UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY STUDIES

COLLEGE OF LEGAL STUDIES

BA, LLB (HONS.)

SEMESTER-VII

ACADEMIC YEAR: 2016 -17 SESSION: AUG- DEC

RESEARCH PROJECT
(PRINCIPLE OF SELF DETERMINATION IN AALAND
ISALND CASE. 1920 )
FOR
Interpretation of law

Under the Supervision of: Asst. Prof. DEBRATI PAL

NAME: KOMAL SRIVASTAVA
SAP NO: 500028600
ROLL NO R450213058
 INTRODUCTION

The Aland Islands, located at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, have always been of strategic
importance in the Baltic region. In the aftermath of the First World War the islands - inhabited
by the Swedish-speaking population but belonging to Finland - became an object of a territorial
dispute between Finland and Sweden.

The residents of the islands claimed their right to self-determination and demanded a
reunification with Sweden. This separatist movement was supported by Sweden but opposed by
Finland who insisted on its sovereignty over the archipelago and was only willing to offer it an
autonomous status. In order to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the status of the Islands and
prevent destabilization of the Baltic region, the matter was referred in June 1920 to the newly
founded League of Nations.1

The first issue that needed to be resolved was the competence of the international organisation to
settle the dispute. The International Committee of Jurists, entrusted by the Council of the League
of Nations with the task of advising on legal aspects of the Aland Islands case, gave an
affirmative answer to the question of competence. Once declared competent to decide on the
dispute, the Council of the League of Nations appointed a Commission of Rapporteurs to
thoroughly investigate the problem and make recommendations for its solution. Based on the
Commission’s report and on hearing the parties, the Council adopted a resolution in June 1921,
which recognized Finland's sovereignty over the Aland Islands but recommended autonomy for
the territory and guarantees for the local population that would preserve its Swedish language,
culture and local traditions. The islands were also to remain demilitarized, non-fortified and
neutral. The recommendations of the League of Nations were accepted by the parties to the
conflict and fully complied with.

The Aland Islands case proved significant for the following principal reasons. It was one of the
first interstate disputes, which arose in the years after the First World War and before the
Permanent Court of International Justice was established. The pronouncement of the
International Committee of Jurists designating and declaring an international organisation

1
The Åland Islands Solution A precedent for successful international disputes settlement, Ms. Patricia O’Brien,
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel.
competent to settle an interstate dispute was a very important development because it provided a
new forum for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The fact that the parties to the
conflict fully endorsed the final recommendations of the League Council further confirmed the
legitimacy of such international intervention. Other conclusions of the Committee of Jurists and
the Commission of Rapporteurs on the relationship between the principle of self-determination
and the protection of minorities are still of relevance today. It was established that if the rights of
minorities are being respected and its cultural identity is fully protected in situations such as the
one in question, a demand for secession does not seem to be justified. 2The Aland solution has
often been referred to as a model for the constructive and successful settlement of minority
conflicts. The significance of the Aland Islands case consists also in its contribution to the
formation of the general rule of international law about the peaceful settlement of international
disputes. It served as a successful example of the peaceful settlement of an international dispute
in the pre UN Charter era. At a time when the traditional and unrestricted sovereignty of States
allowed them to settle their disputes through whatever means they chose - peaceful or not. The
League of Nations was a revolutionary idea at the time, which contested and tried to restrain the
sovereign right of States to warfare at will and by choice. Though the provisions of the League
Covenant stated the promotion of peace and security as the organisation’s central goal, they were
incomplete and did not stipulate any binding obligations to settle disputes in a peaceful manner.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The arguments of each of the three parties can be summarised as follows: Aaland claims the right
to hold a third plebiscite which could leave no doubt as to the unanimous wish of the population
for reunion with Sweden, to whom she is bound by the traditions of her Swedish past and an
unswerving affection which has survived a separation of more than a century. This claim is based
on the right of people to dispose freely of their own destinies, proclaimed by President Wilson
and used to the advantage of several nationalities in the treaties which ended the great war.

In justice to the Aaland Islanders, it cannot be too often stated that they have entirely refrained
from all actions and demonstrations of a revolutionary nature. Peaceable and law-abiding, they
have only employed the means most calculated to gain the sympathies of civilized nations in
order to win their case. Finland refuses to authorise a plebiscite and to recognise its validity, in
2
REPORT PRESENTBD TO THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS BY THE COMMISSION OF RAPPORTBURS
virtue of the sovereign rights of the Finnish State on its own territory. Aspirations which
envisage the possibility of a slang from the statas quo arc not weli founded, she argues, and the
principle of self-determination cannot be applied in the case of the Aaland Islands. Finland holds
to this juridical field, where she considers that nothing can shake her position.

'Sweden has no selfish rights to maintain with regard to the Islands, neither does she hold
annexationist views, but she considers the wish of tie Alanders to be legitimate, and claims on
their behalf the right to hold a public expression of opinion in accordance with a principle which
is universally recognised. She is moved by the profound interest aroused by men of her own race
and by the fear that their fate may be a precarious and unhappy one if they remain tied to another
nationality.

