ROLE OF DIFFERENT UN ORGANS IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AS

WELL AS OTHER CONFLICT RESOLUTION WHAT HAS THE UN ORGANS DONE

TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

UN’s ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Collective security in form of conflict prevention and resolution in the international scene
remains one of the primary goals of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter notes that
the United Nations was founded to save future generations from the scourge of war. The charter
mandates the UN with the authority to intervene in areas characterised with conflict. Chapter VI
provides a UN mission with the use of force only in the case of self-defense and requires the
consent of all sovereign parties and Chapter VII provides a robust mandate to use military force
without the consent of all sovereign parties. Therefore, its role in conflict resolution is centred
around investigation of the situation, recommendation of procedures and adoption of resolutions
that mandate military or humanitarian interventions in conflicted areas.

IN SYRIA

The UN’s role in Syria was limited as its justification for military intervention was based
on the Responsibility to protect, arguing that the Assad government had failed to protect its
citizen. This justification was put forward by the US, but China and Russia quickly vetoed the
decision arguing that US intentions of interventions are always based on regime change as they
did in Libya instead of Responsibility to protect as they usually claim. The lack of a unanimous
decision for military intervention pushed the UN to settle for a less effective way as I will
illustrate later.

The UN bodies involved in trying to resolve the Syrian civil war include the General
assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. The general assembly put
forward resolutions condemning human rights violations, the Human Rights Council created an
inquiry commission to monitor the grave violations of human rights while the Security council
authorized an observer mission to report on the implementation of the observers under
resolution 2042 and the UN Supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS) established under
resolution 2043 in April 2012. All these organs have been useful in advocating for accountability
for the crimes committed and peaceful dialogue between the opposers and government officials
as a nation building strategy. More so the UN secretary general engaged in dialogue with Assad
urging him to put an end to the grave human rights violations happening under his watch.

General Assembly

Its role is majorly centered in passing resolutions and to some extent suspension of
membership in subsidiary UN bodies. In 2011 it adopted a resolution calling upon the Syrian
authorities to implement the Plan of Action of the League of Arab States towards establishing
peace and to fully comply with their obligations under international human rights law. The
Syrian authority agreed to the league’s peace plan and refrained from deploying the Syrian army
to disperse peaceful demonstrators, removed tanks within the city and released political
prisoners. Despite the government’s agreement to the peace plan, the opposition continued
reporting cases of murder and missing persons which prompted the League to suspend Syria’s
membership of the league for not respecting the terms of the agreement. In 2012 it passed a
resolution condemning all the violence and urged involved parties including armed groups to
stop the violence. The resolution also recommended support be rendered to the League of Arab
States in calling for an inclusive Syrian political process and the decision to facilitate systematic
politic transition into a pluralistic democratic regime.

In December 2016 it passed a resolution involving the creation of an international,

impartial and independent mechanism to collect and analyze evidence of serious crimes
committed by the Syrian government to be used for future purposes in court that may have a
mandate to convict the perpetrators of the crimes.
 Human Rights Council

The council is composed of 47 member states elected by the General Assembly making it
a subsidiary body to the General Assembly. It’s an intergovernmental body of the United
Nations, through which States discuss human rights conditions in the UN Member States. Its role
is to to promote and protect universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, address situations
of violations of human rights and make recommendations.

In 2011 HRC established an independent international commission of inquiry under

resolution S-17/1 with a mandate to investigate alleged human rights violations. Their task also
included to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and where
possible to identify those responsible so that they are held accountable.

Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the HRC to stop human rights violations, the Syrian
authorities refused to comply with Human Rights Council Resolution S-17/1. Its advocacy role
prompted humanitarian intervention inform of aid from the red cross and Red Crescent aid
workers to provide food and health care services to the victims. However, the commission
continued to report deliberate targeting of hospitals, medical personnel and transport, the denial
of access to medical care by government forces. This continued attacks undermined the efforts of
the commission and aid workers by limiting their potential in helping to relieve the suffering of
the victims.

Security Council

UNSMIS is a peacekeeping mission established for an initial period of 90 days that

involved the deployment of unarmed soldiers and some appropriate civilians to observe the
situation in Syria. UN Peacekeeping helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to
peace. Its role entailed the monitoring of a cessation of armed violence in all forms by all
parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy’s six-point
peace plan to end the conflict spearheaded by Kofi Annan. The peace plan encompassed
addressing the aspirations of Syrian citizens, ending the violence by achieving a UN supervised
ceasefire, facilitating timely provision of humanitarian assistance, hastening the release of
detained political prisoners, respecting freedom of association and ensuring freedom of
movement for journalists. The council further urged the Syria government to be cooperative with
the personnel so that the mission could be a success. However, their efforts were not as
successful as expected as they could not move freely to all regions due to escalation in violence.
The UNSMIS was also tasked with monitoring and supporting the full implementation of a six-
point plan spearheaded by the UN-Arab League special envoy Kofi Annan.

