 6 M a r c h
1998; Rubinstein, 19 Sept. 1996). B u t one central facility c o u l d
not be transferred elsewhere - the M u s l i m sacred center o f al-
H a r a m al-Sharif, the T e m p l e M o u n t . T h e sanctity of Jerusalem
for Islamic believers could not change because of the closure. O n
the contrary, Israeli policy induced Palestinian M u s l i m s to rally
around holy places as evidence of the Palestinian-Arab identity o f
East Jerusalem, w h i c h they insisted could not and should not be
abandoned. T h i s explains the extreme sensitivity o f the Palestin-
ians and the Arab states at the opening of the Western W a l l T u n n e l
in September 1996 (see chapter 7), and the fact that 250,000 M u s -
lims took part i n the prayer service o n the last Friday of Ramadan
in the Al-Aqsa mosque. Israel acted w i t h restraint and overlooked
the entrance into Jerusalem o f masses o f worshippers without
permits and w i t h disturbances from the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
lands, as Israel had done during the previous Fridays of Ramadan.
Aside from the effects o f the closure, the entry o f the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y into Ramallah i n December 1995 led to increased
status for the Ramallah/Al-Bireh region. Ramallah became a city
of offices, commerce, culture, art, and leisure, and i n several ways
an alternative center to Jerusalem. Central offices of the Palestin-
ian Authority dealing w i t h the affairs of the West B a n k were estab-
lished i n Ramallah. T h e Legislative C o u n c i l convenes there at
regular intervals, and the police and security services have their
main offices there. T w o daily newspapers put out by the A u t h o r -
ity are published i n Ramallah: A l - A y a m and A l - H a y a t a l - J a d i d a .
T h e large Arab banks i n the A u t h o r i t y have located their adminis-
trative offices i n Ramallah, as have insurance and financial firms.

Bir Z e i t U n i v e r s i t y , near A l - B i r e h , attracts y o u n g people from

around the West B a n k and Gaza Strip, and the city also houses
three teachers' colleges. T h i s transformation of Ramallah into the
administrative and financial center of the West Bank has brought
about immediate economic results, an increase i n employment
and income. Between December 1995 and the summer o f 1996, a
total o f 669 new companies and businesses opened; restaurants,
coffee houses, bakeries, supermarkets, and even a small industrial
zone have been established (Algazi, 19 Aug. 1998; Litani, 3 Sept.
1996; Rubinstein, 27 O c t . 1995).
T h e developments surveyed so far emphasize from two points
of v i e w the importance of the political dimension i n shaping Jeru-
salem's boundary lines. First, the entrance o f the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y into cities bordering on Jerusalem to the south - B e t h -
lehem - and north — Ramallah — has curtailed East Jerusalem's
metropolitan operations and the extent o f its influence. Second,
the closure line is not simply a m u n i c i p a l boundary but also a
political one, m a r k i n g the area of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem.
T h e damage the closure has caused to the Palestinian status of East
Jerusalem serves the purposes o f the Israeli government. W h i l e
closure was not imposed for this purpose, the longer it has lasted
the more have the Palestinians come to perceive this as the major
reason for its persistence. T r u e , the people of East Jerusalem have
not abandoned their desire to become part o f the Palestinian
Authority, nor have they accepted the Israeli annexation, but their
connections w i t h the Palestinian hinterland have been loosened
and have been made more difficult than they were i n the past. T h e
pressure o n the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem has increased and
they have found themselves caught between, o n the one hand, the
annexation line and the closure that has cut them off from the
West Bank, and o n the other, the national-ethnic line that divides
the city.
E v e r since Israel and the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y began imple-
m e n t i n g the O s l o agreements i n M a y 1994, the political map o f
Jerusalem and its environs has changed. U n t i l then there was a
single border as far as Israel was concerned, the annexation
boundary w h i c h was also the Jerusalem municipal limit. T h e
establishment of the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and its penetration into
Jerusalem made the Jerusalem political border less than straight-
forward. Officially, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y is forbidden to

operate w i t h i n Israeli Jerusalem, but as w i l l be s h o w n below the

Authority has found ways of circumventing this prohibition, and
this has brought into sharper relief the political-national b o u n d -
ary line that passes through the city. Alongside this boundary,
additional boundary lines have been added - electoral district lines
for the Palestinian Authority's legislative c o u n c i l and the Palestin-
ian administrative district ( M u h a f z a t A l - Q u d s ) of Jerusalem. These
two lines coincide and are identical w i t h those o f the Jerusalem
district ( L i w a A l - Q u d s ) that existed w h e n East Jerusalem and the
West Bank were under Jordanian sovereignty ( M a p 1).
T h e O s l o II agreement, signed i n September 1995, divides the
Jerusalem area into four zones o f control. T h e Israeli zone
includes the city of Jerusalem and Israeli settlements around it.
T h e Palestinian area is divided into Zones A and B . Z o n e A is
under complete Palestinian control, i n c l u d i n g the cities of J e r i -
cho, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Ramallah, and A l - B i r e h , w h i c h are o n
the periphery o f the Jerusalem area. I n Z o n e B the Palestinians
have civil and police control, w h i l e Israel has the overriding
responsibility for security. Z o n e B includes villages that are, i n
terms o f urban geography, suburbs o f Jerusalem, such as A l -
Azaria, A b u D i s , and H i z m a . A large block o f territory defined as
Z o n e B lies to the east and southeast of Jerusalem and extends,
unbroken, from A l - A z a r i a to the outskirts o f Bethlehem. In the
north, by contrast, there are o n l y small islands o f Z o n e B , reaching
to Ramallah. T h e neighborhood of A l - R a m to Jerusalem's north
is split. Its eastern part is i n Z o n e B , its center i n Z o n e A , and the
neighborhood's western part, adjacent to the main road leading to
the Atarot airport, has a special status since the airport is w i t h i n the
city limits. Between the different islands o f Z o n e B that dot the
suburbs of the Jerusalem metropolitan area lie swathes of Z o n e C .
Its size, and the powers the Palestinians are to receive there, are
subject to additional negotiation ( M a p 2). In the wake of the O s l o
accords the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y made East Jerusalem part o f its
District ( m u h a f a z a ) of Jerusalem, w h i c h is one o f the nine Pales-
tinian administrative districts o f the West Bank. In 1995 A l - R a m
was accorded special status for the purposes of planning and c o n -
struction, but the rest o f the regions i n the Jerusalem area
remained subject directly to the District P l a n n i n g C o m m i t t e e i n
A b u - D i s , whose members include representatives from East J e r u -
salem (Choshen et al., 1998).

O n e important aspect o f the O s l o II agreement was that it

defined parts o f the Jerusalem area as Zones B and C . T h e O s l o
agreements prohibit, at Israel's insistence, the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity from operating in Jerusalem, but from the Palestinian point o f
view, Zones B and C , and even more so the Palestinian cities i n
Z o n e A , are j u m p i n g - o f f points or anchors to w h i c h East Jerusa-
lem can be attached i n the lead-up to discussions over the perma-
nent settlement. T h i s is the essence o f Israel's motivation to
establish the H a r H o m a neighborhood as a wedge between the
A l - A z a r i a / A b u - D i s block and Bethlehem. Furthermore, i n N o r t h
Jerusalem, the area w i t h the land reserves for Palestinian c o n -
struction, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y has not achieved territorial
contiguity between the regions under its control. Also, the A and
B zones have cut off Jerusalem from the settlements o n its south-
ern periphery, from Efrat and G u s h E t z i o n , w h i c h according to
the Israeli plan are supposed to be part of an Israeli-ruled Greater
Jerusalem. T h e l i n k w i t h M a ' a l e h A d u m i m to the east has also
been narrowed because o f the assignment o f the A l - A z a r i a block
to Z o n e B . F o r this reason the municipality is trying to launch a
construction plan and to expropriate land from the Arabs i n order
to create a physical connection between M a ' a l e h A d u m i m and the
new J e w i s h neighborhoods i n the eastern part o f the city (see
map). Finally, the line that the map shows is temporary i n nature
and cannot be made permanent. T h e O s l o II lines make it difficult
for inhabitants o f the Arab space, w h i c h from an urban point o f
v i e w had previously functioned as a single unit, to live as they used
to live. F o r example, the border between Israeli Jerusalem and the
Palestinian district of Jerusalem runs straight through the neigh-
b o r h o o d o f al-Sawahra. T h e residents find this unacceptable,
especially w i t h regard to the closure, w h i c h prevents residents o f
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y from entering the city (Benvenisti, 2
N o v . 1995; Rubinstein, 15 O c t . 1995).
Jerusalem thus has ethnic-national, demographic, political,
and metropolitan borders. Since it is o n the frontier, the border-
lines divide the city and also enclose it. O n the face of it, this m u l -
tiplicity of borderlines should intensify the conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians, but i n fact it moderates the conflict. Instead
of a single deep fissure i n a single place, the Israelis and the Palestin-
ians have, unintentionally, made the national-ethnic-geographic
confrontation r u n along several faults. A s w i l l be shown below,

this division of the borders cushions rather than sharpens the c o n -

flict. T h e borderlines i n Jerusalem are permeable, soft, and
flexible.
The d i v i s i o n of J e r u s a l e m . A borderline has r u n through Jerusalem

ever since the prospective Jewish state appeared o n the h o r i z o n .
As early as 1937, w h e n the Peel C o m m i s s i o n discussed the parti-
tion of Palestine between Jews and Arabs, it was clear to the Z i o n -
ist leadership that Jerusalem w o u l d be a frontier city. T h e
leadership reasoned that there was no escaping a division o f the
city between the two states that w o u l d be established i n Palestine,
and it submitted to the Peel C o m m i s s i o n a plan for the partition
of Jerusalem. T h e dividing lines i n the Zionist plan were geo-
graphic, ethnic-national, and functional-religious. Geographically,
the Zionist leadership supported separating the eastern city from
the western city, w i t h M o u n t Scopus, where the H e b r e w U n i v e r -
sity and Hadassah Hospital were located, being under Israeli sov-
ereignty. Ethnically, its proposal was to separate the Jews and the
Arabs, w i t h the Jews becoming citizens of the Jewish state even i f
they remained i n the eastern - Arab - part o f the city. F u n c -
tionally-religiously, the Z i o n i s t leadership proposed giving the
holy places international status (Golani, 1994: 3 2 - 3 ; G o l a n i , 1998:
268-72). T h e proposal was indicative o f the t h i n k i n g and p r i o r i -
ties that guided its formulators. W i n n i n g control o f the J e w i s h
population and establishment of the state were more important to
the Zionists than sovereignty over the territory of East Jerusalem.
Moreover, title to M o u n t Scopus was more vital than sovereignty
on the T e m p l e M o u n t (Paz, 1997). T h e symbols o f Z i o n i s m , its
culture, and the desire to establish a state took precedence over the
Jewish symbols i n Jerusalem. T h e dominant part o f the leader-
ship, headed by B e n - G u r i o n , was prepared to give up the O l d
C i t y and historic Jerusalem i n order to establish a state w i t h N e w
Jerusalem as its capital. In principle, this was the policy that Israel
followed until 1967 (Golani, 1998: 270).
T h e Palestinians and the British rejected the partition plan.
T h e mufti of Jerusalem, Haj A m i n al-Husseini, made Jerusalem
and its religious significance for Islam the focus of a political c o n -
frontation w i t h Z i o n i s m ; he and the rest of the Palestinian leader-
ship wanted a unitary state ruled by an Arab majority. Britain
w o u l d not agree to parcel out the C h r i s t i a n sites i n the H o l y Land,

and so abdicate entirely its imperial status. T h e Peel C o m m i s s i o n

ruled that Jerusalem and Bethlehem w o u l d remain under the
British Mandate, as w e l l , perhaps, as Nazareth and the Sea o f G a l i -
lee. Likewise, the Peel C o m m i s s i o n proposed that Jerusalem and
Bethlehem be given an eastern corridor leading to the Dead Sea
and the Jordanian emirite, later to be the Hashemite K i n g d o m o f
Jordan. T h e holy cities' principal ties w o u l d be to Jordan and not
to the Jewish state to be established to their west (Laqueur &
R u b i n , 1995: 48). Between 1937 and 1967 the two generally
accepted alternatives regarding Jerusalem were the international-
ization o f the city or the partition o f it.
A t first, internationalization was considered the better option.
T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s c o m m i s s i o n o f i n q u i r y o n Palestine,
U N S C O P , established i n M a y 1947, and w h i c h at the end o f
August submitted its recommendations to the U N General
Assembly, d i d not accept the Z i o n i s t position that West Jerusa-
l e m s h o u l d be under Israeli sovereignty and East Jerusalem
under international rule. T h e recommendation o f the majority
was to divide Palestine into two states, J e w i s h and Arab, and to
put Jerusalem i n its entirety under an international regime; a
m i n o r i t y preferred to designate Jerusalem as the capital o f the
independent federal state (Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995: 92-5). T h e
Z i o n i s t leadership had to choose at this early stage between two
options, neither o f them simple - having a J e w i s h state without
Jerusalem or being part o f a Jewish-Arab federal state that
included Jerusalem. In the plan it submitted to U N S C O P , the
Z i o n i s t leadership tried to obtain a part o f the capital, the west-
ern part, w i t h the state. In order to accommodate the interna-
tional institutions, the Z i o n i s t leadership thought it w o u l d be
wise o n its part to propose putting the eastern part o f Jerusalem
under international protection. H o w e v e r , an inequitable pro-
posal o f this sort had no chance.
Getting a state was the most urgent need, especially after the
Holocaust. In order to obtain the support o f the U N General
Assembly for U N S C O P ' s majority opinion, recommending the
partition o f Palestine, the Zionists had to accept the international-
ization ofjerusalem, including Jewish Jerusalem, i n exchange for
international support for a Jewish state. There was no point i n
insisting o n Jerusalem as the capital i f the future o f the state itself
was not ensured. Nevertheless, the Zionists were not prepared to

accept the internationalization plan unilaterally. T h e y w o u l d do

so only i f the Arabs also agreed (Golani, 1994).
O n N o v e m b e r 29, 1947 the U N accepted the majority r e c o m -
mendation, and linked the plan for internationalizing Jerusalem
to the overall solution of the Palestine question. I n that decision to
divide Palestine into Jewish and A r a b states, Resolution 181, the
General Assembly recommended putting Jerusalem under an
international regime sponsored by the U N . T h i s regime was
meant to ensure the demilitarization and neutrality of Jerusalem,
to make arrangements for religious observances at the h o l y sites,
and to resolve disputes concerning Jerusalem between the J e w i s h
and Arab states i n Palestine. A c c o r d i n g to the decision, the city
w o u l d have a legislative council chosen by proportional represen-
tation; there w o u l d be autonomous municipalities for Jews and
Arabs. After ten years o f international control there w o u l d be a
plebiscite o n the city's future. Resolution 181 states, however, that
the results o f the vote w o u l d be advisory only. T h e international
regime reserved the right to decide whether to accept the major-
ity's w i l l . F o r all practical purposes, the General Assembly ruled
that internationalization w o u l d not be for a definite period, but o n
the other hand that it need not necessarily be permanent ( H i r s c h ,
Hausen-Koriel & Lapidot, 1994: 10; Lapidot, 1997; Laqueur &
R u b i n , 1995: 97-103). T h i s cold and logical compromise was
based on the demographics o f the city and Mandatory Palestine.
W h e n the partition resolution was passed, there were 102,000
Jews living in Jerusalem as opposed to 65,000 M u s l i m s and C h r i s -
tians (a 66 per cent majority for the Jews). In the territory o f the
British Mandate there were, however, about a m i l l i o n Palestinian
Arabs and about 600,000 Jews. T o put it another way, the d e m o -
graphic situation i n Jerusalem was the reverse o f that i n M a n d a -
tory Palestine as a whole. A different logic, however, reigned i n
the region, a reality of war i n w h i c h each side sought to shuffle the
deck and deal out the cards again to w i n an advantage for itself.
T h e Arabs immediately rejected the entire partition plan
because they did not want to see the establishment o f a State o f
Israel. As a result, the leaders o f the Jewish national institutions
considered themselves absolved o f their consent to the partition
and to the internationalization of Jerusalem. T h e war between the
Jews and Arabs o f Palestine, w h i c h began immediately after pas-
sage o f the partition resolution, prevented enforcement o f the

decision and improved the J e w i s h advantage i n the city. O n M a y

15, 1948, w h e n the independence o f the State o f Israel was
declared, there were 80,000 Jews as against 30,000 M u s l i m s and
Christians i n the city (a J e w i s h majority o f 74 per cent). T h e
course of combat after M a y 15, 1948 led to the division of the city
between the two population groups and made it even more diffi-
cult for the U N to implement the resolution. T h e General
Assembly reaffirmed the decision after the war, i n N o v e m b e r
1949 (Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995: 115-16). Since then, U N institu-
tions have deliberated over the question o f Jerusalem several
times, but they have not reaffirmed the internationalization deci-
sion, and between 1953 and 1967 the question of the city's status
was not raised at all. There were two reasons for removing the
question of Jerusalem i n general, and the question o f its interna-
tionalization specifically, from the agenda. First, the internation-
alization idea was no longer relevant. Israel and Jordan divided
Jerusalem by force o f arms d u r i n g the 1948 war. It was no longer
possible to return to a proposal based o n the dividing lines in Jeru-
salem prior to the war. Second, after the 1948 war an understand-
ing developed between Israel and Jordan, w i t h both parties
seeking to torpedo the U N initiative w h i l e partitioning the city
between them. T h e y succeeded.
In fact, the emerging J e w i s h state and the Emirate o f
Transjordan had already begun discussing Jerusalem before the
1948 war. T h e issue was raised during the 1947-48 contacts
between K i n g A b d u l l a h and the head of the Jewish Agency's polit-
ical department, G o l d a M e y e r s o n ( M e i r ) . Evaluation o f these
negotiations has been a contentious issue among historians, but it
is generally agreed that nothing had been settled concerningjeru-
salem until the 1948 war. A l t h o u g h the J e w i s h Agency and the
Jordanian E m i r arrived at some sort of understanding about n o n -
belligerency and a quiet partition of Palestine between them, they
did not come to an agreement regarding Jerusalem. W h e n the
fighting began, the Jordanian Legion sought - for political reasons
- to refrain from military involvement i n the city itself (in contrast
to its northern and eastern approaches and the Arab quarters sur-
r o u n d i n g it), assuming that the Israeli army w o u l d also abstain
from occupying the city. T h i s assumption was realistic as far as the
O l d C i t y of Jerusalem was concerned, but not as to the western
city.

T h e Jewish Agency, and later the Israeli Government, decided

to establish west Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by force of arms.
In early 1948, the Haganah and the Israeli army ( I D F ) fought sev-
eral battles for control of the road leading into Jerusalem f r o m the
west - from T e l A v i v and the coastal area - and conducted several
military operations i n order to lift the Arab blockade imposed o n
the city from A p r i l 20 to June 2. Lifting o f the blockade was
intended not only to allow transport o f food and supplies to the
besieged Jews o f the city, but also to establish Israeli sovereignty i n
west Jerusalem. However, Israel d i d not invest the same effort i n
the conquest o f the O l d C i t y as it d i d i n west Jerusalem. It
assumed that the conquest o f the eastern part of Jerusalem, w i t h
its Christian and Islamic holy places, w o u l d eventually lead to the
ouster of Israel from the western city as w e l l . Israel therefore c o n -
ducted only two military operations i n the eastern city, both
directed at relief o f the Jewish Quarter. T h e first o f these was
made on M a y 17-19, w h e n the I D F entered the quarter but left it
a few hours later. T h e J o r d a n i a n L e g i o n i m m e d i a t e l y entered
the O l d C i t y o n M a y 19, o c c u p y i n g the J e w i s h Q u a r t e r o n M a y
28. T h e Israeli attack thus gave A b d u l l a h the l e g i t i m i z a t i o n he
had been seeking to invade the O l d C i t y and to t u r n it into the
religious-spiritual capital o f his k i n g d o m . Incidentally, he acted
against the military advice o f J o h n G l u b b , commander o f his
army, and o f Kirkbride, the senior British representative i n
Jordan. In conquering the O l d C i t y , A b d u l l a h wished to extend
the understanding o n partition reached o n the eve o f the war
between himself and the Jewish Agency and divide Jerusalem as
well. T h e Israeli leadership was not b o u n d by any such agree-
ment, and in J u l y 1948 a second attempt was made to liberate the
Jewish Quarter. T h i s attempt also failed, and following the first
cease-fire agreement o n June 11, 1948 a borderline was drawn,
dividing the city: west Jerusalem, i n c l u d i n g the Arab quarters o f
Baq'a, Talbbiyeh, Qattamon, and part o f A b u T o r came under
Israeli rule, while Jordan controlled the east, i n c l u d i n g the w h o l e
of the O l d C i t y ( M o r r i s , 1996: 13-17; P u n d i k , 1994: 105-10;
Rabinowitz, 1991; Sela, 1990; Shlaim, 1988: 217-18).
Israel's foremost aim directly after the fighting ceased was to be
accepted as a member o f the U n i t e d Nations, thereby bolstering
the legitimacy o f the newborn state. Israel faced a d i l e m m a : its
acceptance by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s required that it agree to some

form of internationalization of the w h o l e of Jerusalem, i n keeping

w i t h the decision o f the U N General Assembly. However, the
J e w i s h leaders wished to preserve the gains of the war - to seal the
partition of the city between Israel and Jordan and to declare west
Jerusalem the capital of Israel. Israel therefore rejected Abdullah's
overtures at the end o f 1948 to agree o n a partition of Jerusalem; it
offered instead international rule over the holy places only. H o w -
ever, since they were situated mostly i n a small area o f the O l d
C i t y , this was just another way to distinguish west from East Jeru-
salem. A s this offer naturally d i d not gain international support
(Bialer, 1985; G o l a n i , 1994; Karpel, 13 O c t . 1995), Israel then
turned to Jordan i n order to reach a quick understanding w h i c h
w o u l d block the internationalization of Jerusalem. T h i s suited the
intentions o f K i n g A b d u l l a h , whose primary aim was to maintain
his sovereignty over the areas he had occupied during the war: the
West B a n k and East Jerusalem (Pundik, 1994: 156-7, 170, 242).
Israel portrayed the partition of Jerusalem as being i n the inter-
ests o f both itself and Jordan: A b d u l l a h could gain legitimization
of his rule and justify annexation o f the West B a n k through his
control over the Islamic holy places i n Jerusalem; and B e n -
G u r i o n could declare west Jerusalem the capital o f Israel. T h i s
j o i n t interest i n blocking the internationalization plan brought
about Israel's surprising and radical offer to Jordan i n January
1949, i n talks conducted by M o s h e Dayan, the military c o m -
mander of Jerusalem, w i t h his Jordanian colleague A b d u l l a h al-
Tal. Dayan offered to reach a quick agreement over Jerusalem,
w h i c h w o u l d form part o f an overall agreement between the two
countries. H e openly admitted that Israel wanted a quick resolu-
tion of the issue, and was thus w i l l i n g to make significant conces-
sions. Israel offered to cede the Arab quarters it had conquered i n
1948: Qattamon, the G e r m a n C o l o n y , Baq'a and M a l h a ; its m i l i -
tary posts i n M o u n t Z i o n and A b u - T o r ; the Israeli Kibbutz Ramat
Rachel, and the two Jewish neighborhoods of Talpiot and M e k o r -
H a i m . T h i s w o u l d give Jordan territorial continuity from east to
west and southwest Jerusalem, as w e l l as a broad strip of land con-
necting the Arab city o f Jerusalem w i t h Bethlehem. In return,
Israel asked for the O f e l H i l l , i n order to gain a narrow corridor to
the J e w i s h cemetery o n the M o u n t o f Olives, and the Jewish
Quarter i n the O l d C i t y , w h i c h abuts the O f e l hill to the east and
w i t h M o u n t Z i o n i n west Jerusalem to the west. M o u n t Scopus,

according to Dayan, w o u l d remain under Israeli rule, as w o u l d the

road leading to it. I n contrast to the sites i n the O l d C i t y w i t h
w h i c h there was territorial continuity, M o u n t Scopus was a
Jewish enclave. Israel suggested connecting it to the Jewish city via
a new road that w o u l d circumvent the Arab quarters (American
C o n s u l i n Jerusalem Burdett to the Secretary o f State, 13 Jan.
1949, F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d States ( F R U S ) , 1949: 661-3).
T h e Jordanian king could not reject such a generous offer out-
right, since it w o u l d w i n for h i m through political means m u c h
more than his army had achieved. However, he was i n no hurry,
and he raised the ante. In addition to the Arab quarters, he
demanded full Jordanian sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter i n
the O l d City. Neither was he to be satisfied only w i t h control of the
military posts i n A b u - T o r and M o u n t Z i o n ; he demanded full sov-
ereignty over both quarters. These demands, although made for the
sake of bargaining only, kept Israel from gaining the time advantage
it had sought. Talks conducted later w i t h Abdullah al-Tal also led
nowhere ( F R U S : 667, F r o m A m m a n to Washington, 15 Jan. 1949).
Dayan's offer was discussed informally by the consuls o f the
U n i t e d States, France and Great Britain i n T e l A v i v and A m m a n ,
and between them and the Jordanian king. T h e A m e r i c a n position
at the end of January 1949 was that partition of the city by mutual
agreement was better than coerced internationalization. T h e
U n i t e d States supported the partition of Jerusalem according to
the lines drawn by Dayan without, however, granting either Israel
or Jordan sovereignty over their parts of Jerusalem. In order to
appease the U n i t e d Nations, Washington stated that any bilateral
agreement w o u l d need the ratification of the U N General A s s e m -
bly. T h e A m e r i c a n position was acceptable to Jordan, as it tacitly
confirmed Jordan's gains. Jordan d i d not intend to transfer its cap-
ital from A m m a n to Jerusalem, and it stood to lose less than Israel
from not gaining sovereignty over the city. It went even one step
further than the Americans, proposing to enlarge the international
zone of the city. In direct talks w i t h Israeli delegates at the end o f
January 1949, Jordan suggested that the city be partitioned accord-
ing to the A m e r i c a n plan, allowing loose international supervi-
sion. T h i s d i d not appeal to Israel at all, and two weeks after
Dayan's generous proposal, Israel again demanded sovereignty
over west Jerusalem and the internationalization o f East Jerusa-
lem, w i t h its holy places ( F R U S : 710, Burdett to the Secretary o f

State, 29 Jan. 1949; M c D o n a l d to the Secretary o f State 3 Feb.

1949: 721, 740). T h e Americans received the impression that
Israel's foreign minister, M o s h e Shertok, was ready for a U N
stamp of approval o n an Israeli-Jordanian agreement for the parti-
tion o f the city (see meeting o f D e a n R u s k w i t h Shertok, 4 A p r i l
1949: 890). A t the same time, Israel blocked the realization o f
Dayan's offer by starting to settle the southern Arab quarters it had
conquered (American Consulate i n Jerusalem to the Secretary o f
State, 29 Jan. 1949, F R U S : 711; Krystall 1998).
Jordan had two other reasons for rejecting Dayan's proposal, as
w e l l as all other Israeli offers about Jerusalem. First, Jordan
noticed Israel's eagerness to reach a settlement o n the partition o f
Jerusalem, and wanted to capitalize o n the Jerusalem issue to pres-
sure Israel for concessions i n other areas, such as a solution of the
refugee p r o b l e m and the future o f the southern Negev region.
T h e N e g e v was a bone o f contention between A b d u l l a h and the
B r i t i s h government, their priorities being different. Britain saw
the N e g e v as a strategic asset, whereas A b d u l l a h placed a higher
priority o n the West B a n k and Jerusalem than o n using the Negev
as a corridor to the Gaza Strip and the Mediterranean. H e d i d not
v i e w territorial demands i n the Negev as a "must," since he
thought he could find an alternative Jordanian corridor to the
Mediterranean (there were talks about providing access to Haifa
port) ( P u n d i k 1 9 9 4 : 1 5 6 , 1 7 3 - 4 , 1 9 4 , 1 9 7 , 2 7 8 - 9 ) . Second, Israel's
insistence o n establishing its capital i n Jerusalem raised Jordan's
apprehensions that Israel w o u l d not long tolerate a divided capital,
w i t h Jordanian rule i n the O l d C i t y and the Jewish holy places.
Jordan also feared that M o u n t Scopus w o u l d serve as a base for an
Israeli attack o n East Jerusalem, i n w h i c h the Jordanians w o u l d be
caught i n a vice that might squeeze East Jerusalem from the west
and northeast. Jordan saw an intimation of this i n Israel's demand
for sovereignty over the road to M o u n t Scopus. A b d u l l a h there-
fore linked the Jerusalem issue w i t h a solution to all outstanding
questions between the two countries. H e made a proposal similar
to that of the U . S . : autonomy to both Israel and Jordan in Jerusa-
lem w i t h o u t sovereignty to either, as w e l l as m i n i m a l internation-
alization ( F R U S : 729-30, Burdett to the Secretary o f State 5 Feb.
1949).
M e a n w h i l e , the d e j a c t o status created by the fighting led to a
tacit, practical agreement between Israel and Jordan on partition

of Jerusalem according to the alignment o f the Israeli and Jorda-

nian armies at the end o f the war.
T h e next attempt to anchor the partition of Jerusalem i n a w r i t -
ten agreement between the two countries, i n c l u d i n g territorial
alterations i n their sovereignty i n the city, was made at the end o f
1949 and the beginning o f 1950. It was again a proposal for inter-
nationalization that brought Israel and Jordan to the negotiating
table. In N o v e m b e r 1949, the U N General Assembly decided to
ratify once more the internationalization proposal o f two years
previously (Golani, 1994), and it was time to renew vigorous
political contacts i n order to reach an overall agreement between
Israel and the Hashemite K i n g d o m ofjordan. Israel had territorial
demands i n Jerusalem. O n the eve o f the talks between the two
countries i n N o v e m b e r 1949, B e n - G u r i o n ' s aim was to achieve
territorial continuity w i t h the Western W a l l through the J e w i s h
Quarter i n the O l d C i t y , as w e l l as w i t h M o u n t Scopus. In
exchange, he was w i l l i n g to cede to Jordan a certain area i n the
southern part o f the city, the size of w h i c h was not clearly stated.
O n December 13, a joint Israeli-Jordanian document was drawn
up, outlining an agreement between them. T h e document p r o m -
ised Israel sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter i n the O l d C i t y and
over the adjacent Western W a l l ; however, Israel w o u l d not gain a
territorial link to M o u n t Scopus. In order to allay Jordanian appre-
hensions that it w o u l d use such a link as a staging ground for an
attack on the Jordanian city, Israel was asked to agree w i t h Jordan
on the passage to M o u n t Scopus through Jordanian territory. In
return, Jordan w o u l d receive, i n accord w i t h B e n - G u r i o n ' s original
plan, territorial continuity from the eastern side o f the city to its
south (Rabinowitz, 1991: 119-24; Shlaim, 1988: 233-4, 440).
It was not the issue of Jerusalem that caused the failure o f this
agreement, but the lack of consent o n other territorial issues, such
as the Negev and the Latrun area. T h u s , between December 1949
and February 1950, the two sides strove to reach an agreement at
least about Jerusalem and then to consider less controversial
issues. However, negotiations began at a m u c h lower level, and
the former understanding seemed to have dissipated. Israel p r o -
posed the partition o f the city into a northern district that w o u l d
belong to Jordan, and a southern district, i n c l u d i n g the O l d C i t y
that w o u l d belong to Israel. T h i s was, o f course, rejected outright
by Jordan. Israel reiterated as an alternative its demand for

sovereignty over the area from the Western W a l l , through the

Jewish Quarter, to the western city; as well as territorial continuity
from west Jerusalem to M o u n t Scopus. T h e Jordanians rebutted
w i t h a demand to be given the Arab quarters held by Israel i n the
western city, and it was Israel's turn to refuse outright. Instead,
though, Israel agreed to negotiate about an exchange of territories
in Jerusalem and about financial compensation for the Arab
neighborhoods that w o u l d stay under its rule. B u t these negotia-
tions also reached a dead end.
T h i s failure has been m u c h discussed by historians, w h o have
tried to ascertain w h y it happened and w h o was to blame.
Rabinowitz (1991:111-67) and P u n d i k (1994: 280-1) believe that
the K i n g of Jordan was responsible. T h e king's immediate move
to annex the West B a n k required h i m to include members o f his
government i n the negotiations, and these included West Bank
Palestinians. T h e government opposed any territorial concession
to Israel o n the issue of Jerusalem. These historians also believe
that K i n g Abdullah's maneuverability w i t h i n his government had
weakened since he had begun the process of annexation, and that
he lacked energy and dynamism at that time. T h e weakness of the
k i n g v i s - a - v i s his government and the socio-political reality i n the
West B a n k were held responsible for the failure of the agreement.
Shlaim (1988: 111-67), o n the other hand, believes that the blame
must be laid o n Israel, w h i c h made excessive demands i n order to
stall the agreement. H e held that the Israelis did not want a defi-
nite and agreed borderline i n Jerusalem because they wanted to
change it by force later o n . Shlaim claims that Israel preferred to
wait for an opportune time to conquer the whole of Jerusalem.
H o w e v e r , o n J u l y 20, 1951, a radical Palestinian and partisan o f
the mufti murdered K i n g A b d u l l a h , and the option of reaching an
Israeli-Jordanian agreement - whether comprehensive or partial
- became but another historical footnote.
In the absence o f a broader agreement, the de f a c t o partition o f
the city remained i n force, along w i t h the cease-fire agreement
signed at the end o f the war. O n J u l y 7, 1948, Israel and Jordan
agreed, among other things, to seek the "resumption o f the
normal functioning o f the cultural and humanitarian institutions
on M o u n t Scopus [i.e. the H e b r e w U n i v e r s i t y of Jerusalem and
the Hadassah Hospital], and free access thereto; free access to the
H o l y Places and cultural institutions [e.g. synagogues], and the

use o f the cemetery o n the M o u n t o f Olives" ( H i r s c h , H a u s e n -

Koriel & Lapidot, 1994: 4). H o w e v e r , this paragraph was not h o n -
ored by Jordan. T h e agreement also stipulated that M o u n t Scopus
w o u l d be demilitarized; that a small force of policemen and c i v i l -
ian workers w o u l d be present there; that the U N w o u l d ensure
provision of water and scientific equipment, and w o u l d regulate a
semi-weekly provisioning. In effect, Israel sent soldiers dressed as
police officers, smuggled arms and military equipment to M o u n t
Scopus, and turned the mountain into an observation post and a
main stronghold for its planned conquest o f East Jerusalem
(Narkis, 1975; 1991).
D u r i n g the 19 years between 1948 and 1967, Jerusalem was
divided between Israel and Jordan, both of w h i c h came to accept
this partition. T h e border areas between the two grew into
neglected no man's lands, not into springboards for eastward or
westward expansion. O n December 5,1948, B e n - G u r i o n claimed
Jerusalem as part of Israel and eight days later the Knesset declared
it the capital of Israel. East Jerusalem was annexed to the K i n g d o m
of Jordan about one week thereafter, o n December 13,1948. T h e
West Bank was also annexed de f a c t o to Jordan. T h i s was made de
j u r e i n M a y 1950. O n l y Pakistan and Great Britain recognized the
acquisition, w i t h the latter declaring that it d i d not recognize J o r -
dan's sovereignly over Jerusalem, only its administration o f it.
International recognition of the reality of a divided Jerusalem was
conferred i n 1952, w h e n the U N General Assembly decided that
Israel and Jordan w o u l d be responsible for reaching an arrange-
ment about Jerusalem i n accordance w i t h the U N resolution.
Thus, the U N recognized Israel and Jordan's j o i n t authority to
decide the future of the city, and directed them to do so according
to the U N resolution on internationalization, w i t h o u t stating
how the two w o u l d implement a decision that both opposed. In
other words, the U N recognized Israel and Jordan as the govern-
ing authorities in Jerusalem, and tacitly accepted the demise of the
notion o f internationalization. T h e Arab League recognized J o r -
dan's annexation on M a y 15, 1950, the latter having confirmed its
commitment that the annexation o f the West B a n k w o u l d not
prejudice i n any way the final settlement of the Palestine problem.
F r o m that time until the war o f 1967, Jordan was recognized as
controlling the West Bank ( H i r s c h , H a u s e n - K o r i e l & Lapidot,
1995: 3-6).

Jordan governed Jerusalem i n the same way that it governed the

West B a n k as a whole. A s was the case during the British mandate,
under Jordan the social elite - notables whose influence was based
on kinship, and w h o also happened to have property and capital -
controlled the centers o f political power. T h e y dominated the
chambers of commerce and the religious establishment (the W a q f
and the Sharia' courts), and their financial positions ensured their
children access to m o d e r n schools, higber education, and to
senior positions. After 1948 the members o f the traditional elite
were integrated into Jordanian institutions. T h e Jordanian estab-
lishment exploited for its o w n benefit the old Palestinian elite's
loss o f property and prestige and the dissolution o f its political
organization i n the 1948 war. Also playing into the hands o f the
Jordanian establishment was the fact that many members o f the
old elite had moved to other Arab countries and to the West
because o f the Second W o r l d War. T h e status o f the local elite i n
the West B a n k was weakened and its authority i n the eyes of other
inhabitants was diminished. Nevertheless, many o f its members,
such as the sons o f the Nusseibeh, al-Khatib, al-Alami, and
Barakat families, were given senior positions i n parliament, i n the
cabinet, and i n the top level of Jordanian officialdom, giving them
the means to perpetuate their positions. In the framework o f the
Hashemite dynasty, an owner-client relationship was developed
between the Jordanian elite o n the East B a n k and the Palestinian
elite i n the West Bank, and between the Palestinian elite and the
larger public (Sabella, 1997a).
O n J u l y 13, 1951, elections were held for positions o f m u n i c i -
pal office in Jordanian Jerusalem, and o n A p r i l 1,1952 the borders
o f the Jordanian city were extended to include adjacent areas (e.g.
Silwan and Ras-al-Amud). T h e area of the Jordanian city was thus
six and a half square kilometers, w h i l e the built-up area was only
half of that, three square kilometrers. In February 1958, the Jorda-
nian municipality ofjerusalem initiated the extension of the city's
area north towards the airport i n Kalandia. T h i s plan was not
implemented, nor was the 1963 plan to expand the city's area to 75
square kilometers. Discussions concerning these plans ceased i n
1967, w i t h the outbreak o f the war (al-Tafugji, 1996: 363; .1997).
O n the other side, west Jerusalem consisted at that time o f 38
square kilometers, after its area had been extended west. T h i s
reflected the difference i n status between the capital o f Israel and

Jordanian Jerusalem, w h i c h remained an outlying t o w n w i t h

symbolic religious importance only. West Jerusalem's status i n
Israel was higher than East Jerusalem's i n Jordan, although the
center o f Israeli economical, cultural and social life, the political
parties, trade unions and m a i n newspapers were all i n T e l A v i v .
T h e war o f 1967 was not premeditated, and the parties involved
- other than the P L O and the radical w i n g o f the Syrian govern-
ment - entered it against their w i l l . O n the day the fighting began,
Israel sent a message to Jordan asking it not to enter the war, stat-
ing that it w o u l d , however, accept Jordan's token participation i n
the fighting, such as diffuse light weapons fire o n the borders o f
Jerusalem. However, Jordan d i d not respond to this request. T h i s
was after communication between the two heads o f state was dis-
rupted as a result of the extensive Israeli military action i n Samo'a
in N o v e m b e r 1966, i n w h i c h the Jordanian army suffered heavy
losses (Klein, 2000).
In accordance w i t h accepted Israeli strategic military t h i n k i n g
prior to the establishment of the state, Israel d i d not, i n the 1960s,
have military contingency plans for the conquest o f the O l d C i t y
of Jerusalem. There were plans o n l y for taking possession o f the
road to the Israeli outpost o n M o u n t Scopus. Israel's first step
during the war was i n this direction; at the same time i n the south,
the U N headquarters at the o l d British high commissioner's resi-
dence and the area surrounding it were occupied i n order to keep
Jordanian fire away from adjacent Jewish neighborhoods and to
prevent Jordan's occupation of the strategic site. T h e next step was
to surround the O l d C i t y ; only w h e n this maneuver had been
completed, without producing an international outcry, was the
command given to invade the O l d C i t y (Zak, 1996:106,115). Z a k
recounts that Israel's anger w i t h K i n g H u s s e i n for opening fire
was so intense that Israeli warplanes bombed the king's palace on
the first day of the war i n an attempt to k i l l h i m (Zak, 1996:116).
Immediately after the war, the government considered the pos-
sibility o f establishing Palestinian self-rule i n parts o f the West
Bank outside Jerusalem, but this idea was shelved i n September
1968 (Pedhatzur, 1995). After the Palestinian option had been
dormant for 20 years, the Jordanian option surfaced. O n Septem-
ber 27, 1968, Israeli foreign minister, A b b a Eban, met w i t h K i n g
Hussein, specifying the Israeli principles for negotiation. I n c o n -
trast to its position before the war, Israel was not n o w ready to

share sovereignty o f Jerusalem w i t h Jordan. It demanded that

Jerusalem stay united under Israeli sovereignty, through w h i c h it
was ready to grant to the Arab section o f Jerusalem, including the
T e m p l e M o u n t , a special J o r d a n i a n - M u s l i m status. Eban also
mentioned the possibility o f providing Jordan w i t h a territorial
corridor connecting this part o f Jerusalem to other parts o f the
West Bank, w h i c h w o u l d be returned to Jordanian sovereignty. In
other words, Israel intended to retain its sovereignty over the city,
but was w i l l i n g to grant Jordan a foothold i n East Jerusalem, pro-
vided that its presence and authority be religious only.
Jordan demurred politely; at most, it was w i l l i n g to consent to
Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish holy places i n East Jerusalem,
excluding al-Haram-al-Sharif, w h i c h it viewed as holy to M u s -
lims but not Jews. Jordan agreed w i t h Israel that the city must
remain open, w i t h free movement, trade and passage between its
two parts; but it w o u l d not agree that the city that was united de
f a c t o should remain de j u r e under Israeli sovereignty. A t most, it
w o u l d agree to a special status for East Jerusalem (Zak, 1996: 157—
9). T h i s was K i n g Hussein's consistent policy throughout his sub-
sequent secret negotiations w i t h Israel.
In 1972, K i n g H u s s e i n proposed to the Palestinians the estab-
lishment o f an equal status federation o f the East and West Banks
o f Jordan, once the latter had been liberated from Israeli occupa-
tion. East Jerusalem w o u l d be the capital o f the Palestinian region
o f this federation. P r i m e M i n i s t e r G o l d a M e i r gave the Israeli
reaction to this proposal i n a secret meeting w i t h K i n g Hussein.
She w o u l d , she said, be prepared to recognize the king as custo-
dian o f the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, but w o u l d not under
any circumstance relinquish Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusa-
lem. H u s s e i n insisted on sovereignty over East Jerusalem, or at
least to extricate the city from Israeli sovereignty and establish a
special regime. Hussein's longing for the city he had lost in the
war o f 1967 was so intense that o n M a r c h 7, 1974 he refused the
offer o f the minister o f defense, M o s h e Dayan, to hand back to
Jordan all o f the West B a n k except East Jerusalem. Hussein was
w i l l i n g to leave negotiations o n Jerusalem to the last, as Dayan
suggested, but demanded a prior Israeli commitment to return
sovereignty over Jerusalem to Jordan (Zak, 1996: 161-6, 180).
T h e broad gap between Israel and Jordan from the beginning o f
the secret dialogue between them diverted their efforts away from

finding an overall agreement - what the Israeli political discourse

called the Jordanian option — into a number o f limited under-
standings and ad hoc arrangements (Garfinkle, 1992). Israel
allowed Jordan to consolidate its position i n East Jerusalem via its
control of the M u s l i m religious bodies there. U n t i l it repealed its
annexation o f the West B a n k i n 1988, Jordan had appointed the
chief of the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l and the mufti ofjerusalem,
controlled the W a q f and its assets, and paid the salaries of the offi-
cials (teachers, doctors, municipal and government employees
etc.), w h o were employed by the Hashemite K i n g d o m . Jordan
financed schools, colleges, graveyards, mosques, social and w e l -
fare services, supplied employment to its supporters and devel-
oped patronage networks and political influence i n the West B a n k
and i n Jerusalem via the various properties o f the W a q f and state
appropriations. W i t h an annual budget o f $17 m i l l i o n , i n c l u d i n g
$5 m i l l i o n for Jerusalem alone, the Jordanian W a q f managed
some 950 mosques i n the West B a n k (180 in Jerusalem and envi-
rons), and paid the salaries of2,500 employees (1,000 in Jerusalem
and environs). Between the years 1953 and 1994, Jordan invested
in the West Bank, through the Waqf, about $485 m i l l i o n , and i n
1967-89 another $250 m i l l i o n . In addition, i n the summer o f 1998
K i n g Hussein donated $8.2 m i l l i o n for refurbishing the golden
dome o n the D o m e o f the Rock, p r o m p t i n g the K i n g o f Saudi
Arabia to donate a similar sum to the h o l y places on the H a r a m al-
Sharif. T h e Jordanian donation was handled through the official
channels of the Hashemite K i n g d o m , w i t h the Saudi donation by
U N E S C O i n coordination w i t h the P L O (Friedland and Hecht,
1996: 286-8; G i l a d i and Merchav, 1998; M u s a l l a m , 1996: 97-8,
107; Reiter, 1997; Zak, 1996: 175-8).
Israel approved the Jordanian steps as they were i n accordance
w i t h its policy o f granting Jordan religious standing i n Jerusalem.
T h e moves bolstered Hussein's political control over other parts
of the West Bank, l i m i t i n g the influence of the P L O and suppress-
ing all outcrops o f local Palestinian autonomy.
In June 1967, immediately after the annexation, Israel wanted
to put the Sharia' courts under the authority of its religion m i n i s -
try, but the religious leaders i n East Jerusalem rejected the idea
outright. In J u l y 1967 they re-established the Supreme M u s l i m
C o u n c i l , w h i c h had been founded i n the early 1920s under the
leadership o f Haj A m i n al-Husseini, putting the religious courts

under its provenance. Israel d i d not recognize the C o u n c i l , but

w i t h Jordan exerting its influence and directing the operation o f
the religious institutions i n the eastern city, a way was found o f
arranging for the activity o f the Sharia' courts there as well. T h e y
remained an independent institution whose decisions d i d not
obligate the Israeli establishment. Judgments dealing w i t h per-
sonal status that required official state registration, such as that o f
marriages and births, were handed over for ratification by the
Sharia' courts i n Israel, first the one in Jaffa, then the one i n West
Jerusalem. T h e Sharia' court i n East Jerusalem is not responsible
for sending the records to the Israeli courts; this is done by the
applicant. This arrangement does not require mutual recognition
and thus constitutes a technical solution that each side relates to
from its o w n point of view. T h e Israeli administration credits the
authorization o f a court it recognizes, and the East Jerusalem
court remains independent o f the Israeli M i n i s t r y o f Religious
Affairs (al-Qaq, 1997; R o m a n , 1997a; Sabella, 1997b). Jordan's
involvement i n directing the religious institutions behind the
scenes made it easier to reach this arrangement. T h e confronta-
tion was regulated and managed i n pragmatic ways, also w i t h
regard to oversight o f Al-Aqsa's religious preachers. W h e n a
J e w i s h official asked a M u s l i m preacher, on J u l y 24, 1967, to seek
prior approval of the contents of his u p c o m i n g Friday sermon, the
request was rejected by Sheikh Hassan Tahbub, director o f the
W a q f in Jerusalem and later minister o f religious endowments i n
the Palestinian Authority. T h e Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l issued a
declaration that it was forbidden for n o n - M u s l i m s to supervise
Islamic affairs. In response, Israel deported some of the signatories
to the declaration, most prominently Sheikh A b d a l - H a m i d Sa'ih,
then chairman o f the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l , and later, from
1983 to 1993, the speaker of the Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l (al-
Qaq, 1997; Benvenisti, 1996: 84; Z a k : 1996; 175-8). Jordan inter-
vened to organize religious life, thus preserving its standing i n the
West Bank. A s the status o f the P L O rose i n the West B a n k and
Gaza Strip and its competition w i t h Jordan intensified, the reli-
gious institutions, and i n particular the management of the Waqf,
became targets for the P L O . In the 1980s the P L O insinuated sev-
eral o f its men into the W a q f directorship, and the ups and downs
in the relations between the P L O and Jordan during these years
were reflected i n this body, w h i c h was headed by Sheikh Sa'ad al-

D i n al-Alami, and afterwards by Sheikh Hassan T a h b u b . I n the

mid-1990s this entity, along w i t h the other religious bodies i n
Jerusalem, came under the control o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
(al-Qaq, 1997).
J e r u s a l e m versus the T e m p l e M o u n t
East Jerusalem has been blessed w i t h historical assets and sites

sacred to the three monotheistic religions. These include the sites
of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus i n the C h u r c h o f the
H o l y Sepulcher, according to most C h r i s t i a n traditions; o f the
binding o f Isaac, according to the Jews and Christians, and o f
Ishmael, according to most M u s l i m traditions; the site of the First
and Second Temples o f the Jews; o f the Prophet M o h a m m e d ' s
ascent to heaven, according to M u s l i m tradition; and the focal
point o f M u s l i m prayers before that was transferred south to
M e c c a (all these are o n the T e m p l e M o u n t , called a l - H a r a m a l -
Sharif by the M u s l i m s ) ; the Western W a l l , part o f the retaining
wall of the T e m p l e M o u n t f r o m the Second T e m p l e period and
the most h o l y site for Jews i n the absence o f the T e m p l e ; and any
number o f churches, mosques, synagogues, cemeteries, and h i s -
torical sites scattered around the city. T h i s lodges a great respon-
sibility w i t h the ruler. O f all these h o l y sites i n East Jerusalem,
a l - H a r a m al-Sharif - the T e m p l e M o u n t - is the one w i t h the
greatest potential for an explosion. It is a h o l y place for two r e l i -
gions whose adherents in Jerusalem are i n the midst of an intense
political confrontation. T h e more pious they are, the more inter-
est they have i n the site and the more importance they attribute to
it (Segal and Sa'id, 1997). Furthermore, i n the twentieth century,
the age o f M i d d l e East nationalism, each controlled the area i n
turn. T h e problem of who should control the site became acute
w i t h the appearance o f groups o f believers, Jewish extremists o n
one side and M u s l i m extremists o n the other, for w h o m control o f
and sovereignty over the T e m p l e M o u n t are the litmus test of r e l i -
gious devotion. In short, these groups believe that the M i d d l e East
conflict is not political, but religious, and the side that controls the
Temple M o u n t can prove that G o d is on its side and that it is
bringing redemption to the w o r l d .
In order to regulate religious tension and prevent it f r o m slid-
ing into and exacerbating the already present national tension i n

the city, the Israeli authorities have, since 1967, given the M u s l i m
and C h r i s t i a n authorities autonomy i n managing their holy sites.
In the law for their preservation, enacted i n 1967, Israel promised
to afford full protection from desecration and harm, free access to
visitors and tourists, and freedom o f religious practice i n all these
places. E n t r y to the T e m p l e M o u n t is permitted to all during the
visiting hours that have been set by managers of the site i n keeping
w i t h M u s l i m ritual requirements. In fact, Jewish freedom of w o r -
ship o n the T e m p l e M o u n t was seriously restricted after the occu-
pation i n 1967 out o f fear o f strong M u s l i m protests. O n August
22, 1967, "legal scholars, teachers, and muftis in Jerusalem and i n
the West Bank" went so far as to issue a w a r n i n g that any change i n
the status q u o w o u l d be "a gross violation of the sanctity of the sites
holy to the M u s l i m s , and serious aggression that w o u l d have far-
reaching results, not o n l y w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y in Jeru-
salem, but throughout the M u s l i m w o r l d and i n the international
c o m m u n i t y " (Benvenisti, 1996: 222). Israeli Defense M i n i s t e r
Dayan ruled, i n June 1967, that Jews could visit the Temple
M o u n t but not conduct public prayers there or pray individually
in a provocative way. T h e government approved Dayan's deci-
sion. O n August 16, 1967 the ministerial committee for holy sites
decided to forbid the chief rabbi o f the Israel Defense Forces
( I D F ) , S h l o m o G o r e n , from bringing thousands of Jewish w o r -
shippers to the T e m p l e M o u n t on the Sabbath following the fast
of the N i n t h of Av. F r o m 1967 onwards, the T e m p l e M o u n t was
at the center o f Rabbi Goren's religious w o r l d and his activity.
W h i l e the final shots of the battle were still whistling through the
O l d C i t y i n June 1967, he proposed to the general o f the central
c o m m a n d , w h o had directed the battle, that he b l o w up the D o m e
of the Rock. T h e general, U z i N a r k i s , rejected the idea categori-
cally, but Rabbi G o r e n did not remain silent. H e called Dayan's
measures "handing the T e m p l e M o u n t over to the M u s l i m s " and
"desecration of the T e m p l e M o u n t . " W h i l e he was still i n uniform
he sought, i n a variety of ways, to have the decision revoked, but
never succeeded (Shragai, 31 D e c . 1997). T h e vote of the ministe-
rial committee acquired the force o f a cabinet decision, and it has
served as the basis for all subsequent government determinations
about the status q u o o n the T e m p l e M o u n t . A s is usual i n politics,
the government has tried to refrain from making an explicit deci-
sion forbidding Jewish prayer on the T e m p l e M o u n t , or from

declaring the place a site holy to M u s l i m s alone. Instead, ministers

have preferred to rule that entry to the site is forbidden to Jewish
worshippers o n a given date. Similarly, they have preferred to use
affirmative phraseology for this purpose, stating that Jews asking
to pray on the M o u n t be directed by the police to the Western
W a l l . T h i s was justified by what was said to be a need to preserve
public order (Shragai, 25 Feb. 1997).
Since 1967, the Israeli police and the municipality have been
conducting an ongoing dialogue w i t h the Waqf, w h i c h adminis-
ters the T e m p l e M o u n t . T h e police have forbidden Jews to
engage i n public prayer o n the M o u n t o n the grounds o f security
and preservation of public order. T h e y ignore Jews w h o pray i n d i -
vidually and inconspicuously o n the margins o f the c o m p o u n d .
Israeli ministers o f religion have chosen not to exercise their
authority to permit Jewish prayer o n the site. T h e government has
been aided by the orthodox rabbinate, w h i c h forbids Jews to
ascend to the T e m p l e M o u n t o n religious grounds. A c c o r d i n g to
Jewish law, since the cessation o f T e m p l e sacrifices, Jews cannot
reach the level o f purity required for entering the T e m p l e area,
and since the precise location o f the T e m p l e is u n k n o w n , most
rabbinical authorities ban entry to the T e m p l e M o u n t entirely. A
minority permits Jews to enter a certain part of the M o u n t where,
in their opinion, the T e m p l e was not located. These restrictions
have led certain right-wing religious groups to attempt to establish
a synagogue o n the T e m p l e M o u n t i n this area. B u t Israel's chief
rabbis have consistently opposed such an initiative ( H a ' a r e t z , 13
Oct. 1996).
D u r i n g the 1990s there have been changes i n the status q u o o n
the T e m p l e M o u n t , as well as i n its legal, political, and national
status. First, w h i l e in the 1970s the Israeli Supreme C o u r t rejected
on formal grounds the right of Jews to pray there, i n the 1980s it
ruled i n principle that the government could not enforce, on the
grounds o f preservation o f public order, a blanket prohibition
against Jews worshipping o n the site. T h e state, the court ruled,
had to provide concrete and near-certain p r o o f i n each instance
that Jewish worship w o u l d create a disturbance. Second, the O s l o
accords and the peace treaty w i t h Jordan made the ultimate status
of the site open to negotiation. T h i s was a matter of great concern
to the national religious camp i n Israel. T h e C o m m i t t e e of Rabbis
of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza issued a call for "every rabbi i n whose

o p i n i o n going up [to the T e m p l e M o u n t ] is permitted to himself

go up to the M o u n t and also to instruct the members of his c o m -
munity on h o w to go up in accordance with all the stipulations o f
Jewish law" (Shargai, 19 Feb. 1997). These rabbis' political-religious
impulses m o v e d them to challenge the chief rabbinate's p r o h i b i -
tion against Jews entering the M o u n t . T h e i r religious-political
outlook overtook their loyalty to the chief rabbinate, and they
began to take measures to obtain sanction for going up to the
M o u n t . T h i r d , Israeli and W a q f authorities no longer permit i n d i -
vidual Jews to pray o n the M o u n t i n inconspicuous solitude. In
order to ensure that they not engage i n provocative activity, reli-
gious Jews are allowed to enter the T e m p l e M o u n t only alone or
in pairs, solely i n order to visit the site, and only w i t h police or
W a q f chaperones (Ramon, 1997; Reiter, 1997).
In addition to modulating religious tension, guaranteeing free-
dom o f worship and access to h o l y sites serves as a political tool for
the Israeli government i n its struggle to obtain recognition o f its
sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the T e m p l e M o u n t . T h e
government advertises its guarantee o f free access and worship i n
East Jerusalem to the w o r l d at large, contrasting it to the situation
that prevailed between 1948 and 1967. D u r i n g this period, the
Jordanian authorities d i d not allow Israelis to go to the Western
W a l l or the J e w i s h cemeteries on the M o u n t o f Olives, even
though the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan i n
1949 required Jordan to do so (Hirsch, H a u s e n - K o r i e l & Lapidot,
1994: 131-58). In fact, Israel's sovereignty is not recognized by
any international body, and no flag flies over the buildings on the
T e m p l e M o u n t . There is an Israeli flag inside the Israeli police
station o n the site, and the Palestinians hoist their flag during
demonstrations that occasionally break out i n the compound.
Officially, security and public order are Israel's responsibility, but
in practice the W a q f also plays a role i n this, w i t h its employees
policing, protecting, and supervising the site. T h e police are the
sole guardians of the M u g h r a b i entry gate adjacent to the Western
W a l l , and they guard the external walls. T h e W a q f guards are
solely responsible for the rest o f the gates• and for guarding the
interior o f the c o m p o u n d (Reiter, 1997).
Since 1967 some ten extremist nationalist and religious groups
have been asking for authorization to conduct religious ceremo-
nies on the T e m p l e M o u n t , but the Israeli police and courts have

prevented them from d o i n g so. There are regular confrontations

between these groups and the police o n holidays and days o f c o m -
memoration related to the M o u n t : the N i n t h of Av, the anniver-
sary o f the destruction o f the T e m p l e ; and the three pilgrimage
holidays, Pesach, Shavu'ot, and Sukkot, d u r i n g w h i c h the T o r a h
commands Jews to appear at the T e m p l e . In general, this is an
internal Israeli affair that comes to a head at the gates o f the holy
compound. It is not an interreligious conflict between Jewish and
Arab nationalist extremists, nor does it take place o n the M o u n t
itself. Such a confrontation occurred o n the N i n t h of A v i n 1995.
In general, the police have allowed Israeli r i g h t - w i n g activists to
enter the c o m p o u n d as visitors, i n pairs, o n this day. A s i n the past,
on this particular day the police relied o n the understanding that
had been reached w i t h Faisal H u s s e i n i , w h o is the P L O official
responsible for Jerusalem affairs, and w i t h the vice-chairman o f
the Supreme M u s l i m C o m m i t t e e , w h i c h supervises the manage-
ment of the site. B u t flaring tempers and the preparations made by
y o u n g M u s l i m s for physical confrontation w i t h the Israeli visitors
and w i t h the police w h o accompanied them u n d e r m i n e d the
understanding and led the police to close the M o u n t to both Jews
and M u s l i m s ( H a ' a r e t z , 7 Aug. 1995).
As a rule, Israeli governments have managed to neutralize the
M o u n t ' s potential to spark an uncontrollable religious-national
conflagration. T h e attempts at the establishment o f a c o m m o n
front by extremist Jewish groups that are active on this issue have
failed. In the years since 1967 there have been very few cases i n
w h i c h the j o i n t Jewish-Israeli and M u s l i m - P a l e s t i n i a n supervi-
sion o f the site holy to both groups has not w o r k e d . These epi-
sodes can be divided into three categories. T h e first involves a
combination o f religious fundamentalism and mental illness. In
June 1968 an Australian J e w set fire to A l - A q s a ; o n August 28,
1969 a Christian messianic fundamentalist d i d the same; o n A p r i l
11,1982 a Jew took cover i n the D o m e of the R o c k and went o n a
shooting spree, killing two Palestinians and w o u n d i n g 44 others.
The group that came physically closest to b l o w i n g up the Islamic
holy sites also falls into this category. Its members were less devel-
oped ideologically and less expert operationally than those o f
some o f the other groups that have tried to do the same, and for
this reason Israel's security services gave them scant attention. Y e t
on January 26,1984 W a q f guards discovered members of the B n e i

Y e h u d a cult, consisting o f one-time criminals from the aban-

doned neighborhood o f Lifta i n Jerusalem, trying to infiltrate the
T e m p l e M o u n t under the direction o f their leader, S h i m o n
Barda.
T h e second category is one i n w h i c h religious fundamentalism
and political goals are combined. In 1974, 1977, and 1982, the
extreme rightist religious Z i o n i s t Y o e l Lerner gathered around
him groups of enthusiastic y o u n g m e n w h o conspired to b l o w up
the A l - A q s a mosque and the D o m e o f the Rock. Israel's under-
cover General Security Service (GSS - the so-called Shin Bet)
became attuned to these plots at an early stage, and the conspira-
tors were tried and convicted. O n the Sukkot holiday, October 12,
1990, there was a violent P a l e s t i n i a n - M u s l i m demonstration
against the intention o f some extremist Jews to lay a cornerstone
for a new T e m p l e o n the M o u n t . T h e Temple, this group
believed, w o u l d be built on the ruins o f the Islamic holy places,
and they concluded that laying the cornerstone w o u l d expedite
destruction of the M u s l i m shrines. Matters got complicated w h e n
the Israeli authorities decided not to allow the Jews to bring the
stone into the T e m p l e M o u n t c o m p o u n d , but to permit them
only to pray there. In response, there was a general call-up o f
y o u n g M u s l i m s to defend their holy site. Tempers flared and a
demonstration broke out d u r i n g w h i c h stones were thrown from
a l - H a r a m al-Sharif d o w n onto the Jewish worshippers at the
Western W a l l below. W h e n police entered to restore order, they
killed 21 Palestinians and w o u n d e d 150 (Shragai, 1996: 292-8,
343-60). In December 1997 the Israeli security services frustrated
the plan o f a Jewish group to outrage M u s l i m worshippers o n a
Friday d u r i n g the M u s l i m holy m o n t h of Ramadan by throwing a
pig's head wrapped i n pages of the K o r a n into the compound. T h e
intention was to create a bloody riot that w o u l d stymie the gov-
ernment's intention of making an additional restricted withdrawal
from the West Bank, as it had obligated itself to do ( H a ' a r e t z , 25
Dec. 1997).
T h e third category consists of individuals w i t h a messianic the-
ology according to w h i c h the redemption o f the Jewish people
and the w o r l d w i l l be brought about by h u m a n action, and that, as
a result, the Islamic shrines should be forcibly removed from the
T e m p l e M o u n t . Indeed, G o d , they believe, has assigned this task
to his faithful so that they can prove that they desire and deserve

redemption. U n l i k e beliefs i n the second category, w h i c h are

characterized by a political ideology consistent w i t h its r e l i g i o u s -
fanatic principles, the t h i n k i n g i n this third category is based
entirely o n the messianic theological principle. T h e most danger-
ous and best-known o f the extremist J e w i s h attempts to destroy
the M u s l i m shrines was the plan designed by members o f the
Jewish underground organization of the early 1980s, a case w h i c h
can be seen as falling into both of the last two categories. In J a n u -
ary 1984, members o f this group sought to b l o w up the M u s l i m
shrines o n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif. T h e plot originated i n the heart o f
the religious Z i o n i s t establishment i n Israel and some 80 people
knew o f it, at one level or another. These were not individuals o n
the lunatic fringe; rather, they were people w h o had profoundly
internalized the dominant religious-Zionist ideology and messi-
anic theology. T h e y concluded that G o d was angry w i t h his
people and that he had punished them w i t h the evil o f the w i t h -
drawal from the Sinai and w i t h the peace agreement w i t h Egypt.
God was also angry, they believed, because o f the State o f Israel's
failure to expel the M u s l i m s from the T e m p l e M o u n t . P u r g i n g
the T e m p l e M o u n t of the Islamic shrines was, i n their view, a rev-
olutionary act that w o u l d redeem the J e w i s h people and change
the w o r l d . T h e redemptive explosion w o u l d mitigate G o d ' s
wrath, and from then o n H i s loving kindness towards H i s people
w o u l d prevail. Ironically, they d i d not v i e w the pan-Islamic holy
war and the international actions that w o u l d surely follow their
act as being punishment for a nefarious deed. Instead, they saw
these as an expression of divine grace, a messianic w o r l d order that
w o u l d turn back the wheels o f history and pave the way for
renewal o f the Israeli k i n g d o m and rebuilding o f the T e m p l e .
O t h e r members o f the group sought through this dramatic, war-
precipitating act, to achieve the political goal o f halting the Israeli
withdrawal from the Sinai and from the rest of Greater Israel. T h e
Jewish Underground's plot integrated messianic religious-mystic
w i t h political violence. T h e plan was never, however, put into
action, and the entire U n d e r g r o u n d was arrested over the course
of six months i n 1984. T h e operational competence and ideologi-
cal motivation o f its members marked this as the most highly
developed o f the groups that had planned to attack the Islamic
shrines. Its failure grew out o f ideological-religious doubts, w h i c h
led to repeated postponements of the operation. D u r i n g the delay,

64 Jerusalem: the Contested City
other targets were given priority, as being less problematic for the
conspirators. These operations included attacks on Palestinian
leaders and civilians i n revenge for the murder o f Israeli settlers.
T h e U n d e r g r o u n d carried out several such actions before its
members were rounded up (Ramon, 1997; Shragai, 1996; Shragai,
30 D e c . 1997; Sprinzak, 1991; Sprinzak, 1995).
In summary, since 1967 Israel has succeeded i n keeping the
issue o f Jerusalem a political rather than a religious problem.
Pathological religious phenomena have not damaged the political
frameworks. So far, politics has w o n out over religion. It has
enlisted religion i n its service w h i l e keeping it under control. T h e
problem ofjerusalem is not congruent or identical w i t h the prob-
lem o f the T e m p l e M o u n t , and the question o f the T e m p l e
M o u n t w i l l not prevent political negotiations o n Jerusalem. T h e
status o f the T e m p l e M o u n t is one o f the disputed issues to be
dealt w i t h i n those negotiations, one that the politicians hope to
neutralize i f they cannot resolve it.
O n M a r c h 7, 1995, B i n y a m i n Netanyahu, then running for
prime minister, committed himself in a letter to Yehuda Etzion to
allow Jewish worship on the Temple M o u n t . Etzion is one o f the
most extreme and unrelenting activists w o r k i n g for the removal o f
M u s l i m shrines from the T e m p l e M o u n t and for the construction
o f a new Jewish T e m p l e i n their place, and he was the moving force
behind the Jewish Underground's plot to b l o w up the mosques.
But, once elected, Netanyahu took no steps to keep his promise.
T h e National Religious Party, the parliamentary incarnation o f the
religious Zionist worldview, proposed that the Netanyahu govern-
ment's program read as follows: " T h e government w i l l arrange for
the Jewish right to worship on the Temple M o u n t i n accordance
w i t h the restrictions o f Jewish law." B u t Netanyahu decided to
leave out any mention o f the T e m p l e M o u n t and to declare instead
his government's commitment to "the right o f Jews to pray i n all
places holy to them i n accordance w i t h the restrictions of Jewish
law." H e also moved the declaration from the section o f the gov-
ernment program dealing w i t h Jerusalem to the section on religion
and the state ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 J u l y 1996). So politics has not acceded to
the messianic religious demand; quite the opposite is the case. P o l i -
ticians have used the religious importance o f the Temple M o u n t as
a means o f enlisting support. O n c e that is accomplished, however,
the issue is neutralized.

A city u n i t e d i n t h e o r y a n d d i v i d e d i n p r a c t i c e
O n June 27, 1967, after its crushing victory i n the war, Israel
decided unilaterally to apply its law and administration to East
Jerusalem. T h e shock o f the war and the sharp psychological
transition f r o m a sense of being caught i n an inescapable state o f
siege to a consciousness of having w o n a historic victory, w i t h its
attendant conquest o f biblical territories o f the L a n d o f Israel,
provided the impetus for the annexation o f East Jerusalem
immediately after the battles i n the city had ceased o n J u n e 9,
1967. M a n y people i n Israel v i e w e d the annexation as a c o n t i n u a -
tion o f the Z i o n i s t enterprise and a c o m p l e t i o n o f the process
that had begun i n 1948. In addition, it s b o u l d be remembered
that Israel had asked K i n g H u s s e i n not to enter the war, and that
there were Israeli leaders, such as C h i e f o f Staff Y i t z h a k R a b i n
and General U z i N a r k i s , w h o bore personal memories of Israel's
military failure i n Jerusalem's O l d C i t y i n 1948 ( H i r s c h ,
H a u s e n - K o r i e l & Lapidot, 1994; N a r k i s , 1975; N a r k i s , 1991;
Rabin, 1979).
T h e annexation was greeted harshly by 22 local Palestinian
leaders, w h o on J u l y 24,1967 protested to the military governor o f
the West Bank about Israel's unilateral action. In their petition the
leaders noted that "Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of Jordan."
Affiliation w i t h Jordan seemed to them legitimate since the inter-
national c o m m u n i t y accepted it. T h e y therefore wrote that, "the
annexation of Arab Jerusalem is a n u l l and v o i d act that the o c c u -
pation authorities have imposed unilaterally, i n opposition to the
wishes o f the city's inhabitants, w h o oppose this annexation and
who believe i n the unity of the Jordanian homeland" (Benvenisti,
1996: 216). T h e Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital o f Israel was
passed by the Knesset on J u l y 30, 1980. T h e law declared that
"Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel... the seat
of the President o f the State, the Knesset, the Government, and
the Supreme C o u r t . " T h e annexation thus became a basic law, the
equivalent o f being part o f the country's constitution ( H i r s c h ,
H a u s e n - K o r i e l & Lapidot, 1994: 8). U N Security C o u n c i l deci-
sion 478 ruled that Israel had violated international law, and called
on the 14 countries that had diplomatic missions i n Jerusalem to
leave the city. In the wake o f the decision all these countries
moved their legations out o f Jerusalem. E l Salvador and Costa

Rica returned their embassies to Jerusalem i n M a y 1982 and A p r i l

1984 respectively, and Burkina-Faso d i d so i n September 1986.
U n d e r Israeli law, the legal status of East Jerusalem is different
from that o f the rest o f the territories occupied i n 1967. Since the
Six D a y W a r Israel has maintained that the West Bank and Gaza
should not be annexed officially. Instead, Israel has preferred to
create defacto integration between these territories and the State o f
Israel. Israel understood that, i n the absence of an option to trans-
fer the Arab population, it should adopt a policy o f encouraging
Palestinian emigration and J e w i s h settlement i n order to change
the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs i n the territo-
ries. T h i s w o u l d be accomplished by administrative rules and
means that are available to states w h e n they determine w h o has
the right to reside permanently i n their sovereign and recognized
territory. Israel made use of methods such as not granting permits
to return to the West B a n k to any Arabs w h o had not been there
on June 5,1967, and to those w h o had remained outside the West
Bank for seven consecutive years without c o m i n g to visit at least
once a year. Israel also made it difficult for Arabs residing else-
where to move to live w i t h their family members i n the West
Bank. It should be remembered that the dependence of the inhab-
itants o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip on administrative permits
from the Israeli authorities served primarily as a means of control
and oversight, and were also intended, indirectly, to motivate
them to leave the territories. M o s t of the Arabs, however, held fast
to their land despite everything that was occurring, an action they
called s u m u d - steadfastness i n harsh conditions. G i v e n the huge
gap i n demographic growth between J e w i s h Israelis and Palestin-
ians i n the 1967 territories (Gazit, 1985; Gilbar, 1992: 20-39;
Grossman, 1987; M a ' o z , 1985), this policy o f encouraging e m i -
gration by administrative means had little, i f any, success, and
since June 1967 has not been implemented consistently. T h e
policy of defacto integration thus failed i n the long run.
E v e n in Jerusalem, i n w h i c h a policy of d e j u r e rather than defacto
integration was pursued, and where Israeli leaders were constantly
declaring that the city had been united for eternity, the national-
ethnic split remained a fact of daily life. W h i l e it is true, as M i c h a e l
R o m a n n and A l e x W e i n g r o d have proven ( R o m a n n & Weingrod,
1991), that Jerusalem is not physically divided between east and
west as it was i n the 1948-67 period, even after June 1967 it

remained split between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians o n

two planes. There was a vertical division between East and West i n
day-to-day affairs and a horizontal division, meaning that where
there was contact between the two populations, Jews generally
had the upper hand. T h e annexation d i d not narrow the e t h n i c -
national divide or the cultural gap. T h e distinction between the
residential neighborhoods of the two national communities i n the
city, their different city centers, the separate business and c o m -
mercial centers, school systems, public institutions, public trans-
portation, and medical services all created a notional borderline.
This is not a small matter. It is a notional but concrete wedge
between two groups that are very m u c h aware of the division, and
in fact they perceive it to be dangerous. R o m a n n and W e i n g r o d
also found that m o v i n g from the territory o f one side, "ours," to
that of the "other" is not an everyday matter. T h e ethnic—national
boundary that remains i n Jerusalem has created profound segre-
gation between East and West Jerusalem, and different ways of life
and behaviors o n both sides.
Exchange relations and economic contacts almost never occur
across the ethnic-national border. Different levels o f wealth
divide commerce, economics, and the labor market, and this d i v i -
sion coincides w i t h ethnic-national affiliation. T h e J e w i s h side
has resources and capital, and thus is i n a controlling position i n
such economic cooperation as exists. Cooperation on an equal
basis, if it exists at all, is ad h o c , fortuitous, opportunistic, limited i n
extent and brief i n duration. These are, then, economic relations
imposed by circumstances; they are not the result o f free choice
and preference. Furthermore, the relations between the two
ethnic groups are i n no way commensurate or symmetric. T h e
ethnic-national divide i n Jerusalem is a divide between ruler and
ruled. There is a manifest inequality that favors the Jewish-Israeli
side i n access to resources, political power, and the ability to use
force. Israel is able to operate systems o f oversight and control
over the weak Arab side. In practice, the Arabs i n Jerusalem
depend i n everyway on the Jews. Jews dictate the conditions, the
place, and the manner o f their exchange relations w i t h the Arabs.
So, for example, the Arabs are dependent on the employment
market i n the Jewish city, and are thus forced to adopt the H e b r e w
language. Jews are never i n a situation where they must speak
Arabic, nor are they dependent o n vital services that can only be

obtained i n the Arab part o f the city. Jews alone determine the
municipality's policies and make its major decisions about East
Jerusalem, and m u n i c i p a l authorities generally have m i n i m a l c o n -
tact w i t h the Arab population. W h i l e Arabs w h o must apply to the
municipality are dealt w i t h by Arab staff, these staff do not deter-
m i n e policy. T h e Jewish majority sees to it that the Arab side does
not compete w i t h it, and sets rules of the game that assist it i n per-
petuating its dominance. T h e reliance of East Jerusalem Palestin-
ians o n the J e w i s h sector has become more profound over the
years; Palestinians are extremely dependent on their income from
w o r k i n the Jewish sector and from commerce w i t h Jews. T h i s
dependence has served to w i d e n the economic and social gap
between the two groups.
T h e J e w i s h - A r a b differential has been maintained i n education
as well. U p o n annexing East Jerusalem i n 1967, Israel sought to
impose the c u r r i c u l u m of Israel's Arab school system. T h i s roused
Palestinian opposition, both for national and practical reasons.
For the former, they refused to consider themselves Israeli Arabs
and to instill their younger generation w i t h messages and content
aimed at m a k i n g them Israeli. T h e Israeli Arab c u r r i c u l u m was
pro-Israel i n its narrative and required knowledge of Jewish c u l -
ture and history at the expense of Arab culture, w h i c h was empha-
sized i n the Jordanian c u r r i c u l u m . So, for example, the Israeli
c u r r i c u l u m devoted 156 annual school hours to the study o f
Jewish texts and o n l y 30 hours to the study of Islam, as against 360
hours of Islamic literature i n the Jordanian curriculum. There was
also a practical objection to the Israeli program. Graduates o f the
Israel Arab system could not be accepted to universities i n the
Arab w o r l d , where most y o u n g East Jerusalemites preferred to get
their higher education. T h e Palestinians boycotted the schools
between June 1967 and January 1968, and the public schools were
emptied of most of their pupils. O n l y about 50 per cent of the stu-
dents i n m u n i c i p a l elementary schools i n East Jerusalem i n the
1968-9 school year continued to study i n the municipal schools
the following year. I n the summer o f 1968 o n l y four out of 96 East
Jerusalem Arabs passed the Israeli high school graduation exami-
nation. In comparison, between 70 and 80 per cent o f those w h o
took the Jordanian high school graduation examination passed it.
T h e result was that only a small number of students registered for
municipal high schools where the Israeli examination was

imposed o n them. (Private C h r i s t i a n schools prepared their stu-

dents for European examinations and college studies i n the west,
while private M u s l i m schools prepared their students for the J o r -
danian examination.) Private schools required the payment of t u i -
tion, so Jerusalem Arabs w h o could not afford private schools sent
their children to study i n public schools i n Ramallah and Bethle-
hem. Since i n 1971 this became c o m m o n , the Israeli government
forbade East Jerusalem Arabs to study i n the West Bank. In 1969
the government tried to divert Palestinian protest i n a different
direction. Israel opened a program to prepare the students at
municipal high schools i n East Jerusalem for both the Israeli and
Jordanian examinations. H o w e v e r , of200 students w h o registered
for this program, only five passed the Jordanian exams and none
the Israeli. In 1975 Israel gave i n and offered two separate pro-
grams, one following the Israeli Arab c u r r i c u l u m , to be taught i n
one school only, and the second following the West B a n k - that is,
Jordanian - c u r r i c u l u m . A c c o r d i n g to the municipality and the
Palestinian Teachers' Association, since this time 50-60 per cent
of East Jerusalem students have studied i n private schools belong-
ing to convents, churches, the Waqf, and other sponsors, w i t h the
rest studying i n municipal schools. T h e movement from m u n i c i -
pal to private schools and back again was also affected by eco-
nomic factors. Recession, lowered incomes, and higher tuition
fees i n private schools have increased the number o f students
attending municipal schools (Cheshin, 1992: 180-1; K o l H a - I r , 2
Oct. 1998; Kutab & K a m i n k e r , 1997; al-Qaq, 1997).
Israel excised several problematic components from the Jorda-
nian c u r r i c u l u m , such as its treatment o f the existence o f Israel
and the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and its possi-
ble solution. N o instructions were given o n h o w to teach subjects,
such as geography and history, i n w h i c h the Palestinian narrative
and point of view were entirely different from those o f Israel. In
addition to the Jordanian program, the East Jerusalem schools also
teach H e b r e w , civics, and road safety. B u t these subjects are
optional and are not conditions for p r o m o t i o n o f students from
one class to the next, so the level of the classes, and of the teaching,
is low. T h e municipality makes do w i t h administrative responsi-
bility for upkeep o f the buildings and w i t h paying salaries, but
neglects the development o f the system and does not provide it
w i t h the same services it gives to schoolchildren i n the J e w i s h

sector. In 1995, the Jerusalem municipality had only two and a

half school inspector positions for the East Jerusalem school
system. That system, according to figures from the municipality
and the Palestinian Teachers' Association, numbered, i n 1997,
26,153 pupils (alongside about 16,000 i n private institutions). In
1998 there were 33 schools i n East Jerusalem, or a total o f 842
classes. Students i n them received no psychological counseling
from the municipality, no safety inspections, and no oversight o f
the appointment o f teachers and principals, all services the city
provides to the schools i n the J e w i s h sector. In practice, the con-
tent o f the teaching was not under the supervision o f the Israeli
M i n i s t r y of Education but rather of an officer of the military gov-
ernment. A report by the m u n i c i p a l education office i n 1997
pointed out the long-standing pedagogical and physical neglect o f
municipal education i n East Jerusalem. A s a result of this the level
of illiterates i n the upper classes o f elementary school reached 30
per cent, w h i l e the drop-out rate from secondary schools was
about 40 per cent. Neglect shows itself also i n the education gap
between Jews and Arabs i n Jerusalem, i n elementary education
and i n higher education. In 1995, only 13.9 per cent of the popula-
tion above the age o f 15 i n East Jerusalem had up to an eighth-
grade education, as opposed to 35.2 per cent i n the Jewish sector.
The percentage o f those w i t h more than 13 years of education was
39.9 among Jews as opposed to 19.1 among Arabs. However, the
percentage of those w i t h 9-12 years of education was similar: 46.2
for Jews and 45.7 for Arabs ( C h o s h e n & Shachar, 1998: 266;
H a ' a r e t z , 16 June 1998; Nesher, 6 Sept. 1996; Rubinstein, 11 A u g .
1995; Segev, 4 J u l y 1995; State of Israel, Survey of Population and
H o u s i n g , Central Bureau o f Statistics, 1995).
T h e responsibility for determining the c u r r i c u l u m o f the
public schools i n East Jerusalem was handed over to the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y o n N o v e m b e r 25,1994; the Jerusalem municipality
continued to be responsible for physical maintenance. Aside from
replacing the seal of the Hashemite k i n g d o m w i t h the Palestinian
seal, a symbolic action, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y made no
changes. T h e c u r r i c u l u m and textbooks remained Jordanian and
are identical to those used i n the rest of the Palestinian Authority.
T h e course material contains no incitement against Israel or any
information that opposes the O s l o accords. T h e i m p r i n t i n g of the
Palestinian seal o n the textbooks and graduation examinations put

Israel i n an awkward position but, seeing no other way out, the

Israeli authorities decided i n 1995 to paste stickers bearing the seal
o f the city o f Jerusalem over the Palestinian seal ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 A u g .
1996; Nesher, 6 Sept. 1996; Rubinstein, 11 A u g . 1995; Segev, 4
J u l y 1995).
In 1994, Jerusalem's mayor, E h u d O l m e r t , urged the M i n i s t e -
rial C o m m i t t e e for Jerusalem Affairs to ban the use o f the Pales-
tinian c u r r i c u l u m . In a document he submitted to the committee
in October 1994, he stated:
Via the curriculum the road will be paved towards an absolute takeover
by the Autonomy Authority of the entire school system in East
Jerusalem ... There is a very real danger that under Israeli government
financing ... the school system will in practice be run by the P L O and/or
the Autonomy Authority ... including the history of the conflict from a
Palestinian point of view, the status of Jerusalem, and so on.
(Jerusalem municipality, background paper for the discussions of the
Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs, 25 Oct. 1994: 10)
Olmert's request was not accepted and neither d i d the Palestinian

Authority implement its intention, i n 1996, o f replacing the J o r -
danian c u r r i c u l u m w i t h its o w n ( H a ' a r e t z , 15 A u g . 1995;
Rubinstein, 11 A u g . 1995; Segev, 4 J u l y 1995). I n parallel, the new
Israeli government elected in June 1996 d i d not impose the Israeli
c u r r i c u l u m o n East Jerusalem, despite its original intention o f
doing so. N e i t h e r d i d it prevent the Palestinian Authority's
involvement i n the high school graduation examinations i n the
summer o f 1997 i n both the m u n i c i p a l and private schools. T h e
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y handed over examination papers w i t h o u t a
Palestinian seal at the Israeli roadblocks at the city limit, and
received the exams back, at the same locations, for grading. Super-
vision o f the examination itself was i n the hands o f Israeli Arab
instructors. T h e Israeli authorities presented this arrangement as
temporary, just for a single year. It is similar i n several aspects to
the arrangements achieved for counting the votes i n the ballot
boxes placed i n East Jerusalem during the elections to the Palestin-
ian Authority in January 1996 ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 A u g . 1996,3 June 1997,
5 June 1997; K o l H a - I r , 6 June 1997, 13 June 1997). T h i s compro-
mise left Israel's right-wing L i k u d government frustrated, so it set
up a committee o f senior officials w h i c h proposed imposing the
Israeli c u r r i c u l u m i n East Jerusalem. In June 1998 the M i n i s t e r i a l
C o m m i t t e e on Jerusalem Affairs rescinded the decision, after it

became clear that it w o u l d be impossible to implement. T h e M i n -

isterial C o m m i t t e e made do w i t h a decision to oversee the curric-
u l u m i n East Jerusalem, and stated that, "the textbooks there w i l l
be printed by an Israeli publisher," and not by the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y ( H a ' a r e t z , 16 June 1998).
In the arena o f higher education, the Palestinian Authority
placed A l - Q u d s University, w h i c h operates i n East Jerusalem
w i t h o u t being part o f the Israeli system o f higher education, under
the Palestinian C o u n c i l for H i g h e r Education. A l - Q u d s was
founded i n 1984. In 1996 it had 2,564 students, 41 per cent o f
w h o m (1,050) were residents o f Jerusalem, and 247 faculty m e m -
bers. It is a small university, even by Palestinian standards, and
certainly i n comparison w i t h the H e b r e w U n i v e r s i t y o f Jerusa-
lem, w h i c h i n 1996 had 24,739 students and 1,249 senior full-time
faculty members. T h e Israeli government helps fund the H e b r e w
University, as it funds all public universities i n Israel, but it pro-
vides no funds to A l - Q u d s ( K a m i l & Reiter, 1998). In the wake o f
a petition to the H i g h C o u r t o f Justice by the right-wing organiza-
tion B e - T z e d e k , A l - Q u d s announced that it had initiated the pro-
cess o f requesting a permit from the Israeli C o u n c i l o f H i g h e r
Education (Kol H a - I r , 3 J u l y 1998, 24 J u l y 1998).
R o m a n n and W e i n g r o d ( R o m a n n & Weingrod, 1991) note that
the Arabs i n Jerusalem have preferred to preserve, rather than to
blur, the fundamental segregation o f the two ethnic-national
communities. F r o m their point o f view, this has been the only
way to preserve their distinct national identity. In their desire to
preserve their sectorial identity and not to recognize the annex-
ation o f East Jerusalem to Israel, they collectively boycotted Israeli
institutions and thus the vast majority o f them have not partici-
pated i n municipal elections. T h i s boycott was not, however,
complete. A large number - some 1,500 - Palestinians have been
employed by the municipality (Cheshin, 1992: 191), and many
others have w o r k e d i n other arms o f the Israeli government, or
have provided b u i l d i n g services to Jews, even on expropriated Pal-
estinian land. T h e y have justified such activity as part o f their
sumud, i n order to provide for Palestinian viability and presence i n
Jerusalem. T h e collective boycott has preserved their self-identity
and has prohibited what might naturally and logically have been
considered an outcome o f the annexation to Israel, such as a col-
lective demand for equality i n the allocation o f resources and i n

access to city control and supervisory functions. E v e n though this

position created inequality that grew continually from 1967
onward, the Arabs i n East Jerusalem were w i l l i n g to pay the price
in order to strengthen collective segregation and their covert
struggle w i t h Israel. In many respects, the Palestinians succeeded
in this mission i n Jerusalem. Since the annexation there has been
an entire range o f special Palestinian arrangements and institu-
tions, such as the Jordanian c u r r i c u l u m , the independent Islamic
courts, religious and welfare institutions (the Waqf), and the use
of Jordanian currency. T h e B a n k of Israel also allowed Palestinian
moneychangers to operate there even w h e n similar activity was
prohibited i n Israel. M a n y Palestinian institutions have been
established i n Jerusalem, under the protection o f Israeli law,
w h i c h allows more freedom o f action than that prevailing i n the
rest of the 1967 territories, where military law applied. T h e Israeli
authorities have looked the other way w h e n confronted w i t h v i o -
lations of the law relating to arrangements w i t h the internal insti-
tutions of the Palestinians. Israel has satisfied itself w i t h i m p o s i n g
its authority o n the legal level, and w i t h regard to the contacts that
East Jerusalem Palestinians have w i t h the Israeli establishment. A t
the same time, the Israeli government has done little to reduce the
gap between the large and strong Jewish sector and the weak and
small Arab one. T h e huge gap i n government services has been
maintained even though, legally, East Jerusalem Arabs have equal
status and rights, since the eastern city was annexed to Israel and
its residents bear Israeli identity cards and pay m u n i c i p a l taxes.
In fact, the level o f services East Jerusalem enjoyed at the time
of annexation was a l o w one. Jordanian Jerusalem had only partial
water and sewage systems, and the Jordanian territory that Israel
added to Jerusalem included rural areas where people conducted
their lives independently without any l i n k to the Jordanian
municipality of Jerusalem. T h e level of services and infrastructure
in these rural areas was even lower than that i n Jordanian Jerusa-
lem. There was almost no system o f roads l i n k i n g these villages,
the water system did not supply the needs o f the inhabitants, and
there were no sewage or telephone services at all. B r i n g i n g the ser-
vices and infrastructure o f these areas up to the Israeli level
required huge investments, but for the reasons cited above Israel
did but little i n this area. U n t i l the 1980s Israel refrained from pre-
paring a master development and b u i l d i n g plan for East

Jerusalem, thus supplying itself w i t h an administrative excuse for

preserving the gap between Arab East Jerusalem and Jewish West
Jerusalem. Israel d i d l i n k up all homes i n Jerusalem to the water
system, but the garbage removal service, the state of the roads and
sidewalks, street lighting and sewage are all far inferior in Arab
Jerusalem to that w h i c h exists o n the Jewish side. Furthermore, in
the years 1988-90, less than five per cent o f all non-residential
b u i l d i n g starts were i n the Arab areas of Jerusalem. T h i s structural
discrimination against the Arabs is also reflected i n the city's
workforce. M o s t of the workers responsible for East Jerusalem are
from the western part o f the city. In the 1990s Arab municipal
workers were 17 per cent o f the total municipality workforce,
w h i c h is only half of East Jerusalem's proportion of the city p o p u -
lation. M o r e o v e r , two-thirds o f the Arab employees are employed
in sanitation and maintenance w o r k (Benvenisti, 1996: 102, 150—
1; C h e s h i n , 1992: 178-84).
In 1995, the municipality prepared a report i n w h i c h it
acknowledged, for the first time, that there is a serious gap
between the Arab and J e w i s h sectors i n terms o f infrastructure
and m u n i c i p a l and national services. T h e lack of a detailed master
plan approved by the authorities made it impossible to develop the
road, water, and sewage systems, or to set aside land for the c o n -
struction o f schools, public institutions, and parks. There were
serious difficulties i n garbage collection, firefighting services, dis-
tribution of mail and of household gas, and i n the development o f
the electric and telephone networks. In several areas the situation
was particularly harsh - there was no street lighting i n large areas,
there was a shortage o f 21 kilometers o f roads, and o f 150 kilome-
ters o f sewage and drainage pipes; there was no regular garbage
collection. There was a sbortage o f 345 schoolrooms, a serious
problem o f adolescent drug use, overwhelming poverty and
neglect o f the elderly because o f the lack o f welfare services and
failure to care for disadvantaged populations. There were no
arrangements for the hospitalization o f the mentally i l l and the
retarded. It should be remembered that the East Jerusalem Arabs
make up 30 per cent of the city's population, but received, i n 1995,
only about seven per cent o f funds budgeted by the city. In the
national budget their share was even smaller. In 1995 the Arabs o f
East Jerusalem received less than one per cent — N I S 1.5 m i l l i o n -
of the N I S 175 m i l l i o n allocated by the government to Jerusalem.

