Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
I. Practice of Law
a. Who may practice? See Sec. 1, Rule 138, ROC
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
b. What constitutes and characterizes the practice of law?
i. Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
FACTS: Atty. Christian Monsod became a member of the Philippine Bar after passing the 1960 bar
examinations. Thereafter, he worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father; as an operations officer
with the World Bank Group; as Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank; as a legal or economic
consultant in various companies; as Secretary General of NAMFREL; as a member of Constitutional
Commission; as National Chairman of NAMFREL; and as a member of the quasi-judicial Davide
Commission.
In April 1991, Atty. Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, as required under
Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office and assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC on the same
day.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec is violative Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution him not having satisfied the requirement of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years
HELD: No.
Atty. Monsod possesses the required qualification.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court.
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of

industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman.
ii. People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
FACTS: Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief. The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after
securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that
every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence,
and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of Fule as private prosecutor
was questioned by Villanueva’s counsel, citing Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, wherein it was ruled that "when
an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.” Counsel for accused Villanueva
also filed a motion to inhibit Fiscal Fule, invoking Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing, claiming that Fule falls under this limitation.
ISSUE: Whether or not City Attorney Fule is engaged in the private practice of law as to bar him from
acting as counsel de parte
HELD: No.
The fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127
(now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the
bar or give professional advice to clients." The isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior,
the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
iii. Practice of law v. study of law
1. Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, Sept 10, 2019
FACTS: Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the poor
performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations, the Congress, on December 23,
1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662, which created the LEB, an executive agency separate from the
DECS, but attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support.
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB issued,
among others, LEBMO No. 7-2016 to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those seeking
admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known
as the PhiLSAT.
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners Oscar B.
Pimentel, et al. filed their Petition for Prohibition, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared
unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its issuances, most
especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning admissions to
the practice of law.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law, including
the power to prescribe the requirements for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to
Sections 698 and 16,99 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an
administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court. They emphasize that
the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not linked or accountable to the Court nor
placed under the Court's regulation and supervision.
For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal
profession which includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing requirements for and
discipline of lawyers. According to them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to
admit members to the practice of law extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a
preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal profession, which "residual power" of the
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court exercises regulatory powers over legal education
HELD: NO.
The historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the
political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education, including
legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps
unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself to
demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political
branches.
Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study of law. The definition of
the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law. Neither
may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court's "residual"
power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which the
remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal
education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be
claimed by the judiciary.
Rules 138 and 138-A of the Rules of Court do not intend nor provide for direct and actual Court regulation
over legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the inevitable relationship between legal
education and the admissions to the bar.
In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Court
has prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar
examinations. Only those bar examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are
admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law.170 The regulation of the admission to the practice of law
goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the Philippine Bar to maintain a
high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal profession is maintained at a high
standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in
and knowledge of the law by the standard set by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and
in the regular and usual manner are admitted to the practice of law.
Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to
those who would like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required
of them. The Court does not impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but
prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the
bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In fact, the Court even
extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad or that granted by a
foreign law school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine Bar Examinations, subject only to the
submission of the required certifications. Section 5 could not therefore be interpreted as an exercise of the
Court's regulatory or supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious reasons, its reach could
not have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.
In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar
examinations must have completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed upon the applicant to the bar examinations and not to law
schools. These requirements are merely consistent with the nature of a law degree granted in the
Philippines which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree.
It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar
examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools. Adjustments in
the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law schools apparently are willing to take in order to
elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in this regard that the relationship between
legal education and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that the
Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by law schools with the prescribed
core courses is but a recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law
- that no person shall be allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the
Philippine Bar without having taken and completed the required core courses.
Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who fail the bar
examinations for three or more times must take a refresher course. Similarly, this is a requirement
imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not impose that a law school should absolutely include in its
curriculum a refresher course.
Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on law student
practice manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal education.
In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the Court
regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before
any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity
rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for
the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise regulation and
supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their
appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate their actions.
In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and supervises
legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or law schools,
but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for admission to the bar examinations -
consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, the
same being fundamentally a judicial function.
2. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), 1987 Constitution
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
c. Privilege, not a right
i. Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations
and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St.
Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to
him.
Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one
of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan. 21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha
Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details
or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent. 22 On
the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives. 23 Complainant also received a
phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into
believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not. 24 Further,
he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and security. 26 He also became the subject of conversations among his
colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC. 27 Hence, complainant filed the
present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal
practice of law.2
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name,
identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred
from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to
the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law
course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study
of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or
college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics.
(Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991,
he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly,
respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education
and earn a law degree under his real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all,
is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar
Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the
Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, 59the Court explained the essence of good moral
character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when
he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had
been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his
client, as well as between him and the court.62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his
acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to
uphold its integrity and dignity.
