D, ule oF eect area fe : oa ve Sony Heap 9 Ute “hs OK > tnkorak . ie eiolden Ro’ tae Usb fia 4 3 3 misc Fats a, Payne Appreonh fiudle (Pye? <7 the word Gy vi bee N No 1 ee No Gecoral se aged nb ts | In bach via ie Muth wot go ay Mr Crodd “wot oive 2p eve eg pis L ov ert . . “th Rak Ses aaa Coen Pig ¥ Grobe (tee) Municipal Board Prunwor v 4 euilc® Ramey tina Bbhadprarad v Pape ter og fut ip ? Ranft Uduh v &): of Nahaushtva (4 4) PU Kya vy Mathal eve (44 9) a ae Hand v Sat pits oan nea a ead Fe Lami v 84-0) Bihar Gv) 7 uy aot. en Vi Qatga Jahan Begua (tu) * (luo trae) Yo Marana, han Aha nalebiok Me » thd Be Ke Lteton Pye) Ween? + bELiteral or Grammatical Rule It is the first rule of interpretation. According to this rule, the words used in this text are to be given or interpreted in their natural or ordinary meaning. After the interpretation, if the meaning is completely clear and unambiguous then the effect shall be given to a provision of a statute regardless of what may be the consequences. The basic rule is that whatever the intention legislature had while making any provision it has been expressed through words and thus, are to be interpreted according to the rules of grammar. It is the safest rule of interpretation of statutes because the intention of the legislature is deduced from the words and the language used. According to this rule, the only duty of the court is to give effect if the language of the statute is plain and has no business to look into the consequences which might arise. The only obligation of the court is to expound the law as it is and if any harsh consequences arise then the remedy for it shall be sought and looked out by the legislature.Case Laws Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, In this case, the appellant, a citizen of India after arriving at the airport did not declare that he was carrying gold with him. During his search was carried on, gold was found in his possession as it was against the notification of the government and was confiscated under section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act. Later on, he was also charged under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947. The appellant challenged this trial to be violative under Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution. According to this article, no person shall be punished or prosecuted more than once for the same offence. This is considered as double jeopardy. It was held by the court that the Seas Act neither a court nor any judicial tribunal. Thus, accordingly, he was not prosecuted earlier. Hence, his trial was held to be valid.Manmohan Das versus Bishan Das, AIR 1967 SC 643 The issue in the case was regarding the interpretation of section 3(1)(c) of U.P Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. In this case, a tenant was liable for evidence if he has made addition and alternate in the building without proper authority and unauthorized perception as materially altered the accommodation or is likely to diminish its value. The appellant stated that only the constitution can be covered, which diminishes the value of the property and the word ‘or’ should be read as land. It was held that as per the rule of literal interpretation, the word ‘or’ should be given the meaning that a prudent man understands the grounds of the event are alternative and not combined. State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese and others, 1987 AIR 33 SCR(1) 317, in this case a person was caught along with the counterfeit currency “dollars” and he was charged under section 120B, 498A, 498C and 420 read with section 511 and 34 of Indian Penal Code for possessing counterfeit currency. The accused contended before the court that a charge under section 498A and 498B of Indian Penal Code can only be levied in the case of counterfeiting of Indian currency notes and not in the case of counterfeiting of foreign currency notes. The court held that the word currency notes or bank note cannot be prefixed. The person was held liable to be charge-sheeted.¢ By the literal rule, words in a statute must be given their plain, ordinary or literal meaning. * The objective of the court is to discover the intention of Parliament as expressed in the words used. * This approach will be used even if it produces absurdity or hardship, in which case the remedy is for Parliament to pass an amending statute.» One of the leading statements of the literal rule was made by Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl&Fin 85 “. the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”° Lord Esof inR v Judge of the City [1892] 1 QB 273 said: * “If the words of an Act are clear then you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity.”Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd [1998] 4 All ER 417, House of Lords | mone ™ & E} alamy stock photoFacts * In the case Mr C, the Claimant, was injured in a car. * The Defendant’s insurance only covered him under the Road Traffic Act 1988 for the use of his car ‘on any highway and any other road to which the public has access’. Issue * The question for the court to determine, therefore, was whether the multi-storey car park was a road?Held ¢ The HL held that the car park was not a road because a road provides for cars to move along it to a destination. * Therefore, the insurance company was not liable to pay out on the driver’s policy because the claimant had not been injured due to the use of the car on a “road”.Issue * Concerned the construction of s.25 (3) of the Income Tax Act 1952 The Act stated that anyone convicted should be subject to a fixed penalty and treble the tax which he ought to have been charged under the Act The Court had to decide whether the amount should be based on the whole amount that was liable under the statute of just the unpaid amount* The Court decided that on the literal rule he was liable to pay the whole amount, even though this was a harsh decisionMidland Trust Co Ltd y Green [1981] 1 All ER 153 aka Green hill case ee a