Ironically, most o f this s u m was directed to the Arab neighbor-

hood o f Beit Safafa i n the western part o f the city, i n particular for
a new highway that ran through the neighborhood and w h i c h
w o u l d serve large numbers o f Jews ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 J u l y 1995;
Rubinstein, 20 N o v . 1996). In 1999 less than ten per cent o f the
municipality's development budget was designated for invest-
ment i n East Jerusalem, most o f it i n projects connected to tour-
ism. A t a special cabinet meeting i n 1999, the municipality
presented further data on the East-West gap i n the city, gaps r u n -
ning from 300 to 1,000 per cent, depending on the area. In J e w i s h
Jerusalem there were 743 inhabitants per kilometer o f sewage
pipe; i n Arab Jerusalem 7,362 inhabitants. In J e w i s h Jerusalem
there were 690 inhabitants per kilometer o f sidewalk, as opposed
to 2,917 i n the East ( H a ' a r e t z , 25 M a r c h 1999; K o l H a - I r , 16 A p r i l
1999). A c c o r d i n g to the report o f 1995, the s u m required to close
the gap between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem was N I S 520 m i l l i o n ,
but according to municipality data from 1999, this w i l l require
more than N I S 1 b i l l i o n (Kol H a - I r , 16 A p r i l 1999).
T e d d y Kollek, Jerusalem's mayor from 1965 to 1993, i m p l e -
mented Israel's annexation and discrimination policy, maintain-
ing that i n order to prevent friction between Jews and Arabs it was
necessary to develop a multi-confessional and multicultural fabric
in Jerusalem. B u t Kollek's policy, as he h i m s e l f acknowledged,
was also "to make it difficult for the Arabs to live, not to allow
them to build. M a y b e they w i l l get out o f their o w n volition,
ensuring the demographic balance i n Jerusalem" (Benvenisti,
1996: 132). T h i s institutionalized the discrimination against the
Arabs o f East Jerusalem. T h e segregation and c o m m u n a l auton-
omy o f the Arabs i n Jerusalem i n the areas o f religion, education,
language, professional associations, communications, economics,
commerce, and culture led to neglect, despite the repeated asser-
tion that Jerusalem was a united city, and despite Israel's c o n v i c -
tion as to the correctness o f this proposition. T e d d y K o l l e k
confessed:
We said over and over again that we would make the rights of the Arabs
equivalent to the rights of the Jews in the city. These were empty words
... They were and remained second and third-class citizens ... I did
something for Jewish Jerusalem during the last 25 years. For East
Jerusalem? Nothing! What did I do? Schools? Nothing! Sidewalks?
Nothing! Cultural institutions? N o t at all! Yes, we built a sewage system

and improved the water supply. You know what? D o you think it was for
their good? T o improve their lives? Where have you been? There were a
few cases of cholera there and the Jews got alarmed that they'd get it, too.
Then we did the sewage and water system.
(Ma'ariv, 10 Oct. 1999; in: B'tselem, 1995: 49-50)
As noted, this policy d i d not arouse the wrath of the Arabs because
it coincided w i t h their national goal o f keeping themselves sepa-
rate from the Israeli framework and o f not achieving equal rights
w i t h i n it.
In order to conduct day-to-day life, the Israeli establishment,
and the municipality and the Palestinian public i n particular,
made use o f a mediating institution i n the form o f the village or
neighborhood leader, called the m u k h t a r , the heads o f religious
institutions; and the veteran elite. T h e mukhtar was the modern
incarnation o f an institution w i t h O t t o m a n origins that Jordan
had also exploited i n order to create a mediating class ( w a s t a )
between the governing authorities and the population. F u n c -
tioning alongside the mukhtars were members o f the economic,
academic, religious, and social elite, serving as intermediaries w h o
obtained benefits and various permits for their institutions and
families. T h i s class o f intermediaries enabled the central govern-
ment, whose authority over the population was doubtful, to
impose its w i l l . T h e mukhtar and the intermediary presented the
complaints and requests o f the Arabs i n their neighborhoods to
the mayor's advisor o n Arab affairs, and, w h e n these requests were
acted on, it gave the intermediaries authority w i t h i n their c o m -
munities. In exchange for the status they enjoyed from the Israeli
authorities, the mukhtars and intermediaries were expected to
legitimize Israeli rule, and to participate i n official events as repre-
sentatives o f the East Jerusalem population. Since these were not
political personages o f the first order, there were no protests
against their grant o f legitimacy to Israel, and they were not
considered to be collaborators (Benvenisti, 1996: 100-2, 104-7,
131-5; Hasson, 1996). T h e Israeli authorities thus made use of the
veteran elite, w h i c h was adaptable and cooperative, and used tra-
ditional methods to ensure that they w o u l d help oversee the Arab
population. T h i s w o u l d help foster an enlightened image without
equalizing the living conditions i n East Jerusalem to those i n
Jewish Jerusalem. T h e Palestinians i n East Jerusalem were

annexed to Israel, but they d i d not become part o f the Israeli c o m -

munity and collective.
T h e y are not part o f the same "public." T h e governmental and
municipal authorities address the demands and problems o f a spe-
cific civil consumer c o m m u n i t y , the Israeli J e w i s h public. E v e n
w h e n no deliberate policy o f discrimination is implemented, the
authorities tend to be unaware o f the needs o f a public that is not
part o f the "civil society." . . . Benefiting this public gives no p o l i t i -
cal profit to any decision-makers and there are elements that
profit electorally from harming it (Ir Shalem, 1998: 49-50).
Labor Party governments and T e d d y Kollek maintained that
Israeli sovereignty w o u l d be determined i n accordance w i t h physi-
cal changes - the construction and habitation o f Jewish neighbor-
hoods o n the eastern side o f the city, and unequivocal preference
for Jerusalem's Jews over its Arabs. As compensation, Arabs were
allowed to maintain their o w n symbolic space i n the form o f the
link w i t h Jordan. T h i s included the use o f Jordanian passports and
of the Jordanian dinar, maintenance o f Jordanian citizenship, the
operation o f the W a q f and the Sharia courts that were not subject to
Israeli law, and a measure o f local freedom o f action allowing the
development o f local Palestinian institutions and identity. T h e
shortages and discrimination preserved the Palestinian uniqueness
o f East Jerusalem and reinforced its ties to the rest o f the 1967 terri-
tories. This enabled energetic development o f the Jewish sector in
Jerusalem and its suburbs, from w h i c h Arabs i n the metropolitan
area also benefited. T h i s benefit was, however, only indirect, espe-
cially i n the form o f the growth o f employment and income. In
infrastructure and services, construction and education, as well as
in welfare services, their situation worsened as the gap between
them and the Jews grew larger and as the Arab population o f East
Jerusalem increased dramatically. T h e discourse between Israel and
the Palestinian public was a hegemonic one, characterized by Israeli
dominance and the exclusion o f Palestinians from positions o f
power and from resource allocation. T h i s exclusion was not forced
on the Palestinians; on the contrary, they chose it.
T h e L i k u d administrations i n the municipality since 1993 and
on the national level between 1996 and 1999 took an approach
diametrically opposed to that o f previous Labor administrations.
T h e y worked to impose symbols o f Israeli sovereignty and gov-
ernmental presence, and declared their intention o f narrowing the

gap between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem. T h e L i k u d governments

assumed that improvement i n day-to-day life w o u l d , for the Pal-
estinians, serve as compensation for their losses o n the symbolic
level ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 J u l y 1995). T h e first step was made by the
national government w h e n it decided, at the beginning of January
1997, to add N I S 130 m i l l i o n to the m u n i c i p a l budget " i n the
framework of the program to strengthen Israeli sovereignty i n the
eastern city" ( H a ' a r e t z , 27 Jan. 1997). T h i s was an unprecedented
decision, one that even the most "dovish" government i n Israeli
history, the L a b o r - M e r e t z government o f 1992-6, had not made.
D u r i n g 1997 and 1998 some N I S 200 m i l l i o n was invested i n East
Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 M a y 1999; K o l H a - I r , 16 A p r i l 1999). In
M a y 1999, o n the eve of the national elections, the L i k u d govern-
ment decided to allocate approximately N I S 400 m i l l i o n over four
years for infrastructure improvement i n East Jerusalem. H o w -
ever, o f the N I S 60 m i l l i o n designated for 1999, only N I S 18.1
m i l l i o n was actually budgeted ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 M a y 1999). T h e deci-
sion was made over the opposition of the M i n i s t r y of Finance and
it is reasonable to assume that it w i l l not be implemented. In fact,
no Israeli government w i l l find it easy to provide the huge sums
needed to close the gaps created by policies i n existence for more
than 30 years. After all, East Jerusalem Arabs are not Israeli citi-
zens, are not Jews, and are linked politically to the institutions o f
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y . A t the same time, disadvantaged Jews
and Arabs w h o are Israeli citizens are also k n o c k i n g at the govern-
ment's doors.
As w i l l be made clear below, the East Jerusalem Palestinians
reject Israeli national symbols and have no demands for the
improvement of their daily life. T h e y see Israeli government deci-
sions to invest i n the development o f the East Jerusalem infra-
structure as another type o f conquest and o f the imposition o f
Israeli identity, not as the government's obligation to the residents
of its territory. T h e government c o m m i t m e n t to b u i l d Arab hous-
ing as compensation for the construction of the Jewish neighbor-
h o o d o f H a r H o m a is an illustration o f this. In February 1997, a
m o n t h after the decision on the large investment i n East Jerusa-
lem, the national and municipal L i k u d administrations decided to
commence the public construction o f a J e w i s h neighborhood on
the h i l l called Jabel A b u - G h e n e m by the Arabs and H a r H o m a by
the Jews. A s compensation, national and local government leaders

announced that they w o u l d proceed w i t h infrastructure w o r k that

w o u l d allow the private sector to b u i l d thousands of housing units
for Arabs i n East Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 27 Feb. 1997, 5 June 1997;
K o l H a - I r , 9 M a y 1997). However, unlike o n the Arab side, the
infrastructure w o r k for Jews on H a r H o m a was begun i m m e d i -
ately since all the plans had already been completed and approved
and contracts had already been signed. T h e w o r k i n the Arab
sector was not able to begin, even i f the decision makers had been
overflowing w i t h goodwill and had made the appropriate political
decision and even i f a private Arab contractor had turned up. In
order to build, it was necessary to prepare detailed plans and to
receive permits from city planning officials and from the M i n i s t r y
of the Interior, permits that have been methodically denied to East
Jerusalem. T h u s the L i k u d government's decisions were no more
than a declaration o f intent, an attempt to improve the image that
had been sullied by the decision to construct H a r H o m a (Shragai,
27 Feb. 1997).
T h e Intifada, w h i c h began at the tail end o f 1987, turned the
struggle between Israel and the Palestinians i n Jerusalem from
covert to overt. It is interesting that i n several respects the Intifada
in Jerusalem was different from that i n the rest of the 1967 territo-
ries, all linked to the fact that Jerusalem was a frontier city. T h e
economic dependence o f the Arabs o f East Jerusalem o n the
Jewish sector, and the geographical closeness o f the two popula-
tions, made movement and the transfer from the rebellious East
to the western part o f the city easier. T h i s also made several
aspects o f the patterns o f the Intifada i n Jerusalem distinct from
those i n the rest of the 1967 territories. First, there was only a l i m -
ited response to the Intifada leadership's call to Arabs to detach
themselves from Israel administration; the proportion o f police-
men and municipal workers from East Jerusalem w h o resigned
their jobs was m u c h lower than that o f their colleagues i n the rest
of the 1967 territories. T h i s was because the Jerusalem Arabs' eco-
nomic dependence o n income from employment from Israeli
institutions was higher than i n the West Bank; the public could
not make such a sacrifice. In general, i n Jerusalem a Jewish
employer from the private sector hesitates to employ Arabs out o f
fear for his personal safety, while i n other places Palestinian w o r k -
ers boycott the Jewish workplace. Second, their Israeli identity
cards gave Jerusalem Arabs freedom o f movement w h i l e their

compatriots i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip were under closure.

T h e geographical proximity o f the Jewish and Arab areas of Jeru-
salem made it easier for Jerusalem Arabs to get to their workplaces
at times w h e n there was a general Palestinian strike or w h e n there
was an Israeli-imposed closure. A s a result, Jewish employers
began to prefer Palestinians from Jerusalem to those from the rest
of the territories. T h i r d , the relatively easy access to the Jewish
part o f the city allowed Palestinians w h o were less fearful o f
Jewish violence, harassment, molestation, and security checks to
go to the Jewish part of the city to relax and enjoy themselves, and
of course also to make a living. Those w h o sought w o r k in Jewish
Jerusalem came from mobile sectors such as cab, truck, and bus
drivers, as w e l l as driving instructors w h o took advantage o f their
proximity to J e w i s h Jerusalem to supplement their incomes at
times o f strikes i n East Jerusalem and as a result o f the decline i n
tourism. There is m u c h symbolism i n the fact that, despite the
attempt of the agitators to boycott everything connected to Israel,
the souvenir shops i n the O l d C i t y - both those owned by C h r i s -
tians and those owned by M u s l i m s - continued to sell Jewish and
Israeli symbols such as H a n u k a h menorahs and Star o f D a v i d
chains. F o u r t h , under the protection of Israeli law, w h i c h applied
to East Jerusalem, the Palestinian leadership could foster inde-
pendent institutions and take advantage o f the relative freedom
that prevailed there i n comparison w i t h the rest o f the territories
in order to lead the Intifada. W i t h the institutionalization o f the
uprising it was easier to r u n it from Jerusalem, the location of pro-
fessional associations, religious organizations, and other institu-
tions o f Palestinian civil society. T h e leaflets distributed
throughout the territories by the U n i t e d N a t i o n a l C o m m a n d , the
Intifada leadership, p r o v i d i n g instructions to the Palestinian
public, were printed i n and around Jerusalem. It was also easier to
fax the leaflets to P L O headquarters i n T u n i s from East Jerusalem
than from anywhere else. T h e political elite led the uprising i n
East Jerusalem, but there were also elements i n the city that
sought to restrict and moderate the expression o f the Intifada i n
Jerusalem because o f economic interests. T h e Intifada i n East
Jerusalem was largely the w o r k o f residents o f refugee camps and
the suburbs over the city line i n the West Bank. In these places
there was no economic interest i n keeping things quiet. T h e lead-
ership o f the Intifada linked East Jerusalem to the West Bank, as

did the connections between the veteran political elite and its
counterparts i n the rest o f the West Bank. Fifth, i n the second
phase of the Intifada, once the mass demonstrations and c o m m e r -
cial and employment strikes had played themselves out, and the
Intifada was being run by select groups and not by organized
masses, there were fewer terrorist actions i n East Jerusalem than
in other places i n the 1967 territories. A t the same time, it should
be noted, the Intifada in Jerusalem has been characterized by spon-
taneous stabbings of Jewish civilians and policemen by individual
Palestinian Arabs w i t h nationalist, and sometimes personal,
motives. T h e nationalist and religious reasons grew m u c h stronger
after the bloody incident o f October 1990 on the T e m p l e M o u n t .
At this time, Jerusalem became a central theater for acts o f ven-
geance by M u s l i m fanatics, w h o , at their o w n initiative, went out
into the streets of West Jerusalem and stabbed Jewish civilians. In
this frontier city, the lines of friction and contact became as close as
the length of a knife blade. In February and M a r c h 1996 Jerusalem
was hit hard by Hamas terror, harder than any other city i n Israel.
As retribution for the December 1995 slaying by the G S S ofYehiye
Ayash, the commander o f the organization's military arm, the
Hamas carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli buses, and in Jeru-
salem 53 people were killed, 43 in a single week (Riedland & Hecht,
1996: 333-4; Roman, 1992; Z i l b e r m a n , 1997).
Nevertheless, there is any number o f points o f similarity
between the manifestations of the Intifada in Jerusalem and its pat-
tern in the rest of the Palestinian areas. O n e of these is the boycott
of Israeli products. T h i s began as a total boycott that the Palestinian
public was unable to live with, and was thus replaced w i t h one of all
products that could have Palestinian-produced replacements, such
as cigarettes, soft drinks, and sweets. There was considerable eva-
sion o f the boycott, because o f the financial temptation to make
money by smuggling Israeli goods for w h i c h there was always a
demand because o f their higher quality. There was no boycott o f
Israeli raw materials purchased for use i n local industry, and Pales-
tinian products continued to be exported to the Israeli market.
Another similarity between Jerusalem and the rest of the Pales-
tinian territories was the transition from the civil disobedience
and mass demonstrations of the first stage of the Intifada to armed
attacks by individuals. Others were the use of wall graffiti and leaf-
lets as a channel o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n between the Intifada

leadership and the Palestinian public; the boycott o f the school

system, w i t h schoolchildren and students going out into the street
to demonstrate and cause disturbances; and the severing o f con-
tact w i t h Israeli authorities, even by the mukhtars w h o had m e d i -
ated between the Arab populace and the municipality. There was a
drastic decline i n the number o f East Jerusalem Arabs w h o partici-
pated i n courses sponsored by the municipality, especially courses
i n H e b r e w . There were also extended commercial and employ-
ment strikes, either full or partial; the adoption o f a Palestinian
calendar, an independent agenda w h i c h the Intifada leadership
declared and for w h i c h it w o n impressive obedience by the Pales-
tinian populace. There was also a sharp drop i n the number o f
Jewish visitors and tourists i n East Jerusalem, even at the Western
W a l l ; J e w i s h Israeli tourists changed the paths o f their walks so as
to circumvent the Arab area o f the city. Jews found alternatives to
the cheap services that East Jerusalem had offered Jews, especially
auto repair shops and restaurants. T h e organs o f Israeli rule
retreated to a large extent from East Jerusalem - business licensing
regulations were not enforced, b u i l d i n g and sanitation codes were
not strictly observed, and traffic and parking laws went unen-
forced. East Jerusalem branches o f Israeli institutions, such as
banks and the telephone company, were closed, while Jewish
industries moved from the Arab northeast o f the city to its western
side. Non-professional Arab workers i n Jewish Jerusalem, i n
fields such as cleaning, maintenance, store clerks, and gas station
attendants were laid off because o f fear o f terrorist attacks. Jewish
workers, mostly immigrants from the former Soviet U n i o n , were
hired i n their place. J e w i s h dependence on professional Arab
workers, especially i n the construction and auto repair sectors,
prevented layoffs o n a similar scale i n these areas, despite the anxi-
ety o f Jewish employers. There was also sporadic and spontaneous
Jewish violence against Arabs w h o crossed from East Jerusalem to
the J e w i s h part o f the city, along w i t h frequent security checks by
the police and the army. T h i s reduced the number o f Palestinians
w h o crossed the city's seam (Cheshin, 1992: 188-92; R o m a n ,
1992; Z i l b e r m a n , 1997).
T h e conclusions are obvious. First, i n most dimensions oftime
and space, the Intifada linked East Jerusalem even more strongly
to the rest o f the 1967 territories and deepened the g u l f between
it and the J e w i s h part o f the city. A t the time o f the Intifada, the

frontier city of Jerusalem was governed by a geography o f fear.

T h e close relations between the two populations and the w e l l -
developed contacts between t h e m o n l y made the fear more
intense. Second, the special f o r m the Intifada took i n Jerusalem
did not fundamentally change the previous system o f relations,
that between ruler and ruled, but i n fact reinforced it. T h e two
sides adjusted their previous relations to the conditions o f the
Intifada, and even broadened the gaps between them. W h i l e it is
true that, from the beginning o f the Intifada to the accession o f
the Labor government i n 1992, J e w i s h settlers insinuated t h e m -
selves, w i t h the encouragement o f the Israeli authorities, into
more than 40 sites i n the Arab areas o f East Jerusalem, this d i d
not i n any fundamental way change the basic reality i n East J e r u -
salem. T h e Palestinian Intifada was m u c h more effective than
were Israeli moves to make the Arab part o f the city J e w i s h .
T h i r d , the Intifada underlined the unique position of East J e r u -
salem i n the Palestinian space. F r o m the Palestinian point o f
view also, Jerusalem is a frontier city w i t h m a n y connections to
the "other" and the "enemy," leading to the u n i q u e f o r m the
Intifada took there.
It is important to note that the processes that the Palestinian cit-
izens of the State of Israel has undergone since 1948 d i d not repeat
themselves w i t h the East Jerusalem Palestinians, and did not lead
to their c o m i n g to terms w i t h Israeli annexation. Such a develop-
ment was impossible i n the conditions o f 1967 and thereafter. A s
R o m a n n and W i n g r o d stress, there were many a priori differences
between the Palestinians i n East Jerusalem and the Palestinians
residing i n Israel. W h e n , i n 1948, Israel conquered areas i n w h i c h
there were large numbers o f resident Arabs, the population was
largely a rural one scattered over a wide area. B e y o n d this geo-
graphic aspect, and the l o w level o f urbanization and moderniza-
tion that characterized this population, the Palestinian population
of 1948 lacked a political leadership and autonomous institutions
that functioned more or less properly. T h i s was apparently
because the leadership dissolved w i t h the flight o f many o f its
members and the arrest, by the British, o f others, and because it
had been deeply divided since it had become tied up i n the rebel-
lion o f 1936-9 ( A r n o n - O h a n a , 1989; N e v o , 1977; Porat, 1978).
N o n e o f this was the case i n East Jerusalem i n 1967, and all the
more so thereafter. Jerusalem was home to a Palestinian

84 J e r u s a l e m : The C o n t e s t e d C i t y
c o m m u n i t y w i t h a solid consciousness o f itself, a local leader-

ship, and a tradition o f political leadership, both w i t h i n the P a l -
estinian institutions o f the B r i t i s h Mandate period and i n the
Jordanian k i n g d o m .
In the period that preceded the Israeli occupation, Jerusalem
was not a remote rural area but rather a city o f great religious
importance, rule over w h i c h had granted legitimacy to the
Hashemite dynasty, even i f from an administrative and political
point o f v i e w the city had been marginal. B e y o n d this, the lack o f
contact between the Arabs o f Israel and their Palestinian and Arab
brethren for 19 years had led to far-reaching changes among
them. U n l i k e the Arabs o f East Jerusalem, only a minority o f the
Palestinians i n the State o f Israel has social and family links to the
inhabitants o f the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. T h e East Jerusalem
Arabs are politically linked to the institutions o f the territories,
and the vast majority o f them boycott Israel's municipal and polit-
ical institutions. T h e Arabs o f Israel, i n stark contrast, are active
participants i n Israeli politics, and one o f them, Knesset M e m b e r
A z m i Bishara, was, i n 1999, a candidate for P r i m e Minister. T h e
ethnic-geographic boundaries between them and the dominant
and r u l i n g Jewish majority have been open since the dissolution
o f the military government over Israel's Arab population i n 1966.
In many cases, the Arabs i n Israel even cross over the e t h n i c - c u l -
tural border and assimilate the norms o f the majority as part of the
process o f Israelification they are undergoing (Mana' and Haj Yehiye,
1995; Rekhes, 1992: 127-99). M a n y o f them have adopted Israeli
identity, and the mainstream among them demand that their
country's government treat them as citizens w i t h equal rights.
In practice this is movement i n two opposite directions. W h i l e
the Palestinians i n Israel are intensifying their demands for equal
division o f resources and access to the collective institutions, the
process o f separation has intensified among the Palestinians o f East
Jerusalem. T h e Palestinians i n Jerusalem do not want to penetrate
the heart o f the political structure and change the division of power
and resources, but rather to detach themselves from Israeli rule.
U n t i l the O s l o accords, the official demand o f the Palestinians was
to separate Jerusalem into two sovereign municipal entities while
keeping the city undivided physically. Since then, the peace process
has produced other ways to divide positions o f control, administra-
tion, and resources in Jerusalem between Jews and Arabs.

2
4
T H E C U R T A I N RISES
J E R U S A L E M I N T H E ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN
PEACE N E G O T I A T I O N S
To Sinai via Jerusalem
W h e n Israel and Egypt began sounding each other out o n the pos-
sibility o f an agreement, Jerusalem was one o f the issues o n the
agenda. T h e discussions originated i n secret contacts between
Israel's foreign minister, M o s h e Dayan, and President Sadat's
emissary and deputy prime minister, Hassan T o h a m i , i n M o r o c c o
in September 1977. T h e records o f these talks have not yet been
published, but the account provided by D r . E l i a h u Ben-Elissar,
then director-general o f the prime minister's office and later
Israel's first ambassador to Egypt, can be presumed to be reliable,
given his personal involvement and the fact that he quotes Dayan
directly.
T o h a m i demanded o f Dayan that he present a constructive
program that w o u l d be considerate o f Arab sensitivities about the
city that was so holy to the M u s l i m s . Dayan's reply, as Ben-Elissar
reports it, was extremely interesting. "We have vested rights i n the
territories," Dayan said. H e cited, " T h e settlements on the G o l a n
Heights, the Western W a l l , and the Jewish Quarter [of the O l d
C i t y o f Jerusalem], the M o u n t o f Olives and the university, n e w
population centers [in the southern Gaza Strip and northern
Sinai] ... A solution to the problem o f the H o l y C i t y could be easy
and satisfactory to all parties" (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 40-1). M o s h e
Dayan seems to have gone a l o n g way towards T o h a m i . H e d i d
not insist on the annexation to Israel o f Arab East Jerusalem, or o f
the new Jewish neighborhoods built on the eastern side o f the city
after June 1967. Dayan stood f i r m o n Israel's religious rights i n
85
East Jerusalem, yet he refrained from naming the T e m p l e M o u n t

as a holy site for the Jews. H e mentioned the new Jewish neigh-
b o r h o o d i n the Jewish Quarter i n the O l d C i t y , but placed it i n the
same category as the settlements o n the G o l a n Heights and i n the
Rafiah salient o n the Sinai Peninsula. A c c o r d i n g to Ben-Elissar,
Dayan made no distinction between the new Jewish neighbor-
hoods i n East Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements i n the G o l a n
Heights and i n eastern Sinai, even though their status was differ-
ent under Israeli law (because they were never formally annexed
to Israel, as the East Jerusalem ones were). In Ben-Elissar's
account, it was o n l y at dinner, after the formal discussions had
ended, that Dayan referred to the geographic, demographic, and
municipal changes that Israel had made in Jerusalem. Ben-Elissar
states that T o h a m i attached no importance to Dayan's remark.
Indeed, there was no reason for h i m to do so, since Dayan's for-
m u l a t i o n d u r i n g the formal discussion had given h i m what he was
looking for - a foundation for a Sadat-Begin summit and more
than an indication o f Israel's conditions for peace w i t h Egypt.
Dayan and T o h a m i ' s conversation paved the way for a diplo-
matic and historic event - A n w a r Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Presi-
dent Sadat addressed Israel's parliament, the Knesset, on
N o v e m b e r 21, 1977. A t this early point i n Egypt's open contacts
w i t h Israel, he stressed that M u s l i m s attached great importance to
the question o f Israel's rule over East Jerusalem i n general and
over the Islamic holy sites i n particular. Israel's annexation of East
Jerusalem and its rule over the Islamic holy places were at the core
of the Israeli occupation from the M u s l i m point of view, accord-
ing to Sadat. H i s speech indicated that even the moderate camp i n
the Arab w o r l d , w h i c h he headed at that time, w o u l d not acqui-
esce i n the annexation o f East Jerusalem to Israel and i n the per-
petuation of exclusive Israeli rule there. F r o m their point of view,
Israel w o u l d have to change its policy - to turn from an aggressive
entity threatening the Arabs into a state prepared to live i n peace
w i t h its neighbors. T h i s transition could take place only w h e n
East Jerusalem and the Islamic holy sites were returned to Arab
sovereignty (Israeli, 1982: 79-80).
Israeli P r i m e M i n i s t e r M e n a c h e m Begin's official reply did not
address details. H e refrained from repeating the points that Dayan
had made i n M o r o c c o and emphasized the principle that every-
thing was open to negotiation: " D o not say — there cannot be, and

J e r u s a l e m i n t h e I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n Peace N e g o t i a t i o n s 87
w i l l never be, negotiations over any particular issue. I suggest, and

this i n the name of a majority i n this parliament, that we shall dis-
cuss and negotiate about every point. ... Everything must be
negotiated and can be negotiated" (Jerusalem Post, 21 N o v . 1977).
In this declaration, Begin brought the issue of Jerusalem to the
negotiating table without c o m m i t t i n g h i m s e l f to the outcome.
T h e two leaders were o n parallel paths - Begin committed h i m s e l f
unambiguously to the process itself, w h i l e Sadat expressed a f i r m
commitment to the results. T h e y could not, however, continue i n
this way for long. Confrontation between the two, both o n p r i n c i -
ple and on personal grounds, was not long in coming. It broke out
w h e n the process required the two sides to lay out i n detail their
positions on what the outcome o f the talks should be.
Begin took a position that was not at all like the one Dayan had
taken at his meeting w i t h T o h a m i . East Jerusalem was excluded
entirely from the autonomy framework that Begin offered the
Palestinians, and thus the city's Arab inhabitants w o u l d not be
allowed to participate i n the elections for the autonomy's adminis-
trative council. Administrative arrangements for the holy sites i n
Jerusalem w o u l d be included, according to the Israeli program, i n
a separate arrangement that w o u l d ensure free access by the m e m -
bers o f all religions to their holy sites. Begin wished, i n fact, to
detach the discussion of East Jerusalem from the talks about the
rest o f the West Bank. D u r i n g the course o f the negotiations he
proposed removing East Jerusalem from the autonomy frame-
w o r k - t h a t is, leaving it under Israeli sovereignty - and leaving the
question o f sovereignty over the West B a n k open, w i t h Israel's
claim to sovereignty over this territory contending w i t h "other
claims." Sadat d i d not oppose postponing discussion o f sover-
eignty over the West Bank, but he notified Begin, through U . S .
President J i m m y Carter, that East Jerusalem could not remain
under Israeli sovereignty (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 101-3, 109; Shiloah
Institute, 1978). In other words, M e n a c h e m Begin put Jerusalem
one notch above the rest o f the 1967 territories. A c c o r d i n g to his
plan, sovereignty over the 1967 territories was i n dispute between
the two parties, w h i l e Egypt had no claim regarding East Jerusa-
lem, but rather acquiesced i n the Israeli annexation. It hardly
needs to be said that this position could not have been acceptable
to the Egyptian president. Sadat stuck fast to his position - East
Jerusalem was to have the same status as the rest o f the 1967

territories. I f the 1967 territories were i n dispute, the same was

true o f the territory o f East Jerusalem. T h i s was the farthest Sadat
could go towards Begin.
What was the special arrangement regarding the holy sites that
M e n a c h e m Begin was thinking of? Ben-Elissar reports i n his
memoirs that Begin raised a "temporary" and "non-binding" pro-
posal: " T h e holy sites w i l l be handed over to the self-administra-
tion o f each religion and its representatives. T h e Islamic holy sites
w i l l be administered by a representative o f the administrative
council o f the autonomy and representatives o f the neighboring
states - one representative from each country." According to B e n -
Elissar, B e g i n was w i l l i n g to include representatives from c o u n -
tries that d i d not border o n Israel, such as Saudi Arabia, M o r o c c o ,
and Iran, i n the M u s l i m body. H e w o u l d not limit representation
to the confrontation states o n Israel's borders. Begin shared his
thoughts w i t h President Carter, and w h e n the latter asked h i m i f
this meant giving the holy sites a status similar to that o f the V a t i -
can, Begin replied: "We w i l l consider all kinds o f possibilities. W e
haven't decided yet" (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 219-20).
T h i s had serious implications, because Begin's approach c o n -
firmed that Israel had no exclusive political hold in Jerusalem, and
that he was prepared to grant the political representatives o f the
Arab states informal standing i n the body administering the
M u s l i m holy sites in Jerusalem. Begin recognized that these sites
were not solely religious; moreover, i n his plan he granted the
representatives o f the Palestinian autonomy i n the administrative
body a standing equal to that granted to recognized countries.
T r u e , this was a special arrangement for limited functional repre-
sentation and w i t h a status inferior to that o f Israel, but
M e n a c h e m Begin created an opening for a non-Israeli political
entity i n Jerusalem.
W h i l e these were preliminary and n o n - b i n d i n g proposals for
the administration o f religious affairs i n the Islamic holy places,
the fact that they were presented to the president o f the U n i t e d
States proves that they were not meant to be taken lightly. It is
important to remember that i n 1967 Begin, then a minister w i t h -
out portfolio i n the national unity government, furiously attacked
the minister o f labor, Yigal A l l o n , for proposing that the Israeli
government give Jordan some measure o f control over the Islamic
holy places in Jerusalem. Begin argued then that a state could not

have any k i n d o f status that was not a political status. H e was so

firm on this point that he even rejected the possibility that A l l o n ' s
proposal w o u l d state explicitly that Jordan's status i n religious
T
affairs would be subject to Israeli sovereignty. B e g i n reasoned that
giving any standing at all to Jordan was tantamount to giving it
political status, and that such status w o u l d necessarily c o m p r o -
mise Israeli sovereignty over the site (Shragai, 1996: 372).
Begin did not reject the Vatican model i n his conversation w i t h
Carter, and this had far-reaching political implications, for two
reasons. First, i n 1929 Italy recognized the sovereignty of the H o l y
See over the Vatican i n the international theater, w h i l e the H o l y
See undertook to remain neutral i n international disputes. O n the
Vatican model, the holy sites w o u l d be independent of Israeli sov-
ereignty, and their status w o u l d be different from that o f Begin's
version o f autonomy. T h e autonomous entity that Begin envi-
sioned was not meant to be independent o n the international
level, while an "Islamic see" in Jerusalem w o u l d be. Second, c i t i -
zenship in the Vatican state is dependent o n position - that is, it is
acquired by being appointed to a Vatican post and is thus linked to
a j o b and not a person. O n the m o d e l of the relations between Italy
and the Vatican, an entity granting its o w n citizenship w o u l d be
located i n the heart of Jerusalem's O l d C i t y . Israeli sovereignty
and citizenship w o u l d be w i t h d r a w n from the Islamic and C h r i s -
tian holy sites i n Jerusalem and they w o u l d thus enjoy a higher
status than that w h i c h Begin offered, i n his proposal, to the rest o f
the 1967 territories (Hirsch, H a u s e n - K o r i e l & Lapidot, 1994).
In raising these ideas, Begin displayed, for a short time, a mea-
sure o f pragmatism. In order to ensure that the Arabs and M u s -
lims w o u l d come to terms w i t h the annexation of East Jerusalem
to West Jerusalem, and w i t h the grant of autonomy to the inhabit-
ants o f the West B a n k according to the parameters that he had
sketched, Begin was prepared to consider r e m o v i n g the T e m p l e
M o u n t from the area o f Israeli sovereignty and establishing an
"Islamic State" i n the heart o f the O l d C i t y i n Jerusalem. H o w -
ever, as w i l l be seen, this was his position at the beginning o f the
negotiations, w h e n he was still under the influence of Sadat's visit
to Jerusalem, and before the beginning of the tough bargaining o n
the details o f the agreement between Israel and Egypt. A s the
points of dispute w i t h Egypt grew more serious, Begin's position
became more rigid.

The C a m p D a v i d conference: peace despite Jerusalem

T h e negotiations between Israel and Egypt on the details o f the
agreement between them ran into many difficulties even before
there was a thorough discussion o f Jerusalem. There was the
question o f Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, the future o f the
Israeli settlements there, and Begin's proposal for administrative,
non-territorial, and personal autonomy i n the West Bank
(Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995: 400-3). A l l these were rocks that the
negotiation wagon ran into even before the question of Jerusalem
was addressed by the two parties. T h e dead end that Israel and
Egypt reached after eight months o f talks led to the C a m p David
Conference.
T h e conference opened on September 6,1978, and by the next
day it was clear that the starting positions o f the two sides were
diametrically opposed. Sadat sought to apply to Jerusalem the
principles o f sovereignty he had laid out i n his speech to the
Knesset - that is, the return of East Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty
according to the borders ofjune 4, 1967. In the program he tabled
at the conference, he proposed that Israel withdraw from Jerusa-
lem to the lines of the armistice agreement o f 1949, i n accordance
w i t h the principle o f non-recognition o f the acquisition o f terri-
tory by war. Arab sovereignty and government, Sadat said, w o u l d
be restored to the Arab area. A j o i n t municipal council, composed
of an equal number of Palestinian and Israeli members, w o u l d be
responsible for the provision o f public services - traffic control,
public transport, mails, telephones, and tourism. T h e parties
w o u l d c o m m i t themselves to freedom o f worship at and free
access to holy sites without distinction and without prejudice
(Ben-Elissar, 1995: 220).
In addition, Sadat demanded that an Arab flag o f some sort be
flown above the Islamic holy sites, while Begin, i n response, wished
to preserve East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty i n accordance
w i t h the new borders that Israel had established in J u l y 1967 (Ben-
Elissar, 1995: 220; K a m i l , 1986: 297; Quandt, 1988: 309).
Despite the dispute over the question of Jerusalem, the C a m p
D a v i d conference opened as planned. T h e r e were two principal
reasons for this. First, the question of Jerusalem was set aside at
C a m p D a v i d because there were more burning issues for both
sides. Just as had happened during the eight months of negotiation

that had preceded the conference, at C a m p D a v i d the bilateral

issues between Israel and Egypt were more important than Jerusa-
lem, because the latter was essentially an Israeli-Palestinian ques-
tion. Instead o f entering into a detailed discussion of Jerusalem
and the West Bank, Israel •and Egypt made do w i t h a general treat-
ment o f the Palestinians.
Second, on September 11, 1978 President Carter asked P r e s i -
dent Sadat not to discuss the Jerusalem question for the present.
T h i s request, made w h e n the Americans decided to begin active
mediation, was an indication o f the A m e r i c a n inclination to take
Jerusalem out of the framework of the talks so that it d i d not inter-
fere w i t h reaching an agreement o n the Egyptian front (Quandt,
1988: 218-33). Sadat d i d not respond to the A m e r i c a n request, but
neither did he raise the question again at the conference. H i s p r i -
orities were similar to those of the Americans, because the A m e r i -
can position on Jerusalem was closer to his o w n position than it
was to the Israeli position. Sadat preferred to wait, and then raise
the Jerusalem question at some time appropriate for the A m e r i -
cans. It was Begin, i n fact, w h o raised the Jerusalem question the
next day, w h e n he met w i t h the A m e r i c a n team. Begin reiterated
his commitment to Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, but this state-
ment was drowned out by the c o m m o t i o n over other issues,
w h i c h were more important for the bilateral agreement that was
then crystallizing.
O n September 14, 1978 Egypt proposed a goodwill gesture to
the U n i t e d States. Sadat told Carter that he w o u l d remove Jerusa-
lem from the framework of the accords i f Israel w o u l d agree to fly
an Arab flag over the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. Carter asked
Sadat to wait, and not make this proposal to Begin, preferring to
put off confrontation over the question of Jerusalem i n order to
move forward o n the agreement between Israel and Egypt
(Benziman, 1978; Haber, Schiff & Ya'ari, 1980; K a m i l , 1986: 29;
Sofer, 1986). O n l y on the final day o f the C a m p D a v i d confer-
ence, on September 17, 1978, d i d a discussion o f the Jerusalem
question begin, and it was fundamentally a discussion between
Israel and the U . S . and not between Israel and Egypt. Carter
turned the dispute over Jerusalem into a personal argument
between h i m and Begin. O n other issues, the U n i t e d States had
functioned as an active mediator, taking positions and trying to
reach an understanding w i t h Begin about the interim

arrangements, yet it had set aside resolving the permanent status

of Jerusalem. W h e n the Americans raised the issue, Begin was so
angered that he adopted an inflexible position. H e reiterated his
refusal to include Jerusalem i n the autonomy framework and even
refused to discuss the issue, i n complete contradiction o f his pre-
vious undertaking that everything was open to negotiation. A t this
point he was not inclined to make any compromise and also cate-
gorically rejected the idea of flying a green flag (the color of Islam)
above the D o m e of the Rock, even i f this was a plain flag that did
not represent any particular Arab state. Furious, Begin threatened
to leave the conference. In the face o f the severe crisis that Begin
had caused, the Americans had no choice but to satisfy the Egyp-
tians. T h e Americans thus drafted a letter to President Sadat,
quoting the statement of the A m e r i c a n representatives at the U N ,
Ambassadors G o l d b e r g and Yost that, i n keeping w i t h its past
position, the U n i t e d States saw East Jerusalem as occupied terri-
tory. In other words, the U . S . supported Egypt's stand o n the
autonomy and the future o f East Jerusalem. T h i s unambiguous
U . S . position angered the Israeli representatives and they threat-
ened to leave the conference. After an incisive discussion,
unavoidable given the force o f the dispute and the psychological
pressure o n the parties, the necessary compromise was achieved.
It was agreed that the A m e r i c a n president w o u l d send Begin and
Sadat a general letter clarifying America's position. Carter's letter
made it clear that "the position o f the U n i t e d States on Jerusalem
remains as stated by Ambassador G o l d b e r g i n the U N General
Assembly on J u l y 14,1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost
at the U N Security C o u n c i l o n J u l y 1, 1969" (Ben-Elissar, 1995:
221; Quandt, 1988: 219; Sofer, 1986).
W h a t was the position o f the U n i t e d States i n the documents
that President Carter was referring to? In the U N General A s s e m -
bly debate o f mid-July 1967, Ambassador G o l d b e r g explained his
country's reasons for abstaining o n Resolution 2254.
I wish to make it clear that the United States does not accept or recognize
these measures [the annexation of East Jerusalem] as altering the status
of Jerusalem ... We insist that the measures taken cannot be considered
other than interim and provisional and not prejudging the final and
permanent status of Jerusalem.
(American Foreign Policy, 1967: 579;
Near and Middle East Doc. VII-52)

J e r u s a l e m i n t h e I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n Peace Negotiations 93
T h e ambassador based his speech on President Johnson's declara-

tion of June 28, 1967 that Israel should not take any unilateral
steps o f any sort i n Jerusalem, and also o n the announcement o f
the American State Department of that same day that the decision
to annex East Jerusalem to Israel could not be a final determina-
tion of the status o f the holy places or the permanent status of the
city. Ambassador Yost's statement at the beginning of J u l y 1969
was no less trenchant:
The United States considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under
the control of Israel in the June war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is
occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international
law regarding the rights and obligations of an occupying power. ...
[T]he occupier has no right to make changes in laws or in administration
other than those which are temporarily necessitated by his security
interest, and that an occupier may not confiscate or destroy private
property. ... I regret to say that the actions of Israel in the occupied
portion of Jerusalem present a different picture. ...
(Moore, 1974: 993-4)
Ambassadors G o l d b e r g and Yost stressed Jerusalem's uniqueness

as a city holy to the three monotheistic religions, and that as such it
should remain open and free for the worship by all believers. Pre-
cisely because Jerusalem was holy not just for the Jews, Israel
should not implement any unilateral measures o f any k i n d .
In his letter, President Carter made no change i n the funda-
mental American position on Jerusalem, and this satisfied Egypt.
Egypt hoped to make use o f the U . S . i n the future, w h e n the
autonomy discussions began and the question o f the connection
between East Jerusalem and the autonomy w o u l d arise. O n the
other hand, the omission o f a direct statement o f the A m e r i c a n
position enabled Israel to argue that, i n practice, nothing new had
happened, and that the U . S . was simply repeating its k n o w n posi-
tion. A similar claim was made by the Egyptian foreign minister,
Ibrahim K a m i l , a hawk. H e believed that the U . S . had deliberately
fudged his position on the status of Jerusalem i n the permanent
arrangement because it wished to perpetuate Israeli occupation o f
the city (Kamil, 1986: 297, 333, 345, 373). Israel, the U . S . , and
Egypt also agreed that, i n their replies to Carter's letter, Begin and
Sadat w o u l d state their differing positions o n the question o f
Jerusalem.

T h e Israeli prime minister's letter was laconic and formal, and

presented his position unambiguously - exclusive Israeli rule over
East Jerusalem (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 222). T h e dry legalistic tone i n
w h i c h B e g i n chose to express h i m s e l f was meant, quite properly
from his point o f view, to circumvent and dismiss the dispute.
C a m p D a v i d was enough for h i m .
In contrast to Begin's letter, Sadat's was detailed and proposed
both partnership i n and partition of Jerusalem. T o the position i n
principle that he had presented to the Knesset, Sadat added a few
practical sections o n how, i n Egypt's view, sovereignty over Jeru-
salem should be divided w h i l e preserving its physical unity, the
unified administration o f the city, and its vital activities, w h i c h
were also to be carried out jointly. T h i s exchange o f letters thus
continued the discussion o f the status o f East Jerusalem i n the
interim and permanent agreements. Begin d i d not succeed i n
removing the issue from the negotiating table, and it could be said
that he j u m p e d the gun. T h e serious differences'of opinion on the
question ofjerusalem came up prematurely, as d i d the serious dif-
ferences of o p i n i o n between Begin and Carter. F r o m the Egyptian
point of view, this was a success, because the opening shot on the
negotiations over the autonomy applying to East Jerusalem was
fired o n the last day o f the C a m p D a v i d conference.
J e r u s a l e m a n d the a u t o n o m y negotiations: a dialogue

in t w o languages
Officially, the negotiations between Israel and Egypt over the

establishment o f autonomy for the Palestinians began i n M a y
1979. I n these talks there were again disagreements over the
question o f whether East Jerusalem should be included i n the
autonomy as Egypt demanded, or whether it should remain out-
side the framework o f the negotiations, as Israel demanded.
Egypt d i d not see East Jerusalem as an inseparable part o f Israel,
but rather as part of the West Bank, so i n its o p i n i o n the Palestin-
ian inhabitants ofjerusalem w o u l d be able to exercise their polit-
ical and national rights i n the framework o f the autonomy
arrangements to be instituted there. T h e principles o f the E g y p -
tian position, as c o n f i r m e d by the Egyptian M i n i s t e r i a l C o m m i t -
tee o n A u t o n o m y Affairs o n M a y 10, 1979, stated that "the
autonomy as a w h o l e w i l l apply to all the Palestinian territories

conquered i n 1967. In other words, to the West B a n k i n c l u d i n g

Jerusalem, and the Gaza S t r i p " (Gemer, 1981: 3). Egypt's auton-
omy proposal of January 29, 1980, was based o n these g u i d i n g
principles (Gemer, 1981: 4 1 - 2 ) .
As expected, the A m e r i c a n position on the subject was close to
that of the Egyptians, and this was also expressed i n the A m e r i c a n
administration's contacts w i t h Jordan. T h e Carter administration
was, i n October 1978, trying to tempt Jordan to get o n the C a m p
David bandwagon. Jordan had questions; H a r o l d Saunders
drafted the A m e r i c a n answers, w h i c h were written above Presi-
dent Carter's signature. W i t h regard to Jerusalem, Saunders
repeated the statements made by Ambassadors G o l d b e r g and
Yost, and emphasized that the U n i t e d States w o u l d support the
Egyptian position o f allowing the inhabitants of East Jerusalem to
participate i n the elections to and activities o f the autonomous
authority, although the autonomy w o u l d not apply to the city
during the interim period (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 134—5; Quandt,
1988: 336-9). T h e A m e r i c a n position infuriated Begin, and i n
response he ordered that his office be transferred to the eastern
part o f the city (a decision that was never implemented) and that
several settlements i n the territories be enlarged. T h e U n i t e d
States d i d not want to impose its unambiguous position o n Israel,
so it left the problem of Jerusalem to the parties involved i n the
conflict. In the Reagan plan o f September 1982 the U n i t e d States
w o u l d take a similar position.
T h e disagreements on Jerusalem caused the Egyptian president
to bring up the subject i n a series of summit meetings between the
two leaders and also to refuse to visit the city again. T h e lack o f
communication between Sadat and Begin over Jerusalem soured
relations between them. T h i s lack of c o m m u n i c a t i o n can be illus-
trated by an event that took place i n J u l y 1978, w h e n Begin and
Sadat met at E l - A r i s h . A t this meeting Begin understood Sadat to
be proposing an exchange: an Israeli concession i n Jerusalem i n
exchange for piping water from the N i l e into the N e g e v ( B e n -
Elissar, 1995: 223-4). B u t Begin considered Jerusalem to have
spiritual and symbolic value that could not be exchanged for
something material, and was unable to appreciate the national and
symbolic value of the N i l e ' s waters i n the Egyptian consciousness.
T h i s incident w o u l d be recalled later, w h e n the autonomy talks
ended and each side tried to share out the responsibility.

F r o m this point forward the Egyptian government worked

along two lines. First, the president made an effort to pry out o f
Begin a concession o n the question o f Arab sovereignty in Jerusa-
lem. Second, o n l i n k i n g the city's Arab inhabitants to the auton-
omy, and his vice-president tried to persuade the Israelis to make a
symbolic concession - to allow the flying o f some sort o f n o n -
Israeli flag in Jerusalem. T h e Egyptian vice-president at the time,
H u s n i Mubarak, tried, i n M a r c h 1980, to persuade Ambassador
Ben-Elissar to agree to this (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 224-5). Mubarak
ignored the fact that Begin and the L i k u d administration he repre-
sented were advocates o f the politics o f symbols, as opposed to the
political culture o f the Labor Party, w h i c h emphasized action.
M u b a r a k tried to persuade Ben-Elissar that, i n exchange for a
m i n i m a l , symbolic price, Israel and Egypt could gain the favor o f
Saudi Arabia and the support o f the M u s l i m masses outside the
Arab countries. These Arabs were important to Egypt because o f
the isolation that had been imposed o n Egypt by the Arab w o r l d
after the accords w i t h Israel. M u b a r a k argued that the M u s l i m
w o r l d was not able to challenge Israel's hold on East Jerusalem, so
that the symbolic concession he was asking Israel to make was
meaningless. T h e Israeli government o f the time was very m u c h
attuned, however, to the politics o f symbols, and saw any conces-
sion o n the symbolic level as fundamental.
M u b a r a k d i d not give up. A t the end o f M a r c h he tried to
explain directly to Ben-Elissar h o w important it was for Egypt to
circumvent its isolation i n the Arab w o r l d .
They can't be allowed to accuse us of having given up Jerusalem
completely. You need to help us with that. ... What do you care about a
flag, an Arab flag. A l l we ask for is something external, something
symbolic, that's all. Who knows what will be in five more years. After all,
you are there. You will be there. N o one will take you out of there.
In response to Ben-Elissar's question about w h i c h flag he was

speaking, M u b a r a k said "any flag." " A n Egyptian flag?" B e n -
Elissar wondered. "Let it be an Egyptian flag," the vice-president
answered (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 226). The Egyptians were almost on
their knees. T h i s shows h o w great their distress was, and to what
extent the two governments d i d not understand each other's lan-
guage and each other's dilemmas.
T h e issue came up for a third time o n August 8,1980, i n a c o n -
versation between Ben-Elissar and Vice-President M u b a r a k

(Ben-Elissar, 1995: 233). T h e n , too, the Egyptian efforts were i n

vain. T h e politics o f symbols that the Israeli government made
great use o f i n both its foreign and domestic policy contradicted
the pragmatic arguments o f the Egyptian vice-president. F o r the
L i k u d government, the symbol, the flag, played an important psy-
chological role i n creating consciousness. It was consciousness,
not deed, that determined reality. W h a t Egypt portrayed as a scrap
of cloth covering the nakedness o f the separate peace w i t h Israel
was seen by the Israeli regime as a symbol of foreign sovereignty i n
the entire city, not just at the Islamic holy sites i n Jerusalem.
In parallel, Egypt tried to make progress i n the talks to establish
the autonomy administration, talks that were meant to be c o n -
cluded o n M a y 26, 1980. Egypt made every effort to guarantee a
link between the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem and those o f the
autonomy. It demanded, first, that the inhabitants of East Jerusa-
lem participated i n the elections to the autonomous authority's
representative council; and second, that the institutions o f the
self-governing authority be located i n Jerusalem. East Jerusalem
w o u l d be designated i n the agreement as the capital o f the Pales-
tinian autonomy (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 225; G e m e r , 1981: 99;
Legum, Shaked & Rabinivich, 1979-80: 131). Israel, o f course,
rejected Egypt's two demands, since Begin saw them as a
redivision of sovereignty over the city. H e was not prepared to dis-
cuss the issue without seeing the discussion itself as a declaration
of division of the city. T h i s was i n contrast to his previous refusal
to discuss East Jerusalem at all. Nevertheless, he w o u l d not agree
to grant the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem political ties to any
entity other than Israel, because he feared that having the Arab
inhabitants of Jerusalem vote for the autonomy council w o u l d
create a political linkage to the Palestinian autonomy, and this
w o u l d refute the annexation of the eastern part of the city to Israel.
As already noted, M e n a c h e m Begin was prepared to c o m m i t
himself to the process but not to any outcome other than the one
he wanted. W h e n , later on, the dimensions of the gap between the
desired results of the two sides became clear, as d i d the inability to
bridge those gaps, the end o f the process was near. B u t i n the
meantime the discussions continued. Israel explained its position
again and again, assuming that its interlocutor had difficulty
understanding it, and that the source o f the problem was not
Israeli policy but the way it was explained. A t the same time, Egypt

tried to broaden the circle of the talks and to involve outside actors
in the discussions, i n the hope that they w o u l d influence Israel to
make its position more flexible.
A t first Egypt turned to the U n i t e d States. In A p r i l 1980, Sadat
presented the dispute over the linkage o f the inhabitants o f East
Jerusalem to the autonomy to President Carter. Carter raised the
subject w i t h Begin w h e n they met i n Washington a few days later.
Carter supported the Egyptian position, justifying this by noting
that Israel allowed Jordanian citizens w h o were residents o f East
Jerusalem to vote for the Jordanian parliament without seeing this
as c o m p r o m i s i n g Israeli sovereignty. B u t Begin was not per-
suaded and even cast doubt on whether Israel w o u l d i n the future
continue to allow Jordanian citizens from East Jerusalem to vote
for the Jordanian legislature. Begin also rejected Carter's sugges-
tion that East Jerusalem residents vote for the autonomy council
by mail, as do American citizens w h o live outside their states
(Ben-Elissar, 1995: 227). It is important to recall that Begin had
once considered, as part o f his autonomy plan, offering the Arabs
of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (though not, o f course, the Arabs o f
East Jerusalem) a choice between Israeli and Jordanian citizen-
ship. A c c o r d i n g to this proposal, the grant o f citizenship w o u l d
give its recipients the right to vote for the parliaments i n their
respective countries. Ben-Elissar testifies that this offer had been
meant as a fundamentally tactical move, aimed at countering the
charge that Israel intended to rule over the Arab minority. Begin
believed that o n l y a few Arabs i n Judea, Samaria, and Gaza
w o u l d choose Israeli citizenship, and that Israel w o u l d be able
to cope w i t h this w h e n the time came (Ben-Elissar, 1995: 101-2
- Ben-Elissar unhesitatingly states that Begin was being naive on*
this point). T h i s proposal o f Carter's reduced the size o f the
wedge that Begin had put between the Arabs o f East Jerusalem
and the inhabitants of the rest of the 1967 territories, and created a
political l i n k between the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem and the
autonomy authorities. Begin was not prepared to be party to this.
Since Begin was proposing both administrative and personal
autonomy i n the territories, he ostensibly could have agreed to
either one or the other k i n d of autonomy i n East Jerusalem-while
still retaining its special status. Yet he refused. Begin did not want
the elections to create a political-personal l i n k between the inhab-
itants of East Jerusalem and the autonomy, w h i l e preserving their

administrative link to Israel. H e saw the elections themselves as no

less than a redivision of the city. T h e y were not a political-personal
act that externalized the ties o f the Arabs o f East Jerusalem, but
rather an incursion o f the autonomy into the Israeli capital that
w o u l d lead to its politicabdivision. T h e hard part of this approach
is that Begin never proposed to impose Israeli citizenship o n the
Arabs o f East Jerusalem. H e preferred the existing situation i n
w h i c h only a small part of the Arabs of East Jerusalem voluntarily
accepted Israeli citizenship, and another small portion kept their
Jordanian citizenship. T h e majority was to remain w i t h o u t p o l i t i -
cal rights, even without the m i n i m a l rights that Begin offered i n
the autonomy plan.
Since the attempt to involve Carter i n the dispute failed, the
discussions changed venue to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . After the
Jewish U n d e r g r o u n d attacked the mayors o f N a b l u s , Ramallah,
and E l - B i r e h , and after it booby-trapped Arab buses and planned
to b l o w up the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, the U N General
Assembly decided, in June 1980, to c o n d e m n Israel. U n l i k e previ-
ous proposals of this sort, the U . S . d i d not veto this decision and it
included East Jerusalem i n the list o f occupied territories from
w h i c h Israel had to withdraw. In response, the Begin government
decided once again to transfer the prime minister's office to East
Jerusalem. T h e A m e r i c a n government was adamantly opposed to
this decision and tried to prevent it. T h e Israeli government
responded to these events by supporting the Basic Law: Jerusa-
lem, a bill introduced to the Knesset by right-wing opposition
member G e ' u l a C o h e n that changed the legal status of the annex-
ation of East Jerusalem. T h e law was passed on J u l y 30,1980, w i t h
Begin voting i n favor, even though the issue was still under nego-
tiation w i t h Egypt. Passage o f the law led Egypt to declare that it
was halting the autonomy talks. Egypt understood that, under the
circumstances, the process was worthless, and it had no reason to
prefer Palestinian interests over its o w n . T h e chasm between the
goals o f both sides was too wide for them to continue to be c o m -
mitted to negotiating autonomy for the Palestinians. Instead, they
preferred to finalize their o w n peace treaty.
W i t h the autonomy talks suspended, each side took stock.
Begin and Sadat accused each other o f responsibility for the fail-
ure. D u r i n g August 1980 the two leaders exchanged personal let-
ters setting out their reciprocal grievances (Ben-Elissar, 1995:

229-30; F B I S , D a i l y Report, 13 Aug. 1980, 18 Aug. 1980). Sadat

claimed that dialogue and negotiation could not be accompanied
by unilateral actions. A person w h o is committed to the process
and w h o declares that everything is open to negotiation must
prove the sincerity o f his intentions and avoid acting unilaterally
in accordance w i t h his ideology. Sadat rejected Begin's approach
of distinguishing between the rights of Jews i n Jerusalem, w h i c h
he claimed were national rights, and the rights o f Christians and
M u s l i m s , w h i c h i n Begin's view were solely religious rights. Sadat
also rejected Begin's "it's all m i n e " attitude. H e suggested Israeli-
Palestinian partnership i n the administration of the city and a d i v i -
sion of sovereignty, instead of exclusive Israeli rule. Sadat believed
that the division of sovereignty in Jerusalem and the preservation
of its administrative and m u n i c i p a l unity through the j o i n t m a n -
agement model offered a fair compromise between Israel's goals
of not physically redividing the city and o f having East Jerusalem
as part o f the Israeli capital, and the Arab goal o f returning Arab
sovereignty to Jerusalem and making it part of the Palestinian ter-
ritories. In practice, Sadat was proposing de f a c t o unity and d e j u r e
partition. T h i s was the proposal o f a pragmatic statesman to a
statesman for w h o m the symbol and legal status were paramount
and actually shaped daily life. Begin preferred a city that was u n i -
fied de j u r e and divided de f a c t o - although from his point of view, it
should be noted, the de f a c t o reality was a product of the d e j u r e situ-
ation. T h e two leaders spoke different languages.
T h e suspension of the autonomy talks put an end to the negoti-
ations between Israel and Egypt w i t h the exception o f the long
wrangling over Taba, a small part o f the Sinai Peninsula that was
disputed by the two countries. Egypt made do w i t h its achieve-
ments - a peace treaty and normalization i n exchange for all of the
Sinai Peninsula and the dismantling o f the Israeli settlements
there, Israeli c o m m i t m e n t to autonomy for the Palestinians and
acceptance o f the statement that the permanent solution must, as
the C a m p D a v i d agreements stated, "recognize the legitimate
rights o f the Palestinian people and their just requirements."
(Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995:404-10). F r o m here o n out Egypt w o u l d
make no claim to be negotiating for the Palestinians or in» their
name, and w o u l d at most mediate between them and Israel, and
between them and the U . S . - the m o v i n g force behind the diplo-
matic process i n the M i d d l e East.

J e r u s a l e m i n t h e Israeli—Egyptian Peace N e g o t i a t i o n s 101
The C a m p D a v i d m o d e l : t h e i n d i r e c t a p p r o a c h a n d its l i m i t a t i o n s
T h e peace talks between Egypt and Israel advanced the p r o b l e m o f

Jerusalem towards a solution. First, Egypt recognized west Jerusa-
lem as the capital of Israel, and the fact o f the Egyptian president's
historic visit to Jerusalem i n N o v e m b e r 1977 proves this. T h e
negotiations w i t h Egypt dealt only w i t h East Jerusalem. Second,
both sides agreed that Jerusalem w o u l d remain a physically u n d i -
vided city. A l l the functions aimed at ensuring the unity of the city
in practice, without w h i c h that unity w o u l d not be realized, were
to be handed over to a city council w i t h equal Israeli and Palestin-
ian representation. T h i r d , freedom of worship w o u l d be guaran-
teed, and the representatives of the religions w o u l d administer the
holy sites. T h i s was, i n practice, recognition by Egypt of the reality
that Israel had created i n the holy sites immediately after the Six
Day W a r i n 1967, w i t h the annexation o f the city.
After identifying these points o f agreement, Israel and Egypt
defined the points o f dispute as well. A s expected, no agreement
was reached o n the question o f sovereignty i n Jerusalem. Egypt
categorically rejected the Israeli annexation and Israel's measures
in East Jerusalem after the occupation i n 1967. There were other
differences o f o p i n i o n regarding the l i n k that should be estab-
lished or prevented between East Jerusalem and the rest o f the
1967 territories. Israel rejected such a link, w h i l e Egypt insisted o n
applying all the arrangements regarding the rest of the 1967 terri-
tories to East Jerusalem as w e l l . W h i l e the U . S . took Egypt's side
in the fundamental debate o n Jerusalem, it d i d not impose its
position on Israel. T h e U n i t e d States made great efforts to reach a
positive conclusion on the point that it and the two negotiating
parties placed first - a peace agreement and Israeli withdrawal
from the Sinai.
Progress towards a solution o f the question of Jerusalem d i d
not receive any official expression i n a consensual document. T h e
reason was that, despite its importance, the two sides addressed it
on a secondary level. T h e agenda between Israel and Egypt
included manifestly bilateral issues such as the extent of the Israeli
withdrawal from Sinai and its schedule; the question of the Israeli
settlements i n the Sinai; the security arrangements and the early
warning stations; the stages o f the normalization of bilateral rela-
tions, and the question o f Taba. T h e two sides viewed these

questions as being o f extremely high importance, more than the

question o f Palestinian autonomy i n general and the question o f
Jerusalem i n particular. First and foremost, Egypt wanted to
achieve peace w i t h Israel and to return the entire Sinai to its sover-
eignty. Its involvement w i t h the question o f Jerusalem and the
West Bank was o f secondary importance, and was meant to pave
the way to an arrangement i n Sinai. Nevertheless, its duty as an
Arab state and its o w n relation to Jerusalem should not be taken
lightly.
T h e negotiations between Israel and Egypt at C a m p David gave
birth to the presumption that, i n order to succeed and progress i n
peace negotiations, the subject o f Jerusalem should be pushed to
the end o f the discussions. In this view, the question o f Jerusalem
is so momentous for the parties involved that dealing w i t h it pre-
maturely is likely to cause trouble. In order not to bring negotia-
tions to a halt at their very beginning, Jerusalem should be
addressed o n l y at the end o f the process. W h i l e this postponement
w i l l not solve the problem, w h e n the parties get around to it there
w i l l be a mutual and equal risk involved i n a stalemate that w i l l
lead them to a compromise. Failure to reach an agreement w o u l d
threaten to destroy all the achievements o f the negotiations and
destabilize the peace that had been built w i t h such great labor. O n
the positive side, the understandings and agreements achieved on
lesser questions w o u l d produce mutual trust between the sides.
T h i s trust and understanding w o u l d broaden and spread from the
periphery to the center and neutralize the reluctance to make c o n -
cessions on Jerusalem. T h i s approach can be called the indirect
strategy.
T h i s strategy was developed at C a m p D a v i d by President
Carter. It was adopted first by President Sadat and afterwards also
by P r i m e M i n i s t e r M e n a c h e m Begin, although never w i t h the
same enthusiasm as the Egyptian president. Begin, after all, fre-
quently spoke o n the question o f Jerusalem and it was a matter o f
great importance i n his politics o f symbols. T h i s model proved
itself, since it led to the signing o f the peace treaty between Israel
and Egypt. Since then, it has been accepted as the only way to cope
w i t h the question o f Jerusalem.
T h i s assumption was appropriate for the negotiations between
Israel and Egypt, i n w h i c h the bilateral issues shunted aside
detailed consideration o f the Palestinian question, o f w h i c h

Jerusalem was one aspect. It was also appropriate w h e n those w i t h

a direct interest i n the matter - the Palestinians — were not
involved. O n c e Israel and the Palestinians conducted negotiations
on the Jerusalem question, it was no longer possible to adopt the
C a m p D a v i d model i n full. M o r e o v e r , at the time o f the auton-
omy negotiations it was already clear that it was impossible to
completely ignore the Jerusalem question, and a dispute arose
over the status of Jerusalem i n the interim period and o n the c o n -
nection between the residents o f East Jerusalem and the auton-
omy institutions. T h e differences of o p i n i o n o n these issues were
expressed i n blunt exchanges between Begin and Sadat.
T h e parties involved i n the negotiations learned the limitations
and advantages o f the C a m p D a v i d m o d e l for the solution o f the
problem of Jerusalem. T h u s , from that point to the M a d r i d C o n -
ference o f 1991, Jerusalem w o u l d be addressed o n two parallel
tracks. Israel w o u l d try to ignore the subject of Jerusalem c o m -
pletely i n the plans it proposed, i n order not to get into the same
dispute it ended up w i t h i n the autonomy negotiations w i t h
Egypt, or i n order to avoid internal disputes among the different
components o f the Israeli government. T h e Arabs and the U . S . ,
for their part, understood that it was impossible to resolve the
issue o f tbe permanent status of Jerusalem for the time being. A t
the same time they demanded that the issue of Jerusalem not be
ignored entirely. T h e U . S . , the Palestinians, and Egypt w o u l d
concentrate on searching for Jerusalem's place i n the interim
agreement and i n the transition period leading to the permanent
solution.

3
T H E P.L.O.
F R O M T H EWINGS T O C E N T E R STAGE
The P L O : p o l i t i c s stops a t t h e gates of J e r u s a l e m
T h e P L O was founded i n 1964 as a body w i t h an entirely marginal

political status. In 1968 the organization received a facelift and
turned into a coalition o f guerrilla and terrorist organizations.
D i p l o m a t i c and political action was sidelined i n favor o f revolu-
tionary activity - liberation via "armed struggle." F o r many long
years the P L O was relegated to the wings on the political stage,
fighting for a place under the lights. It strove, i n various ways, to
gain recognition as the sole representative o f the Palestinian
people and their goals. T h e story o f the P L O ' s movement into the
spotlight has been the story o f the organization's changing attitude
to the diplomatic process, from the time w h e n it made it's first
moves i n that direction i n 1974. T h e turning points were in 1974
and 1993. In June 1974, the P L O accepted the "staged program,"
w h i c h i n retrospect can be seen as the first step i n the direction o f a
political solution. In October o f that year, the Arab League
s u m m i t conference recognized the P L O as the only legitimate
representative o f the Palestinian people. A m o n t h later, Arafat was
invited to speak before the U N General Assembly, and nearly 20
years later, i n September 1993, Arafat signed a declaration o f p r i n -
ciples w i t h Israel o n the W h i t e H o u s e lawn. T h i s agreement,
reached after the P L O recognized Israel towards the end o f 1988,
and after lengthy negotiations that began i n M a d r i d i n 1991, was
the final development that made the P L O the major, i f not the
sole, Arab negotiator for Jerusalem.
T h e P L O , from its inception, considered itself to be tied to
Jerusalem. In fact, its founding conference was held i n Jerusalem
104

The P L O : f r o m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 105
from M a y 28 to June 2, 1964, i n the Intercontinental H o t e l o n the

M o u n t o f Olives. T h e Jordanian authorities at first rejected the
Palestinian's request to gather i n the city, but acquiesced after
reaching an understanding w i t h the P L O o n the organization's
objectives and the relationship between Palestinian identity and
Jordan's identity. T o accommodate Jordan, the P L O ' s leadership
agreed that it w o u l d represent only those Palestinians outside
Jordan. T h i s meant that its goal was to liberate only Israeli Jerusa-
lem, not the Jordanian side of the city. T h e P L O ' s founding char-
ter stated that Jerusalem w o u l d be the seat o f the Palestinian
National C o u n c i l , the P L O ' s quasi-parliament (Harkabi, 1975:
24, 48). However, the Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l has not c o n -
vened in Jerusalem since the founding conference i n 1965.
T h e P L O ' s position on Jerusalem is expressed i n its sharp
response to the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, passed by
the Knesset on July 30, 1980 (Hirsch, H a u s e n - K o r i e l & Lapidot,
1994: 8-9). T h e P L O ' s Executive Committee considered this law
to be a violation o f U N resolutions, and interpreted it as an addi-
tional aggression against the Palestinian people and its heritage, and
against the Palestinian national and M u s l i m and Christian religious
character ofjerusalem. T h e P L O considered the U . S . to be primar-
ily responsible for this Israeli government action. T h e U . S . , the
P L O charged, had not restrained Israel and had continued to grant
the country economic, military, and political assistance. T h e Exec-
utive Committee's statement emphasized that Jerusalem
has been the capital of our Arab-Palestinian homeland from the time it
was built by our Arab Jebusite and Canaanite forefathers in the heart of
Palestine, and which was also the first direction of prayer for Islam's
believers [qiblat a l - m u m i n i n ] . Therefore, liberation ofjerusalem from the
Zionist occupation that disavows the city's Christian and M u s l i m
essence is a fateful mater for our people and nation, and this is the only
way to ensure freedom of worship there for all believers.
( F i l a s t i n a l - T h a w r a , 11 Aug. 1980)
(The P L O emphasizes its "Canaanite" roots as the foundation o f

its claim to modern Jerusalem, and i n order to c o n d e m n the
Israeli occupation o f 1967. T h e P L O claims prior, Jebusite-
Canaanite ownership, and thus implicitly also condemns the c o n -
quest o f the city by K i n g D a v i d . In order to prove its historical
rights, the P L O names the Canaanites and Jebusites as its fore-
fathers, even though they were i n no way Arabs and even though

the p r e - I s l a m i c J a h i l i a period is condemned by Islam as a period o f

idolatry and ignorance.)
T h e changes that took place i n the P L O ' s political approach
d u r i n g the 1980s d i d not change its fundamental position on the
future of East Jerusalem. U p until the 1980s, the P L O adhered to
all the articles of the Palestinian N a t i o n a l Covenant (1968) and all
the articles o f the "staged program" (1974), i n c l u d i n g their sec-
tions on Jerusalem. Between 1988 and 1993 the P L O accepted
U N resolution 181, the partition decision, and recognized the
State of Israel. It accepted U N resolution 242 while continuing to
demand an independent Palestinian state, offering a conciliation
plan based o n peace i n exchange for the territories that Israel occu-
pied i n 1967. This change, from hostility to peace and coexistence,
did not modify the P L O ' s position on Jerusalem until Israel, i n
1993, recognized the P L O and accepted it as a partner i n negotia-
tions over the city.
O n N o v e m b e r 15,1988 the P L O declared Jerusalem the capital
of its country. "By virtue of the natural, historical, and legal rights
[of the Palestinian Arab people] . . . the Palestine N a t i o n a l C o u n -
cil i n the name o f A l l a h and i n the name o f the Palestinian Arab
people hereby proclaims the establishment o f the state o f Pales-
tine on our Palestinian territory, w i t h its capital H o l y Jerusalem"
( A b d u l H a d i , 1997: V o l . 1, 332).
In the wake o f the decisions o f the 19 Palestinian National
C o u n c i l , Arafat was invited to speak at a special session of the U N
General Assembly i n Geneva, held o n December 13, 1988. In his
speech, he reiterated the P L O ' s position o n the Jerusalem ques-
tion, and put it i n the most moderate context that had ever been
heard i n the organization's history ( H a ' a r e t z , 14 Dec. 1988).
Immediately after Arafat's speech and after his press conference
the next day, the U n i t e d States launched an official dialogue w i t h
the P L O . T h e U . S . interpreted Arafat as having accepted U N
Resolution 242, as having abandoned terrorism, and as having
recognized Israel's existence. (The dialogue between the U . S . and
the P L O was cut off i n 1990, after the organization refused to
issue an unambiguous condemnation of the M a y 30,1990 attempt
by A b u al-Abas's Palestinian Liberation Front to stage a terrorist
attack against Israeli civilians.)
At this stage, the P L O had not yet conducted negotiations w i t h
Israel and the organization was i n any case not at the center of the

diplomatic stage. T h e moderation i n P L O policy d i d not extend to

Jerusalem. T h e organization's stand on Jerusalem at this stage was
ideological rather than political - it was not w i l l i n g to bargain. It
had made a one-sided payment i n order to j o i n the negotiating
process, but the price of entrance was not going to be paid in J e r u -
salem currency.
Israel's position o n Jerusalem had not, however, become more
flexible i n the decade and a half following 1967. It maintained that
the city i n w h i c h it had wrought huge physical, demographic, and
constitutional changes must remain unified under exclusive
Israeli sovereignty, w i t h Israel taking responsibility for ensuring
freedom o f worship for all religions at their h o l y places. F r o m
Israel's point of view, the status of Jerusalem is different f r o m that
of the rest o f the 1967 territories, so arrangements that applied to
them d i d not apply to Jerusalem. A t the beginning o f the 1990s,
w h e n the P L O pushed its way into the negotiating hall and took
its place beside the table, Israel's position o n Jerusalem changed.
Henceforth, it w o u l d become more pragmatic about Jerusalem
and more w i l l i n g to v i e w it as a political issue. B y then Israel could
no longer ignore the presence o f the Palestinian "homeowner"
facing it, and d u r i n g the negotiations over Jerusalem there was a
quantum leap. U n t i l that happened at the M a d r i d Conference and
in the O s l o agreements, the two sides had to overcome Israel's
two nos - no negotiations w i t h the P L O and no negotiations
about Jerusalem. A s expected, breaking these 'nos' became a chal-
lenge for the Palestinians.
D e t o u r i n g a r o u n d Jerusalem a n d the P L O
Republican Ronald Reagan was among the most friendly o f

American presidents i n his attitude towards Israel, yet despite this
he did not accept the Begin government's position on East Jerusa-
lem. In the wake o f the Lebanon W a r o f 1982, Reagan decided to
promote a continuation o f the diplomatic process that had begun
at C a m p D a v i d . Reagan's administration understood that it could
not ignore the Jerusalem question entirely, but that it was not
worthwhile to awaken too many disputes over it. In the plan he
proposed on September 1, 1982, Reagan addressed o n l y what he
thought was the necessary m i n i m u m : he said that the U . S . sup-
ported the proposal to allow Palestinian residents o f East

Jerusalem to participate i n the elections to the autonomy author-

ity. Jerusalem w o u l d remain undivided, he maintained, w i t h its
final status to be determined by negotiation. Reagan believed that
the territories-for-peace formula should be implemented i n the
West B a n k w i t h o u t it bringing about the establishment of a Pales-
tinian state. T h e final solution i n this arena, i n his opinion, w o u l d
be achieved between Jordan and Israel. In the meantime, there
w o u l d be an interim arrangement o f five years, during w h i c h
period a self-governing Palestinian regime w o u l d be administered
by an elected Palestinian authority. Reagan refrained from stating
in his plan that the principle of territories for peace applied also to
Jerusalem, or that it applied o n l y to the rest of the West Bank, nor
did he say whether, i n the permanent agreement, the autonomy
w o u l d be linked to Jordan or to Israel.
B e g i n and Arafat rejected Reagan's plan categorically. Begin
was angered that it had been issued w i t h o u t prior consultation,
and Arafat was not prepared to l e n d his hand to a plan that
rejected the establishment o f a Palestinian state and w h i c h d i d
not accept the P L O as a party to the permanent settlement.
M o r e o v e r , Reagan's plan placed m u c h hope i n K i n g H u s s e i n o f
J o r d a n taking the P L O ' s place, after the P L O ' s forces had been
beaten i n the war and the organization had been deported from
L e b a n o n . J o r d a n said it w o u l d not take such a risk unless the
U . S . could pressure Israel at the very least, to freeze its settle-
ment activity i n the territories. In Jordan's view, the settlements
endangered the H a s h i m i t e character o f the East Bank, because
they were liable to press the members o f the West B a n k to move
to the east. Jordan's desire to preserve the H a s h i m i t e character o f
its k i n g d o m was greater than its desire to regain control o f the
West Bank.
Furthermore, the P L O ' s defeat i n Lebanon had been military
but not i n any way political. T h e organization enjoyed political
support from Egypt, and President M u b a r a k had reiterated to Sec-
retary of State George Shultz that it was the P L O , not Jordan, that
should conduct the negotiations w i t h Israel. F o r this reason,
H u s s e i n stressed to the U . S . that it w o u l d be difficult for h i m to
act w i t h o u t the P L O ' s approval ( F B I S , 2 Sept. 1982; K l e i n 1 9 8 8 ;
0
Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995: 439-45; Susser, 1985: 2 2 - 5 ; Shultz,

1993: 85-100). T h e failure o f Reagan's initiative proved that the
Lebanon W a r had not eliminated the P L O from the political map.

O n the contrary, its veto power had actually grown stronger. T h e

Reagan program was a non-starter.
T h e desire to break the diplomatic deadlock led the foreign
minister i n Israel's national unity government, S h i m o n Peres, to
conduct a personal, secret diplomatic effort behind the back o f
L i k u d P r i m e M i n i s t e r Yitzhak Shamir. O n A p r i l 11, 1987, before
the Intifada began, Peres's secret diplomacy led to the L o n d o n
agreement. T h e L o n d o n agreement was the endpoint o f a l o n g
series o f contacts d u r i n g 1986-87, i n w h i c h the participants were
Peres, Hussein, and A m e r i c a n envoys. In these contacts, Peres
tried to realize the Jordanian option, as he understood it. T h i s
meant convening an international conference i n w h i c h the P L O
w o u l d not participate, or at most w o u l d be a j u n i o r participant.
O n l y eight years later, Peres led the negotiations w i t h the P L O
without Jordan's knowledge, but i n the years 1985-87 he labored
to bolster Jordan's standing i n the West B a n k and to weaken the
P L O ' s status both there and i n Tunisia. (The b o m b i n g o f P L O
headquarters and Arafat's residence i n T u n i s i n October 1985 was
presented as Israeli retaliation for the murder o f three o f its c i v i l -
ians i n Cyprus, but at the same time it was meant to get the senior
Palestinian actor out o f the arena and make it easier for the K i n g o f
Jordan to take his place.) In J u l y 1985, Peres reached an under-
standing w i t h H u s s e i n that the U n i t e d States w o u l d open a dia-
logue w i t h a Jordanian delegation that w o u l d include Palestinian
members from the P L O . Peres conditioned the participation o f
P L O representatives on the organization, disavowing terrorism
immediately at the end o f the meeting. H e promised that i n such a
case Israel w o u l d only protest against opening a dialogue w i t h
P L O members without the organization having abandoned ter-
rorism. Reagan, however, opposed this. In October and N o v e m -
ber 1985, several further important meetings were held between
the parties and, according to the account o f one o f the participants,
the problem o f Jerusalem was also floated, indirectly. Because o f
the conflicting demands o f the two sides for sovereignty over
Jerusalem, everyone preferred to adopt Carter's approach and
postpone seeking a solution to the problem until the end o f the
negotiations. In the meantime, Israel agreed that i n the final
arrangement there w o u l d be a Jordanian presence on the T e m p l e
M o u n t , and that a Jordanian flag w o u l d fly over the Islamic holy
sites (Zak, 1996: 20, 201-2, 205).