ii. Re Petition of Al Argosino to Take Lawyer’s Oath, B.M. No.712, March 19,
1997
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991.
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of
the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.
n compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious
orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor
of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused
in the criminal case.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to
the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's
oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good
moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to
find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to
be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of
youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and
easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
d. Profession, not a business
i. Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the
client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan
de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to
secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he
subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount
of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the
amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly
tell me just to wait;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk
of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta’s complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there
told that there was no record at all of a case.
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day; May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not
at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose;
XXX
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent
to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a
complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until
this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to
P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment
basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent’s secretary and told her that
it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called
the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before
the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the
complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures,
Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for
two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the
complaint be filed first before payment of respondent’s acceptance and legal fees. When respondent
refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own
personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent’s checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had
been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
RULING:
The Practice of Law — a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business. 11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration. 13 Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may
be attained without making much money. 14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant — as evidenced by the receipt issued
by the law office of respondent — the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties
that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien upon
the client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such
funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve
them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client’s interest
within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent
fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client
and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not
exculpate him from his breach of duty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. 19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
ii. Spouses Tolentino v. Ancheta, A.C. No. 6387, July 19, 2016
This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Henry B. So for neglect in handling a case, and
respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta for extorting ₱200,000.00 from a client.
Complainant Flordeliza C. Tolentino was the defendant in Civil Case No. SC-2267 entitled "Benjamin
Caballes v. Flordeliza Caballes," a case involving recovery of possession of a parcel of land. 1 On June 24,
1991, Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, rendered the Decision 2 against
complainant Flordeliza ordering her to vacate the land.
The case was appealed3 to the Court of Appeals through complainant Flordeliza's counsel, Atty. Edilberto
U. Coronado (Atty. Coronado). While the appeal was pending, Atty. Coronado was replaced by Atty. Henry
B. So (Atty. So), a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian
Reform.4
Complainants Flordeliza and Gabino V. Tolentino, her husband, afterwards learned that the Court of
Appeals affirmed5 the Regional Trial Court Decision against complainant Flordeliza. Complainants contend
that Atty. So did not inform them nor take the necessary action to elevate the case to this Court. 6 Thus,
they were compelled to secure the legal services of Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta (Atty. Ancheta), whom
they paid ₱30,000.00 as acceptance fee.7
Atty. Ancheta allegedly promised them that there was still a remedy against the adverse Court of Appeals
Decision, and that he would file a "motion to reopen appeal case." 8 Atty. Ancheta also inveigled them to
part with the amount of ₱200,000.00 purportedly to be used for making arrangements with tlie Justices of
the Court of Appeals before whom their case was pending. 9
Initially, complainants did not agree to Atty. Ancheta's proposal because they did not have the money and
it was against the law.10 However, they eventually acceded when Atty. Ancheta told them that it was the
only recourse they had to obtain a favorable judgment. 11
Complainants were surprised to learn that no "motion to reopen case" had been filed, 13 and the Court of
Appeals Decision had become final and executory.14
Hence, complainants sought to recover the amount of ₱200,000.00 from Atty. Ancheta.
However, Atty. Ancheta did not heed their demand despite receipt of the letter.
On May 17, 2004, complainants filed their Sinumpaang Sakdal16 praying for the disbarment of Atty. So for
neglect in handling complainant Flordeliza's case, and Atty. Ancheta for defrauding them of the amount of
₱200,000.00.
Xxx
It was established by the evidence on record that (1) Atty. Ancheta received the acceptance fee of
₱30,000.00 on December 9, 2002; 46 and (2) complainants deposited on January 17, 2003 47 the amount of
₱200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's bank account. Atty. Ancheta made false promises to complainants that
something could still be done with complainant Flordeliza's case despite the Court of Appeals Decision
having already attained finality on September 22, 2001. 48 Worse, he proposed bribing the Justices of the
Court of Appeals in order to solve their legal dilemma.
Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a decision that has attained finality is no longer open for
reversal and should be respected.49 A lawyer's duty to assist in the speedy administration of
justice50 demands recognition that at a definite time, issues must be laid to rest and litigation ended. 51 As
such, Ancheta should have advised complainants to accept the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
accord respect to the just claim of the opposite party. He should have tempered his clients' propensity to
litigate and save them from additional expense in pursuing their contemplated action. Instead, he gave
them confident assurances that the case could still be reopened and even furnished them a copy of his
prepared "motion to reopen case." Despite his representation that he would file the motion, however, he
did not do so.52
Atty. Ancheta's deceit and evasion of duty is manifest. He accepted the case though he knew the futility of
an appeal. Despite receipt of the ₱30,000.00 acceptance fee, he did not act on his client's case. Moreover,
he prevailed upon complainants to give him ₱200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the Justices of
the Court of Appeals in order to secure a favorable ruling, palpably showing that he himself was
unconvinced of the merits of the case. "A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause." 53 Atty. Ancheta's misconduct betrays his lack of
appreciation that the practice of law is a profession, not a money-making trade. 54
As a servant of the law, Atty. Ancheta's primary duty was to obey the laws and promote respect for the
law and legal processes.55Corollary to this duty is his obligation to abstain from dishonest or deceitful
conduct,56 as well as from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system."57 Atty. Ancheta's advice involving corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and the judicial system and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Complainants eventually found out about his duplicity and demanded for the return of their money. 58 Still,
Atty. Ancheta did not return the ₱200,000.00 and the ₱30,000.00 despite his failure to render any legal
service to his clients..59
A lawyer "must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent
to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein."60 Atty. Ancheta's deceit in dealing with his clients constitutes gross professional misconduct 61 and
violates his oath, thus justifying his disbarment under Rule 138, Section 2762 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, this Court finds respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta GUILTY of gross misconduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby DISBARS him from
the practice of law.
iii. Atty. Khan v. Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 9, 2003
FACTS: Ms. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up a
published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half
of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been
rendered. Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.
Atty. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office,
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Simbillo admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising;
that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him
and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Simbillo’s act of soliciting legal services warrants disciplinary action
HELD: YES
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort
to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence,
his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded
for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing
his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell. Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s
authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
Atty. Simbillo is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.
e. Admission to the bar
i. Sections 1, 2, 6,7, 9-19, Rule 138 of ROC
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or
field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of
the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within
the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4
they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the
same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at
the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this
rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and
Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the
same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee.
Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to
use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of
papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers.
No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take
place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of
the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and
International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law
(morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon);
Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar

examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the
Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one
year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The
names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the
committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they
give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this
rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further
disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per
cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent;
Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after
the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the
result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the
clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations
for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of
the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a
pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify
under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required
examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe
before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar
for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records,
and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his
authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to
practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
ii. Qualifications (age, citizenship, residency, good moral character, no moral

turpitude charges, academic requirements, bar exam, lawyer’s oath, signing
the roll of attorneys)
1. So v. Lee, B.M. No. 3288, April 10, 2019
On May 19, 2017, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter 3 from Mercuria D.
So (So) alleging that Lee is a defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and is not fit for admission to
the Bar considering her irresponsible attitude towards her monetary obligations.
Lee claimed that she was unaware of the pendency of Civil Case No. 740 as she learned of it
only when she registered for the oath taking. She admitted that she obtained a ₱200,000.00
loan from So but had already paid a total of ₱140,000.00 for 10 months. Lee explained that
due to the losses her business suffered, she failed to pay the subsequent monthly
payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to evade her obligation to So, but had
asked the latter to give her ample time to settle it.
he OBC noted that Lee was an applicant of the 2016 Bar Examinations and in her
application, she declared that a civil case was filed against her on January 29, 2014
docketed as Civil Case No. 1436 titled "Nonoy Bolos v. Ma Lucille Lee Jao" for collection of
sum of money.
The Court held in abeyance Lee's request to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys in view
of the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to manifest the status of
the aforementioned cases.
In her October 2017 petition, Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed in
view of the Compromise Agreement she had entered into with So. She manifested that she
already paid So in accordance with the terms and conditions of the approved Compromise
Agreement.8
WHETHER LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE

LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
The Court's Ruling
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.11 It is extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral
qualifications and the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to
exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. 12 Section 2, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides for the minimum requirements applicants for the admission to the Bar
must possess, to wit:
SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the depravity of private and social
duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals.13
Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes involving moral turpitude: abduction with consent,
bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft,
illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, issuance of bouncing checks, intriguing against honor, violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated
homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling, embezzlement,
extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public
records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of
marriage, falsification of public document, and estafa through falsification of public document. 14
Nevertheless, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. 15 The determination whether there is moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances. 16 In turn, it is
for the Court to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes moral turpitude. 17 In the same vein, not all
civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude. As defined, acts tainted with moral turpitude are of
such gravity that manifests an individual's depravity or lack of moral fiber.
As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take
their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve acts
evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken into account to
establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. If it
were otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously jeopardized
by the expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character.
Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason to prevent her from
taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these civil cases alone does
not establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.
It is equally important to note that all civil cases filed against Lee had been dismissed on account of the
compromise she entered into with her creditors. Thus, there is no longer any obstacle which may hinder
her in officially becoming a member of the Bar by taking her oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
Nevertheless, Lee must still satisfactorily exhibit that she would not renege on her monetary obligations to
Bolos. As above-mentioned, Civil Case No. 1436 was dismissed after Lee had agreed to enter into a
compromise with Bolos and set the terms and conditions for her to settle her monetary obligation. There is
no question that Lee owes Bolos a sum of money.
It must be remembered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year suspension from the practice of law. 18 After taking her
Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys, Lee would be a full-fledged member of the legal
profession and subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court. This is true even if there would be no
complainants, as the Court may motu proprio initiate disciplinary proceedings.19 Concomitantly, she is
bound to act in a manner consistent with the high standards imposed on lawyers — otherwise, she could
be subjected to administrative sanctions. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, but a continuing requirement for membership in the legal
profession.20
In sum, the pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees to take their
Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts or omissions which had been
previously determined by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude. This is of course without prejudice
to the filing of any administrative action against would-be lawyers who fail to continue to possess the
required moral fitness of members of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
to ALLOW Ma. Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
subject to the condition that she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from making her
first monthly payment to Joseph Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her
monetary obligation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the January 29, 2019
Judgment by Compromise.
2. Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the
jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has
"good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the
standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 1 to the practice of
law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of
grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2
In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit

relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time
respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus
forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs. Complainant pointed out that
these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyer’s oath and his moral and legal obligation to be
a role model to the community.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979,
complainant and respondent were married7 and lived with the latter’s mother in Balintawak. At that time,
respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and
sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondent’s mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February
20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondent’s extra-marital affairs. 11 Sometime in
1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent
had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic
helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant
asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to
the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told
her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely:
(i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients.
A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. 27 They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 28
Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently,
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning
one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
3. Re SC Decision v. Atty. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor
Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved
the request and sent Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated
Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
away. Abastillas eventually got the ₱10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of
Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas’ letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of
₱10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a
falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the
disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against Atty.
Pactolin for falsification of public document.1 On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty.
Pactolin guilty of falsification
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction. 2 Since the Court
treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses he raised
before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over
the facts, that its decision and referral to the IBP was "factually infirmed" 3 and contained "factual
exaggerations and patently erroneous observation,"4 and was "too adventurous."5
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas’ letter which
Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious.
This Court’s decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re: Disbarment
of Rodolfo Pajo,7 the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called upon to review the
judgment of conviction which has become final.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and
good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. 8 Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.9
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution.1âwphi1 Being the most severe form
of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.10 Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. 11
Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although his
culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his sentence. His
conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.12
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most sacredly
bound to uphold the law. 13 The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
4. Aguirre v. Rana B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On
the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party.
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel
for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent
a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant
further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In
this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of
the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the
MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of
certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or
represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law