Regardless of the presence of the UNSMIS, the Syrian regime violated the UNSC
resolutions on cease fire demanding safe and unhindered humanitarian access; cessation of
“indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas and an end to the practices of
arbitrary detention, disappearance, and abductions, and the release of everyone who has been
arbitrarily detained.

The most effective role played by UNSC in the civil war that can be categorised as
successful is that of imploring other actors to impose sanctions on the regime. This call was
taken seriously by the US, EU, the Arab League, Turkey among others. The US banned the
importation of petroleum and its products from Syria and prohibited new investment in Syria.
The EU sanctions restrict the transportation of crude oil, petroleum products, key equipment and
technology for the oil and gas industry in Syria. The EU further prohibits the provision of
insurance or reinsurance to the Syrian government, public bodies, corporations and agencies
owned and controlled by the government. The Arab League chose to block the sale of "non-
essential" commodities to Syria, halt the funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria and
a ban on commercial flights and a travel ban on senior Syrian officials. Turkey’s sanctions on
Syria include a travel ban on Syrian leaders, the freezing of their assets, prohibition on shipment
of arms and military equipment and suspension of dealings with the Syrian Central Bank and
Syrian Trade Bank. More so, the seizure in Gibraltar in July 2019 of the tanker Grace 1 with
cargo allegedly destined for the Banyas Oil Refinery underlines the continuing commitment to
enforcement of EU sanctions against Syria. The sanctions taken against the Syrian regime forced
them to refrain from using the army to attack civilians but still the situation in Syria is in a
stalemate.

However, the Security Council could not effectively sanction perpetrators of gross human
rights violations or refer the case to the ICC because of China and Russia’s veto power. The
power struggle between the five-permanent member of the UNSC makes it difficult to have a
unanimous vote towards a certain resolution and in this case, it was because of the different
national interests envisaged by China and Russia. For instance, Russia was protecting its interest
in continuing to provide the Assad regime with military assistance. The failure of the permanent
member so the UNSC to help the Syrian government find a political solution has been
catastrophic. The fact that a unanimous decision needs to be taken by the permanent members of
the UNSC in order to take action, limits its capability in getting fully involved in conflict
resolution.

For the UNSC role to be more effective factors such as mandate, duration of mission,
domestic, international and the mission’s capacity should correspond with the intensity of the
conflict. Looking at the UNSMIS, it was established for 90 days with a possibility of extension
and yet the report given did not effectively promote positive results necessary to resolve the
conflict. The UNSC is seen to be ineffective most of the times because the recommendations
they give are not always binding and there are essentially no consequences for violating their
resolutions. As long as it continues depending on the will of states to provide military personnel,
it shall not exercise its duty independently without being bound by the state’s interests.

ASSESSMENT OF THE UN ROLE IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS

The main purpose of the United Nations as delineated in Article 1 of the UN Charter is to
maintain international peace and security and to that end take collective action to prevent and
remove threats to the peace (Javed and Mahmood, 2017). As such several UN bodies have
responded to the escalating crisis since it began in 2011 including the Security Council, the
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council in various ways.

Since 2013, the Security Council has passed 25 resolutions on peace talks, chemical
weapons and humanitarian access in Syria. Several of these resolutions refer to the government’s
responsibility to protect its population enshrined under the principle of the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) but none of the resolutions have been fully implemented and several drafts have
been vetoed by Russia and China jointly and independently as well (Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2020). Russia and China have jointly vetoed eight resolutions since
2011 and Russia has independently vetoed six resolutions. Some of the vetoed resolutions have
been highlighted below showing the impotence of the UNSC in the face of the veto power.

In 2011, the Security Council drafted a resolution condemning the Syrian government for
violation of human rights but it collapsed after Russia and China vetoed it because the Chinese
Permanent Representative felt the resolution did not comply with the principle of non-
interference set forth in the United Nations Charter and Russia did not agree with its accusatory
tone or the ultimatum of sanctions issued against peaceful crisis settlement (United Nations,
2011).