110 J e r u s a l e m : the Contested City
H u s s e i n and Peres signed the " L o n d o n Agreement," and the

Israeli cabinet was meant to approve it after the U . S . presented it
to Shamir. T h e agreement stipulated that an international M i d d l e
East peace conference w o u l d be convened w i t h the participation
of a j o i n t Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. T h e participants i n
the conference w o u l d be obligated to accept U N Security C o u n -
cil resolutions 242 and 388, to abandon terrorism and violence,
and to conduct direct talks among them. It was, by and large, a
procedural document that d i d not make any mention o f the c o n -
ference's agenda and w h i c h made no reference to Jerusalem. T h e
n o n - i n c l u s i o n o f Jerusalem was something that Peres adopted,
following Carter, w i t h the goal o f circumventing the differences
between Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians, as well as the dif-
ferences between the Labor Party and the L i k u d , the prime m i n i s -
ter's party. T h i s was not the only piece o f creative diplomacy that
Peres concocted, and it was ingenious to the point of being unten-
able. Peres tried to use H u s s e i n to tempt Shamir to go to an inter-
national conference, and used the U n i t e d States as the salesman
who was supposed to market the goods to a stubborn client. Peres
presented Shamir w i t h a menu f i x e at a bargain price, but the price
didn't interest Shamir. W h a t did interest h i m was that the meal
had been prepared without his knowledge. T h e L i k u d ministers
viewed Peres's actions as political subversion and this confirmed
their image o f the foreign minister and his party as unreliable.
W h e n the debate turned into a contention between the two par-
ties, Peres's hope for a vote that w o u l d cross party lines - like the
vote o n w i t h d r a w i n g the Israeli army from Lebanon i n 1985 - was
dashed. T h e camps were clear, as were the rules o f the coalition
game. T h e national unity government was one i n w h i c h the two
large parties and their satellites had equal numbers o f ministers,
and a tie vote o n any subject meant its rejection. That was the
result o f the vote o n the L o n d o n Agreement on M a y 13, 1988.
T h e paralyzing parity and the mutual veto doomed i n advance
every proposal that became framed as a partisan dispute (Koren,
1994: 148-50, 188-93; Makovsky, 1996: 181-2; Shultz, 1993:
937-42; Zak, 1996: 267-8, 270-3).
T h i s political paralysis was one of the factors leading to the out-
break of the Intifada i n December 1987. A short time thereafter, i n
January 1988, the political leaders o f the local inhabitants (the
"internal" leaders, i n Palestinian jargon, as opposed to the

"external" leadership, the P L O i n T u n i s ) issued a political pro-

gram, laying out their demands i n 14 points. T h e Palestinian posi-
tion on East Jerusalem was unambiguous, and i n contrast w i t h
Peres's desire to strike it from the diplomatic agenda, the Palestin-
ians addressed the issue prominently. A c c o r d i n g to the Palestinian
program, East Jerusalem was an inseparable part o f the 1967 terri-
tories, and they therefore demanded that Israel desist from its
construction, population, land confiscation, and settlement activ-
ity i n East Jerusalem as i n the rest o f the 1967 territories. In any
case, the Palestinians emphasized, Israel had to conduct negotia-
tions w i t h the P L O (Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995: 505-7). In fact, the
14-point plan was a protest manifesto, the product o f a political
uprising more than a basis for meaningful negotiation. T h e
importance o f the plan is not its details, but i n its presentation.
T h e Intifada's success gave the inhabitants o f the territories and
their political leaders prominence and from this point onward this
coterie o f political leaders took its proper place as a mediating
factor between Israel and the U . S . on the one side and the P L O on
the other.
Despite the Reagan administration's bitter experience i n pre-
senting a plan for the resolution o f the M i d d l e East conflict, Sec-
retary of State George Shultz was of the o p i n i o n that three months
of the Intifada were a sufficient spur for the two sides to move
towards each other. O n M a r c h 4, 1988, Shultz wrote to K i n g
Hussein and P r i m e M i n i s t e r Shamir asking for their response to
proposals gathered i n a framework that was already familiar to
them from previous programs. T h i s included an international
peace conference and ajointJordanian-Palestinian delegation; an
interim arrangement and permanent agreement; the acceptance o f
resolutions 242 and 338; abandonment of terrorism and violence;
and consent to direct talks between the parties as a condition for
participating i n the p l e n u m . Shultz even set out a detailed sched-
ule linking the interim arrangement to the permanent solution,
and thought that this w o u l d attract the Palestinians. A s for
Shamir, Shultz tried to tempt h i m by stating that the J o r d a n i a n -
Palestinian path w o u l d not be dependent o n the other channels o f
negotiations, that the conference w o u l d not be able to force s o l u -
tions on the parties, and w o u l d not veto agreements achieved i n
bilateral talks. T h i s meant that the conference w o u l d not turn into
a means o f applying Arab pressure against Israel. Regarding

Jerusalem, Shultz adopted Peres's line, and he thus made no m e n -

tion at all o f the Jerusalem problem i n his plan, just as he said
nothing about the conference's agenda (Makovsky, 1996: 183;
Shultz, 1993: 1,028-9).
As far as the Palestinians were concerned, Shultz succeeded i n
circumventing the Jerusalem problem on the way to the interna-
tional conference, but he d i d not manage to circumvent the P L O .
T h e P L O ' s leaders i n T u n i s were disturbed i n particular by their
absence from the negotiations picture, w h i c h they interpreted as a
denial of their right to an independent state, and the duty to estab-
lish an independent Palestinian state and the installation o f an
alternative quisling leadership. T h e P L O had always identified
itself w i t h the Palestinian nation and w i t h its demand for inde-
pendence and it considered the Palestinian representation slated
to participate i n the conference to be a puppet delegation to w h o m
the conditions for a settlement could easily be dictated. T h e issue
of a state was a matter o f principle for the P L O , more important
than having the first meeting ever i n East Jerusalem between an
A m e r i c a n secretary o f state and p r o m i n e n t Palestinians. F o r this
reason, the P L O made it clear that it w o u l d not permit the repre-
sentatives o f the territories to attend the meeting w i t h Shultz at
the A m e r i c a n C o l o n y H o t e l i n East Jerusalem. W h a t seemed
very dangerous to the Palestinians d i d not tempt Shamir. H e was
nauseated by the c o n v e n i n g of an international peace conference
and was not at all impressed by Shultz's roundabout way o f
achieving it.
W h i l e Shamir's fears were not the P L O ' s , paradoxically the
fears of one party to the confrontation did not neutralize the fears
of the opposing side. Shultz d i d not succeed i n using the fears o f
each side as a way o f sedating the opposite side. Shamir rejected
the initiative, and the designated Palestinian delegation notified
Shultz i n advance of the P L O ' s veto. Despite this, the secretary o f
state insisted o n showing up for the meeting at the American
C o l o n y H o t e l . H e wanted to be the first secretary o f state to visit
East Jerusalem and to make a statement before the world's press
on the political rights of the Palestinians, and to proclaim that the
Palestinians should receive political and economic responsibility
for issues that touch them and influence their lives (Shultz, 1993:
1,024—5). Shultz's memoirs give the impression that Shamir's
repeated rejections made Shultz all the more determined to go to

East Jerusalem, and spurred h i m to establish an official l i n k w i t h

the P L O towards the end o f his term at the State Department, i n
December 1988. It should be noted that the issue of Jerusalem was
not raised i n the official contacts between the U . S . and the P L O .
F r o m the point of view of the U . S . , Jerusalem was not preventing
the P L O from achieving legitimacy and status. T h e issue was
raised only i n the public pronouncements o f P L O leaders (Abas
[ A b u - M a z i n ] , 1995: 28-9).
Shultz was right about the incentive that the Intifada had cre-
ated for the two sparring sides, Israel and the Palestinians, but
some time had to pass before the Intifada produced political fruit.
T h e Intifada's success caused the Israeli government to under-
stand that it must initiate some sort o f diplomatic program i n
order to m i n i m i z e its losses. Israel's peace plan o f M a y 14, 1989
was aimed at continuing the C a m p D a v i d agreements via negotia-
tions w i t h a delegation o f inhabitants o f the territories. T h e big
innovation i n the plan was the section that stated that the Palestin-
ian delegation w o u l d be elected, chosen by the Palestinian inhab-
itants of the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. T h i s recognized that Israel
had to give the inhabitants o f the territories something as a result
of their uprising. In addition to m a k i n g a necessary concession,
Israel also sought to use the elections to create an alternative lead-
ership to the P L O . Israel hoped the residents o f the territories
w o u l d use the Intifada to rid themselves of the P L O . T h e plan d i d
not speak of an international conference, w h i c h was taboo for the
L i k u d , but rather o f direct negotiations w i t h the elected delega-
tion o f the Palestinians. A t first they w o u l d discuss an agreement
for an interim period o f five years, d u r i n g w h i c h the inhabitants o f
the territories w o u l d enjoy self-government except i n the areas o f
security, foreign affairs, and the settlements, and later there w o u l d
be discussions for a final agreement. T h e plan explicitly rejected
any sort o f negotiation w i t h the P L O , and noted that the perma-
nent settlement and determination o f Israel's eastern border
w o u l d be agreed on w i t h Jordan. H o w e v e r , the Israeli program
refrained from proposing a clear outline o f the permanent agree-
ment. A c c o r d i n g to the accepted practice of Israeli governments o f
the 1980s, the plan d i d not mention Jerusalem (Laqueur & R u b i n ,
1995: 547-51). H o w e v e r , the minute the idea o f elections had
been broached, the question of Jerusalem could not be ignored,
because the inevitable question was whether and h o w elections

w o u l d be held i n East Jerusalem. A s i f that were not enough, from

here o n out the question of Jerusalem was tied up w i t h the ques-
tion of the P L O ' s presence at the negotiating table.
T h e n o n - m e n t i o n of Jerusalem i n the Israeli plan was a c o m -
promise formulation o f the members o f the "prime ministers'
club," comprised o f Prime M i n i s t e r Shamir and the two former
prime ministers that served i n his national unity cabinet - Foreign
M i n i s t e r Peres and Defense M i n i s t e r Rabin. T h e plan had to
paper over their differences o f opinion, since during this period,
the cabinet was equally divided between hawks and doves. W h i l e
the Labor ministers were pressing for a positive decision on the
participation o f East Jerusalem's Arabs i n the elections as voters,
though not as candidates, L i k u d ministers Sharon, M o d a ' i and
Levy were pressuring Shamir to oppose the plan. T h e y opposed
any participation at all by East Jerusalem's Arabs i n the elections,
as w e l l as any negotiations w i t h the P L O and the establishment o f
a Palestinian state (Koren, 1994: 219-24). T h e L i k u d thought that
allowing East Jerusalem Arabs to vote for the autonomous author-
ity w o u l d be tantamount to sanctioning a Palestinian political ele-
ment i n Jerusalem, w h i c h they viewed as a significant step
towards redivision o f the city. Labor, for its part, maintained that
there was no evil i n allowing East Jerusalem Arabs to vote, just as
U . S . citizens living outside their country are allowed to vote i n
presidential elections from their place o f residence. In order to
differentiate the elections i n Jerusalem from those i n the rest o f
the territories, the Labor Party proposed placing the voting sites
outside the city limits. T h e Labor Party opposed allowing East
Jerusalem Palestinians to be candidates i n the election, because it
interpreted this to i m p l y the application of Palestinianjurisdiction
and law o n East Jerusalem via their representatives i n the legisla-
tive council (Makovsky, 1996: 31-2).
T h e only way around these opposing pressures w i t h i n the
Israeli government was to ignore the subject of Jerusalem entirely,
k n o w i n g that o n this issue there was a difference o f opinion
between the L i k u d and Labor. E v e n before a decision was needed,
Labor and the L i k u d were divided on the issue of whether Israel
w o u l d allow Palestinians from Jerusalem to participate even i n the
negotiations over the procedures for and implementation o f the
elections. T h e L i k u d unanimously vetoed this, seeing it as a first
step towards the participation of residents of East Jerusalem i n the

elections, and rejected the Labor Party proposal to make a gesture

to the Palestinians o n this issue. A n additional Israeli initiative for
the advancement o f the peace process was thus ground into
powder by the national unity government.
T h e P L O officially rejected the Israel program, since it left out
both the P L O and the question of Jerusalem. Unofficially, h o w -
ever, the P L O ' s leaders understood that via the elections they
could get into the diplomatic process through the back door, even
though the front door had been slammed i n their faces. T h i s was
indeed the new reality created i n the territories after the Intifada
began at the end o f 1987 and after Jordan severed its ties w i t h the
West Bank at the end of J u l y 1988. It was no longer possible to
ignore the P L O as a diplomatic actor, and it w o u l d be the P L O
that w o u l d decide the results o f the elections i n the territories.
T h e organization's leadership remembered that for four years
they had been searching for a way to integrate themselves into the
diplomatic process, but their w i s h had not been granted, even
though i n the A m m a n agreement o f 1985 the P L O had accepted
the principle o f territory for peace. T h e position o f Israel and the
U . S . was that a solution o f the Palestinian problem w o u l d be
found i n the framework of Jordan or i n the framework o f auton-
omy for the inhabitants o f the West B a n k and o f the Gaza Strip.
T h e Intifada indeed proved that it was no longer possible to ignore
the Palestinians as an active element i n the diplomatic scene, and
Israel and the U . S . thus toyed w i t h the thought that the P L O ' s
place could be taken by local representatives of the Intifada rebels.
T h i s hope was, however, disappointed. W h i l e the Intifada d i d i n
fact elevate the status o f the "inside" leaders, they could under no
circumstances be an alternative to the establishment ensconced i n
T u n i s ; the leaders o f the "outside" also made sure to prevent this
by carefully controlling the grants they poured "inside." T h e y
encouraged the growth of several competing elite groups "inside,"
all, of them looking to the P L O "outside," seeking to preserve their
positions as granters of authority, legitimacy, and status. T h e P L O
leadership i n T u n i s maneuvered astutely and successfully
between the different elites. It knew that i n order to be integrated
into the diplomatic process it had to take advantage of the opening
provided to the "inside" leadership, and at the same time t u r n the
"insiders" to its emissaries. It had to give them rope to conduct
talks while at the same time proving to the opposite side h o w short

the reach o f the insiders was; it must prove the seriousness o f its
intentions and be flexible without losing sight o f its principal
goals. T h i s process was conducted between 1989-93 and reached
its height i n the period between the M a d r i d Conference and the
Israel-Palestinian statement of principles.
T h e person w h o persuaded the P L O to raise the gauntlet that
Israel had t h r o w n d o w n before it was Egyptian President
M u b a r a k , w h o had a very good grasp o f the importance o f the
planned elections - national political elections held for the first
time i n Palestinian national history, and specifically since Israel
had occupied the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. M u b a r a k helped the
P L O become convinced that the endpoint o f this detour around
the P L O paved by Israel could be Yassir Arafat himself (later, the
P L O , w i t h the help o f Secretary o f State Baker, w o u l d reach the
same conclusion about Jerusalem). Therefore, the Egyptian presi-
dent devised, i n September 1989, a ten-point plan, w i t h elections
in the territories at its center. T h e debate between Israel and
M u b a r a k was conducted around the question of who w o u l d par-
ticipate i n the negotiations over the Israeli plan - w h o w o u l d rep-
resent the Palestinian side? It was clear to all that the Palestinian
delegation w o u l d be composed of people from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. B u t what part w o u l d the P L O play i n putting the dele-
gation together? T h e P L O acceded to Mubarak's request to
remain i n the background, but demanded that all threads lead to
it, and visibly - the P L O w o u l d appoint the delegation and declare
that the Palestinians accepted the initiative, or at the very least
w o u l d make it clear to the entire w o r l d that it had given the dele-
gation a green light.
T h i s , o f course, intersected w i t h the issue o f the participation
of East Jerusalem representatives i n the Palestinian delegation and
the question o f whether and h o w the elections w o u l d be held
there. In Mubarak's plan, Jerusalem was part o f the West Bank,
and the sections addressing the electoral process i n the West Bank
also applied to Jerusalem. A l l the inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza, i n c l u d i n g "the Palestinians i n East Jerusalem, w i l l partici-
pate i n the elections," both as voters and as candidates ( F i l a s t i n a l -
T h a w r a , 17 Sept. 1989). President M u b a r a k thus maintainedthat,
w i t h regard to the elections, all the arrangements applying to the
rest o f the 1967 territories w o u l d also apply to East Jerusalem: all
of Israel's security forces w o u l d have to retreat from the territories

during the elections, no entry o f Israelis w o u l d be allowed o n

election day, the elections w o u l d be held under international
supervision, and the candidates w o u l d have complete freedom o f
expression during the election campaign. E v e n though Israel
rejected the plan, President Mubarak's efforts were not i n vain.
His plan was coordinated w i t h the U n i t e d States, and Secretary o f
State James Baker, w h o w o u l d soon sire his o w n five-point plan,
and later the M a d r i d Conference adopted several o f the Egyptian
leader's points.
In October 1989 Baker formulated his five points, w h i c h were
meant to produce a consensus on the composition of the Palestin-
ian delegation. Baker proposed that Israel approve the c o m p o s i -
tion o f the delegation, enabling it to ensure that it contained no
P L O representatives; the agenda o f the discussions w o u l d be
open. Israel w o u l d come to the negotiations w i t h its M a y 14,1989
election plan, w h i l e the Palestinian delegation could put other
subjects o n the agenda or propose to broaden the circle o f partici-
pants and include P L O representatives as w e l l . Baker also stated
that, i n the framework o f the negotiations, the Palestinians could
express their position o n the election arrangements; that is, they
could demand to hold them i n Jerusalem as well (Laqueur &
R u b i n , 1995: 556). T h i s formulation made it possible to transfer
the disagreements over elections i n Jerusalem to the negotiating
table, without allowing the difference o f views to block the discus-
sions themselves. T h i s technical-procedural compromise was
accompanied by a clarification made by the U . S . to Egypt and the
P L O tbat, i n its opinion, the East Jerusalem Arabs ought to parti-
cipate i n the planned elections. T h e U . S . refrained, however,
from promising that it w o u l d impose its o p i n i o n o n Israel.
U p o n the presentation o f Baker's five points, the L i k u d and
Labor again began to argue over the issue of the participation of East
Jerusalem Palestinians in the negotiating delegation. Like the U . S . ,
Labor supported their participation, while the L i k u d was, of course,
opposed. T h i s dispute led to the dissolution o f the national unity
government i n M a r c h 1990, but not before Labor and Baker made
one last attempt to placate the L i k u d . Baker proposed that the Pales-
tinian delegation include two or three Palestinians that Israel had i n
the past deported from the territories, alongside a person w i t h two
addresses, one of w h i c h was i n East Jerusalem. T h r o u g h this c o m -
promise Baker hoped to accommodate both the P L O leadership

and Israel. Israel w o u l d claim that they were indigenous n o n - P L O

Palestinians o f the territories, w h i l e the P L O w o u l d claim that
they represented the "external" P L O . T h i s was a brilliant idea that
caused a difference o f o p i n i o n i n the L i k u d . Foreign Minister
Arens favored accepting the A m e r i c a n compromise proposal, but
Shamir and the other L i k u d ministers opposed it vociferously.
Baker thought that the L i k u d ' s moderates w o u l d vote w i t h the
Labor ministers to accept his proposal, but w h e n it became an
internal Israeli political issue, it was no longer possible for the
amenable L i k u d ministers to break ranks and vote against their
party. T h e L i k u d o n l y saw what it wanted to see - the political suc-
cess o f the Labor Party. F o r the L i k u d , Labor was a horrifying
demon, worse than a diplomatic quagmire and worse than a con-
frontation w i t h the U . S . O n l y w h e n the L i k u d remained alone i n
government d i d its internal differences of opinion become a cata-
lyst for the advancement o f the peace process. B u t this happened
only after the G u l f War o f 1991, w h e n , i n parallel, the necessary
changes i n the w o r l d and the region took place that made conven-
ing the M a d r i d Conference possible (Arens, 1995: 124; Bentzur,
1997: 46-50; Shamir, 1994: 248-9, 258).
A consensual l i e : t h e P L O does notfunction in Jerusalem
After the G u l f War, i n 1991, Baker renewed his efforts to achieve a

peace accord i n the M i d d l e East, taking advantage o f the state o f
the Arab w o r l d at the end o f the war. Arab unity had been shat-
tered more severely than at any time since the Arab states o f the
M i d d l e East had come into existence. A pro-Western block had
consolidated, for the first time bringing together the oil states w i t h
their money and capital and Syria and Egypt, the strongest and
most important Arab states that had i n the past led the war against
Israel. T h e Palestinians, w h o had supported Iraq, were stinging
from their ally's defeat, and Jordan was eagerly k n o c k i n g o n the
U . S . ' s door after having taken an equivocal stance during the war.
T h e international stage was weighted i n the U . S . ' s favor, espe-
cially after the collapse of the Soviet b l o c and the end of the C o l d
War, o n w h i c h the Israel-Arab dispute had been built as an_upper
floor. A l l this allowed the U n i t e d States to get the wheels o f the
diplomatic process m o v i n g . Baker had the full support o f Presi-
dent George B u s h , the leader o f the victorious war coalition, and

The P L O : f r o m t h e W i n g s t o C e n t e r Stage 119
it was hard to resist the brilliant move he planned. Baker, the ener-
getic architect o f the conference, entered the political history o f
the M i d d l e East w i t h his truly amazing diplomacy.
;
The major element was the A m e r i c a n proposal o n M a r c h 6,
1991 of a procedural framework for the convention of an interna-
tional M i d d l e East peace conference. A c c o r d i n g to the proposal,
in the framework o f the conference there w o u l d be negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians o n a two-stage s o l u t i o n to
the conflict. T h e first stage w o u l d be the establishment o f self-
government for a transition period of five years, w i t h negotiations
on a permanent settlement beginning i n the third year. T h e Pales-
tinians w o u l d be represented at the conference by a delegation o f
residents of the territories that w o u l d be part of a j o i n t J o r d a n i a n -
Palestinian delegation (this analysis o f the actions leading to the
M a d r i d conference is based o n Abas [ A b u - M a z i n ] , 1995; Arens,
1995: 241-6, 271-2; Ashrawi, 1995: 81-130; Baker, 1995;
Bentzur, 1997: 82-135; Makovsky, 1996: 443-67; Naufel, 1995).
In order to bring the different sides into the vicinity of his goal,
Baker used a number o f methods that he h i m s e l f compared to
hunting, his favorite hobby. First, Baker took elements from past
plans. There was the international conference that Shultz and his
predecessors had insisted on, the Israeli government's proposal
for negotiations w i t h an elected Palestinian leadership, and the
formal formula drafted by Baker i n his five-point plan concerning
the Palestinian delegation and the agenda. Second, Baker was an
active mediator w h o did not wait for the parties to accept his p r o -
posal. H e presented himself as acting i n the name of the president
of the U n i t e d States and applied pressure to all the relevant par-
ties. Baker took advantage of the collapse of the Soviet U n i o n , and
of America's position as leader o f the victorious G u l f War coali-
tion i n order to create a situation i n w h i c h the sides c o u l d not
reject his plan. T h e fact is that the major participants i n the c o n -
ference - Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria — dragged their feet all
the way to M a d r i d , but i n the end they got there.
T h i r d , Baker succeeded i n redefining the questions of principle
as procedural problems. Baker's goal was to encourage all the par-
ties to make procedural and symbolic concessions and to leave the
fundamental issues for the negotiations. H e knew that there was
an issue o f substance behind every m i n o r and symbolic proce-
dural concession, but w i t h regard to the procedural issues Baker

suggested compromises that were difficult to reject. T h e same was

true o f the issue o f Jerusalem. U n l i k e Shultz, Baker understood
that it was impossible to ignore Jerusalem entirely. H e imposed a
compromise between Israel's desire to remove Jerusalem from
the M a d r i d conference and the Palestinian desire to link it inexo-
rably to the fate o f the rest o f the 1967 territories. F o u r t h , Baker
pulled the parties into the process by p r o m i s i n g compensation i f
the move succeeded, and by continually increasing the price o f
failure. Baker also knew that the further the process progressed
and the involvement o f the different sides increased, it w o u l d be
harder for them to free themselves, to shake off responsibility for
the failure o f the talks and to accuse their opponents o f being the
reason for the breakdown. A t times o f crisis he thus repeated to
each party that they could not allow themselves to be accused o f
responsibility for leaving the process to die. W h e n there seemed to
be no w i l l to succeed and the collapse o f the whole enterprise
seemed i m m i n e n t , Baker k n e w h o w to get each person he spoke
to to react to A m e r i c a n anger. These each then tried to prove that
the failure o f the talks was not their fault. H e was not a well-liked
mediator but he was efficient, aloof, and shrewd. Those w h o sat
across from h i m feared h i m and were afraid to disappoint h i m .
D o n ' t let the cat die on y o u r doorstep, he w o u l d repeatedly warn
the different parties, each one i n turn. A t the same time, Baker
k n e w h o w to arouse expectations and deepen trust and confidence
i n his w o r d .
H e first dealt w i t h Shamir, w h o m he estimated to be the tough-
est customer. Baker d i d not want to begin from ground zero, but
instead from the agreements that had been achieved between
Shamir and Shultz i n the Israeli plan o f M a y 14, 1991. O n e o f
these agreements had to do w i t h the international opening,
Shamir's term for an international conference o f a single session,
after w h i c h there w o u l d be direct bilateral talks between Israel and
each o f its neighbors. T h e second agreement was that each o f the
negotiating channels w o u l d be independent o f the others. T h e
third agreement was that no official representative o f the P L O
w o u l d participate i n the conference. O n A p r i l 19,1991, Baker told
Shamir that i f the Palestinian representatives on the j o i n t delega-
tion declared that they represented the P L O , Israel could leave the
talks, and the U n i t e d States w o u l d follow. B u t this promise was
not sufficient for Shamir, and he demanded that the Palestinians

participating i n the conference not mention the P L O at all; he also

demanded that they provide written statements that they d i d not
represent Arafat.
Baker was not w i l l i n g to go that far. H e made it clear to S h a m i r
that no Palestinian w o u l d be able to attend the conference w i t h o u t
an explicit or secret green light from the P L O , because otherwise
his or her life w o u l d be forfeited. T h e representatives of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip w o u l d be required to declare that the P L O
did not oppose their inclusion i n the delegation, the secretary o f
state claimed. T h i s could lead to an agreement between h i m and
the Palestinians o n maintaining contact. In order to promote this
possibility, Baker asked Shamir not to speak out against the P L O .
The West Bank and Gaza Strip representatives w o u l d , for their
part, not sing the P L O ' s praises and claim to be its proxies. U n d e r
Baker's overbearing, intimidating, and blunt pressure, Shamir was
forced to agree grudgingly to a Palestinian delegation that was i n
practice linked to the P L O but w h i c h denied this, or at least d i d
not explicitly confirm it. T h i s was an opening that had never
before been available to the P L O , and through w h i c h it could
w o r m its way into the negotiations. Baker also k n e w h o w to
extend Shamir a bag of carrots - o n A p r i l 19, 1991, he agreed w i t h
Shamir that i f the initiative failed because of Palestinian inflexibil-
ity, they w o u l d both blame the P L O . In exchange for Shamir's
procedural concessions, Baker moved towards h i m o n other pro-
cedural matters: the conference w o u l d have no power to compel,
it w o u l d not take votes, and it w o u l d not make decisions. It w o u l d
be a ceremonial conference and no more, Baker and Shamir
agreed. O n M a y 22, 1991, Baker put his understandings w i t h
Shamir into writing. T h e U . S . understood that Israel w o u l d not
agree to sit d o w n w i t h people unacceptable to it, but neither
w o u l d the Palestinians o f the West B a n k and Gaza Strip come i f
the P L O actively opposed it. T h e y required personal, individual
permission, a k i n d o f tacit sanction, to participate i n the confer-
ence. Shamir was not enthusiastic and tried to change Baker's
position, but to no avail. T h e debate n o w proceeded to other
issues. O n M a y 28, 1991, there was a discussion about h o w the
Palestinian representatives to the conference w o u l d be chosen
and h o w the P L O leadership w o u l d give its covert green light. A t
this point two o f Shamir's aides tried to turn the clock back and
reject any link o f the delegation to P L O headquarters i n T u n i s or

to the P L O at all. Baker reacted sharply, demanding that Shamir

keep his commitments. H a v i n g obtained guarded consent from
the Israeli side, Baker had to go to the P L O and show it w h y it
w o u l d be persuaded to accept Shamir's preferred framework.
Baker took care of the P L O o n several channels. First, the P L O
had to approve the meeting between the "internal" leadership and
Baker so that the talks o n convening the M a d r i d conference could
get underway. In the light of the P L O ' s l o w international status, it
could not refuse, and i n this regard Baker was in a better position
than Shultz had been. M o r e o v e r , since Shultz's initiative, the
P L O ' s authority over the Palestinian political leadership i n the
territories had increased, and thus its ability to prevent them from
becoming an alternative to the leadership i n T u n i s . T h e leaders i n
the territories seemed, to the U . S . , to be appropriate partners for
dialogue, not only because they had been so portrayed i n past dip-
lomatic initiatives, but also because they had expressed reserva-
tions about the P L O ' s unambiguous support for Saddam H u s s e i n
d u r i n g the G u l f War. U n d e r the circumstances created after the
war, negotiations through the leadership i n the territories looked
to Israel like a way of getting around the P L O , and to the P L O as
the high road into the international arena. E v e n the negotiations
about the negotiations gave political prestige to the Palestinians
and to the P L O . T h e Palestinians' positive response was given on
M a r c h 10, 1991, and two days later a Palestinian delegation met
w i t h Baker at the A m e r i c a n Consulate in west Jerusalem (the del-
egation had 11 members; five came to the next meeting, and
thereafter three: H a n a n Ashrawi and Faisal Husseini from Jerusa-
lem and Zakariya al-Agha from Gaza). A t the first meeting Baker
notified the Palestinians that it was none of his business w h o their
leader was and from w h o m they were receiving instructions. H e
was looking for leaders from the territories w h o were not officially
members of the P L O , w h o were prepared to conduct direct nego-
tiations w i t h Israel o n a two-stage solution based on U N resolu-
tions 242 and 338, w h o rejected terrorism and w h o supported the
principle o f territoiy for peace. T h e Palestinian representatives
clearly needed the P L O ' s blessing, and Baker allowed them to
consult w i t h T u n i s . In this way the P L O became an "absent pres-
ence" i n the negotiations.
Second, since Baker lacked an official negotiating channel
between the P L O and the U . S . , he enlisted K i n g Fahd o f Saudi

Arabia and President M u b a r a k o f Egypt, his partners i n the war

coalition against Iraq, i n order to extract the P L O ' s consent to
refrain from taking an official role i n the lead-up to and at the
M a d r i d conference. T h e P L O w o u l d still, however, be tied to the
process so that it could not r u n away from or torpedo it. T h i r d ,
Baker had a relatively easy time closing a deal w i t h K i n g H u s s e i n .
Jordan agreed i n principle to a j o i n t delegation w i t h the P L O
because it wanted to improve its relations w i t h the U.S., damaged
by its failure to j o i n the anti-Iraq coalition. O n M a y 14, H u s s e i n
and Baker agreed that the delegation o f "insiders" w o u l d w o r k
openly w i t h H u s s e i n , but w o u l d covertly mediate between h i m
and Arafat to set up a j o i n t delegation. H u s s e i n even agreed, for
appearance's sake, not to invite Arafat to visit A m m a n so long as
the deal had not been closed. Above all, H u s s e i n also agreed to
exploit his direct negotiating lines w i t h Israeli leaders i n order to
pass o n to Shamir a promise that there w o u l d be no "bad sur-
prises" i n the j o i n t delegation. In other words, Arafat and his
people w o u l d not suddenly materialize as members. T h i s was a
smart move by Baker and H u s s e i n . Even though Shamir d i d not
have Hussein's confidence (Shultz, 1993: 942-4), H u s s e i n had
Shamir's confidence after having kept the promises he had made
to the prime minister at their meeting o n the eve of the G u l f War.
At that time H u s s e i n had asked Shamir for an Israeli c o m m i t m e n t
that Israeli air or ground forces w o u l d not pass through his k i n g -
dom i f Israel decided to retaliate against an Iraqi attack. H u s s e i n
did not want his country to turn into a battlefield. Shamir pre-
vented any action by Israeli forces against Iraq, justifying this,
among other reasons, by stating that he could not violate J o r d a -
nian sovereignty (Zak, 1996: 21, 35, 48, 51). Thanks to this pact
w i t h Hussein, Shamir was able to stand firm against the pressures
from his cabinet and from the Israeli military to retaliate against
the Iraqi missile attacks against Israel. H e thus avoided endanger-
ing the A m e r i c a n - A r a b coalition against Iraq. In short, the P L O
accepted Baker's line that Shamir should be given the procedural
commitments he demanded, w h i l e standing f i r m only o n purely
substantive issues that w o u l d be brought up at the conference
itself.
As was his habit, Shamir engaged i n procedural politics w i t h
the goal o f gaining time and benefiting from the complications
being encountered by his Palestinian partner. Baker proposed a

formula to Shamir that the latter thought w o u l d allow h i m to con-

tinue to conduct his procedural politics. A t the same time, Baker
succeeded i n persuading the Palestinians to be considerably more
flexible about procedural questions i n exchange for parallel c o n -
cessions o n the Israeli side, and i n exchange for a letter o f assur-
ance from the U . S . that was closer i n its content to the Palestinian
position than that o f the Israeli's.
T h e p r o b l e m o f Jerusalem came up at the beginning o f Baker's
contacts and accompanied them as they progressed, although not
always w i t h the same intensity. A t times the issue was only m e n -
tioned, at others it was discussed at length. In A p r i l and M a y 1991
a solution took f o r m and i n later contacts it was accepted by the
parties because the deal as a whole satisfied each o f them. T h e
question ofjerusalem had two elements: first, the participation o f
representatives from East Jerusalem i n the Palestinian delegation;
second, the inclusion o f the Jerusalem question on the confer-
ence's agenda. O n A p r i l 10 Shamir demanded that Jerusalem be
completely eliminated from the framework o f negotiations at the
conference, h o p i n g to thus obtain de f a c t o recognition o f the facts
that Israel had created i n the city after 1967. F r o m Shamir's point
o f view, the very fact that the issue ofjerusalem was on the confer-
ence's agenda called the annexation into question, so he
demanded that the East Jerusalem representatives be forbidden to
participate i n the delegation. Baker refused to promise this to
Shamir, and agreed only to try to persuade the Palestinians to give
their assent. In order to help gain the Palestinians' consent, Baker
asked Shamir to refrain from publicly declaring his ultimatum.
Baker made it clear that he d i d not agree w i t h the Israeli position
that categorically rejected, i n every way and all times, the partici-
pation o f East Jerusalem representatives i n the negotiations. T h e
U . S . w o u l d w o r k to achieve this, but it could not promise that
they w o u l d not participate i n the future, Baker explained to Israel
i n his diplomatic way. Between A p r i l 10 and 18, 1991, Baker pro-
posed that the Palestinian delegation include Faisal Husseini from
Jerusalem, w h o had met Shamir previously i n other c i r c u m -
stances. A s for the agenda, Baker proposed that the Jerusalem
question not be discussed during the first stage o f the conference,
w h i c h w o u l d be devoted to the interim arrangement. Jerusalem
w o u l d be raised for discussion only i n the context o f the perma-
nent settlement; the U . S . was w i l l i n g to c o m m i t itself to this i n

writing. T h i s being the case, Baker argued, the East Jerusalem rep-
resentatives could participate i n the j o i n t Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation d u r i n g the talks o n the interim agreement. I f Israel
were to~continue to reject the participation o f East Jerusalem rep-
resentatives at all times and at all stages, i f it refused to allow dis-
cussion o f the eastern city, and i f it made both these preconditions
to the conference, there w o u l d be no peace process, Baker
warned. In this way Baker sought to mediate between Shamir's
position and that o f the Palestinians, towards w h o m Baker was
using similar language. T h e Palestinian demands were, o f course,
the opposite o f Shamir's, and were meant to reject the facts that
Israel had unilaterally established. First, the Palestinians
demanded the inclusion o f East Jerusalem representatives i n their
delegation; second, they demanded that East Jerusalem be
included i n the self-governing area during the period o f the
interim agreement; and finally, their position was that the confer-
ence was meant to ensure the full implementation o f Resolution
242, i n c l u d i n g Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem.
O n A p r i l 26,1991 there was progress i n the wide-ranging c o n -
tacts Baker was conducting, and he informed Shamir that his pro-
cedural conditions had been accepted - the East Jerusalem
representatives w o u l d not participate i n the Palestinian delega-
tion, and Jerusalem w o u l d not be put on the agenda o f the confer-
ence, which would be discussing the interim agreement. In
exchange, Baker extracted Shamir's consent that the joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation w o u l d include one or two members w h o
bore Jordanian passports and w h o had been born i n East Jerusa-
lem, or w h o lived there. H o w e v e r , o n M a y 17, 1991, Shamir
reneged and wrote to Baker that he was not prepared to accept
participation by any representatives o f East Jerusalem, and Baker
accepted this. After accord was reached o n the composition o f the
Palestinian delegation, the discussions concentrated o n the ques-
tion o f h o w the composition o f the delegation w o u l d be assured -
who w o u l d choose the Palestinian representatives, and could
Israel veto them?
D u r i n g the course o f their contacts w i t h Baker, it had been dif-
ficult for the Palestinians to assimilate the B a k e r - S h a m i r under-
standing that neither the subject o f Jerusalem nor the
representatives o f the city's Palestinians w o u l d be allowed into the
conference. F r o m their point o f view this was tantamount to

recognition of the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel. A t one o f

their meetings Faisal H u s s e i n i even told Baker that the secretary
of state was speaking w i t h a dead man. Despite all this, Baker m a n -
aged to persuade the Palestinians to be more flexible on proce-
dural matters and to defer obduracy to the discussions o n
substance. H e argued that i n the substantive talks the solution that
w o u l d take shape w o u l d be closer to their m o d e l than to Israel's.
Baker even promised Faisal H u s s e i n i and H a n a n Ashrawi, resi-
dents o f Jerusalem w i t h Israeli identity cards, that w h i l e they
wouldmot be members of the Palestinian delegation to the confer-
ence, he w o u l d continue to meet w i t h them and to coordinate his
actions w i t h them. Baker reiterated that these restrictions were
temporary and applied only to the first stage o f the talks and
accords. H e pledged that the letter of guarantees w o u l d unambig-
uously state the American position on the issue of East Jerusalem.
T h e final argument i n this series was conducted around the Pales-
tinian demand to be the sole determinants o f the membership o f
their delegation. Shamir w o u l d not consent to this because he sus-
pected that P L O members or East Jerusalem representatives
w o u l d be named to the delegation at the last minute. T h e c o m -
promise stated that the names o f the members o f the Palestinian
delegation w o u l d be delivered to Baker and he w o u l d certify that
they d i d indeed meet the Israeli conditions. Baker pledged to the
Palestinians that he w o u l d not show the list to Israel so that Israel
w o u l d not be i n the position of certifying it or determining w h o m
the Palestinian representatives w o u l d be. Baker notified Shamir
that the Palestinian delegation met Israel's conditions, and that
Israel should thus confirm its participation. Israel gave its consent
on August 2, 1991.
O n the eve o f the M a d r i d conference, o n October 3, 1991, all
that remained to be determined were the rules o f the game
between the P L O and Jordan, regarding the j o i n t delegation. T h e
Palestinians wanted to reach an advance agreement w i t h Jordan
on a delegation that was j o i n t i n name but separate i n practice.
Baker encouraged the leaders from the territories to travel to
Jordan i n order to prove to Shamir that the P L O was indeed not
participating i n the M a d r i d conference. Ashrawi, Husseini•, and
al-Agha went to A m m a n , and at the same time a P L O delegation,
headed by A b u - M a z i n , also arrived. T h e U . S . saw to it that the
two visits were coordinated i n such a way that Shamir and his

The P L O : f w m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 127
government could not object to anyone. A c c o r d i n g to the A m e r i -

can staging, the delegation from the territories was i n the media
spotlight while the P L O delegation remained i n the shade. T h e
"internals" went w i t h the media to the office of Jordan's prime
minister, and at the end of the meeting announced that agreement
in principle had been reached o n the structure of the j o i n t Jorda-
nian-Palestinian delegation. After the "internal" group and its
party had left, the P L O delegation strode in. A t this meeting it was
agreed that each o f the two components o f the j o i n t delegation
w o u l d discuss the issues germane to it. W i t h U . S . acquiescence, it
was agreed that the delegation w o u l d have two co-chairmen o f
equal status, and that both o f them w o u l d address the M a d r i d
conference at its opening session (Abas, 1995: 86-7).
T h u s , denial by both sides o f the P L O ' s activity i n Jerusalem
was a consensual falsehood. T h e media made fun of Israel's p r o h i -
bition of contact w i t h the P L O . T h e operational leadership of the
Intifada took advantage o f Israeli law i n Jerusalem to direct the
Intifada and organize it i n accordance w i t h instructions that
arrived from T u n i s by telephone and fax. T h e political leadership
of the territories was, after the Intifada, subordinate to the "exter-
nal" leadership, and turned East Jerusalem into the focus o f its
activities. T h i s was an unelected political elite that w o r k e d o n a
voluntary basis, but it had an elevated status i n the P L O organiza-
tions "inside," and decided at the beginning o f the Intifada to
coordinate public relations and political activity. These leaders
lived i n the Jerusalem metropolitan region and acted inside it.
F r o m the beginning o f the Intifada they initiated public relations
activities for the world's media and for the representatives of for-
eign consulates i n the territories w h o were attracted to the fire o f
the popular uprising i n the territories, and w h o even exchanged
ideas w i t h the P L O leadership i n T u n i s (Ashrawi, 1995: 50-7).
Palestinian political activity i n East Jerusalem moved up one
level w h e n Baker began to shuttle between the region's leaders.
W h i l e his Palestinian contacts met w i t h h i m i n the American c o n -
sulate i n the west side o f the city, most o f the preparations for
these meetings took place i n Jerusalem at O r i e n t H o u s e . T h i s
building belonged to the H u s s e i n i family, and Faisal H u s s e i n i
used it as the offices of his Arab Studies Society. T h e preparations
for the meetings w i t h Baker included ongoing contacts w i t h P L O
headquarters i n T u n i s , and this established a political fact that was

very difficult to challenge thereafter. Moreover, Baker was negoti-

ating on the composition of the delegation and o n the inclusion o f
Jerusalem o n the peace conference's agenda w i t h East Jerusalem
leaders and w i t h the P L O , w i t h the full knowledge o f the Israeli
government.
T h e local Palestinian panel had 18 meetings w i t h Baker, most
of them in Jerusalem. These consultations w i t h the P L O and w i t h
Baker were conducted under the watchful eyes of the media. Sev-
eral foreign consulates also took an interest. B y far the greater part
of this feverish activity took place i n Jerusalem, w i t h the k n o w -
ledge, but also the denial, o f the Israeli government. T h e Israelis
hoped that denials w o u l d preserve something o f its symbols o f
sovereignty i n the city, w h i l e it waited, teeth gritted, for an altern-
ative, n o n - P L O Palestinian leadership to appear. Baker's argu-
ment against Shamir had been that i f Israel did not provide the
local leadership w i t h the means to take the P L O ' s place, it w o u l d
not be able to get off the ground. Shamir and his colleagues were
waiting for the m o m e n t at w h i c h the ostensibly more amenable
"internal" leadership w o u l d disassociate itself from the "external"
leadership and the P L O establishment w o u l d itself unwittingly
authorize those w h o w o u l d take its place. T h e y did not guess that
the opposite w o u l d happen and that the "internals" w o u l d be the
official means by w h i c h the P L O w o u l d establish its foothold i n
the territories and at the M a d r i d conference. T h e Israeli govern-
ment of the time believed that the P L O ' s extremism was a matter
of principle and that its representatives w o u l d not demonstrate
political flexibility, whereas the internal leadership w o u l d be dif-
ferent. As w i l l be seen, this perspective was not b o r n out i n prac-
tice. T h e "external" P L O was flexible and shrewd and imposed
political concessions o n the "internals" (Abas, 1995: 87; Ashrawi,
1995: 50-7).
T h e nature o f the links between the "internals" and T u n i s did
not remain as they had been i n M a r c h 1991 w h e n Baker began to
shuttle among the M i d d l e East's capitals o n his way to the M a d r i d
conference. The Palestinian delegation to the talks w i t h Baker
astutely and gradually notched up its levebof activity in Jerusalem
and its links w i t h the P L O leadership, taking care not to make any
move that w o u l d sever the contact w i t h Baker. Initially, the pres-
ence of Baker and Arafat i n A m m a n i n September 1991 was used
to discuss the issue o f the j o i n t Jordanian-Palestinian delegation

to the M a d r i d conference. First there was a secret meeting

between Ashrawi and Arafat, and the latter's position was later
conveyed to Baker at an open meeting between h i m and Ashrawi.
Since Ashrawi d i d not want to deny her ties w i t h the P L O , she and
Baker agreed to remain silent until the media left the r o o m . T h i s
plan was upset w h e n a C N N correspondent asked A s h r a w i
whether she had a message from Arafat to Baker and she
responded i n the affirmative. T h i s was not the only fact estab-
lished by the Palestinians during this visit. T h e P L O arranged an
official car w i t h a Palestinian flag to take A s h r a w i from the A l l e n b y
Bridge to A m m a n ; after her meeting w i t h Baker, she conducted a
press conference at the P L O embassy in Jordan, where a Palestin-
ian flag stood by her side and a portrait o f Arafat gazed out from
above her (Ashrawi, 1995: 95-100).
A further promotion o f their status occurred w h e n H u s s e i n i
and Ashrawi appeared before the Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l
( P N C ) . T h e P N C convened its 20 session i n 1991 for the purpose
of approving participation o f a Palestinian delegation i n the
M a d r i d conference. Baker was involved i n this as w e l l - he co-
ordinated the trip w i t h the P L O and w i t h Israel. H e warned the
Palestinians against leaking news of the story. T h e y d i d so anyway,
though they refused to confirm it officially. Israel was furious
about the leak, and threatened to take legal action under the law
that forbade meetings w i t h P L O officials. Baker once again went
into action and obtained the Palestinian delegation's consent not
to return to Israel until the matter had been cleared up w i t h
Shamir. O n c e the scenario had been written the Palestinian actors
played their roles to the hilt. A s h r a w i and H u s s e i n i returned to
Israel and told the press and the police that they had not violated
Israeli law. T w o days later, o n October 10,1991, they flew to meet
Baker i n Washington, a meeting that had been scheduled before
their return from T u n i s to Israel, and w h i c h was meant to prevent
their arrest (Ashrawi, 1995: 101-15).
F r o m J e r u s a l e m to T u n i s , M a d r i d , W a s h i n g t o n , O s l o , a n d back
T h e 20 session o f the Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l authorized the

P L O ' s Executive C o m m i t t e e to "respond favorably" to the p r o -
posal to convene the M a d r i d conference after two conditions had
been met ( A l - Q u d s , 2 9 Sept. 1991). These two points were
emphasized i n the P N C ' s political program. First, the conference

was to ensure Israel's compliance w i t h resolutions 242 and 338,

meaning a full withdrawal from the occupied lands, including
Jerusalem. Second, that a Jerusalem representative had to be
included i n the Palestinian delegation (Ayalon, 1993: 241).
T h e P L O chairman decided to confirm the participation of the
Palestinian delegation despite the absence of any mention of Jeru-
salem i n the invitation and without the P N C ' s conditions having
been met. Arafat, w h o had always maneuvered beyond the restric-
tions imposed o n h i m , gave his consent because o f the achieve-
ments the P L O had obtained up until then. H e was also counting
on the letter o f assurances from the U . S . to the Palestinians o f
October 18, 1991, i n w h i c h the U . S . had expressed its substantive
position o n the issue ofjerusalem. T h e U . S . d i d not recognize the
annexation of East Jerusalem and believed that its inhabitants had
the right to vote for the self-governing authority during the
interim period and to be included i n the delegation that w o u l d
negotiate the final settlement (Laqueur & R u b i n , 1995: 573-6).
In general, everything that Israel saw as a gain i n shaping the
M a d r i d conference was not accepted by the U . S . Moreover, the
U . S . refrained from making its position clear to Israel. A t the earli-
est stages o f the discussions between the U . S . and the "internal"
leadership on the letter of assurances that was to be sent to the Pal-
estinians, Baker asked the Palestinians not to leak even a draft of the
letter o n the grounds that Israel w o u l d object sharply and block it.
Things reached the point that Baker asked the local Palestinian del-
egation not to disseminate the letter of assurances even among the
delegates o f the P N C . T h e Palestinians acceded to his request and
made do w i t h giving the P N C a reworked summary o f the U . S .
commitments (Ashrawi, 1995: 100). Since Jerusalem was not men-
tioned i n the U . S . letter of assurances to Israel, the Israeli leadership
assumed that the issue had not been mentioned i n the letter to the
Palestinians, either. T h e letter to Israel emphasized that Israel
w o u l d not be required to talk to any interlocutors it did not accept
at the M a d r i d conference, during the initial stage o f the talks, and
beyond (Bentzur, 1997: 135). B u t the U . S . d i d not obligate itself to
support the Israeli position i f Israel d i d not agree to sit d o w n with
representatives of East Jerusalem, or i f Israel refused to discuss the
future o f this part o f the city during the final status talks. It is not
hard to imagine h o w the Israeli leadership w o u l d have felt i f they
had seen the American letter to the Palestinians.

The P L O elegantly circumvented the procedural roadblock that

Israel placed i n the way of the East Jerusalem representatives by cre-
ating special titles for them. A negotiations steering committee was
set up, including Faisal Husseini, H a n a n Ashrawi, and two other
representatives o f parties that were not represented at M a d r i d -
F I D A and the People's Party. Alongside them were three "exter-
nals," w h i c h strengthened the hand o f the leaders from Jerusalem
and their identification w i t h the P L O establishment i n T u n i s .
Moreover, Faisal Husseini was appointed to head the delegation to
the M a d r i d conference and H a n a n Ashrawi became its spokesper-
son (Ashrawi, 1995: 124—30). W h i l e they themselves did not parti-
cipate in the talks, they were present and involved i n the diplomatic
process, w h i c h was conducted i n the media no less than i n the c o n -
ference room, and the media extravaganza was conducted as m u c h
around the conference r o o m as inside it. T h u s , thanks to Israel's
procedural restrictions, Faisal Husseini and H a n a n Ashrawi from
Jerusalem were the focus of special attention and stood out i n their
roles as delegation head and spokesperson.
The Palestinian delegation went even further by m a k i n g a
night-time trip from M a d r i d to T u n i s to meet w i t h Arafat
(Ashrawi, 1995: 150). A t this stage the meeting was secret and was
not leaked to the media. Later, i n J u n e 1992, A s h r a w i and
Husseini, w h o were by then heading the Palestinian delegation to
the bilateral talks w i t h Israel i n Washington, went to visit Arafat at
the hospital i n A m m a n where he was undergoing an operation.
T w o months earlier, w h e n an airplane Arafat was flying i n
crashed, Ashrawi had stated publicly that i f he had indeed been
killed (as was at first supposed), it w o u l d be necessary to organize
elections for his replacement. T h i s had angered Arafat and in June
1992 Ashrawi understood that she needed to meet w i t h the P L O
chairman. Ashrawi apparently sought, by publicizing the trip, to
atone for her outspokenness, to clear her name, and to re-establish
her loyalty to Arafat. Israel announced that A s h r a w i and H u s s e i n i
w o u l d be arrested u p o n their return to Israel i n accordance w i t h
the law forbidding meetings w i t h the P L O . T h i s was a week
before the elections i n Israel and the Americans, w h o as usual
rushed i n to resolve the crisis, recommended to A s h r a w i and
Husseini that they remain i n Jordan until after the poll. A week
later the Israeli government changed and the matter lost its i m p o r -
tance (Ashrawi, 1995: 209-13).

In parallel w i t h the M a d r i d talks, and w i t h the subsequent talks

in Washington, activity i n O r i e n t H o u s e began to burgeon. T h e
Palestinian delegation used it as a base to prepare for the talks, and
D r . Sari Nusseibeh convened groups o f local experts there to
advise the delegation and prepare position, w o r k i n g , and back-
ground papers o n various subjects. T h e Palestinian media closely
followed the extensive activity and gave great emphasis to East
Jerusalem as the political center for the Palestinians i n the West
B a n k and Gaza Strip.
After the opening session, the M a d r i d Conference broke up
into multilateral and bilateral negotiating groups, w i t h the talks
between Israel and the Palestinian delegation taking place i n
Washington beginning i n December 1991. In accordance w i t h the
prior agreement between the P L O and Jordan, at the very first
stage o f these discussions the Palestinians, through a series of u n i -
lateral actions, separated themselves from the Jordanian delega-
tion. T h e Palestinian delegation arrived separately at the hotel and
the conference r o o m , conducted its o w n briefings and press con-
ferences, and demanded that Israel conduct separate negotiations
w i t h the Palestinian and the Jordanian delegations. T h e Palestin-
ian demand roused the ire o f Israel, w h i c h refused to commence
negotiations w i t h the Palestinian delegation. T h e Palestinian
provocation was effective. In Washington, as i n M a d r i d , they suc-
ceeded i n portraying the Palestinian problem as separate from the
Jordanian issues, and i n directing the spotlight at H a n a n Ashrawi
and Faisal H u s s e i n i as representatives o f Jerusalem (Ashrawi,
1995: 158-68). U n t i l a compromise was reached in January 1992,
the talks between Israel and the j o i n t delegation were conducted
in a corridor of the State Department b u i l d i n g i n Washington, and
were limited to talks between the two delegation heads. The c o m -
promise achieved in January stated that the j o i n t delegation w o u l d
split into two parts, each of w h i c h w o u l d include two representa-
tives from its sister delegation. Furthermore, the U . S . agreed to
grant a visa to N a b i l Sha'th, a P L O official from T u n i s w h o bore
an A m e r i c a n passport, w h o was sent by the P L O to coordinate
between T u n i s and the team i n Washington. Sha'th was sent for
symbolic-political, not practical, reasons. H i s very presence was a
political statement. In fact, it complicated the functioning o f the
Palestinian delegation and its channel o f communication w i t h
T u n i s (Abas, 1995: 88; Ashrawi, 1995: 168-73).

O f course, the entire course o f the talks i n Washington was

accompanied by a wide-ranging web of discussions and consulta-
tions between the Palestinian delegation and P L O headquarters.
T h e Palestinians i n the territories also followed events closely.
T h e consultations between Washington and T u n i s were ongoing,
and they became public at times o f crisis. A s might have been
expected, there was no shortage of such crises. T h e disagreements
surrounding the issues under discussion were only one cause. A
second cause was the interest that each side had i n initiating crises
in order to gain support at home. T h e Palestinians were particu-
larly persistent i n this. A t the end of each r o u n d of talks and before
the opening o f the next round, they announced consultations
about their participation i n the c o m i n g round. T h i s calculated
crisis made it possible for the members of the delegation to reiter-
ate the P L O ' s position as the guiding hand behind the Palestinian
delegation. It also answered an internal political imperative — the
involvement o f a large number o f representatives, streams, and
organizations i n the process, and the release o f ideological and
political pressures o n the part of P L O elements i n T u n i s . T h e East
Jerusalem representatives played a special role i n these consulta-
tions. T h e senior status o f the Jerusalem representatives i n the
delegation was recognized not only by the Palestinians, but also, at
a certain stage, by the U . S . and Israel. A t the fourth r o u n d of talks,
in February 1992, Baker sent an official letter to Faisal H u s s e i n i i n
his role as head of the Palestinian delegation (Abas, 1995: 8 9 , 2 3 9 -
50; Ashrawi, 1995: 171-3). O n the eve o f the ninth round, i n M a y
1993, Israel agreed to allow H u s s e i n i to participate officially i n the
talks.
T h e problem of Jerusalem was not raised i n Washington until
the ninth round. In preparation, the Palestinian delegation drew
up what it considered an appropriate m o d e l for Palestinian self-
government ( P I S G A - Palestinian Interim S e l f - G o v e r n i n g
Authority) d u r i n g the transition period. T h e Palestinian d o c u -
ment noted over and over again that the arrangements applying to
the "occupied Palestinian territories" d u r i n g the transition period
should also apply to Jerusalem. It stated that the inhabitants o f
East Jerusalem and their descendants, those listed i n the popula-
tion registry on June 4, 1967 as residents o f the city, should be
allowed to be elected to the P I S G A legislative council. T h e Pales-
tinians viewed the enlargement of Jerusalem's m u n i c i p a l borders

and its annexation to Israel as illegal unilateral actions that were

v o i d by their very nature. Jerusalem, the members o f the delega-
tion noted, was the heart o f Palestinian national identity, and as
such they were determined to make it the capital o f their inde-
pendent state w h e n it was established (Abdul H a d i , 1997, V o l . II:
133-4). In fact, the Palestinian position regarding the application
of the i n t e r i m administration's legal authority to Jerusalem had
been formulated prior to this, i n the period leading up to the sev-
enth r o u n d o f talks i n N o v e m b e r 1992, but it had not yet been
raised i n the discussions (Abas, 1995: 94).
After the Labor Party's return to power i n 1992, Israel agreed
that Faisal H u s s e i n i , a resident of East Jerusalem, could officially
participate i n the Palestinian delegation beginning w i t h the ninth
r o u n d o f talks. A c c o r d i n g to the new Israeli position, w h e n the
time came, the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem w o u l d vote - but
could not be candidates - i n the elections to the Palestinian
interim self-governing authority. Israel's flexibility led the Pales-
tinians to take a less rigid position i n the statement o f principles
they submitted d u r i n g the n i n t h round than they had taken i n the
P I S G A document. T h e draft said that the Palestinians listed i n the
population registry as residents o f the city o n June 4, 1967, and
their descendants, w o u l d "participate i n the elections," without
specifying whether this was just as voters or also as candidates.
T h e draft also stated that the 1967 territories were for the Palestin-
ians a single unit, implicitly i n c l u d i n g Jerusalem. " T h e authority
of P I S G A w i l l extend to all the Palestinian territories occupied
since June 1967, w h i c h is an integral w h o l e and constitutes a
single territorial unit under one system o f law" (Abdul H a d i ,
1997, V o l . II: 134). E v e n though this declaration was a reiteration
of the Palestinian position on Jerusalem, they d i d not emphasize it
as they had i n the past. T h e y thus hoped to satisfy Israel. T h i s was
the m a x i m u m concession the Palestinian delegation, headed by
residents o f East Jerusalem, felt it could make, especially given
that the P L O leadership i n T u n i s was spurring the delegation i n
Washington to take a tough position o n the issue. In order to cover
for the progress that had been achieved behind the scenes i n O s l o ,
Arafat called Washington several times a day, personally instruct-
ing his delegation to stand firm. T h e result was that i n the ninth
r o u n d the Jerusalem issue again became a focus o f disagreement.
U n d e r pressure from the P L O leadership and from Arafat

personally, the Palestinian delegation i n Washington demanded

that all Palestinian legislation apply to Jerusalem. Israel, of course,
refused ( A l - S h a r q a l - A w s a t , 10 A u g . 1993; A l - W a t a n a l - A r a b i , 20
Aug. 1,993; Ashrawi, 1995: 183-4, 218; Naufal, 1995: 67).
In the tenth round of talks, in June 1993, the U . S . submitted its
own proposal for a statement of principles between Israel and the
Palestinians. In contrast w i t h the position o f the P L O and o f the
Palestinian delegation i n Washington, w h i c h maintained that East
Jerusalem had to be a part of the Palestinian authority and that the
elected Palestinian council's legislative authority w o u l d also apply
to it, the A m e r i c a n proposal was that both sides agree to postpone
discussion of the question of Jerusalem until the final agreement,
and to remove it from the interim arrangements. T h e Palestinians
fiercely opposed the A m e r i c a n proposal, both because o f the
instructions Arafat had given (intended to bring the talks to a dead
end) and because o f the fact that several members o f the delega-
tion lived i n East Jerusalem. A sharp m e m o r a n d u m handed by
Faisal H u s s e i n i to D e n n i s Ross, the A m e r i c a n coordinator o f the
peace talks, on J u l y 1, 1993, stated that there was a large gap
between the letter of assurances that the U . S . had given the Pales-
tinians on the eve o f the M a d r i d conference and the A m e r i c a n
proposal to postpone the discussion o f the Jerusalem question
(Abdul H a d i , 1997, V o l . II: 135-7). W h i l e the Palestinians i n
Washington were raining d o w n fire and brimstone on the U . S . ,
the P L O had already agreed i n its secret contacts w i t h Israel i n
O s l o to put off discussion of Jerusalem to the talks o n the perma-
nent settlement. T h e U . S . d i d not have detailed and up-to-date
information about the talks i n O s l o and it d i d not attribute any
importance to what was happening there. T h e U . S . w o r k e d i n
June and August 1993 to issue a j o i n t Israeli-Palestinian statement
of principles from Washington. In order to get around the sharp
opposition o f the Palestinians i n Washington to the postpone-
ment of the Jerusalem issue to the permanent settlement, the U . S .
proposed ignoring the subject entirely. T h e leaders of the delega-
tion i n Washington rejected this proposal as well. A s w i l l be
shown below, the P L O leadership i n T u n i s "suffered" from
having been all too successful i n stiffening the position o f their
representatives i n Washington.
In August, the P L O responded to the U . S . proposal w i t h its
own document, w h i c h also omitted mention of Jerusalem. T h e

leaders o f the Palestinian delegation i n Washington declined to

convey the document to Secretary o f State Warren Christopher
on the grounds that it was a capitulation to the American position.
Instead of the paper prepared i n T u n i s , they wanted to give C h r i s -
topher a document of their o w n that w o u l d state that the legal and
legislative power of the Palestinian Authority w o u l d apply to East
Jerusalem as well. T h e Revolutionary C o u n c i l o f the Fatah, the
P L C s m a i n faction, affirmed this position at the end of J u l y 1993
( F i l a s t i n a l - T h a w r a , 30 J u l y 1993). A n editorial i n the P L O weekly
also stated that "without recognition o f the rights of the Palestin-
ians i n Jerusalem there w i l l be no peace agreement" ( F i l a s t i n a l -
T h a w r a , 11 J u l y 1993).
T h e instructions from T u n i s were, however, unambiguous.
T h e document was to be submitted to Christopher. T h e delega-
tion tried to maneuver and to bargain w i t h T u n i s and w i t h the
Americans. D u r i n g the course of the crisis it even learned that the
draft P L O response had already been handed over to the A m e r i -
cans, after N a b i l Shath, President Mubarak, Egyptian Foreign
M i n i s t e r A m r M u s a , and the Egyptian president's political adviser
U t h a m a al-Baz had w o r k e d o n it i n Cairo; the members o f the
delegation were being asked simply to repeat the act and officially
hand Secretary o f State Christopher the P L O ' s response. A t the
time that the delegation was formulating a counter-response of its
own, Faisal H u s s e i n i went to C a i r o to see the proposed d o c u -
ment. H e notified his colleagues i n Jerusalem that without w r i t -
ten instructions from Arafat they dared not submit such a far-
reaching document to Christopher. A t the request o f the delega-
tion, the document prepared i n C a i r o and T u n i s was forwarded to
Jerusalem, w i t h an unambiguous order i n Arafat's o w n handwrit-
ing attached. It instructed them to submit the document as it was.
T h e delegation was faced w i t h a dilemma. S h o u l d it submit a doc-
ument that i n its o p i n i o n contained unwarranted concessions,
i n c l u d i n g those o n the matter of Jerusalem? Should it agree to
such a blatant b l o w to their status and authority, or should they
meekly accept Arafat's dictate? S h o u l d they dispute the position o f
the P L O leaders i n T u n i s and set up an-alternative leadership, or
adhere to their previous policy that maintained that only the
"external" leaders o f the P L O determined Palestinian policy?
Christopher met w i t h the members of the delegation on August 3,
expecting to receive the response that had been promised to h i m ,

but the delegation claimed that it had not yet completed its w o r k
on the document. In the meantime, the delegation gained a few
hours o f debate w i t h T u n i s before officially handing over the
P L O response to Christopher at their next meeting. In parallel,
the delegation's leaders• submitted their resignations to Arafat.
Arafat invited the resigning delegates to T u n i s to discuss the entire
issue i n the P L O Executive C o m m i t t e e , where he succeeded i n
resolving it i n his o w n way (Ashrawi, 1995: 250-64).
As became clear at the end of August 1993, the real negotiations
were not taking place i n Washington, but behind the scenes,
between Israel and the P L O , i n O s l o . T h e O s l o channel was not the
only one i n operation behind the official talks in Washington, but it
was the most successful of them. T h e first back channel was Egyp-
tian, w h i c h had taken form even before the N o r w e g i a n channel
began to function. In October 1992 Egyptian foreign minister, A m r
Musa, visited Israel and tried to advance the negotiations i n all areas
in w h i c h no progress had been made, including the issue of Jerusa-
lem. These contacts centered o n the question o f h o w elections
w o u l d be held in Jerusalem for the interim period legislative c o u n -
cil. M u s a proposed involving the Jerusalem Committee of the O I C
and conducting elections i n A l - H a r a m A l - S h a r i f and i n the C h u r c h
of the H o l y Sepulcher. M u s a hoped thus to bridge the desire of the
Palestinians to conduct elections i n Jerusalem and Israel's reluc-
tance to discuss it on the grounds that it w o u l d lead to the govern-
ment's fall. M u s a also proposed establishing two w o r k i n g groups
for discussions w i t h the Palestinians, one on the elections in Jerusa-
lem and the other on the powers o f the elected council. Rabin's
approach was to put off any discussion of Jerusalem because of the
issue's sensitivity i n Israel public opinion and because the Palestin-
ians had not yet proved to h i m the seriousness o f their intentions.
Rabin complained to M u s a that the Palestinian delegation in Wash-
ington was chasing after the media and argued that the public
nature of the talks was destroying any chance of producing results.
If the Palestinians w o u l d consent to accept his approach about the
need for secret talks, he, Rabin, w o u l d be w i l l i n g to discuss w i t h
them Egypt's proposal for conducting elections i n East Jerusalem
(Abas, 1995: 67-9).
T w o months later, i n a meeting between A f i f Safia, the P L O ' s
representative i n Britain, A b u - A l a , and D r . Yair Hirschfeld i n
L o n d o n i n December 1992, the O s l o channel was b o r n as a secret,

unofficial, semi-academic channel. ( O n the circumstances by

w h i c h it came into being, see: Abas, 1994:112; Beilin, 1997: 63-80.)
F r o m the m o m e n t it became clear that the O s l o channel was
p r o m i s i n g and might produce results, both sides mobilized for it.
T h e y halted their other attempts to establish a secret channel and
concentrated solely on this one. W h e n other channels opened i n
parallel it was as assistance to the O s l o channel rather than as alter-
natives to it. T h e O s l o talks encompassed the entire range o f
issues that were at stake between Israel and the Palestinians. In
these talks, Jerusalem was not perceived to be a special issue; it was
not taboo, untouchable or set aside for separate treatment. F u r -
thermore, not finding a comprehensive and immediate solution
to the Jerusalem issue d i d not prevent progress on other subjects.
O n the contrary, once there was significant progress it was possi-
ble to arrive at arrangements for bargaining and compromise on
the issue of Jerusalem precisely because the city was not discussed
as a separate issue. W h i l e the Palestinian delegation was composed
of important political figures and senior commanders such as its
head, A b u A l a (Ahmad Qri'a), was the Fatah's financial affairs
chief; M a h e r A l - K u r d , Arafat's economic adviser; and Hassan
Asfur, secretary of the committee for negotiations w i t h Israel and
assistant to A b u M a z e n , w h o held the Israel portfolio i n the P L O
Executive C o m m i t t e e . T h e Israeli delegation was composed o f
two scholars w h o d i d not hold official posts. D r . Yair Hirschfeld
and D r . R o n P u n d i k drew their unofficial authority from Yossi
B e i l i n , Israel's deputy foreign minister, w h o , at his o w n initiative,
assumed responsibility for instructing them. T h e Israelis' impres-
sion was that the Palestinians assumed that Peres and Rabin were
behind the envoys from Israel and that the channel should there-
fore be taken very seriously (Beilin, 1997: 82).
T w o issues relating to the subject o f Jerusalem stood out
d u r i n g the talks. T h e first was h o w the inhabitants of East Jerusa-
lem w o u l d participate i n the elections, and whether they w o u l d
only be allowed to vote, or whether they w o u l d also be allowed to
be elected. T h e second was whether the city w o u l d be removed
from the framework and be left for the final agreement, and i f so,
whether the fact that it was being removed w o u l d be stated, in the
document. T h e major part o f the debate d i d not focus o n these
subjects at every r o u n d of talks. A s w i l l be shown, i n some rounds

The P L C • : f r o m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 139
the lack of agreement between the parties was noted and the major
effort to bridge the gaps was devoted to other questions.
At the first r o u n d o f talks i n O s l o i n January 1993, and d u r i n g
the second round o f talks i n February 1993, the Palestinians pre-
sented their traditional position. T h e Arab inhabitants o f East
Jerusalem w o u l d participate i n the elections to the legislative
council o f the interim arrangement just like their Palestinians
brethren i n the territories, and the interim agreement w o u l d have
to apply fully to all the 1967 territories, i n c l u d i n g East Jerusalem.
Against the Palestinian's maximalist opening position, the Israeli
approach at the second r o u n d was pragmatic. T h e Israeli repre-
sentatives, Hirschfeld and P u n d i k , made an interesting proposal at
this stage, and many o f its elements were included i n the O s l o
agreements at the end of the convoluted bargaining. T h e y arrived
at the meeting w i t h an organized, written draft o f a declaration o f
principles between Israel and the Palestinians that took into c o n -
sideration the positions of both sides and attempted to find a way
between them.
T h e talks had, however, rules o f their o w n , and they were not
the same as those that Israel dictated. A t the second meeting i n
Oslo, Hirschfeld and P u n d i k proposed separating the discussion
of East Jerusalem from the discussion o f the rest of the territories
and postponing the decision o n its future to the permanent
arrangements. In the meantime, the city w o u l d be given a special
status under the interim agreement w h i l e preserving its physical
unity. T h e special status, according to Hirschfeld, w o u l d include
recognition o f O r i e n t H o u s e as a political headquarters, recogni-
tion of official Palestinian institutions operating in Jerusalem, and
even the construction o f public housing projects for the Palestin-
ian inhabitants o f the city. A c c o r d i n g to A b u M a z e n , H i r s c h f e l d
argued that Jerusalem should remain under Israeli sovereignty,
but that its Palestinian inhabitants could be linked politically to
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y through elections to the legislative
council. A t this stage, Hirschfeld d i d not distinguish between
voting and candidacy, but rather focused o n the placement of the
polling stations - whether they w o u l d be inside or outside the city.
Israel w o u l d not agree to have the p o l l i n g stations for the elections
to the legislative council inside the city itself, and it also opposed
allowing the city's inhabitants to r u n for elective office. R o n
P u n d i k complemented Hirschfeld's suggestions by proposing

that the representatives of East Jerusalem be elected by running i n

the adjacent Ramallah district (Abas, 1995: 120-6; B e i l i n , 1997:
84). B u t according to one of the Israeli representatives, the subject
of voting by the Palestinians of East Jerusalem was not even m e n -
tioned i n the document submitted by Hirschfeld. T h e subject was
raised o n l y later i n an appendix to that document.
Between the second and the third r o u n d B e i l i n briefed Peres
on the secret talks, and showed h i m the minutes o f the discus-
sions. Peres updated Rabin, w h o listened and d i d not veto contin-
uation o f the contacts. F r o m this point onward Peres was at the
apex of the pyramid guiding the Israeli delegation. T h e delegation
was not, however, authorized to tell the Palestinians that Peres
was i n the picture; this information was conveyed, however, by
the N o r w e g i a n intermediary, Terje Larsen. A t the third round, i n
M a r c h 1993, the Israelis sought to insert changes into the model
of h o w the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem w o u l d vote, and they
encountered pragmatism o n the Palestinian side. A b u A l a pro-
posed that the Jerusalem p o l l i n g places be located i n the A l - A q s a
mosque and i n the C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulcher, i n accordance
w i t h the Egyptian proposal o f October 1992. W i t h this proposal,
the Palestinians created an opening for granting a special status to
Jerusalem d u r i n g the period of the interim accord, a principle that
the Israeli delegation had demanded to implement since the first
r o u n d at O s l o . In the meantime, however, Israel's position had
become more rigid. Between the third and fourth rounds, Peres
sought to amend the appendix to the paper submitted by the
Israeli team and to distinguish between voting i n the elections and
r u n n i n g for and being elected to office, i n keeping w i t h the Labor
Party platform (Beilin, 1997: 90). A c c o r d i n g to this approach, the
act o f voting linked the voter politically to an outlying elected
institution, w h i l e the act o f being elected to the body applied the
authority o f the elected institution, the legislative council, to the
voter. In other words, allowing inhabitants of East Jerusalem to be
elected to a Palestinian institution w o u l d bring the West Bank to
Jerusalem and it was therefore rejected by Peres, as opposed to the
act o f voting, w h i c h preserved the distance between the two
regions. .!
Jerusalem d i d not come up i n the fourth round o f talks, from
the end o f A p r i l to the beginning o f M a y 1993, even though the
Israeli delegation had, i n its preparatory talks, agreed that it w o u l d

The F L O : f r o m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 141
request to reopen the question of the way i n w h i c h the inhabitants

of East Jerusalem w o u l d vote. In this r o u n d it was the Palestinians
who pushed forward, w h i l e the Israelis sought to hold back prog-
ress because Peres and R a b i n had not yet completed discussing
the statement o f principles (Beilin, 1997: 99). U n d e r Palestinian
pressure a j o i n t draft statement of principles was formulated at the
fifth r o u n d of talks, i n M a y 1993. T h i s draft put into w r i t i n g o n l y
those issues agreed u p o n by the parties. It was not merely a techni-
cal step, but rather a signal that agreement had been reached o n a
series of questions. T h e draft noted that the resolution of the J e r u -
salem issue w o u l d be left for the discussions o n the permanent
agreement; the jurisdiction of the legislation o f the elected Pales-
tinian council w o u l d include all of the West B a n k and Gaza Strip.
W i t h regard to the elections, it said, "Palestinians o f Jerusalem
have the right to participate i n the election process as candidates
and as voters. Voters in Jerusalem w i l l cast their ballots at the A l -
Aqsa M o s q u e and the C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulcher" (Abas,
1995: 146-7). W o u l d the Palestinians act o n their right to be
elected to office? N o answer to this was formulated. T h i s ques-
tion remained controversial and was passed o n to the next stage o f
the talks, i n w h i c h the senior professional level w o u l d take the
place o f the academic delegates. W i t h regard to the election pro-
cess, the parties agreed to adopt the Egyptian compromise pro-
posal. Instead o f taking the polling stations outside the city
entirely, it was agreed that they w o u l d be placed i n the h o l y sites,
thus giving the elections i n Jerusalem a special flavor. T h e draft
was built on an additional compromise about Jerusalem - i n
exchange for the Palestinians' willingness to put off discussion o f
the Jerusalem question to the permanent arrangements, the Israe-
lis were w i l l i n g to grant Jerusalem special status. Furthermore, for
the first time since 1967 they w o u l d agree to discuss the annex-
ation of East Jerusalem, placing an official question mark over the
continuation o f Israeli sovereignty i n the city.
Progress i n the secret O s l o channel had a good effect o n the
open channel i n Washington. Faisal H u s s e i n i arrived i n W a s h i n g -
ton as an official member of the delegation on the eve of the n i n t h
round o f talks i n M a y 1993. T h i s move was part o f an effort to
shore up the Fatah i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip i n preparation
for Israel allowing the return o f some 400 Hamas activists w h o
had been deported the previous December. T h e deportation had

held up the diplomatic process and hurt Israel. W i t h the media-

tion o f the U . S . , Egypt, and Jordan, a compromise was reached
under w h i c h Israel w o u l d allow the phased return o f the Hamas
deportees, but not before allowing the Fatah activists it had
deported i n the late 1960s and early 1970s to return (Klein, 1996a).
The Palestinians i n O s l o saw this move as compensation for their
consent to postpone the discussion of Jerusalem to the permanent
status talks. That same m o n t h , i n the fifth round, the status of the
O s l o talks was reinforced w h e n it became clear to the P L O that it
was talking w i t h an authorized Israeli representative. A n official
representative o f the Israeli government, Director-General of the
Foreign M i n i s t r y U r i Savir, was put at the head of the delegation,
above the two academic experts. In this r o u n d and the subsequent
one the question of Jerusalem came up i n full force and the dis-
cussion was conducted around two aspects o n w h i c h the O s l o
talks had focused i n the past, citing the issue as being among those
that w o u l d be left to the permanent agreement, and the participa-
tion o f the inhabitants of East Jerusalem i n the elections.
In the meantime there was drama i n Jerusalem as w e l l . Attor-
ney Y o e l Z i n g e r j o i n e d the Israeli team i n O s l o and proposed
mutual recognition o f Israel and the P L O . Peres had reservations
about this but not about the development o f the negotiations i n
O s l o , whereas R a b i n had reached the mistaken conclusion that
the Palestinian representatives i n O s l o were not faithfully repre-
senting the P L O ' s position and were, perhaps, even trying to m i s -
lead Israel and prevent an agreement w i t h the moderate "internal"
leaders. R a b i n d i d not understand w h y the Palestinian delegation
in Washington was b e c o m i n g more rigid i n its positions, i n accor-
dance w i t h instructions from P L O headquarters i n T u n i s . Rabin
saw the P L O leaders i n T u n i s as being more rigid and hawkish
than the leaders from the territories w i t h w h o m Israel was c o n -
ducting the official negotiations, and w h e n T u n i s instructed the
delegation to be less flexible, R a b i n understood this to be a true
expression o f the P L O position; the moderate position taken by
the P L O leaders i n O s l o seemed to h i m to be a deception. There-
fore, at the beginning of June 1993 R a b i n expressed his reserva-
tions about the list o f agreed points composed i n O s l o i n M a y
1993. It was Peres w h o showed R a b i n his error, and i n order to
satisfy R a b i n it was decided to re-examine the understandings for-
mulated i n O s l o . O n June 10, 1993, Rabin gave a green light to

continue w i t h the talks. H e even allowed Y o e l Zinger, w h o

became his personal representative i n the negotiations, to p r o -
pose mutual recognition, as a personal suggestion (Beilin, 1997:
107-12).
Rabin's entry into the negotiations as the m a i n decision maker
for Israel formally institutionalized the negotiations and r e i n -
forced Israel's commitment to the talks. Furthermore, there was a
change i n Israel's style, emphases, and i n some o f its positions.
Rabin adopted Hirschfeld and Pundik's idea o f putting off the dis-
cussion o f Jerusalem, and sought Palestinian reaffirmation o f this
understanding. Rabin was concerned that the Palestinians might
have had second thoughts about this, especially because Israel was
taking a somewhat tougher position.
T h e seventh round o f talks, w h i c h began on June 13,1993, pro-
vided an opportunity to test whether the understanding was still
in force. T h i s was the first, r o u n d i n w h i c h Y o e l Z i n g e r partici-
pated, and he made frequent references to Rabin as a way o f hint-
ing to the opposite party that the negotiations had taken another
step forward, and that he had been sent by the Israeli prime m i n i s -
ter. Z i n g e r presented the P L O w i t h 40 questions, w h i c h had been
composed i n consultation w i t h Rabin after they had read the draft
of the j o i n t declaration. R a b i n was particularly troubled by two
issues concerning Jerusalem. First, Rabin, naturally suspicious,
wanted to be certain that the P L O really d i d stand behind putting
off discussion o f Jerusalem to the permanent status talks; second,
Rabin wanted to k n o w whether the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y w o u l d
operate in Jerusalem, and whether its offices w o u l d be established
in Jerusalem or i n Jericho. " I f your answer is Jerusalem this w i l l
create a problem" (Abas, 1995: 154), Z i n g e r told the Palestinians,
w h o thought that they had arrived for a concluding discussion,
after w h i c h the document w o u l d be passed on to Washington to
be signed by the two delegations. N o w they realized that the
negotiations were continuing and going i n new directions. Z i n g e r
mentioned his personal ideas about mutual recognition, amend-
ment o f the Palestinian Covenant (the P L O ' s foundation d o c u -
ment, expressing its ideology o f destroying Israel), and the
cessation o f the Intifada. T h e Palestinian delegation had not pre-
pared itself for this and so had to pass the matter o n to T u n i s for
clarification. Zinger's impression was that the Palestinians stood
behind the agreement to put o f f discussion o f Jerusalem to the

permanent status talks and he conveyed this to Rabin. A s a result,

Z i n g e r could, at his next meeting w i t h the Palestinian team, con-
centrate on other questions relating to Jerusalem (Abas, 1995:
153; B e i l i n , 1997: 112-6; Savir, 1998: 49-55).
T h e removal ofjerusalem from the interim agreements raised a
series of subsidiary questions that affected the subsequent negoti-
ations. First, as already noted, w o u l d Palestinian institutions be
removed from the city, and i f so, w o u l d this apply to the existing
institutions or just to the new ones established by the Palestinian
Authority? Second, was the city not to be included only i n practice
or also i n the w o r d i n g o f the framework agreement? In other
words, should Jerusalem be mentioned i n the document, even
though the document d i d not apply to it? Perhaps the fact that the
interim agreement d i d not apply to the city should be stated
explicitly? T h i r d , should the framework agreement state that the
elections to the Pale_stinian A u t h o r i t y C o u n c i l w o u l d be held i n
Jerusalem as well? A n d i f so, w o u l d that be merely a general refer-
ence or w o u l d the special election arrangements for the city be
spelled out?
In the eighth r o u n d o f talks, at the end of June 1993, Z i n g e r
expressed Israel's desire to have Jerusalem mentioned i n the state-
ment o f principles only i n the context o f the elections, without
m e n t i o n o f the postponement o f the Jerusalem issue to the per-
manent status talks. Israel sought i n this way to play d o w n the dis-
cussion o f sovereignty i n East Jerusalem. In addition, Israel
demanded that the elections i n the city not be r u n as they w o u l d
be r u n i n the rest o f the 1967 territories, w h i l e also refusing to
locate polling stations at the holy sites, as previously agreed. Israel
also opposed granting the elected council legislative authority i n
East Jerusalem, and stated explicitly that the inhabitants o f East
Jerusalem w o u l d be allowed to vote but not be elected to office.
Israel believed that elections that didn't give the elected officials
legislative authority over the voters in Jerusalem w o u l d m i n i m i z e
the political l i n k between East Jerusalem and the Palestinian insti-
tutions and w o u l d do only m i n o r injury to Israel's rule over the
eastern city. A b u - A l a d i d not focus o n the new issues raised by
Zinger, and instead addressed issues that Israel had presented i n
the previous round. In Arafat's name he demanded to k n o w what
the fate o f the Palestinian institutions functioning i n East Jerusa-
lem w o u l d be i f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y d i d not operate i n the

The P L C • : f r o m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 145
city. W h o w o u l d look after the needs of the residents of East J e r u -

salem? Zinger's reply was that no agency o f the Palestinian
Authority w o u l d be allowed to operate i n the city, and that the
existing institutions could continue to operate as before (Beilin,
1997: 119-20; Hirschfeld, 1998).
T h e matter o f mutual recognition by the P L O and Israel came
up for discussion w h e n A b u - A l a accepted Zinger's private idea
(Savir, 1998: 69-71; Zinger, 18 Sept. 1998), and this step enlarged
both delegations' r o o m for maneuver. It is important to note that
the Palestinians' agreement to postpone the question ofjerusalem
to the permanent status talks preceded the tabling of the proposal
for mutual recognition. T h e Palestinians had consented i n M a y to
put off the issue ofjerusalem while the proposal about mutual
recognition had come in June 1993. In other words, it was not the
discussion o f mutual recognition that brought about the P L O ' s
agreement to postpone the issue o f Jerusalem, but rather its
understanding that it had to make more concessions on Jerusalem
than Israel did. T h e leadership i n T u n i s seems to have realized
that without this there w o u l d be no interim agreement and the
basis for a Palestinian state w o u l d be lost. Furthermore, at the first
meeting P u n d i k and Hirschfeld had presented the far end o f the
Israeli consensus on Jerusalem, as they understood it. F r o m the
very beginning of the contacts they had made it clear that m a k i n g
Jerusalem part o f the Palestinian autonomy w o u l d be accepted
neither by the Israeli government nor by Israeli public o p i n i o n .
Nevertheless, it is nearly certain that the June discussion o n
mutual recognition spurred the P L O to move forward i n this
direction. Israeli recognition o f the P L O promised the organiza-
tion benefit, even i f it conceded o n the Jerusalem issue i n the
interim period, and gave it a better opening position i n the perma-
nent status talks.
T h e negotiations received a facelift i n the next r o u n d o f talks,
the ninth, w h i c h ended on J u l y 6,1993. Israel refused to m e n t i o n
Jerusalem at all i n the j o i n t document. T h i s position had been dis-
cussed by the oversight team i n Jerusalem some time before and
was n o w placed before the Palestinians. Israel's position gained
the support o f Foreign M i n i s t e r Johan Jorgen H o i s t o f N o r w a y ,
who tried, during a visit to T u n i s , to persuade Arafat to accept it.
Arafat refused. In T u n i s and O s l o the Palestinians demanded that
the statement o f principles mention the elections i n Jerusalem

only as a subject that w o u l d be raised for discussion i n the frame-

w o r k of the negotiations o n the election arrangements, but that it
be stated that the Arabs of East Jerusalem w o u l d participate i n the
elections. A t this stage the Palestinians revised the position they
had presented i n the O s l o talks. T h e y preferred that East Jerusa-
lem's inhabitants participate i n the elections as candidates but not
necessarily as voters (Abas, 1995:160-1), even though prior to this
they had wanted both. T h e Palestinians presented, as a bargaining
position, a m i r r o r image o f Israel's position. T h e y wanted to get
East Jerusalem's inhabitants the right to be elected and, i n
exchange, to give up the right to vote entirely, i n c l u d i n g the spe-
cial arrangement for polling stations. B y making a concession i n a
direction that was uncomfortable for Israel, they hoped to maneu-
ver Israel into a compromise, even though this involved giving up
one o f their two original demands. A l l i n all, the Palestinian
approach i n this r o u n d was characterized by rigidity deriving from
tactical considerations. A b u - A l a arrived w i t h a list of 26 demands
for changes i n Zinger's draft declaration from the previous round
(Beilin, 1997: 121-3).
T h e Palestinians arrived at the tenth r o u n d o f talks on J u l y 21,
1993 w i t h a new idea. Instead of the tit-for-tat compromise (yes to
candidacy, no to voting) that they had previously insisted on, they
now proposed meeting i n the middle o n each o f the disputed
questions. Arafat agreed that the statement of principles w o u l d be
somewhat vague about Jerusalem. Instead o f mentioning Jerusa-
lem as a city, the document w o u l d refer to the holy places, and this
change made it possible to locate polling stations o n the T e m p l e
M o u n t and i n the C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulcher. Arafat's repre-
sentatives i n O s l o also demanded that Jerusalem not be left out o f
the document entirely, and that there be some reference to the
issue o f the city being raised i n the permanent status talks. There
was also a debate over the question o f what kind o f link there
w o u l d be between the elected institutions and Jerusalem. Israel
demanded that all connection between the Palestinian Authority
and Jerusalem be severed, w h i l e the Palestinians demanded a
compromise on this issue, as well as on>the problem o f h o w the
elections i n Jerusalem w o u l d be conducted (Abas, 1995: 107-8;
B e i l i n , 1997: 128, 162).
O n J u l y 20, a day before this r o u n d of talks began, a new Israel-
P L O channel was opened. In light of the sharp disagreements and

1
The P L C : f r o m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 147
polarized positions at the n i n t h r o u n d o f the O s l o talks, Rabin

sought to check out, once more, a series o f issues, among them
whether Arafat still accepted the postponement o f the Jerusalem
issue to the permanent status talks. F o r his part, R a b i n gave reas-
surances o n his commitment to recognizing the P L O . M i n i s t e r o f
health, H a i m R a m o n , met w i t h Arafat's adviser, D r . A h m a d T i b i ,
in Jerusalem, and proposed a tradeoff on the issues o f greatest,
concern to the two sides - a postponement of the Jerusalem issue
in exchange for solid, meaningful Israeli recognition o f the P L O .
R a m o n told T i b i that removal o f Jerusalem from the interim
arrangement was a condition for progress i n other areas. In
exchange, R a m o n promised, i n Rabin's name, that i f ajoint state-
ment of principles was reached the P L O w o u l d sign it i n the name
of the Palestinians, w h i c h w o u l d be tantamount to mutual recog-
nition o f two enemies. Israel even promised that the recognition
w o u l d have practical consequences. I f 99 per cent o f the subjects
under discussion were resolved, there w o u l d be a public meeting
between the P L O chairman and the prime minister o f Israel.
R a m o n acted, and was used, as a channel secondary to and differ-
ent from the O s l o agreement. In O s l o recognition had not been
made dependent on the Jerusalem issue; R a m o n linked them.
W h i l e it is not clear whether he d i d so at his personal initiative or
under instructions from Rabin, he seems to have had two reasons.
First, Rabin, or R a m o n , had to give the P L O something i n
exchange for its consent to postpone the Jerusalem issue - this is
how negotiations work. Second, R a m o n was not negotiating
details, but rather inquiring about a specific point. H e d i d not have
the r o o m for maneuver and the options that the Israeli team i n
O s l o had. H e could not maneuver between the range o f issues
connected to Jerusalem, making a concession here to make a gain
there. H e sought to clarify a matter of principle and he had to offer
a concession of principle i n exchange. In short, Ramon's offer was
the exception that proved the rule that was taking shape i n O s l o .
Tibi's response was candid. H e expressed the P L O ' s fear that
removing East Jerusalem from the interim arrangements w o u l d
give Israel a free hand to establish facts o n the way to the perma-
nent agreement - i n other words, to change the status of the Pales-
tinians and their existing institutions i n Jerusalem. Despite this,
T i b i said, the Palestinians were prepared to negotiate a special
arrangement. U s i n g plain white letter paper rather than official

Israeli letterhead, R a m o n submitted to the P L O , via T i b i , four

questions from Yitzhak Rabin. O n e o f these addressed Jerusalem:
"Does the P L O accept i n principle the concept o f a phased solu-
tion involving an interim arrangement to precede a permanent
settlement?" (Abas, 1995: 81).
T h e P L O ' s response was conveyed to R a m o n on J u l y 26, the
day the eleventh r o u n d o f talks i n O s l o began. It stated, "We agree
that its [Jerusalem's] permanent status is to be discussed w i t h i n
the framework o f a permanent settlement. Position at present:
there should be full participation i n the elections by candidates
and voters. There should be linkage between Jerusalem institu-
tions and the interim authority w h i c h w i l l oversee them" (Abas,
1995: 81). T h e P L O reiterated the position it had presented in
O s l o : postponement o f discussion o f Jerusalem i n exchange for
full participation i n the elections and a link between the institu-
tions o f the P L O and o f the Palestinian Authority. It should be
emphasized that the compromise offered by the P L O was i n line
w i t h the O s l o approach o f give-and-take o n the Jerusalem issues,
rather than concessions i n exchange for recognition o f the P L O .
A t the same time, the P L O returned to its maximalist opening
position and demanded that East Jerusalem's Arabs be allowed
both to vote and to be elected, and that there be a clear link
between the institutions o f the Palestinian Authority outside Jeru-
salem and those that functioned i n the city. T a k i n g this position
was a tactical measure i n order to get itself into a good bargaining
position, just as it d i d at this stage i n O s l o . A c c o r d i n g to A b u -
M a z i n , Rabin's reply o n August 1, after reading the P L O ' s
response, was positive. Rabin was prepared to move i n the P L O ' s
direction o n all the points i n dispute, except w i t h regard to the
application o f Palestinian legal authority o n East Jerusalem. I f
Jerusalem was not included i n the framework o f the interim
agreement, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y had no jurisdiction there,
R a b i n maintained, and it was thus important to state this i n the
Declaration o f Principles. T h e Palestinian position was, naturally,
the opposite (Abas, 1995: 76-81).
In the eleventh r o u n d o f talks, o n J u l y 26, the points o f agree-
ment and disagreement were put into writing, as were t h o c o m -
promise formulations that they were proposing. W i t h regard to
Jerusalem, the Palestinians demanded that the city be cited among
the issues to be discussed i n the permanent status talks, while

Israel demanded that the formulation be that i n the permanent

status talks each side w o u l d be allowed to bring up any issue o f
concern to them, without stating explicitly what those issues
‫־‬
would be. B o t h sides agreed that, w h e n the j o i n t Declaration o f
Principles was signed, talks o n mutual recognition o f Israel and
the P L O w o u l d commence. In other words, mutual recognition
remained o n the table. It was not dependent o n the Declaration o f
Principles, w h i c h w o u l d be signed even without official recogni
tion, and it was not linked to Jerusalem nor to the Palestinians'
willingness to put off discussion o f the city's future to the perma
nent status talks. Moreover, the Palestinians accepted Israel's
position that the Palestinian Authority's offices w o u l d be i n J e r i
cho and not in Jerusalem. In exchange, the P L O demanded a letter
from Israel's foreign minister to N o r w a y ' s foreign minister and
the O s l o mediator, H o i s t , i n w h i c h Israel w o u l d c o m m i t itself to
preserving the status of the Palestinian institutions i n East Jerusa
lem (Abas, 1995: 171-3). Israel refused to issue such a letter.
At the twelfth round o f talks, on August 14, the issues i n dis
pute regarding Jerusalem were again cited, but they were not
debated i n detail. T h i s debate occurred on August 17, w h e n Peres
arrived i n Stockholm. There, on the night of August 18, he c o n
ducted an eight-hour conference call w i t h Israel and T u n i s , i n
w h i c h the specifics o f the j o i n t Declaration o f Principles were
resolved (Abas, 1995: 177). T h e debate focused o n the questions
of where the offices of the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y w o u l d be located
and what w o u l d be the fate of the Palestinian institutions i n J e r u
salem. Arafat proposed that the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y operate
w i t h i n a defined area w i t h i n East Jerusalem or, alternatively, that
its location not be mentioned at all i n the Declaration o f P r i n c i
ples. Arafat, o f course, wanted to advance not only the cause o f a
Palestinian state but also Israeli recognition of East Jerusalem as its
capital, whether explicitly or tacitly. B u t Peres stood firm i n his
position that the Palestinian Authority's offices could not be
located i n or operate w i t h i n the city. R a b i n and Peres demanded
an explicit statement that the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y w o u l d be r u n
from Jericho and Gaza, so as to leave the question of Jerusalem
open. B u t Arafat was not w i l l i n g to leave the matter open because
he feared that Israel w o u l d try to prejudice the status of the P L O ' s
institutions i n the city w i t h the intention o f weakening the Pales
tinian position i n the final status negotiations. O n l y after long

wrangling d i d Peres promise not to hurt existing Palestinian insti-

tutions i n East Jerusalem, i n c l u d i n g the O r i e n t House, i n
exchange for Arafat giving i n to his demand to remove the city
from the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. In other words,
Arafat was prepared to postpone discussion of the planned capital
of the Palestinian state i n order to advance the establishment o f a
Palestinian state. F o r the P L O , Israel's recognition and its agree-
ment to the establishment o f a Palestinian A u t h o r i t y for a limited
period was a j u m p i n g - o f f point for the establishment o f a Pales-
tinian state i n the 1967 territories. T h u s , w h i l e the Palestinian del-
egation i n Washington was, w i t h the encouragement o f the P L O
leadership, presenting tough positions o n the Jerusalem question,
the same leadership was making its position more flexible i n the
secret O s l o channel. T h e Palestinians w o u l d not take an oral
promise and demanded that Israel provide a written commitment
to take no action against its existing institutions i n East Jerusalem.
At first Peres agreed, but he then retracted his consent under
instructions from Rabin. Peres made the argument that Israel's
representatives had made throughout the O s l o talks - fear o f
Israeli public outrage that w o u l d topple the government. After
additional negotiations, the Israelis agreed to send the letter the
P L O demanded. There was then a debate among Israel's repre-
sentatives about whether the letter should be made public. T h e
opponents o f publication had the upper hand and the Palestinian
side agreed that it w o u l d be kept absolutely secret and w o u l d not
be brought to the knowledge o f the P L O ' s supreme institutions,
w h i c h w o u l d be called o n to ratify the Palestinian decisions
(Beilin, 1997: 135; H a ' a r e t z , 6 J u n e 1994, 9 J u n e 1994; Makovsky,
1996: 71-3; Naufal, 1995: 123-6).
It should be noted that w h e n the Jerusalem issue was agreed on,
there was still no agreement o n mutual I s r a e l - P L O recognition.
T h e issue of recognition came up i n the talks and advanced under-
standing by Israel and the P L O about a series of subjects that were
in dispute. B u t since both delegations related to Jerusalem as one
of the issues to be decided and not as a special issue that stood on
its o w n , there was no longer any reason to condition it on recogni-
tion. In the big picture, the compromise o n Jerusalem was
achieved through give-and-take o n questions relating to Jerusa-
lem itself. Jerusalem was one o f several issues under discussion,
and unlike the C a m p D a v i d model, the discussion of Jerusalem

began i n parallel w i t h discussion o f the rest o f the issues. Putting

off a final decision d i d not prevent the negotiators from breaking
d o w n the Jerusalem issue into its constituent parts, and from
reaching give-and-take agreements. Jerusalem had lost its m y t h o
logical status and b e c o m e ‫ ׳‬a political issue.
While Peres's letter to H o i s t bears the date September 9, 1993
(that is, four days before the signing o f the declaration o f principles
on the White House lawn), it was not conveyed to the P L O on that
date and was not signed that day, but rather on October 10 or 11,
after the Knesset had approved the declaration o f principles and
Rabin had declared that there were no secret commitments supple
mentary to it (Makovsky, 1996: 71-3; Musallam, 1996: 37-48).
Peres wrote i n his letter:
I wish to confirm that the Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem and
the interest and well-being of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are of
great importance and will be preserved. Therefore, all the Palestinian
institutions of East Jerusalem, including the economic, social,
educational, and cultural, and the holy Christian and Moslem places, are
performing an essential task for the Palestinian population. Needless to
say, we will not hamper their activity; on the contrary, the fulfillment of
this important mission is to be encouraged.
(Abdul Hadi, 1997, Vol. II: 154; according to H a ' a r e t z , 7 June 1994,
this letter was dated Sept. 11)
Israel's commitment i n the letter is consistent w i t h the general

direction o f the O s l o agreements - bargaining and compromise
on Jerusalem - but i n some ways goes beyond it. T h i s was the first
time that Israel had used the term "East Jerusalem" to designate
the Palestinian character o f this area. It named not simply a geo
graphic area, but also a demographic and social region, and p o l i t i
cal meaning could also be derived from it. Furthermore, this was
the first time that Israel recognized not only M u s l i m and C h r i s
tian religious institutions, but also the Palestinian institutions i n
the eastern part o f the city and their importance to the population.
Israel promised not only to preserve the status q u o w i t h regard to
these institutions but also to encourage their activity. W h i l e Arafat
did not obtain Israeli recognition o f East Jerusalem as the capital o f
his country, he d i d manage to get a commitment to preserve the
Palestinian character o f the eastern city. F r o m Arafat's point o f
view this was a significant step towards disconnecting sovereignty
over East Jerusalem from sovereignty over West Jerusalem and

from turning the east into his capital. Later Israeli attempts to por-
tray the commitments i n the letter as touching solely o n the con-
tinued operation o f institutions that are not governing institutions
(such as those that offer health, education, charity, and welfare
services) were forced, not to say pathetic (letter from Foreign
M i n i s t e r Peres to the Peace W a t c h organization, Appendix 3 to
Peace W a t c h Report 1995, "What are the Palestinian Authority
institutions in Jerusalem"). It is no wonder, then, that Israel tried
to keep the existence o f the letter secret. It became public only i n
the wake o f remarks made by Arafat during a visit to a mosque i n
Johannesburg.
The I s r a e l - P a l e s t i n i a n D e c l a r a t i o n of P r i n c i p l e s
T h e Declaration o f Principles signed by Israel and the Palestinians

in September 1993 stated that talks o n the permanent agreement
w o u l d include the issue o f Jerusalem, and that i n the interim
period Palestinian self-government w o u l d not apply there. "Juris-
diction o f the C o u n c i l [the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y C o u n c i l , the
Palestinian governing authority i n the interim period] w i l l cover
West B a n k and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that w i l l be
negotiated i n the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, the
settlements, military and Israeli areas" (State o f Israel, 1993). T h e
permanent status talks were to commence no later than the begin-
n i n g o f the third year o f the interim period. B o t h sides also agreed
that the results o f the permanent status talks w o u l d have no effect
o n the interim period, and that the postponement o f the discus-
sion o f these issues w o u l d not affect the negotiations on the per-
manent status. In other words, postponement o f the discussion o f
the Jerusalem question should not be taken to mean that the Pal-
estinians accepted t h e status q u o , and Israel could not use the Pales-
tinians' consent to this as a debating point i n the future
negotiations. T h e differences o f opinion, and the c o m m o n desire
to arrive at an agreed-upon declaration o f principles, required that
another issue be postponed. T h i s was whether and h o w the Pales-
tinian inhabitants o f East Jerusalem w o u l d participate i n the elec-
tions to the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y C o u n c i l . Special talks w o u l d be
devoted to this question. "Palestinians o f Jerusalem w h o live there
w i l l have the right to participate i n the election process according
to an agreement between the two sides," the Declaration o f

Principles stated without mentioning whether they w o u l d partici-

pate just as voters or also as candidates (State o f Israel, 1993). Res-
olution o f this issue remained open to the general negotiations o n
the conditions o f the elections. It should be noted that the declara-
tion o f principles differed• from the invitation to the M a d r i d c o n -
ference. There Jerusalem was not mentioned at all, whereas i n the
Declaration o f Principles, Jerusalem is cited as one o f the issues i n
dispute whose solution w o u l d be put off to the permanent status
talks. T h e disagreement o n the issue n o w received the official
imprimatur o f both parties, w h o agreed that the dispute over J e r u -
salem should not prevent agreement o n other subjects. T h i s
meant that the Jerusalem question was not a total one, nor was it a
litmus test for the intentions o f the other side. It was not a w o r l d -
shaking question o n w h i c h the entire agreement w o u l d stand or
fall, even i n the interim period. It was an important problem, but
only one o f several, and it was addressed as fundamentally political
in nature. Jerusalem w o u l d be brought up i n political negotia-
tions, and both sides w o u l d be able to bargain and to compromise.
T h e Declaration o f Principles produced a new P L O approach
to the permanent arrangement i n Jerusalem. In the past, the offi-
cial Palestinian position had been that sovereignty i n Jerusalem
should be divided, and nothing P L O leaders said i n public devi-
ated from this. In September 1993, however, the official approach
changed. In an interview w i t h D e r Spiegel o n September 20, 1993,
Arafat replied to Rabin's declaration that Jerusalem w o u l d forever
remain Israel's capital:
If he meant all of Jerusalem he is wrong. ... East Jerusalem is the capital
of the State of Palestine and Jewish West Jerusalem is and remains the
capital of Israel and will remain such, and against which there are no
objections. ... When the time comes, the human brain, that is, we, will
certainly find a model that fits Jerusalem. I know one thing for certain:
Palestinians and Israelis will live peacefully side by side in the city.
(FBIS, Daily Report: 21 Sept. 1993)
Arafat made similar remarks i n an interview w i t h the B B C on

September 15, 1993, and i n an interview w i t h C N N o n Septem-
ber 14,1993, as well as i n an interview w i t h Radio M o n t e C a r l o o n
December 30,1993. Faisal H u s s e i n i took a similar position o n the
city's future: "As a resident o f Jerusalem I do not want the city to be
divided. ... W e want Jerusalem to be an open city, the seat o f two
capitals with joint arrangements for both sides" ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 June

1994; K o l H a - I r , 6 M a y 1994). T h e P L O ' s ambassador i n Cairo

reiterated this position i n an interview w i t h Egyptian television on
December 24, 1993 (Albin, 1992: 24-5). What is clear is that since
the O s l o agreements, P L O leaders do not refrain from stating that
different rules apply to Jerusalem and to the West B a n k and Gaza
Strip. T h e principles that guided President Sadat have become the
property o f the P L O leadership - sovereignty i n the city w i l l be
divided i n the permanent arrangement but the city w i l l not be
divided physically, and unlike i n the rest o f the 1967 territories,
there w i l l be special arrangements to enable Palestinians and
Israelis to live together.
T h e September 1993 signing o f the Declaration o f Principles
and Peres's letter to H o i s t d i d not allay the Palestinians' fears
about what Israel might do i n Jerusalem during the interim
period, before the future o f the city came up for discussion. T h e i r
fears derived from the reality that Israel controlled the city. T h e
Palestinians were concerned that Israel w o u l d operate i n opposi-
tion to its commitments i n Peres's secret letter to H o i s t , and that
Israel w o u l d even claim that the Palestinians' public willingness to
put off discussion o f Jerusalem's future was to be taken as its
acquiescence i n the status q u o that allowed Israel to gain a firm hold
i n East Jerusalem. T h e Palestinians expressed their fears both i n
w o r d and deed. T h e political manifesto o f the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity expressed the traditional P L O position o n Jerusalem - U N
resolutions 242 and 338 required Israel to retreat from all the ter-
ritories, and the establishment o f an independent Palestinian state
w i t h its capital in Jerusalem. T h e P L O itself declared:
We will also reject any interpretation of the postponement of the final
status of Jerusalem that would allow the occupation authorities to
change the physical or demographic status through illegal settlement
activities or the continuing development and isolation of the Arab city of
Jerusalem. We emphasize the Arab and Palestinian character of
Jerusalem and its people. ... The Palestinian Authority will work to
realize that principle in all its work plans.
(Daily Report, 31 May 1994)
T h e Palestinians did not interpret Peres's letter to Hoist, even

though it went far beyond previous Israeli statements o f policy as a
long-range change i n Israeli policy. In their evaluation, there was
no difference between L i k u d and Labor governments i n Israel,
since both claimed that Jerusalem was entirely Israeli. Israel was

not prepared to compromise o n the issue of Jerusalem and there-

fore the Palestinians felt that they needed to initiate and establish
unilateral facts o n the m u n i c i p a l level and w i t h regard to daily life.
T h e y did not feel obligated at this point to spar w i t h Israel over the
question o f sovereignty over East Jerusalem, but they had to estab-
lish a realistic foundation for this demand i n the future. Palestin-
ian academics i n Jerusalem developed this approach, and it has
been accepted as P L O and Palestinian A u t h o r i t y policy since the
signing o f the Declaration o f Principles (Albin, 1992: 32-5).
Arafat's speech i n the Johannesburg mosque i n M a y 1994 was
exceptional i n the sharpness o f the language he used. It was also
exceptionally inaccurate - to say the least - i n explaining w h y he
had participated i n the M a d r i d conference, and w h y he had, i n
view o f the whole w o r l d , refused to sign a part o f the C a i r o
accords (the agreements that arranged for Israel's withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, M a y 1994). In his
speech, Arafat emphasized that:
Thej i h a d will continue and Jerusalem is not for the Palestinian people, it
is for all the Muslim u m m a [nation].... There is a continuous conspiracy
against Jerusalem. ... They will try to demolish and to change the
demographic of Jerusalem. . . . "
(Musallam, 1996: 26, 28)
Arafat's words angered Israel, w h i c h demanded an unambiguous

retraction o f his reference to a j i h a d - holy war,. T h i s , Israel m a i n -
tained, contradicted the O s l o accords. Palestinian officials
explained Arafat's statement i n a variety o f contradictory ways -
his words had been taken out o f context and had not been p r o p -
erly understood, because all Arafat wanted to do was to explain
why he supported the O s l o and C a i r o agreements. O r Arafat had
indeed erred and used terms that he should not have used. O r the
error was not Arafat's but rather that o f the Palestinian public rela-
tions operation, w h i c h d i d not explain to the w o r l d media the real
meaning o f Arafat's speech. T h e n there was the explanation that
the w o r d j i h a d was not a political term but rather a religious one,
and that it d i d not mean physical battle as Islamic extremists say,
but any great effort, including a peaceful one. T h ej i h a d that Arafat
spoke o f was the unflagging effort to establish peace and b u i l d up
the Palestinian Authority's institutions and economy ( M u s a l l a m ,
1996: 21-4, 32-5).