COMPETENCE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

At a meeting of the 20th September, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations, having studied
the report made at its request and in a consultative capacity by an International Cmmission of
Jurists, in accordance with the conclusions of this report, declared itself competent to
recommend the solution which it considered as most equitable and most appropriate to the
question of the Aaland Islands. We have been delegated to present it, after the necessary
consultations, with a report upon which it could base a recommendation of a nature calculated to
establish conditions favorable to the maintenance of peace in this part of the world by an
arrangement, whether final or provisional, taking the legitimate interests of all parties in the case
into consideration. 3

The enquiry which we have made, by virtue of this mandate, has given us the absolute conviction
that the only method to adopt in order to obtain a solution of the question in accordance with
these lofty views, is to entrust it to impartial examination by the Council. It is therefore within its
rights in declaring its competence. Although we cannot share the opinion stated by the
Commission of Jurists on all points, we agree with their declaration that the Aaland question is
one that extends beyond the sphere of domestic policy. But, in our opinion, it is because it had
acquired such considerable international importance that it was necessary to submit it to the high
authority which the League of Nations represents in the eyes of the world. On its equitable
3
See e.g. PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 15, Judgment No. 12 (1928) regarding Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia and PCIJ Ser.
A/B, No. 64 (1935) regarding Minority Schools in Albania.
settlement depend, not only the re-establishment of the spirit of peace where feeling has been
running high among this interesting Baltic population, and the resumption of the good relations
which should exist between two nations which have all the conditions for a mutual
understanding, Sweden and Finland, but also the consolidation of the peace which the population
of this part of Europe need as much as others to efface the deep traces left by the war, to
reconstitute their forces of production and to establish their economic development upon solid
foundations.

Without losing sight of these considerations, we come first of all to this statement; the primary
question at issue, and which no ethnical or political considerations allow to be brushed aside, is a
legal one -- that of Finland's right of sovereignty with regard to the Aaland Islands. The summary
we have made of the successive transformations through which Finland has passed has shown
that more than a hundred years ago this country was constituted a Grand-Duchy under a
sovereign who was at once Emperor of Russia and Grand Duke. We shall first of all see whether
Finland was a sovereign State after the dissolution of the bonds which attached her to Russia,
and, secondly, whether her sovereignty extended over the Aaland Islands just as over the other
parts of her territory. 4

THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE DETERMINATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE

CASE OF TI{E AALAND POPULATION

It is just this principle of free determination which is as the Swedish memorandum states. at the
bottom of the Aaland question. This principle is not, properly speaking a rule of international law
and the League of Nations has not entered it in its Covenant. This is also the opinion of the
International Commission of Jurists. "The recognition of this principle in a certain number of
international Treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a
positive rule of the Law of Nations. "l It is a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed by a
vague and general formula which has given rise to the most varied interpretations and differences
of opinion. It is no part of our duty or pretentions to treat these interesting theoretic discussions
exhaustively. We shall confine ourselves to stating the considerations which arise out of its
application to the Aaland problem. First of all, we must eliminate an analogy which cannot be
pleaded justly. The Alanders and the Swedes are wrong in citing the example of Finland, which,
4
D.H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, 1928, vol. 2, p. 238-246
in determining her own fate, has succeeded, thanks to the results of the great war, in freeing
herself from her dependence on Russia. As we think we have fully proved, Finland has been an
autonomous State since long before the war from 1809.

But even if one persisted in thinking that she only became a State on proclaiming herself
independent and after this proclamation, one would none the less be forced to admit that the
Finnish people, with their clearly defined territory and a well-developed national life, fulfilled all
the conditions necessary for constitution as an independent State. Whichever view is taken, no
one will dispute the natural right of the Finns, born of inherent justice, to proclaim their
independence; but this right which Finland possessed does not provide any evidence in support
of the demand of the Alanders. The Aaland Archipelago is only a small part of the Finnish
territory, and the Aaland population a small fraction of the Finnish nation. Now, it is evident that
one cannot treat a small minority, a small fraction of a people, in the same manner and on the
same footing as a nation taken as a whole. There is another consideration which excludes the
analogy which it is wished to establish between the Finnish people and the Aaland population.
Finland has been oppressed and persecuted, her tenders feelings have been wearied by the
disloyal and brutal conduct of Russia. The Alanders have neither been persecuted nor oppressed
by Finland. We have asked the Executive Committee of the Land sting what were its Report of
the International Commission of Jurists Grievances against the Finnish administration before the
war. It was able to formulate only insignificant reproaches. As for persecutions, it is impossible
to define by this term the angst of M. Sundblom and M. Bjorkman, in justification of which
Finland cites specific clauses of her penal code. It is true that as a result of quite exceptional
conditions, the Aaland population is threatened in its language and its culture. But this is not the
result of a policy of oppression; on the contrary, we feel certain that it is possible to appeal to the
good will of the Finnish Government to preserve and protect the language and the culture which
are so precious to the Aalanders. The example of Finland is, therefore, in no way a conclusive
argument for the case put forward by the Aaland island. Let us turn to the question of principle
as it stands in relation to the Aaland problem bearing in mind that Finland has existed as a State
for a century with the same frontiers, and that she has given striking proofs of her national
5
strength and solidarity. is it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of the
population of a State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly capable of fulfilling its duties
5
P. De Azcárate, League of Nations and National Minorities: An Experiment, 1945, p. 92.
as such, has the right of separating itself from her in order to be incorporated in another State or
to declare its independence? The answer can only be in the negative. To concede to minorities,
either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from
the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to
destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would
be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political
unity. The idea of justice and of liberty, embodied in the formula of self-determination must be
applied in a reasonable manner to the relations between States and the minorities they include. It
is just that the ethnical character and the ancient traditions of these minorities should be
respected as much as possible and that they should be specially authorised to practice freely their
religion and to cultivate their language. This postulate marks one of the noblest advances of
modern civilisation and, as it is clear that there can be no lasting peace apart from justice,
constitutes one of the most powerful means of strengthening peace and combating hatred and
dissensions both within the State and in international relations. But what reasons would there be
for allowing a minority to separate itself from the State to which it is united, if this State gives it
the guarantees which it is within its rights in demanding, for the presentation of its social,
ethnical or religious character? Such indulgence, apart from every political consideration, would
be supremely unjust to the State prepared to make these concessions. The separation of a
minority from the State of which it form! a part and its incorporation in another State can only be
considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will
or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.