In 2012, another resolution supporting the Arab League Peace plan was again vetoed by
Russia and China and a similarly drafted resolution endorsed by the General Assembly was also
voted against by China, Russia and ten non-permanent members. Later that year, the council set
up a peacekeeping mission through Resolution 2043 headed by Kofi Annan as the special envoy
which presented a peace proposal to the Syrian government that included committing to end the
fighting and attaining UN-supervised cessation of violence and ensuring humanitarian assistance
could be provided in a timely manner. However, although this was widely considered to be the
best opportunity for resolving the conflict, it stalled and the conflict continued to escalate (Javed
and Mahmood, 2017).

Even when resolutions have been successfully passed, the Syrian government has
blatantly violated them. The Syrian government has disregarded UNSC Resolution 2118
that enshrined the agreement with Syria to surrender its chemical weapons, Resolution 2165 that
authorized initiating access to Syria through a four-border crossing not controlled by the
government for humanitarian aid and Resolution 2328 that demanded unhindered access to
monitor civilian evacuations in Aleppo. Moreover, both Russia and China have shielded Syria
from accountability measures proposed by the security council such as the proposal to condemn
the crackdown on anti-government protests and referring Syria to the International Criminal
Court undermining its efforts to bring an end to the almost decade-long conflict (Javed and
Mahmood, 2017).

The General Assembly

 Article 11 of the UN Charter gives the General Assembly the power to consider and
make recommendations with regard to the principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace
and security to its members and the Security Council. In the Syrian conflict, the General
Assembly has adopted several resolutions in an attempt to foster peaceful resolutions to the crisis
and pressure the Security Council to act in line with its mandate. For instance, in 2013 the
General Assembly requested the then Secretary General to brief the council and urge the
members of the Council to intensify the efforts to end the violence and overcome the divisions in
the region, in Syria and in the Security Council (Javed and Mahmood, 2017).

Many of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly have been to condemn the
escalation of the conflict and violation of humanitarian law and to demand the Syrian
government to comply with international law, cooperate with the commissions of inquiry and to
meets its responsibility to protect its population (Javed and Mahmood, 2017).

The Human Rights Council, a subsidiary of the General Assembly, has also adopted
several resolutions in its efforts in the Syrian conflict mainly in condemning the atrocities that
have been carried out in the civil war. Majority of the resolutions demand that the Syrian
government upholds its responsibility to protects its population. It also established a Commission
of Inquiry to investigate and bring to light the crimes committed by Syrian government forces
including crimes against humanity, war crimes, use of chemical weapons, abductions, arbitrary
detentions and disappearances attributed to the Syrian government (Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2020).

The other UN body involved in the peace efforts in the Syrian conflict is the United
Nations Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to Protect. This body
has constantly voiced its condemnation against the breaches of human rights carried out by both
state and non-state actors and specifically condemned the aerial attacks and use of indiscriminate
weapons by governments against civilians including the use of barrel bombs in civilian-inhabited
areas (Javed and Mahmood, 2017).

Success or Failure
 Many UN efforts have centered around the use of resolutions that call for the de-
escalation and cessation of the violence and demands for the government to protect its people.
However, there has been a wide consensus that the international response especially from the UN
has been ineffective in diffusing the crisis with more eruptions of violence occurring as recently
as this month when Israeli warplanes fired missiles at military positions near Syria’s capital
(BBC News, 2020). Mathias argues that the sustained failure of the United Nations to effectively
address the situation undermines the institution and the existing international order (2012). Javed
and Mahmood concur with this assertion and state that the UN has been helpless in controlling
the crisis and needs to take steps to neutralize the veto powers of the Security Council permanent
members in order to resolved the conflict (2017). It is our assertion that although the UN has
made various efforts to resolve the Syrian Conflict through its various organs, it has been
unsuccessful in making any headway in the crisis and its failure in Syria is a part of a wider
epidemic symptomatic of the declining influence of the UN especially over its permanent
members.

HAS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEEN IMPACTFUL IN CONFLICT

RESOLUTION? A CASE STUDY OF SYRIA

The Charter of the United Nations provides the legal framework for the obligations and
duties of the UN and its various bodies. Chapter IV gives the General Assembly its powers and
functions including the power to make recommendations to the Security Council and member
states with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security with regard to the
general principles of cooperation (U.N. Charter Art. 10). It is under this mandate that the General
Assembly has adopted several resolutions calling for the cessation of all violence and for the
parties involved to support the UN’s efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria peacefully.