B e y o n d the debate over the meaning o f the w o r d j i h a d , it w o u l d

seem that Arafat's need to present the Jerusalem issue so sharply
and to distort the events o f M a d r i d and C a i r o derived not only
from the audience he was addressing - pious M u s l i m s at a Friday
prayer service - but also from the subject at hand: Jerusalem.
Arafat was expressing his fears as a result o f Israel's actions in Jeru-
salem d u r i n g the interim period, and his concern that the Pales-
tinians d i d not intend to do anything about it.
Sa'ib Ariqat, a member o f the Palestinian delegation to the
bilateral talks w i t h Israel, sketched out the Palestinian line o f
action after the agreement w i t h Israel: " W i t h or without an agree-
ment we must do our utmost to create facts o n the ground on a
daily basis and do so fast to safeguard Jerusalem's holy places and
Arab character" (Sawt al-Arab, C a i r o Radio, 8 O c t . 1993, quoted
by B B C , S W B , 11 O c t . 1993).
As a rule, the tendency o f the political leaders on both sides to
put off the decision on Jerusalem's future to the end o f the diplo-
matic process did not freeze reality. In practice, both sides have
been acting to establish facts i n preparation for the decision on the
future o f East Jerusalem. T h i s w i l l be discussed i n chapters 5 and 7.
Peres's letter to H o i s t , as far as it went i n Israel's promise to pre-
serve the Palestinian character o f East Jerusalem and to assist the
operation o f the Palestinian institutions there, d i d not serve as a
basis for creating a new consensual reality, but was rather an
incentive for both sides to intensify the competition between
them over the fate o f East Jerusalem. Israel wanted to make up for
its promises through deeds, w h i l e the Palestinians aspired to
strengthen the Palestinian character o f East Jerusalem and per-
haps o n l y thereafter to demand that Israel abide by its c o m m i t -
ments. A n d i n fact, ever since the O s l o agreements, there has been
a race between Israel and the Palestinians to determine the future
face o f East Jerusalem. Clearly, the Declaration o f Principles put
off discussion o f the Jerusalem question but d i d not put off the
attempts by both sides to establish facts i n anticipation o f the per-
manent status talks. It should be emphasized, however, that the
contest is not an equal one. Israel controls the city and its policy is
directed by a central government, even though the Jerusalem
municipal council, i n L i k u d hands since 1993, w o u l d have liked to
have seen a broader and more strenuous policy. In contrast, the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y cannot, according to the O s l o agreements,

1
The P L C : f r o m t h e W i n g s to C e n t e r Stage 157
operate w i t h i n Jerusalem, and the governing center i n Gaza has no

interest i n building up Jerusalem's status as an independent and
free Palestinian center. T h e Palestinians' actions have thus been
lesser in'their extent and i n their force than those of Israel, as w i l l
be shown below. Nevertheless, the Palestinians have created a
critical mass that cannot be ignored.

4
THE CHORUSES
T H E ARAB LEAGUE A N D T H E O.I.C.
W h i l e the major part o f the negotiations o n Jerusalem were con-

ducted between Israel and the Palestinians, two collective organi-
zations also played a role - the Arab League, through the vehicle o f
the s u m m i t o f Arab heads o f state, and the O I C (the Organization
o f the Islamic Conference). T h e "Palestine question" has been
one o f the central preoccupations o f the Arab League since it was
established i n 1945, and has been the focus o f its gatherings since
the first s u m m i t conference o f Arab leaders i n 1964. O v e r the
years these summits have become one o f the most important
political institutions i n the Arab w o r l d . T h e first summit o f heads
o f Islamic states, convened i n Rabat, M o r o c c o , i n 1969, was
directly linked to events in Jerusalem - specifically, an arson, attack
on A l - A q s a M o s q u e - and these events bave since been the major
subjects o f its deliberations. T h e f o r u m was formally constituted
as the O I C i n 1972. It i n turn formed a Jerusalem Committee
headed, until his death, by K i n g Hassan II o f M o r o c c o .
T h e role played by the Arab and Islamic states i n the negotia-
tion o f a solution to the Jerusalem p r o b l e m is a secondary one. It
can be compared to the role o f the chorus i n a play. T h e Arab and
M u s l i m states grant existing norms legitimacy but do not create
them; they chant "amen" or sing a refrain o f routine formulations,
but do not initiate new melodies or improvise lyrics.
A s collective organizations, the Arab League and O I C do not
1
conduct negotiations w i t h Israel, nor do they set policy. T h e
negotiations o n Jerusalem are conducted i n bilateral talks, w i t h
the multilateral framework established by the M a d r i d Conference
remaining i n the background. In characterizing the roles o f collec-
tive organizations i n the negotiations, it should be remembered
158

The A r a b L e a g u e a n d t h e O I C 159
that the decisions o f the Arab and Islamic summits are always
made unanimously, by consensus. O n l y w h e n a new consensus
crystallizes is it ratified ex post f a c t o i n a collective decision. So w h e n
negotiations require concessions and compromises and make
extraordinary breakthroughs, the collective institutions, by their
very structure, cannot participate i n them. T h e i r role is limited to
lending support to the prevailing n o r m . T h i s is part o f the Arab
starting position and a background factor that must be taken into
account during the diplomatic give-and-take between the parties.
It goes without saying that the decisions o f s u m m i t conferences
are toothless. T r u e , conferences declare that they w i l l take action,
but they have no ability to actually do anything. In declaring polit-
ical and economic measures, the Arab summits seek to establish
the authority o f the collective Arab w i l l , but they can do no more
than make declarations. Nevertheless, the collective organizations
do cany a certain intra-Arab weight. V i a the pan-Arab and pan-
Islamic frameworks, one central player can neutralize an excep-
tional initiative by an opponent. This is what the P L O d i d w h e n
Jordan signed a peace treaty i n w h i c h Israel promised to grant it, i n
the permanent settlement to the Israel-Arab conflict, a preferred
position i n the Islamic holy places i n Jerusalem.
The A r a b s u m m i t conferences
A n old refrain i n a new song
T h e official Arab collective position is that East Jerusalem is an

inseparable part o f the territories occupied i n 1967; therefore, the
large-scale construction o f Jewish neighborhoods o n the eastern
side o f the city is illegal settlement activity i n the full sense o f the
term. T h i s has been reiterated i n all concluding resolutions and
decisions passed by Arab summit conferences since 1967, for
example i n the decisions o f the A m m a n Conference o n N o v e m -
ber 11, 1987 ( F i l a s t i n a l - T h a w r a , 1 D e c . 1987) and o f the Algiers
S u m m i t o f June 9, 1988 ( F i l a s t i n a l - T h a w r a , 19 June 1988). T h i s
approach was also expressed i n the peace initiative approved by
the summit conference o f Arab heads o f state i n Fez at the begin-
ning o f September 1982. T h e Fez decisions demanded that Israel
withdraw from East Jerusalem, w h i c h had the same status as the
rest o f the 1967 territories. T h e Arab leaders demanded that Israel
dismantle all the settlements it had built i n the 1967 territories,

and indicated that this included the Jewish neighborhoods i n East

Jerusalem. Instead o f being under Israeli sovereignty, the eastern
side o f the city w o u l d be under Palestinian sovereignly, and East
Jerusalem w o u l d be the capital of an independent Palestinian state
(Sela, 1983: 259).
T h e only innovation in the plan is recognition o f the Jewish
right to freedom of religious worship i n their holy places. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the Arab states meant the Western W a l l and
not the T e m p l e M o u n t , and that they wanted to make a c o m m i t -
ment similar to the one Israel has made since 1967 - that is, grant-
ing freedom o f worship to all religions at holy sites under Arab
sovereignty. T h e Fez program d i d not, however, address the
regime or administration that w o u l d oversee the Islamic holy sites
after Israel's ejection from them. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, M o r o c c o ,
and even Egypt see themselves as taking part i n the control and
management o f the Islamic holy sites i n Jerusalem, alongside the
Palestinians. T h e sites holy to Islam i n Jerusalem are sources o f
legitimacy for the rulers of those countries. T h e Arab states united
only i n determining that political sovereignty i n East Jerusalem
must be given to the Palestinians.
Despite the clear continuity i n the collective Arab position on
Jerusalem, it has evolved i n keeping w i t h its context. T h e first step
came w h e n Egypt was invited to the Casablanca conference o f
1989, after having been excluded since it signed the C a m p David
agreements. It was allowed to participate, it should be emphasized,
without having to repudiate its peace treaty w i t h Israel. In returning
to the body that was the agent of the Arab consensus, it contributed
to a moderation o f the collective position (Sela, 1983). Second,
during the 1980s there was a change i n the collective approach to an
accommodation w i t h Israel. T h e Fez program of 1982 does not deal
w i t h direct negotiations w i t h Israel or w i t h the granting o f direct
Arab guarantees of enforcing a peace agreement with it. T h e Casa-
blanca decisions o f 1989, however, confirmed the P L O ' s accep-
tance of U N resolution 242 and thus the P L O ' s defacto recognition
of Israel. T h e decisions o f the 19 Palestinian National C o u n c i l i n
N o v e m b e r 1988 were considered a breakthrough at the time, and a
year later, at the Casablanca summit o f 1989, they were already part
of a new Arab consensus ( F i l a s t i n a l - T h a w r a , 4 June 1989).
T h e focuses o f friction between the Palestinians and Israel i n
Jerusalem provided the leaders o f the Arab states w i t h many

The A r a b L e a g u e a n d d i e O I C 161
opportunities to strengthen the Palestinian hand i n its contest

for Jerusalem. So, for example, the question of Jerusalem was
cited i n the c o n c l u d i n g statement o f the Baghdad conference o f
M a y 30,<-1990, i n the context o f two developments of this period
that were o f concern to the Arab states: the establishment o f a
Jewish settlement i n the O l d C i t y ' s C h r i s t i a n Quarter i n 1990,
and the settlement of new immigrants f r o m the Soviet U n i o n i n
parts o f the city that were not under Israeli control i n 1967
(FBIS, 31 M a y 1990). T h e same is true o f the C a i r o s u m m i t o f
June 1996, w h i c h was convened after the publication o f the p r o -
gram of the new Israeli government of P r i m e M i n i s t e r B i n y a m i n
Netanyahu.
Even though there was no great difference o n the Jerusalem
issue between the Netanyahu government's program and that o f
the previous Rabin and Peres governments o f 1992-1996
( H a ' a r e t z , 17 June 1996), the Palestinians and Arabs were w o r r i e d
about what the new Israeli government was likely to do. T h e
reason was that the L i k u d ' s leaders had, d u r i n g the election c a m -
paign, made extensive promises about Jerusalem, i n c l u d i n g c o m -
mitting themselves to the closure o f the O r i e n t H o u s e and to
removing the Jerusalem question from the permanent status talks.
T h e Cairo summit, the first s u m m i t since the Arab w o r l d split
over Iraq's invasion o f Kuwait i n August 1990, was meant to be
pre-emptive. T h e Israeli government's statement of its intentions
helped the Arab w o r l d unite, i f only for a brief moment, around
the Jerusalem problem ( A l - Q u d s , 24 June 1996).
Ultimately, collective organizations support successful negoti-
ations and thus create a new consensus. T h e Casablanca confer-
ence o f 1989 gave its imprimatur to the P L O ' s recognition o f
Israel one year previously, and the C a i r o s u m m i t o f 1996 gave its
seal o f approval to the O s l o accords, even though they were far
from the Arab consensus. T h e negotiations over Jerusalem are not
conducted between a pan-Arab or pan-Islamic organization and
Israel, but rather between Israel and each o f the parties directly
involved. Negotiations that produce an agreement acceptable to
the countries involved, and w h i c h are acceptable to the interna-
tional c o m m u n i t y , w i l l receive the retroactive blessing o f the
collective organizations.

The O r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e I s l a m i c C o n f e r e n c e (OIC)
The W a s h i n g t o n D e c l a r a t i o n a n d t h e peace agreement between

J o r d a n a n d Israel
T h e peace talks between Israel and Jordan produced the Washing-

ton Declaration signed by Rabin and H u s s e i n on J u l y 25, 1994.
O n e o f the Declaration's sections relates to Jerusalem's holy
places. T h i s section, later copied i n substantially similar language
into the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty o f September 1994, con-
firmed Palestinian apprehensions about Israeli activities in Jerusa-
lem, and rekindled discord between the P L O and Jordan. T h e
Washington Declaration states that:
Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan in M u s l i m holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the
permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the
Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In addition the two sides have
agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations among the three
monotheistic religions.
(Laqueur & Rubin, 1995: 655)
T h i s clause d i d not appear i n the Declaration o f Principles that

K i n g H u s s e i n and Israeli Foreign M i n i s t e r S h i m o n Peres were to
sign o n N o v e m b e r 2, 1993, although that agreement is generally
similar to the Washington Declaration ( H a ' a r e t z , 23 N o v . 1994).
R a b i n and H u s s e i n drafted this clause themselves (Ad. M .
Kokhanovski, Legal Adviser o f the M i n i s t r y o f Defense, i n
H a ' a r e t z , 27 O c t . 1995), w i t h the purpose of separating the discus-
sion o f political sovereignty over Jerusalem from the issue o f the
religious status o f the holy places. In fact, until the signing o f the
Washington Declaration, there were disputes w i t h i n the Israeli
establishment between the heads o f the Foreign M i n i s t r y , the
M i n i s t r y o f Defense and the prime minister as to whether Israel
needed a stronger Jordan for the formulation o f the permanent
agreements. T h e Foreign M i n i s t r y saw i n the proposed clause a
needless provocation and an insult to the Palestinians. T h e y
believed that a Palestinian state was inevitable, and that Israel
should therefore not try to prevent it from developing by placing a
Jordanian protectorate over the Palestinian Authority. Neither,
they maintained, should Israel assist Jordan i n becoming the d o m -
inant partner i n a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. In any
case, Foreign M i n i s t r y officials maintained, the Hashemite

kingdom was likely to disappear after Hussein's departure. G i v i n g

precedence to Jordan w o u l d only infuriate the Saudis and M o r o c -
cans, w h o w o u l d do their best to frustrate any such plan. T h e
Ministry• o f Defense and the prime minister believed, however,
that it w o u l d be possible totovercome Arab opposition to a special
role for Jordan. T h e y maintained that Hashemite Jordan w o u l d
not disappear, and it was i n Israel's interest to supply it w i t h the
means to oversee the Palestinian neighbor that both established
states considered suspect and had an interest i n keeping small and
weak. T h e y also claimed that this approach was acceptable to
Jordan, w h i c h w o u l d , at the time o f tbe permanent settlement,
establish an alliance w i t h Israel (Galili, 5 Aug. 1996).
In fact, Jordan went along w i t h the new direction set by P r i m e
Minister Rabin w h e n he forced his o p i n i o n on the Foreign M i n i s -
try and Peres. In his speech before the U n i t e d States Congress,
K i n g H u s s e i n stated:
M y religious faith demands that sovereignty over the holy places in
Jerusalem resides with God and God alone. Dialogue between the faiths
should be strengthened; religious sovereignty should be accorded to all
believers of the three Abrahamic faiths, in accordance with their
religions. In this way, Jerusalem will become the symbol of peace and its
embodiment, as it must be for both Palestinians and Israelis when their
negotiations determine the final status of Arab Eastern Jerusalem.
(140 Congr. Rec. H6204, H6205, daily ed. 26 July 1994;
H a ' a r e t z 27 July 1994; F B I S 27 July 1994)
C r o w n Prince Hassan of Jordan was more open and direct. H e
stated that Jordan had never, and w o u l d never, relinquish its
responsibility over the Islamic holy places i n East Jerusalem. In his
view, it was necessary to do everything to separate the religious
and political issues i n East Jerusalem, not only i n the i n t e r i m
period but also i n the permanent settlement. T h i s might even
involve dividing Jerusalem i n different ways for religious and
political purposes. In the permanent agreement, he suggested,
political sovereignty w o u l d be i n Palestinian hands, should they
attain it, but religious sovereignty w o u l d be i n the hands of a pan-
Islamic C o u n c i l i n w h i c h both Palestinians and Jordanians w o u l d
participate ( H a ' a r e t z , 20 J u l y 1994).
In the Washington Declaration, Israel undertook an initial
commitment about the permanent status o f Jerusalem. F o r all
practical purposes it relinquished any claim to sovereignty over

the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and to the T e m p l e M o u n t as a

religious site. Israel claimed that its paramount interest was to
guarantee its political sovereignty over the eastern city, and that
management of the Islamic h o l y places and their religious status
was not part of political sovereignty. Furthermore, i n the W a s h -
ington Declaration, Israel officially recognized for the first time
Jordan's special status i n regard to the Islamic h o l y shrines i n
Jerusalem. H i s t o r i c a l l y and traditionally, the W a q f (religious
e n d o w m e n t administration) has been responsible for these holy
shrines. After the annexation of the West B a n k to Jordan i n 1951,
the W a q f was subordinated to the Jordanian authorities. T h e
Hashemites developed a special attachment to the Islamic holy
places in Jerusalem, d e r i v i n g from the shrines m u c h of the legiti-
macy for their rule and a good part o f their political resilience.
T h e Jerusalem W a q f remained subordinate to Jordan even after
the Israeli conquest o f 1967, and even the severance of Jordan's
legal and administrative ties to the West B a n k i n J u l y 1988 d i d
not alter this. B u t u n t i l the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, Jordan
maintained this role because it was the status q u o , rather than by
force of any decision regarding the future of the sites. T h e W a s h -
ington Declaration established the possibility o f a future expro-
priation o f Jerusalem's Islamic h o l y places from any political
sovereignty.
In 1992, A d n a n A b u O d e h , the former Jordanian prime m i n i s -
ter and K i n g Hussein's confidant, suggested - possibly w i t h the
king's knowledge - that the O l d C i t y of Jerusalem (inside the
walls) should not be under the political sovereignty o f any state
but rather be designated a holy place. A j o i n t J e w i s h - M u s l i m -
Christian council w o u l d administer the site, and each religion
w o u l d have custody of its o w n shrines ( A b u O d e h 1992: 183,185;
see also H a ' a r e t z , 23 A p r i l 1992). It should be emphasized that i n
the Washington Declaration, Israel and Jordan adopted only one
of A b u Odeh's guiding principles: the separation of political from
religious sovereignty. T h e Washington Declaration went further
than his plan. A b u O d e h d i d not advocate a preferential position
for Jordan i n the administration o f the holy places, nor d i d he
intend to accord even indirect legitimacy to Israel's political hold
over Eastern Jerusalem. O n the contrary, he sought to oust Israel.
T h i s makes it clear that he considered the new Israeli neighbor-
hoods i n East Jerusalem to be illegal settlements.

A l t h o u g h A b u Odeh's statement d i d not elicit any response

from Israel at the time, after the O s l o agreements the Jordanian
inclination to separate the political future o f Jerusalem from the
future o f the holy places became an Israeli inclination as w e l l .
Since 1967, Israel has aspired to retain political sovereignty over
East Jerusalem and to accord its actions a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic,
and international legitimacy. In return for Jordan's agreement to
separate political and religious questions regarding Jerusalem,
Rabin was w i l l i n g to endorse Jordan's special religious status i n
the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem, although he stated informally
that he wished to discuss their future w i t h more than one partner
( H a ' a r e t z , 27 J u l y 1 9 9 4 ) . Jordan claimed to have received from
Israel a foothold i n the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem by e x c l u d -
ing Israel from them. T h u s , it argued, Israel had moved closer to
acceptance o f expropriating the holy places f r o m all political sov-
ereignty, i n c l u d i n g its o w n . W h i l e Israel claimed to have gained
support for its view that the mere existence of Islamic h o l y places
in East Jerusalem does not i n itself eviscerate Israel's political sov-
ereignty over the city, Jordanian-Israeli cooperation weakened
the Palestinian position i n their struggle to establish East Jerusa-
lem as their capital.
As expected, the Palestinians d i d not accept the Washington
Declaration. T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y organized a popular cam-
paign against it, and protested to the president o f the O I C and the
secretariat o f the Arab League ( M u s a l l a m , 1996: 93-103). In
response to Israel's invitation to K i n g H u s s e i n to come and pray i n
Jerusalem and the rumors i n the West B a n k that this invitation
w o u l d soon be acted upon, C h a i r m a n Arafat declared that he
alone had the right to issue invitations to prayer i n Jerusalem.
Arafat mobilized the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l headed by Hassan
Tahboub, w h o declared that the C o u n c i l was the sole body
responsible for the Islamic holy^places i n Jerusalem. Arafat also
accused Israel o f violating the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration o f
Principles, and added that the Palestinians therefore demanded
the accelerated commencement of negotiations over the future o f
Jerusalem ( M u s a l l a m , 1996: 93-104; H a ' a r e t z , 27 J u l y 1994).
D i d Israel indeed violate its agreement w i t h the P L O ? T w o
briefs by Israeli jurists state four reasons w h y Israel d i d not. First,
Jordan was not a partner i n the negotiations for the permanent set-
tlement, and the agreement w i t h Jordan contained nothing that

w o u l d have a substantive effect o n the results o f the negotiations

over the permanent status of Jerusalem. A l l that had been deter-
m i n e d was that Israel w o u l d consider assigning a higher priority to
Jordan's role i n the holy places i n all future negotiations. Second,
the agreement w i t h Jordan d i d not obligate the P L O and did not
compromise Palestinian rights; it simply testified to what Israel's
priorities w o u l d be w h e n it sat d o w n to talk w i t h the P L O . T h i r d ,
the agreement w i t h Jordan addressed the permanent status,
whereas Israel's c o m m i t m e n t to the P L O promised preservation
of the status q u o d u r i n g the interim period. F o u r t h , Israel's agree-
ment w i t h the organization set out o n l y the timetable for discuss-
ing the question o f Jerusalem. A t the most, Israel's agreement
w i t h Jordan went beyond Palestinian expectations ( H a ' a r e t z , 4
Aug. 1994). Rabin and H u s s e i n formulated the clause i n the
Washington Declaration i n such a way that the Palestinians w o u l d
not be able make a legal claim that it contradicted Israel's under-
takings to the Palestinians, w h i l e at the same time seeing it as an
indirect confirmation by Jordan o f Israeli political sovereignty i n
East Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 23 N o v . 1994).
F r o m a legal and verbal point of v i e w Israel may not have v i o -
lated its agreement w i t h the P L O , but this is certainly not the case
from a political point of view. Israel wanted to exploit its contacts
w i t h Jordan i n order to influence the permanent status of Jerusa-
lem and to weaken the Palestinian claim to sovereignty i n East
Jerusalem.
T h e Washington declaration quite naturally raised the P L O ' s
hackles because the Palestinians understood it to be an Israeli and
Jordanian attempt to narrow the Palestinian Authority's range o f
options and push it into a corner. A c c o r d i n g to the Palestinian
position, Israel was not an owner w i t h rights to hand out the
T e m p l e M o u n t - a l - H a r a m al-Sharif - to whomever it sought to
favor. Israel was an occupier. Political ownership had to be i n Pal-
estinian hands, and they w o u l d make the decisions about the
future o f the Islamic holy places i n Jerusalem. In their opinion it
was not possible to separate political sovereignty over the holy
places from their religious status, especially given that a great part
o f the Palestinian claim to political sovereignty i n East Jerusalem
was based o n the religious status o f a l - H a r a m al-Sharif i n Islam.
T h e P L O thus saw the agreement between Israel and Jordan as an
attempt to p u l l the rug out from under it in Jerusalem and to leave

The A r a b L e a g u e a n d d i e O I C 167
it without any special religious standing. T h e P L O read the agree-

ment as a deal under w h i c h Jordan was w i l l i n g to accept Israeli
political sovereignty i n East Jerusalem i n exchange for getting
exclusive (in the interim agreement) or dominant (in the perma-
nent settlement) responsibility for the Islamic holy sites. In this
way Israel created a prior fact i n relation to a subject that was sup-
posed to be discussed i n the framework o f the permanent status
talks and i n opposition to Peres's commitments i n his letter to
Hoist. Finally, the agreement between Israel and Jordan left the
Christian holy sites under Israeli sovereignty, whereas the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y maintained that it should receive responsibility
for them because they were located o n territory occupied by Israel
in 1967. Christian freedom o f worship was to be granted by
Arafat, the legal claimant to political sovereignty there, and not by
the Israeli occupier (Musallam, 1996: 75-89). " N o Arab or Israeli
leader rules over the holy places i n East Jerusalem. That right lies
solely w i t h the Palestinians," a statement o f Arafat's declared
( H a ' a r e t z , 27 J u l y 1994).
In response, K i n g H u s s e i n suggested that the debate being
stirred by the P L O over Jerusalem's holy places was aimed at cov-
ering up the organization's failures - its inability to wrest from
Israel either a l - H a r a m al-Sharif or a sovereign Palestinian state
w i t h Jerusalem as its capital. H u s s e i n pledged that Jordan had no
interest i n competing w i t h the P L O o n the political level. Jordan
may well have caught the P L O by surprise i n its agreement w i t h
Israel but, H u s s e i n noted, the P L O had given Jordan no less o f a
surprise by not coordinating policy w i t h it w h i l e it was negotiating
with Israel and secretly concluding the O s l o agreements (inter-
view w i t h D e r Spiegel, printed i n H a ' a r e t z , 22 Aug. 1994). T r y i n g to
conciliate the P L O , H u s s e i n stated that the separation of the polit-
ical question of Jerusalem's future from the religious p r o b l e m d i d
not interfere w i t h the P L O ' s political negotiations w i t h Israel, nor
w i t h the P L O ' s political status as the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinians.
T h e debate between Jordan and the P L O over the preferred
status on al-Haram al-Sharif was no more than an extension of the
mutual suspicion that had long characterized the relations
between Arafat and H u s s e i n and between the two political enti-
ties. So, for example, o n the eve o f the signing o f the Declaration
of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians o n August 23,

1993, Arafat visited A m m a n and told K i n g H u s s e i n that there had

been secret contacts between h i m and Israel that had involved for-
mulating a Declaration o f Principles, but the matter was still
unfinished. Furthermore, he d i d not present the details or show
H u s s e i n a draft of the agreement, even though he had showed it to
Mubarak. Despite the efforts o f his aides and advisors, Arafat was
not persuaded that signing the O s l o accord had laid the "Jordanian
option" to rest once and for all; i n his view there was still a danger
that it w o u l d be realized and leave the Palestinians without inde-
pendence. Arafat feared this, and so demanded o f Israel that, i n
addition to its redeployment i n the Gaza Strip, it also withdraw
from Jericho, the city that had i n 1948 served as Jordan's portal to
the West Bank. It was i n Jericho, after all, that the "Jericho C o n -
gress" had been convened - that is, the conference i n w h i c h Pales-
tinian public figures petitioned K i n g Abdallah to take the West
B a n k under his protection. In 1974 Israel and Jordan discussed the
future of Jericho i n the context of Jordan's entry into the diplo-
matic process and into the West Bank. Israel then offered Jordan a
"Jericho corridor," a plan under w h i c h Jordan w o u l d receive a
corridor l i n k i n g j e r i c h o to the heights near Ramallah as a first step
towards the implementation o f the A l l o n Plan, a proposal for ter-
ritorial compromise i n the West B a n k put forward by Israeli m i n -
ister o f labor, Yigal A l l o n . B u t Jordan wanted a complete Israeli
withdrawal from the West Bank, and as a first step demanded a
separation o f forces along the length o f the Jordan Valley, just as
Israel had w i t h d r a w n its forces on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts,
(Zak, 1996: 163-6). T h e signing o f the Declaration o f Principles
just a few days after Arafat's visit w i t h h i m angered Hussein. H e
viewed Arafat's failure to report to h i m o n the impending agree-
ment as an expression o f lack o f confidence and ungratefulness,
for the significant assistance that Jordan had granted to the P L O
from the time o f the contacts that preceded the convening o f the
M a d r i d Conference (Naufel, 1995: 143-4).
Hamas was also critical o f the Washington Declaration, even
though it had been inclined, since its inception, to benefit from
Jordanian support against the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and the P L O .
T h e agreement laid the foundation for peace and normalization
between the two states, w h i c h Hamas was resolutely opposed to.
Hamas argued that Jordan's agreement w i t h Israel harmed the
P L O and made it easier for Israel to negotiate w i t h the Palestinians

on the permanent settlement, and that Jordan had also conceded

political sovereignty i n Jerusalem to Israel. Furthermore, Hamas
claimed, Jordan's action had increased the friction between Jordan
and Saudi Arabia, and the sole beneficiary o f this division - as o f
the division between the P L O and Jordan - was Israel. T r u e ,
Hamas abstained from raining fire and brimstone on the W a s h -
ington Declaration as it had o n the O s l o accords, but it considered
the declaration to be a total capitulation and a betrayal o f all sacred
values. In its desire to d i m i n i s h Arafat's standing, Hamas voiced
agreement w i t h the idea o f divine sovereignty in Jerusalem. N e v -
ertheless, it attacked the Washington Declaration for what it
viewed as a grant to Israel o f political sovereignty o n a l - H a r a m al-
Sharif and in Jerusalem ( A l - B i y y a n , 22 J u l y 1994,29July 1994; A l -
I s t i q l a l , 28 O c t . 1 9 9 4 ; A l - M a q a d a m e h ( u n d a t e d ) ; F U a s t i n a l - M u s l h n a ,
Sept. and N o v . 1994, quoted i n Shabbat, 1997).
In the meantime, there were attempts to bridge the differences
between Jordan and the P L O and to moderate the dispute. Prince
Hassan, Jordan's heir apparent, tried, at the beginning o f N o v e m -
ber 1994, to persuade the Palestinians that Jordan was acting as no
more than an agent o f the Arab and Islamic worlds for the pur-
poses o f getting the Islamic holy places out o f Israel's hands, and
that i n the final account this also served the Palestinian interest
(FBIS, 3 N o v . 1994). Previously, Jordanian P r i m e M i n i s t e r al-
Majali had spoken more bluntly (FBIS, 31 O c t . 1994). U n l i k e
Prince Hassan, w h o had conditioned transferring authority over
the Islamic holy sites i n Jerusalem to the Palestinians on them
receiving this responsibility from the Israelis, al-Majali c o n d i -
tioned it o n obtaining political sovereignty. It was clear to every-
one that al-Majali's standard was higher than Hassan's, and
whoever perceived profound doubts about whether the Palestin-
ians could remove Israel politically from East Jerusalem i n al-
Majali's statement was not mistaken.
A t the beginning o f December 1994, Faisal Husseini, w h o held
the Jerusalem portfolio i n the P L O Executive C o m m i t t e e , went
to Jordan i n an attempt to bridge the differences on Jerusalem and
prepare the ground for an official visit by Arafat i n Jordan. A t the
end o f his trip he declared:
These holy places are being deposited with Jordan, which will hand
them over the Palestinians when we reach a position that will allow us to
assume this responsibility. We have agreed that the situation remain as it

is, with greater coordination between the Jordanian and Palestinian

parties. In the absence of coordination even measures taken with good
intent are liable to produce results that will be misinterpreted by one side
or the other.
( A l - Q u d s , 5 Dec. 1994; H a ' a r e t z , 5 Dec. 1994)
In other words, both parties agreed that the Palestinian Authority
w o u l d recognize the status q u o prevailing i n Jerusalem since 1967,
granting Jordan responsibility for the Islamic holy places in the
city. In exchange, the Jordanian authorities agreed to view this
guardianship as a trust to be handed over to the Palestinians w h e n
they could assume responsibility. It is not clear whether or to what
extent Arafat had given H u s s e i n i a mandate to reach such a c o m -
pact, w h i c h was closer to Jordan's position than to the Palestin-
ians'. In any case, Arafat was not prepared to approve the
agreement, and his planned December 1994 visit to Jordan was
called off. A s an. alternative, Arafat brought the dispute between
h i m and K i n g H u s s e i n for resolution into a new arena - the O I C .
The O I C : December 1994-January 1995
T h e O I C , w h i c h convened i n Casablanca i n December 1994,

blazed its way straight into the dispute between the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y and Jordan over the Islamic holy places i n Jerusalem.
Jordan was supported by Qatar, Y e m e n , and O m a n , and
demanded that the conference's concluding statement commend
Jordan's role as guardian o f the holy places and that it applaud
K i n g H u s s e i n for his concern. In his attempt to enlist the support
o f the Islamic heads o f state, K i n g H u s s e i n claimed that i m m e d i -
ately u p o n the conclusion o f a Palestinian-Israeli agreement on
the permanent status o f Jerusalem, Jordan w o u l d hand over the
guardianship o f the city's holy places. B u t the P L O , supported by
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and M o r o c c o , discerned Jordan's political
purposes and adamantly refused to agree to this. T h e Palestinians
claimed that the section o f the Jordanian-Israeli agreement deal-
ing w i t h this subject was an obstacle to achieving sovereignty i n
East Jerusalem and i n effectuating Israeli withdrawal. M o r o c c o ,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the P L O even tried to persuade the con-
ference to establish a committee that w o u l d take oven, guardian-
ship o f the h o l y places from Jordan until the Palestinian Authority
received full authority i n East Jerusalem. W h e n he was unable to
convince a majority o f the delegates to recognize Jordan's role as

guardian o f the holy places until a permanent settlement was

reached, K i n g H u s s e i n left the conference. F o r the first time since
the organization's establishment i n 1970 there was no consensus
for its decisions, w h i c h were, for all intents and purposes,
imposed on Jordan ( A l - Q u d s , 15 D e c . 1994; A l - W a s a t , 19 D e c .
1994).
T h e concluding statement noted that the Conference "stresses
once again that the problem o f Palestine and the sublime Jerusa-
lem is a fundamental problem for all M u s l i m s and that they
express their identification w i t h the Palestine Liberation O r g a n i -
zation i n its just struggle to remove every remnant of Israeli o c c u -
pation and to b u i l d the Palestinian national institutions on the
land o f Palestine" ( A l - Q u d s , 16 D e c . 1994). T h e statement
declared that the members o f the O I C should "assist the P L O i n
future negotiations so that all the powers and areas of responsibil-
ity i n the occupied lands, i n c l u d i n g sublime Jerusalem, w i l l be
transferred to the Palestinian N a t i o n a l A u t h o r i t y and i n order to
ensure the return o f Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty" ( A l -
Q u d s , 16 D e c . 1994). T h e statement emphasized that "sublime
Jerusalem is an inseparable part of the Palestinian territories o c c u -
pied by Israel i n 1967 and all rules that apply to the occupied terri-
tories apply to it" ( A l - Q u d s , 16 D e c . 1994). M o r e o v e r , the
announcement maintained that, d u r i n g the i n t e r i m period,
authority i n Jerusalem should be transferred to the Palestinian
Authority; it completely ignored Jordan's role i n the holy places
( A l - Q u d s , 16 D e c . 1994; H a ' a r e t z , 22 D e c . 1994, 2 Jan. 1995).
As can be seen, this statement emphasized the political aspects.
It was not Jordan's preferred religious status that caused the antag-
onism o f the strong M i d d l e Eastern Islamic states, but rather the
political significance implicit i n the Washington Declaration, the
indirect recognition that Jordan had given to Israel's annexation o f
East Jerusalem. T h e debate among the Islamic states o n the holy
places was not about the religious issue, but rather about political
sovereignty. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, M o r o c c o , and the P L O rea-
soned that the status o f the holy places i n Jerusalem was derived
from political sovereignty over the city, and therefore that i f polit-
ical sovereignty remained i n Israel's hands, the holy places were
not liberated from occupation as Jordan claimed. Saudi Arabia
added to this the argument that a separation o f religion and p o l i -
tics o f the type H u s s e i n had sought to accomplish i n Jerusalem

was alien to Islam. O n January 16, 1995, the O I C ' s Jerusalem

C o m m i t t e e convened i n M o r o c c o i n its new configuration, one
that had been initiated by M o r o c c o , Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the
P L O . In this framework the dominant members o f the organiza-
tion completed what they had begun at the Conference's plenary
session a m o n t h before. T h e Jerusalem C o m m i t t e e refused to rec-
ognize the preferred status that Jordan was to receive from Israel,
and d i d not agree w i t h the claims favorable to Jordan ( A l - Q u d s , 18
Jan. 1995).
The agreement between the P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y a n d J o r d a n
After the issue o f the holy places was decided in the Palestinians'
favor, the way was clear for Arafat to visit Jordan. O n January 25,
1995, Arafat arrived i n A m m a n to sign a m e m o r a n d u m of under-
standing and cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and
the Hashemite K i n g d o m of Jordan i n the areas o f c o m m u n i c a -
tions, the movement of goods and people, banking, mail, culture,
education, and local administration. T h e signing o f these agree-
ments had been delayed since the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority, and i n 1994 Jordan signed separate economic agree-
ments w i t h the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and w i t h Israel. T h e agree-
ments between Jordan and the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y were meant
to put their bilateral relations i n order, and i n their wake Jordan
also decided to open a liaison office i n Gaza. A s a preamble to this
series o f agreements, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority also
signed a political document drafted as a treaty between two politi-
cal entities o f the same diplomatic standing. T h i s document did
not m e n t i o n Jordan's special status i n Jerusalem and did not
directly address the Islamic holy places i n the city. A t the same
time, however, it d i d note the political sovereignty of the Palestin-
ian people i n Jerusalem. T h e Palestinian side viewed w i t h favor
the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel and stated, i n opposi-
tion to the Syrian position, that this treaty d i d not interfere w i t h
the other channels of negotiation between Israel and its neighbors
- i n other words, Syria's efforts to return the G o l a n Heights to its
sovereignty. Jordan's peace treaty w i t h Israel was presented i n the
document as assuring Jordan's right "to its land, water, and bor-
ders, and an act to ensure the rights o f the displaced persons and
refugees" - that is, it d i d not violate Palestinian rights ( A l - H i y a t , 24
Jan. 1995; A l - S h a r q a l - A w s a t , 27 Jan. 1995; H a ' a r e t z , 27 Jan. 1995).

Jordan thus committed itself to help the Palestinians and the P L O

realize their right to self-determination and to a state w i t h Jerusa
lem as its capital. T h i s meant that the Jordanians w o u l d not be
permitted‫־‬to place an obstacle i n the Palestinians' way i n the f o r m
of separating political sovereignty i n Jerusalem from religious
sovereignty i n the holy places. T h e same thing is implied i n the
section i n w h i c h Jordan committed itself to cooperate w i t h the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and to assist it i n the establishment o f its
national institutions. In fact the agreement between Jordan and
the Palestinians contains no mention of Jordan's preferred status
in the Jerusalem holy places, and one of the prominent sections i n
the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel was dealt w i t h i n the
Palestinian Authority-Jordan treaty as i f it d i d not exist.
T h e new situation created by the O I C i n the wake of the agree
ment w i t h the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was imposed o n H u s s e i n . H e
found it difficult to make his peace w i t h it. K n o w i n g that the
question of Jerusalem had not been decided yet and that it w o u l d
be discussed at length as part o f the establishment o f the perma
nent arrangements between Israel and the Palestinians, he hoped
that i n time he w o u l d be able to turn the clock back. In his remarks
at the signing ceremony for his agreement w i t h the Palestinian
Authority, K i n g H u s s e i n said that his country w o u l d continue to
do its duty and to extend its protection to the h o l y places in Jerusa
lem "as in the past." Jordan w o u l d do so "on the basis of its efforts
to foster these holy places and as fulfillment of its duty to preserve
Jerusalem and foster its Arab and Islamic identity" ( A l - H a y a t , 2 7
Jan. 1 9 9 5 ; A l - S h a r q a l - A w s a t , 2 7 J a n . 1995). T h e extent to w h i c h
the issue of Jerusalem was convoluted and complicated for K i n g
Hussein can be seen i n an interview he granted to Ibrahim Nafa,
editor o f the Egyptian daily newspaper A l - A h r a m , about a m o n t h
after the signing o f the agreement w i t h the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
(FBIS, 21 Feb. 1995). It was hard for anyone to get an unambigu
ous answer about Jordan's policy because o f tbe contradictions
that emerge from each o f Hussein's sentences and the awkward
ness apparent i n them. Jordan, according to the king, was respon
sible for East Jerusalem, but the Hashemite K i n g d o m of Jordan
had no aspirations i n Jerusalem. T h e permanent status talks
between Israel and the Palestinians w o u l d determine w h o w o u l d
be sovereign i n Jerusalem, but at the same time Jordan believed
that national-political sovereignty i n the H o l y C i t y should not be

given to one o f the contending parties; he hoped that Jordan

w o u l d be a partner i n shaping the permanent arrangements, but
said also that the Palestinians were the ones w h o w o u l d make the
agreements w i t h Israel, and that the goal of the peace process was
to establish Palestinian rule o n Palestinian land. E v e n though he
stated that Jordan had no goals i n Jerusalem, the k i n g d o m w o u l d
continue to supervise the holy places i n the period o f the interim
agreement, because this was its obligation. E v e n though the gen-
eral direction o f his remarks was a retreat from the Washington
Declaration i n the direction of A d n a n A b u Odeh's plan, Hussein
did not say this explicitly. In practical terms, the O I C had shuffled
the deck for H u s s e i n . H e was s q u i r m i n g i n a situation that had
been forced o n h i m , had a difficult time accepting it, and since
East Jerusalem's final status had not yet been determined i n the
framework o f the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, he
still hoped that i n the future the Islamic states w o u l d accept his
position.
The I s l a m i c h o l y places — a p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m
Israel may have thought it could deal the P L O a political b l o w by

playing the religious card, but the Islamic countries finessed it.
Just as i n 1974, w h e n the s u m m i t conference o f Arab heads o f
states demoted Jordan from being a legitimate representative o f
the Palestinian people alongside the P L O , so 20 years later the
Islamic heads o f state demoted it from its preferred status i n the
Islamic h o l y places i n Jerusalem. A t base, the debate among the
Islamic states was between two political alternatives. Jordan m a i n -
tained that it was doubtful whether the Palestinians w o u l d suc-
ceed i n getting Israel to agree to turn the Palestinian Authority
into a state, and it was even more doubtful whether Israel w o u l d
agree to concede its sovereignty i n East Jerusalem. Therefore,
Jordan argued, at the very least, action should be taken to end
Israel's religious grip on the Islamic holy sites i n the city by sepa-
rating political sovereignty from religious sovereignty. O f course,
Jordan maintained that this could best be done by buttressingjor-
dan's religious standing i n Jerusalem. T h e great majority of Arab
and Islamic states, however, considered this to be tantamount to
recognition of the political annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel.
In their o p i n i o n , ending Israel's religious grip on the Islamic holy
sites in Jerusalem was inseparably tied up i n ending the occupation.

They believed that the Palestinians should be strengthened and

they did not believe that they should consent to a preferential reli-
gious status for Jordan, because that w o u l d clearly weaken the P a l -
estinian 'claim to full sovereignty and independence. T h e Arab
and Islamic states were certain that they w o u l d be able to get Israel
to agree to turn the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y into a state w i t h its capi-
tal in Jerusalem.
T h e dispute between Jordan and the Islamic states was a funda-
mentally political one, and this has significance for the adminis-
tration o f the Islamic holy places i n the future. It is not at all
certain that the Islamic states w i l l consent to exclusive Palestinian
administration o f the holy places themselves; at the very least, this
is not required by their decisions thus far. T h e Islamic states, i n
the view presented here, have sought a way to end Israel's occupa-
tion o f East Jerusalem, and this led them to support the Palestin-
ian demand. T h e y have still not decided h o w the holy places w i l l
be run after Israel transfers East Jerusalem to Palestinian sover-
eignty. T h e option o f the Islamic holy places i n Jerusalem being
under the religious administration o f several states under a Pales-
tinian political r o o f has not yet been stricken from the agenda.
W i t h the Islamic states j o i n i n g his ranks, Arafat was i n a better
position for his next dispute w i t h H u s s e i n . T h e establishment o f
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y i n mid-1994 brought up the question o f
who w o u l d control the W a q f i n Jerusalem - the Palestinian M i n -
istry o f Religious Endowments, w h i c h was responsible for the
W a q f in the West Bank, or the Jordanian Waqf, as i n the past, since
the Palestinian ministry was prohibited from operating i n Jerusa-
lem. In August 1994, Arafat decided to set up a Palestinian W a q f i n
Jerusalem that w o u l d replace the Jordanian body. H e conducted a
series o f contacts i n order to obtain Jordan's consent to this, but
failed ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 Aug. 1994). A s a result, Arafat decided that, from
the beginning o f October 1994, the Palestinian W a q f ministry
w o u l d be responsible for the W a q f i n both the West B a n k and i n
Jerusalem. Realizing that being removed from the W a q f adminis-
tration w o u l d end its senior status o n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif, Jordan
quickly appointed loyalists to the W a q f administration i n Jerusa-
lem and increased its financial aid to the Jerusalem institutions it
supported through the Waqf, such as A l - M a q a s e d Hospital.
Jordan took advantage o f the prohibition against the Palestinian
Authority operating in Jerusalem i n order to argue that its removal

from the city w o u l d leave a v a c u u m that Israel w o u l d fill. Jordan

could not ignore the fact that the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y enjoyed
legitimacy and full authority i n the areas under its control. There-
fore, o n September 29, 1994, the Jordanian government decided
to disassociate itself from the W a q f administration i n the West
B a n k and to transfer it to Palestinian minister of religious endow-
ments, Hassan Tahboub, w h o also headed the Supreme M u s l i m
C o u n c i l , whose seat was i n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif. Jordan transferred
to T a h b o u b all documents relevant to administering the W a q f i n
the West Bank, but not those dealing w i t h the Jerusalem district
(Musallam, 1996: 105-9).
F r o m this point onward, the dispute between Jordan and the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was limited to Jerusalem and encompassed
three issues. T h e first was the right to appoint the mufti of Jerusa-
lem. I n m i d - O c t o b e r 1994, M u f t i Suleiman al-Ja'bri, scion o f a
w e l l - k n o w n pro-Jordanian family, died. Jordan quickly appointed
a replacement, Sheikh A b d el-Qadr Abadin. That same day Arafat,
as head of the Palestinian Authority, appointed his o w n candidate
to the post. Arafat's appointee was no other than Akaramah Sabari,
w h o m Jordan had fired in June 1987 from his post as chief i m a m
of A l - A q s a . Sabari had angered Jordan by supporting the P L O i n a
dispute w i t h Jordan i n 1985. T h e dispute over filling the post o f
mufti of Jerusalem, a post of extremely high Palestinian-religious
rank ever since it had been held by Haj A m i n al-Husseini, leader
of the Palestinian national movement i n the time o f the British
Mandate, was also a dispute over the powers o f the head o f the
Palestinian Authority. D i d Arafat's authority extend to Jerusalem
and to the religious administration there that Jordan controlled?
N o less so, the debate reflected an attempt by the two competing
sides to enhance their hold o n the Islamic holy places i n Jerusa-
lem. In time, the dispute was decided i n Sheikh Sabari's favor,
thanks to the Palestinian Authority's means o f control and over-
sight. T h e Palestinian Authority's security apparatus saw to it that
people w h o came to call o n the mufti of Jerusalem were sent to
Sabari's chambers, and Sheikh A b a d i n was thus left w i t h no more
than his title. W h e n Sheikh A b a d i n retired i n 1998 Jordan did not
appoint a replacement and made do w i t h appointing a^young
sheikh, A b d a l - A ' z i m Silhab, to be responsible for the two Sharia'
courts in Jerusalem that had been under Abadin's supervision (Kol
H a - I r , 2 7 Feb. 1998).

T h e second issue under dispute between Jordan and the Pales-

tinians had to do w i t h the permanent status talks. In M a y 1996, o n
the eve o f Israel's national elections, K i n g H u s s e i n , President
Mubarak, and Arafat met i n C a i r o to coordinate their moves. T h e
opening o f the permanent• status talks that m o n t h , talks i n w h i c h
the question o f Jerusalem was to be discussed, made Arafat appre-
hensive. H e worried about possible collusion between Jordan and
Israel aimed at weakening his hold i n Jerusalem i n general and o n
al-Haram al-Sharif i n particular. Arafat's fears were not unjusti-
fied, because it had been a Labor government that had signed the
agreement giving the Hashemite K i n g d o m preferred status i n
Jerusalem. T h i s could repeat itself i f the Labor Party candidate,
S h i m o n Peres, w o n the prime ministerial elections. W h i l e the
summit's participants were hardly hoping for a victory by Peres's
opponent, B i n y a m i n Netanyahu, they were apprehensive about
that possibility as well, since Israeli public o p i n i o n polls were pre-
dicting a close race.
O f the three leaders, Arafat was the most worried, for the
reason that K i n g H u s s e i n had refrained from m a k i n g critical
remarks about Netanyahu and had even received h i m for a c o n -
versation during his campaign. Arafat enlisted M u b a r a k i n order
to tie Jordan's hands no matter what the outcome o f the election.
In the summit talks H u s s e i n promised not to conduct negotia-
tions over the permanent status o f Jerusalem behind Arafat's back
and, at Arafat's request, to forbid Hamas leaders i n Jordan to act
against the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y or conduct a campaign o f incite-
ment against it. Arafat saw a connection between the two: i n his
opinion, Jordan permitted Hamas to operate o n its territory and to
attack h i m personally as preparation for usurping his place i n J e r u -
salem w i t h Hamas backing. F o r his part, Arafat promised to co-
ordinate his positions and moves w i t h Jordan, and accepted J o r -
dan's contention that the k i n g d o m w o u l d be affected by the
results o f the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians o n the
issues o f refugees, permanent borders, and Jerusalem. Regarding
Jerusalem, Arafat agreed to leave responsibility for the Islamic
holy places i n Jordanian hands and accepted Jordan's claims that
its abdication w o u l d only serve Israeli interests. In exchange,
Jordan reiterated its previous promise to be the first state to recog-
nize Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, i f and w h e n the
Palestinians achieved this ( A l - Q u d s , 13 M a y 1996, 14 M a y 1996,

15 M a y 1996). A t the opening session of Jordan's parliament, he

declared: "We have announced w i t h full clarity to the Arabs and
the M u s l i m s o n our duty to the holy places ... we w i l l hand them
over to the Palestinians after the end of the permanent status talks
and the establishment o f a Palestinian state w i t h A l - Q u d s as its
capital" ( A l - Q u d s , 20 N o v . 1996).
In the framework o f this m i n i - s u m m i t , Arafat brought up the
idea o f declaring a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, even at
this early stage. T h i s , he suggested, w o u l d give h i m a stronger
position at the negotiating table, since it w o u l d demonstrate that
he had Jordanian recognition o f a Palestinian state i n his pocket.
Such recognition, Arafat thought, w o u l d pre-empt any possibility
of an Israel-Jordan combination against Palestine. In this, Arafat
was changing the tactics that had characterized h i m from the m i d -
1980s to the mid-1990s. T h e n he had feared a confederation
between the senior and established Hashemite K i n g d o m and a
weak Palestinian entity. H e thus aspired to establish such a con-
federation o n l y after achieving Palestinian independence. N o w
Arafat sought to exploit the confederation idea as a tactical move, a
political tool, a seal of approval w i t h w h i c h it w o u l d be possible to
achieve full Palestinian independence. A c c o r d i n g to Arafat's plan,
the confederation w o u l d have real significance only after Palestin-
ian independence was achieved. Jordan rejected the proposal just
as it had rejected it at the end o f 1995 and the beginning o f 1996,
on the grounds that it was premature. T h e Palestinians first
needed to make an agreement w i t h Israel that w o u l d define their
legal and political status and determine whether they w o u l d get a
state and w i t h i n what borders. O n l y afterwards w o u l d it be possi-
ble to agree on a confederation between Jordan and the Palestin-
ians. Jordan was concerned that the Palestinians w o u l d not
succeed i n obtaining Israeli recognition of their independent state.
In such a case the Palestinians w o u l d derive recognition only from
their membership i n a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation i n
w h i c h the Jordanian side was dominant, and the Palestinians,
Jordan feared, w o u l d blame Jordan for their failure ( A l - W a s a t , 25
Dec. 1995; A l - Q u d s , 7 Feb. 1996, 14 M a y 1996).
F r o m the time w h e n the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian federa-
tion was suggested, during the talks o n the A m m a n agreement
(Klein, 1988), Jordanian policy on the Palestinian problem vacil-
lated. It wavered between cooperation w i t h Israel, or at least

standing to one side and waiting for the outcome o f the Palestin-
ian negotiations w i t h Israel, and assisting the P L O so that it could
achieve independence. T h e first approach was taken d u r i n g the
f
period of Israel's Labor government, w h i l e the second was taken
when Israel was headed by a L i k u d - l e d coalition. Jordan estimated
that the Likud's traditional policy, w h i c h advocated widespread
Israeli settlement i n the West Bank, endangered the existence o f
the Hashemite K i n g d o m east o f the Jordan. T h i s policy, the J o r -
danians believed, w o u l d push many Palestinians over the river
into the East Bank and upset the demographic balance between
Palestinians and native Jordanians. T h e Hashemite character o f
the East B a n k had been achieved w i t h great pains, during w h i c h
Jordanians o f Palestinian origin had become central supporters o f
the Hashemite regime. These were largely Palestinians w h o had
been absorbed into the country w h e n it annexed the West B a n k i n
1949, and the refugees o f 1967. M a n y members o f the merchant
class, the families o f government employees, the middle class, and
a large part o f Jordan's economic sector were o f Palestinian origin
and had contributed greatly to the country's stability and develop-
ment. T h e Jordanians o f Palestinian origin had made a political
alliance w i t h the palace and supported K i n g H u s s e i n i n identify-
ing the state w i t h the Hashemite descent o f its ruler. T h e y had
influenced Hussein to stand firmly behind the P L O and to create
a link between the political establishments o f both sides o f the
Jordan. T h e Likud's policy even aided this by narrowing support
for Jordanians o f the opposite viewpoint - members o f the bour-
geoisie, intelligence and army chiefs, and senior government offi-
cials who advocated developing an exclusively East B a n k identity
and close cooperation w i t h Israel (al-Tal, 1996; Susser, 1995).
In the 1980s the Jordanians worked hand i n hand w i t h the P L O
i n order to help the Palestinians remain tied to their land. O n the
eve o f the M a d r i d conference they even provided the P L O w i t h
the necessary cover to establish a j o i n t delegation, and w i t h
Netanyahu's accession to power they stood at Arafat's side i n his
bargaining w i t h Israel. It had been K i n g H u s s e i n w h o , in January
1997, brought Netanyahu a compromise Palestinian, Jordanian,
and Egyptian proposal on the redeployment agreement i n H e b r o n
and the rest o f tbe West Bank. M o r e o v e r , Hussein was the first
Arab head o f state to visit, i n October 1996, the Palestinian
Authority i n Jericho, against the background o f the " A l - A q s a

incident" (the violent Palestinian response to the opening o f the

Western W a l l T u n n e l by the Netanyahu government). T h e visit
was meant to express the fact that Jordan had completely removed
itself from the negotiations o n the West Bank, and it stood shoul-
der to shoulder w i t h the Palestinians against the Israeli govern-
ment (Jordanian minister o f propaganda, M a r w a n Mu'ashar,
H a ' a r e t z , 4 N o v . 1996).
T h e third issue was control of the W a q f in Jerusalem as a whole
and o n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif i n particular. In October 1996 a fight
broke out between the Jordanian W a q f officials and their Palestin-
ian colleagues. Against a background o f rumors about financial
corruption, the Palestinian minister of religious endowments and
the governor o f the Jerusalem district demanded that the W a q f s
treasurer (a Jordanian appointee) hand over his authority to a
Fatah activist that Arafat had appointed to replace h i m . T h e i r
demands were accompanied by a display of force by the presiden-
tial security apparatus (Force 17), one o f the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity's security forces. T h e Jordanian W a q f administration referred
the matter to its offices i n A m m a n , and the heads of the Jordanian
M i n i s t r y o f Religious Endowments invited their colleagues from
across the river to talk. It was agreed that Jordanian sponsorship o f
the W a q f w i t h i n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif w o u l d continue, and that the
Jordanian-appointed treasurer w o u l d remain i n his post. U n t i l
such time as a permanent status accord was reached, "the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y has high regard for Jordan's role and its sponsorship
of the Islamic holy places and religious endowments i n Jerusa-
lem," declared a member of the Palestinian delegation, Tayib A b d
al-Rahim, secretary-general of the presidential office i n the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y ( A l - Q u d s , 5 N o v . 1996).
Outside the city i n its Israeli borders, i n the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity's Jerusalem district (identical to the former Jordanian Jerusa-
lem district), responsibility for W a q f properties and
administration w o u l d be handed over to the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity. T h i s included 150 people out o f the 700 w h o worked i n the
city and district, officials responsible for schools, mosques, and
other W a q f properties i n the urban suburbs of Jerusalem such as
A b u - D i s and Al-Azaria, where the Palestinian Authority .ruled
( A l - Q u d s , 5 N o v . 1996, 6 N o v . 1996, 11 N o v . 1996). Jordan n o w
recognized the Palestinian Authority's status i n the Jerusalem
municipal space, recognition it had not granted previously.

The A r a b L e a g u e a n d t h e Q I C 181
Jordan's interest i n the W a q f was n o w reduced to a l - H a r a m al-

Sharif, the only site in Jerusalem o n w h i c h Jordan's eyes were set
and where it was determined not to lose its role i n the permanent
settlement. A first symbolic expression of this appeared i n the J o r -
danian government's announcement, d u r i n g the talks w i t h the
Palestinian delegation, that K i n g H u s s e i n had decided to person-
ally assume the renovation of the A l - A q s a M o s q u e , as he had w i t h
the renovation o f the D o m e o f the R o c k i n 1994. Second, at the
same time the pro-Jordanian East Jerusalem daily newspaper A l -
N a h a r was closed. (It had been founded i n the s u m m e r o f 1986
because of the shift i n the editorial policy of the largest circulation
East Jerusalem daily, A l - Q u d s , w h i c h passed into new, p r o - P L O
ownership.) B y this time A l - N a h a r had neither a readership nor
political and economic backing. Jordan's interest i n a l - H a r a m al-
Sharif did not justify its maintenance o f a daily newspaper
(Rubinstein, 6Jan. 1997).
In practice, from early 1997 onward, Jordan's effective author-
ity i n al-Haram al-Sharif was very limited. Jordan's sponsorship o f
the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem is, i n practice, w i n d o w dress-
ing, behind w h i c h Palestinian elements operate ( H a ' a r e t z , 9 Sept.
1998). T h e story of the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l is a good illus-
tration o f this process o f Palestinization i n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif.
T h e Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l was established d u r i n g the B r i t i s h
Mandate and renewed its activity i n the city after the 1967 war.
T h e C o u n c i l was not recognized by Jordan's governments i n the
1948-1967 period, nor by Israel (from 1967 onward), and Israel
even deported the man w h o headed it i n 1967, S h e i k h A b d a l -
H a m i d Sa'ih, later speaker o f the Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l .
M o s t o f the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l ' s business was closely
supervising events i n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif and i n the W a q f institu-
tions. O n the eve of the establishment of the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
in 1994, the W a q f s director, Hassan T a h b o u b , later to be the P a l -
estinian minister o f religious endowments, was chosen to head
the council; Faisal H u s s e i n i , w h o holds the Jerusalem portfolio i n
the P L O executive committee, was chosen to be his deputy. In
this way the C o u n c i l became a body whose leaders were top local
national political figures, and this aided the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
in the conduct o f its struggle for control o f a l - H a r a m al-Sharif.
T h e next stage i n the struggle took place i n January 1997, w h e n
Arafat decided to appoint 18 representatives of the West B a n k and

Gaza Strip to the council, among them former Palestinian m i n i s -

ter D r . A b d a l - A z i z al-Haj A h m e d and the Palestinian Authority's
governor o f the Jerusalem district, J a m i l O t h m a n Nasser, whose
office is located i n A b u - D i s (Rubinstein, 26 Jan. 1997). In this way
the entire council, not just its leaders, became a body whose p r i n -
cipal members were Palestinian government officials w h o could,
in practice, manage the affairs o f a l - H a r a m al-Sharif and oversee
the Waqf, w h i c h remained under Jordanian sovereignty.

5
T H E P.L.O. A N D T H E P A L E S T I N I A N
I D E N T I T Y OF EAST J E R U S A L E M
Patterns o f political organization i n Palestinian society have

changed since 1967. U n d e r Jordanian rule, as d u r i n g the B r i t i s h
Mandate period, political power i n the West B a n k lay i n the hands
of a traditional elite, w h i c h had land, capital, high social status, and
family connections. Political organizations were established
around these elites, and the extended family (the h a m u l a ) played a
major political role, particularly i n the area o f recruitment and
organization. T h e veteran elite's power extended not only to
political life, but also to religion - it controlled the M u s l i m
endowments and properties, from w h i c h the elite could allocate
resources to its followers as compensation for their political loy-
alty. T h i s congruence o f political power and control o f the reli-
gious establishment provided the veteran leadership w i t h the
highly effective legitimacy o f tradition and religion.
U n d e r Israeli rule, however, the political elite i n the West B a n k
and Gaza Strip became more heterogeneous i n its status, educa-
tion, and social composition, and it came to be organized around
ideology and political institutions. B e g i n n i n g i n the mid-1970s,
the leading political role played by the hamulas weakened as P a l -
estinian political organizations, the P L O chief among them,
gained strength. T h e P L O penetrated from the "outside" to the
"inside" via three processes. First, from 1974 onward it gained a
firmer position i n the Arab w o r l d and the recognition o f the inter-
national community. Second, it gained control o f or founded its
own welfare, youth, sport, and health organizations (called "pop-
ular organizations" by the Palestinians), professional associations
and unions, and placed its o w n activists i n top municipal positions
in the territories. T h i r d , it benefited from the aspirations o f y o u n g
Palestinians, especially m i d d l e - and lower-class students, to take a
183
leading role i n politics and society and to eject the veteran pro-
Jordanian elite that had been part o f the Jordanian regime's
r u l i n g apparatus before the 1967 war. Instead o f an exclusive
club based o n kinship and traditional deference, the P L O offered
ideology and organization to those seeking to break into politics.
Instead of tradition, it offered a politics o f protest and revolution.
T h e P L O realigned the axis around w h i c h political life i n the
1967 territories had been organized and broadened the social
c o m p o s i t i o n o f the political elite. B y co-opting the members o f
the veteran elite, it brought t h e m into P L O frameworks and
assigned them a defined place. It refused to accept the existence
of any n o n - P L O leadership, thus preventing the growth o f an
"internal" establishment that might develop into an alternative
to its o w n authority.
T h e P L O k n e w h o w to buy the political fealty o f the veteran
elite, allowing it to serve as an intermediary between the organiza-
tion and the local population, or between it and Israel and the U . S .
It should be noted, however, that the P L O d i d not change the
patron-client mode o f the relationship between the elite on the
one hand and both the rank-and-file and the masses o n the other.
W h i l e loyalty to the P L O political establishment replaced loyalty
to the hamula, this was not abstract or general loyalty to the orga-
nization or the national idea, nor d i d it mean becoming part of an
organization i n w h i c h all leaders were equal. T h e P L O has been
characterized by vertical political alliances, from top to bottom, by
echelon. These alliances have encouraged personal loyalties and
animosities and turned the organization's hierarchy of ranks into a
hierarchy o f patrons that use the P L O power vested i n them to
gain their o w n personal supporters. Alongside these vertical ties,
there have also been, from time to time, horizontal political alli-
ances, between patrons, generally between those w h o have held
senior positions at the organization's top levels (Klein, 1997; R o b -
inson, 1997; Sayigh, 1997).
These changes occurred i n Jerusalem as well, but they were
manifested i n a different way for a variety of reasons. A part of the
veteran Jerusalem elite had emigrated in the wake of the 1948 war,
and there was a wave of immigration into the city from H e b r o n . A
young, college-educated generation, graduates o f the West Bank
universities that had opened their doors i n the mid-1970s,
matured and entered the labor market and political arena. T h e

The P L O a n d t h e P a l e s t i n i a n I d e n t i t y of E a s t J e r u s a l e m 185
same period saw the rise of a new class of Palestinians w h o earned

comfortable incomes from w o r k i n Israel. T h e y had money and
political ambitions but no connections to high-placed families.
Furthermore, Israel emasculated the veteran elite w i t h its annex-
ation o f East Jerusalem and by transferring prerogatives and
positions o f power from the traditional elite to Israeli bodies.
T h e elite no longer supplied m u n i c i p a l services and d i d not deal
out favors to its loyalists. Israel left it o n l y a small part its former
role o f mediator between the state and the populace. T h e focus
of decision-making o n the local level m o v e d f r o m the east side o f
the city to the west, or to P L O headquarters. M o r e o v e r , the
powers o f the elite i n Jerusalem were even fewer than those o f
the elite groups i n the rest of the cities of the West B a n k and Gaza
Strip. These groups retained the municipalities and local c o u n -
cils, w h i l e in Jerusalem the powers of the East Jerusalem m u n i c i -
pality were transferred to Israel. T h e weak Jerusalem elite d i d
not govern w i t h i n the city, m u c h less o n a national level. As a
rule, Israel prevented local leaders f r o m t u r n i n g into national
leaders and the Jerusalem elite f r o m establishing centers o f
influence i n other cities. Finally, some members o f the veteran
Jerusalem elite were deported and some o f their institutions
were closed. P r o m i n e n t i n the heterogeneous elite o f post-1967
Jerusalem were immigrants w h o had m o v e d to Jerusalem from
H e b r o n and become well established i n the city. T h e traditional
and religious background o f the former Hebronites and their
major role i n commerce helped t h e m capture key positions i n
the W a q f and i n commercial organizations. Since 1967, many
members o f the Jerusalem elite m o v e d gradually f r o m identifi-
cation w i t h Jordan to adoption o f Palestinian identity and sup-
port for one or another o f the P L O ' s constituent factions. Elite
groups i n the rest o f the 1967 territories underwent the same
metamorphosis, but the pace o f change i n Jerusalem was slower
than i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip and to a more limited
extent. A s a result, there was a higher level o f friction between
the Jerusalem elite and the P L O ' s leadership than there was
between the overall "internal" and "external" leaderships. East
Jerusalem preserved its unique character (Sabella, 1997a). I n the
final analysis, the P L O ' s entry from T u n i s and Beirut into the
West B a n k and f r o m the West B a n k into Jerusalem, and its
actions to intensify the Palestinian identity o f East Jerusalem, has

been conducted along two parallel paths: confrontation w i t h

Israel and its actions, and confrontation w i t h the local elite and the
local political establishment.
B o y c o t t s of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d p o l i t i c a l processes
After the annexation o f East Jerusalem i n 1967, Israel granted its

Arab inhabitants the right to vote i n municipal elections, but the
vast majority preferred to boycott the elections as a way of protest-
ing about Israeli rule. T h e Palestinians in Jerusalem d i d not accept
Israel's contention that their participation i n elections was a
municipal act w i t h only local implications. In the 1969 elections,
21.5 per cent of eligible Arabs voted; i n 1973, only 7.3 per cent; i n
1978, 14.4 per cent; and i n 1983, 18.4 per cent. D u r i n g the Inti-
fada, i n 1989, this fell to 2.75 per cent, and i n 1993, after the P L O ' s
agreement w i t h Israel and despite an attempt to enlist massive East
Jerusalem Arab support for the candidacy of M a y o r T e d d y Kollek
against his right-wing challenger, E h u d O l m e r t , only 7 per cent o f
the eligible East Jerusalem Arabs voted (Halabi, 1993: 35;
R o m m a n & W e i n g r o d , 1991: 207). T h i s meant that the Declara-
tion of Principles signed i n 1993 had but a negligible affect on the
political behavior o f East Jerusalem's Arabs. Politically, the East
Jerusalem Arabs see themselves as part of the Palestinian political
system. T h i s also found expression i n the 1998 elections, w h e n
only 6.5 per cent of Arabs voted ( H a ' a r e t z , 12 N o v . 1998).
O n the eve o f the 1989 elections, at the height o f the Intifada,
H a n a Sinyora, a well-off East Jerusalem political activist and news-
paper editor w h o identified w i t h the P L O but voiced independent
opinions, floated the idea of running for the city council as a candi-
date o f the residents o f East Jerusalem. Sinyora argued that these
were local elections whose significance was limited to the adminis-
tration o f day-to-day life i n the city. East Jerusalem representation
in the city council, he maintained, w o u l d act to reduce inequality
between the two sides o f the city i n the allocation of resources and
in positions o f power, especially i f it became part o f the governing
coalition. T h e idea aroused great opposition i n East Jerusalem and
in the P L O headquarters i n T u n i s . Sinyora's two cars were set on
fire and he received death threats until he withdrew his proposal
(al-Qaq, 1997). T h e idea of participation i n local elections came up
again i n N o v e m b e r 1993, after tbe signing o f the Declaration o f

Principles between Israel and the P L O . T h i s time the idea was con-
sidered seriously and did not arouse the antagonism that Sinyora's
proposal had, but it was again rejected.
In this case the proposal was to r u n a j o i n t A r a b - J e w i s h slate for
the city council o n a platform o f granting political rights to East
Jerusalem Palestinians, cessation of Jewish construction i n East
Jerusalem, and making East Jerusalem the capital o f Palestine
without physically dividing Jerusalem. Naturally, most o f the
slate's support was expected to come from East Jerusalem, and
bringing Palestinian voters to the polls w o u l d have required the
intervention o f both the local leadership and the P L O "outside."
T h e P L O leadership i n T u n i s took into account the possibility
that massive Palestinian support for the slate was likely to change
the political map of the city council, but the price w o u l d be defacto
recognition of the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel. F o r this
reason, the P L O leadership preferred to let the local leadership
decide; they rejected the initiative o n September 24, 1993. Aside
from the matter o f principle, the local leadership gave other, prac-
tical reasons for not participating i n the elections. A t a time w h e n
Israel was continuing to pursue its policy o f making East Jerusa-
lem Jewish, the local leadership argued, it w o u l d be inappropriate
to establish a j o i n t city council. T h e city council, they maintained,
was not the arena where decisions were being made about Jewish
construction i n East Jerusalem and about the purchase o f Arab
houses by Jews. T h e national arena was the only place to influence
Israel's actions i n East Jerusalem and only diplomatic contacts
between the P L O leadership and the Israeli government w o u l d
solve the problem. If the slate w o u l d have no influence o n an issue
so painful to the Palestinians, w h y should they participate i n the
elections? T h e local leadership also argued that there was r o o m
for suspicion that some o f the members o f the slate - apparently,
the slate's Jewish candidates - w o u l d support, after being elected,
Teddy Kollek's " O n e Jerusalem" policy. M o r e o v e r , even i f the
slate managed to gain seven to ten seats o n the 31-seat city council,
they w o u l d still be a m i n o r i t y facing a majority that advocated the
entire city remaining under Israeli sovereignty. T h e local Pales-
tinian leadership preferred not to recognize the annexation de f a c t o ,
even i f doing so w o u l d promote redivision o f the city and turn
East Jerusalem into the capital of the state of Palestine. In the 1993

elections, right-wing candidate E h u d O l m e r t beat T e d d y Kollek

( H a ' a r e t z , 29 Sept. 1993; 3 June 1994; Halabi, 1993: 38-43).
In the summer o f 1998 there were exploratory talks between
U z i Baram of the Labor Party, w h o was then considering running
for mayor that c o m i n g N o v e m b e r , and the Palestinian leadership
in Jerusalem about calling o n the Palestinian public to participate
in the elections for mayor and help oust O l m e r t . Despite Olmert's
actions i n Jerusalem, the response was adamantly negative. It
should be noted, however, that the Palestinians had not sat on
their hands since the Intifada; the boycott of the elections did not
indicate a passive response to the annexation o f East Jerusalem.
Faisal H u s s e i n i chose to define Palestinian actions i n this way:
"We do not establish facts i n the field. W e are the facts i n the field"
( H a ' a r e t z , l j u n e 1994).
B u i l d i n g counter-institutions
Even before the O s l o agreements, the Palestinians began operating

a variety of institutions in Jerusalem. There were professional asso-
ciations for engineers, economists, journalists, lawyers, nurses,
doctors, pharmacists, artists, writers, laborers, and farmers; there
were trade unions, chambers o f commerce, and an industrialists'
association; there were charitable, welfare, and health organiza-
tions, children's and youth groups, sports associations, councils for
education, housing, tourism, health, culture and public relations,
industry, and agriculture; there were women's organizations and an
office o f statistics and demographics.
In the educational area, East Jerusalem had al-Quds University
and the Palestinian O p e n University, j u n i o r colleges and voca-
tional institutes. T h e city is not a center of industry, but it is home
to institutions for economic development, credit companies, and
the electric company. T h e Islamic holy places gave Jerusalem
great religious importance and it is thus home to the most impor-
tant Palestinian religious institutions, such as the Supreme
M u s l i m C o u n c i l , the Waqf, and the religious court. Jerusalem is
also a center o f Palestinian culture and media; it houses the most
important Palestinian museums and several theaters, among them
the Palestinian national theater, A l - H a k w a t i ( H a ' a r e t z , 20 M a y
1994, 8 June 1994, 26 June 1994; Passia, 1994). Obviously, not all
these institutions are large, national, well-functioning institutions,

and not all were founded after the signing o f the Declaration o f
Principles. For our purposes, the level of institutionalization, orga-
nization, and functioning is not important, but rather the fact tbat
they are located i n Jerusalem. For the Palestinians, Jerusalem is the
capital-designate and they are trying to locate all their national, social,
religious, scientific, cultural, media, employment, and economic
institutions i n the city, especially those whose field o f activity is not
municipal but national and covers the entire West Bank.
T h e jewel i n the crown of the Palestinian institutions in Jerusa-
lem is O r i e n t House. T h e b u i l d i n g belongs to the H u s s e i n i
family, and there, i n 1979, Faisal H u s s e i n i opened the offices o f
the Arab Studies Society, w h i c h documents Palestinian activity
and roots i n Jerusalem. T h e b u i l d i n g served as the headquarters
for the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks from M a r c h 1991
until the signing o f the Declaration o f Principles i n September
1993, and it was also the place of w o r k for the "technical c o m m i t -
tees," the expert panels whose j o b was to prepare w o r k i n g papers
for the delegations engaging i n the bilateral and multilateral talks
w i t h Israel. T h e y also prepared the scholarly and professional
infrastructure for the Palestinian self-government that was dis-
cussed i n the talks w i t h Israel. U n t i l Arafat and the Palestinian
Authority's offices established themselves i n Gaza i n June 1994,
Orient House functioned as an unofficial political arm o f P L O
headquarters i n T u n i s w i t h regard to the local population. In the
field of foreign policy, O r i e n t H o u s e became the focus o f the
P L O ' s public and official contacts w i t h the Palestinian delegation
between 1991 and 1993.
After the signing o f the Declaration o f Principles there was a
change i n the building's function, and O r i e n t H o u s e began to
represent East Jerusalem's Arabs to the Israeli government and to
the Palestinian Authority. It also served as an unofficial arm of the
Palestinian Authority. M o s t o f the Authority's meetings and the
principal diplomatic w o r k o f the Palestinian leadership is accom-
plished i n Gaza, w i t h a smaller portion being conducted i n
Ramallah, Nablus, and H e b r o n . Jerusalem hosts only ceremonial
and symbolic meetings meant to demonstrate the Arab and Pales-
tinian identity of East Jerusalem. F o r this reason a Palestinian flag
flies on the building's r o o f and security guards protect it. A s w i t h
all O r i e n t House's activity, the Palestinian guards i n the b u i l d i n g
also began to operate w i t h Israel's approval. T h i s was at the

beginning of the contacts on the participation of a Palestinian del-

egation i n the M a d r i d conference, at a time w h e n threats were
being made against the Palestinian representatives, i n particular
Faisal H u s s e i n i . W h e n the Palestinian threats on Hussein's life
dissipated and his activity received the P L O ' s blessing, threats
began c o m i n g from the Israeli extreme right. It was thus necessary
to continue to provide guards for h i m and for the institution he
heads, i n addition to Israel's peripheral protection. T h e Palestin-
ian security guards are seen as not only having security roles but
also as symbols of sovereignty. Israel has not allowed them to bear
arms nor to operate outside the building, and i n response the Pal-
estinian security staff has refused to allow the Israeli bodyguards
assigned to the Egyptian foreign minister and the T u r k i s h prime
minister to accompany them into O r i e n t H o u s e w h e n they vis-
ited, and i n both cases the Palestinian and Israeli guards tussled
w i t h each other (Mussallam, 1996: 51-4, 59, 63-4).
O r i e n t H o u s e does not function only as a political center. It is
also an address for resolving problems that Jerusalem Palestinians
have w i t h the Israeli authorities - obtaining licenses, identifica-
tion cards, and w o r k permits, receiving discounts o n the payment
of property taxes and water rates, expedition of requests for family
reunification and permits to visit relatives i n Arab countries. It
also functions i n m u n i c i p a l arenas such as i n the construction and
renovation o f schools, tourist and economic development, and
in legal areas such as mediating civil disputes, approving prop-
erty transactions, mediating and deciding land disputes and
financial claims between spouses, all this circumventing the
Israeli court system. (Rulings are enforced by the preventative
security apparatus i n the West Bank, headed by J i b r i l Rajoub.)
O r i e n t H o u s e also coordinates requests for allocations o f finan-
cial assistance from the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y ' s institutions and
from private donors to schools, clubs, non-profit organizations,
and Palestinian charitable organizations i n East Jerusalem, and
mediates between them and the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y . In the
past it even granted office services to Palestinian A u t h o r i t y offi-
cials such as the c h i e f o f m u n i c i p a l affairs, to P E C D A R (Pales-
tinian E c o n o m i c C o u n c i l for D e v e l o p m e n t and Reconstruction)
and to the Palestinian C e n t e r for Statistics ( H a ' a r e t z , 16 N o v .
1994, 20 D e c . 1994, 7 J u l y 1996; Peace W a t c h , 1995; Shragai, 9
J u l y 1996). B u t from the beginning o f 1997 there has clearly

been a decline i n the range o f activities at the b u i l d i n g and i n its

status, together w i t h a rise i n the status of the central Palestinian
regime. F r o m 1997 the governor o f the Jerusalem district has
successfully competed w i t h O r i e n t H o u s e .
Beyond this, members of the Palestinian Preventative Security
Force i n the West Bank, under the c o m m a n d of J i b r i l Rajoub,
filled the police vacuum that had been created i n East Jerusalem
after the Intifada. T h e Intifada disturbances, and the resignation o f
Arab policemen during the course o f the uprising, left the Israeli
police i n East Jerusalem overworked. T h e i r limited resources
were directed at crime prevention and at keeping the drug trade
from spreading from the Arab to the Jewish sector; little m a n -
power was left to enforce law and order i n the streets of East J e r u -
salem. Rajoub's men stepped into this opening. T h e y began to
carry out policing activities, to accept complaints from the public,
to take action against drug and sex offenders and against prostitu-
tion, often w i t h m u c h violence. T h e y conducted police investiga-
tions i n East Jerusalem and functioned as an enforcement agency,
carrying out the rulings of the voluntary court system sponored by
Orient H o u s e and returning stolen property ( H a ' a r e t z , 16 N o v .
1994, 20 D e c . 1994; Shragai, 9 J u l y 1996).
T h e Israel police force also generally refrained from patrolling
non-Jewish holy places i n the O l d C i t y . W h e n pickpockets and
thieves around the C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulcher and other
Christian shrines became such a nuisance that tourists began
avoiding them, church income declined. C h u r c h leaders applied
to Arafat, and he ordered Rajoub's m e n to function as a tourist
police force as well. Rajoub professionally instructs his m e n o n
this assignment and the churches pay their salaries o f approxi-
mately $525 a month, w h i c h is some 50 per cent higher than the
average salary o f a Palestinian policeman i n the Palestinian
Authority. T h i s is an incentive given to them to encourage them
to w o r k i n Jerusalem (Kol H a - I r , 1 M a r c h 1997; T e m k i n , 9 A p r i l
1999; H a ' a r e t z , 2 Aug. 1999). Rajoub's m e n operate i n the political
arena as well. A t times of tension between the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity and Jordan, J i b r i l Rajoub's forces have supervised the sermons
in A l - A q s a , have prepared lists o f East Jerusalem residents going
on the pilgrimage to M e c c a via Jordan, and have recorded the
names of people visiting the office of the Jordan-appointed mufti
of Jerusalem. M o r e o v e r , Palestinian intelligence agents have

operated against opposition elements and have worked to lower

the tones of Arafat's critics. Such actions have included the arrest
of civil rights activist Basem E i d , threats against the editorial
offices of East Jerusalem newspapers, and the arrest of journalist
D a o u d Kutab for having conducted a live broadcast, on the al-
Q u d s U n i v e r s i t y television station, o f deliberations o f the Pales-
tinian Legislative C o u n c i l i n w h i c h delegates were sharply critical
of financial and personal corruption among senior Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y officials. T h e corruption charges reverberated among
the Palestinians and the Preventative Security Service used force
to silence the criticism ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 M a y 1997).
T h e Palestinian Preventative Security Force began to operate i n
Jerusalem i n mid-1994 w i t h the blessing of Israel's General Secu-
rity Service (GSS), the country's covert security agency. T h e GSS,
w h i c h had difficulty collecting intelligence i n Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity territory as it had done i n these areas before the O s l o agree-
ments, received assistance from its Palestinian colleagues. T h e
G S S ' s interest was that there should be no vacuum w h e n Israel
evacuated these areas and that there should be an authoritative
address to w h i c h Israel's security services could apply. Providing a
firm foundation for the authority o f the Palestinian Preventative
Security apparatus was also important to the G S S because it
wanted the Palestinian force to be able to gather intelligence and
prevent terrorism. In exchange, the G S S permitted Rajoub to
expand his field of activity i n the West Bank, including the Jerusa-
lem area. In late 1994 the G S S ' s policy aroused the ire of the Israel
police, whose interest was the enforcement o f law and order i n
Israel. T h e Israel police and the minister of police claimed that the
activity of Rajoub's forces called into question Israel's sovereignty
in East Jerusalem. Rabin took the side of the police, but i n practice
Israel had little capability to prevent the Palestinian activity. F r o m
the beginning o f 1996 through to mid-1997, Israel arrested 76 Pal-
estinian security agents o n charges o f illegal activity in Jerusalem.
O f these, 66 were arrested for abducting residents of Jerusalem
and taking them for interrogation i n the territory o f the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y , six were arrested for assault, and four for carrying
illegal weapons ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 6 M a y 1997; 16 Feb. 1998). D u r i n g the
course o f 1995 other Palestinian security forces also began to
operate in Jerusalem - General Intelligence, under the command
of A m i n a l - H i n d i ; the Presidential Security G u a r d (the former

Force 17), and Jerusalem District Security, an organization estab-

lished by the Palestinian governor o f the Jerusalem district, J a m i l
O t h m a n Nasser. T h e range o f activity o f the Palestinian security
agencies-grew over time, and to the functions already noted, the
protection o f public figures, and facilities was added ( H a ' a r e t z , 26
May 1997, 16 Feb. 1998). T h e activity o f the Palestinian intelli-
gence organisations i n Jerusalem takes place under camouflage
w i t h i n civilian sites and is possible because their authority is
accepted by the Palestinian inhabitants o f the city. These see the
forces as legitimate national organizations and, for this reason, do
not quickly make complaints to the Israeli authorities ( H a ' a r e t z , 26
Dec. 1994, 22 Feb. 1997, 28 Feb. 1997, former G S S deputy direc-
tor G i d e o n Ezra to M e l m a n , 29 Aug. 1995).
T h e O s l o agreements prevent inhabitants o f East Jerusalem
from operating i n the framework o f the Palestinian Authority, so
Husseini stated that Palestinians should "act i n such a way that it
w o u l d not be possible to prevent the activity as a violation o f the
law" ( H a ' a r e t z , 9 Feb. 1996; K o l H a - I r , 9 Feb. 1996). H u s s e i n i
himself served as a personal example o f the policy he had r e c o m -
mended - he d i d not r u n i n the elections for the Palestinian
Authority's Legislative C o u n c i l i n January 1996, since, had he
been elected, he w o u l d have had to disassociate h i m s e l f from
Orient H o u s e or shut it d o w n . After his election to the P L O Exec-
utive C o m m i t t e e by the Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l , w h i c h
convened for its 21 session i n Gaza i n M a y 1996, and the reports i n
the Palestinian press o n his appointment to the Palestinian cabi-
net, Husseini quickly convened a press conference and declared
that he had never been a member o f the executive branch o f the
Palestinian Authority. H i s post, he said, was that of being respon-
sible for Jerusalem affairs o n the P L O Executive C o m m i t t e e ( A l -
Q u d s , 13 M a y 1996; H a ' a r e t z , 14 M a y 1996). Husseini's official
omission from the list o f Palestinian cabinet ministers does not
interfere w i t h his functioning as the official responsible for J e r u -
salem affairs. Since the 21 Palestinian N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l was c o n -
vened, meetings o f the Palestinian cabinet have been held j o i n t l y
w i t h meetings o f the P L O Executive C o m m i t t e e , under the
rubric "meetings o f the Palestinian leadership." F r o m Israel's
point o f view there is no legal reason to prevent H u s s e i n i from
being a member o f the P L O leadership, since it no longer defines
the P L O as a terrorist organization. In the same way, the

