CHAPTER IV

WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH, the rule is corollary of the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should
not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the Law. In other words,
there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think in ought to be but as they find and without regard to the
consequences.

Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., Petitioner,

Vs. Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, Sycwin Coating and Wires, Inc., and Dominador Capcal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 72005, May 29, 1987

Facts: Private Respondent Sycwin Coating and Wires Inc. filed a complaint for the collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation.
During the pendency of the case, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian upon posting of a supersedeas
bond. Varian in turn posted a counter bond amounting to ₱ 1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Coy a registered and
recognized surety, thus, attached properties were retarded.

The trial court then rendered a decision favorable to the private respondent and Writ of execution was issued in favor of the private
respondent. The same was however returned unsatisfied since Varian failed to deliver the attached personal properties. Sycwin thus prayed
that petitioner corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted by the respondent Court. (IAC)

Issue: Whether or Not the counter bond issued through petitioner corporation covers execution of a judgment pending appeal.

Held: Yes. The counter bond was issued in accordance with section 5 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the Counter
Bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It applies to the payment of any Judgment that may be recovered by the
plaintiff.

It is a recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Since the law did not make any exception, when it
speaks of "any judgment" which may be charged against a counter bond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory
judgment, but also judgment pending appeal.

Rep. of the Philippines represented by the AFP of the Phil. Finance Center vs. Daisy Yahon, June 16, 2014;

Issue ; Whether or not retirement and pension benefits of government employees can be a proper subject of garnishment to R.A 9262

HELD : Section 8 (g) of R.A 9262 used general term employer which includes in its coverage the military institution., S/ sgt. Yahon’s employer,
where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus section 8 (g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.

juanito Pilar vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995;

The Rule is well-organized that where the Law does not distinguish , courts should not distinguish.

FACTS: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065
dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc
(UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme
Court. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a “non-
candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is . . . clear from the law that
candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing
for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for election.

HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

RATIO: Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy
or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one
who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
fine.

PP vs. Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista and Guildo S. Tugonon, February 20,  1996;

The law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so neither should the court.

Facts: Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the
chief probation and parole officer recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the ground that appealing the
sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. The Regional Trial Court set aside the probation's
officer is recommendation and thus granted private respondent's application for probation.

Issue: Whether or Not the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's application for probation despite filed
by the private respondent.

Held: Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992 after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered
by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from the judgment
of the conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal."

Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation after the court of appeals had affirmed his conviction, private
respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. The law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious
appeals so neither should the court.

EXCPETION IN THE STATUTE - Cecilio De Villa vs. CA, G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991

When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons to justify it.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL TERMS

-General term in a statute are to receive a general construction, unless restrained by the context or by plain inferences from the scope and
purpose of the act.

Special terms in a statute may sometimes be expanded to a general signification by the consideration that the reason of the law is general.

General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates
the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration
belong to or fall under the specific class.

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro M. Gimenez as Auditor General  G.R. no. L-14787, January 28, 1961 

Facts: The Petitioner Colgate - Palmolive, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine law for the manufacture of toilet
preparations and household remedies. The company imported various materials such as Irish moss extracts, sodium benzoate, sodium
saccharin ate, precipitated calcium and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and dental cream flavor of the dental cream they
manufacture. For every importation of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other incidental charges, in accordance with R.A. 601 (Exchange Tax Law). On March 14,
1956, Petitioner filed with the Central Bank 3 applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax in the total amount of ₱ 113,343.99, based on
section 2 of R.A. 601 which provides that foreign exchange used for the payment of cost, transportation and incidental charges to the
importation of stabilizers and flavors shall be refunded to any importer upon satisfactory proof of actual importations. OIC of the Exchange Tax
Administration of Central Bank advised the petitioner that they can claim for refund the amount of ₱ 23,958.13 of the total sum of ₱
113,343.99, representing the 17% special excise tax on foriegn echange used to import Irish moss extract and sodium benzoate and
precipitated calcium carbonate. However, the auditor of the Central Bank refused to pass in audit its claim for refund on the theory that
toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under sec. 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
The Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank on the same ground that
stabilizers and flavors in sec. 2 of Exchange Tax Law refers only to food products.Petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Foreign Exchange used by the petitioner in the importation of Dental Cream Stabilizers and Flavors is exempt from
the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, so as to entitle it to a refund.