The first and most important resolution that the General Assembly adopted regarding the
Syrian Conflict is Resolution 66/253 which was adopted after a similarly-drafted resolution
by the Security Council was vetoed by Russia and China on February 4 th 2012. It called
upon the Syrian government to immediately end the attacks against civilians and all human rights
violations and to act in accordance with the Plan of Action set forth by the League of Arab States
which outlined a list of proposals including the cessation of violence and the protection of the
population, the release of all those who were arbitrarily detained, the withdrawal of all military
forces from cities and for the Syrian government to guarantee the freedom of peaceful
demonstrations. It also called for a Syrian-led political transition that would lead the country into
a pluralistic democratic political system (Mathias, 2012). It is important to note that this
resolution was not adopted by the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace”
resolution which states that where the Security Council fails to act to maintain
international peace and security due to a lack of unanimity, the General Assembly shall
consider it and make any recommendations that it deems fit to restore international peace.
It was adopted under another existing agenda already before the Assembly, but it brought
to light the Assembly’s stand on Syria and made comprehensive recommendations that
have been the backbone of other recommendations to date (Mathias, 2012).

The resolution also called on then Secretary-General, Kofi Anan to use his good offices
in accordance with Chapter IV of the UN Charter to support the efforts of the League of Arab
States and appoint a special envoy mission to Syria. A UN-Arab League envoy was set up in
accordance with the General Assembly Resolution and it presented a 6-point peace proposal to
the government that included committing to work together in a Syrian-led political process to
address Syrians aspirations and concerns, committing to end the fighting and attaining UN-
supervised cessation of violence and protecting the citizens, ensuring humanitarian assistance is
timely, intensifying the release of arbitrarily detained persons and ensuring and respecting
freedom of association of free movement of journalists. This peace proposal heralded the best
opportunity for resolving the conflict and facilitating a peaceful transition into a pluralistic
democratic political system and was supported by both the General Assembly and the Security
Council (Mathias, 2012). However, the proposed plan has effectively stalled, robbing the
Syrian people of the last remaining hope for peace.

In 2013, the Assembly adopted another resolution reiterating Resolution 66/253 and
condemning the escalation of the conflict, the violation of humanitarian law by both pro-
government and anti-government belligerents and demanding that the Syrian government meets
its responsibility to protects its population and cooperate with the commission of inquiry in its
investigation on the use of chemical weapons. The latest attempt by the General Assembly to
resolve the situation came in 2016, when the UN General Assembly voted to establish a
mechanism to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of the atrocities carried out in Syria; the
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) (International Coalition for The
Responsibility to Protect). This mechanism is aimed at assisting HRC’s special envoy in
investigating the atrocities committed and bringing the perpetrators to justice. This follows the
General Assembly’s precedence in acting where

GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S ACTION IN OTHER CONFLICTS

The General Assembly has been rather passive in Syria only exercising its power to make
recommendations as mandated under the UN Charter until rather recently which greatly
hampered its efforts as these recommendations are not binding. In other situations, the
General Assembly has been more impactful in its institutional role and therefore been
more successful in contributing to the resolution of various crises. For instance, in 2010 the
General Assembly accepted the credentials of a delegation appointed by President-elect Alassane
Ouattara even though Laurent Gbagbo continued to exercise authority in Cote D’Ivoire. This
move by the Assembly occurred four months before the forces of former President Gbagbo fell
his regime came to an end when he was taken into custody. This action of recognition by the
General Assembly provided legitimacy to the presidency of Alassane Ouattara and contributed to
the international community’s recognition of his authority. (Mathias, 2012).

Furthermore, the General Assembly voted to suspend Libya’s membership to the Human
Rights Council, two weeks before the Security Council adopted its Resolution to impose a no-fly
zone over Libya and authorized the use of all necessary measures by member states to protect
civilians under threat, seven months before President Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed
in the Security Council sanctioned use of force (Mathias, 2012). This move by the General
Assembly set a precedence for the other UN organs to take action and played an important
institutional role in resolving the conflict. However, the passive role of the General Assembly in
Syria has showcased the need for more decisive action in all UN organs and the need for
mechanisms such as the Responsibility to Protect, which we shall look at below, to be
strengthened in order to be more effective in in maintaining and protecting international peace.

THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT- PURPOSE

 The responsibility to protect, abbreviated as R2P, was founded in 2005 based on
large scale mass atrocity that was being committed within the international community.
The R2P doctrine aimed at laying the basis for intervention for the international
community against governments that violated human rights against their citizens
(Kersten, 2015). The crimes also known as four mass atrocity range from ethnic
cleansing as witnessed in Yei region of South Sudan where the army allied to President
Kiir were accused torching down villages linked with tribesmen from the opposition side
(Lynch, 2017), Genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, war crimes, among other forms of
crimes against humanity. The United Nations, therefore, created a framework that would
help overcome barriers positioned by state sovereignty in pursuit of implementing
humanitarian intervention (Lea-Henry, 2018). The R2P norm is anchored on three pillars
(Genser, 2018). The first pillar mandates the state to ensure the protection of the entire
population within its borders. The second pillar bestows the responsibility of
implementing the mandate in the first pillar in the international community. The last
pillar recognizes the need for the international community to deploy appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian, peaceful, or coercive approach in pursuit of protecting civilians
in the circumstance the state fails to fulfill this obligation. From the perspective of the
U.N. Security Council, the three pillars attract equal significance. In the words of the
former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, the three are supposed to operate independently
but not in isolation. Hence, the three pillars are organized in a manner that they must
operate sequentially (Lynch, 2017).

PROPONENTS

The advocates of the R2P doctrine believe that it is advisable to reform the post-
1945 U.N. noninterventionist approach in order to pave the way for a more effective
approach to addressing armed conflicts in real-time. The current U.N. regime restricts
deployment of armed forces on two accounts, maintaining international peace and
security and national defense (as reflected in Article 7 and 15 of the U.N. Charter). For
the proponents, by permitting the international community to protect civilians whose civil
rights feel threatened by their regimes, they assert the need to revise the UN Charter,
moving the dualist doctrine of state sovereignty beyond the 1945 doctrine. Therefore, this
calls for the expansion of the right of war within the realm of international relations.
Thirdly, the proponents of R2P reinforce that armed intervention is the most preferred
practical solution to a humanitarian crisis in fragile states.

CRITICISM

As cited by Lea-Henry (2018), lack of political goodwill is the most significant

impediment towards the practical realization of the R2P resolutions. In most cases,
whenever the international community is confronted with the crisis of mass atrocity, lack
of political goodwill rises among the concerned states. The other major criticism levied
against the three dimensions of R2P is the evident overlap between the second and the
third pillar. As illustrated by Lynch (2017), the international commissions of inquiry
could serve well as a pillar of three actions in the time of immediate and decisive
response. However, the same could work under the framework of international assistance
under the second pillar. Additionally, even though the U.N. Security Council's primary
obligation lies in the first pillar, it is equally expected to ensure that states comply with
the first pillar in ensuring the protection of the entire civilian population within their
borders.

Furthermore, critics of R2P argue that there is yet to be a clear legal definition and
basis, implementation framework, monitoring institutions for potential crimes. Branch
(2012) adds that R2P has only gained prominence on the global scene due to the
indeterminate nature of the legal framework on which it is purported to operate. This,
therefore, leads to the question of accountability among these countries. With the first
pillar of R2P advocating for the states to protect civilian populations within their domain
boundaries, does it then imply that countries can implement Pillar one without being held
to account? Considering that nearly 70% of the R2P has been deployed in Africa, Branch
(2012) adds that R2P has fuelled division between the continent and the west on the basis
that the west has continuously been used as a benchmark to assess legitimacy and
sovereignty of African states. The western allied African states are categorized as pro-
human rights and pro-democracy. In contrast, those allied to the East are labeled human
rights violators, meriting international coercion, or failed states. As a consequence, R2P
has been employed in overthrowing legitimate governments through the arming of the
civilians. Lastly, segmentation of the international community with states from African
(for example) being compelled to take sides (Lynch, 2012).

SUCCESS/FAILURE RECORD

The Basis

In assessing the context in which R2P has worked or failed, it is vital to draw
country-specific illustrations. Before indulging in the country-specific analysis, first, it is
essential to understand the circumstances that would shape the success or failure of the
R2P strategy. In an attempt to debunk the condition, facilitate the successful or
unsuccessful implementation of the R2P: to begin with, there is a lack of obstruction by
the government responsibilities for the atrocity crimes. In the context that the government
does encounter an obstruction, the chances are that there is a P5 state providing the
political will challenging this obstruction. The second determinant lies in the presence of
regional interaction like the ECOWAS, which aligns with the Security Council to
coordinate the adopted R2P response. The last antecedent rests in the potential of the R2P
to unleash a more effective and efficient intervention that would result in the protection
of the civilians.