Palestinian minister o f religious endowments, Hassan Tahboub,

has operated officially i n Jerusalem under his title o f chief o f the
Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l , but not as a member of the Palestinian
cabinet.
J e r u s a l e m versus Gaza
T h e "internal" leaders based i n O r i e n t H o u s e have always led Pal-

estinian activity i n East Jerusalem. T h e i r approach has been more
activist than that o f the P L O leaders "outside," i n T u n i s , until
mid-1994. T h e leaders o f the public "inside" felt the problem o f
Jerusalem i n full force, unlike the leaders i n T u n i s . T h e organiza-
tional and personal priorities were different - the heads o f the
organization i n T u n i s wanted to obtain broad international recog-
nition o f the organization, w h i l e squelching the growth o f an
alternative leadership from the "internal" Palestinian public. T h e y
believed that recognition of the right to self-determination and o f
the right to establish an independent state took precedence over all
else, even buttressing the status of Jerusalem as the Palestinian
capital. T h e P L O leadership i n T u n i s managed to maneuver the
internal leadership into complete political dependence on them,
and cut short the internal leadership's attempts to put Jerusalem at
the top o f the P L O agenda. Such an attempt was made i n M a y
1992, w h e n a discussion of the Jerusalem question was held i n the
framework of the expert committees w h o assisted the Palestinian
delegation to the peace talks. Three approaches emerged from the
discussion. T h e first advocated unilateral Palestinian action i n
Jerusalem. T h i s was unconnected to the negotiations w i t h Israel,
apparently o n the assumption that Israel w o u l d not be prepared to
concede its sovereignty i n East Jerusalem. T h e second approach
advocated bringing the issue up for negotiation w i t h Israel, not by
the P L O alone, but rather i n cooperation w i t h the Arab and
Islamic states, w h i c h w o u l d serve as a counterweight to Israel. T h e
third approach was that there was no point i n raising the issue o f
Jerusalem, at least not for the present. But, unlike the first
approach, w h i c h maintained that the "internal" Palestinians
should bear the sole burden of establishing unilateral facts in Jeru-
salem, the supporters o f the third approach believed that the
"internals" should collect the necessary information and use it to
prepare a plan o f action. In their o p i n i o n , however, the actual

execution o f the plan should be i n coordination w i t h the "exter-

nal" P L O leadership, w i t h its support and approval (Halabi, 1993:
49). T h i s was the majority approach and the "internals" intended
to operate i n accord w i t h it.
T h e Palestinian Academic Society for the Study o f Interna-
tional Affairs (PASSIA) was the first Palestinian institution to pre-
pare w o r k i n g papers on Jerusalem, among them papers o n m a k i n g
East Jerusalem the capital of Palestinian state; the establishment o f
an Arab municipality i n East Jerusalem for the management o f
day-to-day affairs; the creation o f public awareness o f the Pales-
tinian apparatus managing daily life i n East Jerusalem; the ques-
tion o f Palestinian political sovereignty i n Jerusalem; the
geographic reality i n the city; and the status of a l - H a r a m al-Sharif,
the Jewish Quarter, and Jewish settlements and settlers i n the O l d
C i t y and outside it (Halabi, 1993: 50). P A S S I A ' s director, D r .
M a h d i A b d u l H a d i , presented a summary o f the deliberations to
the P L O leadership on September 12, 1992. A b d u l H a d i
remarked o n the lack o f coordination between the different arms
of the Palestinian establishment responsible for Jerusalem. E v e n
worse, he maintained, the different branches of the P L O w o r k i n g
on the Jerusalem issue were at times fighting each other. H e pro-
posed that the P L O create an apparatus for coordinating between
these different bodies, and for rousing Palestinian public o p i n i o n
in Jerusalem and i n the 1967 territories about the importance o f
the struggle for the city. A c c o r d i n g to A b d u l H a d i , it was i m p o r -
tant to achieve coordination not only w i t h i n the P L O establish-
ment, but also between it and the Arab and Islamic states. H e also
noted the importance of establishing a database o n East Jerusalem
and o f methodically and periodically issuing w o r k i n g papers o n
issues relating to the status of Jerusalem i n the interim period, and
on h o w to turn it into the capital of the Palestinian state i n the per-
manent settlement. H e proposed that, i n its negotiations w i t h
Israel, the P L O stress Jerusalem as the focal point of the 1967 ter-
ritories. A b d u l Hadi's assumption was that a single rule w o u l d
apply to Jerusalem and the rest o f the 1967 territories i n the
interim settlement, and that both national and municipal elections
w o u l d be held there. O n the basis o f this assumption, D r . A b d u l
H a d i expressed his disappointment that the P L O had no position
on and was making no demand to conduct elections to an Arab
municipality i n East Jerusalem i n parallel w i t h the elections that

were supposed to be held i n the 1967 territories, under the frame-

w o r k agreement o f the M a d r i d Conference.
Dr. A b d u l H a d i recommended that the P L O leadership plan
for the establishment o f an Arab municipality i n East Jerusalem,
i n c l u d i n g a city council, bureaucracy, municipal institutions, and
a department for cooperation w i t h other municipalities around
the w o r l d . H e proposed enlisting between 100 and 150 public fig-
ures to establish a 15-member N a t i o n a l Organization for Arab
Jerusalem ( a l - H a y a a l - W a t a n i y a l i - A l - Q u d s a l - A r a h i y a ) . T h i s body
w o u l d function as an East Jerusalem municipality alongside the
Israeli municipality (Halabi, 1993: 50-3). However, the P L O
leadership d i d not adopt the program, preferring to negotiate w i t h
Israel. T h e way i n w h i c h the O s l o accords were produced i n d i -
cates that the "external" P L O preferred to progress towards
obtaining a Palestinian state i n preference to buttressing the status
of East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. In opposition to the
"internal" leadership, w h i c h was largely ensconced i n the Jerusa-
lem area, the P L O leadership reasoned that a Palestinian state
w o u l d guarantee obtaining Jerusalem as a capital, rather than the
other way around. There were both political and personal motives
for this stand. T h e P L O leadership had wanted i n the past to pre-
vent the growth o f an alternative leadership among the "inter-
nals," and had taken no steps to establish a Palestinian institutional
presence in Jerusalem as Faisal H u s s e i n i had suggested. F r o m the
beginning o f the implementation o f the O s l o accords, the Pales-
tinian Authority's leaders had thus preferred to operate the insti-
tutions i n Jerusalem as arms o f the Gaza regime, rather than
risking the creation of a parallel, independent local establishment.
For this reason, the "internal" leadership decided to implement
on its o w n some o f the proposals the P A S S I A experts had made,
w h i l e adapting them to the new reality created by the signing o f
the Declaration o f Principles. T h i s meant, for most part, the
establishment o f representative institutions from the top d o w n .
T h e first step i n this direction was taken o n N o v e m b e r 1,1993,
w h e n Faisal H u s s e i n i called o n Palestinian public leaders to estab-
lish a Jerusalem N a t i o n a l Organization - Palestine ( H a y a t A l - Q u d s
a l - W a t a n i y a ) as a source of national Palestinian authority for m a n -
aging local Jerusalem matters. H i s assumption was that alongside
management o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y from Gaza, there was
r o o m d u r i n g the interim period to create a parallel system on the

The P L O a n d die P a l e s t i n i a n I d e n t i t y of E a s t f e r u s a l e m 197
local level. I f it went well, it w o u l d provide a dimension o f sover-

eignty to the Palestinians i n the city, ensure their presence there
and the Palestinian character of East Jerusalem, so w h e n the ques-
tion of Jerusalem came up for discussion i n the permanent status
talks the Palestinians w o u l d be i n a better position than they had
been i n previously. Hussein's proposal spoke of the establishment
of a 21-member body that w o u l d operate out o f O r i e n t H o u s e i n :
municipal planning, economics, law and justice, basic services,
religion, finance, external relations, development o f public insti-
tutions, and public security and order. Faisal H u s s e i n i took it
upon himself to head the body that w o u l d prepare for the estab-
lishment o f this institution, and he chose Hassan T a h b o u b , head
of the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l , as his deputy ( H a ' a r e t z , 20 M a y
1994,3 June 1994,7June 1994,15 June 1994; Halabi, 1993:53-6).
This initiative was, however, unsuccessful, so H u s s e i n i tried a
new tack - re-establishing the municipal government o f Arab
Jerusalem. O n June 27, 1967, the Israeli military government had
disbanded to the city council o f Arab Jerusalem, a body o f 16
members headed by M a y o r R u h i al-Khatib. Thereafter, the Arab
city council existed on paper only, and i n 1994 Israel deported al-
Khatib, w h o died later that year. N o w , i n mid-1995, H u s s e i n i
notified D r . A m i n Majaj, a member o f the defunct city council
and a former member of the Jordanian parliament, that the Pales-
tinian Authority's cabinet had decided to re-establish the Arab city
council and to appoint h i m mayor.
W h e n Husseini declared the re-establishment of the city c o u n -
cil, only six o f the original 16 members were still alive. Replace-
ments had to be chosen. Furthermore, the re-established city
council had an economic problem. Financing o f the council's
activities had been placed o n the shoulders o f the Palestinian
Authority - J o r d a n had, i n severing its constitutional and adminis-
trative connections w i t h the West B a n k i n 1988, ceased to transfer
funds to the Arab Jerusalem city council ( H a ' a r e t z , 12 June 1995,
13 June 1995,14June 1 9 9 5 ; K o l H a - I r , 16June 1995). N o funding
was, however, forthcoming, and the fate o f the Palestinian city
council was the same as that o f the Jordanian one. Like its prede-
cessor, it remained o n paper ( H a ' a r e t z , 9 Feb. 1996). N e i t h e r d i d
the shadow city council's status change w h e n al-Majaj died at the
end o f 1998. A t the beginning o f 1999 a new mayor was appointed,
Z a k i a l - G h u l , along w i t h 12 council members. A l - G h u l himself,

like several members o f the council, lives i n Jordan. M o s t o f the

council's members are well-off, elderly notables and do not con-
stitute a representative cross-section o f the city's population ( A l -
Q u d s , 21 Feb. 1999; H a ' a r e t z , 22 Feb. 1999).
Husseini's plan d i d not focus only o n the area of municipal ser-
vices; it also sought to establish an institution parallel to the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y i n Jerusalem, one that w o u l d operate i n a large
variety of areas. T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y leaders i n Gaza seem to
have been concerned precisely about this, since their agreement
w i t h Israel forbade them officially to operate Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity institutions out of Jerusalem. T h e y d i d not want to see a paral-
lel, competing apparatus come into being, so they did not take any
real action to implement Husseini's program. T h e Palestinian
Authority leadership preferred to compete w i t h Israel i n Jerusa-
lem by operating local institutions and leaders by remote control
or as arms of the central establishment i n Gaza. Gaza was the seat
of most o f the Palestinian Authority's institutions, including
Arafat's office, Palestinian police headquarters, and most o f the
ministries. T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was not concerned that its
operations in Jerusalem remained weak and inefficient. Since the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y could not operate i n East Jerusalem it was
wary that any body operating there might slip out o f its control.
M o r e o v e r , the traditional power base o f the "internals" lay i n
Jerusalem and its environs. F r o m this point o f view, it was not
coincidental that J i b r i l Rajoub's force operated i n Jerusalem. V i a
the Preventative Security apparatus, one of the pillars of the Fatah
in West B a n k and Gaza Strip, Arafat apparently hoped not only to
strengthen East Jerusalem's Palestinian identity, but also to keep
tabs o n the activity o f the Jerusalem political elite and to prevent
Faisal H u s s e i n i from becoming a national leader (Klein, 1997).
In the summer o f 1995 H u s s e i n i tried to go i n a different direc-
tion. Instead o f incessantly trying to establish new bodies,
H u s s e i n i understood that it was necessary to improve the func-
tioning o f the existing bodies and to coordinate between them.
Likewise, H u s s e i n i sought to increase the sums o f money sent
from outside the country - specifically,, from the oil emirates - to
O r i e n t H o u s e i n order to enhance the status o f the local i n s t i t u -
tions as against the national system i n Gaza.
W h e n this d i d not succeed, either, H u s s e i n i had a new idea - no
more t o p - d o w n institutions and no more attempts to enlist

masses and governments outside Palestine; he n o w sought to

mobilize the Jerusalem public to b u i l d institutions from the grass-
roots. H e proposed establishing an East Jerusalem development
authority, w h i c h w o u l d be a corporation i n w h i c h eveiy Palestin-
ian inhabitant could buy a share for one Israeli shekel. T h e share-
holders w o u l d choose a management that w o u l d also serve as a
political-municipal representative o f the Arab neighborhoods i n
East Jerusalem. In this way H u s s e i n i hoped to achieve several
goals. First, he sought to establish a company w i t h capital that
could develop East Jerusalem and serve as a strong counterweight
to the Israeli Jerusalem Development Corporation, w h i c h
invested its resources i n developing the Jewish part of Jerusalem.
Second, Husseini wished to mobilize the larger Palestinian public
to be active and involved i n the fate o f East Jerusalem. T h i r d ,
Husseini hoped to turn the East Jerusalem development authority
into a broad-based political representation. These hopes w o u l d
not be achieved without mass Palestinian response ( H a ' a r e t z , 9
Feb. 1996; K o l H a - I r , 9 Feb. 1996; M u s a l l a m , 1993: 17-18), w h i c h
was not forthcoming. It was easier to mobilize the Palestinian
masses for brief political protests against the Israeli occupation
than to get them to participate i n ongoing constructive action.
In parallel w i t h his attempt to organize the East Jerusalem pop-
ulation from the grassroots, H u s s e i n i w o r k e d to consolidate a
united front of political leadership i n the city. H e understood that
Jerusalem is a frontier city, so he d i d not want to exacerbate the
political differences w i t h i n the Palestinian camp. Rather, he
sought to rise above them. T o this end he put togetber a represen-
tative panel w i t h members from all Palestinian political groups. In
addition to H u s s e i n i himself, the group included H a n a n Ashrawi,
Ziyad A b u - Z a y a d , and D r . Sari Nusseibeh, all Fatah supporters;
Dr. M u h a m m a d Jadallah o f the Democratic Front; D r . Riad al-
M a l k i , n o w independent but formerly a member o f the Popular
Front; Ghassan al-Khatib of the People's Party (the former C o m -
munist Party); and Sheikh J a m i l H a m a m i of Hamas ( H a ' a r e t z , 11
Feb. 1996). In practical terms, this was not the establishment o f a
new institution but rather cooperation between prominent p o l i t i -
cal figures i n the Jerusalem area w h o represented a spectrum o f
positions. T h e t i m i n g o f the initiative was not a coincidence - it
was close to the elections for the Palestinian Legislative C o u n c i l .
Husseini hoped that the panel w o u l d r u n as a consensus slate i n

the elections, but the Popular Front and Hamas objected and the
initiative failed. T h e failure d i d not prevent H u s s e i n i from turn-
ing the panel into a permanent group that met w i t h high-level for-
eign visitors i n O r i e n t H o u s e ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 Sept. 1996; 28 Jan. 1997;
K o l H a - I r , 2 9 M a r c h 1996). In practice, this group became, along
w i t h the members o f the Palestinian Legislative C o u n c i l elected
from the Jerusalem area, i n c l u d i n g the C o u n c i l ' s speaker, A b u -
Ala, the political leadership of East Jerusalem.
M o s t o f the attempts by the Palestinian establishment i n Jeru-
salem to compete w i t h the national leadership by establishing
local institutions w i t h "outside" or mass support were failures.
Dr. M a h d i A b d u l H a d i understood this as early as 1995, w h e n he
analyzed the shortcomings of Palestinian policy on Jerusalem and
argued that there were contradictions between the different lines
of policy that Palestinian leaders were declaring. Often, he said,
leaders made commitments and statements that were not imple-
mented, or declarations that harmed the Palestinian interest i n
Jerusalem. There was no coordination between the different arms
of the Palestinian administration dealing w i t h Jerusalem; on the
local level there were no properly functioning planning and exec-
utive frameworks operating the Palestinian institutions i n the city;
the activities of Jordan and Saudi Arabia were not coordinated; the
national administration i n Gaza d i d not coordinate its actions w i t h
the local establishment i n O r i e n t H o u s e and w i t h local officials;
the Palestinian institutions i n the city suffered from a lack o f
financial support from the central administration i n Gaza, and
planned institutions remained o n paper. D r . A b d u l Hadi's con-
clusion was that without bodies to mobilize the Palestinian p o p u -
lation i n East Jerusalem, and without a framework to coordinate
between the institutions operating i n Jerusalem and between the
establishment i n Jerusalem and external elements - the central
administration, the population o f the West B a n k and Gaza Strip,
and the Arab and Islamic states - there was no point i n going into
the permanent status talks, since the Palestinians w o u l d suffer
from a doubly inferior position (Abdul H a d i , 1996: 213-22).
D u r i n g 1997, after its confrontations w i t h the Netanyahu gov-
ernment, the national leadership gained support i n Jerusalem at
the expense of the \oca\ establishment. Since politics is often per-
sonal as w e l l , the national and local leaderships soon developed
low opinions of each other's ability to defend the Arab character o f

The P L O a n d d i e P a l e s t i n i a n I d e n t i t y of E a s t J e r u s a l e m 201
East Jerusalem (Rubinstein, 23 June 1997). Politically, Arafat took

Husseini's place as the director of protest and as the m a i n address
for negotiations on resolving the dispute. Arafat established a
Jerusalem C o m m i t t e e under his chairmanship to serve as a
national task force. It included ministers and the directors o f
national and municipal bodies operating i n the Jerusalem area ( A l -
I y a m , Jan. and Feb. 1988). Arafat co-opted the local establishment
into the committee, making it part of a larger framework under his
direct control. W h i l e it is not the most efficient o f groups, it has
given Arafat a mechanism for controlling and supervising the local
Jerusalem establishment and a way o f circumventing the local
leadership via national bodies. T h e national security, intelligence,
and police forces have established themselves i n the areas around
Jerusalem that are under their control, and use those areas as bases
for intensive activity w i t h i n Jerusalem itself. T h e governor o f the
Jerusalem district i n the Palestinian M i n i s t r y of the Interior, Jamal
O t h m a n Nasser, and the chief o f the district police, C o l o n e l
Khalid Tantash, n o w played roles that had previously been played
exclusively by O r i e n t H o u s e . These included investigation o f
complaints and resolution o f civil conflicts via compromise and
arbitration, housing assistance for the indigent, issuing permits,
project planning and budgeting, organizing ceremonies and
public gatherings o n Jerusalem, organizing protest activities
against Israel (while interfering w i t h similar initiatives f r o m
Orient House), encouraging illegal construction i n unsettled
areas of the city and its environs, investing i n infrastructure, urban
planning aimed at creating a contiguous Palestinian built-up area
from East Jerusalem to the north, criminal investigations, infor-
mation collection on real estate up for sale (in particular real estate
on offer to Jews), and guarding public figures and facilities
( H a ' a r e t z , 1 Feb. 1998, 9 Sept. 1998; Qashu'a and C o h e n , 19 June
1998).
D u r i n g the first half of 1997, Arafat also tried to gain control o f
Orient House's budget, demanding that all or most o f it be fun-
neled through the Palestinian Authority. H u s s e i n i refused, c l a i m -
ing that the money had been contributed specifically for
Jerusalem and had been deposited w i t h h i m personally. A c c o r d -
ing to Husseini, the operating costs of the Palestinian institutions
in East Jerusalem were some $5 m i l l i o n a m o n t h . A part o f this
sum came from the Palestinian Authority's budget ( H a ' a r e t z , 9

Feb. 1996) and part from the W o r l d Islamic Association i n Saudi

Arabia and from contributions raised personally by Husseini i n
the oil states - for example, the $8 m i l l i o n collected i n a fundrais-
ing campaign conducted by the Saudi television station M B C
( H a ' a r e t z , 17 June 1998). I n his struggle to preserve freedom o f
action and budgetary independence, H u s s e i n i made use o f the
prohibition that Israel had made against the Palestinian Authority
operating i n Jerusalem. H u s s e i n i was fearful that the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y w o u l d skim a " c o m m i s s i o n " off his funds or at least use
control o f the money as a way o f applying political pressure on
him and restricting the freedom o f action o f the leadership i n
Jerusalem. In response, Arafat delayed the transfer o f funds to
O r i e n t H o u s e , i n c l u d i n g for East Jerusalem projects funded by
Husseini's institution, creating a deficit for O r i e n t House that
caused it difficulty i n meeting its payroll (Kol H a - I r , 7 M a r c h
1997) . Despite this, the local institution was able, at the beginning
of 1997, to receive a contribution o f $19 m i l l i o n from Saudi
Arabia, earmarked for the construction and renovation o f homes
in East Jerusalem, and another $5 m i l l i o n to cover O r i e n t House's
r u n n i n g expenses (Rubinstein, 23 June 1997). T h e tension
between the local establishment and the national leadership fre-
quently turned into personal tension between Arafat and
H u s s e i n i . T h i s often came out i n meetings of the Palestinian lead-
ership, w h e n the two traded harsh language and accusations about
who was responsible for the failure to allocate funds for various
East Jerusalem projects, or for Palestinian negligence i n the strug-
gle w i t h Israel over control of East Jerusalem (Rubinstein, 20 J u l y
1998) .
As noted, the Jerusalem leadership had limited room for
maneuver compared w i t h the Palestinian leadership i n Gaza. T h e
only efficient way for the local political establishment to buttress
its position against Gaza was to receive grassroots public support
via the elections to the Palestinian Authority's Legislative C o u n c i l
in January 1996. A s elected officials, deriving their legitimacy
from personal, regional elections, and as members o f the Legisla-
tive C o u n c i l , the delegates from the Jerusalem area could present
themselves as a local leadership w i t h a popular base o f support
(the elections i n Jerusalem are discussed i n chapter 6).
A n internal confrontation between the two Palestinian estab-
lishments, the local and the national, broke out at the beginning o f

August 1996, w h e n a member o f the Legislative C o u n c i l , K h a t i m

A b d al-Qadir E i d , opened a parliamentary office i n his home i n
Jerusalem's Bait H a n i n a neighborhood. Jerusalem viewed E i d ' s
5
action as a violation o f the O s l o accords, and P r i m e M i n i s t e r
Netanyahu's staff requested o f Arafat that he order the office to
close. Arafat complied and even ordered the Voice o f Palestine not
to cover Eid's activities. E i d , for his part, ignored Arafat's c o m -
mand and even refused to report to the Palestinian police station
in Jericho for the purpose o f signing a c o m m i t m e n t to close the
office. T h e Israel police served E i d w i t h a w a r n i n g demanding
that he provide, w i t h i n 24 hours, an explanation for his actions. I f
no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming, the minister o f
internal security w o u l d shut d o w n his office immediately, the
warning stated. U n d e r pressure from the Palestinian administra-
tion i n Gaza, E i d declared i n w r i t i n g that the office i n his home
was a private one and had no connection to the Palestinian
Authority or Legislative C o u n c i l , and that he had no intention o f
violating the law ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 A u g . 1996, 5 A u g . 1996, 8 A u g . 1996,
11 A u g . 1996, 12 A u g . 1996).
T h i s was more o f an internal Palestinian conflict between the
parliamentary group i n Jerusalem.and the central administration
in Gaza than a conflict between E i d and Israel. It was but one l i n k
in a series o f confrontations between the national and local leader-
ships that took place i n the spring and summer o f 1996 and at the
beginning o f 1998 against the background o f attempts by Fatah
activists and the Jerusalem representatives i n the Legislative
C o u n c i l to turn up the heat on Israel i n Jerusalem, i n opposition
to the policy o f the central Palestinian regime and its executive
arm (Cohen, 29 A p r i l 1998). B y the time the E i d affair came to an
end the Palestinian political system realized that it was very diffi-
cult for a local element to act against the central regime o n a long-
term basis, especially i f the independent activity puts the national
leadership i n conflict w i t h Israel. In other words, the conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians i n Jerusalem broke out w h e n
the two central establishments faced off against each other along-
side the local institutions, as happened later w h e n the Western
W a l l T u n n e l was opened and during the protests against Israel's
construction o f a new Jewish neighborhood, H a r H o m a , o n land
claimed by Palestinians i n southern Jerusalem. In contrast, d u r i n g
the Ras a l - A m u d crisis o f the summer o f 1997, the central

administration was apathetic about the demonstrations, commer-

cial and school strikes, and other protest activity organized by
O r i e n t H o u s e . Despite the local establishment's attempts to esca-
late the protest, it remained small i n scope, decentralized, and
w i t h o u t direction and coordination. T h i s was the result of actions
taken by the central leadership i n Gaza, w h i c h preferred to deal
w i t h the issue through diplomatic channels w i t h the U . S . ( A l -
Q u d s , 10 Sept. 1997, 29 Sept. 1997, 30 Sept. 1997, 26 Oct. 1997;
Rubinstein, 18 Sept. 1997, 22 Sept. 1997).
Palestinian competition w i t h Israel i n Jerusalem is accompa-
nied by an ever-present fear o f unilateral Israeli actions that w i l l
tilt the balance against the Palestinians. T h e opening position o f
the local leadership was that, so long as no permanent settlement
had been signed, Israel w o u l d certainly try to modify the situation
in Jerusalem i n its failure. T h e Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem
saw evidence o f this i n the restrictions that have been placed on
the activities of Palestinian institutions i n the city since 1993. Even
the occasional closure that Israel has imposed o n the West Bank
since 1995 i n response to increased Hamas terrorism w i t h i n Israel
has been seen by the Palestinians as being motivated more by
political rather than security requirements. Israel, they believe,
wishes to cut Jerusalem off from its social and economic hinter-
land and detract from its status as the capital of the West B a n k and
as the lynchpin l i n k i n g the southern and northern West Bank
( H a ' a r e t z , 1 June 1994). W h e n a L i k u d - l e d right-wing religious-
nationalist government came to power i n Israel i n 1996 there were
additional Israeli actions such as the construction o f new Jewish
neighborhoods, Jewish settlers entering homes i n Arab neighbor-
hoods, and the withdrawal o f residence status from some Pales-
tinians living i n Jerusalem (Abu-Arafa, 1985; A l - H a y a t , 14 June
1994; a l - N a k h a l , 1993, 1994; A l - Q u d s , 18 Jan. 1995; Faisal
H u s s e i n i on the Voice o f Palestine, 18 Jan. 1994, 19 Jan. 1994,
F B I S ) . T h e Palestinians maintained that the arena should not be
left vacant for Israel. T h e Palestinians were indeed the weaker
party i n the field and at the negotiating table, but just as they had
brought Israel to recognize the P L O and to discuss Jerusalem w i t h
it, so they w o u l d succeed i n obtaining sovereignty i n East Jerusa-
lem, thanks to a well-managed and assertive struggle that w o u l d
impose outcomes on Israel (Husseini, 1996).

A N EAST J E R U S A L E M P O L I T I C A L P R O F I L E
Public opinion
Public o p i n i o n polls have been conducted o n a regular basis i n the
West B a n k and Gaza Strip since September 1993 and provide a
political profile o f the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem.
A t the beginning o f the 1980s, as P L O officials began to focus
on the diplomatic process as a means o f achieving a Palestinian
state, they became interested i n the opinions o f the Palestinians i n
the territories. T h i s interest was further spurred by the Intifada,
the popular and spontaneous uprising that broke out at the end o f
1987, during w h i c h the P L O found itself competing w i t h Hamas
for the hearts and minds o f the territories' inhabitants. T h e inhab-
itants themselves became familiar w i t h polls through their l o n g -
standing and close acquaintance w i t h Israeli, democracy and
public opinion, as w e l l as w i t h representatives o f international
diplomacy and the media. Furthermore, there was the P L O ' s
transformation from an organization representing the Palestin-
ians into an organization that headed a regime, a process that
opened an ongoing dialogue between the Palestinian public i n the
territories and its political leadership. A s i n all political systems,
the Palestinian leadership aspires to enlist public support and
respond to public expectations, w h i l e the public seeks to m a x i -
mize its influence over decision makers.
T h i s interest produced something unique i n the Arab w o r l d - a
series o f regular o p i n i o n polls, conducted m o n t h l y i n the West
Bank and Gaza Strip since September 1993 by the Center for P a l -
estinian Research and Studies ( C P R S ) . T h e polls survey a repre-
sentative sample o f the population o f the territories, i n c l u d i n g
Jerusalem.
205
A t the end o f 1993 the population o f the territories, according

to Israel's Central Bureau o f Statistics, was 1.084 m i l l i o n , not
i n c l u d i n g East Jerusalem, while the Palestinian Central Bureau o f
Statistics counted 2.19 m i l l i o n Palestinians i n the territories,
i n c l u d i n g East Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 M a r c h 1995). T h e sample
taken for the polls is not o f a fixed size, but it is large relative to the
population, averaging 1,223 adults over the age o f 18 i n the polls
conducted from 1994 to 1996. A l l the polls were conducted via
personal interviews i n the homes o f the subjects. T h e C P R S polls
are national rather than municipal. I have isolated the data for
Jerusalem for the years 1994 and 1995, w h i c h I have compared
w i t h the national findings. T h e margins o f error for Jerusalem are
m u c h wider than the margins o f error for all the territories, since
the sample i n Jerusalem is small. H o w e v e r , since the discussion
below is a comparative one and covers two years, and since the
intent is to sketch a political profile o f the Palestinian inhabitants
o f Jerusalem rather than to aim for percentage point precision, the
surveys paint a valuable general picture.
T h e discussion below is based first and foremost on C P R S ' s
findings, but they w i l l be placed alongside polls conducted by the
Jerusalem M e d i a and C o m m u n i c a t i o n Centre ( J M C C ) . W h i l e
there are differences i n both the methodology and results o f the
polls conducted by these two institutes, the overall picture they
provide is similar. Elections can be seen as active political behavior
and are i n fact the most reliable and comprehensive o f public
o p i n i o n polls. F o r this reason, I w i l l also examine to what extent
the results o f the elections i n Jerusalem manifest the trends that
appeared i n the public o p i n i o n polls o f the preceding two years.
Political support: organizations a n d parties
In general, the C P R S polls o f 1994—5 show that Fatah, the central

faction i n the P L O , was weaker i n East Jerusalem than i n the rest
o f the territories; however, it was never supported by less than
one-third o f the public. T h i s means that Fatah had a solid base o f
support in Jerusalem d u r i n g this period, albeit a smaller one than
elsewhere. In comparison w i t h the movement's other branches,
the local Fatah leadership i n Jerusalem is more independent - it
has its o w n international standing and financial resources. F u r -
thermore, since Israeli law applies to East Jerusalem, the institu-
tions o f the Palestinian state-in-the-making have had trouble

A n EastJerusalem Political Profile 207
functioning i n the city. O n the eve o f the elections for the Pales-
tinian Authority's Legislative C o u n c i l and presidency, Fatah made
an effort to enlarge its support, and i n fact at the end o f 1995 sup-
port for Fatah i n Jerusalem passed the 40 per cent mark.
D u r i n g 1994-95, support i n East Jerusalem for the coalition
that had voted i n favor of the O s l o accords i n P L O forums (Fatah,
F I D A , and the People's Party) was solid and ranged from 35 to 40
per cent. F r o m J u l y 1995 onward the People's Party and F I D A
ceased to have any statistically significant existence i n the city,
leaving Fatah as the sole standard-bearers for the p r o - O s l o camp.
In contrast w i t h the solid support for Fatah i n East Jerusalem,
support for the opposition (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic
Front for the Liberation o f Palestine) was smaller, variable,
changeable, and was largely a protest vote against the ruling elite.
Furthermore, while the coalition fully exploited its base o f sup-
port i n Jerusalem, the opposition was unable to mobilize addi-
tional support from among those w h o backed independents or
"none o f the above" (these categories are discussed below). T h e
opposition has ceaselessly criticized the O s l o accords, emphasiz-
ing i n particular that the P L O leadership has not stood firm o n
Jerusalem. Yet this has not resonated w i t h Jerusalem's inhabitants.
O n the contrary, the Palestinians of Jerusalem have been skeptical
of the opposition.
T h e opposition's core support i n Jerusalem does not come
from Hamas partisans. W i t h the exception o f October 1995,
during the entire two-year period under discussion here, Hamas
was weaker i n East Jerusalem than i n the rest of the country. S u p -
port for Hamas was concentrated i n the rural areas around
H e b r o n , Bethlehem, and Jerusalem. T h e central West B a n k cities
(Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Ramallah) have the greatest support
for the independent nationalists, a category that is discussed below
(Ross & Sa'id, 1995). East Jerusalem is a Palestinian frontier city
under Israeli control, and also Islam's third-holiest city. B u t i n the
large picture, Hamas has no solid, consistent base o f support
among the Palestinian public i n Jerusalem.
Support for unaffiliated opponents o f the current political
establishment is measured by these surveys under the category
"independents." These are organizations or persons w i t h either
Islamicist or nationalist ideology w h o do not belong to a political

organization such as Hamas or Fatah. Support for this category

may w e l l reflect aversion to, reservations about, and apparently
also repugnance for the establishment rather than positive support
for these candidates. T h e level o f support for "independents" i n
Jerusalem i n 1994—95 was high, but it was not solid support -
these were clearly protest votes. In contrast, support for "inde-
pendents" o n the national level was more or less fixed, at a lower
level - generally a m u c h lower level - than i n Jerusalem. As the
elections for the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y Legislative C o u n c i l
approached, voters became more concerned w i t h finding effective
representatives. Support for the politics of protest declined. Some
of the protestors switched their support to Fatah, while those w h o
did not w i s h to participate i n the elections or w h o rejected them
switched from the independents to the organized opposition.
Support for "none o f the above" denotes distaste for all the
political forces on the Palestinian map. Support for "none o f the
above" i n Jerusalem is highly variable o n a m o n t h l y basis. O n a
national level, support for "none of the above" is lower. T h i s pro-
vides further confirmation of the previous conclusion that there is
a floating protest vote that leans towards the opposition whose
potential has not been fully exploited and institutionalized i n
Jerusalem. T h e solid base o f support for "none o f the above" is
based o n distaste and repugnance for everything o n offer i n the
political market, w h i l e the peripheral support for "none o f the
above" has tended to indicate voters floating between the opposi-
tion and the independents.
S u p p o r t f o r presidential candidates
The polls also measured support for the Palestinian Authority's

president, Arafat, and for his chief critics, w h o were seen as poten-
tial rival candidates i n the elections. T h e most prominent figure i n
the Islamic opposition was Sheikh A h m a d Yassin, leader o f the
Hamas. A prominent leader o f the secular-Marxist left was D r .
George Habash, the chairman of the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion o f Palestine. Habash advocated the staged plan o f 1974
(founding a Palestinian state i n the 1967 territories as the first
stage i n "liberating" all of Palestine) and a Greater Palestine ideol-
ogy. A n o t h e r potential presidential candidate was D r . Haidar Abd
al-Shafi, chairman o f the Palestinian delegation to the M a d r i d
conference and to the bilateral talks w i t h Israel in Washington. H e

supports reaching an accommodation w i t h Israel but not Arafat's

concessions. A b d al-Shafi is also a sharp critic of Arafat's methods.
At the end o f 1994 he founded the M o v e m e n t for Democratic
Construction, w h i c h enlisted support for the independents.
According to C P R S surveys, Arafat's support in Jerusalem rose
from 25 per cent i n N o v e m b e r 1994 to 48.1 per cent i n December
1995. O n the national level, however, support for Arafat was
m u c h higher, 44.2 per cent i n N o v e m b e r 1994, reaching 68.5 per
cent on the eve of the December 1995 elections. In contrast, sup-
port for Sheikh Yassin i n Jerusalem was lower, ranging between
20.8 per cent i n N o v e m b e r 1994 and 14.3 per cent i n October
1995. Yassin's backers did not succeed i n broadening his circle o f
support i n any significant way or for any length o f time, w h i l e
Arafat's support grew significantly. It should be stressed, however,
that Arafat improved his standing m u c h more o n the national
level than he did i n Jerusalem.
In general, the Popular Front's Habash has enjoyed greater
support in Jerusalem than i n the rest of the territories, as has A b d
al-Shafi. There was more support for A b d al-Shafi, however, both
on the local and on the national level, because A b d al-Shafi was
perceived as a constructive critic. Nevertheless, the candidacy o f
Abd al-Shafi, w h o lives i n Gaza, did not captivate the Palestinians
in Jerusalem. T h e major pattern of protest in Jerusalem was a large
measure o f support for "other" or "none o f the above." In other
words, the protest vote i n Jerusalem is not Islamic-extremist but
rather, for the most part, nationalist.
W h i l e full data on the educational level o f the inhabitants o f
East Jerusalem has not yet been published, one cannot ignore the
link between education and political criticism that appears time
and again i n the polls. A c c o r d i n g to C P R S surveys, support for
nationalist independents is widespread i n the Jerusalem area and
higher among the educated and professionals, whereas support
for Islamicist independents is concentrated i n the villages i n the
central and southern West Bank and comes from people w h o are
less educated and younger (Ross & Sa'id, 1995). Furthermore, the
level o f post-secondary education i n the Jerusalem district was
particularly high among those w h o participated i n the exit polls i n
the 1996 elections: 31.8 per cent as opposed to 20 per cent (or less)
in the other districts. In contrast, the percentage o f those w i t h a
complete or partial elementary school education was 15.2 per cent

in Jerusalem, but twice that i n the other electoral districts

(Awartani, 1997: 65).
T h e national figures i n the C P R S surveys point to a close link
between educational level and criticism of the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity and Arafat. T h e higher their education, the more critical the
Palestinians i n the territories are o f Arafat and his movement,
Fatah. So, for example, i n N o v e m b e r 1994, a full 49 per cent o f
voters w h o had not finished h i g h school supported Arafat, but
only 34 per cent of those w i t h undergraduate degrees and 33.3 per
cent o f those w i t h advanced degrees supported h i m . Support of
Sheikh Yassin also varies w i t h education - among voters w h o had
not finished high school he garnered 18.7 per cent, as opposed to
6.75 per cent among those w i t h advanced degrees. T h e college-
educated showed relatively high levels of support for Abd al-Shafi,
13.3 per cent, whereas only 6 per cent of voters w h o had not fin-
ished high school supported h i m . T h i s same survey showed cor-
relation between l o w educational level and support for Fatah -
44.5 per cent o f the voters w h o had not completed high school
supported Fatah, as opposed to 31.3 per cent of those w i t h under-
graduate degrees. It is interesting to note that, among Palestinians
in the territories, the lower the educational level the higher the
o p t i m i s m . H i g h e r education makes Palestinians i n the territories
more pessimistic. Naturally, support for the continuation o f the
negotiations w i t h Israel was higher among the poorly educated
optimistic supporters o f the establishment than among the more
educated and alienated pessimists, w h o leaned towards the
opposition.
Support for Arafat among the employed was no higher than
among the unemployed. T h e long closure imposed on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip from the end of January 1995 worsened the
economic condition o f the Palestinians i n the territories and
increased the rate of unemployment. A c c o r d i n g to C P R S surveys,
the unemployment rate i n the refugee camps, villages, and towns
was higher than i n the large cities, and lower among those w i t h
academic degrees than among those w i t h only an elementary edu-
cation. U n e m p l o y m e n t was lower i n the central West Bank than
elsewhere, apparently because many Palestinians from the Jerusa-
lem metropolitan area, unlike their compatriots i n other parts o f
the West Bank, were able to continue to w o r k i n the Jewish sector.
T h e generally higher educational level o f the inhabitants o f East

A n E a s t J e r u s a l e m P o l i t i c a l Profile 211
Jerusalem was undoubtedly a factor as w e l l . E v e n so, the city's P a l -

estinians were highly critical o f the Palestinian Authority. T h i s
was not a result o f the economic situation. T h e Palestinian
Authority's and Arafat's most consistent supporters were the
poorly educated residents «of the refugee camps, villages, and
towns, where unemployment was most severe. Nationally, the
statement that the economic situation had improved since the
Oslo agreements was supported by relatively large percentages i n
the Gaza Strip, and this means that people answered the question
not i n accordance w i t h their economic situation, but rather i n
accordance w i t h their political situation. Since the O s l o accords,
the economic position of the residents o f the Gaza Strip has gotten
worse and their standard of living has declined, but they feel better
about their lives and are more confident politically.
Candidates for vice-president
T h e post of vice-president o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y is an i m a -

ginary one, since no such position exists i n either the P L O or the
Palestinian Authority. Arafat has consistently refused to delegate
even a part o f his authority. T h e conductors o f the C P R S survey
invented the j o b i n order to examine w h o the Palestinians i n the
territories see as being second i n rank to Arafat. A t the end o f 1994
and beginning o f 1995 no one person was seen by Palestinian
public o p i n i o n to be Arafat's deputy. H i s image overshadowed the
entire Palestinian political system and dwarfed all the other p o l i t i -
cal figures, even w h e n people were asked to choose Arafat's
deputy and not his replacement. T h e protest vote i n East Jerusa-
lem led to more than 50 per cent support for "other" or for "no
opinion."
P o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s o n o n g o i n g issues
As might have been expected, support for the O s l o agreements

was lower i n Jerusalem than i n the rest o f the Palestinian terri-
tories. East Jerusalem's removal from the jurisdiction of the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y lowered the expectations o f the residents of East
Jerusalem as to the likelihood o f finding a satisfactory solution to
their problem. T h e Palestinians i n Jerusalem, more than those
living elsewhere, rejected the assumption that the historic
achievements o f the Palestinian national movement i n the

a
negotiations w i t h Israel demonstrated that it w o u l d i n the future

be able to achieve an acceptable solution i n Jerusalem as well.
E v e n i n December 1995, o n the eve o f Israel's withdrawal from
the West B a n k and at the height o f the preparations for the elec-
tions, the Palestinians i n Jerusalem were less optimistic about the
future, felt relatively less secure, and were more concerned and
skeptical than the Palestinians o f the territories as a whole about
the present and future.
E v a l u a t i n g the P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y
T h e residents o f East Jerusalem gave the Palestinian Authority a

lower grade than d i d the Palestinians o f the territories as a whole
i n all categories, or answered "don't k n o w " more than their c o u n -
trymen did. A t first, the negative v i e w o f the accomplishments o f
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was firmer and less forgiving than in the
rest o f the country, but at the beginning o f 1995 there was a nota-
ble drop i n the assertiveness and critical attitude o f the Palestin-
ians o f East Jerusalem, and positive attitudes to the Palestinian
Authority's accomplishments increased.
A r m e d a c t i o n s by t h e I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s
In the period between January 1995 and M a r c h 1996, Hamas and

Islamic Jihad launched a series o f terrorist attacks against Israeli
civilian targets. In January 1995 suicide bombers attacked the bus
station at the Beit L i d j u n c t i o n between T e l A v i v and Haifa, and i n
J u l y and August there were similar attacks o n buses i n the T e l A v i v
suburb, Ramat G a n , and i n Jerusalem. In February and M a r c h
1996 there was a series o f four horrible attacks. Some 100 people
were killed and 200 injured; 47 o f the dead and 162 o f the
w o u n d e d were i n Jerusalem. Israel's major responses were the
imposition o f a total closure o n the territories o f the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y and pressure o n Arafat to take aggressive steps against
extremist Islamic organizations.
A t the beginning o f 1995 there was a great deal o f ambivalence
among the Palestinians o f East Jerusalem about Islamic terrorism,
m u c h more so than i n the rest o f the Palestinian territories. F r o m
the s u m m e r o f 1995 onwards, however, the East Jerusalem public
stood firmly against terrorist attacks, more so than Palestinians
nationwide. T h e change i n o p i n i o n was apparently due to the fact
that the extremist Islamic organizations had no firm hold i n East

Jerusalem, and because Palestinians from East Jerusalem had been

among the victims of the terrorist attacks (al-Shikaki, 1997a: 149;
Shikaki, 1996: 9-15).
"Soft" p r o t e s t i n J e r u s a l e m '
The people of East Jerusalem were very conscious of two things -
that discussion o f their future had been suspended, and that the
Palestinian Authority was officially absent from the city. T h e P a l -
estinian Authority's successes o n the national level d i d not seem
particularly relevant to the residents o f East Jerusalem, and they
demanded that the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y produce gains on the
local level. M o r e than i n the rest o f the country, the Palestinian
residents o f East Jerusalem were firm i n their negative attitude
towards the Palestinian Authority's achievements. T h e people o f
East Jerusalem were not seeking to protest for its o w n sake - they
wanted a real change i n their status. I n other words, the contest for
the floating and protest vote i n East Jerusalem was fought o n the
issue of who could w o r k most effectively to improve the lot of the
city's residents. E v e n though many of these d i d not t h i n k m u c h o f
the Palestinian Authority's accomplishments, its prospects for
persuading the floating and protest voters to j o i n its camp
improved as the elections approached. T h e Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity's gains i n its dispute w i t h Israel over the election arrangements
in Jerusalem strengthened its position i n the city and made the
people o f East Jerusalem more w i l l i n g to participate i n the elec-
tions. T h e consistent gains i n support for Arafat and Fatah o n the
national level at the end o f 1994 and beginning o f 1995 also led
many people i n East Jerusalem to the conclusion that, despite
their reservations, there was no alternative to Arafat and his associ-
ates, and that it w o u l d be better to produce the desired change via
the existing Palestinian establishment.
East Jerusalem is a capital-in-waiting for the Palestinians, and
every capital loses some of its significance w h e n its nation's entire
political establishment lives and works outside it. F o r this reason,
the Palestinian Authority has sought to penetrate and operate i n
East Jerusalem. Israel has tried, for its part, to frustrate these initia-
tives or keep them to a m i n i m u m . B e y o n d the national aspect, the
ruling coalition i n the Palestinian Authority, and Fatah i n particu-
lar, had political-organizational interests i n penetrating East

j
214 J e r u s a l e m ; the Contested C i t y i
Jerusalem and establishing a foothold there. T h e weakness of the
opposition i n Jerusalem tempted them because they k n e w that
broadening the Palestinian Authority's power and legitimacy i n
Jerusalem w o u l d reinforce their regime o n the national level. U p
until mid-1995 they had only limited success at this, but this grew
after their gains on the subject o f the polling i n East Jerusalem,
and as the elections themselves approached.
P o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r : t h e e l e c t i o n s to t h e P a l e s t i n i a n A u t h o r i t y ' s
Legislative C o u n c i l a n d presidency
T h e elections to the Palestinian Authority's Legislative C o u n c i l

and presidency, held i n January 1996, were the most important
political event since the signing o f the Declaration o f Principles
between Israel and the Palestinians i n 1993. F o r the first time i n
the history o f the Palestinian national movement Palestinians
chose their o w n political leaders (elections i n the West B a n k and
Gaza Strip had, since 1967, been limited to municipal govern-
ments, student governments at the universities and to labor and
professional organizations). T h i s was a grant of legitimacy both to
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and the P L O . T h e elections were a con-
stitutive event for other reasons as well - they changed the basis o f
legitimacy for the Palestinian national movement and the division
of powers i n the political institutions, and marked the arrival o f a
new political order. T h e P L O ' s institutions were never elected;
instead, they were based on an intra-Arab, international, and Pal-
estinian consensus, and on the material resources that the organi-
zation oversaw and allocated. M e m b e r s h i p i n political institutions
was determined via consensual quotas for political-ideological
groups that were members o f the P L O ' s r u l i n g coalition, or via
political appointments by the ruling P L O establishment. U n t i l
the establishment o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y , the institutions
of the P L O , the national umbrella organization, enjoyed pre-
eminence over all the local institutions that developed i n the West
B a n k and Gaza Strip and i n the smaller Palestinian diasporas.
Since Israel prevented the P L O ' s official entry into Palestine, the
outside had to r u n the "inside" by remote control. ^
T h e 1996 elections opened a new stage i n the politicization o f
the Palestinian public. F o r the first time ever, elections gave the
Palestinian political system the legitimacy that comes from

representatives being directly elected by the public. It is important

to note that the previous basis o f legitimacy d i d not completely
disappear - it was only weakened. T h e dual foundation o f legiti-
macy was reflected i n an official duality o f institutions - the P L O
and the Palestinian Authority. T h i s raised the question of priority
- did the high legitimacy o f elections place the Palestinian
Authority above the P L O , at least i n value terms? B u t the political
platform o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and decisions o f the P L O
Executive C o m m i t t e e explicitly stated that "the A u t h o r i t y draws
its legitimacy from the P L O , w h i c h is to be the source of political
and constitutional power" ( D a v a r , 31 M a y 1994).
T h e entry of "outside" P L O officials into the "inside" and their
contesting of the elections dulled the urgency of the question and
created a certain amount of congruency between the P L O and the
Palestinian Authority. T h e weekly meetings o f the "Palestinian
Leadership" were demonstrations of this new reality. T h i s f o r u m
is composed o f the members o f the P L O Executive C o m m i t t e e ,
the members of the executive branch of the Palestinian Authority,
the chiefs o f the security and police forces, and the negotiators
w i t h Israel. It was established i n order to circumvent the p r o b l e m
that could have arisen i f either the P L O ' s Executive C o m m i t t e e or
the Palestinian Authority's cabinet functioned as the main decision-
making forum.
T h e Palestinian agenda also underwent considerable change. In
the past, ideological-political debates took up most o f the Pales-
tinians' attention, and the military and political confrontation
with Israel served as a tool for nation-building (Sayigh, 1997). T h e
establishment of the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y put more prosaic mat-
ters on the agenda, such as the operation o f political institutions
and the use of the organs of government as the means to b u i l d the
nation. T h e issues that had preoccupied the Palestinian establish-
ment i n the past and w h i c h nevertheless remained o n the agenda
took on a new cast. T h e debate w i t h i n the Palestinian establish-
ment, and the debate between it and Israel, has focused less o n
overarching questions such as the permanent borders o f the P a l -
estinian state and the relation between national goals and the
means used to achieve them, and more on a series o f very w e l l -
defined issues such as arrangements for the elections, the place-
ment of Israeli policemen at the border crossings leading from the
Palestinian Authority to Egypt and Jordan, entry permits to Israel,

and the operation o f cooperative security arrangements with

Israel. E v e n the definition o f the nation-state has changed. In the
past there was identity between the national movement - the P L O
as an organization - and the definition of the nation and national-
ism; according to the P L O charter, every Palestinian was a natural
member o f the organization. Since 1994 the definition o f the
nation and the state has come to correspond more and more to the
population living i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. A n opening
has been created for distinguishing between the nation-state and
Palestinian citizenship therein and a Palestinian national identity
that is ethnic-cultural and historical at base, w h i l e at the same
time maintaining a strong link to a defined territory, Palestine ( a l -
B i l a d , 25 M a r c h 1996).
T h e agreement between Israel and the P L O i n September 1993
opened the door to the P L O and allowed it to make an official
entry into a land i n w h i c h it aspired to establish Palestinian self-
government. In practice, the P L O institutions that remained "out-
side" evaporated, and the same happened to political figures who
refused to enter the Palestinian Authority territory under the aegis
of the O s l o accords. In the transition period between the signing o f
the Declaration o f Principles i n September 1993 and the elections
in January 1996, the period in w h i c h the P L O establishment moved
from "outside" to "inside," the P L O enjoyed an advantage i n the
contest for leadership w i t h local forces. T h e P L O assigned to itself
the glory o f the historic achievement, and the agreements with
Israel allowed it to establish a provisional regime for the transition
period. T h i s regime (the Palestinian Authority) was constructed on
the superiority of the "outsiders" w h o had recently arrived, and on
the exploitation of contention between different social and political
groups o n the "inside." T h i s allowed it to place the local forces i n
the places that the ruling elite assigned it. T h e Palestinian Author-
ity's ruling elite enjoyed no small advantage w h e n the election cam-
paign began (al-Shikaki and Qasis, 1997; K l e i n , 1997).
W i l l i n g n e s s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n elections
T h e elections to the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y Legislative C o u n c i l

were held even before the Israeli army had retreated entirely from
the West B a n k and Gaza Strip, yet the Palestinians were still very
keen on participating i n them. M o s t of the population understood

the historic importance of the elections, and participation was per-

ceived as a national duty and a part o f the struggle for independ-
ence. B e y o n d national and historical consciousness there was also
lively democratic consciousness, a product o f the population's
painful contact w i t h Israeli democracy. F r o m the very first, the
elections were perceived as a national event and not a matter o f
concern only to the ruling elite, and the same was true o f voter
registration. Registering was a prerequisite for voting and, had
there not been widespread participation, the elections w o u l d have
lost some of their national value. T h i s was precisely the intention
of various opposition groups w h o viewed the elections as a stage-
managed show by the r u l i n g elite aimed at legitimizing the "capit-
ulation," as they termed it, inherent i n the O s l o accords. These
opposition groups failed, however, to w i n broad support for their
boycott o f registration. In the C P R S poll o f December 1995, the
percentage of those intending to participate i n the elections passed
the 70 per cent mark, in Jerusalem and i n the territories as a w h o l e .
Moreover, a full 75 per cent o f Hamas supporters viewed elec-
tions as the proper way o f choosing a Palestinian leadership
(Shikaki, 1996: 27). T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was not blamed for
the special election procedures in Jerusalem and the arrangements
had no effect on the willingness o f the inhabitants o f East Jerusa-
lem to participate i n the poll. Furthermore, the inhabitants of East
Jerusalem seem to have expected that they w o u l d be able to
change the city's status w i t h their votes.
East Jerusalem was part o f general Palestinian trends i n other
ways as well. T h e people o f East Jerusalem responded m u c h like
Palestinians i n the rest o f the territories i n citing the factors that
w o u l d determine their choice o f candidates. A c c o r d i n g to C P R S
surveys conducted i n October 1995, willingness to vote for
w o m e n was about the same i n Jerusalem as throughout the terri-
tories (74.7 per cent on average - 78.1 per cent i n Bethlehem, 80.8
per cent i n T u l k a r e m , 80 per cent i n Jericho, and 60.7 per cent i n
the north and central Gaza Strip). A s i n the rest o f the territories,
political affiliation and h o l d i n g an academic appointment d i d not
play an important role i n the choice o f candidates i n Jerusalem.
Residents of East Jerusalem placed less weight on family connec-
tions. There was no clear picture o f the religious factor - the
extreme Islamic groups were relatively weak i n Jerusalem, and
Christians were allotted two o f the Jerusalem District's seats.

The positions taken by the residents o f East Jerusalem were

affected by the city's status as a frontier city. In a C P R S survey
conducted i n December 1995, the residents o f East Jerusalem
cited participation i n the struggle as a criterion that w o u l d help
determine their choice o f candidate. T h i s was higher than i n the
rest o f the territories (39.7 per cent as opposed to 26.6 per cent).
Furthermore, i n Jerusalem the percentage support for candidates
who favored the O s l o agreements was one o f the lowest i n the
country, even though it stood at 79 per cent. In the Gaza Strip, for
example, support for this criterion reached 94.4 per cent. It should
not be concluded from this, however, that support for candidates
who opposed the O s l o agreements was higher i n Jerusalem than
elsewhere. In Jerusalem only 10 per cent o f respondents to the
survey said that they w o u l d vote only for opponents o f the O s l o
accords, the same percentage as i n Jenin, a Fatah stronghold and
the first West Bank city tbat the Israeli army evacuated i n the
period just before the elections.
E l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , slates of c a n d i d a t e s , p r e p a r a t i o n s , a n d p r o p a g a n d a
The electoral system was determined after a debate between those

who supported a first-past-the-post constituency system i n w h i c h
votes w o u l d be for individual candidates and those w h o supported
nationwide proportional representation i n w h i c h votes w o u l d be
cast for a party slate. T h e supporters o f the first method pointed
out that the largest political organization w o u l d sweep the poll and
w o u l d gain a decisive majority i n the Palestinian institutions.
A c c o r d i n g to the advocates o f the second system, granting repre-
sentation to the m a x i m u m number of political streams was a more
important principle than the regime's ability to make decisions,
and more appropriate to the heterogeneity o f Palestinian society.
The debate was not between factions, but rather crossed political
boundaries, especially w i t h i n the Fatah organization (al-Shikaki
and Qasis, 1997).
In the end, a system o f personal v o t i n g was adopted. T h e vote
for president was personal and first-past-the-post, w i t h each voter
required to choose one o f the two candidates. T h e elections for
the Legislative C o u n c i l , held simultaneously, had a regional ele-
ment. T h e West B a n k and Gaza Strip were divided into 16 elec-
toral districts, w i t h each district assigned several seats. T h e
n u m b e r of polling stations was set at 1,696, of w h i c h 165 were i n

the Jerusalem district; only five were placed i n territory that Israel
had annexed. Voters were required to mark the names o f a
number o f candidates equal to the number o f seats allocated to
their district. T h e Jerusalem District received seven seats, w i t h
two being reserved for Christian candidates. T h i s system reduced
the importance of political movements and turned attention to the
individual competing candidates, i n contrast w i t h the system o f
political and appointment quotas practiced i n the P L O . Further-
more, the P L O was r u n by consensus (consociational) politics,
and i n general there was no open competition between the differ-
ent organizations, but rather negotiations between their leader-
ships for the achievement o f an accommodation.
The Palestinian Authority elections instead created competi-
tion, and this innovation was accepted because, from the point o f
view o f the P L O ' s constituent movements, the system chosen
solved the problem they had been struggling w i t h since 1993 -
whether to dissolve themselves and turn into political parties i n
every sense of the term, or to preserve their existing structures and
allow their members to r u n i n the elections. T h e personal-
regional system also solved the problem o f the inhabitants o f the
West Bank and Gaza Strip w h o had not taken an active role i n the
P L O establishment and w h o were unsure h o w they w o u l d be able
to contest elections i n w h i c h only political parties participated.
W h i l e the system made it possible for several candidates to orga-
nize as a slate i n w h i c h candidates lent each other mutual support,
the elections were nevertheless personal and this made the phe-
nomenon a marginal one. T h e system d i d not have antagonism
built into it, nor was it amenable to a campaign by one camp to
defeat another, mostly because the large n u m b e r o f candidates
dissipated tension and competition. Furthermore, the system
opened the door to independent candidates. F r o m the point o f
view of the "internals," w h o had little acquaintance w i t h the estab-
lishment "outside," this was, of course, an advantage, but from the
point of view o f the established movements it was the salient dis-
advantage of the method. T h e Popular F r o n t for the Liberation o f
Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation o f Palestine,
and Hamas opposed participating i n the elections and were thus
forced to decide what their attitude w o u l d be to candidates w h o
shared their ideologies but w h o had disassociated themselves
from these movements and entered the race o n an independent-

opposition platform. In contrast, Fatah had to cope w i t h hundreds

of independent candidates w h o d i d not accept their non-inclusion
in the official Fatah slate.
T h e 16 v o t i n g districts were d r a w n as the election
approached. T h e Jerusalem district was defined not only as an
electoral district, but also as an administrative district i n the P a l -
estinian A u t h o r i t y ' s M i n i s t r y of the Interior. T h e administrative
district was headed by A t t o r n e y J a m i l O t h m a n Nasser, a
m e m b e r o f Fatah and an Arafat loyalist. T h e district offices were
located i n A b u - D i s , a suburb that is not w i t h i n Jerusalem's
m u n i c i p a l boundaries. T h e district was i n practice composed o f
those areas that had been part of the Jordanian Jerusalem district,
except for the part that had been annexed to Israel. T h e district
stretches f r o m the outskirts o f Ramallah i n the north to the edge
o f B e t h l e h e m i n the south, and f r o m the northwestern corner o f
the D e a d Sea to the G r e e n L i n e (the border w i t h the State o f
Israel) i n the West ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 Jan. 1996). D e f i n i n g the Jerusa-
lem electoral district to be the same as the Palestinian adminis-
trative district, rather than using the m u n i c i p a l boundary
established by Israel i n 1967, made it possible to h o l d elections i n
East Jerusalem and find pragmatic and functional solutions to
the demands o f Israel and the Palestinians. T h e territory o f the
electoral district was m u c h larger than the m u n i c i p a l area o f
Jerusalem and i n c l u d e d the city. Israel wanted the major part o f
the elections to be held outside its territory, w h i l e the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y planned for t h e m to be held i n the city, despite the
annexation. T h i s arrangement had internal Palestinian signifi-
cance as w e l l , because i n c l u d i n g Jerusalem i n a larger district
made it easier for the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y to cope w i t h East
Jerusalem criticism of the national regime. In this way Jerusalem
and Gaza became closer to each other.
T h e negotiations w i t h Israel o n the right of the residents of East
Jerusalem to vote and be elected produced a new order: Palestin-
ians w h o were citizens o f Israel were not allowed to participate i n
the elections, but residents of East Jerusalem were allowed to vote
and to be elected as well. Those w h o wanted to be candidates had
to have a dual address, i n Jerusalem and outside it. T h e second
address d i d not have to be a residence. T h e candidate was required
to prove a l i n k to some location outside Jerusalem, for the purpose
of residence, work, or business ( H a ' a r e t z , 16 J u l y 1995).

According to the Palestinian election law, approved i n D e c e m -

ber 1995, the number o f seats i n the Legislative C o u n c i l up for
election was 89, including the president o f the Palestinian
Authority. A t first, the Palestinians demanded that Israel agree to a
council o f between 130 members (the n u m b e r o f members that
had been proposed for the Palestine N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l , the P L O ' s
representative body, after a structural reform i n the mid-1980s)
and 180 (the number of seats allotted to the "internals" o n the P a l -
estine N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l , but w h i c h had never been filled and
w h i c h were not included i n the q u o r u m o f members, w h i c h
reached 486 at its last session). Israel proposed between 30 and 40
members, so as to give the Legislative C o u n c i l a local character,
rather than the parliamentary character that the P L O wished it to
have. In the end the Palestinians agreed to make do w i t h 89 m e m -
bers. T h e Israeli achievement was disconnecting the n u m b e r o f
members i n the Legislative C o u n c i l from the number o f m e m -
bers i n the Palestine National C o u n c i l , w h i l e the Palestinians
gained a council that had more members than was customary for
the legislative bodies o f cities or districts.
At first Jerusalem was allotted six seats, one o f them reserved
for a Christian. A t the beginning o f January 1996 this was
increased to seven, w i t h two seats for Christians. Christians were
reserved five seats on a nationwide basis - two in Jerusalem, two i n
Bethlehem, and one i n Ramallah. Since the Christians made up
approximately two per cent o f the Palestinian population i n the
territories, their representation i n the Legislative C o u n c i l was
about three times what strict proportionality w o u l d have p r o -
vided. F o r political reasons, and i n order to demonstrate the
multicultural character o f the Palestinian Authority, one seat i n
the N a b l u s district was reserved for a member o f the miniscule
Samaritan c o m m u n i t y . In contrast, no seats were reserved for
w o m e n . There were five w o m e n candidates each i n the Jerusalem
and H a n Y u n i s (Gaza Strip) districts, while i n the rest o f the dis-
tricts there were between one and three w o m e n ( A l - Q u d s , 16 D e c .
1995, 6 Jan. 1996; U k a l and al-Surani, 19 Jan. 1996). T h e assign-
ment o f seats to the electoral districts was not i n accordance w i t h
population or eligible voters. In the Jerusalem district each seat
represented 11,309 eligible voters, whereas i n N o r t h Gaza, each
seat represented 8,949 eligible voters; i n Gaza C i t y each seat rep-
resented 10,414 voters and i n Tubas, i n the northern West Bank,

16,349 voters ( A l - N a s W a - a l I n t i k h a b a t , A l - Q u d s , 20 Jan. 1996;

G a n i m , 1996; Shikaki and Kasis, 1997).
A b o u t 40 per cent o f the total population of Jerusalem regis-
tered to vote, the same as i n Ramallah and Rafiah, and the same as
the national average ( U k a l and al-Surani, 19Jan. 1996). T h e d i v i -
sion of seats among the electoral districts was determined by a set
of factors that was not sufficiently transparent. These were the
size o f the population i n each district (so that the elected council
w o u l d have the same regional cross-section as the population),
the n u m b e r o f registered voters i n each district, and "other crite-
ria," as Sa'ib Ariqat, the Palestinian Authority minister i n charge
o f the elections, put it ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 D e c . 1995). It is reasonable to
assume that among these unstated considerations was the strength
of Fatah i n each district, and each region's status and national
importance.
Fatah candidates were selected i n a two-stage process. P r i m a -
ries were conducted i n the district branches o f the movement,
after w h i c h a placement committee was convened, composed o f
members chosen by Fatah's two leading "inside" institutions, its
Central C o m m i t t e e and Revolutionary C o u n c i l . T h i s committee
decided w h i c h seat each candidate w o u l d contest, meaning that
the primary results were i n reality merely advisory.
The placement committee was set up i n order to balance
between the various elements that Arafat wanted to see repre-
sented i n the C o u n c i l . First, Arafat was anxious to b r i n g i n the
y o u n g leadership that had b o r n the burden o f r u n n i n g the Inti-
fada. T h i s group had gained the public's sympathy w h e n it fought
Israel, and w h e n some of its members spent time i n Israeli jails or
were deported. T h i s group was not closely linked to national p o l i -
tics, and its close ties to the c o m m o n m a n and its collective, clean
image stood i n sharp contrast to the corrupt image o f the m e m -
bers o f the P L O establishment, w h o were perceived as conde-
scending and distant from the public. Second, Arafat and the
Fatah leadership wanted to construct a slate that w o u l d represent a
range o f social strata and political classes. T h i s was aimed at
enhancing their o w n representative power and legitimacy, so that
they could maneuver politically between different and opposing
elements. H e wanted to place activists from the field alongside
k n o w n political figures, members of the establishment, represen-
tatives o f ethnic communities and minorities, and the heads o f

notable families (Rubinstein, 25 D e c . 1995). T h i r d , by doing this,

Arafat sought to retain control o f the institutions o f the Fatah
movement during its transition into a political party, and to i n f l u -
ence the composition of the parliament. Arafat k n e w that by c o n -
trolling w h o Fatah's candidates were he could m i n i m i z e the
party's and the parliament's oversight o f the executive organiza-
tions that he headed. Nevertheless, it was important to h i m to give
the elections a democratic and representative appearance, and this
led to the decision o n the two-stage process o f putting together
the movement's recommended slate.
Eighteen candidates ran i n the Jerusalem primaries, competing
for the votes of the city's approximately 400 Fatah activists ( m e m -
bers of the Fatah party apparatus, popularly called a l - t a n z i m - "the
organization"). T h e top five spots were w o n by: K h a t i m A b d al-
Q a d i r Eid, one of the prominent Intifada commanders i n the city;
A h m a d G h a n i m , a member ofjabril Rajoub's Preventative Secu-
rity force i n Jerusalem; and three m i n o r local activists: M u h a m -
mad Suan, M u h a m m a d Khalid, and Salwa H u d i e b , chairman o f
Fatah's local welfare organization (Kol H a - I r , 15 D e c . 1995). T h e
movement's better-known figures d i d not compete. T h e y had no
need for such an entry ticket, nor d i d they need to catch the atten-
tion of Arafat or the placement committee. T o compete against a
group of youngsters w o u l d have been undignified.
T h e placement committee was headed by one of the top figures
in the Fatah organization, Sakhr Habash. Fatah also appointed a
political committee headed by A b u - M a z i n (who also served as
chairman o f the Central Election C o m m i s s i o n on behalf o f the
Palestinian Authority), and a communications committee headed
by N a b i l Sha'ath. T h e West Bank organization committee was
headed by Faisal Husseini, and the parallel committee i n the Gaza
Strip was chaired by Zakariya al-Agha, both of them leaders of the
movement i n their respective areas. A b u - A l a ran the finance c o m -
mittee, and U m - J i h a d the women's committee ( A l - Q u d s , 21 N o v .
1995).
M a n y Fatah activists, those unhappy w i t h the decisions o f the
placement committee and losers i n the primaries, d i d not accept
the movement's verdict and Arafat's decision. T h e y decided to
run as independents. T h e direct, first-past-the-post m u l t i -
member constituency system created a negative dynamic for
Fatah. T h e more candidates there were i n a district, the fewer

votes were needed to w i n a seat i n the C o u n c i l . Even before the

independents rebelled against their movement's central authority,
the number o f candidates was large, and this spurred Fatah activ-
ists w h o d i d not agree w i t h the placement committee's decision to
run against the representatives of the establishment and the politi-
cal organizations, h o p i n g to be elected o n the basis o f their per-
sonal accomplishments and reputations i n their home districts.
Fatah d i d not look kindly on this political rebellion, and ruled that
anyone w h o ran as an independent w o u l d be expelled from the
movement. B u t there were so many Fatah members running as
independents, and their standing i n the movement was so high,
that it was impossible to kick them out without dealing a mortal
b l o w to the organization. So the Fatah leadership could do no
more than hope that its official candidates w o u l d beat the
independents.
U n l i k e i n the rest of the country, the placement committee was
not authorized to compose the Fatah list in Jerusalem district ( A l -
Q u d s , 27 D e c . 1995). Arafat assigned this j o b to Faisal Husseini. In
d o i n g this, Arafat enhanced Husseini's power and that of the local
Jerusalem leadership at the expense o f the Fatah organization (al-
t a n z i m ) o n the national level - Sakhr Habash, M a r w a n Barghuthi,
Abas Z a k i , and M u h a m m a d G h a n i m . Husseini's strengthened
position also came at the expense o f Rajoub. Rajoub had a great
deal of influence i n the Fatah organization. M a n y o f its operatives
were agents of his Preventative Security Service. Despite Rajoub's
rivalry w i t h the national civilian branch o f Fatah, the two had a
c o m m o n interest i n restricting the power o f the local establish-
ment in Jerusalem. T h e source of the rivalry between the political
establishment i n Jerusalem - Husseini's O r i e n t H o u s e - and the
leaders o f the national Fatah organization had its base i n the rela-
tions between the "outside" and the "inside." Husseini, it should
be recalled, is one of the leading figures of what was formerly the
"inside," w h i l e Sakher Habash, M u h a m m a d G h a n i m , and Abas
Z a k i were Fatah officials from "outside." Hussein's appointment
as Fatah chief in the West Bank, i n September 1993, and the entry
of the "outside" officials to the "inside", i n mid-1994, turned the
prior rivalry into one that was n o w between a center of power that
had once been national and was n o w local i n Jerusalem, and a
national center of power that n o w wanted to subjugate the differ-
ent local branches to its c o m m a n d and w h i c h was u n w i l l i n g to

accept the independence o f the Jerusalem organization. T h e

struggle between the Fatah apparatus and Husseini's Jerusalem
political elite was also a generational one. T h e Fatah organization
opposed• Husseini's political and social O r i e n t H o u s e elite w i t h
young field operatives w h o had w o n glory i n the Intifada.
In order to maneuver between the constraints he faced,
Husseini tried to operate the Jerusalem district differently to the
other districts and to draw up a united consensus slate o f candi-
dates that w o u l d represent all political factions. H o w e v e r , two
opposition organizations, Hamas and the Popular F r o n t for the
Liberation o f Palestine, forbade their representatives, Sheikh
Jamil H a m a m i and D r . Riad a l - M a l k i , from participating i n the
elections. Negotiations between H u s s e i n i and the opposition
groups ended without issue just before the deadline for register-
ing candidacies. A t this point the Jerusalem district had been
assigned six seats, one of w h i c h was reserved for a Christian, leav-
ing four places for w h i c h more than 20 prominent activists were
competing. There was no way to decide among them i n the few
hours that remained to register candidates o n December 12,1995
( H a ' a r e t z , 24 D e c . 1995).
In addition to these difficulties, H u s s e i n i had to cope w i t h the
problems that the placement committee and the national Fatah
leadership had already faced - the y o u n g Intifada leadership's
demand for representation. T h e local Fatah activists w h o had
been successful i n the movement's primaries i n Jerusalem also
demanded recognition. P r o m i n e n t among these two groups were
the y o u n g candidates w h o m the national Fatah organization sup-
ported. T h e y hoped to exploit their reputations as fighters against
the Israeli occupation to w i n out over what they called "the salon
and media leadership" (the veteran politicians) and the n e w c o m -
ers from outside w b o had never suffered the vicissitudes o f the
occupation (members o f the P L O establishment). T h i s group
refused to j o i n a united slate w i t h veteran candidates because they
knew that they w o u l d be poorly represented. T h e people, they
argued, should be allowed to have their say. T h e inability to
decide w h o w o u l d be o n the slate led to a situation i n w h i c h the
official Fatah slate i n the Jerusalem district originally only
included two names - A b u - A l a , about whose candidacy there was
general consensus, and Faisal H u s s e i n i ( A l - Q u d s , 22 D e c . 1995,25
Dec. 1995; H a ' a r e t z , 24 D e c . 1995).

A few days later a new list containing four names was issued.
In the other electoral districts Fatah ran slates w i t h a number o f
candidates equal to the n u m b e r o f seats allocated to the district,
but i n the Jerusalem district the Fatah list left two spaces open,
granting tacit legitimacy to other candidates to r u n as independ-
ents and ask tbe j u d g m e n t o f the voters. T h i s time Faisal
H u s s e i n i was not included i n the list, because participating i n the
elections w o u l d have required h i m to disassociate h i m s e l f from
O r i e n t H o u s e (as explained i n chapter 5). T h e slate n o w
included A b u - A l a , one o f the architects o f the O s l o accords;
A h m a d H a s h i m al-Zughayir, a fruit and vegetable dealer o r i -
ginally f r o m H e b r o n , Fatah activist, and member o f the U n i t e d
N a t i o n a l C o m m a n d (the body that had coordinated the Inti-
fada); K h a t i m A b d a l - Q a d r E i d , w h o had come i n first i n the
Fatah p r i m a r y elections i n Jerusalem; and E m i l Jarju'i, a pedia-
trician w h o had never been politically active - he was adopted as
a C h r i s t i a n representative by the Fatah organization in Jerusalem
because they thought he w o u l d be loyal. It is interesting that the
Fatah list included o n l y one C h r i s t i a n candidate even though
two places were reserved for Christians. D r . H a n a n A s h r a w i was
too independent for the national Fatah leadership, so she ran on
her o w n . O t h e r p r o m i n e n t Jerusalem area figures also ran as
independents - H a n a Sinyora, a w e l l - o f f pharmacist w h o was
also editor o f the daily newspaper A l - F a j r and w h o had opposed
Arafat d u r i n g the 1980s; Z i y a d A b u - Z a y a d , lawyer, journalist,
and Fatah activist; and Jonathan Kutab, lawyer and political
activist. A b u - Z a y a d and Kutab tried to organize a b l o c k o f five
p r o m i n e n t independent candidates, i n c l u d i n g the popular A b u -
Ala, but they were unable to reach an agreement and i n the end
each ran o n his o w n ( A l - Q u d s , 22 D e c . 1995, 25 D e c . 1995;
H a ' a r e t z , 26 D e c . 1995). In addition to the independents, F I D A
(a political party formed by e x - D F L P members i n 1991) ran one
candidate (Zuhira Kamal), and the People's Party, the former
C o m m u n i s t s , ran four candidates. There were also two blocs of rel-
atively anonymous candidates - the Independent Bloc, with four
candidates, identified w i t h Fatah, and the National-Palestinian
U n i o n , w i t h three candidates ( A l - A y a m , 6 Jan. 1996). T h e major
race, however, was between the Fatah slate and the most p r o m i -
nent independents, w h o had bucked Fatah discipline w h i l e
r e m a i n i n g loyal to its ideology.

In general, the candidates could be categorized i n several over-

lapping and intersecting ways. There were Fatah representatives
versus independents identified w i t h Fatah; Fatah members versus
members of other organizations and parties; members of political
organizations versus completely independent candidates; w e l l - o f f
candidates (such as H a n a Sinyora or Rajah A b u - A s a b , w h o sells
electric appliances) versus members o f the middle and lower
classes; y o u n g Intifada fighters and commanders versus public
figures and political activists such as Haj A b u - D i a b , chairman o f
the u n i o n at the East Jerusalem Electric C o m p a n y ; or D r . A n i s al-
Qaq, a doctor and secretary-general of the Palestinian C o u n c i l for
M e d i c a l Services; and attorney A l i j o z l a n , chairman o f the C o m -
mittee of Arab Attorneys. There were people w i t h exposure in the
international media versus people k n o w n only to the Palestinian
public, or only to the people i n his or her electoral district; people
from notable families w i t h social or economic position versus
people w i t h no family connections; recently arrived operatives
from "outside" versus people from "inside." In Jerusalem there
were also candidates from the city's H e b r o n immigrants versus
those whose families had been i n Jerusalem for generations. F o r
example Sheikh N a b i l al-Ja'bari, director o f H e b r o n University,
who lives in Jerusalem, belongs to one of the most socially p r o m i -
nent families i n H e b r o n and, until the 1970s, also the most i m p o r -
tant political family i n the H e b r o n area (Rubinstein, 2 N o v . 1995;
J M C C , 1996: 187-216).
T h e Central Election C o m m i s s i o n began registering candi-
dates a m o n t h before the election, o n December 19,1995, and was
meant to complete this task two weeks later. In districts where no
problems rose, registration was indeed completed by the target
date, but this was not the case in Jerusalem, H e b r o n , K h a n Y u n i s ,
and Gaza C i t y , so i n these locations the deadline was put off for
another week. In total, there were 676 candidates for 88 seats.
These included 76 official Fatah candidates and about 50 w h o ran
on the slates o f other parties and organizations. In Jerusalem the
declared Fatah candidates were 7.6 per cent of the total number o f
candidates; opponents o f the O s l o accords were 7.4 per cent; and
Islamic independents were 3.7 per cent. T h e great majority (81.3
per cent) were independent candidates, similar to the percentage
of independent candidates o n the national level, 82.6 per cent
( U k a l & al-Surani, 19 Jan. 1996). Fatah was the largest o f the

parties that competed i n the elections, followed by the People's

Party, w h i c h ran 25 candidates. T h e great majority o f the candi-
dates, however - 550 o f them - defined themselves as independ-
ents. These included 23 w o m e n , 300-350 Fatah members w h o
ran w i t h o u t the support o f their party, and some 200 independ-
ents w h o either d i d not belong to a political organization, or
whose political organization had forbidden them to run. Finally,
there were 15 candidates identified w i t h extremist Islamic organi-
zations w h o decided to participate i n the elections despite the veto
imposed by their factions (Shikaki, 1996: 34-7).
The n u m b e r o f candidates i n each district, i n relation to the
n u m b e r o f seats apportioned to it, provides a picture of the level o f
competition. In Jerusalem there were 7.4 candidates per seat, as
opposed to 8.6 nationwide ( G a n i m , 1996: 11), that is, there was a
bit less competition i n Jerusalem than there was nationally, but
not m u c h less. It should be recalled that the campaign was a short
one, and this also moderated competition and rivalry.
The candidates invested about $2.5 m i l l i o n i n their campaigns.
A b o u t 90 per cent of the candidates were members of the middle
class (college-educated technocrats and professionals), or former
blue-collar workers w h o had risen into the upper economic class.
These two groups make up, however, only about five per cent o f
the Palestinian population i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. T h e
lower classes were not represented among the candidates i n n u m -
bers anywhere near their proportion i n the population. In the
Jerusalem district they were only 6.7 per cent of the candidates. In
comparison w i t h other districts, this was l o w - i n the N o r t h e r n
Gaza Strip they were 10.4 per cent o f the candidates, i n N a b l u s
12.9 per cent, in Jericho 16.6 per cent, and i n Ramallah 9 per cent.
Jerusalem had, however, a higher percentage o f lower-class candi-
dates than d i d H e b r o n (4 per cent) and K h a n Y u n i s (4.5 per cent)
( U k a l & al-Surani, 19 Jan. 1996).
O n l y 359 candidates (55 per cent) placed advertisements i n the
daily newspapers as part of their campaigns. Sixty per cent of these
did so once or twice; only 40 per cent published three or more
advertisements. These were the candidates w h o had financial sup-
port from their movements (Fatah gave each o f its candidates
$10,000 i n campaign funds) ( H i l a l , 1997: 118), or had the inde-
pendent financial means to pay for advertisements. T h e use of the
newspapers was influenced by the candidates' level o f education

and their target audience. In Jerusalem independent candidates

H a n a n Ashrawi, Jonathan Kutab, and H a n a Sinyora stood out.
T h e y were v y i n g for the Christian seats and targeted the educated
population. T h e fact that a relatively large number of Jerusalem
candidates used the daily press as a campaign forum is an indica-
tion o f the economic and educational level o f the candidates and
their target population. In Jerusalem, 41 out o f 5 4 (77 per cent) o f
the candidates used the press, i n contrast w i t h other districts, i n
w h i c h the candidates preferred to contact the voting public face to
face, i n small gatherings over coffee and to print their o w n c a m -
paign material. In Jerusalem candidates were forbidden to h o l d
outdoor election rallies, but even i n other places rallies were not
used to reach the voters. Candidates and voters preferred personal
contact to mass gatherings ( A l - N a s W a - l - I n t i h a b a t , A l - Q u d s , 20
Jan. 1996). Except for a few incidents i n w h i c h the Israel police
prevented H a n a n Ashrawi from conducting prohibited outdoor
campaign rallies, there were no confrontations between the candi-
dates and Israeli security forces. Ashrawi had wanted to make use
of the Israel police i n order to reinforce her image as a fighter for
Palestinian rights, but she d i d not succeed, and the several i n c i -
dents she arranged had little effect. T h e voters d i d not want to
shout, demonstrate, or confront the Israeli authorities, but rather
to talk to the candidates and hear what they had to say. After doing
so and hearing the high-sounding nationalist declarations they
expected to hear, the voters wanted to be given solutions to their
day-to-day problems and to k n o w more about the elections and
how to vote ( H a ' a r e t z , 14Jan. 1996,18Jan. 1996; N i r , 15Jan. 1996).
T h e negotiations about the elections began i n M a y 1995, and
the detailed talks about the arrangements i n Jerusalem were c o n -
ducted from September 1995 onward. In M a y it was agreed that
the Palestinians w o u l d be allowed to conduct a census of voters i n
Jerusalem, under the rubric of a "population and housing survey."
T h e debate focused on the question of where the polling stations
w o u l d be located - at the city limits, i n U N facilities, or i n
churches and mosques. A t this point Israel opposed having polling
stations i n the city, and also opposed allowing the city's inhabit-
ants to be elected to the Palestinian Authority's Legislative C o u n -
cil. In June 1995 it was agreed that the polling stations w o u l d be
placed o n the municipal boundaries and that the right to be a can-
didate w o u l d be granted only to people w i t h a double address, one

in Jerusalem and one outside it ( H a ' a r e t z , 9 M a y 1995, 7 J u l y 1995,

20 J u l y 1995, 8 Aug. 1995, 19 Sept. 1995). Agreement o n the con-
duct of the elections i n East Jerusalem was achieved i n September
1995, two months before the agreement o n the Israeli redeploy-
ment i n H e b r o n . In other words, the compromise o n Jerusalem
was easier than the compromise o n the Jewish settlement i n
Hebron.
Initially, the Palestinians wanted the post offices i n East Jerusa-
lem to serve as fully-fledged polling stations. In the w o r k i n g paper
they submitted at the beginning o f the talks they demanded that
the voting procedures at these stations be the same as at all other
stations, w i t h the exception that there w o u l d be no redeployment
of Israeli forces. T h e y therefore demanded that the preparations
for the elections - registration of candidates and voters, campaign-
ing, the opening o f an office o f the Central Elections C o m m i s -
sion, security for polling places and international oversight o f the
elections - take place in Jerusalem just as they were to take place i n
the rest o f the 1967 territories ( A l - Q u d s , 20 M a y 1995). Israel
rejected the Palestinian position o n the grounds that the voting i n
Jerusalem was being done by mail, and that every detail o f the
voting procedures had to be i n keeping w i t h that definition. Israel
wanted the mail services to function as usual, w i t h the vote being
only a part o f those services; the Palestinians demanded that
normal post office services be suspended while the vote was taking
place; Israel opposed this. Israel demanded that the ballots be
placed i n double envelopes that w o u l d be sent as pieces o f mail
rather than inserted into a ballot box; the Palestinians, o f course,
opposed this. T h e n there was the question of who w o u l d transfer
the ballot boxes for counting outside the city - the staff o f the
Central Elections C o m m i s s i o n , as the Palestinians demanded, or
post office workers, as Israel demanded? T h e dispute extended
even to the design o f the ballot boxes - Israel demanded that the
slit be o n the side o f the box, as i n mail boxes. T h e Palestinians
demanded that the slit be i n the middle of the top of the box, as is
customary w i t h ballot boxes. There was even a semantic problem
- w h a t w o u l d the boxes be called i n the agreement: ballot boxes or
mail boxes? a
A l l these issues were resolved through mutual concessions and
compromises. A c c o r d i n g to the O s l o II agreement o f September
1995, w h i c h laid out the procedures for Israeli troop

A n East.Jerusalem Political Profile 231
redeployments and the Palestinian elections, not all inhabitants o f

East Jerusalem w o u l d vote i n the five post offices: the central post
office on Salah a l - D i n Street, the Jaffa Gate post office, the post
offices«in Sho'afat and Bait H a n i n a i n the northern part o f the
city, and the M o u n t o f Olives post office i n the east. T h e number
of voters assigned to these post offices w o u l d be limited i n accor-
dance w i t h their capacities. Each voter w o u l d receive, from the
Central Election C o m m i s s i o n , notification o f where he w o u l d
vote. U p o n arriving, the voter w o u l d be asked to identify h i m s e l f
to a post office worker and present his voting certificate. O n l y this,
rather than an Israeli identification card, w o u l d be used for identi-
fication, as i n the rest o f the territories. Elsewhere, however, the
elections were conducted by people appointed for that purpose,
while i n Jerusalem post office workers performed this task. Post
office employees w o u l d hand the voters the ballots and envelopes,
w o u l d receive the sealed envelopes i n return, and insert them into
the ballot boxes. T h e compromise found for the design o f the
boxes was that the slit was placed at one of the edges o f the top o f
the box. T h i s way it d i d not make it too m u c h like a ballot box for
the Israelis and not too m u c h like a mail box for the Palestinians.
As for the terminology, the two sides agreed to use the neutral
term "receptacles," although the voting documents w o u l d be
called "ballots." Likewise, the post office staff w o u l d be responsi-
ble for transferring the sealed ballot boxes to Palestinian officials
outside the city for counting. A c c o r d i n g to the agreement, the
international observers w h o were to oversee the elections w o u l d
be allowed to function i n East Jerusalem as w e l l . T h e Palestinians
saw this as an achievement that, to a certain extent, put the elec-
tions i n East Jerusalem under international supervision and out-
side the range o f Israeli law, but Israel claimed that the observers
were meant to ensure a fair election and d i d not symbolize the end
of Israel's annexation ( H a ' a r e t z , 1 6 J u l y 1995, 4 Sept. 1995, 5 Jan.
1996, 15 Jan. 1996; State o f Israel, 1995: 119-20).
A c c o r d i n g to the O s l o agreement, public election campaigning
in Jerusalem was restricted. A t a cost, posters could be pasted up
only on 35 billboards that the Jerusalem municipality erected for
this purpose i n central locations. T h e candidates w h o wished to
use the billboards had to apply to the Central Elections C o m m i s -
sion, w h i c h i n turn applied to the Israeli-Palestinian C o m m i t t e e
on C i v i l i a n Affairs, a committee set up i n 1993 i n the wake o f the

O s l o agreement. T h i s cumbersome procedure was meant to pro-

vide an indirect way for Palestinians to receive a permit from the
Jerusalem municipality for the use of the billboards. Israel viewed
this procedure as recognition o f its sovereignty i n East Jerusalem
because the permit was issued by the Israeli municipality, while i n
the Palestinian v i e w they were applying to a special body o f their
own that dealt w i t h the elections, rather than to the Jerusalem
municipality. T h e Central Election C o m m i s s i o n d i d not occupy
itself o n l y w i t h obtaining permits for public advertising. It also
vetted content, m a k i n g sure that there were no racist slogans or
anti-Israeli incitement. T h i s arrangement grew out of Israel's fear
that the election campaign, especially in Jerusalem's public places,
w o u l d turn into a protest against the annexation. F o r this reason it
agreed to grant the Central Elections C o m m i s s i o n the authority
to inspect campaign material. T h i s was not explicitly stated i n the
O s l o agreement, w h i c h spoke instead about examining whether
the campaign material was i n contravention o f the Palestinian
election law and the agreement. In practice not all the provisions
were observed, and many posters were pasted up o n store doors,
walks, and electric poles, and notjust o n the municipal billboards.
In no case, however, d i d the campaign material contain anti-
Israeli statements ( H a ' a r e t z , 5 Jan. 1996; State of Israel, 1995:119).
U n l i k e the rest of the electoral districts, the voter rolls in Jeru-
salem had, according to the O s l o II agreement, to receive the
approval o f the Israeli M i n i s t r y o f the Interior. T h e ministry
checked to ensure that the rolls included no Israeli citizens. Aside
from the practicality of this arrangement (which enabled the Pal-
estinians to make use o f Israeli records and the Israelis to ensure
that no Palestinians w h o were Israeli citizens voted i n the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y elections), Israel considered this a symbolic
expression of its sovereignty i n East Jerusalem, w h i l e the Palestin-
ians saw it as a technical step meant to ensure that its lists were
precise. Since the Palestinians had no population registry of their
own and had no time to conduct a population and housing census,
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y used the records and data o f Israel's
C i v i l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and M i n i s t r y o f the Interior, the Israeli
administrative organ i n the territories ( H a ' a r e t z , 1 Jan. 1996).
Employees o f the school system carried out voter registration,
and i n East Jerusalem the registration stations were manned by
teachers and students from Al-Ibrahamieh College, w h o also

A n E a s t J e r u s a l e m P o l i t i c a l Profile 233
went from door to door i n East Jerusalem's neighborhoods

( H a ' a r e t z , 22 N o v . 1995). Registration began i n m i d - N o v e m b e r
1995 and was supposed to last for two weeks. T h e number of reg-
istrants 'reached 1.01 m i l l i o n . D u r i n g the registration period
Israeli right-wing groups launched a psychological campaign
against East Jerusalem voters, pasting up notices and spreading
rumors that those w h o registered w o u l d prejudice their status as
residents o f Israel, leading to the loss of their Israeli identification
cards, social security payments, and other social benefits that resi-
dence qualified them for ( H a ' a r e t z , 7 D e c . 1995, 16 Jan. 1996).
These activities had their effect o n the Palestinians, even though
top Palestinian political figures i n Jerusalem and Gaza repeatedly
promised that nothing bad w o u l d happen to those w h o registered,
and that "registration for the elections is a national duty . . . and
counters the attempts to change the Arab-Palestinian identity o f
Jerusalem" ( H a ' a r e t z , 22 N o v . 1995).
W h e n the official deadline for registration arrived, at the begin-
ning of December 1995, it turned out that only 35,000 people had
registered i n East Jerusalem. I n H e b r o n , i n comparison, 135,000
people had registered, and i n N a b l u s 100,000. T h e Palestinians
estimated that there were 280,000 inhabitants o f the Jerusalem
district, 40 per cent o f w h o m were eligible voters - a total o f
110,000. T h e combination o f the psychological campaign and
Jerusalem's marginal position i n the Palestinian political system
had led to a l o w response. T h e l o w level o f registration was dia-
metrically opposed to the expectations o f the local Palestinian
leadership, w h i c h had hoped for 90 per cent registration. T h e
Jerusalem leadership understood that w i t h such a response the
Jerusalem district w o u l d be among the smallest, and the Palestin-
ians w o u l d lose their claim on the national identity o f East Jerusa-
lem. It was thus decided to extend the registration period i n
Jerusalem, as well as the opening hours of the registration offices,
and to launch a public relations campaign. T h e number o f regis-
trants i n the district soon grew to 80,051 (40 per cent o f them
women), approximately 65 per cent o f eligible voters. H o w e v e r ,
only 40 per cent of these were from East Jerusalem ( G a n i m , 1996:
21-4; H a ' a r e t z , 3 D e c . 1995, 4 D e c . 1995, 7 Dec. 1995; M a r k a z al-
Q u d s L i - a l - N i s a , 1996:11). T h e number of voters i n the city itself
was 32,316, making up 40.37 per cent o f the total number o f
voters i n the district ( A l - Q u d s , 23 Jan. 1996). Accordingly, each

parliamentary seat i n Jerusalem represented 27,000 residents and

11,000 eligible voters ( U k a l and al-Surani, 19 Jan. 1996).
A breakdown o f Jerusalem's voter rolls by age shows that Jeru-
salem is not m u c h different from the rest o f the territories - i n
Jerusalem, as there, half the population is under voting age, so it is
clear that the political process is relevant to only half the popula-
tion. E i g h t per cent o f the voting population was made up o f
y o u n g people between the ages o f 18-49 ( U k a l and al-Surani, 19
Jan. 1996). M o s t o f them had been b o r n after Israel occupied the
territories; none o f them had been a part o f the political process
under Jordanian rule. T e n years after the Intifada, the "children o f
the stones" had turned into voters and their commanders into
candidates. T h e only political arena they identified w i t h and con-
sidered themselves part o f was the Palestinian one.
Jerusalem's distance, as a frontier city, from the political center
was expressed i n the elections not only by the l o w level o f registra-
tion and l o w number o f participants, but also by a lack o f order,
bad organization, and no information o n the election procedures.
E v e n i n Silwan, w h i c h became part o f the front line against the
annexation i n the 1980s, w h e n Israeli settlers bought houses there
and m o v e d i n , only 40 per cent o f eligible voters registered
( C o h e n , 19 Jan. 1996). T h e elections emphasized Jerusalem's
remoteness from the political center rather than the front line o f
the confrontation w i t h Israel.
The elections
A s befits a historic event, the Palestinians turned out for the elec-
tion i n high numbers - 75.3 per cent o f those registered on the
national level. T h e turnout i n the West Bank was 69.5 per cent, i n
the Gaza Strip 86.2 per cent ( A l - Q u d s , 23 Jan. 1996; al-Shikaki,
1997: 304). It is interesting to note that there was a high turnout,
60 per cent, even among supporters o f Hamas, w h i c h was offi-
cially boycotting the elections. In contrast, however, the turnout
i n East Jerusalem was only about 30 per cent, w i t h 40.3 per cent
voting i n the Jerusalem District as a w h o l e - 32,316 voters out o f
80,051 eligible voters ( A l - Q u d s , 23 Jan, 1996; J M C C , 1996: 17;
Shikaki, 1996: 34). O f the 4,500 Palestinians eligible to vote at the
post offices i n East Jerusalem, only 500 actually voted (Kol H a - I r ,
26 Jan. 1996). A c c o r d i n g to a survey conducted on election day,
more m e n than w o m e n voted i n the Jerusalem area, presumably

because they were more w i l l i n g to confront the obstacles Israel

placed in the way of voters (as is related below). Age and education
were also linked to participation - i n Jerusalem, y o u n g educated
people were more likely to vote (Awartani, 1997: 63).
T h e Jerusalem District had the lowest voter participation by far
of all districts, the next lowest being the H e b r o n District w i t h 66.4
per cent ( G a n i m , 1996: 16-17). Jerusalem and H e b r o n are o n the
front lines o f the political confrontation w i t h Israel, and both the
elections were conducted under the presence o f Israeli forces.
Participation i n the Palestinian elections on the national level was
high compared to that i n most Western democratic regimes. It was
almost as high as the voter turnout i n the 1996 general elections i n
Israel (78 per cent), where citizens are very involved politically
and election campaigns "hot" and long. Nevertheless, the Pales-
tinian voter turnout was about 10 per cent less than what was gen-
erally seen i n the first-time democratic elections held i n Eastern
Europe i n the 1990s. It should be kept i n m i n d , however, that the
elections i n the former Soviet bloc were held after the previous
regimes collapsed, whereas i n the West B a n k and Gaza Strip the
Israeli occupation was reduced and w i t h d r a w n , but had not disap-
peared entirely.
C o n c e r n about a possible l o w voter turnout led the Palestinian
leadership i n Jerusalem to call o n the public to come to the polls
despite the psychological and physical obstacles that Israel police
placed i n their way. T h e arguments were openly nationalistic,
reminding the Palestinian public that the struggle for sovereignty
in East Jerusalem and the terms o f the permanent settlement
w o u l d be affected by the turnout and political involvement they
displayed ( H a ' a r e t z , 16 Jan. 1996, 19 Jan. 1996). Despite this, the
turnout i n Jerusalem was very l o w . Israel made it difficult for
voters to reach the polls by placing large contingents of policemen
around the five polling places i n East Jerusalem, claiming that
large forces were necessary to protect the Palestinians from right-
w i n g Israeli elements w h o were threatening to disrupt the voting.
T h e forces were m u c h larger than the threats justified, and the
policemen were overly active, setting up roadblocks and closing
off the roads around the polling stations, photographing people
who came to vote, and checking Palestinians' identification and
voting documents. A t the entry points into the city Israeli soldiers
held up buses organized by the Central Elections C o m m i s s i o n

and those organized by candidates, and also refused to allow p r i -

vate vehicles to take voters to their p o l l i n g places outside the city.
Furthermore, just before the elections, activists belonging to
Israel's right-wing L i k u d party spread false rumors and threats
about punishments that w o u l d be meted out to voters, including
the revocation o f their right to live i n the city. O n election day,
extreme right-wing Israeli activists clashed w i t h Palestinian
voters, aiming to keep turnout low. These elements believed that
a l o w turnout w o u l d serve their interests, enabling them to claim
that Jerusalem's Palestinians d i d not feel connected to the Pales-
tinian political system. These deliberate disruptions caused Israel
a loss o n the symbolic level, for they kept the post offices from
continuing to supply regular postal services d u r i n g the vote, as
Israel had originally intended ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 Jan. 1996,21 Jan. 1996;
M a r k a z a l - Q u d s L i - a l - N i s a , 1996: 8-9).
The obstacles created by Israel were not the only causes of the
low turnout. T h e organizers o f the poll themselves created tech-
nical difficulties and confusion about the polling places. T h e C e n -
tral Election C o m m i s s i o n d i d not divide the voters up among the
p o l l i n g stations i n advance and d i d not establish far i n advance
who w o u l d be allowed to vote i n the post offices and w h o w o u l d
vote outside the city limits. F o r purely technical reasons it was
impossible to have the tens of thousands o f eligible voters i n East
Jerusalem vote i n the post offices. It was obvious that only 4,500
voters w o u l d be able to vote w i t h i n the city, and that the other
28,000 w o u l d have to go to polling stations outside the city
boundaries. T h i s required good organization - notices had to be
sent out and transportation arranged. B u t it was only at a relatively
late stage, after the candidates had begun to organize transporta-
tion o f their o w n , that the Central Elections C o m m i s s i o n made
150 buses and 80 vans available to the voters ( H a ' a r e t z , 12 Jan.
1996, 14 Jan. 1996, 19 Jan. 1996; M a r k a z al-Quds L i - a l - N i s a ,
1996: 8-9; N i r , 15 Jan. 1996). Additionally, many voters d i d not
participate i n the election because o f their reservations about the
Palestinian political system, and the fact that they lived i n a fron-
tier city, relatively far from the political center.