In the case of the Aalanders, the important question is the protection of their language -- the
Swedish language. Its language is the very soul of a people. We appreciate the ardent desire, the
resolute wish of the Aaland population, proud in its democratic simplicity and eager for
independence, to preserve intact the Swedish language and culture their heritage from their
ancestors. The conviction that their language is threatened and can only be saved by union with
Sweden has profoundly moved this gallant little race, which inhabits, from an international point
of view, one of the most interesting regions of Europe. They have expressed their fears and their
aspirations with such force that they have succeeded in carrying with them into the controversy,
apart from the whole of Finland and of Sweden the two conflicting parties - the public opinion
of a great part of the civilized world. It is thus undoubtedly that the Aaland question has gained
the importance and the character of an international dispute, the first problem of this nature with
which the League of Nations has had to deal. In spite of the lively sympathy with which the
Aalanders inspired us, we yet cannot, in view of the heavy responsibility which is laid to us,
accede to their request. We recognise that the Aaland population, by reason of its insular position
and its strong tradition, forms a group apart in Finland, not only distinct from the Finnish
population, but also in certain respects distinct from the Swedish-speaking population. They
deserve all the more protection and support in that they are, because of their great remoteness
from the Finnish mainland, left to themselves, so to speak, in their struggle for the preservation
of their ethnical heritage. We admit also that the fear fostered by the Aalanders of being little by
little submerged by the Finnish invasion has good grounds, and that effective measures should be
taken with a view to eliminating 1fois danger. If it were true that incorporation with Sweden was
the only means of preserving its Swedish language for Aaland, we should not have hesitated to
consider this solution. But such is not the case. There is no need for a separation. The Finnish
State is ready to grant the inhabitants satisfactory guarantees and faithfully to observe the
engagement which it will enter into with them: of this we have no doubt. To take the Aaland
Islands away from Finland in these circumstances would be the more unjust inasmuch as from
the point of view of history, geography and politics, all the arguments militate in favor of the
status quo. 6

Historically, the Islands belonged throughout the Middle Ages and modern times, like the
Finnish provinces, to the Swedish Crown. With the exception of short periods and apart from
certain peculiarities of their fiscal regime, they have been administered as though they formed
part of these provinces. It may be questioned whether, in the eyes of the Swedish monarchs and
their Ministers, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Aaland Sea did not form for the royal administration
and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a kind of line of demarcation between the countries which were
the ancient cradle of the monarchy and those which it had conquered successively, beginning
with the Baltic Archipelagoes, on the opposite shore of the Gulf. The fact is that these different
countries were grouped from the year 1634 in separate governments. The Treaty of
Fredrikshamn sanctioned from a territorial and political point of view a separation which already
existed for administrative and religious purposes.

6
Athanasia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law, 1997, pp. 101-118
Since that time the Aaland Islands have followed the destiny of Finland, enjoying the same
autonomy under the Czars who were faithful to their promise, oppressed like her by the
Sovereign who broke his, and freed at length from the Russians by the events of the Great War
and by the Revolution at Petrograd. If one studies the geographical situation and the geological
formation of these Islands, one is convinced that they connect with the neighboring
archipelagoes and through them with the Finnish mainland, but not with the Scandinavian
peninsula. We have seen that the Aalanders form in Finland a group which in certain respects is
not one with those which are Swedish-speaking.

They are distinguished from them above all in their separatist spirit, which carries them towards
Sweden, alienating them from their brothers in race who have remained Finnish at heart. But
they do not form a different ethnical group: in reality they constitute the fifth part of the Swedes
of Finland, from whom they are not isolated geographically. 7

The Swedes form a minority in Finland which has long governed the country, formerly
possessing the monopoly of intellectual culture and the privilege of the official language. Today
this minority is striving to maintain the character of its original nationality by the side of the
preponderant Finnish majority, and to preserve cordial relations with it, while at the same time
keeping up close ties with Scandinavia. The question of languages is not an easy one to settle
completely and satisfactorily in Finland, because there are in this country many mixed or
bilingual districts, in which the majority is most frequently Finnish. The new Finnish
Constitution seems, it is true, to establish clearly enough equality between the native languages.

The essential point is, however, the application of this principle, and it is incontestable that there
exists a certain tension even a certain distrust -- between the two linguistic groups. We greatly
hope that the Finnish majority, whose predominance is assured forever, will see its way, without
abdicating its own rights, to be liberal and generous towards the minority. Only in this way will
all distrust disappear only in this way can there reign a peace and 320 friendship proof against
every attack between the Swedish-speaking and the Finnish speaking Finns in the supreme
interest of their country, to which they are all deeply devoted. The leaders of the Swedish party
have not concealed from us the fact that the agreement between the two unequal fractions of the
nation would be irretrievably compromised if Aaland were ceded to Sweden. It would result in a
7
Artur Tollet & John Uggla, Lagstiftningen angående självstyrelse för Åland, Helsingsfors, 1930, p. 11.
diminution of the national territory, against which the Swedes would protest as vehemently as
the Finns.

But, further, the bitter resentment of the latter would be swift to change to hatred both against
their fellow-citizens of Swedish stock and against the Swedes of the Kingdom. The Finns dre
vindictive and their vengeance would turn first of all on their unfortunate associates.
Consequently, the loss of Aaland would cause an irreparable blow to the Swedish minority. Nor
is this all: it would sow the seeds of imitation and rancor in the hearts of the Finnish majority,
which might perhaps drive the Republic into political combinations and alliances directed against
Sweden. It seems that if European public opinion attaches importance to the fate of 25,000
Aaland Islanders, for still stronger reasons it cannot ignore that of 350,000 Swedes in Finland --
their brothers who cannot possibly exist separated from the rest of Finland, where the groups in
which they live often blend with the Finnish population.

Some of these Swedes maintain that before according the Aaland Islanders the opportunity of a
plebiscite, it would be just to consult the whole Swedish population in Finland on a question so
important for its future as that of the loss of Aaland. Others would wish to inter mingle the
question of autonomy for Aaland with that of a general autonomy, claimed by the delegates of
the Swedish Communes in their own Assembly, which corresponds to the Lansing of the Islands.