HELD: Yes.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed
the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
5. In re: Michael Medado, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and
passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated
"under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." 9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required
to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
xxx
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive, 24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia
legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already
the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of
his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging
in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice
of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because
at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise
applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him
in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the
one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely
by this Court.
iii. Read: Why Bar Exams Ruin Legal Education by Oscar Franklin Tan (Inquirer Opinion dated
October 3, 2014)
This week, another batch of law students will have wasted an extra year of their lives to study for the
month-long bar exam. This is in addition to four years of law school where every moment was defined by
the bar. It is high time the Philippines got rid of its unique obsession with what was supposed to be a
simple licensure exam that mutated into a rite of passage and national spectacle.
We Filipinos do not realize that we are the only society that banners bar topnotchers on the front pages of
newspapers. My American classmates in Harvard Law School openly said that every point they scored
above passing in the New York bar represented eight wasted hours of their lives. Our bar reviewer
stressed that the exam demands a lower level of intelligence.
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I saw confused looks on my classmates’ faces in reaction to a Filipino citing “bar topnotcher” as a
credential. Later, I would see the same confused look on an international law firm partner’s face, seconds
before throwing away a Filipino resumé. Note that Barack Obama is cited as the first African-American
president of the Harvard Law Review—the United States’ single most prestigious legal credential—not as a
bar topnotcher and not even as a Harvard Law magna cum laude graduate.
I can attest that the Philippine bar exam is the most difficult in the world—for all the wrong reasons. The
New York exam has a well-defined scope and structured questions. When I took the Philippine exam, I
was asked a question on which I wrote a thesis of over 100 pages.
The long list of required Philippine bar subjects has not changed in decades. The exam demands basic
knowledge of intercountry adoption, war crimes, value-added taxation, and liability in car accidents, a
demand that would never arise in actual practice.
Our law school curricula naturally follow the too-long list of prescribed bar subjects. This has destroyed
legal education because there is simply no room for anything else, especially with the entire fourth year of
law school intended for bar review subjects that are a compressed repeat of the first three. In contrast,
law is a three-year program in the United States where one takes the most basic subjects in freshman
year. The succeeding years are purely for electives—they presume one does not need exposure to every
single field—and some have proposed two-year programs given this.
Philippine law schools must devote three units to the Negotiable Instruments Law. This is a cruel joke
because the law was intended for a time when commercial papers were delivered by galleon or stagecoach
and that class typically ends with a summary of the brief rules for bank checks, the instrument we far
more commonly use today. In contrast to this monumental waste of time, modern, complex laws such as
the Intellectual Property and the Securities Regulation Codes are not required reading.
The line of University of the Philippines professors once was that students were there to study law in the
grand manner, not review for the bar. Even UP bowed to pressure from alumni fixated on the bar. Equally
fixated college seniors were attracted to schools with higher bar passing rates and topnotcher counts. UP
did well in both in recent years, but at the staggering cost of eliminating nearly all electives in favor of
mandatory bar review classes and stricter grade requirements to remove perceived weaker students
before they could affect the all-important bar statistics.
All this has reduced law school to soulless memory games. Our unconscious image of the abogado de
campanilla is still an idiot savant who can recite pages of rules verbatim, down to the commas. I
remember a progressive Dean Raul Pangalangan holding up a CD of compiled court decisions, then worth
about P30,000, to freshmen and reiterating the trivial market value of the memory games.
The obsession with memorization cripples education. Teaching constitutional law, the most philosophical of
all law subjects, it is frustrating to see students simply skip to the bottom of decisions to see who won,