The winners
Arafat w o n the presidential elections, receiving an official 88.1 per

cent o f the vote nationwide ( H a ' a r e t z , 21 Jan. 1996, 23 Jan. 1996),
almost the same level o f support he received in Jerusalem, where
he w o n 88.8 per cent of the vote ( J M C C , 1996: 172). T h e official
results d i d not, however, include blank ballots - ones i n w h i c h the
voter declined to choose either o f the two candidates. A c c o r d i n g
to C P R S , about 22 per cent o f the ballots were left blank, about
four per cent of them as a result of technical problems, w i t h 18 per
cent being intended as protest votes. T h u s , according to C P R S ,
Arafat was really supported by only 70 per cent of the voters, w i t h
12 per cent o f the vote going to the alternative candidate, Samiha
Khalil (Shikaki, 1996: 28).
The Legislative C o u n c i l representatives i n Jerusalem make up
7.9 per cent o f that body's membership. T h e Jerusalem district
returned four official Fatah candidates and three independents
identified w i t h the organization. T h e winners were: A b u - A l a , a
national establishment figure and member of Fatah, w h o received
18,839 votes, 58.3 per cent; D r . H a n a n Ashrawi, an independent
Christian, 17,944 votes, 55.5 per cent; A h m e d al-Batsh, a y o u n g
independent w h o had been a field commander i n northern J e r u -
salem during the Intifada, 9,846 votes, 30.4 per cent; Z i y a d A b u -
Zayad, attorney, independent, and a member of the veteran p o l i t i -
cal leadership i n Jerusalem, 8,434 votes, 26.1 per cent; K h a t i m
Abd al-Qadir Eid, 8,307 votes, 25 per cent; A h m a d H a s h i m a l -
Zughayir, 7,613 votes, 23.5 per cent; D r . E m i l Jarju'i, a Christian
pediatrician, Fatah member, and H u s s e i n i loyalist, w h o w o n
5,334 votes, 16.5 per cent ( A l - Q u d s , 23 Jan 1996; C o h e n , 26 Jan.
1996; J M C C , 1996:166). T w o w h o came close to being elected
were Z u h i r a Kamal o f F I D A , w h o had Fatah's support i n the
framework o f a deal struck between the two movements, and
Rana Nashashibi of the People's Party. O n Election day, the Fatah
campaign w o r k e d only to elect al-Zughayir and Eid.
The Fatah organization d i d not support al-Batsh despite the
fact that his age and Intifada record put h i m i n the same group as
al-Zughayir and E i d and most of the Fatah organization's appara-
tus in Jerusalem. Batsh was too independent for the machine. N o r
did it mobilize itself to support A b u - A l a , a member of the central
establishment w h o was older than most o f the activists w h o had

recently arrived from T u n i s . N e i t h e r d i d it go all out for D r .

J a r j u ' i , w h o was seen as a loyalist of the Jerusalem political estab-
lishment rather than o f the city's Fatah organization. B y m o b i l i z -
ing to elect only two candidates, the organization also took into
account the political assertiveness o f the East Jerusalem voting
public. T h e organization allowed voters to choose other candi-
dates as w e l l , thus increasing the chances for success o f its pre-
ferred candidates. T h i s consideration was proven correct by the
election results.
M o r e than elsewhere, voters i n Jerusalem d i d not vote blindly
for the Fatah slate. W h i l e the level o f support for independent
candidates in Jerusalem, 43.4 per cent, was very similar to the sup-
port that w i n n i n g independent candidates received nationally,
45.5 per cent, the support for the independents i n Jerusalem was
more notable. O n the national level, the average support per can-
didate was about 24 per cent. Notable candidates on the national
level, such as H a n a n A s h r a w i in Jerusalem, A b d al-Jawad Salah i n
Ramallah, and H a i d a r A b d al-Shafi i n Gaza were able to garner
broad support exceeding 50 per cent (Shikaki, 1996: 38). Ashrawi
received nearly as many votes in Jerusalem as the candidate for the
P L O organization, A b u - A l a , and three independent candidates
were a m o n g the seven representatives the district sent to the
Legislative C o u n c i l . It should be noted that these three received
more votes than three of the four official Fatah candidates.
O n l y one of the seven victors in Jerusalem - meaning 14.2 per
cent o f t h e m - lacked an academic degree (al-Batsh). T h e pro-
p o r t i o n o f those w i t h degrees (85.8 per cent) is similar to the
p r o p o r t i o n o f college graduates i n the Legislative C o u n c i l as a
w h o l e (82.9 per cent). W o m e n are better represented i n the J e r u -
salem delegation than o n average nationally: 14.2 per cent as
against 5.6 per cent.
M o s t members o f the Legislative C o u n c i l are experienced
politicians; b l u e - c o l l a r workers and businessmen are under-
represented. T h i s characteristic becomes sharper w h e n one looks
at the composition o f the Jerusalem delegation - only one o f the
representatives was a businessman before he was elected, and
none o f them are blue-collar workers ( J M C C , 1996: annex vi).
Fatah ran 75 candidates and 50 were elected; 11 n a t i o n a l -
independents and seven Hamas supporters w o n . Fatah's victory
was almost absolute. T h i r t e e n other organizations and political

parties ran their o w n candidates, receiving 10 per cent o f the vote,

but only two o f these parties succeeded i n getting represented i n
the Legislative C o u n c i l , one representative each: A z m i al-Shu'ybi
of F I D A ‫ ־‬i n Ramallah, and Haidar A b d al-Shafi o f the N a t i o n a l
Democratic Alliance i n Gaza (Shikaki, 1996: 37). T h e system was
skewed i n Fatah's favor; the large number and disorganization o f
the independent candidates, i n contrast w i t h the strong district
organization o f Fatah, swung the election to Fatah. W h i l e 505
independent candidates received 60 per cent o f the votes, they
received only 39.8 per cent of the seats i n the Legislative C o u n c i l .
In contrast, Fatah candidates received only 30 per cent o f the
votes, but w o n 58 per cent o f the seats ( G a n i m , 1996: 18). T h e 21
members o f Fatah w h o ran and were elected as independent can
didates should be added to the 47 victorious official Fatah candi
dates, bringing the Fatah representation i n the Legislative C o u n c i l
to 68 out o f 88, or 77.3 per cent o f the total ( H i l a l , 1997: 116).
It is important to note that family connections played no role i n
the elections. T h e attenuation o f the extended family's i m p o r
tance was predicted by pre-election polls, i n w h i c h respondents
did not cite family as one o f the factors i n their choice o f candi
dates. Furthermore, i n no insignificant n u m b e r o f cases, several
candidates from the same extended family ran against each other.
This detailed survey o f the election shows that Jerusalem dif
fered from the rest o f the Palestinian territories i n almost every
criteria - election procedures, voting arrangements, p o l l i n g
places, slates o f candidates, campaigning, the right to vote and to
be a candidate, voter registration, average campaign expenses,
voter turnout, and Israeli activity aimed at l i m i t i n g voter turnout.
It is important to note that these were not artificial differences,
even though one o f the ways i n w h i c h they were enshrined was
through negotiations w i t h Israel. Yet these negotiations d i d not
lead to results that were fundamentally different from the political
reality o f East Jerusalem. T h e aggressive actions Israel took i n
order to limit voter turnout i n East Jerusalem, it turns out, are not
what made the elections i n the city unique. Israel's unilateral
actions certainly added some special elements to the vote i n East
Jerusalem, but they were not what set these elections apart. A t
base, their effect o n the political character o f East Jerusalem was
marginal. M o r e important was a correspondence between the
political profile of East Jerusalem's Palestinians and the results o f

the negotiations w i t h Israel o n the arrangement, conduct, and par-

ticipation i n the elections. Furthermore, a comparison of the dele-
gation that East Jerusalem elected to the Legislative C o u n c i l to
those elected i n the other districts - by social background, educa-
tional level, economic status, age, affiliation, and political position
- also testifies to Jerusalem's unique place o n the Palestinian polit-
ical map. In other words, not only was the process different i n
Jerusalem, but the results were also different, i n keeping w i t h the
political profile of East Jerusalem.
Eight per cent o f the members o f the Legislative C o u n c i l are
former deportees, 59.1 per cent are original inhabitants o f the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 33 per cent are "returnees," P L O
activists w h o came to the territories i n the wake of the agreements
w i t h Israel. B u t none o f the Jerusalem representatives is a former
deportee, and only one, A b u - A l a , is a "returnee" ( J M C C , 1996:
annex v i ) . T h e election results confirmed that Jerusalem is the
political stronghold o f the leaders of the former "inside" ( J M C C ,
1996: annex vi; O d e , 1997: 122). In contrast, there is no difference
between Jerusalem and the rest of the territories w i t h regard to the
representation o f 1948 refugees. T w o o f Jerusalem's delegates
(28.6 per cent) are from families w h o became refugees i n 1948; o n
the national level 28.3 per cent are. B u t unlike some o f their c o l -
leagues from adjoining districts, the Jerusalem representatives
who come from 1948 refugee families do not live i n the refugee
camps o n Jerusalem's outskirts.
Geographically, 60.2 per cent o f the Legislative C o u n c i l ' s
members live i n the cities, 22.7 per cent i n towns and villages, and
17.0 per cent i n refugee camps. In the Jerusalem district, however,
all the representatives live i n the city ( J M C C , 1996: annex vi). In
Jerusalem the link between place o f residence and political activ-
ity, i n c l u d i n g ties to the political establishment, is stronger than
elsewhere, although it is impossible to say what came first -
whether place o f residence drew people to politics and the estab-
lishment, or whether the opposite is the case.
Before their election, five o f the seven Jerusalem representa-
tives were active o n the national level, i n tbe West Bank or i n the
P L O , and only one (Jarju'i) has no background of political .or Inti-
fada anti-Israel activity. Three o f the other six have impressive
records o f diplomatic activity (Ziyad A b u - Z a y a d , Ashrawi, and
A b u - A l a ) and three other were prominent commanders i n the

Intifada. O n the whole, the proportion of Intifada commanders i n

the Jerusalem delegation was high, 42.6 per cent ( H i l a l , 1997;
J M C C , 1996: 219-25).
Professionally, a majority of the members of the Jerusalem del-
egation are technocrat-professionals, P L O organization figures,
or Intifada activists. There are no blue-collar workers, w h i c h
make up 8 per cent o f the membership of the Legislative C o u n c i l
as a whole, and none are private-sector wage earners, although
these make up 5.8 per cent o f the Legislative C o u n c i l ' s members
(Hilal, 1997: 120). T h e Jerusalem voters placed representation o f
the West Bank's most political city into the hands o f experienced
politicians. Jerusalem stands out i n this regard i n comparison to
the national average. O n l y one of Jerusalem's representatives is
neither an experienced politician nor a member o f the political
establishment (14.2 per cent), whereas 25 per cent are politicians
on the national level ( H i l a l , 1997: 119-27). T h e political p r o m i -
nence o f the East Jerusalem delegation is expressed i n the posts
they hold i n the Legislative C o u n c i l ( A b u - A l a is the speaker) and
in each of the two compositions of the executive C o u n c i l . Hassan
Tahbub and H a n a n A s h r a w i were both members i n 1996, the
former as minister o f religious endowments and the second as
minister o f higher education, while Z i y a d A b u - Z a y a d served as
minister without portfolio i n 1998.
In terms of economic status, most of the Jerusalem representa-
tives are o f high economic position, relative to the national aver-
age. T r u e , two o f the Jerusalem representatives (28.5 per cent)
have l o w incomes (up to 600 Jordanian dinars a month), c o m -
pared to 22.4 per cent o f national representatives. T h e Jerusalem
delegation, however, has no members o f middle income (up to
1,000 dinars a month), while this group makes up 24.7 per cent o f
the Legislative C o u n c i l ' s members as a w h o l e . Five (71.4 per
cent), have high incomes (more than 1,000 dinars a month); this
group makes up 51.8 per cent o f the C o u n c i l ' s members o n the
national level (Ode, 1997: 122).
The age of the Jerusalem delegation is greater than i n the Legis-
lative C o u n c i l as a whole. In Jerusalem, 56.8 per cent o f the dele-
gation are between the ages o f 51 and 60, as compared to 30.6 per
cent on the national level. In the 41-50 age group the picture is
almost identical. In Jerusalem 43.2 per cent o f the delegation fits
into this group, as does 42.4 per cent o n the national level. T h e

Jerusalem delegation contains no y o u n g people under the age o f

40, nor does it include anyone over the age o f 60, w h e n on the
national level these figures are 17.4 per cent and 10.2 per cent
respectively ( H i l a l , 1997: 123; O d e , 1997: 164-6). In this context
it should be noted that there is a correspondence between the rep-
resentatives' ages and their previous political and organizational
positions, and that this itself corresponds to their income level.
T h e Palestinian Authority elections marked the end of a chapter
in the history o f the Palestinian national movement. U n l i k e the
general identification w i t h the P L O , w h i c h stood "outside" as an
object of identity and symbol of national aspirations, the Palestinian
public i n the West Bank and Gaza Strip organized into grassroots
political frameworks, from the neighborhoods, villages, and streets.
T h i s process accelerated during the 1980s, w h e n P L O organiza-
tions penetrated "inside" and established chapters and local focuses
of activity, women's and youth organizations, professional associa-
tions and student organizations (Hess, 1996: 57-70; Robinson,
1997). W h e n the Palestinian Authority was established "inside" i n
the middle o f 1994, it completed this process. It established repre-
sentative institutions from above and "swallowed up" local bodies.
T h e elections strengthened the status of the "returnees," the people
from "outside," and effaced the previous geographical distinction
between "outside" and "inside," w h i c h had existed since the m i d -
1970s. Prominent figures from the Palestinian establishment "out-
side" were elected w i t h broad support: Tayib A b d al-Rahim, w h o
had been secretary-general o f the P L O Executive Committee;
N a b i l Sha'ath, minister of the economy and international coopera-
tion; Abas Z a k i , one o f the top figures i n the Fatah organization
"outside;" H a k i m Bal'awi, formerly the P L O ' s ambassador to
T u n i s and one o f the chiefs o f Fatah's internal security apparatus;
U m Jihad (Intisar al-Wazir), w h o had headed Fatah's welfare insti-
tutions i n T u n i s and w h o was the w i d o w o f Abu-Jihad, w h o had
been killed by Israel commandos there; and A h m a d Q r i a ' (Abu-
Ala), Fatah's economic chief.
The c o n t o u r s of P a l e s t i n i a n p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n
There are five research approaches explaining the contours of Pal-

estinian political organization (Brynen, 1995a, 1995b). T h e first
approach believes that the Palestinian political elite is affected by

primordial ties, blood ties between members o f the extended

family ( h a m u l a ) . As we have already seen, the results o f the Pales-
tinian elections invalidate this explanation. It is true that the
h a m u l a was a decisive element i n the political map d u r i n g the B r i t -
ish Mandate period, but imthe wake of the wars o f 1948 and 1967,
and of Jordanian and Israeli rule i n the West Bank, the veteran
political and social elite that had been based o n family affiliation
was destroyed. N e w groups took their place and the political
power o f the extended family d i m i n i s h e d considerably. In addi-
tion, P L O organizations were constructed o n an entirely different
social base than the Palestinian national movement d u r i n g the
British period had been; the link to the organization, its w o r l d -
view, and its policies were more important than primordial ties
and affiliation to a given social class.
T h e second approach states that Palestinian political organiza-
tion is based o n affiliation to a counter-elite, a new social stratum
that has come out against its predecessor, the veteran elite w i t h its
high social status and its property. T h e veteran elite had c o n -
trolled the political institutions i n the major Palestinian cities
during the British Mandate period and under Jordanian and
Israeli rule. T h e new elite appeared as a result o f the processes o f
modernization and development, i n particular the acquisition o f
higher education by the middle class and the process of urbaniza-
tion. T h e Fatah leadership sprouted from this stratum d u r i n g the
late 1950s and the 1960s, and the leadership of the Intifada, w h i c h
broke out in 1987, grew up i n this same environment d u r i n g the
decade 1975-85 ( K i m m e r l i n g & M i g d a l , 1994: 205-8, 246-75;
Quandt, Jabber & Lesch, 1973; R o b i n s o n , 1997). T h i s character-
ization is correct w i t h regard to the founding fathers and the cen-
tral members o f the various component factions o f the P L O , and
valid until 1968, at w h i c h time the new elite replaced the veteran
leadership of the P L O . Furthermore, the explanation is valid w i t h
regard to infighting w i t h i n the ruling establishment elite, but is o f
doubtful value w h e n it comes to the relations o f the P L O elite
w i t h the Palestinian public. In this case the elite has g r o w n up out-
side the territory that it aims to rule and i n w h i c h it aims to estab-
lish its authority. T h e P L O "outside" was a political organization
without sovereignty and without a m o n o p o l y o n making the rules
in the region it sought to govern. In practice, it was a political
establishment without a nationwide economic and social

infrastructure. G i v e n this data, it is difficult to accept the explana-

tion that the salient element i n shaping Palestinian political and
executive institutions has been social-economic interest. T h e
elections of January 1996 also challenge this thesis, at least as a p r i -
mary explanation, since they proved that the Palestinians' socio-
political portrait is very complex, at least i n some o f the districts.
E v e n i n the Jerusalem District the local elite is not cut from a
single cloth.
The third approach suggests that the tension between "outside"
and "inside" is by far the most important factor i n the Palestinian
political map. T h e source o f this tension is, i n one version, the
tension between the traditional elite and the counter-elite, a d i v i -
sion congruent w i t h the split between the leadership "inside" and
the P L O establishment "outside" (Robinson, 1997); i n a different
version, the source is the difference i n geographical location.
These two groups are geographically distinct and wage a struggle
for political control and social authority. A s we have seen above,
the elections blurred the difference between the two leadership
groups. A s has been proven i n the previous chapters, the elections
brought to its conclusion a process that began a long time previ-
ously. A s early as the late 1970s the left-wing factions i n the P L O
began operating o n the civilian level i n the West B a n k and Gaza
Strip as a way of gaining a political and social foothold. T h e P L O ' s
evacuation o f Lebanon i n 1982 and the enforced transfer o f its
political headquarters to T u n i s motivated the P L O to use the 1967
territories as its rear and major stronghold. T h e Intifada did not
break out i n a v a c u u m i n 1987, and it was institutionalized and
directed into political and diplomatic channels by the P L O i n
T u n i s . T h i s process strengthened the seniority of the P L O estab-
lishment "outside," w h i c h , little by little, also became an organiza-
tion w i t h a f i r m hold "inside" (Klein, 1997). Again, the 1996
elections erased the final traces o f the difference between "out-
side" and "inside."
T h e fourth approach argues that the organizing principle o f
Palestinian politics is neo-patrimonialism. T h i s refers to a kind o f
m o d e r n paternal authority that expands o n the rule of the h a m u l a
chief in traditional Arab society. A s a result of modernization, this
authority has been transferred from the extended family or tribe
to the political-institutional realm. T h e system is headed by a
father figure whose authority is sanctioned by political structures

and bureaucratic institutions. Additionally, the leader reinforces

his strength through patronage. H e grants his protection to his
political "clients," so b u y i n g their loyalty. O n the political level
the entire system is characterized by a series o f patron-client,
c o m m a n d - c o m p l y relations. T h e authority of those on the lower
rungs o f the ladder is drawn from and depends o n the authority
and power o f the patrons above them, up to the leader himself.
T h e advocates of this explanation do not restrict it to the Palestin-
ians alone, but claim that it is typical o f the entire Arab p o l i t i c a l -
social system (Sharabi, 1988). Even, however, if there are political
systems i n the Arab w o r l d for w h i c h this explanation is valid and
useful, there w o u l d seem to be some serious questions about
whether it is fully appropriate to the Palestinian case. T h e Pales-
tinian political system, and specifically the P L O and Fatah sys-
tems, are characterized by a well-developed culture o f debate. T h e
P L O has, since it was founded, conducted many lengthy discus-
sions and its leaders have developed a politics of consensus, not a
politics o f decision-making, as w o u l d be the case i n the depend-
ent, hierarchical system described by this theory. I n the frame-
w o r k o f these discussions, Arafat's subordinates have frequently
differed w i t h h i m , criticized h i m , and even interrupted h i m
(Rubinstein, 1995). As we have already seen, i n the 1996 elections
the father-leader had a hard time controlling his sons, and many
Fatah partisans ran as independents. I f there was ever a n e o -
patrimonial Palestinian system, it collapsed on the eve o f the
elections.
T h e fifth approach is the organizational approach. Its support-
ers argue that the Palestinian political system is an organizational
one, and that this determines membership i n the political and
organizational elite. T h i s approach also has two different explana-
tions: one argues that the organizations differ from one another
on the basis o f their orientation to one or another o f the Arab
countries or superpowers. It w o u l d seem, however, that the
P L O ' s increasing strength as an independent organization, whose
determining orientation is towards the Palestinians, and the fact
that it has set as its goal the establishment of an independent Pales-
tinian state, disproves this explanation w i t h regard to the largest
and most important P L O organizations. T h e abortive 1982-3
pro-Syrian rebellion i n Fatah and i n the P L O led by A b u - M u s a ,
removed the pro-Syrian P L O factions from the organization and

marginalized them. T h e collapse o f the Soviet bloc destroyed the

w o r l d o f the leftist Palestinian factions, w h o watched anxiously
and incredulously as Hamas became firmly rooted i n Palestinian
society. T h e second explanation emphasizes organizational affilia-
tion i n the Palestinian arena. Since the P L O turned, i n 1968, into a
coalition of organizations, the organizational principle d i d indeed
turn into the key according to w h i c h representational quotas, jobs,
and budgets were handed out. B u t this explanation is not suffi-
cient, because i n most political debates the dividing lines were not
just between organizations, but were also conducted w i t h i n Fatah
itself, especially since the organization stepped up its diplomatic
efforts i n the decade beginning i n 1983. Furthermore, as the
major organization, Fatah, grew stronger and the infrastructure it
established for a Palestinian state broadened, so Fatah became the
r u l i n g establishment. Aside from the other changes, the establish-
ment o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y created a fundamental change
in the P L O ' s political contours. T h i s requires a new explanation
that w i l l take the nature o f this change into account.
A l l this indicates that the principal contours o f the Palestinian
political establishment are no longer inter-organizational, Fatah
versus the P L O ' s small factions, but are rather o f those inside the
establishment and those outside it. It is not official membership i n
Fatah that counts, but rather affiliation to the ruling establishment
or standing independent of it. Moreover, location on the establish-
ment ladder is also a decisive element because a high position
increases the control o f material resources and enlarges effective
authority. T h e obvious conclusion is thus that power struggles i n
the Palestinian political system are conducted between different
branches o f the ruling establishment, w i t h each branch seeking to
increase its power, or between the holders of power and the seekers
of power knocking at the gates of the political system (Klein, 1997).
T h e elections o f 1996 were an important milestone i n the
politicization o f the P L O and o f turning it from an organization
focused on armed struggle into a "normal" political establishment.

7
c
ISRAELI P O L I C Y I N EAST J E R U S A L E M
Keeping Palestinians i n line
T h e O s l o II agreements, signed in June 1994, established the P a l -

estinian Authority, an autonomous regime w i t h full powers over
areas designated as Z o n e A (mostly Palestinian urban centers) and
civil, but not security, powers over areas designated as Z o n e B .
T h e agreements explicitly excluded it from having any authority
or right to act i n East Jerusalem. N e i t h e r the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
administration nor any o f its agencies was to operate there. T o
ensure compliance w i t h these previsions, the Israeli M i n i s t r y o f
Justice drafted legislation enabling Israel to close Palestinian insti-
tutions operating i n East Jerusalem i n contravention o f the agree-
ment. T h e law was passed by the Knesset on December 26, 1994
( L a w s of t h e State of Israel 1497, 28 D e c . 1994; H a ' a r e t z , 15 June
1994, 26 June 1994, 13 J u l y 1994).
Since independent Palestinian political and public affairs activi-
ties were permitted i n East Jerusalem so long as they were not
connected w i t h the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli security
establishment formulated criteria defining what Palestinian oper-
ations i n East Jerusalem were forbidden and what were permitted.
Prohibited activity included the k i n d typically carried out by a
government ministry, operations funded by and bureaucratically
subordinate to the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and the operation o f
offices that associated themselves w i t h the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
in a symbolic way (such as by using a logo containing symbols or
elements used by the Palestinian Authority, or by giving their
senior officials titles that indicated a connection to the Palestinian
Authority) (Shragai, 9 J u l y 1996).
247

Israel took action along several lines. T h e first was closing i n on

the Preventative Security Service, w h i c h had turned the larger
Jerusalem metropolitan area into a staging ground for operations
in East Jerusalem. Its m e n collected protection money from
storeowners, s u m m o n e d suspects to interrogations i n A b u - D i s
and Anata, bought land i n East Jerusalem to counter land pur-
chases by Israel, resolved civil disputes, and fought the drug trade.
W h i l e the Palestinian policemen d i d not carry weapons, they were
effective because they acted i n the name of the security system. It
was precisely this that roused the Israel police and the Jerusalem
municipality against them ( H a ' a r e t z , 21 J u l y 1995; 8 M a y 1996). In
September 1994 the Israeli government ordered that Jibril
Rajoub's Preventative Security Service operations i n East Jerusa-
lem be halted. B y the beginning o f 1995 the Israel police had dealt
w i t h 23 incidents involving Palestinian security agents, arresting
22 suspects, of w h o m 13 were brought to trial ( H a ' a r e t z , 20 Sept.
1995). Israel d i d not succeed, however, i n hampering the Palestin-
ian force's operations.
T h e L i k u d government that came to power i n 1996 decided to
fight the presence o f Rajoub's agents by establishing new police
stations i n Arab neighborhoods and manning them w i t b 400
policemen w h o w o u l d be assigned "to enforce Israeli sovereignty
in East Jerusalem" ( H a ' a r e t z , 3 June 1997). However, budgetary
difficulties prevented the implementation o f this decision (Kol
H a - I r , 9 M a y 1997, 15 A u g . 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 3 June 1997, 5 June
1997). A t the beginning o f 1998 the police force tried to overcome
these difficulties by reorganizing its manpower, m o v i n g police-
men's residences to the O l d C i t y , and by installing close-circuit
televisions for surveillance o n the central roads i n the O l d C i t y
( H a ' a r e t z , 24 June 1998; K o l H a - I r , 30 Jan. 1998). However, Israel
had but a limited capability to restrict the Palestinian force's room
for maneuver, for two reasons. First, the Palestinian security sys-
tems camouflage their activities. T h e y use some 100 apartments
lying outside the city limits as bases for operations i n the city, as
interrogation rooms, and as headquarters ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 Sept. 1996,1
Aug. 1997). Second, the Palestinian population i n Jerusalem
grants these agents legitimacy and authority that it does not grant
to the Israel police. So, i n fact, Israel took action only i n excep-
tional cases, such as the abduction of an Israeli Arab citizen i n East
Jerusalem by Rajoub's agents ( H a ' a r e t z , 21 J u l y 1996).

I s r a e l i P o l i c y i n East J e r u s a l e m 249
T h e second line o f action was launched i n mid-1994, w h e n

Rabin decided to prevent the establishment of new political insti-
tutions i n East Jerusalem and to restrict the activity of the existing
institutions to their range o f activities before the signing o f the
Declaration o f Principles i w i t h the Palestinians. A c c o r d i n g to
Israel's security agencies, at that time there were 13 Palestinian
national or governmental institutions operating i n East Jerusalem
( H a ' a r e t z , 10 Feb. 1995). H o w e v e r , according to a report by the
Peace Watch organization, there were only seven institutions w i t h
clear links to the Palestinian Authority, and two more whose l i n k
to the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was doubtful (Peace Watch, 1995).
T h e Israeli government took action against only a few o f these
institutions. T h i s generally involved collecting evidence and pre-
senting it to the officials o f the institution that was slated for clo-
sure. T h e y were then allowed to respond. T h e Palestinian side
was presented w i t h the choice of severing all links w i t h the Pales-
tinian Authority, as was done i n August 1995 by the Palestinian
C o u n c i l on H e a l t h and the Palestinian Broadcast C o r p o r a t i o n
( H a ' a r e t z , 18 A u g . 1995, 28 A u g . 1995, 3 Sept. 1995, 14 M a r c h
1997), as well as the National Institutions Office, the N a t i o n a l
Islamic C o m m i t t e e for the Struggle against Settlements, the P a l -
estinian Institute for the W o u n d e d ; and the Jerusalem Association
for Welfare and Development, all o n M a r c h 4 ( H a ' a r e t z , 12 Feb.
1997, 14 Feb. 1997, 18 Feb. 1997, 20 Feb. 1997, 23 Feb. 1997, 5
M a r c h 1997, 6 M a r c h 1997, 11 M a r c h 1997, 14 M a r c h 1997, 26
M a r c h 1997). Another option was to move the institutions to a
location outside the municipal border, as was done i n mid-1994
by the Palestinian Central Bureau o f Statistics, the H o u s i n g
C o u n c i l ( H a ' a r e t z , 1 June 1994, 8 June 1994), and P E D C A R (Pal-
estinian E c o n o m i c C o u n c i l for Development and Reconstruc-
tion) - an organization that coordinates planning and oversight o f
economic and social projects i n the Palestinian Authority, as w e l l
as infrastructure reconstruction. P E D C A R ' s headquarters were
transferred to the al-Ram neighborhood, just a few meters outside
the Jerusalem city limits. U n d e r Israeli pressure the w o r d "Jerusa-
lem" was also eliminated from the organization's logo ( H a ' a r e t z ,
31 M a y 1994; Peace Watch, 1995: 23-4). T h e Jerusalem branches
of the Palestinian Prisoner's C l u b and the office o f the deputy
minister for Christian affairs were closed i n A p r i l 1999 ( H a ' a r e t z , 9
A p r i l 1999; 14 A p r i l 1999).

Israel's activities against the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y institutions

i n East Jerusalem were affected first by its ability to prove its
claims i n court. Second, the government had to take other factors
into account, such as whether it w o u l d be able to shut d o w n
offices and institutions w i t h o u t rousing Palestinian or interna-
tional ire. These considerations prompted Israel not to take action
against the mufti o f Jerusalem and the Waqf, even though there
was sufficient evidence against their operations i n East Jerusalem.
Israel d i d not want to ignite a religious conflagration whose out-
come was impossible to predict. T h i r d , Israel could shut d o w n
Palestinian offices, but it was very difficult to prevent activity by
Palestinian Authority institutions that sent personnel into Jerusa-
lem w i t h o u t having a bureaucratic base o f operations i n the city. A
financial pipeline connects the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y w i t h al-
Maqasid H o s p i t a l and the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y participates i n
determining policy i n the areas o f welfare, health, housing, tour-
ism, b u i l d i n g and neighborhood reconstruction, transportation,
management o f holy places, and the school system ( H a ' a r e t z , 24
M a r c h 1999). F o u r t h , Israel cannot efficiently control entry into
the city. T r u e , at the end o f 1995 the Israel police prevented the
Palestinian minister o f education, Yasir A m a r , and the deputy
minister for planning and international cooperation, D r . Anis al-
Q a q (a resident o f Jerusalem) from participating i n a conference
held at the al-Hakawati Theater to mark Palestinian Teachers'
Day ( H a ' a r e t z , 15 D e c . 1995). O n four occasions during the first
half o f 1996, Israel also prevented Palestinian A u t h o r i t y officials
from participating i n conferences held by non-governmental Pales-
tinian institutions ( H a ' a r e t z , 7 M a r c h 1996, 3 A p r i l 1996). In the
summer o f 1997 Israel went so far as to prevent the appearance of a
ballet company from C h i l e at al-Hakawati on the grounds that the
event, as publicized i n the Palestinian press, was under the sponsor-
ship o f the Palestinian M i n i s t r y o f Information as part o f tbe c o m -
pany's tour i n Palestinian Authority cities ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 Aug. 1997).
But the Palestinian Authority's minister for Jerusalem Affairs,
Z i y a d Abu-Zayad, regularly entered the city, even w h e n the Israel
government revoked his entry permit between M a r c h and August
1999, and the minister o f tourism and archaeology and the minister
o f labor and welfare has held business meetings w i t h local bodies
operating i n their areas o f responsibility ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a r c h 1999;
18 A p r i l 1999; 1 A u g . 1999; 5 N o v . 1999).

Israeli Policy in EastJerusalem 251
T h e most prominent Palestinian institution i n East Jerusalem

is Orient House. In the period between the talks about going to
M a d r i d and the signing o f the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration o f
Principles (1991-3), Israel did not prevent foreign diplomatic del-
egations from visiting O r i e n t H o u s e . T h e Israeli government
hoped that these visits w o u l d encourage the local Palestinian lead-
ership to present itself as an alternative to the P L O ( M u s a l l a m ,
1996: 60). After Jerusalem was excluded from the territory o f the
Palestinian Authority, the diplomatic visits to O r i e n t H o u s e
began to disturb Israel, whereas the Palestinians d i d not want to
give up the diplomatic gain that these visits constituted. F r o m
September 1993 to M a r c h 1995, at least 47 diplomatic meetings
took place at O r i e n t H o u s e . D u r i n g this period issues relating to
the Palestinian autonomous regime were conducted and aid and
cooperation agreements were signed ( H a ' a r e t z , 13 J u l y 1994;
Peace Watch, 1995). F r o m the signing o f the C a i r o agreements i n
M a y 1994 through to the summer o f 1999, representatives o f 29
countries visited O r i e n t H o u s e at some 50 diplomatic meetings.
These representatives included one prime minister, two deputy
prime ministers, five foreign ministers, two deputy foreign m i n i s -
ters, nine other ministers, and a large number o f ambassadors and
consuls ( H a ' a r e t z , 15 A u g . 1995). Since the establishment o f the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y i n mid-1994, the diplomatic meetings at
Orient H o u s e have become symbolic ceremonies or have been
given a local character, as opposed to the meetings that are devoted
to national issues, w h i c h are conducted i n Gaza.
In June 1995 the deputy prime minister o f Sweden stormed
home from Israel i n anger after not being allowed to make an offi-
cial visit to O r i e n t H o u s e , and the Irish foreign minister
demanded to visit the institution the following August. Rabin
responded by declaring, "I w i l l not station policemen to prevent a
foreign minister's visit [to O r i e n t H o u s e ] . " H o w e v e r , Rabin
added, "We have determined for ourselves that we w i l l not accept
personal meetings higher than the ministerial level i f [the visitor]
visits O r i e n t H o u s e " ( H a ' a r e t z , 1 N o v . 1995). T h e L a b o r - M e r e t z
government decided that visits by ministers to O r i e n t H o u s e
w o u l d have to be on a private basis, and that the guests w o u l d have
to declare this publicly. T h e foreign minister o f Ireland and the
British minister o f housing conformed to this requirement i n
August 1995, as d i d the F r e n c h foreign minister i n December

1995 { H a ' a r e t z , 19 June 1995,15 Aug. 1995,29 O c t . 1995,24 D e c .

1995, 29 D e c . 1995). T h i s arrangement continued under the
Netanyahu government. In January 1997, the Belgian secretary o f
state for international cooperation visited O r i e n t H o u s e while his
foreign minister met w i t h a Palestinian delegation at the American
C o l o n y H o t e l , next door to O r i e n t H o u s e ( H a ' a r e t z , 28 Jan 1997).
A n d i n January 1999 the Greek deputy foreign minister paid an
official visit to O r i e n t H o u s e .
W i t h the approach o f Israeli elections i n 1999, the L i k u d gov-
ernment issued closure orders to three offices operating i n Orient
H o u s e : Husseini's office, the International Affairs Department,
and the M a p p i n g and Geographical Department. (Israel had no
legal foundation for closing the entire building, as the govern-
ment w o u l d have preferred.) Israel made this move after Husseini
and three Legislative C o u n c i l members met at O r i e n t H o u s e w i t h
30 foreign consuls and diplomatic representatives i n a counter-
event to Israel's Independence Day. T h i s meeting was held after
the director-general of the Israeli Foreign M i n i s t r y had written to
the foreign diplomatic corps i n Israel requesting that they not
attend diplomatic briefings i n O r i e n t H o u s e because this was i n
violation o f the O s l o accords and constituted intervention i n the
Israeli election campaign. In response, the European U n i o n sent
an official letter to Israel stating that the E U ' s member states reaf-
firmed Jerusalem's status as a corpus s e p a r a t u m i n accordance w i t h
the U N resolution of 29 N o v e m b e r 1947. A c c o r d i n g to this deci-
sion, the city was to be administered by a special international
regime r u n by the U N . T h e European countries d i d not simply
send the letter, w h i c h itself was a slap i n the face for Israeli
policy, but also permitted their representatives to participate i n
the O r i e n t H o u s e event. T h e Israeli government's capacity to
absorb such blows o n the eve o f the elections was exhausted and
the closure orders were delivered to an O r i e n t H o u s e represen-
tative, despite warnings f r o m Israeli defense figures that carrying
t h e m out was liable to lead to bloodshed ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a r c h
1999, 11 M a r c h 1999, 15 M a r c h 1999, 27 A p r i l 1999, 10 M a y
1999, 11 M a y 1999; Eldar, 11 M a r c h 1999). T h e crisis had the
potential o f b e c o m i n g international because the European c o n -
suls decided that they w o u l d appear at the b u i l d i n g i f Israel were
to try to enter by force to carry out the closure orders ( H a ' a r e t z ,
11 M a y 1999).

Israeli P o l i c y i n East J e r u s a l e m 253
Israel's minister o f internal security, Avigdor Kahalani, and

Husseini met to try to find a compromise but failed. Kahalani sug-
gested that the M a p p i n g and Geographical Department and the
International Affairs Department close their O r i e n t H o u s e offices
and be transferred to A b u - D i s , whereas Husseini's office w o u l d
continue to function normally. O r i e n t H o u s e , for its part, p r o -
posed that only certain functions of the offices be transferred out-
side Jerusalem but that the offices themselves remain open.
Furthermore, O r i e n t House's top officials w o u l d declare i n
w r i t i n g that they had no l i n k w i t h the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y .
W h i l e these discussions were i n progress it became clear that the
two national leaders were finding it difficult to accept a c o m p r o -
mise. Arafat wanted to demonstrate that he and not Faisal
H u s s e i n i was m a k i n g the decisions about Jerusalem, so he
refused to endorse the compromise proposals formulated by
O r i e n t H o u s e . In parallel, N e t a n y a h u contributed his share by
drafting the Israeli proposal i n a f o r m that invited Palestinian
rejection - he demanded that the Palestinians declare p u b l i c l y
that the offices were being transferred out o f Israel and promise
that O r i e n t House's activities w o u l d be based o n Israeli law
(Benziman, 14 M a y 1999; H a ' a r e t z , 10 M a y 1999; Eldar, 10 M a y
1999, 11 M a y 1999).
T h e crisis was resolved w h e n Israel's Supreme C o u r t issued an
interim order forbidding the Israeli government to carry out the
closure orders. T h e court accepted a petition by nine Israeli intel-
lectuals w h o argued that a decision o f this type should not be
affected or motivated by electoral considerations ( H a ' a r e t z , 12
M a y 1999). W i t h the accession o f the Barak government, tacit
agreement was reached o n the continued operation o f O r i e n t
H o u s e w i t h i n the lines set by the Rabin government. Faisal
Husseini met w i t h the British foreign secretary at the A m e r i c a n
C o l o n y H o t e l i n October 1999, and w i t h the F r e n c h and D u t c h
foreign ministers i n East Jerusalem hospitals ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 N o v .
1999). O n this level, only Zimbabwe's foreign minister had the
privilege o f meeting H u s s e i n i i n O r i e n t H o u s e ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 N o v .
1999). There were, however, O r i e n t H o u s e meetings w i t h lower-
level delegations, such as members o f parliament from M o r o c c o
and Jordan (Kol H a - I r , 5 N o v . 1999). Israel and the Palestinians
walked a fine line distinguishing between diplomatic meetings
held at O r i e n t H o u s e , and those held i n neutral places such as

hospitals or i n health and welfare institutions, and between highl-

and low-level meetings.
Israel's actions regarding the Palestinian institutions in Jerusa-
lem received the Supreme C o u r t ' s approval at the end of January
1996 (Rulings, H i g h C o u r t o f Justice, 2142/95, V o l . 49, 1995:
363-5; H a ' a r e t z , 30 Jan. 1996). T h e court ruling clearly indicates
that the Israeli government had reached arrangements w i t h the
various Palestinian institutions regarding the form of their opera-
tions, i n c l u d i n g those against w h i c h evidence justifying their clo-
sure had not been obtained. These arrangements were opposed by
Jerusalem M a y o r , E h u d O l m e r t , (Rulings, H i g h C o u r t of Justice,
1995, 365). O l m e r t and the L i k u d ' s hawks made no distinction
between official operations of the Palestinian Authority and unof-
ficial operations, nor between the activity of a person i n one of the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y institutions and his activity i n a local Jerusa-
lem institution. N o r d i d they distinguish, on the one hand,
between an institution operating i n Jerusalem as an arm o f the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y or a religious or c o m m u n i t y institution that
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y had decided to recognize and, on the
other hand, an institution over w h i c h the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
exerted influence to ensure the appointment o f its o w n loyalists
to the governing board. A n example o f the first k i n d o f institu-
t i o n is a l - Q u d s U n i v e r s i t y , w h i c h operates i n East Jerusalem
under the accreditation o f the Palestinian rather than the Israeli
C o u n c i l for H i g h e r E d u c a t i o n . Examples o f the second are the
al-Maqasid and Augusta V i c t o r i a hospitals. Likewise, the hawks
made no distinction between an institution located in Jerusalem
and a body located outside the area i n w h i c h Israeli law applies,
but whose workers frequently enter Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 12 Feb.
1997, 14 Feb. 1997, 9 Sept. 1998). These arrangements indeed
blurred the boundary between local and national institutions,
and helped the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y cover its tracks i n Jerusa-
lem. W h i l e for the Israeli government the distinction between
the two, n a r r o w as it was, had political significance, it is hard to
demonstrate f r o m a legal point o f v i e w that these institutions
broke the law. T h e Israeli government d i d not seek to weed out
every single national aspect of these local bodies and people, but
rather made do w i t h granting a special, Jerusalem flavor to the
operations.

The J e r u s a l e m m u n i c i p a l i t y versus t h e Israeli government
In keeping w i t h its traditional policy, the Labor government

invested considerable resources i n what was defined as "Greater
Jerusalem" - the area stretching from north o f Ramallah to south
of the E t z i o n B l o c , and from east o f M a ' a l e h A d u m i m to west o f
Beit Shemesh (Shragai, 20 Jan. 1995). A t the end o f 1994, the gen-
eral of the Central C o m m a n d enlarged M a ' a l e h A d u m i m ' s j u r i s -
diction westward i n the direction of Jerusalem, so that legally the
two municipalities share a border. Various government forums
secretly discussed applying Israeli regulations and bylaws to this
area (Shragai, 20 Jan. 1995).
M u n i c i p a l policy changed i n N o v e m b e r 1993, w h e n the
Likud's E h u d O l m e r t defeated the Labor candidate, M a y o r T e d d y
Kollek. Instead o f a quiet, creeping annexation o f East Jerusalem
and its surroundings, O l m e r t believed that the annexation should
proceed openly and dramatically. T h e L a b o r - M e r e t z national
government wished to adjust M a y o r Kollek's classic Labor Party
policy to the new political reality created by the O s l o accords.
Olmert's goal was, however, diametrically opposed. H e viewed
the talks w i t h the Palestinians as a threat to exclusive Israeli sover-
eignty i n the city, and wished to use his authority as mayor to resist
the O s l o accords' implications for Jerusalem. T o this end he
wielded his construction and planning powers, as w e l l as the law
enforcement system i n these areas, to a twofold purpose: to d e m -
onstrate w h o was sovereign i n Jerusalem and to create cracks i n
the political structure that the O s l o agreements had established.
So long as a Labor government was i n power, O l m e r t was a b e l -
ligerent oppositionist w h o , together w i t h the leaders o f his party,
put Jerusalem at the top of the political agenda. After the change o f
government i n Israel, in M a y 1996, O l m e r t played a central role i n
the government's decision-making o n Jerusalem, even w h e n he
found himself at odds w i t h P r i m e M i n i s t e r Netanyahu. W h e n his
position was not accepted or w h e n he acted alone, he functioned
as an internal opposition ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 Jan. 1997).
In mid-1994, w h e n the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was established,
O l m e r t announced his support for the construction o f new
Jewish neighborhoods. O n e of these was located on the south side
of the city and was meant to serve as a buffer between Jerusalem
and the Palestinian cities o f Bethlehem and Bait Sahur, w h i c h
were under the full control o f the Palestinian Authority. T h e i r

purpose was to separate them from the a l - A z a r i y a - A b u - D i s

region. These Palestinian suburbs o f Jerusalem, outside the
municipal borders, were classified as Z o n e B (Map 4). In the
B e i l i n / A b u - M a z i n plan (p. 301) they were proposed as a possible
seat for the Palestinian capital. A b u - D i s n o w houses the offices o f
the Palestinian governor of the Jerusalem District, and other Pal-
estinian government offices also operate there and provide ser-
vices to other areas, i n c l u d i n g East Jerusalem. A t the beginning o f
2000, the Palestinians completed the construction of a compound
in A b u - D i s that could serve as a parliament building ( A l - A y a m , 13
Feb. 2000; H a ' a r e t z , 9 Jan. 2000). A l - A z a r i y a and A b u - D i s are
closed off o n the east by M a ' a l e h A d u m i m , w h i c h i n 1997 had
25,000 inhabitants. O n the north, the area was to be cut off,
according to plan, by three new neighborhoods: Jewish A b u - D i s ,
Sha'ar M i z r a c h , and Plan I E . In this way the principal Palestinian
region i n the Jerusalem area w o u l d become an isolated enclave,
like the small Z o n e B regions to the city's north.
Execution and planning d i d not happen fast enough to keep up
w i t h political aspirations. B y the end o f 1997 not m u c h had been
done to further these plans, despite the L i k u d ' s national victory a
year earlier. A t the beginning of January 1997, the Jerusalem city
council appropriated funds for the planning of a Jewish neighbor-
h o o d of250 apartments on 180 dunams of A b u - D i s at the edge o f
the m u n i c i p a l territory, on land that was privately owned by Jews.
T h e slow pace o f planning led the M i n i s t r y o f Agriculture to
examine the possibility o f building greenhouses on the land i n
order to establish a presence, and thus achieve at least some of the
plan's political goals ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 9 Sept. 1997; K o l H a - I r , 19 Sept.
1997). P l a n n i n g o f the neighborhood was resumed at the begin-
n i n g o f 2000, w h e n the Israeli government considered the possi-
bility of turning A b u D i s from Z o n e B to Z o n e A ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 Jan.
2000).
In contrast, the area designated for Plan I E was not owned by
Jews. T h e concept was to b u i l d 1,500 housing units (to be
expanded i n the future to 20,000 units), 3,000 hotel rooms, as well
as additional tourist attractions, o n 12,000 dunams o n and around
w h i c h live 44,000 Palestinians. T h e vacant land was the available
expansion space for the Palestinian inhabitants ( H a ' a r e t z , 18 Feb.
1997). T o advance this project, it was proposed to expand M a ' a l e h
A d u m i m ' s jurisdiction by more than 12,000 dunams ( H a ' a r e t z , 21

M a y 1998). T h e plan was approved by minister o f defense M o s h e

Arens i n M a y 1999, and M a ' a l e h A d u m i m n o w encompasses
more territory than T e l A v i v ( H a ' a r e t z , 3 M a r c h 1997, 28 M a r c h
‫׳‬1997, 2 8 M a y 1999, 30 M a y 1999).
T h e Sha'ar M i z r a c h plan-is for the construction o f 8,000 hous
ing units on a total area o f 2,400 dunams lying between F r e n c h
H i l l and Pisgat Ze'ev. It also includes commercial centers, indus
try, and public institutions (Kol H a - I r , 27 M a r c h 1998). T h e plan
was first put forward i n 1991, before the O s l o accords, but the
Labor government froze it after September 1993. O l m e r t decided
that Israel should implement it quickly and unilaterally, before a
permanent settlement on Jerusalem was reached, and this despite
the fact that it required the expropriation o f private land ( H a ' a r e t z ,
23 Jan. 1995, 7 A p r i l 1995, 4 Jan. 1996; Rubinstein, 10 Jan. 1995).
Moreover, O l m e r t demanded that the government carry o n w i t h
its traditional policy o f using administrative measures to restrict
the demographic presence o f Arabs i n Jerusalem (Benvenisti, 22
A u g . 1996; H a ' a r e t z , 6 M a y 1994,3 June 1 9 9 4 , 4 J u l y 1997; Hess, 2
July 1997; K o l H a - I r , 6 D e c . 1996). Together w i t h E l i y a h u (Eli)
Suissa, then chairman o f the District P l a n n i n g and C o n s t r u c t i o n
C o m m i s s i o n o f the M i n i s t r y o f the Interior, and from mid-1996
minister o f the interior, he launched an initiative o f demolishing
East Jerusalem buildings that had been constructed without per
mits. T h e R a b i n government, however, opposed O l m e r t ' s initia
tive ( H a ' a r e t z , 14 June 1995, 5 J u l y 1995, 23 J u l y 1995, 2 June
1997). In 1993, the Interior M i n i s t r y issued 56 demolition orders,
o f w h i c h only 48 were carried out; i n 1994 a full 65 orders were
issued but only 29 were carried out; i n 1995 the number o f orders
issued rose to 117, but only 25 were carried out; and i n 1996, a
total o f 66 orders were issued, o f w h i c h only 17 were carried out
(data supplied by Ir Shalem). Israel also demolished buildings i n
the area outside the Jerusalem m u n i c i p a l boundaries. In 1993,
47.7 per cent o f all the demolitions carried out i n the West B a n k
were i n the Jerusalem region; i n 1994 they were 34.8 per cent; i n
1995 they were 58.1 per cent, and i n 1996 they were only 23.8 per
cent (B'tselem, 1997). T h e 1996 figures can be attributed to the
Western W a l l T u n n e l incident o f September 1996, i n the wake o f
w h i c h Netanyahu refused to approve the implementation o f
dozens o f demolition orders that the Interior M i n i s t r y and

Jerusalem municipality had issued ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 9 M a y 1997,13 J u l y

1997, 16 J u l y 1997; K o l H a - I r , 28 M a r c h 1997).
T h e institution that most infuriated Israeli r i g h t - w i n g groups
was O r i e n t H o u s e . In September 1993 they began demanding
that the b u i l d i n g be shut d o w n . R a b i n refused ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 Jan
1995), but O l m e r t insisted and, i n mid-1995, i n parallel w i t h a
s i t - d o w n strike staged by Israeli r i g h t - w i n g groups opposite the
Palestinian institution, the Jerusalem municipality's Local
P l a n n i n g and C o n s t r u c t i o n C o m m i s s i o n launched procedures
aimed at shutting d o w n O r i e n t H o u s e o n the grounds that the
b u i l d i n g was zoned for use as a hotel and not as an office b u i l d -
ing, and because the staff there had declared that it did not recog-
nize the authority o f the Jerusalem m u n i c i p a l i t y and the Israeli
government ( H a ' a r e t z , 25 J u n e 1995, 30 June 1995).
O l m e r t wished to take advantage of the illegal construction that
had been carried out at O r i e n t H o u s e and use it as an excuse for
shutting d o w n the institution. H o w e v e r , the government refused
to grant O l m e r t a proxy to act i n the name o f the state. U n l i k e
O l m e r t , the minister of police, M o s h e Shahal, and the minister o f
justice, D a v i d Libai, did not want to halt O r i e n t House's public
affairs w o r k - they sought only to end its diplomatic activity. The
attorney general ruled that the mayor could take action against
b u i l d i n g violations or additions built without a permit, but had no
authority to shut d o w n an institution o n the grounds that it had
changed its use ( H a ' a r e t z , 12July 1995,24 Aug. 1995). O l m e r t was
compelled to make do w i t h a limited administrative measure. In
J u l y 1995 he served the O r i e n t H o u s e staff w i t h an order forbid-
d i n g activity i n the northern part of the building, w h i c h had been
built without a license ( H a ' a r e t z , 13 J u l y 1995). T h e O r i e n t House
staff asked to be allowed to carry out renovations, and permission
was granted. T h e municipality viewed this as an acknowledge-
ment by O r i e n t H o u s e that it was subject to Israeli law and to the
Jerusalem municipality. O r i e n t H o u s e was w i l l i n g to pay this
price i n order to continue its operations. B y doing so, it showed
the municipality's demand for a total shut-down o f the site to be
unrealistic. B u t the Israeli opposition ,did not give up, and at the
beginning o f 1996 it succeeded i n getting the Knesset to^send to
committee legislation mandating the closure o f O r i e n t House
( H a ' a r e t z , 8 M a r c h 1996).

The battle waged by the L i k u d and the Jerusalem municipality

against the Labor government had reverberations i n the U . S . as
well. T h e Republican opposition, led by Senate Majority Leader
Robert D o l e , a supporter o f a hawkish Israeli policy, came out
against the Democratic president, B i l l C l i n t o n . D o l e a n d '
Netanyahu had a close w o r k i n g relationship, just as President
C l i n t o n did w i t h K i n g H u s s e i n , President Mubarak, C h a i r m a n
Arafat, and even more so w i t h P r i m e M i n i s t e r Yitzhak Rabin.
W i t h the encouragement o f L i k u d leaders i n Israel and their sup-
porters i n the A m e r i c a n J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y , Senator D o l e i n t r o -
duced legislation declaring that Jerusalem had been Israel's capi-
tal since 1950 and that U n i t e d States policy was that the city
should remain u n d i v i d e d and that the rights o f ethnic and r e l i -
gious groups w o u l d be guaranteed w i t h i n it. T h e law stated that
the U . S . should recognize Jerusalem as the capital o f Israel and
that the A m e r i c a n embassy should be m o v e d from T e l A v i v to
Jerusalem by m i d - 1 9 9 9 , that is, by the time o f the permanent
status agreement between Israel and the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y .
Finally, the law appropriated m o n e y for this purpose
(Halberstam, 1998).
The legislative initiative was opposed by the Democratic
administration, w h i c h announced that President C l i n t o n w o u l d
veto the bill i f it d i d not include a section granting the president
the power to suspend its implementation. Administration repre-
sentatives also demanded the elimination o f the b i n d i n g target
date; the requirement to report to the H o u s e o f Representatives
on the allocation o f the necessary funds for the project and o n
progress towards its implementation; and a section that imposed
sanctions if the project d i d not progress as expected. T h e adminis-
tration, i n short, wanted declarative legislation, whereas the bill's
sponsors were aiming for operative legislation. In the end, the
only amendment made was the addition of a section that allowed
the president not to allocate funds for the embassy's move i f he
proved to Congress every six months that this was necessary to
protect the national security o f the U n i t e d States. T h e law was
passed by the H o u s e o f Representatives and the Senate o n O c t o -
ber 24,1995, and went into force o n N o v e m b e r 8,1995 (Eldar, 27
Oct. 1995; H a ' a r e t z , 26 O c t . 1995). Since then, President C l i n t o n
has suspended implementation o f the law on the grounds that it
w o u l d hinder the peace process and harm the A m e r i c a n national

interest. Even the apartment that the U . S . embassy leased i n

M a r c h 1999 i n a Jerusalem hotel for the personal use o f the
ambassador was not used for official meetings, as some members
of Congress suggested it should be ( H a ' a r e t z , 6 M a y 1999, 14 M a y
1999, 20 June 1999, 17 D e c . 1999).
J e r u s a l e m : escape hatches f r o m t h e O s l o accords
T h e government that the L i k u d established w i t h the religious par-

ties at the end o f M a y 1996 put Jerusalem at the top of the Israeli
and Palestinian agendas. A t first, the new government toyed w i t h
the idea of changing the rules of the game at the most fundamental
level. Specifically, it proposed closing the offices of the Palestinian
minister o f religious endowments, Hassan Tahboub; the holder
of the Jerusalem portfolio i n the P L O Executive Committee,
Faisal H u s s e i n i ; and o f the mufti o f Jerusalem appointed by
Arafat, S h e i k h Akaramah Sabri. Similarly, it w o u l d have revoked
Palestinian responsibility for the public education system i n the
city and closed a l - Q u d s U n i v e r s i t y ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 M a r c h 1996, 12
June 1996, 12 J u l y 1996; Rubinstein, 15 J u l y 1996).
T h e N e t a n y a h u government soon realized, however, that not
everything they had advocated f r o m the opposition benches was
actually feasible. So it initially stayed w i t h i n the lines laid d o w n
by the R a b i n and Peres governments ( H a ' a r e t z , 30 June 1996, 5
J u l y 1996; Shragai, 9 J u l y 1996), and made do w i t h taking action
against a few offices that were demonstrably linked to the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y . T h e government also demanded an end to the
preventative intelligence activity o f Rajoub's agents in Jerusalem
( H a ' a r e t z , 28 J u l y 1996, 9 Aug. 1996, 21 A u g . 1996). A s a result,
the M a p p i n g and Geographical Department returned to its o r i -
ginal location i n O r i e n t H o u s e , and the offices o f the Y o u t h and
Sport D i v i s i o n and the Vocational T r a i n i n g Institute were trans-
ferred to Ramallah ( H a ' a r e t z , 14 M a r c h 1997). T h e new govern-
ment d i d not, however, manage to halt the activity o f the
Palestinian security organizations i n Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 22
Aug. 1996).
Israel's inability to do this led to frustration, w h i c h caused
efforts to be diverted from preventative measures to increased
positive action i n the capital.

The contestfor t h e A r a b space
In contrast w i t h the policies pursued by all previous Israeli gov-

ernments, w h i c h limited themselves to b u i l d i n g j e w i s h neighbor-
hoods on the heights around East Jerusalem, at the end o f 1996
the minister o f the interior, Suissa, and M a y o r O l m e r t sought to
promote a plan to b u i l d a Jewish enclave o f 132 housing units i n
the heart o f the Arab neighborhood o f Ras a l - A m u d , i n w h i c h
some 11,000 Arabs live. A t the beginning o f the 1980s, w h i l e
Teddy K o l l e k was mayor, a smaller, 75-unit b u i l d i n g plan had
been prepared, spurring a sharp debate i n the municipality and the
government. O n e o f that plans' supporters was Suissa, w h o was
then chief o f the M i n i s t r y o f the Interior's Jerusalem district
office. O v e r a five-year period, he conditioned his approval o f a
plan for the construction o f 560 Arab housing units i n the neigh-
borhood o n approval o f the J e w i s h enclave. In M a y 1992, under
pressure from Kollek, the Jerusalem city council approved the
program, but Rabin ordered it halted. In December 1996, after the
national change o f government, the Local P l a n n i n g and C o n -
struction C o m m i t t e e i n the Jerusalem M u n i c i p a l i t y approved a
plan of double the size and sent it to E l i Suissa. T r u e , this was not
construction o n confiscated land but rather o n land owned by
Jews, but the intention and identity o f the purchasers were clear.
T h e y wanted to change the character of East Jerusalem and settle
as many Jews as possible i n the Arab neighborhoods i n order to
carry out their religious Z i o n i s t program, and i n order to frustrate
a permanent agreement that w o u l d link the East Jerusalem Arab
neighborhoods to a Palestinian state and create a Palestinian c o r r i -
dor to the T e m p l e M o u n t ( H a ' a r e t z , 23 D e c . 1996, 2 Jan. 1997;
Shragai). T h e construction plans prepared for the neighborhood
reflect this - the Jews were granted construction density o f 115
per cent, w h i l e the Arabs were granted only 50 per cent. T h e Arabs
were required to preserve a distance o f six meters between one
home and another, and were limited to two stories, w h i l e the Jews
were not restricted o n the distance between houses and were
allowed to built four stories ( H a ' a r e t z , 5 D e c . 1996; Rubinstein, 13
Dec. 1996; Shragai, 23 D e c . 1996, 1 A u g . 1997). U n d e r pressure
from Jordan and the Palestinians, i n the s u m m e r o f 1997
Netanyahu froze implementation of the program and, i n Septem-
ber 1998, even promised the U . S . i n w r i t i n g that no J e w i s h

neighborhood w o u l d rise on the site i n the near future

(Benvenisti, 12 D e c . 1996; H a ' a r e t z , 5 D e c . 1996, 26 M a y 1997, 2
Sept. 1999; K o l H a - I r , 23 M a y 1997).
For this reason the Jerusalem city council approved, on J u l y 24,
1997, implementation of the smaller plan ( H a ' a r e t z , 27 J u l y 1997).
It also permitted three families to settle o n the site i n a house pur-
chased by E r w i n M o s k o w i t z , the financial patron o f the Jewish
settler organizations i n the Arab areas of East Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z ,
15 Sept. 1997,16 Sept. 1997,17 Sept. 1997,18 Sept. 1997,19 Sept.
1997). T o O l m e r t ' s displeasure, tbe Israeli government believed
that this was not the appropriate time for the construction of a set-
tlement i n Ras a l - A m u d . T h e national government was able to
prevent construction by means o f an o p i n i o n composed by the
attorney general, w h i c h stated that, because o f the near certainty
that implementation of the project w o u l d lead to a disturbance o f
public order and endanger the public peace, the owners o f the
property s h o u l d be prevented from actualizing their rights
( H a ' a r e t z , 28 J u l y 1997, 29 Sept. 1997, 11 J u n e 1998; H a r e u v e n i
and Dayan, 1 A u g . 1997). A t Netanyahu's initiative, the settler
families were evacuated and ten people took their place "for the
purposes o f protection and upkeep o f the properties" ( H a ' a r e t z ,
19 Sept. 1997). A t the b e g i n n i n g o f February 1998 the minister
o f the interior approved, w i t h Netanyahu's support, the large
plan, and i n A u g u s t 1998 the first two families moved into the
c o m p o u n d ( H a ' a r e t z , 11 June 1998, 4 Sept. 1998). Israel's move
was made by taking advantage o f the fact that several Arab resi-
dents o f Ras a l - A m u d had petitioned the Israeli Supreme C o u r t
against the linkage between their b u i l d i n g plan and that o f the
J e w i s h settlers, and against h o l d i n g their plan hostage until the
J e w i s h plan was approved ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 Feb. 1998). E v e n before
the petition was heard, the M i n i s t r y o f the Interior announced
that it was severing the linkage, and the petition was revoked.
After this, the m i n i s t r y decided to approve the J e w i s h construc-
tion plan. Israel's move was made w h i l e the U . S . was involved i n
m a k i n g military and political preparations by the U n i t e d States
for its attack on Iraq. T h e construction w o r k began i n M a y 1999,
w i t h o u t the Labor government finding any legal means to stop it.
A t the end o f 1999, four families were l i v i n g i n the c o m p o u n d
( H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a y 1999; 6 J u l y 1999; K o l H a - I r , 5 Feb. 1999, 20
Aug. 1999).

Israel's effort to revise the municipal geography of East Jerusa-

lem was also conducted, at specific locations, by the purchase o f
individual houses i n the heart of Arab neighborhoods. In the m i d -
1980s, settler organizations began receiving control o f homes i n
Silwan and i n the M u s l i m Quarter. T h e y had the assistance o f the
government organizations that provided some $20 m i l l i o n , as well
as information and legal backing. " N o tenders were issued for
granting rights to the properties. The political level decided w h i c h
organizations [Ateret K o h a n i m and Elad, two settler groups]
w o u l d win." These deals "were planned i n advance" and the C u s -
todian of Abandoned Properties "did not apply the m i n i m a l level
of judgment required from the person h o l d i n g this position (The
K l u g m a n Report, B'tselem archive; C h e s h i n et al., 1999: 215-17;
H a ' a r e t z , 25 Sept. 1996; Rubinstein, 24 Sept. 1996). T h e rise of the
Labor Party i n 1992 led to the unofficial elimination o f govern-
ment aid to settler organizations and their straw m e n . Since then,
most purchases have been made by a private person, E r w i n
M o s k o w i t z . In this way, by June 1998, some 62 housing units had
been purchased i n the M u s l i m Quarter, i n w h i c h about 1,000
Jews lived, among them 400 yeshiva students. A t a conservative
estimate, about half o f the homes i n the M u s l i m Quarter belong
to the W a q f and are thus not for sale, so it is clear that the J e w i s h
purchasing potential is limited. Seventeen houses were purchased
in Silwan, and i n M a r c h 1997 about 100 Jews lived there, i n c l u d -
ing 30 yeshiva students. A c c o r d i n g to the settlers there, about half
the houses i n Silwan have been transferred to Jewish ownership,
but only about 30 per cent of them are occupied; occupation o f the
others has been delayed for tactical or legal reasons ( H a ' a r e t z , 21
M a r c h 1997, 11 June 1998, 27 J u l y 1998, 20 Sept. 1998). I n d i v i d -
ual houses have also been purchased i n the Christian Quarter and
in Sheikh Jarah, and a small n u m b e r o f families live there
( H a ' a r e t z , 22 M a r c h 1999; 28 A p r i l 1999, 12 J u l y 1999). F r o m the
beginning, these purchases by Jews have led to a series of legal bat-
tles between the purchasing organizations and the Palestinian
owners, and i n most o f the cases the purchasers have w o n
( H a ' a r e t z , 2 9 Sept. 1996, 27 D e c . 1996). T h e evacuation o f the
Arab tenants has produced not only legal and political questions,
but also moral dilemmas and h u m a n tragedies. T h e Jozlan family,
with 28 members, had lived i n Silwan for 32 years. T h e court
ruled i n favor o f the Jewish purchaser, the Elad organization, and

the family was required to evacuate the house so that the new
owners could take possession. T h e fact that the Jozlan family pos-
sessed an official certificate from the Jewish National F u n d testi-
fying to their having saved Jews during the 1929 riots was o f no
avail. Elad activists explained their attitude towards the Jozlans:
"The most important thing i n this place is its location and impor-
tance ... to leave and not evacuate them is to miss the most impor-
tant thing, w h i c h is that the C i t y o f D a v i d is ours" (Shragai, 27
J u l y 1998).
U n d e r Olmert's leadership, the municipality switched from
restraining settlers w h o were penetrating the M u s l i m neighbor-
hoods, as T e d d y K o l l e k advocated, to using the city's planning and
construction powers, i n coordination w i t h the national infrastruc-
ture minister, A r i e l Sharon, to assist them. Sharon had been the
driving force behind this activity d u r i n g his tenure as housing
minister i n the L i k u d government prior to 1992. In December
1996 the District P l a n n i n g and C o n s t r u c t i o n Committee
approved the b u i l d i n g o f four homes for Jews i n the Arab neigh-
b o r h o o d o f Sheikh Jarah ( H a ' a r e t z , 22 D e c . 1996), and Sharon
authorized E l a d , the organization that promoted Jewish settle-
ment i n Silwan, to plan a Jewish neighborhood o f 200 housing
units there ( H a ' a r e t z , 25 Sept. 1996; K o l H a - I r , 13 Dec. 1996). In
June 1996 the Jerusalem municipality approved the publication o f
a plan for b u i l d i n g 48 housing units for Jews i n the Arab neighbor-
h o o d A l - T u r , along w i t h the approval o f the construction o f 100
housing units for the area's Arab inhabitants. T h e city's mode o f
action was similar to that i n Ras a l - A m u d - l i n k i n g a Jewish b u i l d -
ing plan to existing Arab b u i l d i n g plans; approval o f the Arab
b u i l d i n g plan by changing the designation o f the area from
"green" to residential housing; and raising the construction den-
sity proposed to A l - T u r i n the original plan from 50 per cent to 70
per cent ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 June 1998). Finally, d u r i n g the second half
of 1998, discussion began o n the plan of the Ateret K o h a n i m orga-
nization to b u i l d 200 housing units for Jews i n the M u s l i m Q u a r -
ter, near H e r o d ' s Gate, on land that the Israel Lands
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had appropriated a year before ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 6 M a y
1998, 27 M a y 1998, 28 M a y 1998, 29 M a y 1998, 3 June 1998, 5
June 1998, 8 June 1998; K o l H a - I r , 5 June 1998).
In response, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y made several moves.
First, the local Palestinian authorities i n O r i e n t H o u s e sought to

establish bodies that w o u l d compete w i t h the Israeli organizations

and purchase Palestinian properties that were up for sale. In J u l y
1995 the establishment of a Palestinian Investment C o m p a n y was
announced, and a year later an Association for the Development
of the O l d C i t y , headed by‫־‬Faiz Daqaiq. These two organizations
did not succeed i n preventing the sale of Arab real estate to Jews.
After the failure o f attempts to establish local bodies, the local
authorities turned to wealthy Palestinians overseas. A t the end o f
M a r c h 1997, M u n i b al-Masri, A b d al-Majid, and Hasib Sabagh,
wealthy Palestinians w i t h experience i n national institutions,
established the Jerusalem F u n d for Development and Investment
w i t h initial capital o f $100 m i l l i o n . It was decided that its profits
w o u l d be assigned to fund the purchase of land and properties put
up for sale i n East Jerusalem, the goal being to prevent their sale to
Jews. T h e Palestinian H o u s i n g C o u n c i l tried to draw up a plan to
encourage Palestinian construction, and at the end o f 1996 it
adopted a proposal to provide long-range loans o n easy terms to
Palestinians w h o wished to b u i l d houses or housing projects i n
Jerusalem ( A l - Q u d s , 2 March 1998; H a ' a r e t z , 11 J u l y 1995,27 D e c .
1996,28July 1997,17 Aug. 1997; K o l H a - I r , 4 N o v . 1997). In m i d -
1997, the Islamic Development B a n k i n Saudi Arabia established a
$19 m i l l i o n fund for private construction i n Jerusalem, to be
administered by O r i e n t H o u s e ( H a ' a r e t z , 23 June 1997). A c c o r d
ing to Husseini, d u r i n g 1997 about $9 m i l l i o n o f this was allocated
in housing loans ( H a ' a r e t z , 23 June 1998). In 1999 the Palestinian
H o u s i n g C o u n c i l granted several home loans of up to $45,000 per
family for renovations (Kol H a - I r , 29 O c t . 1999). It was only at the
end o f 1997 and the beginning o f 1998 that Israeli authorities
became aware o f the Palestinians' initial successes i n real estate
purchases. Palestinian General Intelligence located potential sell
ers, Arabs and Jews, and persuaded them to sell lots in Ras a l -
A m u d , Jabel Mukabar, the O l d C i t y , Sheikh Jarah, and W a d i j o z
to representatives o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y or O r i e n t H o u s e .
In some o f these places the extent o f Palestinian purchases was
greater than those o f the Israeli settlers ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 Feb. 1998, 9
Feb. 1998; K o l H a - I r , 30 Jan. 1998; 10 D e c . 1999).
T h e competition between the Palestinians and Israel over the
purchase o f real estate i n East Jerusalem was not between two
equal sides. T h e Arab organizations and states w h o promised to
help the Palestinians i n this area talked more than they acted. F o r

example, the Jerusalem Treasury F u n d , founded by the K i n g o f

M o r o c c o in January 1995, began operating only i n A p r i l 1997, and
by December 1997 had raised only $5 m i l l i o n out of the $500 m i l -
lion that the k i n g wanted to devote to "saving Jerusalem" ( A l -
Q u d s , 3 D e c . 1997). E v e n though the pace and extent o f Israeli
purchases is not especially high, and their demographic effect
nearly nil, they have been very visible, given the Palestinian estab-
lishment's impotence i n preventing the sale o f Arab property to
Jews.
T h i s state o f affairs led the Legislative C o u n c i l to pass a law i n
M a y 1997 forbidding Palestinians to sell houses and land i n East
Jerusalem to Jews; religious leaders concurred and issued a ban
against the dealers. T h e Palestinian cabinet announced that viola-
tors of the law w o u l d receive the death penalty. It ordered General
Intelligence to block such transactions and to hunt d o w n and
punish the sellers. General Intelligence identifed 16 dealers w h o
had been active d u r i n g the five previous years. In M a y 1997 three
land dealers were murdered and about 12 arrested, w i t h the Israel
police succeeding i n preventing, at the last minute, the murder o f
another. In Israel's view, these actions infringed on its sovereignty
because the victims were residents o f East Jerusalem w h o held
Israeli identity cards and w h o had been murdered by the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y for doing business w i t h Israelis. Consequently,
Israel equipped the dealers w i t h alarms and pistols, conducted a
propaganda campaign against the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y for carry-
ing out death sentences without trial, and appealed to the U . S . to
pressure the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y to desist from this activity
immediately. T h e U . S . acceded to Israel's request on humanitar-
ian grounds, and Arafat acceded to the A m e r i c a n request out o f
political expediency ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 M a y 1997, 6 M a y 1997, 25 M a y
1997, 2 J u n e 1997, 5June 1997, 6June 1997, 8June 1997, lOJune
1997; K o l Y i s r a e l , 1 J u l y 1997).
Israel challenges the demographic balance

As has been noted, Israel was concerned about the changing
demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. Israel
estimated that between 50,000 and 80,000 o f East Jerusalem's
180,000 inhabitants had moved to the suburbs outside the Jerusa-
lem city limits, although their lives continued to be centered on
Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 6 Jan. 1997, 17 M a r c h 1997). B y law, as

upheld by the Supreme C o u r t , permanent residence status t e r m -

inates automatically i f the holder of the document remains outside
Israel for seven years, even if he makes brief visits. It is also v o i d i f
he receives a permit to reside permanently i n a foreign country, or
,
becomes a citizen there. U n l i k e Israeli citizenship, permanent
residence can be transferred from parents to offspring only under
certain restricted conditions. " M i x e d " couples - those i n w h i c h
one spouse has resident status and the other does not - must
submit requests for family unification to gain the non-resident
spouse the right to live i n East Jerusalem. Such a request must also
be submitted by residents o f East Jerusalem w h o for any reason
were not present i n the city at the time of the 1967 census. A l l this
makes it m u c h easier for the minister of the interior to revoke per-
manent resident status than to revoke citizenship (B'tselem and
Center for the Defense o f the Individual, A p r i l 1997).
U p until the beginning o f 1996 there had been only r a n d o m
action against those whose permanent resident license was no
longer valid. In 1993, resident status was revoked from 32 people;
in 1994 from 45 people; and i n 1995, from 96 people (B'tselem,
1998: 9). T h e increase i n 1995 may be attributed to the activity o f
the investigations branch o f the Social Security Institute, w h i c h
began methodically checking homes i n the Jerusalem suburbs and
recording w h o lived i n them. T h e purpose was to identify all regis-
tered residents of East Jerusalem. Since Israeli regulations d i d not
lay out what circumstances prove that a person has settled outside
Israel, the regulations were adjusted to the new policy. First, i n
December 1995 it was decided that the Jerusalem suburbs and
West Bank w o u l d be considered to be outside Israel for the pur-
pose of the invalidation of permanent resident permits. F o r Israeli
settlers, the West Bank was part of the State of Israel, but for Pales-
tinians it was considered a foreign country. Second, the term
"center o f life," mentioned i n the law, was interpreted to apply to
the past as well as to the present. If in the past the center of a Pales-
tinian's life had moved outside Jerusalem, his residence rights
were revoked even i f he had, i n the meantime, returned to live i n
the city. T h i r d , the burden o f p r o o f was transferred from the
Israeli authorities to the Arab residents. T h e y were required to
present receipts for the payment o f Jerusalem property taxes,
apartment rental contracts from their day o f marriage onward,
receipts for the payment o f electricity and water from previous

years, and p r o o f that they had medical insurance i n the city and
that their children studied i n Jerusalem schools. In the past these
demands were made only o f people w h o had sought to receive a
residence permit i n the framework of family unification, or i n the
case of registering a child o n the identity card of his Jerusalem res-
ident mother w h e n his father was not a resident o f the city. T h i s
p r o o f now became extremely difficult to provide, since the criteria
were more rigorous and more people were required to meet them.
Those w h o d i d not qualify were required to return their identity
and transit documents and to leave Jerusalem and live i n the West
B a n k ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 M a r c h 1997; B'tselem and the Center for the
Defense of the Individual, A p r i l 1997). A Palestinian whose iden-
tity card was revoked lost his right to live i n and visit Jerusalem; to
move freely w i t h i n Israel (an extremely important benefit held by
East Jerusalem residents, w h o were able to travel through and
w o r k i n Israel d u r i n g the closure that prevailed i n the West Bank
d u r i n g the 1990s, w h e n many West B a n k residents could not); to
receive welfare payments that Israel provided to residents; and the
right to register his children and spouse as residents of Jerusalem.
T h e M i n i s t r y o f the Interior took advantage o f every applica-
tion for service (birth registration, replacement o f a damaged or
lost identification card) and border crossing to examine the eligi-
bility o f the applicant for permanent resident status i n Jerusalem
according to the new criteria (B'tselem and the Center for the
Defense o f the Individual, A p r i l 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 22 Aug. 1996, 27
N o v . 1996). T h e ministry also revised its treatment of East Jerusa-
lem residents w h o held two passports; these were required to
choose between Jerusalem residency and their foreign citizenship.
Some 70 Palestinians w h o also held A m e r i c a n citizenship were
required to choose between Israeli identity cards and their A m e r i -
can passports, a move w h i c h brought an official protest from the
U . S . C o n s u l - G e n e r a l i n Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 M a r c h 1997;
Rubinstein, 23 Aug. 1996, 26 Jan. 1997, 3 Feb. 1997). Finally, the
M i n i s t r y o f the Interior also revoked most temporary Jerusalem
resident permits, including those of people whose family reunifi-
cation requests had been approved. A c c o r d i n g to the ministry, this
was done because i n the years 1974-7 it was flooded w i t h 7,202
family unification requests ( H C J 474/97; 2227/98; Algazi, 9 Sept.
1998). Instead o f supplying an Israeli identity card promptly, the
ministry began granting the documents only five years after the

request was approved. In the meantime the couple was given a

temporary permit, and once a year their eligibility for c o n t i n u i n g
to live i n Israel was re-examined (B'tselem and the Center for the
D e f e n s e ‫ ׳‬o f the Individual, A p r i l 1997).
T h e Social Security Institute operated alongside the M i n i s t r y
of the Interior i n its area of authority, and at the beginning o f 1998
transfer payments to East Jerusalem residents w h o had m o v e d to
the West B a n k were halted. In addition, in January 1998 the Israeli
press revealed that Jerusalem hospitals were requiring Palestinian
mothers to pay hospitalization costs w h e n they gave birth. Social
Security, it turned out, w o u l d not promise to cover hospitaliza
tion costs without first checking to see whether the mother or her
husband had moved outside the city. T h i s took a l o n g time, since
the Social Security office i n East Jerusalem employs o n l y five
investigators and the process is generally conducted after the
birth. In the wake of a petition to the Supreme C o u r t , Social Secu
rity restricted the application o f this practice only to mothers
whose spouses were not residents of Jerusalem (B'tselem, 1998:
22-30; H a ' a r e t z , 13Jan. 1998,1 Feb. 1998; K o l H a - I r , 9Jan. 1998).
A c c o r d i n g to the Palestinians, Israel used these measures to
confiscate some 4,000 identity cards (www.pna.net, 25 N o v .
1997). Israel reported that between 1967 and 1996 the residence
status o f 3,874 people had expired, i n c l u d i n g those w h o had
moved from Jerusalem to other countries ( H a ' a r e t z , 9 Sept. 1998).
In the period from the beginning o f 1996 to the s u m m e r o f 1999
the residence status o f another 2,711 people was revoked
( H a ' a r e t z , 16 June 1999, 21 J u l y 1999), o f w h i c h only about 200
were Jerusalem residents w h o had moved into the suburbs; most
of them lived outside the West B a n k (Kol H a - I r , 22 A u g . 1997).
Even though the information o n people w h o m Israel alleged had
left Jerusalem was gathered methodically, Israel's new policy was
not implemented i n a similar way. A c c o r d i n g to the Social Secu
rity Institute, the permanent resident permits of tens of thousands
of Arabs had expired - but these people never received notice o f
the fact. A few thousand o f them found out only w h e n they
applied to one or another government service and their I D cards
were confiscated. Others continued to hold their cards, unaware
that their status had changed (State C o n t r o l l e r , A n n u a l Report,
1996, 47:576).

In the final analysis, Israel's policy accomplished little, since it

brought about no change in Jerusalem's demographic balance. O n
the contrary, even though its implementation was spotty, the new
policy alarmed 50,000-80,000 Palestinians w h o were concerned
that they might become its victims ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 June 1997, 3 June
1997; K o l H a - I r , 6 June 1997). Between 20,000 and 30,000 resi-
dents o f the suburbs returned to live i n Jerusalem i n harsh hous-
ing conditions so as not to lose their Israeli identity cards and their
residence rights. T h e demand for housing rose and prices spiraled
upwards, housing density increased, and housing and living c o n -
ditions worsened ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 June 1997, 10 June 1997, 17 June
1998; K o l H a - I r , 22 Aug. 1998). T h e result was that at the end o f
1997 the ministry decided to slow d o w n implementation
(Rubinstein, 12 Feb. 1998), and i n October 1999 it announced
that it w o u l d no longer check to see i f a person had been absent
from Jerusalem for .seven years, o n condition that he or she d e m -
onstrated a "suitable connection" to the city ( H a ' a r e t z , 18 Oct.
1999). It is doubtful, however, i f the policy has really been
changed ( A l - Q u d s , 11 N o v . 1999). B o t h Social Security and the
health plans have continued w i t h their policies, and East Jerusa-
lem residents w h o have sought health services i n the hospitals or
who have applied to Social Security to cover health costs were
required to prove that they bore Israeli identity cards. A Social
Security investigation took several months, d u r i n g w h i c h the
right to receive medical care was suspended. T h i s policy was criti-
cized by the o m b u d s m a n for the national health law, w h o ordered
that medical care could not be denied to babies and to those whose
lives were i n danger d u r i n g the course of a Social Security investi-
gation (B'tselem, 1998: 20-37; H a ' a r e t z , 14 M a y 1998; Hess, 25
M a r c h 1998). It took a Supreme C o u r t appeal to get the state to
agree not to revoke rights under the national health law before all
the bureaucratic steps had been taken to determine that the person
in question was not eligible ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 N o v . 1999). T h e myriad
problems these policies caused led the Israeli authorities to use the
planning and construction laws to tip the demographic balance i n
Jerusalem i n Israel's favor.
o

Construction against Oslo
Demographic growth and the shortage of housing and land for the
residents o f East Jerusalem led to large-scale illegal construction
in the Jerusalem area ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 June 1996, 3 J u l y 1997, 4 J u l y
1997,16July 1997), especially i n the city's north and northeast, o n
vacant land separating the Palestinian neighborhoods. Arab c o n -
struction tends to be spontaneous and private, not planned from
above by the local or national leaderships ( C o h e n , 1993: 4;
H a ' a r e t z , 9 J u l y 1997, l O J u l y 1997), although both w e l c o m e d this
method o f building. Since 1997, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y has
attempted to encourage it by issuing its o w n b u i l d i n g permits i n
the Z o n e B areas o f tbe Jerusalem District. A total o f 1,777 such
permits have been issued thus far, i n response to 2,977 official
requests. It is reasonable to assume that the actual number of P a l -
estinians seeking permits is even larger (data provided by O r i e n t
H o u s e and the Palestinian M i n i s t r y o f Local Government). S u c h
construction created contiguity between the Arab neighborhoods
in the city's north, preventing them from remaining isolated
islands surrounded by Jewish neighborhoods and connecting
them w i t h Ramallah. Palestinian construction tightens East J e r u -
salem's links to the Palestinian Authority, blurs Israel's annex-
ation lines, and even threatens to surround and isolate some of the
Jewish neighborhoods i n the city's east. T h e Jerusalem m u n i c i -
pality treats this phenomenon as a challenge to. Israeli sovereignty
in the city. Furthermore, illegal Palestinian construction i n north-
east Jerusalem can frustrate Plan I E , w h i c h was meant to link
Ma'aleh A d u m i m w i t h Jerusalem. It could also prevent the cre-
ation of Jewish contiguity from N e v e Ya'akov to the center of town.
"It is a cancer that is a clear and present danger to Israel's sover-
eignty in Jerusalem," O l m e r t has stated ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 June 1997).
T o battle against illegal construction, the M i n i s t r y o f the Inte-
rior and the Jerusalem municipality adopted a policy of demolish-
ing illegal buildings at various stages o f construction, such as
skeleton, foundations, and during the expansion of existing b u i l d -
ings. According to data collected by Ir Shalem, the municipality
issued 245 demolition orders i n the years 1992-8, o f w h i c h 83
were carried out. A c c o r d i n g to the Jerusalem municipality, 97
orders out of272 were carried out ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 June 1998,2 M a r c h
1999,26 N o v . 1 9 9 9 ; K o l H a - I r , 26 Feb. 1999). In other words, less

than a third o f the orders were implemented. A t the end o f 1999

there were 839 d e m o l i t i o n orders i n force i n East Jerusalem, but
o n l y 141 (16.8 per cent) had been carried out (Galili, 12 Jan.
2000; K o l H a - I r , 10 Dec. 1999). T h e relationship between the
implemented demolition orders and the number of building viola-
tions identified by the municipality is even smaller - about eight per
cent - according to Ir Shalem's data, and about four per cent
according to municipal figures ( H a ' a r e t z , 21 A u g . 1996, 22 A u g .
1996,25 Aug. 1996,26 Aug. 1996,18 Sept. 1996,20 Sept. 1996,29
M a y 1997, 13 J u l y 1997, 16 J u l y 1997). In addition, Israel's civil
administration has carried out demolitions i n the West Bank sub-
urbs o f Jerusalem. Between J u l y 1997 and J u l y 1998 the C i v i l
Administration demolished 29 structures i n the Jerusalem area,
about half of the total number of demolitions i n the West Bank as
a w h o l e ( A l - Q u d s , 1 A u g . 1997; B'tselem, 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 4 A u g .
1997, 2 M a r c h 1999). D u r i n g the first half o f 1998, five out o f 42
orders were carried out ( H a ' a r e t z , 4 June 1998), but according to
B'tselem's figures, nine orders were carried out, as were another
17 i n the metropolitan area. A c c o r d i n g to the Palestinians, 40
demolitions were carried out d u r i n g this period (Rubinstein, 22
June 1998). In any case, the pace of Israeli actions did not keep up
w i t h the Palestinians. D u r i n g the second half o f 1997, M a y o r
O l m e r t urged the d e m o l i t i o n o f a large number o f illegally built
buildings and homes, but the Israel's General Security Service
opposed this out o f fear that it w o u l d cause a general conflagra-
tion. P r i m e M i n i s t e r Netanyahu also requested o f O l m e r t , for
diplomatic reasons, that he postpone the implementation o f the
orders ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 J u n e 1997, 23 June 1997, l O J u l y 1997).
D e m o l i t i o n s had led to large-scale disturbances a year before,
on August 27, 1996, w h e n the municipality, i n coordination w i t h
the prime minister's office, demolished a building belonging to a
Palestinian charitable organization i n B o u r g al-Laqlaq, i n the
northeastern corner o f the O l d City's M u s l i m Quarter. T h e
b u i l d i n g had been renovated w i t h o u t a license w i t h the help o f a
donation from the Canadian government, and was intended to
serve as a sports facility for the neighborhood's children ( H a ' a r e t z ,
28 A u g . 1996). T h e Palestinian establishment did not view the
Netanyahu government's actions i n Jerusalem as a local matter,
but rather as an expression o f a comprehensive policy aimed at
sabotaging the O s l o accords (Galili, 30 A u g . 1996; H a ' a r e t z , 25

Aug. 1996,29 Aug. 1996,3 Sept. 1996; Rubinstein, 30 Aug. 1996).