But the autonomy which they demand is a matter of domestic policy in which the League of
Nations has no right to interfere. Nevertheless, it may be seen thereby what justifiable feelings
the Aaland question has provoked amongst the Swedes of Finland, and what disastrous
consequences a solution contrary to their wishes might have for them. From a strategic point of
view, the position of both countries is about the same. Sweden and Finland have both an obvious
interest in being mistress of the Aaland Islands. 8

But we do not see why the Swedish interest should take precedence over the Finnish interest and
the latter be sacrificed to the former. Aaland in the hands of the Finns does not constitute danger
for Sweden, and the reverse would be equally true. That the two Baltic States should be driven to
make war upon one another is an idea that can hardly be taken seriously. The possession of the
islands is only of unquestionable military importance in the eyes of the Swedes and the Finns

8
Outi Korhonen, International Law Situated, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 28
inasmuch as they fear to see them falling into the possession of a great Power. In anticipation of
such a contingency, there are means of defense quite apart from the granting of the Archipelago
to the one State or the other, and of which we shall speak when dealing with their neutralization.
Political reasons in support of our conclusions are not lacking. The services which Finland
rendered to others as well as to her sell in repelling the attacks of Bolshevist Communism after a
bloody struggle, should not be forgotten. Had she succumbed, the gate would have been opened
to revolutionary expansion and Scandinavia would undoubtedly have been the first to be
menaced. It would be an extraordinary form of gratitude towards the Finnish Republic to wish to
despoil her of territory to which she attaches the greatest value. Such a humiliation would be
cruelly painful to every country, but more so still perhaps to a State which has the pride and the
susceptibility of youth.

She would thus be alienated from the Scandinavian countries. Which have need of her as she has
of them? The Helsingborg Cabinet has signed a Treaty of peace with the Socialist Federal
Republic of the Soviets at Drat, which will allow it to devote itself to the economic development
of the country and to the settlement of its internal affairs" Finland is none the less exposed to the
subtle penetration of Bolshevist propaganda. We have no certain knowledge of what is going on
in Russia. Even at Helsingborg when we were staying there, there were but uncertain rumors as
to possibilities of duration or of transformation of the Soviet regime. In the field of conjectures
which we are surveying, a long period of anarchy is not altogether unthinkable.9

But sooner or later Russia will rise from this chaos to become once again one of the important
factors in the future of Europe. Shall we then see a restoration of pan-Slavish imperialism" as in
the time of the Romanoff’s? Whatever happens, it is in the ‘general interest to hasten the
consolidation of the States which have freed themselves from the Empire of the Czars to live an
independent existence, and to help them to live and to prosper.

Finland, in particular, is one of these bulwarks of peace in Northern Europe. We can only wish
that she will grow strong under the happy influence of the League of Nations and that she will
enter into the constellation of the Scandinavian States after the settlement of the Aaland question.
It will have been an honorable task for us to have contributed to this restoration of peace and at
9
Markku Suksi, The Constitutional Setting of the Åland Islands Compared, in Lauri Hannikainen & Frank Horn,
Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland Islands in a Changing Europe, The Hague, Kluwer
Law International, 1997, 99- 129.
the same time to win still more sympathy for a State which has made such noble endeavors to
rank among the most energetic, the most hard-working and the most cultivated of nations. It is
true that in Stockholm another view is taken of the result which would ensue from a solution
different from that which we propose. Aaland restored to Sweden would, so we were told, form a
bridge between the two shores of the Baltic, on which Sweden and Finiand would eventually
meet in friendship. The Finns only see in the Aaland question the loss of certain islands: they.do
not see wh4t they would gain thereby -- the friendship of Sweden. But if Aaland were left to
Finland, the relations of the inhabitants with the Finns, whether Swedish of Finnish in speech,
would become as bad as those which existed between them and the Russians during the last years
of the Czar's sovereignty.10

Finland could only keep the islands by force; disputes would arise which would make
themselves felt in Sweden, for the Swedish people would not lose their interest in the lot of the
Aalanders. Sooner than share in these fears, we prefer to consider the great r6le which would
then fall to Sweden -- a role truly worthy of her civilizing mission, of the generous manner in
which she has unloosed her union with Norway and of the example which for more than a
century she has set Europe in keeping outside every war. It would consist in calming the
violently excited feelings of her proteg6s, and in seeking to extinguish the fire rather than to let it
burn. Sweden consented to submit the dispute to the Council of the League of Nations. Shemust
bow with good grace to its opinion, if it is not in accordance with her hopes and must use her
good influence over the Aalanders in persuading them to accept the decision without too much
complaint. We cannot pretend that their disillusion will be anything but great. So sure are they of
their right and so certain of success that they have been at pains to warn us of the consequences
which would ensue from the rejection of their claims. "Never will the Aaland Islanders submit to
a sovereignty which they detest," exclaims the Executive Committee of the Landsting in a
document which was sent to us after our departure. They will sooner emigrate in large numbers
to escape from this intolerable situation.

Irredentism will never cease, from which will arise the most serious complications. These
forecasts are too pessimistic, these presages too gloomy. We have a better opinion of the
Aalanders, of their judgment and their common sense. We think also that emigration" which has

10
Korhonen, loc. ci
always existed in Aaland, will only be caused in the future as it has been in the past, by the
enterprising nature ofthe Islanders and by their desire to enrich themselves abroad. The opinion
of the Aalanders who are loyal to Finland -- there is quite an intellectual colony at Helsingfors
and we met several at Mariehamn - is that the violence of the protests against a decision contrary
to general expectation would gradually die down and that feeling would again grow calm on the
express condition that the denationalisation which this brave people so greatly dread no longer
threatens them. It is to dispel their apprehensions that we have turned our attention" in
formulating a certain number of guarantees to be demanded of the Finnish Government, in
favour of the inhabitants of Aaland.

INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

Before expressing an opinion as to the most suitable measures for the preservation of its national
character for this population, we ought to mention two suggestions which 1 Annex 6: Statement
submitted by the Aaland Island. have been made, but which must be rejected because, in reality,
they would not solve the question: the first aims at a definite solution, the second only at a
provisional arrangements. It has been proposed, as the best means of solving the question
between Sweden and Finland, to grant the Aaland Islands complete independence. The Executive
Committee of the island would rally to this idea in despair of its cause, if its dearest wish, return
to Swede4 proved unrealizable, and in preference to accepting the sovereignty of Finland . 11

But does the Aaland Archipelago possess the necessary capacity to survive as an independent
State? We think not. Even if we suppose that prominent citizens of the Island possess the
necessary experience and impartiality for government amid the difficulties of their geographical
and political position, the Archipelago has not the certain resources which would enable it to
bear all the expenses both of internal administration and communications with abroad. These
reasons would suffice for the rejection of such a solution -- even supposing that Finland would
consent to abandon her right of sovereignty over the Archipelago, which is outside all
probability.

A transitory expedient has also been thought of, which would consist of leaving matters as they
are for a number of years, five or less, at the end of which a plebiscite should take place. This
11
Lars Ingmar Johansson, Åland Autonomy – Its Background and Current Status, in Islands of Peace, The Åland
Islands Peace Institute, Åland, 2006, p. 42.
arrangement, in the opinion of its sponsors, would have the advantage of ending the state of
tension which exists at present and giving time for matters to calm down and for the inhabitants
to reflect more dispassionately over the guarantees which union with Finland would offer for the
preservation of their Swedish individuality. But the Aaland Islanders are not in favour of it, and
the idea was similarly rejected by the Helsingborg Government.

The Aaland Islanders are anxious to bring matters to a head: the idea of a plebiscite, which arose
at a time of distress, has attained the persistence of an obsession with them. It engrosses their
will which aims only at this end. Patience for a period of years would be more than they can
achieve. Further, the men who have given the impulse to the movement would not remain idle.
The partisans of Sweden would not cease to keep up separatist agitation or to exploit the causes
of discontent as they have done hitherto, whether in public meetings or through their newspaper
"Aaland." Stormy manifestations and unexpected incidents might provoke repressive measures
by the Finnish authorities.12

It could therefore hardly be hoped that peace would be established pending a final solution. The
Aaland question would continue to trouble the peace of the Baltic countries. '

Statement submitted by the Aaland island In the acute phase which has been reached in this
question, a final solution cannot be deferred, and it can only be based on the maintenance of the
sovereignty of Finland. Once this principle is recognized, some essential guarantees to which we
have already referred ought to complete the Law of Autonomy voted by the Diet on the 7th May,
1920, infamous of the province of Aaland.

They air& above all, at the preservation of the Swedish language by teaching in the schools. To
this fundamental condition we would add the maintenance of the territorial property in the hands
of the natives, and in the region of politics, in measures against the premature exercise of the
franchise granted to new inhabitants. Finally, we would suggest conditions for the nomination of
a Governor who has the entire confidence of the population. With regard to teaching, the
Autonomy Law (Article 9) only stipulates that it should be given on the basis of public
instruction in Finland. This assimilation does not content us. We propose that in the province of
Aaland the primary schools and even the technical school,should only give instruction in

12
Håkan Skogsjö & Jonas Wilén, Skotten I Tornvillan; Historien om Ålands självstyrelse, Ålands museum, 1997, p. 8
Swedish. If this is already the case in the primary schools, it is because the children who go there
are all Swedish-speaking, but this teaching in Swedish ought to take the form of the obligatory
exclusion of Finnish, confirmed by law. A similar guarantee has been inserted in several peace
treaties as a measure necessary for the protection of minorities. The only objection made to this
by some of the members of the Finnish Government is that such a stipulation might work to the
disadvantage of the Swedish population in certain communes of the country. But we do not ask
that the basis of public instruction in Finland should be modified: we would only request that
such an exception should be stipulated in favour of Aaland by reason of a situation which is quite
peculiar to itself. To preserve for the communes and their inhabitants the exclusive ownership
and enjoyment of their property the right of pre-emption should be accorded to them on every
occasion that offers of purchase are made by a person or company foreign to the Islands. It may
be asked why such a restriction on the liberty of business should be necessary. 13

The Islands do not contain mineral riches capable of tempting foreign capitalists, and their
wealth in timber is not comparable to that of the neighboring countries. This is true. But Aaland,
by its situation in the middle of the Baltic and by the excellence of its harbors, is destined to
become a shipbuilding center. The development of this industry is to be foreseen, as it has
already been successfully established by the Islanders. Finnish Companies will seek to acquire
land for the construction of more important building yards there. This would involve the influx
of Finnish workmen into the country, and with them all the consequences feared by the Aaland
Islanders. The right of pre-emption granted to the communes and to the inhabitants would
remove this danger.

To prevent out-bidding, the purchase price could be equitably fixed according to current prices
by a Commission to be appointed by the General Council, the provincial Assembly instituted by
the law of autonomy. The Aaland Islanders complain that every newcomer who has recently
taken residence in one of their communes takes part in the elections.