Held: Yes. The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner Company.

Section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law provides: The Tax collected under the preceding section on the foreign exchange used for the payment of
the cost, transportation and/or charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya
beans, butter, fat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizers and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizers poultry feed, textbooks, reference
books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board on Textbooks and/or established public/private educational institutions; newsprint
imported by paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) ...,
anesthetics, antibiotics, vitamins, hormones, X-rays films, Laboratory Reagents, biological, dental supplies and pharmaceutical drugs necessary
for compounding medicines: medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of
Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals, and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to
time to making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant
to sec. 7 thereof.

Therefore, the law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by a
particular recital does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. Since the law does not distinguish between "Stabilizers and
Flavors", the court is not authorized to make any distinction when the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish.

GENERAL TERMS FOLLOWING SPECIAL TERMS (EJUSDEM GENERIS)

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons o things by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. It teaches us that comprehensive expressions in an act such and all others or any
others are usually to be restricted to persons or things of the same kind or class with those specially named in the preceding words.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrino and Tecson, G.R. No. 89483,  August 30, 1990;

Facts : The New armed forces Anti-Graft board under the Presidential commission On Good Government PCGG recommend that private
respondent Lt. Col Troadio Tecsom be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended and Rep. Act. No 1379, Private
respondent moved to dismiss.

ISSUE : Whether or not private respondent acted as a subordinate Under E.O No.1 an related executive order.

Held : No. Civil case decision dismissed and nullified TRO was made permanent.

People v. Echavez G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against 16 persons charging them with squatting, as penalized in Presidential Decree 772.
Respondent Echavez dismissed the case on the grounds that 1) the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy and not with the use
of force, intimidation, or threat or taking advantage of the absence of the owner (as described in the Presidential Decree); and 2) under the rule
of ejusdem genernis, the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 penalizes squatting and similar acts also apply to agricultural lands

Held: No.

Ratio: The preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or particularly to illegal constructions in squatter
areas. The complainant involves pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind) does not apply to this case.

Alta Vista Golf and Country Club vs. The City of Cebu, Hon. Mayor Tomas  Osmeña et al G.R. no. 180235, January 20, 2016 
Under the principle of ejusdem generis “where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of

the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons,
things or cases akin to, resembling or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Cebu or any local govt. can validly impose amusement tax to the act of playing golf.

Held: there is merit in the instant petition. The local Govt. code authorizes the imposition by Local govt. units of amusement tax under section
140.

EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION

-It is a general rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion
of all others. Meaning that does not appear nor is intented or reflected in the very Language of the Statute cannot be placed therein

Expressiu Unius Est ExclusioAlterius) – Municipality of Nueva Era et al vs. Municipality of Marcos, February 27, 2008

Issue : Whether or not the eastern boundary of marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva era

Held : Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A No. 3753

ASSOCIATED WORDS

It explain and limit each other. When a word used in a statute is ambiguous or vague, its meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company which are associated with it.

 Dra. Buenaseda et al vs. Sec. Juan Flavier, September 21, 1993 

Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company
of terms in which is found or with which it is associated.

USE OF NEGATIVE WORDS

Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are mere directory

Manolo P. Fule vs. CA, June 22, 1988; g)

THE USE OF WORDS MAY AND SHALL

The use of word ‘may’ in the statute generally connotes a permisibe thing while the word shall is imperative

Purita Bersabal vs.  Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176;

Office of the Ombudsman vs.  Merceditas De Sahagun, Manuela T. Waquiz and Raidis J. Bassig, August 13, 2008; 

- the use of the word may clearly shows it is directory in nature and not mandatory

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association vs. CA, G.R. No. 117188, August 7, 1997;

- The word must in a statute like shall is not always imperative and may be consistent with n exercise of discretion

Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. vs. NLRC, February 4, 2008; Philippine National Bank  vs. CA, May 17, 1993; ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and
National Steel Corporation, August 2,  1994.

- The word only means Exclusive