T h e Palestinians planned, i n response, a series o f skirmishes for
August 30, w h i c h was named al-Quds Day. T h e first lesson i n
Palestinian schools that day was devoted to the dispute over J e r u -
salem { A l - Q u d s , 2 9 Aug. 1996).
T h e commercial strike o f August 30, 1996 was complete i n
Jerusalem, but there were no processions, demonstrations, or
clashes w i t h Israeli military or police forces. It was a typical w a r n -
ing strike, compliance w i t h w h i c h was voluntary. T h e Palestin-
ians coordinated their actions w i t h the Egyptian and Jordanian
leadership. Jordan even went so far as to send its prime minister,
Abd al-Karim Kabriti, to Ramallah to meet w i t h Arafat and
express his support. T h i s was the first official visit by an Arab
leader o f this rank i n the Palestinian Authority. T h e businesslike
and almost positive position taken by Jordan after Netanyahu
came to power was replaced by full support for Arafat ( A l - Q u d s , 20
Aug. 1996,29 Aug. 1 9 9 6 ; H a ' a r e t z , 3 0 A u g . 1996). Despite this, the
Palestinian Authority failed both i n its attempt to bring the Pales-
tinian masses to al-Haram al-Sharif by breaking through the
Israeli roadblocks around Jerusalem, as w e l l as i n an attempt to
conduct mass prayers next to the Israeli checkpoints. T h e Pales-
tinian protests were only partially successful ( H a ' a r e t z , 1 Sept.
1996), primarily because o f the deployment o f Israeli forces
around the T e m p l e M o u n t and also because o f criticism o f the
Palestinian administration's corruption, and o f the severity and
arrogance o f the Palestinian police and security services. T w o
weeks previously, 20,000 Palestinians had demonstrated i n
Nablus to protest tortures committed by Palestinian naval intelli-
gence, w h i c h led to the death of a Fatah supporter i n the local j a i l .
U n d e r these conditions, Arafat had a hard time enlisting Palestin-
ian frustration and channeling it into an active confrontation,
along the lines of the Intifada. A n o t h e r reason was that the people
w h o were expert at organizing large-scale protests were out o f
practice, not having organized sucb an action for several years.
T h e big protest w o u l d come two weeks later, w h e n fire burst
forth from Jerusalem and ignited the entire West B a n k and Gaza
Strip - and an international crisis as well.
O n August 22, 1996, evidence first came to light o f the W a q f s
construction of a mosque i n Solomon's Stables, w h i c h are subter-
ranean halls dating from H e r o d i a n times i n the southeastern

corner o f the T e m p l e M o u n t , close to A l - A q s a M o s q u e . (The

name derives from the Crusaders, w h o attributed the site to K i n g
S o l o m o n , and used it as stables. T h e M u s l i m s call the site the
M a r w a n i M o s q u e , after the K h a l i f A b d a l - M a l i k ibn Marwan.)
O n September 4, 1996 the Jerusalem municipality served the
W a q f w i t h an order to halt the work, and went to court to enforce
it. T h e court ordered the w o r k halted; i n response the W a q f accel-
erated the project. T h e mufti o f Jerusalem, Sheikh Akaramah
Sabri, declared that the mosque lay outside the municipality's
jurisdiction. W a q f employees prevented city inspectors from
entering the site, forcing the police to photograph it from a dis-
tance i n order to prove that a violation of the law had taken place.
T h e Ministerial C o m m i t t e e o n Jerusalem Affairs discussed the
possibility o f enforcing the order, but the top police command
anticipated that such an action w o u l d lead to riots, so Prime M i n -
ister Netanyahu rejected that option. H e preferred to respond by
opening the Western W a l l T u n n e l ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 Sept. 1996,27 Sept.
1996, 10 O c t . 1996).
O n September 24, 1996, the Israeli government broke through
the opening o f the Western W a l l T u n n e l , w h i c h connects the
Western W a l l plaza to the V i a Dolorosa i n the M u s l i m Quarter.
T h e tunnel is an ancient aqueduct from Hasmonean times, r u n -
n i n g alongside the Western W a l l from south to north, and was
uncovered i n 1987. A s a rule, W a q f (and later Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity) officials had, since 1967, opposed Israeli excavations near the
T e m p l e M o u n t and the Western W a l l , i n c l u d i n g archaeological
excavations, on both religious and political grounds. T h e i r fear
grew w h e n , i n 1984, Israeli excavations caused cracks in ancient
M a m e l u k e structures i n the M u s l i m Quarter and i n the W a q f
offices o n the T e m p l e M o u n t ; urgent action had to be taken to
repair the damage ( H a ' a r e t z , 27 Sept. 1996). In the nine interven-
ing years since Israel's M i n i s t r y o f Religious Affairs had first dis-
covered the Hasmonean aqueduct, the W a q f had stymied two
attempts to open it, i n J u l y 1981 and i n J u l y 1988. In both cases,
violent clashes broke out on the site and elsewhere, and Israel
backed o f t ( H a ' a r e t z , 27 Sept. 1996). .
In January 1996 Peres had intended to open the tunnel i n
response to the L i k u d ' s claim that Peres was planning to divide
Jerusalem. O n January 16, 1996, aides to the minister o f internal
security notified W a q f officials that they w o u l d be given a permit

to use Solomon's Stables as a mosque d u r i n g the holy m o n t h o f

Ramadan, and that i n parallel Israel w o u l d open the Western W a l l
T u n n e l . T h e W a q f s leaders d i d not respond. Actually, Israel had
not expected an explicit response, and was only seeking that they
"not make a fuss." Israel <took the W a q f s non-answer as tacit
agreement, especially after W a q f officials had been taken for a pre-
liminary tour of the tunnel and had seen that it d i d not lead to the
Temple M o u n t . O n January 24,1996, the Ministerial C o m m i t t e e
on Defense approved what seemed to them to be a closed deal.
But on February 6, 1996, W a q f officials sent a letter demanding
that the tunnel not be opened ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 O c t . 1996).
Israel interpreted this letter as having been sent i n order to put
the W a q f s opposition on the record and so absolve it of responsi-
bility, rather than a demand that the Islamic leadership actually
expected Israel to accede to. O n l y bad weather and the Hamas sui-
cide bombings o f February and M a r c h prevented Israel from
opening the tunnel then. Since the W a q f acted i n August 1996 to
turn Solomon's Stables into a permanent mosque w i t h o u t an
Israeli permit, and because o f the difficulty i n enforcing planning
and construction laws there, P r i m e M i n i s t e r Netanyahu decided
on September 16, 1996 to treat the matter as a deal i n w h i c h each
side carried out its part unilaterally. T h e Jerusalem municipality's
legal adviser redefined the W a q f s project as an internal change
that did not require a license, and ruled that there had not been a
substantive violation o f the law. A week later the tunnel was
opened ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 Sept. 1996, 25 Sept. 1996, 26 Sept. 1996, 27
Sept. 1996,1 O c t . 1996,10 O c t . 1996,13 O c t . 1996; H C J 6403/96,
Temple M o u n t Faithful vs. the mayor o f Jerusalem, ruling,
N 4 : 2 4 1 ; Yecliot A h a r o n o t , 4 O c t . 1996).
As later became clear, too late, Israel's decision was an awful
one, and the process by w h i c h it had been made, faulty. Israel had
not anticipated the violent Palestinian response, nor the furious
reaction o f the Arab countries that had diplomatic relations w i t h
Israel. E v e n though the Palestinians had tried over the previous
two weeks to mobilize the masses against Israel, and the organiza-
tional infrastructure for this had been created, the Israeli decision
makers d i d not see this as relevant. Similarly, Israel's political
leadership did not pick up the voices of protest breaking out of the
Temple M o u n t mosques since the change o f power i n Israel,
voices that had repeatedly warned o f the danger posed to the

Islamic holy sites o n a l - H a r a m al-Sharif by the Israeli government

and its allies, the extremist J e w i s h groups seeking to scale the
m o u n t a i n and change the status q u o there.
T h e Palestinians reacted harshly, and that very day declared a gen-
eral commercial strike i n East Jerusalem. Violent demonstrations
broke out i n the city. T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y brought mobs out
into the streets and launched a diplomatic campaign against
Israel's move (Shchori, 21 O c t . 1996). There were demonstra-
tions against the opening of the tunnel i n Egypt, Jordan, M o r o c c o ,
Tunisia, and T u r k e y , all important M i d d l e Eastern states that had
relations w i t h Israel. T h e i r leaders condemned Israel's actions, as
did Israel's o w n Palestinian citizens, w h o staged a day o f demon-
strations and a general strike ( H a ' a r e t z , 13 Sept. 1996, 26 Sept.
1996, 27 Sept. 1996, 29 Sept. 1996). O n October 15, 1996 K i n g
H u s s e i n made his first visit to the West B a n k since 1967, empha-
sizing that he was o n Palestinian land and supporting the estab-
lishment o f a Palestinian state ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 Sept. 1996, 8 Oct.
1996, 16 O c t . 1996). H u s s e i n made a point of visitingjericho, the
site of the 1948 Jericho Congress, at w h i c h West Bank public fig-
ures "requested" that K i n g Abdallah place them under his political
sponsorship. Abdallah entered Jericho on his way to Jerusalem,
and K i n g H u s s e i n visited it on his way home.
T h e Palestinians turned out en masse to clash w i t h Israeli
forces i n what they called the " A l - A q s a Campaign." T h e i r anger
and frustration were authentic. W i t h the encouragement of the Pal-
estinian Authority leadership, Palestinian policemen and security
personnel j o i n e d the demonstrators - not to prevent disturbances,
but as participants. In many places officers and senior c o m m a n d -
ers stayed behind, increasing the likelihood that the situation
w o u l d deteriorate. T h e demonstrations quickly deteriorated into
a series o f bloody battles throughout the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, a "super-Intifada" o f mass demonstrations driven by rage,
despair, and frustration. Light weapons were fired by small, half-
organized Palestinian forces operating w i t h o u t coordination and
w i t h o u t a central command. T h e battles lasted four days and
ended w i t h 16 Israeli soldiers and 74 Palestinians dead, and 58
Israelis and more than 1,000 Palestinians wounded ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 9
Sept. 1996, 2 O c t . 1996, 3 O c t . 1996).
T h e Solomon's Stables and Western W a l l T u n n e l incidents
highlighted Israel's short reach and limited authority on the

Temple M o u n t . T h e w o r l d had n o w seen that Israel's sovereignty

on the T e m p l e M o u n t was no more than a formal arrangement.
Large financial contributions and volunteer labor by Palestinian
citizens'^of Israel helped bring the Solomon's Stables renovation
w o r k to completion on October 12, 1996, t u r n i n g it from a space
that was occasionally used for prayers to a permanent mosque i n
its o w n right, without a permit from the Jerusalem municipality
( H a ' a r e t z , 10 O c t . 1996, 13 O c t . 1996). Similar w o r k was carried
out i n the basement levels of A l - A q s a i n the years 1998-9, w i t h the
Israeli government's tacit consent (Kol H a i r , 15 Jan. 1999). T h i s
blocked the proposal put forth by several Jewish groups that advo-
cate Jewish prayer on the T e m p l e M o u n t to turn Solomon's Sta-
bles into a Jewish prayer area ( H a ' a r e t z , 21 M a y 1998; Rubinstein,
12 June 1998; Shragai, 8 June 1998).
T h e W a q f s construction activities were included i n the frame-
w o r k o f the status q u o by the end o f 1999. In August 1999 the
Islamic M o v e m e n t i n Israel, w h i c h has evinced great interest i n al-
H a r a m al-Sharif and has helped obtain financial resources and
provide manpower for the preservation and development o f the
holy site, cooperated w i t h the W a q f i n creating a large ventilation
opening i n the A l - A q s a basement, o n the southern external wall o f
the compound. T h e Israeli government was concerned that this
w o u l d lead to the opening o f a new gate to the T e m p l e M o u n t and
to a radical change i n the status q u o . W h i l e w i l l i n g to accept the
W a q f s authority w i t h i n the c o m p o u n d o n a defacto basis, the gov-
ernment was not prepared to allow the W a q f to affect the external
face o f the holy site. A t the order o f the Barak government, and
w i t h the tacit consent o f political elements i n the Palestinian
Authority, the opening was blocked. In exchange, the Barak gov-
ernment approved the creation o f an alternative opening to the
compound. However, the opening created by the W a q f was w i d e r
and deeper than the approved dimensions, and by the beginning
of the year 2000 had encompassed five ancient arches over a length
of 50 meters ( H a ' a r e t z , 1 D e c . 1999, 3 D e c . 1999, 6 D e c . 1999, 3
Jan. 2000).
There were three responses by the Israeli establishment. T h e
Israel Antiquities A u t h o r i t y complained that the archaeology o f
the site, w h i c h dated to the Second T e m p l e period and w h i c h had
been renovated i n the M u s l i m period, was being damaged
( H a ' a r e t z , 7 D e c . 1999). B u t the Antiquities A u t h o r i t y was unable

to evaluate the archaeological damage and did- not relate to the

place as an active holy site. T h e Jerusalem municipality, M a y o r
O l m e r t i n particular, complained o f the infringement o f Israeli
law and sovereignty, since the w o r k was carried out without a city
permit. O l m e r t initiated the process o f issuing stop w o r k orders
and the municipality threatened to disconnect the W a q f s water
supply i f the w o r k was not halted ( H a ' a r e t z , 3 D e c . 1999, 6 Dec.
1999; K o l H a - I r , 10 D e c . 1999).
In contrast w i t h these two approaches, w h i c h , i f implemented,
w o u l d have led to confrontation, the Barak government preferred
talking. Discussions that the minister o f internal security, Shlomo
B e n - A m i , held w i t h the political leadership o f the Palestinian
A u t h o r i t y and top W a q f officials led to an agreement that only two
o f the arches w o u l d be left open and that what Israel considered to
be archaeological supervision o f construction w o r k o n the
T e m p l e M o u n t w o u l d be renewed. T h i s was, at most, i n fact,
loose, symbolic supervision from a distance, w i t h discussions
between Palestinian and Israeli archaeologists rather than a hierar-
chical relationship. These government measures were approved
by the District C o u r t , w h i c h rejected a petition to issue a stop
w o r k order against the W a q f because o f its damage to Jewish
remains and antiquities ( H a ' a r e t z , 7 D e c . 1999).
H a r H o m a : a n obstacle to t h e O s l o accords
Immediately after the 1967 war, Israel declared a hill to the south-
east o f Jerusalem, called Jabel a b u - G h n i m by the Arabs and H a r
H o m a by Israel, as "green" territory, i n order to prevent the local
Arabs from b u i l d i n g there. In A p r i l 1991 Israel appropriated 1,850
dunams there for "public use," w i t h the intention o f constructing
a J e w i s h neighborhood o f 30,000 inhabitants. O n l y a third o f the
land was expropriated from local Arabs. T h e rest was taken from
Jewish landowners, half o f them private individuals and half
public bodies. T h e change o f government i n 1992 had no effect on
the plan's progress, even though the housing minister tried to
pusb it forward w i t h Rabin's approval and blessing ( H a ' a r e t z , 11
Jan. 1995). Israel wanted to use the new residential neighborhood
to complete the encirclement o f East Jerusalem by controlling all
the heights that overlook it. Jerusalem's city engineer said that
"Har H o m a is not exceptional. Political rather than professional

planning considerations dictate the development o f the entire

city. T h e greater part of planning and development i n the city after
unification has been done for political purposes, the principle o f
w h i c h is" to establish a Jewish majority i n the city and hold the
most important strategic positions and establish Jewish neighbor-
hoods on them" (Eldar, 17 M a r c h 1997). In the wake of the O s l o
accords, the political importance o f these neighborhoods
increased, because their establishment w o u l d create a physical
Israeli wedge between Palestinian A u t h o r i t y territory and the
Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem. F o r the same reasons, the P a l -
estinians had an escalating interest i n preventing the establish-
ment o f these neighborhoods.
T h e Israeli government considered the possibility o f pushing
the program forward, but it generally held back because o f the
reaction it expected from the Palestinians, as well as from the local
and international communities (Shragai, 15 O c t . 1996). P r i m e
Minister Netanyahu d i d not approve the project for these same
reasons, despite efforts by ministers Suissa and Sharon as w e l l as
M a y o r O l m e r t ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 Dec. 1996,24 Dec. 1996, 2 Jan. 1997).
Netanyahu changed his m i n d at the end o f February 1996. O n
Feburary 26, 1997 a ministerial committee approved the H a r
H o m a plan, w h i c h included 6,400 housing units. T h e first stage o f
construction, o f 2,450 units, was also approved. Netanyahu was
subject to pressures from opposing directions - defense and secu-
rity officials pressured h i m , as before, to delay the plan, since car-
rying it out w o u l d bring a harsh Palestinian response (Eldar, 13
Feb. 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 17 Feb. 1997). Against them were ranged
political forces that had a more powerful influence o n the prime
minister - the settler lobby and hawks i n the L i k u d and other
coalition parties, including M a y o r O l m e r t . T h e y were prepared to
swallow, w i t h difficulty, Israel's redeployment i n H e b r o n o n c o n -
dition that the H a r H o m a project and the plan to link M a ' a l e h
A d u m i m w i t h Jerusalem commence immediately. Netanyahu
believed that confrontation w i t h the Palestinians was unavoidable
because they w o u l d not accept his plan for a permanent settle-
ment, i n particular i n Jerusalem ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a r c h 1977).
Israel's interest, as he saw it, was to begin the confrontation early
on and conduct it around the issue of Jerusalem, about w h i c h
there was a broad consensus i n Israel.

A t the beginning o f his term, the L i k u d government tried to

raise the diplomatic price it was asking the Palestinians to pay,
w i t h the intention o f b l o w i n g up the O s l o talks. T h e L i k u d c o n -
sidered the O s l o framework, imposed o n it by the previous gov-
ernment, unbearable. Netanyahu's failure to achieve this goal led
to the signing o f the H e b r o n agreement. T h i s was the first time
that a L i k u d government had assumed any sort o f obligation
under the O s l o framework, i n contradiction of its previous w o r l d -
view. T h e Palestinians and the international c o m m u n i t y
applauded the Israeli government, w h i l e the hawks o f the L i k u d
and the religious right condemned it. T h e Netanyahu govern-
ment had serious difficulties, however, i n proceeding along the
O s l o path, especially after the H e b r o n agreement, because that
had set dates for the resumption of the permanent status talks and
three additional Israeli withdrawals from Z o n e C areas. T h e
shadow o f the permanent settlement, i n the framework of w h i c h
the Palestinians hoped to receive some 90 per cent o f the West
B a n k and establish a Palestinian state, was a threat to Netanyahu's
government. H e and O l m e r t wanted to use Jerusalem as a way o f
getting off the O s l o track, and hoped to drag the Palestinians w i t h
them.
T h e plan to b u i l d H a r H o m a created a threat and presented
simultaneous but separate challenges to Israeli and Palestinian
sovereignty, demography, and internal politics. F o r the Palestin-
ians, the most serious threat was H a r H o m a ' s challenge to their
sovereignty i n the Bethlehem and Jerusalem regions. Palestinian
sovereignty was called into question by Israel's unilateral decision
to b u i l d the neighborhood, despite numerous indications from
Palestinian figures that they expected to be consulted about the
decision (Eldar, 6 A p r i l 1998; H a ' a r e t z , 18 M a r c h 1997; Segev, 19
Feb. 1997). B e y o n d this, the construction o f the neighborhood
was a substantive threat to Palestinian sovereignty. In the perma-
nent settlement, H a r H o m a w o u l d prevent the creation o f a link
between the al-Azaria/Abu-Dis area, the center o f Palestinian
administration i n the Jerusalem District, and the Bethlehem/Bait
Sahur region, over w h i c h the Palestinians had complete control
(Zone A ) . Finally, the construction o f H a r H o m a was part o f a
series o f L i k u d government measures i n Jerusalem, all o f w h i c h
the Palestinians saw as attempts to infringe on their limited foot-
h o l d i n the city, and the possibility of enlarging H a r H o m a i n the

permanent settlement. T h e policy o f Labor governments and

Jerusalem municipal governments under T e d d y K o l l e k had dis-
criminated against East Jerusalem's Arabs o n day-to-day issues, i n
contrast w i t h the m o m e n t u m given to the Jewish presence i n East
Jerusalem. A t the same time, bowever, the East Jerusalem Arabs
were allowed to compensate for this discrimination by fostering
institutions and local and national identity symbols. In contrast,
the L i k u d government and the O l m e r t administration advocated
the full imposition o f Israeli sovereignty on the East Jerusalem
Arabs, while promising them compensation o n the level o f
municipal services. T h e Palestinians rejected the L i k u d - O l m e r t
approach and demanded the continuation o f the previous policy,
w h i c h was consistent w i t h the O s l o accords. B u t the L i k u d gov-
ernment realized that Israeli sovereignty i n East Jerusalem was
being eroded, and feared losing it completely i n the permanent
settlement.
Demographically, the plan to settle 30,000 Jews i n H a r H o m a ,
and the L i k u d government's energetic policy to use administrative
measures and legislation to change the demographic balance i n
Jerusalem, aroused a sharp response from the Palestinian popula-
tion i n Jerusalem and Bethlehem. T h e protest took o n a popular
local character, w i t h the public demanding that its political insti-
tutions take action. In Israel, i n contrast, the demographic threat
was the concern of the establishment more than that o f the public
(Weksler, 15 A p r i l 1997).
Arafat's administration faced a challenge w h e n local political
establishments i n Bethlehem and Jerusalem called o n the national
administration to oppose the Israeli plan forcefully, and warned it
against compromising at the expense o f the local residents. T h e
local protest was headed at first by a body called the Emergency
Committee for the Defense of Jabel a b u - G h n i m , w h i c h j o i n e d
political figures from the Jerusalem and Bethlehem districts w i t h
local residents whose land had been expropriated for the c o n -
struction o f the neighborhood ( A l - Q u d s , 20 Feb. 1997). A t a later
stage the protest was led by the Jerusalem and Bethlehem repre-
sentatives i n the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y Legislative C o u n c i l . T h e
local establishment became the protest group that spurred the
national leadership to intensify the struggle and to come out
against Israeli settlements i n general ( A l - Q u d s , 14 Feb. 1997).
F r o m the end o f February 1997 the national leadership led the

protest, turning H a r H o m a into a symbol o f Israel's expansionist

activity ( A l - Q u d s , 24 Feb. 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 12 M a r c h 1997).
A similar challenge developed i n Israel w h e n a hawkish pres-
sure group, characterized by manifestly local motives, developed
in the L i k u d , the municipality, and the Knesset. In the absence o f
c o m m u n i c a t i o n and mutual trust between Netanyahu and Arafat,
the local establishments grew stronger and the national leader-
ships were unable to control them. T h e national leadership on
both sides o f the political divide stood at the head o f local forces
and created a united front against the other side. O n l y when the
crisis became a regional one, w i t h the involvement o f Jordan,
Egypt, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic bodies, and the U n i t e d States,
did Israel realize that it had to m i n i m i z e potential damage and
declare some sort o f construction for Arabs as well. O n February
25,1997, a ministerial committee decided to order the planning o f
infrastructure, at a cost o f $50 m i l l i o n , for the construction o f
3,015 Arab housing units i n East Jerusalem over the next ten years
( H a ' a r e t z , 25 Feb. 1997). Israel's decision highlighted the gap
between the two parts o f the city. First, unlike tbe H a r H o m a
neighborhood, w h i c h was to be built w i t h government funding,
the decision o n Arab housing was only to provide the infrastruc-
ture development for private construction ( H a ' a r e t z , 25 Feb. 1997,
27 Feb. 1997). Second, full-speed w o r k o n H a r H o m a c o m -
menced o n M a r c h 18, 1997, w h i l e the development i n East Jeru-
salem remained o n paper, either because the necessary permits
had not been issued or because there was no real intention o f car-
rying it out. T h e harsh international reaction to the ministerial
committee's decision led O l m e r t and Netanyahu to the conclu-
sion that, without government-assisted housing construction for
Arabs, it w o u l d be impossible to mitigate the criticism o f con-
struction o f a Jewish neighborhood. Therefore, w h e n the m i n i s -
terial committee's decision was brought before the full cabinet for
ratification o n M a r c h 14, 1997, the cabinet instructed Jerusalem's
planning institutions to plan for public construction of 400 hous-
ing units o n state land that had been expropriated i n 1968 from the
village o f Sur Baher, w h i c h borders o n H a r H o m a ( H a ' a r e t z , 16
M a r c h 1997, 18 M a r c h 1997). T h i s instruction, however, also
remained on paper. T h e Jerusalem municipality and the H o u s i n g
M i n i s t r y have not yet prepared the necessary plans. N e i t h e r has
the amount o f government assistance for the project been

determined (Kol H a - I r , 28 M a r c h 1997), at a time w h e n the H a r

H o m a project has benefited from extensive funds. Israel's deci-
sion thus not only called attention to the gap between J e w i s h and
Arab Jerusalem, but also to the fact that East Jerusalem is a dis-
puted area. Israeli construction i n East Jerusalem had never before
raised so large an international storm.
Faced w i t h construction at H a r H o m a , Arafat decided to strive
to isolate Israel i n the international arena and to insert a wedge
between it and the U . S . ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 M a r c h 1997). T h e Palestinian
Authority proceeded along several parallel channels for this pur-
pose. First, the Palestinian Authority staged a series o f protests. Its
institutions organized a general strike o n M a r c h 3, 1997, the first
step i n m o b i l i z i n g Palestinian society and political forces for
ongoing resistance ( A l - Q u d s , 3 M a r c h 1997, 4 M a r c h 1997;
H a ' a r e t z , 3 M a r c h 1997, 4 M a r c h 1997).
T h e strike's success enabled the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y to switch
to a second form o f protest, w h i c h included demonstrations next
to Israeli army and police positions. Disturbances began at H a r
H o m a itself w h e n the decision to b u i l d there was made, spreading
to the Jerusalem/Bethlehem boundary ( H a ' a r e t z , 28 Feb. 1997).
W h e n w o r k actually began, on M a r c h 18, 1997, Jerusalem's
northern border w i t h Ramallah also became a focus o f protest. O n
Land Day, M a r c h 30, 1997, the protests encompassed most o f the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. L a n d Day, w h i c h commemorates the
struggle waged by Palestinian citizens o f Israel i n 1976 against the
expropriation o f their land i n the Galilee, has become an annual
day o f protest by Israel's Arabs against their government's land
confiscations. Twenty-one years later, it turned into a protest
against Israeli policy i n Jerusalem. Land D a y i n 1997 was led by
Palestinians i n the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y rather than by Israeli
Arabs. O n A p r i l 8, 1997 the center o f friction m o v e d to H e b r o n ,
the only Palestinian city i n whose heart lives a small group o f
Israeli settlers. T h e settlers and H e b r o n ' s Arabs have a l o n g his-
tory o f antagonism ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a r c h 1997, 8 A p r i l 1997, 9 A p r i l
1997). T h e protest was thus expanded from being merely against
construction at H a r H o m a to a protest against the Israeli settle-
ments as a whole. T h e organization switched from local to
national, w i t h Fatah at its head. T h e movement enlisted y o u n g
activists i n the demonstrations, augmenting them w i t h children

and teenagers w h o were only too happy to throw stones at Israeli

forces ( A l - Q u d s , 24 M a r c h 1997).
T h e protests were not violent at the start. O n the day that w o r k
commenced on H a r H o m a , Arafat spoke o n Palestinian radio and
appealed to his people not to react violently ( H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a r c h
1997). T h e local leadership that led and organized the demonstra-
tions at the construction site also wished to avoid violence
( H a ' a r e t z , 18 M a r c h 1997, 20 M a r c h 1997). As the demonstrations
came to encompass more and more people at more and more
places i n the West Bank, they became more fervent and threw
stones and M o l o t o v cocktails at Israeli forces, w h o responded by
firing rubber bullets and tear gas ( H a ' a r e t z , 21 M a r c h 1997). T h e
first Palestinian was killed o n M a r c h 29, 1997, ten days after the
demonstrations began, and the n u m b e r o f wounded by then was
480 ( A l - Q u d s , 31 M a r c h 1997). In the first ten days o f A p r i l the
number o f Palestinians killed reached s i x . D u r i n g the demonstra-
tions, Palestinian police and security forces w o r k e d to calm d o w n
particularly turbulent focal points o f confrontation ( H a ' a r e t z , 25
M a r c h 1997,31 M a r c h 1997; Segev, 1 A p r i l 1997). Violent protest
was controlled by preventing physical contact between Israeli sol-
diers and Palestinian demonstrators, and by placing Palestinian
security forces i n a dangerous position between the two camps.
Rules o f the game were established between the sides, preserved
thanks to low-level coordination i n the field, w h i c h continued to
take place despite the suspension o f political coordination
between the Israeli and Palestinian covert security services. In
comparison w i t h the Intifada, Israeli soldiers adopted restrained
rules o f fire, and the tanks that were meant to threaten the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y w i t h the reoccupation o f its territory were
deployed w i t h i n army camps rather than o n the outskirts o f Pales-
tinian cities. ,
Arafat had the diplomatic arena i n m i n d , and everything he did
was meant to further his position there. H e decided to cut off all
political ties w i t h Israel, looking to the U . S . and hoping to tilt it i n
the Palestinians' direction ( A l - Q u d s , 28 M a r c h 1997, 31 M a r c h
1997; H a ' a r e t z , 19 M a r c h 1997, 20 M a r c h 1997, 27 M a r c h 1997).
O n M a r c h 16, 1997 he held an international meeting i n Gaza "to
save the peace process," w i t h the participation o f ambassadors
from the countries involved i n the O s l o accords. T h e U n i t e d
States was the first country to respond i n the affirmative to

Arafat's invitation ( A l - Q u d s , 12 M a r c h 1997), thereby signaling to

the other countries that they should participate. B u t the U . S .
opposed Arafat's intention o f turning the meeting from a unilat-
eral event to a permanent forum, and o f calling on the participants
to intervene directly i n the crisis Israel had brought on. As a result,
the meeting made no operative decisions ( H a ' a r e t z , 16 M a r c h
1997).
T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and the Arab states twice initiated
meetings o f the U N Security C o u n c i l , o n M a r c h 7 and M a r c h 21,
1997, in order to propose a resolution c o n d e m n i n g Israel for its
construction on H a r H o m a . In the wake o f the U . S . ' s double veto,
the Arab states initiated four sessions o f the General Assembly.
O n M a r c h 13, 1997, the General Assembly expressed "serious
concern" ( H a ' a r e t z , 14 M a r c h 1997); on A p r i l 24, 1997, a total o f
134 countries voted for and three (Israel, the U . S . , and M i c r o n e -
sia) opposed a decision c o n d e m n i n g the construction at H a r
H o m a , demanding that it be halted forthwith ( H a ' a r e t z , 25 A p r i l
1997, 27 A p r i l 1997). T h e same pattern repeated itself o n J u l y 15
and N o v e m b e r 14 o f that year ( H a ' a r e t z , 9 J u l y 1997, 13 J u l y 1997,
15 J u l y 1997, 16 J u l y 1997, 15 N o v . 1997).
In parallel to its activity at the U N , the Palestinians brought the
issue before the heads o f state o f the Organization o f the Islamic
Conference ( O I C ) , w h o met on M a r c h 24 i n Islamabad. In their
final statement, the heads o f state, for the first time i n the organi-
zation's history, expressed support for the O s l o agreements and
demanded their full implementation ( A l - Q u d s , 24 M a r c h 1997).
T h e Jerusalem C o m m i t t e e o f the O I C was convened o n M a r c h
27, 1997. B e h i n d the scenes there was a struggle between the two
approaches. Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt wanted the conference
to make an operative decision calling on the organization's
member states to freeze their ties w i t h Israel; they were opposed
by M o r o c c o and Jordan, w i t h the help o f President C l i n t o n ' s
emissary, D e n n i s Ross, coordinator o f the peace talks, w h o had
come to Rabat w i t h the express purpose o f preventing an extreme
decision. Arafat tacitly j o i n e d those seeking a relatively moderate
resolution, his purpose being to w i n U . S . support. T h e official
meeting lasted only 35 minutes, and the final resolution simply
repeated the m a i n points o f the Islamabad statement ( A l - Q u d s , 28
M a r c h 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 28 M a r c h 1997).

T h e proposed resolution that was not adopted i n M o r o c c o

became the recommendation of the foreign ministers of the Arab
League, w h i c h convened i n C a i r o a few days later o n M a r c h 31.
T h e y called for halting the normalization process w i t h Israel,
i n c l u d i n g the closure o f offices and delegations ( H a ' a r e t z , 31
M a r c h 1997, 1 A p r i l 1997). In order to turn this recommendation
into a b i n d i n g decision o f the Arab League, it had to be passed
unanimously. A n appropriate s u m m i t was not called, but despite
this, Qatar, O m a n , and T u n i s i a announced that they were freez-
ing the development o f their ties w i t h Israel. T h e Arab states did
not want, or perhaps they simply were incapable at this stage, to go
so far as to sever relations w i t h Israel, but they marked the path
they intended to walk, and waited to see what the U . S . w o u l d do.
It was no coincidence that Jordan made a special effort to
resolve the crisis. Jordan feared that any worsening o f the Pales-
tinian situation i n the West B a n k w o u l d flood Jordan w i t h refu-
gees and migrants (Shamir, 26 O c t . 1997). U n l i k e Egypt, w h i c h
favored adopting an aggressive line against the Israeli government,
Jordan tried to talk w i t h Netanyahu. H u s s e i n received Netanyahu
for an official visit i n A m m a n o n February 23, 1997 and entreated
h i m personally, i n a last-minute effort, not to b u i l d H a r H o m a .
Netanyahu categorically rejected the plea and that same week, on
February 24, convened the Ministerial C o m m i t t e e for Jerusalem
Affairs to approve the plan. Israel's decision, and Netanyahu's
treatment o f H u s s e i n , led the king to write a letter to the Israeli
prime minister. Its harshness went beyond even Sadat's letter to
M e n a c h e m Begin after the cessation o f the autonomy talks.
H u s s e i n trenchantly took Netanyahu to task i n a most personal
way. Netanyahu's response to H u s s e i n was not long i n coming,
and was phrased as a cold manifesto o n Israeli relations w i t h
Jordan. It bordered on hostility to the Palestinians ( Y e d i o t A h a r o n o t
and A l - Q u d s , 12 M a r c h 1997).
T h e U n i t e d States could not remain indifferent to Israel's deci-
sion to b u i l d H a r H o m a . A t the beginning of the crisis the A m e r i -
cans tried to obtain bilateral understandings between it and each
of the disputant parties w i t h the hope that this w o u l d satisfy both
sides. C l i n t o n prepared a carrot and a stick. In general, according
to the A m e r i c a n plan, Arafat was to receive more territory and
"more state" and even a discussion o f compensation for Israel's
damage to the Palestinian identity o f East Jerusalem. T h i s

American move expressed the position that the H a r H o m a c o n -

struction damaged the Palestinians' status i n Jerusalem, and that
the U . S . w o u l d promote Arafat's preparations for t u r n i n g the P a l -
estinian ^Authority into a state. D u r i n g Arafat's official visit to
Washington at the beginning o f M a r c h 1997, relations between
the U . S . and the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y were institutionalized, and
in some ways the latter was given the status o f a state. T h i s
included the establishment o f a bilateral committee headed by
Secretary o f State Albright and Arafat, just like the committees
that the U . S . had w i t h Russia, South Africa, and Egypt. Similarly,
C l i n t o n promised Arafat that he w o u l d exert "his full influence"
on Israel to postpone the construction of Har H o m a , as opposed
to infrastructure w o r k and the preparation o f an access road to
the site and its connection to the electricity grid, so l o n g as there
was no agreement on the subject between Israel and the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y . Furthermore, the U . S . wanted to extract f r o m
Israel a series o f measures t o u c h i n g o n the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f
the O s l o agreements. A m o n g these were a halt to Israel's confis-
cation o f identity cards f r o m Arab residents o f East Jerusalem,
the granting o f b u i l d i n g permits to East Jerusalem Arabs, and a
cancellation o f d e m o l i t i o n orders for illegal structures i n East
Jerusalem. In exchange, President C l i n t o n asked Arafat not to
allow Palestinian extremists to conduct terrorist acts, and to live
up to his commitments under the O s l o accords ( H a ' a r e t z , 4
M a r c h 1997, 7 M a r c h 1997). T h e "carrot" that C l i n t o n offered
Israel was a U . S . veto i n the Security C o u n c i l , o n M a r c h 8, 1997,
of the resolution c o n d e m n i n g Israel for b u i l d i n g H a r H o m a .
T h e U . S . also accepted Israel's position that its p e n d i n g w i t h -
drawal from Z o n e C (rural or unpopulated West B a n k areas
where the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y still had no control) s h o u l d be
limited i n scope. Still the U . S . d i d not accept the m i n i s c u l e w i t h -
drawal that Israel had decided o n .
T h e U . S . hoped that at this stage, after having proved to his
party's and his coalition's hawks that he had indeed decided to
build H a r H o m a , Netanyahu w o u l d delay the start o f the work.
Perhaps he w o u l d make do w i t h a modest beginning such as a
lengthy survey o f the site, without bringing i n bulldozers and
beginning infrastructure work. President C l i n t o n sent a letter to
Netanyahu i n this spirit o n M a r c h 13, 1997. Netanyahu categori-
cally rejected the president's appeal. Afterwards, w h e n w o r k had

begun, Secretary o f State Albright and the president demanded, at

a meeting w i t h Netanyahu and minister o f defense, Itzchak
Mordechay, that the H a r H o m a construction w o r k be frozen. T h e
Israelis, however, persisted i n their refusal ( H a ' a r e t z , 30 M a r c h
1997, 4 A p r i l 1997, 8 A p r i l 1997). C l i n t o n even tried to extract a
secret promise from Netanyahu that H a r H o m a was the last
Israeli construction project i n Jerusalem prior to the permanent
settlement, a promise that Netanyahu had previously made to
K i n g H u s s e i n . A s far as is k n o w n , Netanyahu refused to do this as
w e l l ( A l - Q u d s , 18 M a r c h 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 17 Feb. 1997).
T h e U n i t e d States, w h i c h had not been a partner at Oslo,
became responsible for getting Israel back o n track, as the Pales-
tinians demanded, and i n fact for preventing a complete wreckage
o f the process that had begun there. Israel's claim that the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y had irreparably damaged the process was not
accepted by the U . S . T h e A m e r i c a n efforts did not succeed i n
calming d o w n either side; both the Israelis and the Palestinians
kicked the stick aside and complained that the carrot was too
small. Israel was encouraged by the U . S . ' s defacto acceptance o f the
decision to b u i l d o n H a r H o m a , and was pleased w i t h America's
support for the tiny size o f the first stage o f redeployment i n the
West Bank. Arafat, for his part, was disappointed w i t h the U . S . ' s
inability to bring about a suspension o f the H a r H o m a project, and
w i t h the planned dimensions o f the Israeli withdrawal ( H a ' a r e t z , 9
M a r c h 1997). T h e Palestinians had been prepared, at the begin-
n i n g o f the crisis, to reach a deal about the construction at H a r
H o m a . T h e fact is that their demand for a complete halt to con-
struction there was only an opening position. Yet so long as no
compromise was achieved, resentment increased among the Pal-
estinian establishment and frustration grew i n the Palestinian
street. T h e entire diplomatic process was o n the verge o f collapse
( A l - Q u d s , 9 M a r c h 1997; H a ' a r e t z , 11 M a r c h 1997, 18 M a r c h
1997).
As a result, the Americans revised their approach and asked
Netanyahu to order a halt to the w o r k for a limited period o f time.
T h e length o f this period varied i n the different proposals that
were suggested to Israel: (1) a half-year moratorium, after w h i c h a
decision w o u l d be made o n whether it should be extended or,
alternatively, after the completion o f earth and infrastructure
w o r k the continuation o f the project w o u l d be halted until the

completion o f w o r k o n the construction site that had been p r o m -

ised to the Arabs; (2) the moratorium w o u l d last until agreement
was reached o n the implementation o f parts o f the O s l o agree-
ments that had not yet been carried out; (3) Israel w o u l d declare
that the neighborhood w o u l d not be inhabited until the c o n c l u -
sion o f the permanent status talks ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 M a y 1997, 25 M a y
1997,26 M a y 1997). T h e U n i t e d States tried to please Netanyahu
by proposing that the project w o u l d be stopped only temporarily,
and the Palestinians by getting Israel back o n the O s l o track and by
obtaining compensatory construction for Palestinians. B u t Israel
rejected these proposals, and its supporters i n the U . S . applied
counter-pressure ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 M a y 1997, 14 Sept 1997, 19 Sept.
1997, 20 Sept. 1997, 30 Sept. 1997). In June 1997 Congress
passed a resolution stating that united Jerusalem is the capital o f
Israel, and i n J u l y 1997 a b i l l was proposed that w o u l d require the
government to address all official documents to Israel to "Jerusa-
lem, Israel" (instead o f simply "Jerusalem"). A n o t h e r bill pro-
posed to subordinate the A m e r i c a n consulate i n East Jerusalem,
w h i c h was responsible for contacts w i t h the Palestinian Authority,
to the U . S . embassy i n T e l A v i v (the consulate reported directly to
Washington, since the U . S . does not officially recognize East
Jerusalem to be part o f Israel) ( H a ' a r e t z , 27 J u l y 1997). B e y o n d
this, Israel's representatives and supporters i n Washington tried to
block the improvement o f relations between the U . S . and the P a l -
estinian Authority, w h i c h it viewed as advancing the Palestinian
Authority's preparations for becoming a full-fledged state. In
practice, the American administration avoided direct confronta-
tion w i t h Israel, out o f fear o f h o w its Jewish voters w o u l d react.
T h e discussions about construction for Palestinians i n Jerusa-
lem as compensation for the Jewish housing at H a r H o m a p r o -
ceeded at a snail's pace. T h e Americans demanded that
Netanyahu keep his promise to b u i l d homes for Arabs i n Jerusa-
lem ( H a ' a r e t z , 15 A p r i l 1997), but discovered that the r e c o m m e n -
dation to b u i l d 3,015 housing units i n ten o f the city's Arab
neighborhoods could not be carried out, partly because o f the
absence o f master plans i n East Jerusalem and because preparation
o f the necessary infrastructure required an investment o f N I S 180
m i l l i o n (close to $50 m i l l i o n ) . Israel thus decided to b u i l d housing
for Arabs near H a r H o m a ( H a ' a r e t z , 17 A p r i l 1997; K o l H a - I r , 6
N o v . 1998). B u t the establishment o f an Arab neighborhood o f

2,300 housing units alongside H a r H o m a required the expropria-

tion of land from Arabs, and w o u l d turn H a r H o m a into a Jewish
neighborhood that bordered on three Arab neighborhoods - the
new Arab H a r H o m a , Bethlehem, and Sur Baher. A s a result, on
M a y 22, 1997, the Jerusalem District Planning and Construction
C o m m i t t e e hastily approved a truncated building plan near Sur
Baher. T h e plan provided for the first-ever government assistance
for Arab housing i n Jerusalem, to enable the construction o f 400
housing units on an area of 80 dunams that had been expropriated
from Arabs i n 1968. In addition to this, some 3,000 units were to
be built by private initiative i n the f o r m of construction on top o f
or as an expansion of existing homes, after the construction densi-
ties i n Sur Baher were increased from 25 to 70 per cent ( H a ' a r e t z ,
23 M a y 1997; K o l H a - I r , 6 June 1997).
M o s t o f the infrastructure and earthwork at H a r H o m a was
completed by October 1997. F r o m that date through to the sign-
ing of the W y e Plantation agreement o n October 23,1998, tenders
were not issued for the construction o f the site. T h e delay was
ordered by Netanyahu i n response to American pressure. Rather
than a trade, then, what emerged was an unofficial suspension o f
the construction process ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 D e c . 1997, 15 N o v . 1998;
K o l H a - I r , 30 Jan. 1998; Y e d i o t A h a r o n o t , 8 Jan. 1998). T h e signing
of the W y e m e m o r a n d u m led to the start of construction and the
marketing o f homes to the public. H a r H o m a can no longer be
stopped, but Israel paid a high diplomatic price for it, a far higher
one than it had ever before paid for building i n Jerusalem. H a r
H o m a is apparently the last Jewish neighborhood that Israel w i l l
b u i l d unilaterally i n Jerusalem before the permanent settlement.
Israel's Labor government and the Palestinians had an unwrit-
ten understanding that breathed life into the O s l o accords. T h e
P L O and the Palestinian Authority were to pass a series of tests as a
condition o f the transformation from a terrorist organization to a
state. T h i s began w i t h the signing o f the first O s l o agreement i n
September 1993, i n w h i c h Israel accepted the P L O as a legitimate
negotiating partner. T h e Labor government maintained that, fun-
damentally and over time, Arafat had passed the tests. In this view,
the tests imposed by the O s l o accords were bilateral - Israel also
had to pass them. T h e question of whether the two parties could
live side by side, w h i c h was the basis of reaching an interim agree-
ment before a permanent settlement, was a question that applied

to both sides. Q u i t e naturally, Israel took Palestinian violations o f

the O s l o accords very seriously w h i l e m i n i m i z i n g the importance
of its o w n unilateral actions, such as the imposition of a harsh and
thorough closure o n Palestinian areas, and o f its o w n violations,
such as the failure to open, the safe passage routes between the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and its failure to free Palestinian pris-
oners. Nevertheless, throughout the service of their governments
Rabin and Peres were cognizant o f Israel's violations. T h e Pales-
tinians went along w i t h Israel's violations and unilateral actions
because they had received the status o f an equal partner, and
understood that Israel had difficulty i n accepting restrictions o n
its power and in m o v i n g instantly from being an occupier to a sit-
uation i n w h i c h the occupied people had equal status w i t h it. T h e
O s l o process gave both sides hope and enlarged the capacity o f
each side to accept the other's violations.
T h e L i k u d government brought an entirely different outlook
to the agreements, acting as i f the learning process that the O s l o
accords laid out was a one-sided process. T h e Palestinians were to
pass all their tests i n full, and only afterwards w o u l d they be
moved from the status o f members o f a terrorist organization, or
of organizations that encourage terror, to the status of an interloc-
utor - and even then one o f inferior status. T h e L i k u d govern-
ment did not want the permanent settlement to create a
Palestinian state w i t h a status equal to that o f the State o f Israel,
but rather to Palestinian autonomy applying to several discon-
nected territorial enclaves covering just half o f the West Bank,
leaving broad powers to Israel. T o achieve this object,
Netanyahu's L i k u d government launched three parallel paths.
T h e first was to allot half a year to permanent status negotiations,
w h i c h were to begin immediately, o n the assumption that it
w o u l d succeed i n forcing the Palestinians to accept these terms.
T h e Palestinians rejected this absolutely because they wanted to
enter the permanent status negotiations w h i l e proceeding along
the O s l o path and implementing it to its fullest.
Netanyahu's second path was to enter into violent confronta-
tion w i t h the Palestinians, whether it broke out immediately or
during the permanent status talks. B u t the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y
acted cautiously and d i d not want to fall into this trap. T h e violent
reactions to the H a r H o m a project were discrete, controlled, and
supervised. T h i r d , the L i k u d government acted to expand the

Israeli settlements i n general, and Jewish housing in Jerusalem i n

particular, w i t h the aim o f taking control o f land that, i n its view,
had to be under Israeli sovereignty. Unilateral action thus
replaced agreements w i t h the Palestinians, and the L i k u d govern-
ment stood behind the O s l o agreements only i n w o r d . T o achieve
broad public support for its actions, the L i k u d government chose
to concentrate its efforts in Jerusalem. T h e capital, it believed, was
an area of national consensus, a sacred value that was w o r t h sacri-
ficing and fighting for. However, to achieve even broader support
it kept silent about this last argument, and instead formulated its
goal negatively: the Labor government, it claimed, had begun the
process o f handing the city over to the Palestinians ( H a ' a r e t z , 19
M a r c h 1997, 20 M a r c h 1997).
T h e L i k u d ' s policy turned Jerusalem into the essence o f the
dispute, rather than a separate issue. D u r i n g the Labor govern-
ment, w h i c h traveled along the O l s o path, Israel and the Palestin-
ians reached an understanding of Jerusalem as a problem o f its
own - not a local and marginal problem, but also not a problem
that epitomized the Israel-Palestinian dispute and not the princi-
pal dispute between the two sides. T h e Likud's policy was diamet-
rically opposed because, for the L i k u d , Jerusalem was at the heart
of the confrontation. T h e way o f getting off the O s l o track, or at
least o f stopping it i n its tracks, was to go through Jerusalem, by
engaging i n intensive unilateral activity there.
T h e Palestinians viewed Jerusalem as a place they could force
the L i k u d government to continue along the O s l o road ( H a ' a r e t z ,
24 A p r i l 1997). In order to re-isolate the Jerusalem problem from
the rest of the pending problems between the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity and Israel, they had to create a controlled diplomatic and v i o -
lent confrontation w i t h Israel over the opening o f the Western
W a l l T u n n e l and H a r H o m a . F r o m the point of view of the Pales-
tinians, the confrontation over Jerusalem was not meant to b l o w
up or halt the O s l o process, but rather to advance it. W h e n Israel
put Jerusalem at the focus o f the dispute, the Palestinians also
began stiffening their position. Arafat stopped talking publicly
about a creative solution to the problem and maintained that Jeru-
salem was the Palestinians' red line ( A l - Q u d s , 8 M a r c h 1998). In
other words, Jerusalem turned from a different and special issue
to the essence o f the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians.
" T h e struggle for Jerusalem is for us a question o f life or death ...

we w i l l mobilize all efforts and abilities to save Jerusalem and

against Israel's policy . . . Israel is a red line" ( A l - Q u d s , 2 J u l y 1998).

8
CONCLUSION
BRIDGES OVER A DIVIDED CITY
The b e g i n n i n g of t h e p e r m a n e n t status negotiations
The permanent status negotiations opened on M a y 6, 1996, but

Israel's change o f government that same m o n t h quickly put the
negotiations into deep freeze, and they were resumed only i n
October 1999, following the Barak government's accession the
previous May. W h e n the talks began i n M a y 1996, Israel was offi-
cially p r o m o t i n g the plan that Rabin had presented to the Knesset
at the beginning of October 1995, according to w h i c h j e r u s a l e m ,
in its current borders, w o u l d remain united under Israeli sover-
eignty, w i t h Israel respecting the rights o f all the city's religious
faiths. Furthermore, Israeli settlements i n the "greater Jerusalem"
area w o u l d be included i n its borders: M a ' a l e h A d u m i m , the
E t z i o n Bloc, Efrat, Betar, and Givat Ze'ev ( H a ' a r e t z , 6 O c t . 1995).
In mid-1997, P r i m e M i n i s t e r B i n y a m i n Netanyahu presented
his government w i t h his plan for a permanent settlement, accord-
ing to w h i c h "greater Jerusalem" was m u c h larger than it had been
in the Labor Party plan. Netanyahu stretched the "greater Jerusa-
lem" boundary northward to Ramallah i n order to include the set-
tlements Pesagot and Beit E l , and o n the west he significantly
broadened the "Jerusalem corridor," the narrow strip o f land that
had, before 1967, linked Jerusalem to the rest of Israel. T h e result
w o u l d have been that the Jerusalem area w o u l d stretch from the
Dead Sea to Israel's coastal plain, effectively bisecting the West
Bank. W i t h regard to the Islamic and Christian holy^, places,
Netanyahu suggested adopting a functional solution that w o u l d
provide free access along agreed routes, i n exchange for parallel
passage to those Jewish holy places located i n the 40 per cent of the
294

C o n c l u s i o n : Bridges over a D i v i d e d C i t y 295
West B a n k that w o u l d be under Palestinian rule ( H a ' a r e t z , 2 9 M a y

1997, 5 June 1997).
G i v e n the limited success of Israel's measures aimed at altering
the demographic balance in Jerusalem, and the lack of progress o n
M a y o r E h u d Olmert's construction plans (the exception being
the first stage o f the H a r H o m a neighborhood), Israeli planning
authorities had no choice but to prepare a significant extension o f
the city's borders. "Greater Jerusalem" is not understood as a
joint, equally divided Jewish and Arab urban space, but rather as
an entity w i t h a sharply clear national-ethnic-religious character.
As i n the past, the boundaries o f the urban space were not deter-
mined by geographical considerations, but by national ones. O n
February 12, 1997, the Israeli cabinet decided, secretly, to estab-
lish an umbrella municipality for the Jerusalem region. It was
clear to the government that it was impossible, from a diplomatic
and political point of view, to annex the Jewish West B a n k settle-
ments i n the Jerusalem region to Israel, so the decision was to
grant the umbrella municipality "planning and other powers" i n
the area "to the east, north, and south" of the city ( M a ' a r i v , 21 June
1998). T h e cabinet decided to appoint a team o f experts to exam-
ine h o w the decision could be implemented. T h i s C o m m i s s i o n
for the Strengthening of Jerusalem recommended the transfer o f
powers presently held by the district offices of government m i n i s -
tries to the umbrella municipality and coordination " w i t h repre-
sentatives of the M i n i s t r y of Defense [which is*responsible for the
West Bank and settlements] about the manner o f the integration
of the settlements to the east, north, and south, especially regard-
ing planning and construction" ( M a ' a r i v , 21 June 1998).
T h e commission advised establishing the umbrella m u n i c i p a l -
ity via Israeli legislation. Its powers w o u l d be divided between it
and the municipalities and local councils that w o u l d be included
w i t h i n it, and w o u l d include areas o f authority currently held by
Israel's national government. T h e umbrella municipality w o u l d
not collect taxes, i n c l u d i n g property taxes, but w o u l d rather
address issues o f planning and construction, infrastructure, e n v i -
ronmental quality, landscaping, economic development, tourism,
emergency and security systems, health, immigrant absorption,
cemeteries, and all other matters that the minister o f the interior
w o u l d see fit to transfer to it. T h e umbrella municipality w o u l d be
headed by the mayor of Jerusalem, and it w o u l d receive funding

from the national government and enjoy broad powers. A regional

planning bureau w o u l d be established i n the framework o f the
umbrella municipality, receiving the construction and planning
powers that are today invested i n the ministries of the interior and
defense.
The recommendations do not specify the names o f the West
B a n k settlements that w o u l d be included i n the umbrella m u n i c i -
pality, but they state explicitly that West B a n k settlements are to be
included. T h e plan was presented as a "rescue action" against "the
demographic threat" presented by Jerusalem's Arabs, w h o were
liable, i n the estimate of Israeli authorities, to become a full 40 per
cent o f the city's population. E v e n though the plan preserved the
autonomy of the small settlements beyond the annexation lines o f
June 1967, Jerusalem's shadow w o u l d fall over them, and the
Jerusalem municipality w o u l d gain more control o f their affairs,
in particular i n the areas of construction and planning. T h e docu-
ments do not specify w h i c h settlements w o u l d be included i n the
umbrella municipality, but it was stated orally that these w o u l d be
M a ' a l e h A d u m i m , Givat Ze'ev, and Betar. T h e y w o u l d not be
fully annexed to Jerusalem, unlike the localities that were w i t h i n
the borders o f the pre-1967 State o f Israel - Ramat Rahel, Beit
Zayit, Mevasseret Z i y y o n , O r a , Aminadav, T z u r Hadasah, and
M e v o - B e t a r . O n June 21, 1998, the cabinet approved the C o m -
mission's recommendations and set up a committee o f ministry
director-generals to formulate recommendations on the structure
of the umbrella municipality, the localities to be included i n it, its
powers, and its operational procedures. T h e C o m m i s s i o n was
supposed to complete this task by September 20, 1998, but at the
time o f writing, it has not done so. Furthermore, the inhabitants
of the communities to the west o f the city that are slated for
annexation have organized themselves to oppose the plan, pro-
testing that they do not want to be forced to become part of a city
that many of them deliberately left. A s a result, the minister of the
interior was charged w i t h drafting recommendations, by August
1, 1998, regarding the jurisdiction o f the umbrella municipality
( H a ' a r e t z , 11 M a y 1997, 25 M a r c h 1998, 22 A p r i l 1998, 20 M a y
1998, 21 M a y 1998, 7 June 1998, 19 June 1998, 22 June 1998; K o l
H a - I r , 5 D e c . 1997). These recommendations also have yet to be
submitted ( H a ' a r e t z , 30 N o v . 1999), apparently because, on
second thoughts, he is reluctant to cede a part o f his ministry's

powers to the Jerusalem municipality (Kol H a - I r , 20 O c t . 1998).

T h e only body to move towards implementation o f the program is
the Jerusalem municipality, w h i c h on June 23, 1998 approved the
establishment o f a metropolitan industrial zone near the A l - Z a ' i m
intersection i n the northern part o f the city ( H a ' a r e t z , 26 June
1998).
The cabinet's decision has more than the technical-organizational
significance that its proponents attributed to it. It involves trans-
ferring the above-mentioned West B a n k settlements from the
oversight o f the M i n i s t r y o f Defense to Israeli civilian authority.
T h e intention is to blur the distinction between Israel and the
West B a n k i n planning and construction, the very areas that were
the L i k u d government's central tool for trying to establish facts i n
Jerusalem prior to the permanent settlement. Specifically, i m p l e -
mentation o f the plan w i l l allow Israel to advance Plan I E and to
broaden control i n areas o f civilian activity that are generally asso-
ciated w i t h sovereignty. Today, Israeli army regulations allow a
Jewish settler i n the territories to enjoy, as a private citizen, most
o f the individual rights o f an Israeli citizen. T h e plan seeks to raise
these rights from the particular to the general level. T h e metro-
politan institutions w i l l grant a range o f new meanings to the dis-
tinction between a Jewish settler and a Palestinian inhabitant, and
these w i l l have d e j u r e status, as opposed to the de f a c t o status o f the
military orders. Finally, the plan unilaterally divests power f r o m
the Palestinians, ignoring the numerical paritybetween them and
Israelis w i t h i n the boundaries o f "greater Jerusalem" (Eldar, 22
June 1998).
T h e U . S . d i d not accept Israel's position that the cabinet deci-
sion had no diplomatic significance and that there was therefore
no reason for intervention i n Israel's internal affairs ( H a ' a r e t z , 22
June 1998; M a ' a r i v , 21 June 1998). N o t wanting to veto a security
council resolution introduced by the Arab states calling o n Israel
to cancel the plan, the U . S . negotiated w i t h Arab representatives
and the two sides agreed that the resolution w o u l d be w i t h d r a w n
in favor o f a consensus statement to be issued by the Security
C o u n c i l president to the effect that the Israeli government's deci-
sion was "a serious and harmful development" ( H a ' a r e t z , 15 J u l y
1998). Israel's unilateral actions i n Jerusalem had once again
caused K i n g H u s s e i n to place h i m s e l f at Arafat's side. A t a m i n i -
summit convened i n C a i r o w i t h M u b a r a k and Arafat, H u s s e i n

declared that the plan "requires all o f us ... to take a stand against
what is happening and to stop any change that takes place i n the
field. ... W e see the establishment o f an independent Palestinian
state i n the Palestinian homeland w i t h Jerusalem as its capital as
our major demand and we w i l l not deviate from it" ( A l - Q u d s , 6
J u l y 1998).
In parallel w i t h the greater Jerusalem plan, the M i n i s t r y o f
C o n s t r u c t i o n and H o u s i n g had published, by the end o f 1999,
tenders for the construction o f 2,506 housing units i n the part o f
the West Bank adjoining Jerusalem. O n paper, there is a plan to
double the number o f housing units i n the urban settlements
around Jerusalem w h i c h , at the beginning o f 2000, had about
12,000 housing units and a population o f some 66,000 ( H a ' a r e t z , 9
Jan. 1998, 6 D e c . 1999; Shragai, 18 Jan. 1998). A c c o r d i n g to the
Israeli government and the Jerusalem municipality, implementa-
tion o f the construction plans and o f the other clauses i n the plan
to strengthen Jerusalem w i l l create a demographic balance o f 70
per cent Jews and 30 per cent Arabs i n greater Jerusalem as a
whole, and not just w i t h i n its current borders. T h i s demographic
balance has become the guide for Israeli planning authorities,
instead o f the previous aspiration to reach a 75:25 ratio ( H a ' a r e t z ,
21 Jan. 1999,3 M a y 1999; K o l H a - I r , 22 Jan. 1999). As noted above
in chapter 7, d u r i n g the years 1997-2000 the number o f requests
for b u i l d i n g permits submitted to the local Palestinian i n the Jeru-
salem district was about 3,000. T h e demographic balance i n the
Jerusalem metropolitan area has not changed i n Israel's favor.
T h e Palestinians also commenced preparations for the perma-
nent settlement. A t the 21 convention o f the Palestinian N a t i o n a l
C o u n c i l , held i n Gaza i n A p r i l 1996, it was decided to establish a
Jerusalem and B u i l d i n g o f the H o m e l a n d C o m m i t t e e as a P N C
committee, w i t h the goal o f influencing the positions to be taken
by Arafat i n the negotiations over Jerusalem i n the permanent
status talks.
T h e committee was headed by Faisal H u s s e i n i , whose presence
was clearly felt i n its decisions. It expressed the positions and con-
cerns o f O r i e n t H o u s e and the political establishment i n Jerusa-
lem. T h e c o n c l u d i n g report laid out the dangers to the Palestinian
identity o f East Jerusalem as a result o f "the lack o f a national Pal-
estinian strategy for coping w i t h the measures being taken by
Israel" ( A l - Q u d s , 26 A p r i l 1996). T h e committee demanded that

the Palestinians "prepare w i t h precision their negotiating file o n

Jerusalem and decide what their red lines are o n the subject. T h i s
requires enlisting all Palestinian potential, talent, and expertise, as
well as the assistance o f friends, i n order to reinforce the position
of the Palestinian negotiator" ( A l - Q u d s , 26 A p r i l 1996). T b e c o m -
mittee's statement and its lines o f action matched the plans that
had been previously prepared by the O r i e n t H o u s e staff ( H a ' a r e t z ,
28 June 1996).
O n the parliamentary level, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y Legisla-
tive C o u n c i l decided i n m i d - M a y 1996 that its permanent seat
w o u l d be i n Jerusalem and that until it could be established it
w o u l d migrate between Gaza, Ramallah, and E l - B i r e h . T h i s was a
symbolic decision, to w h i c h an organizational decision was
appended. T h e C o u n c i l established a committee for Jerusalem
affairs for the purpose o f tracking the permanent status talks, to
oversee the activities o f the Jerusalem Affairs M i n i s t r y , and to take
part i n determining "a comprehensive national strategy on Jerusa-
lem that w i l l take into consideration the city's needs and reinforce
the steadfastness o f its inhabitants" ( A l - Q u d s , 17 M a y 1996;
A h m a d , 1997). T h i s definition o f roles and powers was supported
by a majority i n the Legislative C o u n c i l , w i n n i n g out over a for-
mulation proposed by one o f the Jerusalem representatives,
H a t e m A b d al-Qadr E i d , w h o demanded that the statement o f
appointment declare explicitly that Jerusalem is an inseparable
part o f the territories occupied i n 1967. T h i s was not H a t e m E i d ' s
only "hawkish" position. H e also said that w h e n the Jerusalem
question was placed on the negotiating table, at w h i c h time Israel
w o u l d demand that the permanent agreement guarantee Israeli
sovereignty over East Jerusalem, the Palestinians must, i n
response, state their demands regarding Palestinian claims to
property that Palestinians had left behind them i n West Jerusalem
in 1948. T h i s position d i d not, however, w i n broad support
( H a ' a r e t z , 17 M a y 1996). T h e high level o f activity o f the Legisla-
tive C o u n c i l members from Jerusalem w i t h regard to their elec-
toral district, and their stand against the national leadership, led
Palestinian public o p i n i o n to identify the Legislative C o u n c i l as an
institution that was fighting for Jerusalem. A c c o r d i n g to a C P R S
survey conducted i n September and October 1996, Jerusalem was
the issue on w h i c h the Legislative C o u n c i l received the highest
marks. Nationally, 70.8 per cent o f those surveyed claimed that

the C o u n c i l ' s accomplishments i n this area were "good" or "very

good," w h i c h was 10.9 per cent higher than the marks it received
on its handling o f the settlement issue. T h e C o u n c i l received high
marks from the residents o f Jerusalem as well, even i f consider-
ably lower than its rating o n the national level - 58.2 per cent.
O n the whole, two approaches can be discerned w i t h i n the Pal-
estinian establishment. T h e first is that o f the Jerusalem delega-
tion to the Palestinian Legislative C o u n c i l and o f the local political
establishment centered o n O r i e n t H o u s e - i n particular H a t e m
'Id, H a n a n Ashrawi, and Faisal H u s s e i n i . T h e y seek to limit the
distinction between Jerusalem and the rest o f the 1967 territories
to a single principle: preventing the physical division of the city by
a wall like the one that divided it between 1948 and 1967. T h e
border should be the one that preceded the 1967 war, and Pales-
tinian political sovereignty over East Jerusalem should, they feel,
be complete.
K n o w i n g that Israel w o u l d demand that its annexation o f East
Jerusalem be recognized and grounded i n the permanent settle-
ment, Faisal H u s s e i n i remarked that the Palestinians w o u l d c o u n -
ter w i t h a demand that Palestinian property i n west Jerusalem be
returned to them. H u s s e i n i stated that the permanent status talks
w o u l d discuss west as w e l l as East Jerusalem; according to h i m , 70
per cent o f the land i n west Jerusalem is Palestinian property ( A l -
A y a m , 27 Sept. 1999). In keeping w i t h this, two Palestinian insti-
tutions, the Institute for Land and Water Research and Legal Ser-
vices and the Association for the Protection o f H u m a n Rights,
began collecting material for a database that w o u l d serve as the
basis for claims to ownership o f this property ( H a ' a r e t z , 8 Feb.
1996, 19 Feb. 1996, 22 Sept. 1997, 24 Sept. 1998).
These moves should be viewed as being aimed at providing a
card to play and not as a new Palestinian strategy for taking over
large parts o f west Jerusalem. Israel w i l l concede all or most o f its
claims i n East Jerusalem and the Palestinians w i l l do the same
w i t h their claims i n the west side o f the city. I f the area subject to
negotiation is just East Jerusalem, the compromise lines w i l l pass
through the Arab part o f the city and the Palestinians' gains i n
Jerusalem w i l l be negligible. F o r this purpose, H u s s e i n i has
invoked Israel's classic, almost mythic, claim that Jerusalem is and
must forever be a single and indivisible city. If the principle is that
sovereignty over the city cannot be divided, then the two sides o f

the city must then be discussed together. If Israel should refuse to

do so, the Palestinians w o u l d be able to argue that Jerusalem is not
one city but two, and that sovereignty should be divided according
to the 1967 lines (Abd a l - H a d i , 1996: 213-22; A l - A y a m , 27 Sept.
1999; A l - Q u d s , 14 M a y 19,96; H u s s e i n i , 1996: 203-8; M u s a l l a m ,
1996: 121-6).
T h e major Palestinian national institutions i n Gaza advocated
the second approach. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the
talks, A b u - M a z e n explicitly stated that the Palestinian capital was
East Jerusalem alone. "We are eager to live i n peace i n the frame-
w o r k o f an independent Palestinian state whose capital is East
Jerusalem, and whose borders are secure and recognized, the J u n e
4, 1967 borders" ( A l - Q u d s , 6 M a y 1996). Arafat also stated more
than once that "the Jerusalem that we are speaking of is East J e r u -
salem ( A l - Q u d s a l - S h a r q i y y a ) , the capital o f the Palestinian state"
( A l - A y a m , 6 D e c . 1998; 2 N o v . 1999; H a ' a r e t z , 30 N o v . 1998). In
their opinion, Jerusalem is one o f several issues to be resolved i n
the permanent status negotiations. It is not an issue that stands
above all other issues; it is o f equal importance and can therefore
be discussed i n the framework o f a deal w i t h Israel over a set o f
issues. It was this approach that i n fact stood at the basis of what is
called the B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n document (Beilin, 1997: 167-70).
The B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n understandings
In secret negotiations that were conducted i n 1994-5, Israeli and
Palestinian teams formulated an unofficial statement o f under-
standing on the parameters o f the permanent agreement. T h e i r
goal was to finish the j o b by M a y 1996, the official opening of the
permanent status talks. A t that time, according to the plan, this
framework agreement w o u l d be produced and initialed by both
sides. Israel w o u l d hold national elections that w o u l d also serve as
a national plebiscite o n the framework agreement, m a k i n g it pos-
sible to reach a full agreement w i t h i n a short time (Beilin, 1997:
180). M o s t of the discussions were conducted between the Israeli
team that had originally been involved i n the O s l o initiative - D r .
Ron P u n d i k and D r . Yair Hirschfeld, under the direction ofYossi
B e i l i n - and two academic figures from E n g l a n d - D r . A h m e d
Khalidi and H u s s e i n Agha, under the direction o f A b u - M a z e n .
Dr. Khalidi and Agha, Fatah members since the 1960s, had been

members of the advisory team to the Palestinian delegation to the

M a d r i d conference, and K h a l i d i had also participated i n the nego-
tiations at Taba over the O s l o II agreement (Beilin, 1997: 183,
195). In these talks, Jerusalem was one of the issues on the agenda,
but not the most important or most fundamental o f them. T h e
difficulty of reaching agreement on Jerusalem was no greater than
that of agreeing on the future of Israel's settlements i n the territo-
ries. E v e n w h e n agreement was not reached on various constitu-
ent questions o f the Jerusalem issue, it d i d not keep the teams
from progressing towards solutions to other questions (Beilin,
1997: 174, 193, 200).
T h e c o n c l u d i n g session o f the discussions on the document
took place o n October 30, 1995. It was not an official agreement,
but rather an academic and n o n - b i n d i n g understanding f o r m u -
lated w i t h the knowledge and under the direction o f B e i l i n and
A b u - M a z e n , from w h i c h the political leadership could continue
w i t h the negotiations. T h e first section o f the document deals
w i t h the establishment o f a Palestinian state, w h i c h had, for the
Palestinians, become a touchstone for w h i c h they were prepared
to pay w i t h other issues, i n c l u d i n g Jerusalem. T h e B e i l i n / A b u -
M a z e n understandings expanded Jerusalem's borders and
redivided the expanded territory into five political-municipal
areas: the capital o f Israel, the capital o f Palestine, the Temple
M o u n t , the O l d C i t y , and the Arab and J e w i s h neighborhoods on
the east side of the city. In these five areas there was a variable, dif-
ferential level o f Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty.
T h e proposal was to expand the city's territory and establish an
umbrella municipality for the Jerusalem area. T h e umbrella
municipality w o u l d be administered by a Jewish majority and
w o u l d be headed by a mayor. T w o sub-municipalities w o u l d func-
tion under the umbrella municipality: a Jewish sub-municipality,
w h i c h w o u l d provide services to and be responsible for all the
Jewish neighborhoods i n the west and east of the city, including i n
the O l d C i t y , and an Arab sub-municipality, w h i c h w o u l d provide
identical services to the Arab residents i n the new and expanded
part o f Jerusalem. T h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f this sub-municipality
w o u l d extend over areas that are not currently part of Jerusalem's
municipal territory: A l - A z a r i y a and A b u - D i s , alongside the rest o f
the more distant suburbs of East Jerusalem. T h i s sub-municipality
w o u l d be called A l - Q u d s and w o u l d be the capital o f the

Conclusion: Bridges over a D i v i d e d C i t y 303
Palestinian state. T h e Israeli part o f the city w o u l d include west

Jerusalem and M a ' a l e h A d u m u m and Givat Ze'ev, w h i c h w o u l d
be annexed to the city. Each side w o u l d recognize the other's capi-
tal. Israel's recognition o f the capital o f Palestine, after l o n g years
of denying the Palestinians' nationality and their tie to Jerusalem,
w o u l d be an historic achievement. Palestinian recognition of west
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel w o u l d allow the Arab and Islamic
states and the rest o f the world's countries to follow suit and rec-
ognize Israel's capital, w h i c h most countries n o w refuse to do.
East Jerusalem as it is n o w defined - the Arab and J e w i s h neigh-
borhoods on the east side of the city, w i t h the exception of the O l d
C i t y - w o u l d remain an area that both sides w o u l d continue to
claim for themselves and over w h i c h Israel w o u l d be prepared to
negotiate. In practice, however, this area w o u l d continue to be
under Israeli sovereignty until such time as the two sides reach an
accommodation. Israel w o u l d argue that there had been no return
to the 1967 borders, in Jerusalem i n particular, and that Jerusalem
was not under divided sovereignty, since the Palestinian capital
w o u l d be established outside the current borders of the city i n an
area that is n o w under the rule o f the Palestinian Authority. T h e
Palestinians could claim that their recognition of west Jerusalem
as the capital o f Israel is acknowledgement o f an established fact,
and that they had, by negotiation, succeeded i n removing East
Jerusalem from Israel's hands and annulling its annexation, even
though they w o u l d not receive full sovereignty over the area that
Israel had occupied i n 1967.
T h e question o f territorial sovereignty was deliberately left
undecided. T h e sovereignty that w o u l d prevail i n the current East
Jerusalem w o u l d be, i n Palestinian eyes, a temporary and unrec-
ognized continuation o f the forced annexation o f 1967. Palestin-
ian citizenship w o u l d be extended to Palestinian residents o f this
area and, i n certain matters, Palestinian citizens residing i n this
area w o u l d be subject to Palestinian law. T h e Palestinians w o u l d
continue to demand that the area be transferred to their sover-
eignty, and a j o i n t commission w o u l d deliberate the issue w i t h o u t
setting a deadline for finishing its j o b . Israel saw this as a long-
term solution, i n the framework of w h i c h the question o f sover-
eignty w o u l d remain without any final resolution. In the mean-
time, the existing situation w o u l d continue to prevail, and Israel
could continue to manage the affairs o f this area. Israel w o u l d

claim that the retention of the status q u o meant that Israel was sov-
ereign, because the Israel police w o u l d continue to keep public
order; the Palestinians, for their part, could present the establish-
ment of the c o m m i s s i o n and its mandate to address the issue as an
Israeli retreat from the annexation o f East Jerusalem. T h i s
arrangement w o u l d not include the O l d C i t y , w h i c h w o u l d
receive a special status; complete and absolute freedom of worship
w o u l d be guaranteed to the members o f all religions at their
respective holy sites, w i t h preservation of the status q u o w i t h regard
to Jewish worship on the T e m p l e M o u n t .
A c c o r d i n g to the understandings reached by the two teams, the
Palestinians w o u l d be allowed to raise their flag over al-Haram al-
Sharif as an expression o f the Palestinian W a q f s autonomous
administration o f the site, and the c o m p o u n d w o u l d be declared
extra-territorial sovereignty. Administration o f the Islamic holy
sites by the Palestinians w o u l d not denote their sovereignty, but at
the same time Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and M o r o c c o , for example,
could not gain a status equal to that of the Palestinians. If they par-
ticipate i n administration of the site it w i l l be because the Palestin-
ians allow them to do so. O f course, the Palestinians w o u l d have
right o f access to the Islamic and Christian holy sites i n the O l d
C i t y , and for this purpose they w o u l d be given a corridor between
A l - Q u d s and A l - H a r a m al-Sharif. In an effort to reduce the
expected opposition from Jewish extremists, it was proposed
orally i n the talks that the Palestinians agree to set aside a small and
defined place o n the edge o f the c o m p o u n d for Jewish prayer, i n
the area w h i c h orthodox J e w i s h religious law states is undoubt-
edly outside the ancient T e m p l e M o u n t , but this proposal was not
included i n the written document, w h i c h emphasizes the preser-
vation of the status q u o . U n l i k e the T e m p l e M o u n t , the C h u r c h o f
the H o l y Sepulcher w o u l d fall under the jurisdiction of the Pales-
tinian sub-municipality and w o u l d not be declared an extra-terri-
torial zone.
In fact, the B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n understandings expand the
bounds o f the O l d C i t y beyond the area inside the walls, and
include the Jehoshaphat Valley and the M o u n t o f Olives w i t h
their sites holy to the three monotheistic faiths. Sovereignty over
this area w o u l d remain i n practice i n Israeli hands, a k i n d o f con-
tinuation of the current situation, but daily life w o u l d be managed
j o i n t l y w i t h the Palestinians. O f course, the Palestinians w o u l d

not recognize Israeli sovereignty i n principle. M o r e o v e r , it was

possible that there w o u l d be equal Israeli and Palestinian repre-
sentation on the administering body. T h e zone w o u l d be declared
a holy area and designated for preservation not only because o f its
sacred and historic sites, but also i n order to prevent national and
religious competition over it.
W i t h the exception of the holy area, the entire Jerusalem region
w o u l d be administratively restructured into a framework o f bor-
oughs that w o u l d have independence i n municipal administra-
tion. T h e boroughs o f A l - Q u d s w o u l d comprise its sub-
municipality, and the boroughs of Jerusalem w o u l d comprise its
sub-municipality. T h e boroughs w o u l d be geographic, func-
tional, and national-ethnic units. Palestinians and Israelis w o u l d
each elect the mayor o f its o w n sub-municipality. It is important
to mention that the Arab residents o f East Jerusalem w o u l d par-
ticipate i n the election o f the mayor of A l - Q u d s , thus expressing
their distinct identity. These areas, such as the neighborhoods o f
Sheikh Jarah and W a d i Joz, w o u l d be administered as a borough o f
the A l - Q u d s sub-municipality, even though they w o u l d not be
under Palestinian sovereignty. In this they w o u l d be unlike A l -
Azaria and A b u - D i s , i n w h i c h both day-to-day administration and
sovereignty w o u l d be Palestinian. T h e understanding that the
present residents o f East Jerusalem w o u l d vote for the mayor o f
the Palestinian sub-municipality was a Palestinian gain. U n l i k e
the situation i n w h i c h they were annexed to Israel and could only
participate i n the elections to the Israeli municipality, they w o u l d
be able to vote for and be elected as the mayor o f A l - Q u d s . T h e
Palestinians w o u l d see this as an expression o f their national sov-
ereignty over East Jerusalem, w h i l e Israel w o u l d claim that the
matter was undecided, and that the elections signified only day-
to-day administration.
Above the sub-municipalities w o u l d be the umbrella m u n i c i -
pality, w i t h a city council containing one representative from each
of the city's boroughs. T h i s body w o u l d choose the mayor. Since,
the number o f Israeli boroughs and Palestinian boroughs w o u l d
reflect the present demographic balance o f 2:1, it was reasonable
to assume that the mayor o f "Greater Jerusalem" w o u l d be an
Israeli. H o w e v e r , the demographic proportions w o u l d be
updated, i n accordance w i t h agreed procedures, i n the light o f
any subsequent changes. T h e umbrella m u n i c i p a l i t y w o u l d

assume authority over matters affecting both the sub-municipal-

ities, such as master development plans, main roads, sewerage,
and so on. Finally, the Palestinians w o u l d be able to use the Atarot
(Kalandia) airport without passing through an Israeli border
check.
T h e beauty o f the B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n document is its integra-
tion o f different elements, such as achievements that both sides
share equally, mutual recognition of each other's capitals, the dis-
mantling of the Jerusalem issue into its principal components, and
the game of give and take between the sides. T h i s means insisting
on an important principle i n exchange for the other side's agree-
ment to compromise on a principle that is less important for it,
and vice versa. So there w o u l d be no Palestinian sovereignty
w i t h i n the boundaries o f Jerusalem as established by Israel i n
1967, nor o n the T e m p l e M o u n t , w h i l e the Palestinians could fly
their flag over the Islamic holy sites. Certain municipal functions
now exercised by the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem w o u l d be
transferred to the A l - Q u d s municipality, and the Arabs o f East
Jerusalem w o u l d participate i n the election o f the A l - Q u d s city
council, thus connecting them to the Palestinian capital - unlike
the current situation, i n w h i c h they are allowed to vote only for
the Israeli city council and mayor on the local level and for the Pal-
estinian A u t h o r i t y on the national level. In exchange, Israel w o u l d
enjoy control o f the umbrella municipality. Furthermore, the
B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n understandings use a range o f means to m i t i -
gate the dispute over Jerusalem, for example by postponing the
resolution o f sovereignty over the annexed part of Jerusalem, the
declaration o f a holy zone so as to prevent extremists from using
religious fervor to ignite a nationalist conflagration, the blurring
of the term sovereignty, and distinguishing between its l e g a l -
official aspects and its political, symbolic, and functional aspects.
Each one of the characteristics of sovereignty is divided differently
between the sides i n the Jerusalem region.
T h e understandings also make extensive and sophisticated use
of the functional approach, focusing o n the particular arrange-
ments r e q u i r e d by day-to-day life rather than seeking over-
arching decisions and resolution on the symbolic level. B u t it is
important to emphasize that the understanding achieved by B e i l i n
and A b u - M a z e n does not neglect the symbolic. Instead, however,
of allowing this aspect to be dominant and to determine the lines

of the arrangement, there is a hierarchy o f institutions and s o l u -

tions providing symbolic satisfaction as needed. In other words,
the B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n understandings also use the differential
approach, w h i c h distinguishes between partial and full realization
of rights, aspirations, and symbols, and different levels o f m u n i c i -
pal administration and definition o f the m u n i c i p a l space (for the
conceptual basis o f the document, see Hasson, 1997).
T h e B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n understandings can be seen as preserv-
ing the city's unity on a variable basis, yet also as demarcating dif-
ferent levels o f the division o f Jerusalem. N e i t h e r side w i l l fulfill
all its dreams, but neither w i l l either side be forced to abandon its
viewpoint, w h i c h it w i l l realize i n some way. H e r e is the balance
sheet for each side: Israel achieves recognition o f its capital. There
is no Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem as Israel defined
it i n 1967, nor is there a return to the 1967 borders i n Jerusalem.
Jerusalem is not divided physically nor w i t h regard to sovereignty.
There is no Palestinian sovereignty on the T e m p l e M o u n t , but
rather a d e j u r e confirmation o f the defacto status that has prevailed
since 1967. T h e umbrella municipality is under Israeli control and
the mayor w i l l be Israeli; M a ' a l e h A d u m i m and Givat Ze'ev, out-
side Jerusalem's municipal borders, are annexed to Israel w i t h
Palestinian consent. T h e Palestinians, for their part, achieve rec-
ognition o f their capital. Israel consents to re-examine the annex-
ation o f East Jerusalem, thus placing a question mark over Israeli
sovereignty there. A Palestinian flag flies over a l - H a r a m al-Sharif
and the Palestinians receive a preferential position there, taking
from Israel the power to grant any sort o f status to other Arab and
Islamic states. There is a safe passage between A l - Q u d s and the al-
H a r a m al-Sharif c o m p o u n d and j o i n t administration o f the O l d
City. East Jerusalem Arabs participate i n the A l - Q u d s m u n i c i p a l
elections, and the A l - Q u d s sub-municipality runs the day-to-day
municipal affairs o f the Arabs, i n coordination w i t h the umbrella
municipality.
T h e agreement o n the outline o f the framework and the g u i d -
ing principles allowed A b u - M a z e n to make an optimistic assess-
ment that it w o u l d take only a m o n t h for R a b i n and Arafat to
approve the document and its accompanying maps. T h e assassina-
tion o f Prime M i n i s t e r Yitzhak R a b i n on N o v e m b e r 4, 1995 and
the election o f a L i k u d government i n M a y 1996 prevented the
plan from being realized. B e i l i n and A b u - M a z e n separately

presented the plan to P r i m e M i n i s t e r S h i m o n Peres and to C h a i r -

man Arafat a week after the assassination. Arafat and Peres, each
for his o w n reasons, d i d not accept the document. Peres did not
want a quick agreement w i t h the Palestinians - for electoral rea-
sons he preferred to defer negotiations. H e believed that the doc-
ument was premature and that Israel's citizens were not yet
prepared to consent to it. H e thus rejected Beilin's position that
the document should be incorporated into Labor's election plat-
form and that it w o u l d help Labor w i n a majority. Peres preferred
to receive a general mandate from the Israeli citizenry for con-
ducting negotiations, rather than for approval o f a specific plan.
Instead of intensifying the discord i n Israeli society he preferred to
try to heal the wounds created by the conflict between the sup-
porters of the peace process and its opponents from the national-
religious right.
T o this should be added the huge responsibility that fell on
Peres after Rabin's murder. T h i s was the first time i n the c o u n -
try's history that a prime minister or cabinet member had been
assassinated, and that after a campaign of defamation, divisiveness
and animosity by his political and ideological opponents. After
Rabin's assassination no Israeli prime minister can afford not to
fear another political murder. T h i s was not just a personal consid-
eration - what another assassination was liable to do to Israeli
democracy also had to be taken into account.
As for the document itself, Peres felt that it left the issue of sov-
ereignty over East Jerusalem too open, and he also opposed allow-
ing a Palestinian flag to fly over the T e m p l e M o u n t . Furthermore,
Peres sought a way to include Jordan i n the permanent settlement.
H e wanted to give it an institutionalized and agreed status on al-
H a r a m al-Sharif. O v e r and beyond all this was the question of the
electoral t i m i n g (Beilin, 1997: 210-18; G a l i l i , 4 A u g . 1996;
H a ' a r e t z , 19 Feb. 1996, 22 Feb. 1996, 31 J u l y 1996, 1 Aug. 1996, 2
Aug. 1996, 10 O c t . 1996, 7 M a r c h 1997). T h e news reports i n
Israel i n August 1996 o n the B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n understandings
roused the anger o f the Palestinian establishment i n Jerusalem
(Sokol, 4 A u g . 1996) and embarrassed the Palestinian national
0
establishment. Since the new Israeli government elected injsrael

in June 1996 considered the document irrelevant, even A b u -
M a z e n disassociated himself from it, denying its very existence i n

Conclusion: Bridges overa D i v i d e d C i t y 309
a meeting o f the Fatah central committee that convened at the

beginning o f August 1996 (Sokol, 4 A u g . 1996).
Since 1996, a revised version o f the B e i l i n / A b u - M a z e n plan has
been discussed unofficially by academics from both sides, w h o
have reported their discussions to their respective political leader-
ships. A c c o r d i n g to this "improved" proposal, a network o f roads,
tunnels, and bridges w i l l tie all the pieces o f A l - Q u d s together.
T h e major innovation i n the revised plan is a call for Israel to allow
Palestinian sovereignty i n the Arab neighborhoods w i t h i n the
current Jerusalem boundaries, alongside the Arab suburbs n o w
outside the city. In return, the Palestinians w i l l consent to leave
vague or defer the issue o f sovereignty i n the "holy basin" - the
O l d C i t y and the surrounding sacred and historical areas. Special
arrangements w i l l be made for the "holy basin," i n c l u d i n g the
option o f allowing both sides to display their respective national
symbols ( J e r u s a l e m R e p o r t , 28 Feb. 2000).
T h e opening o f negotiations o n the permanent settlement, i n
M a y 1996, sharpened the differences that had been evident earlier
between the national Palestinian leadership, w h i c h was negotiat-
ing w i t h Israel, and the local Jerusalem leadership. T h e opposition
was led by H a t e m A b d el-Qadr E i d , a member o f the Jerusalem
delegation i n the Palestinian Legislative C o u n c i l . H e was the
m o v i n g force behind a leaflet published o n M a y 15, 1996, w h i c h
stated that "Arab Jerusalem is shrinking . . . Jerusalem w i l l not
return to our hands by negotiation alone" ( Y e r u s h a l a y i m , 10 M a y
1996). T h e Palestinians had to take action, such as finding hous-
ing solutions w i t h i n the O l d C i t y ; renovating its dilapidated
homes; setting a rent ceiling for the city; i m p o s i n g rules o n h o m e -
owners w h o preferred to rent their property to diplomats, foreign
journalists, and U N representatives for high prices; and organiz-
ing mass demonstrations and strikes. E i d was also behind the p r o -
test activity organized i n M a r c h 1998 by the Fatah's Jerusalem
branch against Israel's policy in Jerusalem. U n d e r the direction o f
the local Fatah, a commercial and school strike was organized, but
Arafat clipped Eid's wings and d i d not permit the protest he had
organized to take off. In protest, E i d resigned his chairmanship o f
the Jerusalem committee i n the Legislative C o u n c i l (Kol H a - I r , 6
M a r c h 1998, 27 M a r c h 1998) and stated that "the Palestinian
Authority has conceded Jerusalem" (Kol H a - I r , 2 7 M a r c h 1998).
"It looks to me as i f they prefer a Palestinian state w i t h o u t

Jerusalem to the opposite," he added ( C o h e n , 29 A p r i l 1998). T h e

elections to the Fatah leadership i n Jerusalem, conducted on
N o v e m b e r 16, 1998, honed its activist profile. Sixty-two candi-
dates competed for 17 seats and fought for the support o f some
2,000 voters w h o gathered for the election. Those elected were
young, largely between the ages of 25 and 35, former Intifada and
field activists w i t h "hawkish" views (Kol H a - I r , 20 N o v . 1998).
These positions were what led Arafat to declare i n his speech to
the assembly that i f the way of peace d i d not lead to the realization
of the Palestinian right to a state w i t h Jerusalem as its capital, "our
rifles are ready, and we are prepared to use them against all w h o
might try to prevent us from praying i n Jerusalem" ( H a ' a r e t z , 16
N o v . 1998).
A countervailing statement was not long i n coming, and was
made i n S t o c k h o l m at an event marking the tenth anniversary o f
the P L O ' s recognition of Israel and condemnation of terror. In his
speech, Arafat set out the guiding principles for a permanent set-
tlement, and w i t h regard to Jerusalem he stated that the city
should remain open "to all its inhabitants without prejudice. T h e
city must remain physically undivided by roadblocks and fortifi-
cations. There is no solution to the Jerusalem question unless the
interests of all sides are taken into account, together w i t h standing
firm on halting the Judaization of Jerusalem and the preservation
of the rights of all communities and of adherents of all the m o n o -
theistic faiths equally" ( A l - A y a m , 6 D e c . 1998).
T h e events and developments i n the Jerusalem area since 1967

that affect the f o r m of the permanent status may be categorized i n
accordance w i t h the following questions: Is there a functional or
geographic division between Jews and Arabs? Is there competition
between them? If so, i n what area and what level of competition?
A r e a s of f u n c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n between Jews and Arabs
THE SPATIAL I D E N T I T Y O F T H E RESIDENTS O F EAST J E R U S A L E M
Culturally, linguistically, and religiously *the identity of East J e r u -

salem's inhabitants is M u s l i m or C h r i s t i a n Arab. T h e i r spatial
identity is unique and manifestly distinct from that of Jerusalem's
Jewish inhabitants. E v e n though city ordinances require shop-
keepers to display a H e b r e w sign alongside those i n other

languages, the signs i n East Jerusalem have no H e b r e w , only

Arabic and English, w i t h the exception of certain areas frequented
by Israeli Jewish customers. Like other foreign languages,
H e b r e w is an elective, not a required course i n East Jerusalem
schools and at A l - Q u d s University. Israeli institutions that func-
tion i n East Jerusalem have no choice but to use Arabic i n order to
provide services to the local residents, although Arabic is used
alongside H e b r e w or English. A T M s , bank statements issued by
Israel's B a n k Discount, bank forms, m u n i c i p a l forms, and health
plan forms are b i - or trilingual (English being the third language),
as are the road signs. T r u e , the H e b r e w font is larger than the
Arabic one o n official forms and signs, but this cannot hide the
fact that East Jerusalem has its o w n independent linguistic m i l i e u
(al-Qaq, 1997).
Culturally and religiously, it is not only the M u s l i m religious
institutions that create the different character o f East Jerusalem.
Businesses and commercial establishments are open and public
transportation functions on the Jewish Sabbath and holidays, i n
glaring contrast to the situation i n Jewish Jerusalem. E v e n the
entry of Jewish settlers into East Jerusalem Arab neighborhoods
has not changed this situation i n any fundamental way - the settler
homes are few relative to the majority population. There is c o n -
siderable friction between them. T h e change that this penetration
seeks to make i n the spatial identity causes the Palestinian p o p u -
lace to close ranks to repel the threat.
ISRAEL'S P O S S E S S I O N O F T H E O F F I C I A L S Y M B O L S O F I D E N T I T Y ,
AFFILIATION, AND SOVEREIGNTY
There are two facets here - one symbolic and one practical. O n
the symbolic level, sovereignty is expressed by the simple fact that
the inhabitants o f East Jerusalem bear Israeli identity cards. T h e
practical side is the benefits, payments, and services that the h o l d -
ers o f Israeli I D cards receive, alongside the obligations and pay-
ments imposed o n them. A n Israeli I D card brings w i t h it a variety
of benefits inasmuch as it implies official affiliation w i t h Israel.
These benefits include the right to vote i n m u n i c i p a l elections,
social benefits, health and welfare payments, at an average o f $354
per person per year i n 1999 prices, from Israel's social security
system, residential rights i n Jerusalem, freedom o f movement
into and out o f the city i n times o f closure, freedom o f

employment inside and outside the city, i n c l u d i n g freedom o f

movement and o f employment i n Jewish Jerusalem. T h e East
Jerusalem Arabs consider these rights to be very important since
they grant them an economic, social, and employment advantage
over their peers i n the West Bank. E v e n though this freedom is
interfered w i t h at times by security checks and harassment, these
do not detract from the difference i n status between East Jerusa-
lem Arabs and the rest of the Palestinians i n the West Bank. Israel
has exclusivity i n these matters; the Palestinian Authority is not a
competitor. Israel views the symbolic aspect as the most impor-
tant, whereas the inhabitants of East Jerusalem accept their Israeli
identity i n a pragmatic sense.
In this context there is a difference, first and foremost, between
the official and functional-local identity of the East Jerusalem Pal-
estinians and their political and national identity. O n l y 2.3 per
cent of them are Israeli citizens; the rest have only resident status.
Legally, their national identity is not Israeli and they do not have
the political rights that citizenship brings on the national level, the
most important of w h i c h is the right to vote for and be elected to
the Knesset. Likewise, it is important to distinguish between the
"strong," full symbolic identity of citizens of Israel and the "weak"
symbolic identity of the residents w h o are not citizens. H o l d i n g a
resident I D card creates but a "weak" symbolic link w i t h Israel.
T h e Israeli resident status o f East Jerusalem Palestinians estab-
lishes nothing about their political ties or their national identity.
INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICES
Israeli currency has been the principal legal tender i n East Jerusa-
lem since 1967, w i t h the Jordanian dinar functioning alongside it.
T h e dinar's status i n East Jerusalem's commercial, economic, and
financial life was prominent until its value plunged i n 1991. I f a
currency is not only a means for the development o f economic
and commercial life but also a national symbol, it was clear that
the dominant symbol was the Israeli shekel, but that its status was
not exclusive.
C u l t u r e a n d m e d i a . East Jerusalem's culture and media are Arab

and Palestinian, functioning i n the framework o f Israeli law,
w h i c h subjects them to Israel's censorship office. T h e over-arch-
ing framework is Israeli, but a different linguistic, cultural, and
historical identity beats underneath. It should be kept i n m i n d

that the national movements i n the M i d d l e East built their p o l i t -

ical consciousnesses and national ideologies o n their l i n g u i s t i c -
cultural distinctiveness and on consciousness o f their historical
uniqueness. In most cases this consciousness led them to demand
its expression i n a separate• political structure and national institu-
tions. W h i l e it is not necessarily the case, i n general, national
movements demand full independence for their peoples, and this
is the case w i t h the Palestinians. T h e linguistic, cultural, and his-
torical identity o f the Palestinians i n East Jerusalem cannot be
detached from their political and institutional expression. It is
impossible to maintain for any length o f time a system i n w h i c h
people o f Arab-Palestinian cultural, linguistic, and historical
identity remain without national rights, and are discriminated
against i n the distribution o f services and resources, i n access to
centers of power, and in the operation of the city's control mecha-
nisms. T h e arrangements for the elections o f the Palestinian
Authority's president and Legislative C o u n c i l opened a door i n
this direction, but they also created a situation that differentiates
between East Jerusalem and the rest o f the West Bank.
T h e freedom of the press that the Palestinian media enjoys is a
right that it pays for by being subject to Israeli censorship. B e i n g
under Israeli law gives Palestinian journalists and intellectuals
greater freedom of action than that of their colleagues i n the other
parts o f the West Bank once under Israeli control, and they are
more able to criticize central Palestinian institutions. T h e
restraint evident i n East Jerusalem media and cultural criticism o f
the P A and the P L O is a product of self-censorship. Furthermore,
during the Intifada, the Israeli framework i n East Jerusalem made
it easier for the Palestinian institutions there to express their
national identity. Israeli civil law, w h i c h applies to East Jerusalem,
tied the hands of the military i n East Jerusalem more than military
law d i d i n the rest o f the West Bank.
E d u c a t i o n . W i t h regard to education, there is an arrangement
whereby o n the symbolic level (such as the stickers on the b i n d -
ings of textbooks), and on the organizational level (such as upkeep
of municipal school buildings and payment of salaries), the public
schools i n East Jerusalem are tied to Israel, w h i l e the Palestinian
Authority determines most of the c u r r i c u l u m , chooses textbooks,
and supervises diploma examinations - roles previously filled by
Jordan. T h i s arrangement applies o n l y to the public schools that

function under the sponsorship o f the Jerusalem municipality,

not to private schools or those operated by religious institutions.
For these, the organizations that operate them have organizational
and administrative responsibility. T h e i r symbolic association w i t h
Israel is more limited and their links w i t h the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity are tighter. In the transition period between the functional
relationship w i t h Jordan and the identical arrangement w i t h the
Palestinian Authority, the two national establishments, the Israeli
and the Palestinian, both tried to change the rules of the game and
open education i n East Jerusalem to competition between them.
T h e principal actors were the Israeli municipal and national
authorities, w h i c h sought to expand their involvement i n the
determination of c u r r i c u l u m and examinations. T h i s attempt was,
however, unsuccessful and as a result they have, for the time being
at least, desisted.
H i g h e r education inTast Jerusalem is also party to this arrange-
ment, but i n this case the l i n k to Israel is very weak. Like the p r i -
vate schools, A l - Q u d s U n i v e r s i t y operates i n East Jerusalem
w i t h o u t a permit and without the oversight of Israel's C o u n c i l for
H i g h e r Education, the statutory accrediting and funding body for
Israel's colleges and universities. Instead, the standards are set by
the parallel Palestinian body. R i g h t - w i n g groups i n Israel have
petitioned Israel's H i g h C o u r t of Justice to change this situation
but, for the present, Israel's accrediting procedures have not been
fully articulated. In any case, there is no competition i n this field.
Transportation. Israeli law sets the standards and licensing proce-

dures for vehicles and traffic i n all of Jerusalem, but there are sepa-
rate and non-competing systems o f public transportation i n the
two parts o f the city. T h e distinction is not only organizational
(different service providers) but also i n destinations, quality o f
service, price, and passenger population.
Electricity. F o l l o w i n g the 1967 war, the East Jerusalem Electric

C o m p a n y continued to function as an independent firm. T h e
Jerusalem municipality's attempt to claim that it was the legal suc-
cessor o f the Jordanian municipality andothus had the right to
name two members o f the company's board o f directors !was
rejected by Israel's H i g h C o u r t of Justice. Israeli construction o f
housing for Jews i n the eastern part o f the city, where the East
Jerusalem Electric Company's franchise applied, raised the

question o f w h o w o u l d supply electricity to the new neighbor-

hoods. Israel announced that its electric utility w o u l d do so, but
the East Jerusalem company objected. In January 1970 Israel
decide"d that all its settlements and military installations i n the
West B a n k w o u l d be connected to the Arab electricity grid, i n
return for w h i c h the East Jerusalem Electric C o m p a n y w o u l d
provide a level o f service identical to that provided by its Israeli
counterpart and w o u l d issue bilingual bills to its Israeli customers.
A new generator was purchased to meet the rising demand for
electricity but it was never put into operation because Israel found
a legal excuse for preventing this. It was agreed that the Arab c o m -
pany w o u l d buy electricity from Israel. Because o f the m o u n t i n g
demand for electricity from both its Arab and J e w i s h customers,
by the mid-1980s about 90 per cent o f the electricity supplied by
the East Jerusalem company was purchased from Israel, three
times as m u c h as i n 1967. T h e East Jerusalem company's o w n
generators were i n a bad condition and the company received no
aid from the Israeli government, as the Israeli company did. L i k e -
wise, the East Jerusalem company was unable to raise its prices
because, i n 1967, it had obligated itself to supply its services at a
low price, whereas it paid full price for the electricity it bought
from Israel. T h e East Jerusalem company thus had financial prob-
lems and i n 1998 became unable to continue to exist as an inde-
pendent provider. F o r all intents and purposes it is n o w simply an
agent o f the Israeli company (al-Qaq, 1997; C h e s h i n et al., 1999:
137-144).
Health. Israeli law applies to the health system i n East Jerusalem.