According to Article 2 of 1I 325 the law of autonomy, "all persons having their legal domicile in
one of the communes of the province shall be considered as forming part of the population";
while Article 5 lays down that "members of the General Council shall be elected by universal

13
Ålandsfrågan inför Nationernas Förbund, Diplomatiska Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet,
Stockholm 1920, pp. 56-59 (the text is here in Swedish and French and this is the translation of the author).
and legal suffrage of all electors, male and female, over 27 years of age by direct, proportional
and secret ballot. These arrangements are obviously in favour of the Finnish immigration, in
giving strangers to the country the same rights as natives. We propose that the franchise should
only be granted to newcomers after a stay of five years. This term of probation appears to us the
most suitable. We have reason to suppose that it would not be opposed by the Finnish
Government, which would likewise consent to the concession of the right of pre-emption for the
communes and the inhabitants. Article 4 attributes the nomination of the Governor of the
province to the President of the Republic. The designation of its representative is incontestably
one of the privileges belonging to the central power. Bu! on the other hand, the choice of a
person sympathetic to the whole population and possessing a perfect knowledge of its mentality
and its aspirations is of great importance for the maintenance of good relations between the
Government and the province. On his tact and personal influence over the citizens whom he
governs will depend in part the return of tranquility and final pacification 14. We would suggest
that the General Council of the Aaland Islands should be invested with the right of presenting a
list of three candidates to the Government for the post of Governor, and that the latter should not
be chosen outside this list. In the matter of the provincial budget, Article 21 lays down that the
General Council can vote conjointly with the general State tax an additional tax fixed on the
same basis and to be levied simultaneously. We were told at Maryam that the taxes levied by the
State are already so heavy that little or nothing is left for the requirements of the province, and
that the right conceded by Article 2l is a concession which is more apparent than real. It is
impossible for us to say whether these criticisms are well founded or not, but we have confidence
in the Finnish Government, that it is determined to win over the Aaland Islanders by its justice
and moderation, and will treat them in a perfectly equitable manner.

In conclusion, we will venture to address some words of advice to the Aalanders. The
prevention of Finnish remigration depends greatly on them and their strength of will. Legislative
measures alone would be powerless. The first Finnish workmen were called to Aaland by Aaland
Islanders, owners of saw-mills, because Finnish labour was cheaper, or because this manual
labour was uncongenial to the natives. Finns will not go to the Archipelago if they find no work
there and if they are not attracted by the enticement of certain gain. Instead of seeking their
fortress afar, the inhabitants must apply all their energy and all their efforts in making the most
14
Skogsjö & Wilén, loc. cit.
of their own soil and their own industries. In this way they will have much less to fear from the
invasion of foreign workmen.15 The guarantees which we have just enumerated will contribute to
the work of making peace -- of this we are convinced -- a work in which the Finnish Government
took the initiative on the day on which it voted a special law of autonomy for the province of 326
T2 Aaland in the Diet. This act of goodwill was not understood at that time by the inhabitants,
and they disdainfully rejected the olive branch which was held out to them, striving after another
ideal as they were. But if they leave the heights of their dreams for the terraria of reality, the
privileges which have been offered to them will no longer appear so worthless. To ensure their
better appreciation of the advantages of the exceptional situation which would be granted to them
in the Finnish community, it is necessary that the Government and Parliament of Finland on their
side consent to make some steps on the road towards pacification, by adopting the international
guarantees which we consider indispensable.

They will certainly do this if they recognize, as do we, that by reason of this proximity to its
ancient Swedish fatherland, by the closer bonds of union which it has kept with her, of the
patriotism which it has shown in times of war with a traditional enemy, and which has not been
extinguished by separation, Aaland deserves a place apart in the midst of the other Finnish
provinces. These concessions will not appear too dear when Finland gains at this price both the
peace which she needs to strengthen her interior organization and the friendship of the
Scandinavian nations which will be useful for her against the destructive forces of Russia.
Doubtless pacification will not be achieved in a day: the hopes which have been sustained
throughout three years of discussion and uncertainty will not easily subside into silence. But time
is a great healer, and a solution based upon right will appeal both to the actors and spectators in
this long conflicts, provided that the victorious makes a generous and gentle use of its victory
and abstains from reprisals of every kind.

The good will of Finland towards the Aaland Islanders will not fail to bring her closer to
Sweden, and the more speedily friendship between these two nations is established the sooner
will the tension in the relations between the central power and the province of Aaland be
diminished. However, in the event that Finland, contrary to our expectations and to what we have
been given.to understand, refused to grant the Aaland population the guarantees which we have

15
S. Shepard Jones, The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations, 1939.
just detailed, there would be another possible solution, and it is exactly the one which we wish to
eliminate. The interest of the Aalanders, the interests of a durable peace in the Baltic, would then
force us to advise the separation of the islands from Finland, based on the wishes of the
inhabitants which would be freely expressed by means of a plebiscite.16

But we refuse to think that the Government and Parliament of Heisingforg would not be
animated by a broad spirit of conciliation, with a view to effacing all the traces of this long
conflict, from which the international position of the young Republic has certainly suffered. It is
of importance in this respect to recall that even the Aalanders who are opposed to the separatist
movement declare with a unanimity and an insistence which is most striking that efficacious
guarantees with regard to language and autonomy are absolutely indispensable to reassure the
Aaland population and to establish a durable If the Council of the League of Nations were to
share our views and recommend their adoption to the Finnish Government, certain amendments
to the law of autonomy would be sufficient to give a legal force to the new guarantees granted to
Aaland which would thus assume an international character. Further, we believe that the role of
the League of Nations ought not to stop there.

It would not be enough for it to have given its powerful aid to the solution of the conflict. If
difficulties, always to be apprehended, and disagreements in the application of the new
guarantees which would be added to the fundamental law were to arise, it would then be the duty
of the Council of the League of Nations to intervene to put an end to this. The Finnish
Government, too, ought to grant the General Council of Aaland the right of direct recourse to this
Council for its good offices. ln asking admission to the League of Nations, Finland has shown
her full appreciation of its intervention in the international disputes in which she has been
involved, and the importance which she attaches to its great moral force. No doubt she will in the
same way understand the use of its support for the settlement of internal differences to which the
Aaland question may still give rise. Instead of authorizing the Aaland Islanders themselves to
approach the Council of the League of Nations in the possible differences concerning the
application of the guarantees, this right might be reserved to Sweden or to each of the three
Scandinavian States. But we think Finland would prefer a procedure by which the Aalanders
would not have to demand the intervention of a foreign Power. As to the part played by the
16
Harry Maiander (red.), Sveriges historia genom tiderna, femte delen, Stockholm, Saxon & Lindströms förlag,
1953, 241-248.
Council of the League of Nations, we suppose that it would aim in the first instance at settling
the difference submitted to it as an impartial mediator. But if this proved unsuccessful, Finland,
as well as the Aaland Islanders, ought to have the opportunity of recourse to the International
Court of Justice and request it to pronounce judgment.17