Success: Côte d’Ivoire

In 2010, Côte d’Ivoire was engulfed in political chaos emanating from the
contested victory of the opposition contender Alassane Ouattara’s and his counterpart, the
incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo (Ipinyomi, 2012). As an intervention under R2P,
the UNSC first adopted Resolution 1962, which saw expanding the mandate of the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to include all means necessary to
address the concerns of civilian protection (Abatan & Yolanda, 2016). At the same time,
UNSC reminded Côte d’Ivoire of its obligation to protect her civilians as stipulated in
pillar I of R2P. With the escalation of violence, drawing from Resolution 1962,
intermission cooperation was sought with peacekeeping troops from Liberia (UNMIL)
being temporarily deployed in Côte d’Ivoire under the umbrella of the UNOCI (Serrano,
2013). In January 2011, Resolution 1967 was unanimously passed by the UNSC
permitting deployment of more troops emphasizing the use of all necessary means until
civilians were adequately protected. March 2011, regional and international bodies,
including the A.U. and the E.U., condemned the use of violence against civilians (Ella &
Yolanda, 2016). Despite all these calls, Pro- Gabbro forces continued to unleash heavy
weapons on innocent civilians, leading to a massacre of 225 civilians with thousands of
displacement in Duékoué. The escalation of violence compelled the UNSC to reiterated
UNOCI by opting Resolution 1975.' This paved the way for military intervention from
the U.N. and France, firing directly on Gbagbo’s forces and disarming them. Importantly,
the adoption of Resolution 1975 invoked the R2P mandate of the UNSC. Gbagbo was
later arrested, and the International Criminal Court commenced war crime charges
against him together with the closer allies (Opusumah, 2018). He was accused of four
counts of crime against humanity: rape, murder, persecution, among other inhumane acts.
The case of Côte d'Ivoire is a clear demonstration of the capability of the UNSC in acting
timely and decisive within the framework of the R2P to combat mass atrocity crime. It is
also a particular illustration of how all three conditions were met for successful
intervention by the UNSC.

Failure: Syria

Like Libya, Syria has, for the last decades, languished in a violent political crisis,
raising concerns about the potential of R2P. In the dawn of 2010, the then U.N.
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon assured the world it was the year of prevention
(Aligizakis, 2010). Based on this statement, many hoped for s positive outcome on the
mission of R2P in Syria. In April 2011, Resolution 16/1 condemned the Syrian
government for launching attacks on its citizens. In August 2011, the U.N. established the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which confirmed the gross
failure of the Syrian government to uphold pillar 1 of the R2P (Halliyadde, 2016).
October the same year, France, UK, Germany, and Portugal proposed an arms embargo
resolution against the Syrian government, reinforcing the obligation of the Syrian
government to protect the civilians. Russia feared that the use of force could culminate
into NATO approach in Libya, whereas China emphasized the need for observing Syria's
"sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity." On its part, the U.S. faulted the
decision by Russia and China as a move that would only trigger more crimes of atrocity
in Syria (Nasser-Eddine, 2015). The resolution failed! Since then, multiple resolutions
have been adopted, diplomatic missions deployed (including Koffi Annan led mission).
Unfortunately, almost another decade, political violence still reigns in Syria. Unlike the
circumstances in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, the controversy revolving the use of force for
humanitarian motive in Syria has complicated intervention efforts considering lack of
authorization by the UNSC. With China and Russia declining to authorize the use of
force exposes the abuse of powers bestowed in the UNSC as observed in Libya and Côte
d’Ivoire (Dunne & Gifkins, 2013). To date, as Colonna (2017) elucidates, the Security
Council, and in particular, the P5 members, are yet to agree on humanitarian relief
intervention in Syria under the doctrine of R2P.

There is a need to address the critical challenges to the success of the R2P. First,
the urgent call to fix the Political contestation and the ongoing discord in the global
geopolitics, majorly between the West and East. The second obstacle is the legal
ambiguity on which R2P is anchored. The clash between state sovereignty and non-
interference, as outlined in international law, puts R2P implementation at a much
disadvantageous position. In recent years, the veto power has ignited serious debate with
many players, majorly from Africa, Asia, and Latin America seeking representation.
Perhaps, as currently constituted with the limitation to the P5, efforts to implement the
R2P have been highly frustrated due to the varying political and economic interests of the
P5 members.

REFERENCES

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BBC News (2020) Syria war: Israel 'hits Iran-backed fighters near Damascus'. Available at
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