U n d e r its provisions the inhabitants of East Jerusalem are insured
by one o f the Israeli health plans and receive care i n clinics and
hospitals on both sides of Jerusalem.
I S L A M I C H O L Y SITES A N D INSTITUTIONS
Sharia' Courts. T h e Sharia' courts o f East Jerusalem are not

under the jurisdiction o f Israel's M i n i s t r y o f Religious Affairs,
under w h i c h the Sharia' courts i n Israel operate. T h e State o f
Israel does not recognize the rulings of the East Jerusalem Sharia'
courts for the purposes o f registration o f personal status (mar-
riage, birth), unless they have been ratified by the Sharia' court i n
west Jerusalem or i n Jaffa. F o r the Israeli authorities, the ratifica-
tion document is the b i n d i n g one. T h i s technical ratification

arrangement solves the problem o f public records, protects the

inhabitants of East Jerusalem, and preserves the independence o f
the Sharia' courts o f East Jerusalem, especially since it is not the
court that transmits its rulings to the parallel court o n the western
side o f the city but rather the applicant himself. T h e west Jerusa-
lem Sharia' court views the application as a purely technical
matter, automatically issuing the required document, without
considering itself a superior bench to that i n East Jerusalem.
A l - H a r a m al-Sharif. T h e Islamic holy site c o m p o u n d and its

immediate surroundings has, since 1967, been subject to a func-
tional and geographical division between Israel and Islamic reli-
gious authorities such as the H i g h M u s l i m C o u n c i l , the Waqf,
and the mufti of Jerusalem, as well as to the relevant political insti-
tutions in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. T h e authority for
overseeing routine public order, the security o f the Islamic holy
sites, their religious management, prayer services, and tourism is
in the hands of the appropriate religious bodies. Construction and
reconstruction i n the c o m p o u n d are carried out without permits
from the Jerusalem municipality. There is an Israeli police station
on a l - H a r a m al-Sharif itself, but its presence is not at all indicative
of Israeli involvement i n policing the c o m p o u n d . B e y o n d the
symbolic dimension o f paramount sovereignty, the Israeli police
presence is required mainly w h e n there are problems w i t h right-
w i n g Jewish groups w h o have to be kept from disturbing the
public order. T h e Israeli authorities allow Jews to visit the site as
tourists, but not to pray there, and anyone suspected o f having
ritual intent w i l l be blocked or find h i m s e l f w i t h a police escort to
ensure that he does not violate the rules for visitors. M o s t o f the
supervision o f public order and protection o f the area from the
inside, as w e l l as responsibility for all the entry gates save one, is i n
the hands of the W a q f guards. T h e Israel police are responsible for
external security and they supervise the entrance at the M u g h r a b i
gate, adjacent to the Western W a l l . Israel may have paramount
sovereignty, but this is not felt i n the day-to-day functioning o f
the site. T h e entry o f large police contingents at times o f distur-
bances and demonstrations, as occurred i n October 1990, has led
to bloody clashes. In general, however, the entry of police forces is
prevented through prior negotiation w i t h Palestinian political and
religious authorities.

Since the Declaration of Principles of September 1993, compe-

tition has developed between Jordan and the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity over control of the functional space o f a l - H a r a m al-Sharif and
the operation of the site. Israel has tried to intervene i n the debate,
on Jordan's side. In its peace treaty w i t h Jordan i n the summer o f
1994, Israel promised to grant Jordan a preferred status i n the
Islamic holy sites w h e n the permanent agreement between it and
the Palestinians came into effect. T h i s c o m m i t m e n t was based o n
a c o m m o n Israeli and Jordanian desire to separate the religious
and political functions of the T e m p l e M o u n t / a l - H a r a m al-Sharif.
T h e Palestinians succeeded, however, at the end o f 1994 and
beginning o f 1995, i n garnering the support o f important c o u n -
tries i n the O I C and stripping Jordan o f the potential right that
Israel had granted it. T h i s led to an important change i n the
administrative status of Jordan i n Jerusalem as a w h o l e and al-
H a r a m al-Sharif in particular. In 1997 responsibility for the W a q f
in Jerusalem was transferred, by consensus, from Jordan to the
Palestinian Authority. Jordan continued to operate w i t h i n al-
H a r a m al-Sharif, trying its best to take advantage o f the fact that
the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was forbidden from operating officially
in Jerusalem. In practice and unofficially, however, the Palestin-
ian A u t h o r i t y took control o f most o f the key positions i n the
W a q f and i n the Supreme M u s l i m C o u n c i l . Arafat loyalists n o w
serve as chairman of the council and are a majority of its members,
and Arafat's appointee to the position o f mufti of Jerusalem was
able to displace his Jordanian-appointed colleague. In all things
connected to a l - H a r a m al-Sharif, Jordan's status is largely s y m -
bolic and the religious powers it wields are very limited.
A r e a s of l o w - l e v e l c o m p e t i t i o n
LAW A N D ORDER
Israeli law has applied i n East Jerusalem since the annexation. In

general, public order has been preserved i n East Jerusalem
through loose supervision from above by the Israel police, w i t h
the exception of a few instances o f unlicensed nationalist d e m o n -
strations, some o f w h i c h proceed quietly and others w h i c h lose
control and descend into violence. C i v i l and criminal law enforce-
ment is, however, inadequate. There is no real war o n crime,
especially against drugs, prostitution, theft, and pickpocketing.

O n l y some civil disputes reach the Israeli courts. M a n y Palestin-

ians prefer to seek compromise or arbitration, acting i n accor-
dance w i t h customary law and avoiding the Israeli judicial system.
T h e various Palestinian security systems function i n the c r i m i -
nal and civil fields i n East Jerusalem. T h e y w o r k i n civilian
clothes, and w i t h o u t weapons, or at least w i t h weapons concealed.
T h i s prevents any infringement o n Israel's symbols o f identity. It
could be said that there is no competition between the Israel
police and the Palestinian security forces i n the classic areas o f
police activity. H o w e v e r , the Israel police is, o f all Israel's security
forces, the body that most actively opposes the activity o f the Pal-
estinian security forces i n East Jerusalem i n the national area.
C o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the Israel police arose largely as a result o f the
expanding activity o f the Palestinian forces, such as their enlist-
ment o f agents and their fight against real-estate brokers w h o sell
Arab land and homes to Israeli settlers or their surrogates. T o a
lesser extent competition has increased also because o f the
national significance o f the classic policing activity o f the Palestin-
ian security forces. T h e L i k u d government that came to power i n
M a y 1996 decided to compete w i t h the Palestinians i n this sphere
and to assert Israeli sovereignty i n East Jerusalem by assigning 400
new policemen and b u i l d i n g several new police stations i n East
Jerusalem, but at the this time the decision has only been partially
implemented.
T H E A U T O N O M Y OF T H EL O C A L PALESTINIAN ESTABLISHMENT
T h e activity o f Palestinian institutions i n East Jerusalem was

addressed i n a letter from Foreign M i n i s t e r S h i m o n Peres to N o r -
wegian Foreign M i n i s t e r H o i s t i n September 1993. In it, Peres
promised not to infringe on, and even to encourage, the activity o f
all the existing Palestinian institutions i n East Jerusalem, i n c l u d -
ing economic, social, educational, and cultural institutions, as well
as o f the C h r i s t i a n and M u s l i m holy places. A range o f unwritten
understandings about the operation o f the Palestinian institutions
grew up alongside this official commitment. Functionally, the
Palestinian institutions handle issues that, are not properly dealt
w i t h by Israeli institutions. T h e division is not only o f areas o f
activity, but also o f the population that the Palestinian institutions
deal w i t h , as this population constitutes a distinct sector whose
status i n the institutions o f the majority population is a p r i o r i

inferior because it is an ethnic-national, linguistic, and religious

minority. Furthermore, it does not receive its proportionate share
of budgets, resources, and services from the Israeli authorities. It
should be noted, however, that the symbols of sovereignty remain
in Israeli hands. Israeli law stipulates the framework i n w h i c h the
Palestinian institutions operate, w h i l e i m p o s i n g severe restric-
tions o n them, i n c l u d i n g the prohibition against Palestinian
Authority governing institutions from functioning w i t h i n East
Jerusalem. In this context, it is important to recall that a consensus
was reached on the activity of O r i e n t H o u s e as a Palestinian p o l i t i -
cal center at the beginning o f 1991, even before Peres's c o m m i t -
ments to Hoist. O r i e n t H o u s e has expanded its areas of operation
since then, and deals also w i t h reducing and resolving problems
that arise between individual Palestinians and the Israeli authori-
ties, w i t h municipal matters, and w i t h finding legal solutions to
civil disputes.
T h e phenomenon that distinguishes the competition between
Israel and the Palestinians regarding the Palestinian institutions i n
East Jerusalem is the mutual penetration into areas that, i n other
cases, w o u l d be functionally divided. A s noted, most o f the para-
mount sovereignty and ownership o f symbolic assets is Israel's,
while routine operation i n various m i n o r areas is i n Palestinian
hands. T h e picture is somewhat different w i t h regard to some o f
the Palestinian institutions i n East Jerusalem. T h e Palestinians are
penetrating the symbolic area, for example by flying the Palestin-
ian flag at O r i e n t H o u s e , policing it w i t h its o w n guards, and c o n -
ducting diplomatic meetings there. Israel, for its part, is
penetrating the functional realm and restricting the Palestinian
institutions' freedom o f action through legislation. T h e Palestin-
ian institutions that Israel demanded shut d o w n have had to halt
or restrict their activities, to satisfy a symbolic demand that
implies recognition o f Israeli sovereignty. H o w e v e r , the mutual
penetration is not deep, and thus competition over the extent o f
the autonomy of the Palestinian institutions remains m i l d . Israel's
requirement that the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y not operate openly
and officially i n East Jerusalem is generally abided by, and the P a l -
estinian institutions i n the city have assumed only a limited s y m -
bolic status. O n the other hand, i n practice the Palestinians are
circumventing Israel's restrictions and b u i l d i n g a foothold for
their institutions i n the city, and Israel is not interfering w i t h these

activities i n any significant way. T h e political establishments on

both sides are i n a competition o f mutual penetration on both the
national and the municipal levels, seeking to alter the status q u o ,
but so far they have not been able to bring about any far-reaching
changes.
P O L I T I C A L TIES A N D POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
In these areas the level o f competition is low. T h e first reason for

this is the fact that most East Jerusalem Palestinians boycott the
Israeli municipal elections. Second, i n 1991 the Israeli govern-
ment tacitly permitted the East Jerusalem leadership to develop a
political l i n k to the P L O , concurring that the political center for
the West B a n k and Gaza Strip would.be established i n East Jerusa-
lem. T h e l i n k has grown tighter since then, and the P L O has gone
from "outside" to "inside," not only from T u n i s to the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, but also from those areas to Jerusalem. T h i r d , i n
October 1995 electoral procedures were established for the Pales-
tinian A u t h o r i t y presidency and Legislative C o u n c i l , and in Janu-
ary 1996 East Jerusalem Palestinians participated i n those
elections.
T h e participation of East Jerusalem inhabitants i n the Palestin-
ian elections was unique i n a number of ways, including the elec-
tion procedures, the manner o f voting, polling stations, the
establishment o f candidate slates, campaigning, the right to vote
and to r u n for office, voter registration, candidates' level of expen-
diture, voter turnout, and Israeli action to m i n i m i z e turnout.
These are not artificial differences, but rather an official manifes-
tation o f the unique political profile o f the East Jerusalem Pales-
tinians and o f East Jerusalem's special place i n Palestinian and
Israeli reality. T h e arrangements agreed upon i n these areas
restricted Israel's symbolic and political sovereignty i n East Jeru-
salem, as w e l l as that of the Palestinian Authority. So, for example,
the vote was conditioned on having p o l l i n g staions i n post offices,
and being a candidate o n having a second address outside Jerusa-
lem. M u t u a l restrictions created a reality of symbolic and political
duality i n East Jerusalem, and of a "gray area" that is not under the
control o f either side. T h e existence o f a gray area was expressed,
for example, i n the struggle between the Israeli and Palestinian
authorities over the level of voter registration and the participation
rate i n the actual elections. E a c h side tried to take control o f the

gray area, trying either to encourage or discourage the inhabitants

of East Jerusalem to vote.
T h e competition over areas of political affiliation and participa-
tion was not conducted only between the national Israeli and P a l -
estinian establishments, but also w i t h i n them. T h e Israeli
government, led by the Labor Party, wanted to achieve legitimacy
for the agreements it had made w i t h the P L O , whereas the subse-
quent L i k u d government, and the mayor of Jerusalem, used the
agreements and understandings o n Jerusalem as a means o f can-
celing the O s l o accords. Indeed, w i t h the accession o f B i n y a m i n
Netanyahu's L i k u d government i n June 1996 the disparity
between the municipal and national establishments narrowed,
and the debate between them became merely personal and tactical
rather an argument over principle. T h e competition w i t h i n the
Palestinian establishment was different i n character, even though
it was also conducted between the establishment in Jerusalem and
the national political establishment. T h e subject o f contention
was the preservation o f the status and independence o f the East
Jerusalem establishment on the Palestinian political map. T h e
local establishment in Jerusalem opposed giving preference to the
general interest over Jerusalem's interests, and o f course d i d not
consent to the absolute authority o f the national establishment
and its executive arm. B u t as the national conflict i n Jerusalem
grew sharper, after Israel's opening of the Western W a l l T u n n e l i n
October 1996 and w i t h Israel's initiation o f the H a r H o m a c o n -
struction project at the beginning o f 1997, Arafat's national estab-
lishment was able to shunt aside the local forces headed by
Husseini.
Finally, the level o f competition between Israel and the Pales-
tinian Authority i n matters of political affiliation and participation
is not high. T h i s is because elections to the Palestinian institutions
were held i n 1996 and no date has yet been set for the next elec-
tions, and because Jerusalem and a Palestinian state and its sover-
eignty are key issues that w i l l be discussed i n the permanent status
talks. It w o u l d , however, be a mistake to v i e w the arrangements
for electing the Palestinian Authority's political institutions
during the interim period as artificial. T h e Palestinian elections
did not create the l i n k between East Jerusalem's Palestinians and
the Palestinian Authority ex n i h i l o . T h e procedures were based o n
the reality that prevailed i n East Jerusalem for many years; they

merely arranged, established, and institutionalized it. Election

procedures, campaign rules, and deciding w h o w i l l be candidates,
i n c l u d i n g the composition o f the slate o f w i n n i n g candidates and
their social and biographical background - these are all expres-
sions o f Jerusalem's unique reality. T h e elections brought about a
situation i n w h i c h the Palestinian Authority's Legislative C o u n c i l
and its executive arm, like the P L O Executive C o m m i t t e e before
them, include a significant number o f senior East Jerusalem rep-
resentatives, w h o personify the linkage between the residents o f
East Jerusalem and the Palestinian political system.
A r e a s of h i g h - l e v e l c o m p e t i t i o n
PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION
There is no understanding between the two sides regarding con-

struction and planning, so competition is n o w intense. F o r many
years, however, up until the mid-1990s, there was not a great deal
o f competition i n these fields. A s i n other areas, there was a func-
tional and geographical division between Israel and the Palestin-
ians. There was a great deal o f Israeli construction for Jews on the
eastern side o f Jerusalem, around the Arab city, but not w i t h i n it.
Similarly, there was Palestinian construction i n the Eastjerusalem
suburbs, outside the limits o f the territory annexed to Israel. B u t
i n the mid-1990s, as the permanent status talks approached, the
Israeli authorities began to make a point o f the fact that, according
to Israeli law, these Palestinian suburbs were outside the b o u n d -
aries o f Israeli Jerusalem, and it also began the construction o f the
new Jewish neighborhood o f H a r H o m a . Furthermore, in 1997-8
the first steps were taken towards carrying out a plan to b u i l d the
first J e w i s h neighborhood i n the heart o f an Arab neighborhood,
i n Ras a l - A m u d . T h e competition i n planning and construction
was expressed i n the deep penetration by each side into territory
that had previously been populated exclusively by the other side.
Israel acted to expand its h o l d on manifestly Arab residential
neighborhoods and planned to construct new residential areas on
open land separating Palestinian population concentrations. T h e
Palestinians sought to take control o f these very same areas via
construction, so each side strove to create contiguous built-up
areas i n the open spaces between their neighborhoods. T h i s
turned into a free-for-all, since there was no agreement even on a

symbolic level. T h e Palestinians built illegally, and the Jerusalem

municipality and the Israeli M i n i s t r y o f the Interior demolished
the illegal construction. A n o t h e r sign o f the increased competi-
tion has been the local Palestinian establishment's attempt to
broaden the competition to include Jewish neighborhoods i n
western Jerusalem. A s a counter to Israel's construction i n East
Jerusalem, the Palestinian side has sought to purchase homes i n
Jewish Jerusalem. These attempts have, however, failed because
o f a lack o f funds, bad organization, or lack o f enthusiasm. T h e
Palestinian establishment i n Jerusalem has been able to do no
more than promise that the subject w i l l be raised i n the permanent
status talks i n the form o f a demand for the return o f Arab prop-
erty abandoned or occupied i n the 1948 war. T h e national Pales-
tinian establishment has scored some successes, however, i n the
purchase o f properties i n East Jerusalem. A t the end o f 1997 and
the beginning o f 1998 the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y was able to pur-
chase several East Jerusalem lots and houses that had been offered
to Jewish settlers, thus frustrating plans to settle Jews there.
W h i l e Israel's national and municipal establishment is compet-
ing for control o f Arab areas w i t h its construction and planning
activities, the Palestinian authorities are doing little other than
encouraging illegal construction and offering legal and financial
aid to tbose affected by Israel's actions. Palestinian illegal c o n -
struction is spontaneous and not coordinated w i t h nor planned i n
advance by the national or local Palestinian leadership. U n l i k e
other areas, i n w h i c h the competition takes place only i n annexed
East Jerusalem, the competition i n b u i l d i n g and planning is c o n -
ducted throughout the Jerusalem area, and has intensified because
o f Israel's supplementary actions. Israel has not sufficed itself w i t h
building new homes for the Jewish population. It has also begun
destroying unlicensed Palestinian buildings i n Jerusalem and its
surrounding suburbs and revoking the resident status o f Palestin-
ians w h o have moved from w i t h i n the city to the suburbs. F u r -
thermore, the Israeli authorities have adopted the plan to
"strengthen Jerusalem" and create a Jerusalem umbrella m u n i c i -
pality that w i l l have construction and planning powers i n the
entire metropolitan area. T h e annexation o f Israeli West B a n k set-
tlements to the Jerusalem municipality's construction and plan-
ning space w i l l , so the authorities hope, give the municipality the
means to w i n the construction race w i t h the Palestinians. Despite

this broadening competition, Israel knows that it must halt at the

gates to the T e m p l e M o u n t and not impose its construction and
planning laws there.
In the final analysis, Israel has not succeeded i n w i n n i n g the
battle. T h e Palestinians have made considerable gains i n construc-
tion and planning. In the symbolic area, the Palestinian Authority
has become the address to w h i c h Arab and A m e r i c a n leaders turn
to discuss the issue, and Arafat as the deed-holder w h e n it comes
to planning and construction issues i n East Jerusalem. Further-
more, most of the unlicensed structures and homes built by Pales-
tinians i n the Jerusalem area remain standing, and it has been
proven that the Palestinian presence is a critical mass that cannot
be overcome by force, only by negotiation. Moreover, at the
beginning o f 1998, o n l y the first stage o f the H a r H o m a project
had got off the ground. T h e other neighborhoods that Israel had
planned to b u i l d are still i n the planning stages. T h e umbrella
municipality has not been established either.
POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE
Just as the permanent status talks were to begin, i n the mid-1990s,

Israel discovered that its demographic superiority had been
eroded considerably d u r i n g the previous 20 years, and that the
Jewish proportion o f Jerusalem's population was projected to
decline even further. T h i s meant that one o f the touchstones o f
Israeli policy had been whittled away to the Palestinians' benefit,
and this, from Israel's point of view, created a threat to its contin-
ued claim to the eastern part of the city. In response, Israel took a
number o f steps to tip the demographic balance i n its favor. It
began to revoke resident status from Palestinians w h o no longer
fulfilled the legal requirements for h o l d i n g it. A t the same time, it
made plans for large-scale construction i n the Jerusalem region
and prepared to create a Greater Jerusalem municipality that
w o u l d establish Israel dominance i n the entire area.
Israel's side o f the demographic contest is carried out by its
national and m u n i c i p a l authorities. M o r e o v e r , the minister o f the
interior i n 1996-9 had previously been the chief o f the ministry's
Jerusalem district office. O n the Palestinian side there is a very
low level o f coordination and organization, as is illustrated by the
story o f the Palestinian census i n East Jerusalem.

Conclusion: Bridges overa D i v i d e d C i t y 325
In December 1997, the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y launched a

census i n the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel had conducted the
last census of the West B a n k i n the summer o f 1967 and there had
been rib census i n the Gaza Strip since 1948. T h e Palestinian
political leadership viewed the census not just as a professional
need to provide vital information for its bureaucracy, but also as
an expression of the establishment of national institutions and as a
stage along the way to full independence. Palestinian political rep-
resentatives announced that the census w o u l d be conducted i n
East Jerusalem as well. H o w e v e r , the body carrying out the census
did not make the necessary preparations and d i d not distribute
forms to the Palestinian households i n Jerusalem as it had done a
m o n t h before the census i n other areas. T h i s may have been due
to inefficiency or because it was assumed that the response w o u l d
be low. T h e Palestinian Authority's officials had no contingency
plan for h o w to get around the Israeli authorities and conduct a
census in Jerusalem by remote control, such as by fax, or secretly.
T h e conferences held to mark the census, w h i c h the Palestinian
establishment considered a milestone i n the b u i l d i n g of the Pales-
tinian state and its institutions, were held i n the suburbs o f East
Jerusalem, beyond Israeli jurisdiction.
Since the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y is forbidden to operate in J e r u -
salem, the Jerusalem municipality announced that it w o u l d act
against any attempt to count the city's households. There were
differences on the issue between the cautious statements o f the
professionals i n the Palestinian Authority's Central Bureau of Sta-
tistics and the pronouncements o f the political leadership o f J e r u -
salem. T h e former said that they had not coordinated their actions
w i t h Israel and that the census could thus not be conducted i n East
Jerusalem; the latter said unambiguously that the census w o u l d be
carried out there. These lofty statements had, however, no basis i n
reality ( H a ' a r e t z , 10 D e c . 1997, 11 D e c . 1997). A s a rule, it was
easier for the Palestinian Authority and Israeli political leaderships
to turn the struggle into a matter o f principle and symbols. T b e
Palestinian Authority made no preparations to conduct the census
in Jerusalem, w h i l e Israel, under its L i k u d government, preferred,
as i n the past, the politics o f symbols over pragmatic arrange-
ments. T h e Palestinian A u t h o r i t y left the symbolic field to Israel,
to the intense displeasure o f the local Palestinian leadership,
w h i c h tried to save what it could by issuing extravagant

statements. Since, however, it was the Palestinian Authority and

not O r i e n t H o u s e that was conducting the census, the local lead-
ership could not create a confrontation w i t h Israel, even on the
symbolic front.
Israel took action o n several levels. A s happened during the Pal-
estinian elections of January 1996, rumors were spread through
East Jerusalem that Israel w o u l d rescind the Israeli identity cards
and resident rights o f anyone w h o participated i n the census.
Second, the police deployed large contingents to arrest the
census-takers should they begin to work. In the event, only a
single y o u n g Palestinian w o m a n suspected of having participated
was detained briefly for interrogation ( H a ' a r e t z , 11 D e c . 1997).
T h i r d , the Knesset amended the law to forbid "activity of a politi-
cal or governing nature, or other activity inconsistent w i t h
respecting Israel's sovereignty" - i n other words, the conducting
of a census ( H a ' a r e t z , 11 D e c . 1997). Finally, Israel made a low-key
declaration that it w o u l d grant the Palestinians access to informa-
tion it had gathered i n East Jerusalem during the population and
housing survey it had conducted i n 1995, information w h i c h was
in any case slated for publication. In the end, Israel's efforts to pre-
vent the census in Jerusalem went far beyond what was necessary
on the practical level, but were i n keeping w i t h its view o f the
census as a symbolic demonstration o f sovereignty.
As i n the areas o f construction and planning, the demographic
contest was conducted over the entire region and not limited to
the East Jerusalem that Israel had annexed. Likewise, there was no
unambiguous resolution i n Israel's favor. Resident status was
rescinded from o n l y a relatively small number of Palestinians, and
many Palestinians moved back into the city itself. T h e confisca-
tion o f identity cards also roused Arab and international protest,
w h i c h underlined the Palestinian identity o f the East Jerusalem
Arabs and depicted Arafat and the Palestinian leadership as the
injured parties that needed to be consulted on the issue.
T h e expansion o f the contest to include Jerusalem's Arab sub-
urbs i n the West B a n k is w o r t h examining from three vantage
points. First, under the annexation, Israel enjoyed an advantage i n
Jerusalem that it d i d not have i n the larger surrounding region, as
the annexation supplied Israel w i t h control mechanisms that it did
not have i n the West Bank. It was precisely for this reason that the
Palestinian advantage was i n the area that had not been annexed.

Difficult competition i n the region near Jerusalem meant c o m -

peting i n an area where the Palestinians had an advantage. N e v e r -
theless, Israel broadened the area of competition, because the area
surrounding Jerusalem served the Palestinians as a staging ground
for their activity i n the city;
Second, expanding the dimensions o f the competition blurred
Israel's annexation line. T o put it another way, Israel was tacitly
acknowledging that the annexation lines were no longer relevant.
T h i s served the Palestinians, and at the same time weakened their
steadfastness about the June 4, 1967 lines, since Jerusalem was
expanding rather than shrinking. Finally, the competition being
conducted throughout the Jerusalem area had affected power
relations w i t h i n the Palestinian establishment. Since the power
base of the local leadership was w i t h i n the annexed city, the inter-
est of that leadership was to see the annexation lines as a filter that
weakened the national Palestinian leadership's effectiveness
w i t h i n Jerusalem, as had happened w h e n the Labor Party c o n -
trolled the Israeli government and the municipality.
Strengthening the competition w h i l e the annexation lines were
weakening made it easier for the national Palestinian establish-
ment to penetrate Jerusalem and allowed it to conduct the contest
in Jerusalem at the expense o f the local leadership.
Peace i n s m a l l doses
Israel has ruled both west and East Jerusalem for more than 30
years. It has ruled the Arab part of Jerusalem longer than either
Jordan or the British. Despite the length o f time that has elapsed
since Israel's occupation o f East Jerusalem, the Jerusalem area is
not bounded by rigid borders. A rigid border exists only i n the
declarations o f the Israeli establishment, w h i c h seeks to obtain
Palestinian and international consent to make the annexation line
the permanent peacetime border. T h e m u n i c i p a l border is meant
to close the city off and disconnect it from the West Bank; w i t h i n ,
it is meant to create a single integral unit, united Jerusalem. T h e
municipal border is almost completely identical to the boundary
of the military closure that has been imposed o n the West B a n k
since 1991, and its importance both to Israel and to the Palestin-
ians w h o must cope w i t h it day after day is not open to doubt. B u t
the municipal border is only one o f the elements i n Jerusalem's

character. In practice, there is a deep fissure between the Israelis

and the Palestinians i n Jerusalem. A t its foundation it is a
national-ethnic fissure that takes manifestly political form i n the
contest over the future of East Jerusalem: demographic competi-
tion between the two populations, a contest for control o f the
unpopulated space, a challenge by extremist elements i n Israel
over the character of the Arab part of East Jerusalem, and a dispute
over control o f the Islamic holy sites on the T e m p l e M o u n t . In
other words, the line that i n the past divided the city continues to
exist. It is not a physical boundaiy, but rather one that has spread
and separated, as by a prism, into multiple lines. T h e inhabitants
of the Jerusalem region have many borders i n their daily lives and
in their consciousness. Alongside the municipal border is the
G r e e n Line, the border that split the city between 1948 and 1967,
no longer visible but palpably felt. There is the ethnic-national
line that divides the Israeli neighborhoods built i n East Jerusalem
after the 1967 war from their Palestinian neighbors. There is also
the larger border that defines the city's space as a focus of employ-
ment and services for the population that depends on it, and there
is a w h o l e gamut of functional relationships w i t h i n Israeli Jerusa-
lem that divide areas o f responsibility and operation between the
J e w i s h and Arab populations. T h e application of Israeli law, j u r i s -
diction, and administration has not succeeded in separating East
Jerusalem from the West Bank. N o r has it led to full integration
between the city's Jews and Arabs. Instead o f a rigid border split-
ting the city or cutting off its eastern boundaiy from the Palestin-
ian rear, there are a number o f borders, and all o f them are
permeable and soft. L u c k i l y for the inhabitants of Jerusalem, both
Israelis and Palestinians, the fissures i n Jerusalem are varied and
only partially congruent. It is easer to bridge over a "soft" fissure
than a "hard" one that concentrates i n one spot all the contentious
issues and dividing lines between the two populations.
In practice, the huge physical changes that Israel has brought
about i n East Jerusalem make it impossible to return to the Green
Line. Similarly, it is impossible to make the municipal borders
into permanent borders because the lines cut through several
neighborhoods and even buildings. M o r e o v e r , East Jerusalem is a
center o f employment, tourism, and services, a commercial hub,
political focal point, and the most important religious site i n the
Palestinian Authority. F o r all these reasons East Jerusalem cannot

be cut off from the Palestinian body to w h i c h it is connected,

while at the same time it cannot be detached from its economic
dependence or other ties to J e w i s h Jerusalem. O v e r the years, the
Palestinians i n Jerusalem have turned from a passive population
into an active society. Paradoxically, Israel's high level o f activity
in its capital has turned Jerusalem into a magnet and a m e t r o p o l i -
tan center for the Palestinians.
What emerges is that both sides have succeeded i n braking each
other and i n vetoing the maximalist goals o f the other side. So l o n g
as Israel assumes that it can compel the Palestinians i n Jerusalem,
the Arab w o r l d , the Islamic states, and the international c o m m u -
nity to give their blessing to the annexation o f East Jerusalem
despite their resolute opposition, it must maintain a vertical segre-
gation ofjews and Arabs in Jerusalem and inequality i n the distri-
bution o f and access to resources and power. O n l y thus can it
attempt to defeat those w h o oppose the application o f Israeli law,
jurisdiction, and administration i n East Jerusalem. B u t this makes
the wedge between the city's Jews and Arabs all the more substan-
tial, making it even more necessary to provide an official founda-
tion for the functional and geographical segregation arrangements
that have developed i n the city.
In contrast, the peace process has g r o w n out o f a recognition
that a new arrangement must be found, one based o n the betero-
geneous and multi-dimensional reality that has come into being
in Jerusalem. T h i s was the foundation o f the, O s l o accords and o f
the understandings reached between the teams under the direc-
tion o f Yossi B e i l i n and A b u - M a z e n . C o n t r a r y to Israel's naive
hope, the peace arrangements i n Jerusalem d i d not and w i l l not
sprout from below, from coexistence i n the city and from Pales-
tinian acceptance o f Israel's annexation, but rather f r o m the v a r i -
ous fault lines that have developed i n Jerusalem. Recent
experience teaches us that only w h e n the political leaderships o n
both sides have understood that they must address all the fault
lines that surround and cut through Jerusalem, have they achieved
breakthroughs and agreements. Reality has also proven that
arrangements i n Jerusalem have g r o w n out o f a series o f ostensi-
bly small decisions o n clearly defined issues, and not f r o m i n c l u -
sive large-scale decisions that solve all the issues i n conflict i n one
fell swoop. T h e questions o f what elements o f the complex reality
w i l l be included i n the permanent agreement, and w h i c h ones w i l l

be given precedence over w h i c h others, w i l l be the subjects o f

fierce debate between Israel and the Palestinians d u r i n g the
negotiations.
Furthermore, moves towards peace have not come out o f local
leadership circles i n the Jerusalem municipality and i n O r i e n t
H o u s e , but from the national leadership. T h i s was the case i n the
confrontations o f 1997, i n the wake o f the opening o f the Western
W a l l T u n n e l and the launching o f construction o f the Jewish
neighborhood o f H a r H o m a . It was the national leaderships that
resolved the conflicts then, and the local leaderships fell i n behind
them. T h e two national leaderships are u n w i l l i n g to allow the
local leaderships to determine the contours for the solution o f the
Jerusalem question, nor are they w i l l i n g to be dragged by them
into a head-on Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. T h e national
leaderships v i e w Jerusalem as a national issue. T h e y w i l l make the
decisions o n its future.
In the negotiations the national leaderships conducted o n the
first and second O s l o agreements, the Jerusalem question was one
o f the topics discussed, one o f several national interests. H a d the
national leaderships handed the issue over to the local leaderships,
they w o u l d not have been able to maneuver among different
issues and so maximize their negotiating power. B u t this should
not lead to the conclusion that the local establishments are not
partners i n shaping the arrangements i n Jerusalem. T h e local
leaderships affect the city's future through their influence on their
national leaders, not by circumventing them and negotiating
independently w i t h the other side. Every so often the local leader-
ship, whether O r i e n t H o u s e under H u s s e i n i or the Jerusalem
municipality under O l m e r t , functions as a vanguard i n order to
make local gains and influence the national leadership. T h i s hap-
pens w h e n they feel that the national leadership is making too
many concessions and is not acquainted w i t h , or is cut off from,
the reality i n Jerusalem.
A t times w h e n there was increasing agreement between the
national leaderships and a reduction o f competition between
them, as was the case w h e n the two sides proceeded along the
lines set out i n the O s l o agreements, there was a significant
increase i n the oversight and control that the central governments
imposed o n the local establishments and o n the national agencies
operating i n Jerusalem, such as the police and security services,

w h i c h opposed the process entirely or i n part and blocked its

implementation. In parallel, the two national leaderships made an
effort to enlist the support o f the local elements that favored the
process. In this situation the importance of the "gray area" in J e r u -
salem - those issues o v e n w h i c h there is no agreement — declined.
T h e two national leaderships have been inclined to reduce the dis-
agreements between them via temporary or limited arrangements,
or have disregarded the disputed subjects entirely. A n o t h e r
method o f reducing tensions i n Jerusalem has been to expand
achievements at the national level and to "import" them into J e r u -
salem. T h i s , for example, is a way o f understanding the agree-
ments o n the framework o f activity o f Palestinian institutions i n
East Jerusalem and o n arrangements for the Palestinian elections
in Jerusalem. In this way the national leaderships sought to prove
that they made no concessions but, o n the contrary, made gains
for the city. There is no basis for the claim by the local leaderships
that their national counterparts paid i n local currency for broader
agreements o n issues other than Jerusalem.
W h e n there was increasing competition between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority and a reduction of the areas of agreement, as
under Israel's L i k u d government, the importance o f the "gray
area," where competition takes place, increased, and became the
pivot o f attention and action. W i t h the increase i n competition
between Israel and the Palestinians i n 1996, the local elements
have served as the central regime's fighting forces.
T h e construction o f bridges i n Jerusalem is not an easy task,
and it has yet to be completed. Contrary to the c o m m o n assump-
tion that there has been no negotiation over the future of Jerusa-
lem, and that no understandings or agreements have been reached
about it, this w o r k argues that, i n a pragmatic and cumulative way,
many foundation stones have already been laid for the solution o f
the Jerusalem question. T h e steps taken so far lead to several
conclusions:
Collective political organizations, whether the U N , the Arab
League, or the O I C , play no significant role i n mediating between
Israel and the Palestinians. W h i l e U N Security C o u n c i l resolu-
tions 242 and 338 are the source of authority for the peace confer-
ences, talks, and agreements that Israel has had w i t h the Arab
states and the Palestinians since 1977, the role o f these

organizations is merely to provide an official and collective seal o f

approval to agreements w o r k e d out between Israel and the
Palestinians.
Israel and the Palestinians do not discuss the Jerusalem ques-
tion as a religious issue and do not focus o n the T e m p l e M o u n t / a l -
H a r a m al-Sbarif. T h e status o f the Islamic holy sites is but one o f
the constituent issues o f the Jerusalem problem. B o t h the Israeli
and Palestinian leaderships have an interest i n keeping Jerusalem a
political rather than a religious problem, k n o w i n g as they do that
giving free rein to the religious extremists w h o seek to challenge
this is liable to ignite a conflagration that neither side could con-
trol. T h e danger is greater o n the Israeli than o n the Palestinian
side, since Jerusalem is a center for extremist Jewish religious
organizations. O n the Palestinian side, the fundamentalists, such
as Hamas, tend to be relatively weak in Jerusalem and unaccepted
by the established religious administration o f the holy sites.
T h e C a m p D a v i d model, w h i c h postponed consideration o f
the Jerusalem problem until the end o f the negotiating process,
has proved itself. A c c o r d i n g to this model, w h e n solutions have
been found to the other issues i n dispute, neither side w i l l want to
put the entire peace process at risk and w i l l thus seek an accom-
modation i n Jerusalem. H o w e v e r , w h e n negotiations between
Israel and the P L O began i n the early 1990s, it became clear that
the Jerusalem issue could not be circumvented, and a process o f
bargaining and compromise began. T h e problem w i t h the C a m p
D a v i d m o d e l is that it assumed that at the end o f the process all the
elements o f the Jerusalem problem could be taken up and solved
at once. T h e negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have
s h o w n instead that Jerusalem can be discussed and bargained over
bit by bit d u r i n g the course o f negotiations o n other issues.
T h e negotiations leading up to the M a d r i d Conference, and the
negotiations that took place i n the framework o f that conference,
demonstrated that Jerusalem could not be excluded from the
peace process. Israel's attempts to ensure that Jerusalem's future
status w i l l not be a subject o f discussion, and to prevent even a
symbolic or procedural acknowledgement that East Jerusalem
was part o f the West Bank, were countered by Palestinian mea-
sures that emphasized their claim to East Jerusalem. T h e O s l o
process demonstrated that Jerusalem is not taboo and could be
discussed as part o f the range o f issues that need to be resolved

between Israel and the Palestinians. W h i l e the Palestinians were

w i l l i n g to exclude East Jerusalem from the i n t e r i m agreement,
this was i n no way a concession o f their claim to East Jerusalem or
o f their intention o f i n c l u d i n g it i n the permanent settlement.
B o t h the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships have recognized
that East Jerusalem is unique, and that a resolution o f its status w i l l
have to be unique and creative. Foreign M i n i s t e r Peres's letter to
his N o r w e g i a n counterpart, H o i s t , i n September 1993, recog-
nized East Jerusalem as a distinct entity defined not o n l y by geog-
raphy but also by a separate demography, social reality, and thus
political status that applies not just to religious sites but also to
other Palestinian institutions i n the city. T h e Declaration o f P r i n -
ciples o f September 1993 signaled a change i n the Palestinian v i e w
o f East Jerusalem. Whereas the Palestinians had previously
insisted that East Jerusalem is an integral part o f the West B a n k
and that all arrangements applying to the West B a n k and Gaza
Strip should apply to East Jerusalem as w e l l , Arafat and other P L O
leaders n o w began speaking o f a separate, creative solution for East
Jerusalem. T h e y began to distinguish between Israeli settlements
in the West B a n k and Gaza Strip, w h i c h , they demanded, be dis-
mantled, and the new Israeli neighborhoods o n the east side o f
Jerusalem. T h e i r approach indicates that they recognize that the
new neighborhoods represent irreversible changes and that they
w i l l ultimately accept the annexation o f these new neighborhoods
to Israel. B o t h sides n o w accept that the city cannot be divided
again as it was between 1948 and 1967. T h e y also recognize that
the current municipal border cannot become an international
boundary because o f the interdependence o f the city and its Pales-
tinian hinterland. T h e only option open to both sides i n the per-
manent status talks is a redefinition o f the city's boundaries. T h i s
can be done i n one o f several ways: by enlarging the city and estab-
lishing an agreed border, agreement o n the non-existence o f such
a border w h i l e leaving the issue open for future resolution, or a
variable division w i t h a number o f borders defining divisions o f
different kinds o f authority.
T h e O s l o II agreement o f September 1995, w h i c h established
the procedures for East Jerusalem's participation i n the Palestin-
ian elections, institutionalized the political l i n k between the
inhabitants o f East Jerusalem and the Palestinian Authority. A t the
same time, it was an official recognition o n the part o f the

Palestinians o f the unique, different nature o f that connection,

w h i c h is unlike the relationship between the Palestinian A u t h o r -
ity and the Palestinians o f the West B a n k and Gaza Strip. W h i l e
nearly all East Jerusalem Palestinians have avoided any identifica-
tion w i t h Israel (for example, o n l y a fraction vote i n municipal
elections despite their legal right to do so), their Palestinian politi-
cal identification is distinct from that o f Palestinians i n the West
B a n k and Gaza Strip. East Jerusalem has its o w n local Palestinian
leadership, based i n O r i e n t H o u s e and i n the Jerusalem delega-
tion to the Palestinian Legislative C o u n c i l , that has taken posi-
tions opposed to those o f the national Palestinian leadership,
especially as regards the negotiations over Jerusalem. However,
the national Palestinian government has slowly infiltrated East
Jerusalem and seems to have gained the upper hand over the local
leadership. T h e participation o f East Jerusalem representatives i n
the Legislative C o u n c i l and i n the Palestinian executive has both
strengthened the political l i n k between East Jerusalem and the
Palestinian A u t h o r i t y and granted more authority to the agencies
o f the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y i n East Jerusalem, giving them prece-
dence over the local institutions.
T h e O s l o process has produced competition as well as consen-
sus between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel has accepted the
existence o f O r i e n t H o u s e as a local political center, as well as the
activity of national Palestinian religious institutions i n East Jerusa-
lem. B u t it has taken measures to assert its sovereignty i n the city,
for example by shutting d o w n Palestinian A u t h o r i t y institutions
operating i n Jerusalem. A n o t h e r major means o f asserting sover-
eignty, o n the part o f the city's L i k u d M a y o r , E h u d O l m e r t , and
the L i k u d government o f 1996-9, has been municipal and
national construction and planning powers. These include the
d e m o l i t i o n o f unlicensed Palestinian buildings and the approval
o f plans for further Jewish construction i n the city, including, for
the first time, J e w i s h neighborhoods i n the heart o f concentra-
tions o f Palestinian population. T h e plan for a Jerusalem umbrella
municipality that w o u l d include J e w i s h suburbs of Jerusalem i n
the West B a n k is another example. In, reality, however, these
attempts to alter the city's demographic balance and reverse the
J e w i s h population's declining proportion o f the city's population
have had little success. T h e Palestinian leadership has encouraged
unlicensed Palestinian construction i n open areas i n order to

create a contiguous area o f Palestinian habitation f r o m East J e r u -

salem to Ramallah i n the West Bank. It has successfully used
public and international protest to counter Israeli initiatives such
as theiopening o f the Western W a l l T u n n e l and, i n d o i n g so, has
made President Arafat the internationally recognized representa-
tive o f the Palestinians o f East Jerusalem. Israel's attempts to
impose its sovereignty unilaterally have been unsuccessful; it
must reach an agreement w i t h the Palestinians.
T h e geographic-municipal and political reality surveyed i n this
book shows that Israel and the Palestinians are inextricably caught
in each other's embrace i n East Jerusalem. T h e simplistic but
c o m m o n w i s d o m is that this is a boxer's clutch, but that is only
partially true. T h e foundation for an accord o n Jerusalem has
already been laid, and the competition is partial and limited. T h e
first condition for reaching an agreement is that both sides recog-
nize that they w i l l not be able to w i n by a knockout. T h e way to
reach an agreement is to stabilize the existing situation, not to
upset it. Better to acknowledge the reality i n Jerusalem than to
bang one's head against it until the b l o o d flows. C u r r e n t arrange-
ments should be institutionalized, official expression should be
given to tacit understandings, to ad hoc agreements, and to reality
in the street. T h i s is the starting point from w h i c h both sides may
progress. Businesslike, detailed, and pragmatic negotiations can
lead to a permanent settlement that w i l l express Jerusalem's spe-
cial status and unique character. Negotiations over Jerusalem are
not doomed to failure. O n the contrary, the key is already i n the
door.

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INDEX
Abadin, Abd el-Qadr, 176 Ahmed, Abd al-Aziz al-Haj, 182

Abas, Mahmud see Abu-Mazen Al-Aqsa mosque, 2, 37, 61, 62, 158,
(Mahmud Abas) 181, 277-8
Abd al-Rahim, Tayib, 180, 242 Al-Azaria, 20-1, 39, 40, 180, 256,
Abd al-Shafï, Haidar, 208-9, 238, 239 301, 304
Abdallah, King of Jordan, 44, 45, 46, al-Hakawati theatre, 188, 250
47, 48, 50,168, 276 al-Haram al-Sharif see Islam, holy
Abdul Hadi, Mahdi, 106, 134, 135, places
195-6, 200, 300 al-Maqasid hospital, 254
Abu al-Abas, 106 Al-Quds University, 72, 188, 254,
Abu Odeh, Adnan, 164-5 260, 313
Abu-Ala (Ahmad Qria'), 137, 138, Al-Ram, 36, 39
140, 144,145,146, 200 Al-Sawahra, 40
elections to Palestinian Authority Al-Tur, 264
and, 223, 225, 226, 237, 238, A l - Z a ' i m , 20-1
240, 242 Albin, Cecilia, 154, 155
Abu-Arafa, Abd al-Rahman, 204 Albright, Madeleine, 287
Abu-Asab, Rajah, 227 Algazi,Yosef,38, 268
Abu-Diab, Haj, 227 Allon,Yigal, 88-9, 168
Abu-Dis, 20-1, 39, 180, 220, 256, Amar, Yasir, 250
301, 304 Amman, 36
Abu-Jihad, 242 annexation
Abu-Mazen (Mahmud Abas), 113, of East Jerusalem by Israel (1967),
223 2,18-19, 20, 34, 65-6, 92-3,
Madrid conference and, 119, 126, 134
127, 128,132 of West Bank and East Jerusalem
Oslo talks and, 137, 138, 139, 140, byJordan, 46-53
141, 143,144, 146, 148,149 Arab citizens of Israel, 19, 68, 83, 84,
permanent settlement issue and, 99
300-9, 328 Arab League, 51, 104, 158-61, 285-6,
Washington talks and, 133, 134 330
Abu-Musa, 245 Arab Studies Society, 127, 189
Abu-Zayad, Ziyad, 199, 226, 237, Arabic language, 310
240, 241,250 Arafat, Yasser, 292
administration see municipal agreement between Palestinian
government Authority and Jordan and, 172
Agha, Hussein, 300 at United Nations, 104, 106
al-Agha, Zakariya, 122, 126, 223 attempt to control Orient House,
Ahmad, Aisha, 298 201-2
351
352 Index
attempted closure of Orient Augusta Victoria hospital, 254

House and, 253 Awartani, Faisal, 23, 24, 210, 235
Baker plan (1991) and, 123, 128-9 Ayalon, A m i , 130
Declaration of Principles and, 149, Ayash, Yehiye, 81
167-8
dispute over Waqf in Jerusalem Baker, James, 116
and, 175, 180 peace plan (1989), 117-18
elections to Palestinian Authority peace plan (1991), 118-29
and, 222-3, 224 Bal'awi, Hakim, 242
on future of Jerusalem, 153, 155-6 Bank of Israel, 73
Har Homa scheme and, 283, 284, Barak, E, 4, 253
285, 287, 288 Baram, U z i , 188
Israeli peace plan (1989) and, 116 Barda, Shimon, 62
j i h a d , 155-6 Barghuthi, Marwan, 224
Jordan-Palestine federation and, Barth, Fredrik, 10
178 al-Batsch, Ahmed, 237, 238
Madrid Conference and, 130, 131 al-Baz, Uthama, 136
Oslo talks and, 145, 146, 147, 150, Be-Tzedek, 72
151 Begin, Menachem
permanent settlement issue and, on Islamic holy places, 87, 88-9
177, 300, 307, 308, 309 negotiations with Egypt, 86-9,
as presidential candidate, 208-11, 95-100
237 Camp David conference, 91-4,
Reagan initiative (1982) and, 108 102
Supreme M u s l i m Council and, Reagan initiative (1982) and, 108
181-2 Beilin, Yossi
Washington Declaration and, 165, Oslo talks and, 138, 140, 141, 143,
167, 170 144, 145, 146, 150
Washington talks and, 134, 135, permanent settlement issue and,
136-7 300-9, 328
Arens, Moshe, 118, 119, 257 Beirut, 15, 17-18
Ariqat, Sa'ib, 156, 222 Beit Hanina, 30
Arnon-Ohana, Yuval, 83 BeitJallah,35
Asfur, Hassan, 138 Beit Safafa, 75
Ashrawi, Hanan, 133, 135, 137, 199, Beit Shemesh, 35
241,299 Beitar, 35
at Madrid Conference, 131 Belfast, 15, 16
at Washington talks, 132 Ben-Ami, Shlomo, 278
Baker plan (1991) and, 119, 122, Ben-Elissar, Eliahu, 85, 86, 87, 88,
126, 127, 128, 129, 130 90, 92, 94, 95, 96-7, 98, 99
elections to Palestinian Authority Ben-Gurion, David, 41, 46, 49, 51
and, 226, 229, 237, 238, 240 Bentzur, Eitan, 118, 119, 130
Association for the Development of Benvenisti, Meron, 1, 19, 30, 31, 40,
the O l d City, 265 56, 58, 74, 76, 257, 262
Association for the Protection of Benziman, U z i , 91, 253 °
Human Rights, 299 Betar, 295
Atarot airport, 36, 39, 305 Bethlehem, 21, 35, 38, 39
Ateret Kohanim, 263, 264 Bialer, U r i , 46

Index 353
billboards, elections to Palestinian illegal, 33-4, 270-2, 322

Authority and, 231-2 post-Oslo Accords, 255-8, 270-92,
Bir Zeit University, 38 297
Bishara, Azmi, 84 corruption, 192
blockade of Jerusalem (1948), 45 culture, 311-12
Blum, Yehuda, 34 currency, 311
Bnei Yehuda cult, 61-2
Bollens, A. Scott, 12, 14-15 Dahiat al-Barid, 36
boycotts Daqaiq, Faiz, 265
education, 82 David, King, 105
Israeli products, 81 Dayan, Arieh, 262
municipal government, 72-3, 82, Dayan, Moshe
186-8,319 negotiations about Jerusalem
British Mandate, 41-2 with Egypt, 85-6
Brussels, 12, 13 with Jordan, 46-8, 54
Brynen, Rex, 242 prayers on Temple M o u n t and, 58
bus transport, 35, 36-7, 313 Declaration o f Principles, 149, 151,
Bush, George, 118 152-7, 167-8, 186, 332
Demant, Peter, 13
Camp David conference, 2, 3, 5, Democratic Front for the Liberation
90-4,101-3,331 of Palestine, 219
Canaanites, 105 demographics, 19-22, 35, 43, 266,
capital city 323-6
Jerusalem as capital of Israel, 1, demonstrations, 61, 62, 81, 273, 276,
4-5,46,51,52-3, 65-6, 101, 283-4
153, 259, 289, 302, 306 Dinstein, Yoram, 34
Jerusalem as capital of Palestine, 4, Dole, Robert, 259
97,106, 134, 149, 152, 153, 195,
300, 301-2,306 East Talpiot, 27
Carter, Jimmy, 87, 95,98 Eban, Abba, 53-4
Camp David conference, 91-4, 102 economy ofJerusalem, 22-5, 36-7, 67
census, 324-5 Intifada and, 79, 81, 82,210
Cheshin, Amir, 21, 32, 69, 72, 74, 82, education, 23, 68-72, 312-13
263, 314 boycott, 82
Choshen, Maia, 19, 20, 22, 31, 39, 70 Efrat, 35, 40
Christian Quarter, 263 Egypt
Christianity, 1, 57, 167 isolation in Arab world, 96
elections to Palestinian Authority negotiations with Israel
and, 217, 219, 221,226, 229 about Jerusalem, 85-103
Christopher, Warren, 136-7 autonomy issue, 94—100
Clinton, Bill, 259, 286 Camp David conference, 90-4,
Cohen, Ge'ula, 99 101-3
Cohen, Hillel, 201, 203, 234, 237, 309 Sinai, 90, 100,101-2
Cohen, Shaul Ephraim, 30, 271 Washington talks and, 137
Cohen, Shmaryahu, 23, 35 support for P L O , 108
Cold War, 118 Eid, Basem, 192
construction, 21, 25-6, 27, 31, 278- Eid, Khatim Abd al-Qadir, 203, 223,
90, 321-3 226, 237, 298, 299, 308

354 Index
Elad, 263-4 war of 1948 and, 43-4, 45

Eldar, Akiva, 252, 253, 279, 280, 296 multicultural cities and, 11-18
electricity supply, 36, 313-14 permeability, 18-41, 327
emigration of Palestinians, 66
employment, 22-4, 67 Gal-Nur, Yitzhak, 10
municipal government, 72, 74, 79 Galili, Orit, 163,271,272,307
enlargement of Jerusalem metro- Ganim, Asad, 222, 228, 235, 239
politan area, 3, 19, 20, 34-5,133 garbage collection, 74
Jordanian Jerusalem (1952), 52 Garfinkle, Adam, 55
new umbrella municipality, 294-7, Gaza, 36, 66, 168, 198,211
301, 304-5, 306, 322, 333-4 elections to Palestinian Authority,
Etzion, Yehuda, 64 218, 221, 227, 228, 234
European U n i o n ( E U ) , 252 Gazit, Shlomo, 66
exchanges of neighborhoods, 4 Gemer, Moshe, 95, 97
extended families ( h a m u l a ) , 183, 239, General Intelligence, 192
243, 244 General Security Service (GSS -
Shin Bet), 62, 81, 192, 272
Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia, 122-3 Ghanim, Ahmad, 223, 224
Fatah, 136, 141-2, 243 al-Ghul, Zaki, 197-8
elections to Palestinian Authority Giladi, Rotem, 55
and, 220, 222-8, 237-9 Gilbar, Gad, 66
permanent settlement issue and, Gilo, 27
308-9 Givat Ze'ev, 295, 302
political organization, 245-6 G l u b b j o h n , 45
pro-Syrian element, 245-6 Golan Heights, 172
support in East Jerusalem, 206-7, Golani, Moti, 41, 43, 46, 49
210 Goldberg, Ambassador, 92, 93, 95
federation solution with Jordan, 54, Goldstein, Shalom, 33
178-9 Goren, Shlomo, 58
foundation of State of Israel, 42-4 graffiti, 81
French H i l l , 27 Grossman, David, 66
Friedland, Roger, 31, 55, 81 G u l f War (1991), 118, 119, 122, 123
Friedman, Rami, 24 Gush Etzion, 4, 40
frontiers, 9-84 Gutmann, Emanuel, 13, 14, 15, 16
borders compared with, 9-10
confrontation between concep- Habash, George, 208, 209
tions/communities and, 10-11 Habash, Sakhr, 223, 224
division of Jerusalem, 1-2, 10-11, Haber, Eitan, 91
35, 41-84, 326-34 Hadassah Hospital, 50
British Mandate, 41-2 Haifa, 48
internationalization plan, 42-3, Haj A m i n al-Husseini, 41, 55, 176
44, 45-6, 49 Halabi, Usama, 186,188, 195,196
Oslo accords and, 39-40 Haljperstam, Malvina, 259
partition (1949-50), 46-53 Hamami, Jamil, 199,225
Temple Mount/al-Haram al- Hamas, 207, 246 °
Shanf, 57-64 elections to Palestinian Authority
united in theory and divided in and, 219, 225, 234, 238
practice, 1, 3, 65-84 return of deportees, 141-2

Index 355
terrorist activities, 25, 36, 81, 212 visit to Palestinian Authority in

Washington Declaration and, Jericho, 179-80, 276
168-9 Washington Declaration and, 162,
hamula (extended families), 183, 239, 163,166,167,170-1
243, 244 Hussein, Saddam, 122
Hanf, Theodor, 18 <‫־‬ Husseini, Faisal, 61, 136, 153, 181,
Har Homa, 28, 30, 40, 78-9, 203, 190,193, 204, 260
278-90, 292, 294,320, 321 Arab Studies Society and, 127, 189
Hareuveni, Eyal, 262 at Madrid Conference, 131
Harkabi, Yehoshafat, 105 at Washington talks, 132, 133, 134,
Hassan, Crown Prince of Jordan, 135, 141
163, 169 Baker plan (1991) and, 122,124,
Hasson, Shlomo, 10,11, 35, 306 126,127,129,131
Hausen-Koriel, Devora, 43, 51, 60, boycott of municipal government
65, 89,105 and, 188
Hazboun, Samir, 25 elections to Palestinian Authority
health services, 24, 74, 269, 270, 314 and, 223, 224-6
Hebrew language, 310 housing and, 265
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 50, Israeli policy towards East Jerusa
72 lem and, 252, 253
Hebron, 32, 230, 280, 283 permanent settlement issue and,
elections to Palestinian Authority, 297-8, 299, 300
227, 228, 233, 235 proposal for Arab municipality in
Hecht, Richard, 31, 55, 81 East Jerusalem and, 196-200,
Hess, Amira, 242, 257, 270 201-2
Hilal, Jamil, 228, 239, 241, 242 Washington Declaration and,
al-Hindi, Amin, 192 169-70
Hirsch, Moshe, 43, 51, 60, 65, 89,
105 identity cards, 73, 79-80, 267-70,
Hirschfeld, Yair, 137, 138, 139, 140, 310-11,325
145,300 Igum, 26-7
Hizma, 20-1,39 illegal construction, 33-4, 270-2, 322
Holst, * 145,149 immigration, 21-2, 32-3, 161
housing, 28, 29, 31-3, 78-9, 261-6, incomes, 24, 68
270, 278-90, 297 independent political organizations,
Hudieb, Salwa, 223 207-8
Hussein, King of Jordan, 53, 54, 65, infrastructure provision, 73-6, 78-9
108,111 Institute for Land and Water
Baker plan (1991) and, 123 Research and Legal Services, 299
Declaration of Principles and, 168 intelligence and security services,
Har Homa scheme and, 286 190, 191-3, 198
Islamic holy places and, 162, 163, intercommunal marriages, 13
166, 167,170-1, 173-4, 181 internationalization plan, 42-3, 44,
London Agreement and, 109-10 45-6, 49
new Jerusalem umbrella munici Intifada, 2, 79-83,127, 205, 243, 244
pality and,296-7 closure response to, 36-7, 80, 210
permanent settlement issue and, economy of Jerusalem and, 79, 81,
177 82,210

356 Index
origins of, 110-11 Jerusalem Treasury Fund, 266

results of, 113, 115 Jewish Underground, 63-4, 99
Iraq, 118 Johannesburg, 14—15
Islam, 1 Johnson, Lyndon B., 93
holy places, 37, 41, 54, 57-64, 109, Jordan, 19
175,315-16, 331 agreement with Palestinian
Al-Aqsa mosque, 2, 37, 61, 62, Authority, 172-4
158, 181,277-8 annexation of West Bank and East
Arab League and, 160 Jerusalem, 46-53
Beilin/Abu-Mazen plan, 303-4, Baker plan (1991) and, 123, 126-7
306, 308 dispute over appointment of
Egyptian negotiations and, 87, mufti, 176
88-9, 96, 97 federation solution and, 54, 178-9
Israeli policy towards East Jeru- G u l f War and, 118,123
salem after Oslo Accords and, Har Homa scheme and, 286
273-8 Islamic holy places and, 162, 163,
Jordan and, 162, 163, 166, 167, 166, 167, 170-1, 173-4, 177-8,
170-1, 173-4, 177-8, 180-2, 180-2, 316
316 negotiations with Israel, 44, 46-50,
Washington Declaration and, 53-5, 95, 168
162-72 Washington Declaration (1994),
Sharia' courts, 55-6, 176, 314-15 162-72
Supreme M u s l i m Council, 55-6, Palestinian elite in, 179
165, 181-2, 188 permanent settlement issue and,
see also Waqf administration 177, 307
Islamic Development Bank, 265 P L O and, 105
Islamic Jihad, 212 Reagan initiative (1982) and, 108
Israel Antiquities Authority, 277 Waqf administration in Jerusalem
Israeli peace plan (1989), 113-18 and, 55, 164
dispute with Palestinians, 56-7,
al-Jabari, Nabil, 227 175-6, 180-2, 316
Jabber, Fuad, 243 war of 1948, 44
Jabel Mukaber, 30 war of 1967, 53
al-Ja'bri, Suleiman, 176 Washington talks and, 132
Jadallah, Muhammad, 199 Jozlan, Ali, 227
Jarju'i, E m i l , 226, 237, 238, 240 Judaism, 1, 57
Jebusites, 105 Temple Mount and, 58-64
Jenin, 218
Jericho, 168, 179-80, 228, 276 Kabriti, Abd al-Karim, 273
Jerusalem Association for Welfare Kahalani, Avigdor, 253
and Development, 249 Kamal, Zuhira, 226, 237
Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, 32 Kamil, Muhammad Ibrahim, 90, 91,
Jerusalem Committee, 201-2 *93
Jerusalem Development Corpora- Kamil, Sufian, 72
tion, 199 Kaminker, Sarah, 69
Jerusalem District Security, 193 Karpel, Dalia, 46
Jerusalem Fund for Development Kerwin, *,10
and Investment, 265 Khalidi, Ahmed, 300, 301

Index 357
Khalil, Samiha, 237 Lerner, Yoel, 62

KhanYunis, 227, 228 Lesch, A n n Mosely, 243
al-Khatib, Ghassan, 199 Libai, David, 258
al-Khatib, Ruhi, 197 Likud Party, 77-9, 96, 179
Kimhi, Yisrael, 31, 33 Arab League and, 161
Kimmerling, Baruch, 10, 11, 243* elections to Palestinian Authority
Klein, Claude, 13, 14, 15,16 and, 236
Klein, Menachem, 53, 108, 142, 178, Israeli peace plan (1989) and, 113,
184,198,216, 244, 246 114,117
Kliot, Nurit, 17 London Agreement and, 110
Klugman, Haim, 27 policy towards East Jerusalem,
Kollek, Teddy, 15, 77, 261, 264 248, 252, 254, 259, 260, 279-81,
Olmert's challenge to, 186, 187, 291-2
188, 255 Litani, Yehuda, 38
separation and discrimination local administration see municipal
policy, 26, 75-6, 280 government
Koren, Dani, 110, 114 London Agreement, 109-10
Kotekjoel, 10,11, 12 Lustick, Ian S., 34
Krystall, Nathan, 48
al-Kurd, Maher, 138 Ma'aleh Adumim, 35, 40, 255, 256,
Kutab, Daoud, 192 257,279,295,302
Kutab, Jonathan, 226, 229 Madrid Conference, 117, 129-32,
Kuttab, Daud, 69 331
Baker plan (1991) as lead-up to,
Labor Party, 77, 96, 134, 255, 290 118-29
Israeli peace plan (1989) and, Majaj, Amin, 197
114-15, 117 al-Majali, *, 169
London Agreement and, 110 al-Majid, Abd, 265
policy in East Jerusalem, 263, 280 Makovsky, David, 110, 112, 114, 119,
land and property 150
confiscation/expropriation, 27-8, al-Malki, Riad, 199, 225
283 Mana', Adel, 84
Igum purchase programme, 26-7 Mansfield, Yoram, 17
Israeli policy in East Jerusalem Ma'oz, Moshe, 66
after Oslo Accords, 261-6 Marwani mosque, 274
open public spaces, 28, 29 al-Masri, M u n i b , 265
suburbanization, 31-2 Mazor, Adam, 23, 35
urban planning, 15, 28-30, 73-4, media, 311-12
278-9, 321-3, 333 Meir, Golda, 44, 54
see also construction; housing mental health services, 74
Lapidot, Ruth, 34, 43, 51, 60, 65, 89, Merchav, Reuven, 55
105 M i g d a l j o e l , 243
Laqueur, Walter, 42, 43, 44, 90, 100, mixed residential neighborhoods, 13
108, 111, 113, 117,130 Montreal, 13-14
Larsen, Terje, 140 Moore, John Noton, 93
Latrun area, 49 Mordechay, Itzchak, 287
Lebanon, PLO's defeat in, 108, 244 Morris, Benny, 45
Legum, Colin, 97 Moskowitz, Erwin, 262, 263

358 Index
M o u n t Scopus, 41, 46-7, 48, 50, 51 National Institutions Office, 249

Mu'ashar, Marwan, 180 National Islamic Committee for the
Mubarak, Husni, 96-7, 108, 116-17 Struggle against Settlements, 249
Baker plan (1991) and, 123 National Religious Party, 64
permanent settlement issue and, Naufal, Mamduh, 119, 135, 150, 168
177 Negev region, 48, 49, 95
Washington talks and, 136 neo-patrimonialism, 244—5
mufti of Jerusalem Nesher, Merav, 70, 71
dispute over appointment of, 176 Netanyahu, Binyamin, 64, 161, 177,
Israeli policy and, 250 203, 255, 280, 320
Mughrabi neighborhood, 27 permanent settlement issue and,
m u k h t a r s , 76, 82 293
multicultural cities, 11-18 policy towards East Jerusalem and,
municipal government, 4, 68, 156, 253,257, 261-2,272
185 Har Homa scheme, 279, 282,
discrimination and, 75-6, 77 286, 287-90
education and, 69-70 Nevo, Yosef, 83
employment, 72, 74, 79 newspapers see press
illegal construction and, 271-2, Nicosia, 15, 16-17
322 Nile, River, 95
infrastructure provision, 73-6, Nir, Ori, 229, 236
78-9 Nusseibeh, Sari, 132, 199
m u k h t a r s and, 76, 82
new umbrella municipality, 294-7, Ode,Adnan, 240, 241,242
301,304-5,306,322,333-4 Old City, 46-7
Palestinian boycott, 72-3, 82, Beilin/Abu-Mazen plan, 303-4,
186-8,319 306, 308
Palestinian census and, 324 Jewish quarter, 27, 45, 47, 49, 85,
policy towards East Jerusalem after 86
Oslo Accords and, 255-60, war of 1948 and, 44, 45
261-6 Olmert, Ehud, 33, 71,186, 188
proposal for Arab municipality in Israeli policy towards East Jerusa-
East Jerusalem, 195-204 lem and, 254, 255, 257, 258,
urban planning, 15, 28-30, 73-4, 261,262,264, 271,272, 277-8
278-9, 321-3, 333 Har Homa scheme, 279, 282,
Musa, Amr, 136, 137 294
Musallam, Sami F., 55, 155, 165, open public spaces, 28, 29
167,176,190,199,251,300 opposition, Palestinian, 192, 207-8
M u s l i m Quarter, 263, 264 Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence (OIC), 158,162,170-2,285,
Nablus, 228, 233 330
Nafa, Ibrahim, 173 Orient House, 127,150,193,194,
al-Nakhal, Muhammad Matar, 31, 318
V
32, 204
Arafat's attempt to control, 201-2
Narkis, U z i , 51, 58, 65
Israel's attempted closure of,
Nashashibi, Rana, 237
251-3, 258
Nasser, Jamil Othman, 182, 193,
proposed Arab East Jerusalem
201, 220
municipality and, 197, 198

Index 359
as unofficial arm of Palestinian Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, 19,

Authority, 189-91 68, 83, 84, 99
Oslo Accords, 2, 38-40, 59, 139, 168, Palestinian Authority, 2, 37, 38-9,
193, 290-2, 328, 329,332-3 333
Israeli policy towards East Jerusa- agreement with Jordan, 172-4
lem after Oslo Accords, 247-92 census, 324-5
public opinion in East Jerusalem construction and, 271
on, 211-12, 218 Declaration of Principles and,
talks prior to, 135,137-50, 156, 331 152-3
dispute over appointment of
Palestine Liberation Organization mufti, 176
(PLO), 104-57,183-204 dispute over Waqf in Jerusalem,
Baker peace plan (1991) and, 175-6, 180-2,316
120-3, 125-9 education and, 70-2
boycott of municipal government elections to, 71, 214-42, 319-21
in Jerusalem and, 186, 187 participation, 216-18
Declaration of Principles, 149, presidential election, 208-11,
151, 152-7, 167-8,186 218, 237
defeat in Lebanon, 108, 244 procedures, 218-34
Egyptian support for, 108 results, 234-6, 237-42
formation, 104-5 Har Homa scheme and, 281, 283
institutions of, 214 Israeli policy in East Jerusalem
Intifada and, 80, 110-11 and, 247, 249, 250
Israeli peace plan (1989) and, 113, Legislative Council, 192, 193,
115, 116-18 202-3
Israeli recognition of, 145, 147, elections to, 214-42
149, 150 permanent settlement issue and,
Madrid Conference and, 129-32 177, 297-300
Palestinian elite and, 183-4, 185, proposal for Arab municipality in
243-4 East Jerusalem and, 197, 198,
political organization, 243-6 201-2
proposal for Arab municipality in public opinion in East Jerusalem
East Jerusalem and, 195-6 on, 211, 212, 213
recognition of Israel, 145, 149, U S relations with, 286-7, 289
150, 161 Washington Declaration and, 165
religious organizations and, 56 Palestinian Broadcast Corporation,
Shultz peace plan (1988) and, 249
111-13 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statis-
United Nations and, 104, 106 tics, 249
U S A and, 106 Palestinian Council on Health, 249
Washington Declaration and, 165, Palestinian Covenant, 143
166-7 Palestinian Economic Council for
Washington talks (1991-3) and, Development and Reconstruction
132-7,141 ( P E C D A R ) , 190, 249
see also Oslo Accords Palestinian Housing Council, 249,
Palestinian Academic Society for the 265
Study of International Affairs Palestinian Institute for the
(PASSIA), 195-6 Wounded, 249

360 Index
Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem, Israeli policy in East Jerusalem

144-5, 148-50,156, 188-94, and, 248, 260
195,204,317-19 political organizations, 183-6, 242-6,
Al-Quds University, 72, 188, 254, 319-21
260, 313 elections to Palestinian Authority,
Israeli policy and, 249-54, 260 71,214-42,319-21
proposal for Arab municipality in opposition, 192, 207-8
East Jerusalem, 195-204 support for parties and factions,
Supreme M u s l i m Council, 55-6, 206-8
165, 181-2, 188 Popular Front for the Liberation of
see also Orient House Palestine, 219, 225
Palestinian Investment Company, population, 19-22, 35, 43, 266, 323-6
265 Porat, Yehoshua, 83
Palestinian Liberation Front, 106 post offices, elections to Palestinian
Palestinian National Council, 105, Authority and, 230-1, 236
129-30,160, 193, 297 posters, elections to Palestinian
Palestinian National Covenant, 106 Authority and, 231-2
Palestinian Open University, 188 Presidential Security Guard, 231-2
Palestinian Preventative Security press
Force, 190,191-2, 198,248 elections to Palestinian Authority
Palestinian Prisoners' Club, 249 and,228-9
partition of Jerusalem (1949-50), freedom of, 312
46-53 Preventative Security Force, 190,
Paz, Yair, 41 191-2, 198, 248
Peel Commission, 41-2 property see land and property
People's Party, 226, 228 public opinion in East Jerusalem,
Peres, Shimon, 291, 317, 332 205-6
Declaration of Principles and, 149 on armed actions, 212-13
Israeli peace plan (1989) and, 114 candidates for vice-president,
London Agreement and, 109-10 211
Oslo talks and, 140, 141, 142, 150, elections to Legislative Council,
151, 156 214-42
permanent settlement issue and, Oslo agreements, 211-12, 218
307 on Palestinian Authority, 211, 212,
Western Wall tunnel and, 274 213
permanent settlement issue, 177, political support, 206-8, 319-21
291,293-300 presidential election, 208-11, 218,
Beilin/Abu-Mazen understand- 237
ings, 300-9, 329 on soft protest, 213-14
permits, 66 public transport, 35, 36-7, 313
Pisgat Ze'ev, 27 Pundik, Ron, 45, 46, 48, 50, 138,
Plan IE, 256, 271, 296 139, 300
planning, 15, 28-30, 73-4, 278-9,
321-3, 333 al-Qaq, Anis, 227, 250
police and security services, 190, al-Qaq, Zakariya, 56, 57, 69, 186,
191-3, 198,316-17 310,314
elections to Palestinian Authority Qashu'a, Sayed, 201
and, 235-6 Qasis, Mudar, 216, 218, 222

Index 361
Qria', Ahmad see Abu-Ala (Ahmad Ross, Dennis, 135, 285

Qria') Ross, Leonard, 207, 208
Quandt, William B , 90, 91, 92, 95, Rubin, Barry, 42, 43, 44, 90, 100,
243 108, 111, 113, 117, 130
o
Rubinstein, Dani, 33, 37, 38, 40, 70,
Rabin, Yitzhak, 65, 137, 153, 291 71,75, 181,201,202, 223, 227,
assassination, 306, 307 245, 257, 261, 263, 270, 272, 277
Declaration of Principles and, 149
Israeli peace plan (1989) and, 114 Sa'ad al-Din al-Alami, 56-7
Israeli policy towards East Jerusa Sabagh, Hasib, 265
lem after Oslo Accords and, Sabella, Bernard, 31, 52, 185
251, 258, 261 Sabri, Akaramah, 176, 260, 274
Oslo talks and, 140, 141, 142-3, Sadat, Anwar
147, 148,150, 151 negotiations with Israel, 86-9,
Palestinian security forces and, 95-6, 98, 99-100
192 Camp David conference, 90-4,
permanent settlement issue and, 102
293 visit to Jerusalem, 86, 101
Washington Declaration and, 162, Safia, Afif, 137
163, 165, 166 Sa'id, Nader Izzat, 1,34, 57
Rabinivich, Itamar, 97 Sa'id, Nadir, 207, 209
Rabinowitz, Itamar, 45, 49, 50 Sa'ih, A b d al-Hamid, 181
Rajoubjibril, 190, 191, 192, 198, Salah, A b d al-Jawad, 238
224, 248 Saudi Arabia, 55, 169, 171
rallies, elections to Palestinian Saunders, Harold, 95
Authority and, 229 Savir, U r i , 142,144, 145
Ramallah,21,35, 37-8, 39 Sayigh,Yezid, 184,215
elections to Palestinian Authority, Schiff, Ze'ev, 91
228 security services see police and
Ramon, Amnon, 60, 64 security services
Ramon, Haim, 147-8 Segal, Jerome M . , 1, 34, 57
Ramot, 27 Segev, Amira, 70, 71, 280, 284
Ramot Eshkol, 27 Seideman, Daniel, 28, 29
Ras al-Amud, 203-4, 261-2, 321 Sela, Avraham, 45, 160
Reagan, Ronald sewage system, 73, 74, 75-6
London Agreement and, 109 Sha'ar Mizrach, 256, 257
peace initiative (1982), 107-9 Sha'ath, Nabil, 223, 242
refugees, 32, 48 Shachar, Na'ama, 20, 22, 31, 70
Reiter, Yitzhak, 55, 60, 72 Shahal, Moshe, 258
Rekhes, Eli, 84 Shaked, Haim, 97
resident status, 267-70, 311, 322, Shamir,Yitzhak, 109, 110, 111
323, 325 Baker plan (1991) and, 120-2,
road system, 26, 73, 74, 75 123-5, 126, 128
bus transport, 35, 36-7, 313 Israeli peace plan (1989) and, 114,
Robinson, Glenn E 2 4 3,242,184‫״‬118 ,
244 Sharabi, Hisham, 245
Roman, Michael, 12, 13, 81, 82 Sharia' courts, 55-6, 176, 314-15
Romann, Michael, 66-7, 72, 83, 186 Sharon, Ariel, 264, 279

362 Index
Sha'th, Nabil, 132, 136 Tel Aviv, 53

Shchori, Dalia, 276 Temkin, Moshe, 191
Sheikh Jarah, 32, 263, 264, 304 Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif
Shertok, Moshe, 48 see Islam, holy places
al-Shikaki, Khalil, 213, 217, 218, 222, terrorism see violence
228, 234, 237, 238, 239 Tibi, Ahmad, 147-8
Shin Bet (GSS), 62, 81, 192, 272 Tohami, Hassan, 85-6
Shlaim, Avi, 45, 49, 50 tourism, 24, 25, 36, 75, 80, 82, 191
Sho'afat, 30 transport, 35, 36-7, 313
Shragai, Nadav, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, tree planting, 29-30
79, 89, 190, 191, 247, 255, 260, al-Tufakji, Khalil, 52
261,264, 277, 279, 297
Shultz, George, 108, 110 Ukal, Talal, 221, 222, 227, 228, 234
peace plan (1988), 111-13, 122 U m Jihad (Initisar al-Wazir), 223, 242
al-Shu'ybi, Azmi, 239 U r n Tuba, 30
sidewalks, 75 unemployment, 23-4, 210-11
Silhab, A b d al-A'zim, 176 United National Command, 80
Silwan, 234, 263 United Nations, 65, 99, 330
Sinai, 90, 100, 101-2 Har Homa scheme and, 285
Sinyora, Hana, 186, 226, 227, 229 internationalization plan, 42-3, 44,
Sofer, Sasson, 91, 92 45-6, 49
Sokol, Sami, 307, 308 partition of Jerusalem and, 51
Solomon's Stables, 273-4, 275, 276, P L O and, 104, 106
277 United States of America
Soviet U n i o n , 118, 119 Baker peace plan (1991) and,
Sprintzak, Ehud, 64 118-29
Stotkin, Richard, 11 Egypt-Israel negotiations and
street lighting, 74 autonomy issue, 95, 98
strikes, 82, 273, 276, 283 Camp David conference, 90-4,
Suan, Muhammad, 223 101-3
suburbanization, 31-2, 266 embassy in Israel, 259-60, 289
Suissa, Eliyahu, 257, 261, 279 Har Homa scheme and, 284,
sumud, 66, 72 286-9
Supreme M u s l i m Council, 55-6, Israeli policy towards East Jeru-
165, 181-2,188 salem post-Oslo Accords and,
Sur Baher, 30, 289-90 259-60
al-Surani, Ghazi, 221, 222, 227, 228, London Agreement and, 109-10
234 Madrid Conference and, 130
Süsser, *, 108, 179 new umbrella municipality and,
Syria, 119, 172 296
partition of Jerusalem (1949-50)
Taba, 100, 101, 301 and, 47
Tahboub, Hassan, 57, 165, 176, 181, P L O and, 106
194, 197, 241, 260 Reagan initiative (1982), 107-9
al-Tal, Abdullah, 46, 47 c
relations with Palestinian Author-
al-Tal, Tarik, 179 ity, 286-7, 289
Tantash, Khalid, 201 Shultz peace plan (1988), 111-13,
taxation, 31, 73 122

Index 363
Washington talks (1991-3), 132-7 water system, 73, 74-5

uprising see Intifada Weingrod, Alex, 66-7, 72, 83, 186
Weksler, U z i , 281
Vatican City, 88, 89 welfare services, 24, 269, 270, 310
violence West Bank
Har Homa protests, 284 Israeli occupation, 66
Jewish Underground, 63-4, 99 Jewish settlements, 108
P L O renunciation of, 106 Jordanian annexation, 46-53
public opinion in East Jerusalem Western Wall, 27, 57, 59, 60, 62, 274
on, 212-13 Tunnel, 37, 180, 274-5, 292, 320
on Temple Mount, 61-4 women
terrorist activities, 25, 36, 81, 212 elections to Palestinian Authority
see also Intifada and, 217, 221,228, 234,238
employment of, 24
WadiJoz,304 Wye memorandum, 290
Waqf administration, 36, 59, 60,188,
315 Ya'ari, Ehud, 91
Israeli policy and, 250 Yassin, Ahmad, 208, 209
Jordan and, 55, 164 Yehiye, Kusai Haj, 84
dispute with Palestinians, 56-7, Yost, Ambassador, 92, 93, 95
175-6,180-2, 316
opening in Al-Aqsa basement, Zak, Moshe, 53, 54, 56, 109, 110,
277-8 123,168
Solomon's Stables mosque, 273-4, Zaki, Abas, 224, 242
275, 276, 277 Zelda, 1
Western Wall Tunnel and, 274-5 Zilberman, Ifrah, 32, 81, 82
wars Zinger,Yoel, 142, 143-5
1948, 43-4, 45 Zionism, 27, 41, 63, 65
1967, 53 al-Zughayir, Ahmad Hashim, 226,
Washington Declaration (1994), 237
162-72
Washington talks (1991-3), 132-7,
141

Jerusalem, which means "city of peace", is one of the most bitterly
contested territories on earth. Claimed by two peoples and sacred to
three faiths, the city has been associated for the last three decades
with violent struggle and civil unrest. As the peace negotiations
between the Palestinians and Israelis reach their conclusion, the final
and most difficult issue is the status of Jerusalem. H o w and to what
extent will these two nations share this city? I low will Christians,
Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem and around the world redefine their
relationship to Jerusalem when the dust settles on the final
agreement? Will the Israelis and Palestinians even be able to reach an
agreement at all?
Menachem Klein, one of the leading experts on the history and
politics of Jerusalem, cuts through the rhetoric on all sides to explain
the actual policies of the Israelis and Palestinians toward the city. He
describes the "facts on the ground" that make their competing claims
so fraught with tension and difficult to reconcile. He shows how
Palestinian national institutions have operated clandestinely since the
Israelis occupied the eastern half of the city, and how the Israelis have
tried to suppress them. Ultimately he points the way towards a
compromise solution, but insists that the struggle for power and
cultural recognition will probably remain a permanent feature of life
in this complicated, multi-cultural city.
Menachem K l e i n is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political
Science in Bar-Ilan University and a Board Member of B'tselem, the
Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories. I Ie is a Researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel
Studies.
HURST & COMPANY, L O N D O N

http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/
ISBN 1-85065-576-6
i n association w i t h the
9 ‫״‬7 8 1 8 5 0 ‫ ׳‬6 5 5 7 5 6 ‫> ׳‬
Jerusalem I n s t i t u t e for Israel Studies

Jerusalem The Contested City

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‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

HURST & COMPANY, L O N D O N

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

M a n y fine people have assisted me i n preparing this book for p u b l i -

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

2. T h e C u r t a i n Rises: Jerusalem i n the Israeli-Egyptian

3. T h e P L O - from the W i n g s to Center Stage 104

4. T h e Choruses: the Arab League and the O I C 158

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

The O r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e I s l a m i c Conference (OIC) 162

6. A n East Jerusalem Political Profile 205

7. Israeli Policy i n East Jerusalem 247

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

8. C o n c l u s i o n : Bridges over a D i v i d e d C i t y 294

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians has

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

the O l d C i t y that constitute the historical and religious cores o f

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

municipality w i l l be established as a separate administrative unit

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

w h i c h they live. In this sense, the foundation laid at C a m p D a v i d

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

for m y purposes. I w i l l happily correct i n the future what is dis-

TRANSLITERATION AND TERMINOLOGY

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

produces (for example, Yitzhak Rabin, but Itzchak Mordechay). Finally,

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

T h i s first map shows the changes i n Jerusalem's, municipal

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

A c c o r d i n g to the c o m m o n w i s d o m i n Israel, o n June 4, 1967, the

moved. A frontier is inclusive and implies an open future, while a

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

legitimate entity w i t h equal rights. In a frontier city, by contrast,

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

between the two ethnic national groups is m u c h higher. P u b l i c

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

administration, and business. T h e metropolitan area also contains

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

shown, a strategy o f aggressive urban planning has developed i n

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

Jerusalem was established through democratic procedures and the

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

Beirut's flowering attracted hundreds o f thousands o f i m m i -

Soft, flexible a n d p e r m e a b l e borders

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

Jerusalem and extended the m u n i c i p a l borders ( M a p 1). T h e

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

Table 1.1. JERUSALEM'S POPULATION

Jews (000s) 421.2 417.1 (426.2*) no data

city's M u s l i m inhabitants numbered 164,300, or 90.8 per cent o f

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

U n t i l the Palestinian A u t h o r i t y entered them at the end o f 1995,

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬

from 1979 to 1987, the n u m b e r of Jews c o m i n g to Jerusalem was

‫כל הזכויות שמורות למכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל‬