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

Much has been written about the Aland case and its role in the history of the self-determination
of peoples. To shed more ink on this topic is not the object of this contribution. An article on
the Aland case in a symposium dedicated to the life and work of the eminent Swiss lawyer,
international judge, and president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Max
Huber, leads one to expect something different. Huber was also an academic who was highly
regarded for his theoretical writings on international law. This article discusses the Aaland

17
See e.g. the sumbission of the Govenrment of Sweden to the Council of the League of Nations on 2 July 1920,
Ålandsfrågan inför Nationernas Förbund, Diplomatiska Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet,
Stockholm 1920, pp. 2-37
Commission's findings against the background of Huber's scholarly writings and, more
specifically, explores the common ground between the report and his work.

Huber's approach to international law has been called ‘sociological’ by himself and by
others. Huber was dissatisfied with what he perceived to be the shortcomings and simplistic
concepts of positivist doctrine. In his early writings, prior to World War I, he pioneered the use
of theories and concepts from the then still young discipline of sociology to tackle problems of
international law. He was concerned about the tendency of the international legal order to shift
away from reality. In his view, substantial deviations from its social basis should be avoided
given the decentralized character of international law. Sociology provided appropriate
intellectual tools to analyse the widely unexplored reality in international relations and to lessen
the incidence of deviations.18

Overview of the Report

The facts of the Aaland question and the Commission's main findings may be briefly recalled.
The Aaland Islands form an archipelago in the Baltic sea, the inhabitants of which are almost
entirely of Swedish origin. In 1809, Sweden had ceded the islands – together with Finland – to
Russia. Until the end of World War I, both remained Russian. After the Bolshevik revolution,
Finland declared its independence from the then Soviet Union, asserting the principle of self-
determination of peoples that had been recognized by the Bolshevik leaders.The inhabitants of
the Aaland Islands – whose territory had until that time been treated as part of Finland – took the
opportunity to claim the same right for themselves and to demand accession to Sweden. Sweden
supported the separatist movement, but Finland insisted on its sovereignty over the archipelago.
Troops were dispatched to the Islands by Finland, and the separatist leaders were arrested. Peace
in the Baltic region seemed threatened. In 1920, the case was submitted to the newly founded
League of Nations. Its competence to deal with the matter was, however, uncertain. The Council
of the League asked a committee of three jurists – the Aaland Commission of Jurists – to give an
advisory opinion on the legal aspects of the dispute.

The main question before the Commission concerned the Council's competence to deal with the
matter. Finland regarded the matter as falling entirely within its domestic jurisdiction. A strictly

18
L. Hannikainen, De folkrrättsliga grunderna för Ålands självstyrelse och svenskspråkighet, Åbo, 2004, p. 11.
positivist approach to the question would probably have supported Finland's view. The
Commission could have sought a rule providing an explicit or implicit basis for the Council's
competence in the Covenant of the League, in another treaty or in customary law. Such a search
would, however, have probably proved futile. Instead, the Commission chose to focus on an
analysis of the reality to which the key terms of the case – ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and
‘sovereignty rights’ – referred. It held, reaffirming the traditional position, that the right to
dispose of national territory is an essential attribute of sovereignty. It stated, however, that this
rule only applies if the sovereignty of a state is definitively constituted. The Commission
introduced the terms ‘transitional situation’ and ‘situation of fact’ to deal with circumstances of
transformation or dissolution of a state in which the right to dispose of territory may be limited.
Consequently, it regarded the Council of the League as competent to deal with the matter and to
make recommendations for its resolution.19

The report also considered the role of the principle of self-determination in situations such as the
one in question, holding that this principle ‘may be called into play’ in transitional situations. It
reasoned that ‘new aspirations of certain sections of a nation’ can produce effects that are
relevant for internal and external peace. Importance was also attached to the manifest will of the
Aaland islanders, as expressed in the separatist movement. The report did not, however,
conclude by recognizing a general right of self-determination. The principle was attributed only a
vague legal status in the concrete situation of the case. The Commission remained very cautious,
reasoning that in situations such as the one in question a compromise is often necessary, since
other factors such as geographical or economic circumstances must also be taken into account.

The Report and Huber's Theory

Three aspects of the report appear to be of particular interest when read against the background
of Max Huber's theory. First, there is the Commission's general approach to the Aaland question.
How much common ground is there between the report and Huber's approach to doctrinal

19
Notes of the Government of Finland of 5 June 1919, 3 June 1920 and 12 June 1920 in Ålandsfrågan inför
Nationernas Förbund, Diplomatiska Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet, Stockholm 1920
problems? Second, there is the report's flexible understanding of the terms ‘domestic
jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereignty rights’. This aspect, which refers to the concept of sovereignty,
raises the question whether there are similarities with Huber's concept of the state. Third, there is
the vague legal character of the right of self-determination. How does the Commission's view
compare with Huber's concept of international law? In the following section, these three
questions will be explored.

A General Approach to the Aaland Question

As explained, the Commission in its approach to the Aaland question tried to give the terms
‘domestic jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereignty rights’ a particular meaning, namely one that took
account of the situation of Finland and the Aaland Islands after Finland's secession from the
Soviet Union. I shall now attempt to clarify Huber's approach to doctrinal problems and its
common characterization as ‘sociological’, a characterization that is very general and says little
about his theory.20

An examination of Huber's theoretical writings reveals that he makes use of the social sciences
and their concepts in two different ways. First, he regards them as useful in analysing ‘big’
questions of the international legal order and its social basis. These questions concern, for
example, the ‘character’ of the society of states, the origin of selfish behaviour of states, the basis
of obligation of international law, and the problem of international integration. Nowadays, many
of these questions are mainly treated by ‘international relations’, international law's sister
discipline. Huber's best-known academic work, Beitrage zur Kenntnis der soziologischen
Grundlagen des Volkerrechts of 1910, deals with several problems of this kind.