then memorize a summary of the resulting doctrine, missing the essence of the very human conflicts
involved.
I spent years flying around as a New York securities lawyer and lesson No. 1 was that securities law is
fundamentally different from other fields because it involves public markets; thus, you cannot just copy
financial contracts from other fields. Given our rote education, Filipino lawyers tend to approach it as a list
of registration procedures and exemptions from registration, with less emphasis in contracts on the central
point that you can be jailed for allegedly offering securities to retirees with misleading marketing material.
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At my Harvard graduation, Dean Elena Kagan (later solicitor general and now justice of the US Supreme
Court) did not exhort a 100-percent passing rate, pick a “bar bet,” or even read out academic honors.
Instead, she read out the number of hours my American classmates spent offering free legal aid and
recognized the student who organized all the gatherings and served as the glue that kept the large class
together. If this is good enough for Harvard Law School and one of the most highly regarded American
educators and jurists, it should be good enough for a Philippine law school. Frustrated young professors
eagerly await the day when we do not need a straitjacket of a standardized exam to double-check our
students’ quality, and law can be taught in its full intellectual beauty and modernity.
iv. SC Resolution En Banc Notice dated September 3, 2013 re 5 strike rule – read along with Bar
Matter No. 1161 (The Proposed Reforms in the Bar Examinations)
BAR MATTER No. 1161
RE: PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE BAR EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION
ON
REFORM IN THE BAR EXAMINANTIONS
WHEREAS, pursuant to its Constitutional authority to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law, the Supreme Court en banc item in its Resolution of 21 March 2000, created a "Special
Study Group on Bar Examination Reforms" to conduct studies on steps to further safeguard the integrity
of the Bar Examinations and to make them effective tools in measuring the adequacy of the law
curriculum and the quality of the instruction given by law schools";
WHEREAS, the Special Study Group, with Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) Chancellor Justice
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera as a chairperson and retired Justice Jose Y. Feria and retired Justice Camilo
D. Quiason as members, submitted to the Supreme Court its Final Report, dated 18 September 2000,
containing its findings and recommendations;
WHEREAS, on 21 August 2001, the Supreme Court en banc referred, for further study, report and
recommendation, the Final Report of the Special Study Group to the Committee on Legal Education and
Bar Matters (CLEBM) headed by Justice Jose C. Vitug;
WHEREAS, in connection with the discussion on the proposed reforms in the bar examinations, Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, then a Member of the CLEBM, submitted a Paper, entitled "Toward Meaningful
Reforms in the Bar Examination" with a Primer, proposing structural and administrative reforms, changes
in the design and construction of questions, and the methodological reforms concerning the marking anf
grading of the essay questions in the bar examination;
WHEREAS, proposals and comments were likewise received from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law Professors, the Commission on
Higher Education, the University of the Philippines College of Law, Arellano Law Foundation, the Philippine
Lawyers Association, the Philippine Bar Association and other prominent personalities from the Bench and
the Bar;
WHEREAS, considering her Memorandum to the Chief Justice on "Proposed Technical Assistance Project
on Legal Education," dated 27 February 2003, Program Director Evelyn Toledo-Dumdum of the Program
Management Office (PMO) was invited to a meeting of the CLEBM;
WHEREAS, under the auspices of the PMO, the CLEBM conducted fur (4) regional round-table discussions
with the law deans, professors, the students and members of the Integrated Bar of he Philippines for (a)
the National Capital Region, at Manila Diamond Hotel on 19 November 2003; (b) Mindanao, at the Grand
Regal Hotel Davao City on 23 January 2004; (c) the Visayas, at the Montebello Hotel in Cebu City on
January 2004; and (d) Luzon, at the Pan Pacific Hotel in Manila on 6 February 2004.
WHEREAS, in a Special Meeting of the CLEBM at the Pan Pacific Hotel on 23 April 2004, the Committee
heard the views of Ms. Erica Moeser, the Chief Executive Officer and President of the National Conference
of Board Examiners in the United States of America on a number of proposed bar reforms;
WHEREAS, the CLEBM, after extensive deliberation and consultation, has arived at certain
recommendations for consideration by the Supreme Court and submitted its report , dated 21 May 2004,
to the Court en banc;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court, sitting en banc, hereby RESOLVES to approve and adopt the following
Bar Examination Reforms:
A. For implementation within one (1) up to two (2) years:

1. Initial determination by the Chairman of admission to the bar examinations of candidates
(on the merits of the each case) to be passed upon by the Court en banc.
2. Submission by law deans of a certification that a candidate has no derogatory record in

school and, if any, the details and status thereof.
3. Disqualification of a candidate after failing in three(3) examinations, provided, that he may
take a fourth and fifth examination if he successful completes a one (1) year refresher
course for each examination; provided, further, that upon the effectivity of this Resolution,
those who have already failed in five(5) or more bar examinations shall be allowed to take
only one (1) more bar examination after copleting (1) year refresher course.
4. Promulgation of disciplinary measures for those involved in (a) attempts to violate or vitiate
the integrity and confidentiality of the bar examination process; (b) improper conduct
during the bar examination; and (c) improper conduct of "bar examinations."
5. Disqualification of a Bar Examination Chairperson:
a. kinship with an examinee who if his or her spouse or relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity;
b. having a member of his or her office staff as an examinee, or when the spouse or
child of such staff member is an examinee; and
c. being a member of the governing board, faculty or administration of a law school.
6. Desirable qualifications of Examiners:
a. membership in good standing in the Philippine Bar;
b. competence in the assigned subject;
c. a teacher of the subject or familiarity with the principles of test construction; and
d. commitment to check test papers personally and promptly pending the creation and
organization of the readership panels provided for in item B(6) below
7. Disqualifications of Examiners:
a. kinship with an examinee who is his or her spouse or relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity;
b. having a member of his or her office staff as an examinee; or when the spouse or
child of such staff member is an examinee;
c. being a member of the governing board, faculty or administration of a law school
d. teaching or lecturing in any law school, institution or review center during the
particular semester following the bar examinations;
e. having any interest or involvement in any law school, bar review center or group;
and
f. suspension or disbarment from the practice of law or the imposition of any other
serious disciplinary sanction.
8. Personal preparation, by handwriting or using a typewriter, of fifty (50) main questions,
excluding subdivisions, and their submission to the Chairperson in sealed envelope at least
forty-five (45) days before the schedule examination on any particular subject; examiners
should not use computers in preparing questions;
9. Apportionment of examination questions among the various topics covered by the subject;
10. Burning and shredding of rough drafts and carbon papers used in the preparation of
questions or in any other act connected with such preparation;
11. Publication of names candidates admitted to take the bar examinations;
12. Disqualification of a candidate who obtains a grade below 50% in any subject;
13. Fixing at June 30 of the immediately preceding year as the cut-off date for laws and
Supreme Court decisions and resolutions to be included in the bar examinations; and
14. Consideration of suggested answers to bar examinations questions prepared by the U.P.
Law Center and submitted to the Chairperson.
B. For implementation within two (2) years up to five (5) years:
1. Adoption of objective multiple-choice questions for 30% to 40% of the total number of
questions;
2. Formulation of essay test questions and "model answers" as part of the calibration of test
papers;
3. Introduction of performance testing by way of revising and improving the essay
examination;1awphil.net
4. Designation of two(2) examiners per subject depending on the number of examinees ;
5. Appointment of a tenured Board of Examiners with an incumbent Supreme Court Justice as
Chairperson;
6. Creation and organization of readership panels for each subject area to address the issue of
bias or subjectivity and facilitate the formulation of test questions and the correction of
examination booklets; and
7. Adoption of the calibration method in the corrections of essay questions to correct variations
in the level of test standards.1awph!l.ñêt
C. For implementation within five(5) years and beyond is the further computerization or
automation of the bar examinations to facilitate application, testing, and reporting
procedures.
D. Items not covered by this resolution, such as those that pertain to a possible review of
the coverage and relative weights of the subjects of the bar examinations, are
maintained.
E. For referral to the Legal education Boards:
1. Accreditation and supervision of law schools.
2. Inclusion of a subject on clinical legal education in the law curriculum, including an
apprenticeship program in the Judiciary, prosecution service, and law offices.
3. Imposition of sanctions on law schools that fail to meet the standards as may be prescribed
by the Legal Education Board.
4. Mandatory Law School Admission Test.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth day of July 2004, and shall be published in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Promulgated this 8th day of June 2004.
v. Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility

1. Rule 7.01; Read Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 4,
1997
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Alawi v. Alauya, 268 SCRA 639, February 24, 1997
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used
to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President
of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996,
and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. He also wrote on
January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by "the scheming sales agent."
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for
the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."
In that complaint, she accused Alauya of: Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether Alauya may use the title “attorney”
HELD: No
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region,
there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators.
The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED.
2. Rule 7.02; Read In Re Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.

Meling, B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2014
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person
known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to
the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding
with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is
not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed
as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing
his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As
held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may
render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the
Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s
membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003
Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires
the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law,
rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not
reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant
would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer.
By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases
are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his
lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him
as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot
go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the
title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The
respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the
title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by
him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may
only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney."
The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task
of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the
highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and
practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's
faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public
trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the
Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom
until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in
the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.
vi. Law school v. LEB v. SC; Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), 1987 Constitution
1. Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, Sept 10, 2019 – SEE ABOVE
2. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates / In Re Cunanan, March 18, 1954
FACTS: Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."
(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers
were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to
1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the Supreme
Court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured
in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in
bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, to admit to
the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional
HELD: NO.
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life,
honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made
available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly
magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and
magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even
with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission
to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these
same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments
of the government.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively
to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested
law suffers from these fatal defects.
3. In Re Petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission to the bar, 2 SCRA

985, August 15, 1961
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen
born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished
in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the
"Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished
the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice
the law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to
practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11
thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of
their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions
within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring
to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the liberal
professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be
deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws
and regulations of the latter. . . ..
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to
exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof,
which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine
he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of
the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

a. Who may practice? See Sec. 1, Rule 138, ROC

b. What constitutes and characterizes the practice of law?

i. Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

Atty. Monsod possesses the required qualification.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of

ii. People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109

iii. Practice of law v. study of law

2. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), 1987 Constitution

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

c. Privilege, not a right

i. Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

d. Profession, not a business

i. Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002

The Practice of Law — a

Profession, Not a Business

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

e. Admission to the bar

i. Sections 1, 2, 6,7, 9-19, Rule 138 of ROC

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar

ii. Qualifications (age, citizenship, residency, good moral character, no moral

1. So v. Lee, B.M. No. 3288, April 10, 2019

WHETHER LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE

The Court's Ruling

2. Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit

3. Re SC Decision v. Atty. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012

4. Aguirre v. Rana B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law

Respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

5. In re: Michael Medado, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

BAR MATTER No. 1161

RE: PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE BAR EXAMINATIONS

A. For implementation within one (1) up to two (2) years:

2. Submission by law deans of a certification that a candidate has no derogatory record in

Promulgated this 8th day of June 2004.

v. Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility

Alawi v. Alauya, 268 SCRA 639, February 24, 1997

ISSUE: Whether Alauya may use the title “attorney”

Respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED.

2. Rule 7.02; Read In Re Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.

2. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional

3. In Re Petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission to the bar, 2 SCRA

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

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