aes =Facts: ¢ In 1961 Mr. Walter Green(Father) granted an option to purchase Gravel Hill farm to his son Geoffrey Green(Son). The option, although registrable as a land charge under the Land Charges Act 1925, was not registered. ¢ In 1967 there was a disagreement in the family and Mr. Walter (Father) sold the farm to his wife for £500 (it was worth around £40,000) in a deliberate attempt to defeat the option granted to his son. The wife then changed her will so as to leave the farm to all five of her children including Mr. Geoffrey. Geoffrey learnt of the sale and sought to enforce the option.Issue * The question for the court was whether the option was binding on the wife or whether she took the farm free of the option. Provision ¢ S 13 (2) of the Land Charges Act 1925 provided that a land charge would be void against a purchaser of the land unless registered and where an_— estate contract was under consideration it would only be void against a purchaser of a legal estate for money or money’s worth. * Purchaser was also defined in s.20(8) as a purchaser who for valuable consideration takes any interest in land.* The trial judge found for the wife and held that the option was not binding on the wife * This was reversed by the Court of Appeal with Lord Denning holding that the sale was not for money or money’s worth and that the protection of the Act was not available in cases of fraud where there was a deliberate attempt to defeat an interest. * The wife’s representative appealed to the House of Lords.Held * Lord Wilberforce stated that the decision of Lord Dennings as 'muddying clear waters’. * Delivering a unanimous reversal of the Court of Appeal's majority decision, he said: ‘Thus the case appears to be a plainone...iIn my opinion this appearance is also the reality. The case is plain; the Act is clear and definite. Intended as it was to provide a simple and understandable system for the protection of title to land, it should not be read down or glossed; to do so would destroy the usefulness of the Act.'¢ The appeal was allowed. There was no requirement of good faith for a purchaser under the Land Charges Act 1925. ¢ The options should have been registered under the Land Charges Act 1972 * Good faith was irrelevant to the Land Charges Act 1972.London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278Facts ¢ A railway worker was knocked down and killed by a train whilst oiling parts of the line. His wife was trying to claim compensation for his death. Provision ¢ The relevant statute said that compensation was available for workers who were ‘.killed whilst repairing the line...’ Issue * Whether the widow is entitled for the compensation.* The court held that in the ordinary sense of the word, ‘repairing’ did not include oiling as this was merely maintenance.Magqbool Hussain v. St of Bom.(AIR 1953 SC325) aka Gold Confiscated casefeo Facts ¢ A citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he had bought gold with him. Gold found in his possession during search in violation of govt. notification, was confiscated u/s.167(8) of Sea Customs Act, 1878.¢ The appellant could be proceeded against under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act as also under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in respect of the said act. * Proceedings were in fact taken under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act which resulted in the confiscation of the gold. ¢ Further proceedings were taken under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act by way of filing the complaint aforesaid in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.Issue whether by reason of the proceedings taken by the Sea, Custom Authorities the appellant could be said to have been prosecuted and punished for the same offence with which he was charged in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay. The plea which was taken by the accused in bar of the prosecution in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, was that he had already been prosecuted and punished for the same offence and by virtue of the provisions of article 20(2) of the Constitution he could not be prosecuted and punished again.Held * The Customs Officers are not required to act judicially on legal evidence tendered on oath and they are not authorised to administer oath to any witness. * Sea Customs Authorities are merely constituted administrative machinery for the purpose of adjudging confiscation, increased rates of duty and penalty prescribed in the Act. * Weare of the opinion that the Sea Customs Authorities are not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute a judgment or order of a court or judicial tribunal necessary for the purpose of supporting a plea of double jeopardy.Motipur Zamindary Company Pvt. Ltd. V. St of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 660Facts * Green vegetable are exempted of the sales tax within Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 Issue * Whether sugarcane fall within the term green vegetable?Held: ¢ That sugar cane was not a green vegetable and was not exempted under the notification. * The word "vegetables" in taxing statutes was to be understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class of vegetables which were grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and were used for the table. The dictionaries defined sugar cane as a "grass."PANNE Tal eet 4215 Disadvantages Respects Parliamentary Supremacy and leaves law making to those elected to the job Provides no scope for judges to use their own opinions or prejudices Restricts the role of judges to applying the law to the facts of the case There can be disagreement as to what amounts to the ordinary or natural meaning Creates awkward precedents which require Parliamentary time to correct Fails to recognise the complexities and limitations of English language and assumes every Act is perfectly drafted Undermines public confidence in the law Creates loopholes in the law Leads to injustice