In addition, Huber makes use of social science in his writings regarding doctrinal questions. This
latter use is of particular interest in the present context but is less known than the former. In his
doctoral thesis, for example, Huber analyses the problem of succession of states with a, as he
calls it, ‘sociological approach’. What is meant by this? Huber makes a fundamental distinction
between two categories of legal terms. On the one hand, there are the ‘key terms’. They
correspond with the main social facts such as property, family, state, or political community. For
Huber, the social sciences can help to give these terms a meaning that corresponds most closely

20
. Ibid., pp. 234-279. The report of the Commission of Jurists is dated 5 September 1920.
with reality, or may be used to adjust them. Adjustments and differentiations are particularly
important in international law due to the tendency of the international legal order to stray from
reality. Huber regards the application of highly abstract terms from private law to problems of
international law as an important cause of these deviations. The other category of legal terms,
namely legal terms that are not ‘key’, does not attract Huber's interest. In his theory, they have
the status of auxiliary constructions.21

The approach described can be seen in many judgments and arbitral awards in which Huber was
involved. The famous Island of Palmasarbitral award of 1928, which is treated in more detail
elsewhere in this volume, is a good example. In this case, he ‘adjusts’ the key terms ‘state’ and
‘sovereignty’ to reality by distinguishing the situation of the creation of sovereignty rights (by
discovery) from the situation following their creation. In order to avoid substantial deviations of
the legal order from its social basis, Huber regards ‘effective occupation’ as a condition for the
continued existence of sovereignty rights.

A comparison of the Aaland report and Huber's approach reveals common ground too. The
Commission did not indulge in a long positivist search for a rule limiting the domain of
‘domestic jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereignty rights’ of Finland, but analysed instead the social reality
to which these terms refer. It concluded that the differences between the situations of definitively
constituted states and states in transformation or dissolution cannot be ignored by international
law. By recognizing that not only the dichotomy of state/full sovereignty and no state/no
sovereignty exists in reality, but that there are also further possibilities of which international law
must take account, the Commission differentiated the key term ‘state’ and its corresponding
terms ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and ‘sovereignty rights’. It thereby contributed to a diminution of
the deviations of the legal order from its social basis.

B State, Sovereignty, and Domestic Jurisdiction as Flexible Concepts

The second aspect of the report to be analysed against the background of Huber's theory
concerns the concept of the state. At first sight there is common ground between the two. The
Commission, by referring to the problem of the transformation of the state and analysing the
relevance of different factual situations, appears to regard the state as a living unit, not as an

21
Convention on the Non-fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands, 1921
abstract entity endowed with abstract rights. This concept of the state resembles sociological
thinking in general, as sociology regards social change as a key question of its discipline.22

A closer look at Huber's theory and his concept of the state is required beforehand. Huber's
concept of the state at the fundamental level is influenced by two ideas. First, there is Ferdinand
Tonnies' dualism of ‘community and society’, which provides a tool to explain the specific form
of social cohesion in nations. In Huber's view, nations are the ‘basis’ of the states. They are
‘communities’ in Tonnies' sense, and as such they are to be distinguished from all societal forms
of social cohesion. Their core is a set of moral values such as faith and loyalty, and each nation
has its own specific character and personality. For Huber the division of the world into nations,
which in his view provides stability in human life, is a natural fact.

States arise due to the nations' wish to organize themselves as political units. Influenced by the
‘historical school’, and in particular by Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Huber regards states as
manifestations of their ‘spirit of nation’. States are also, and here the second idea comes into
play, ‘social organisms’ that can be compared with biological organisms. This idea is derived
from Otto von Gierke's theoretical writings. Analogies between social and biological organisms,
according to Huber, help explain the birth, growth and death of states as well as the complex
interplay between their organs. With a view to the Aaland matter, it is noteworthy that Huber
distinguishes between original and derived births of states, depending on whether or not a nation
separates from an existing state. He explicitly recognizes that states, as natural organisms, can be
divided and that new centres can be built in the detached part. As regards growth, it is caused by
the states’ ‘natural tendency’ to expand and by the elites’ greed and lust for war. The analogy
between social and biological organisms also explains that states, in order to stay alive, must
adjust as best they can to changing circumstances. Failure to adjust is dangerous, as suppressing
renewal and adjustment can cause tensions and eventually the death of the state. In Huber's view,
only major changes of circumstance require adjustments. This is also an insight that he gains
from analogies with biological organisms, which do not adjust to merely peripheral changes.

Examination of the report reveals that the common ground with Huber's theory goes beyond the
rather banal fact that the concept of the state is ‘dynamic’ in both. On the one hand, both assume

22
Ålandsfrågan inför Nationernas Förbund, Diplomatiska Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet,
Stockholm, Vol. II, Stockholm, 1921, pp. 2-139
that states are ‘based’ on nations that aim to organize themselves in independent political units.
The nation in this concept has a pre-political, quasi-natural character. The report states, for
example, ‘all that has been said … only applies to a nation which is definitely constituted as a
sovereign state’. The reasoning in this passage coincides with Huber's concept. On the other
hand, the idea of necessary ‘adjustments’ to major changes of circumstances plays a crucial role
both in the report and in Huber's theory. The report uses the term ‘readjustment’, and its
reference to the intensity of the claims of the separatist movement on the Aaland Islands can be
regarded as an indication of the influence of Huber's concept on the report. The claim of the
separatist movement could be, as Huber would put it, a major change of circumstances and a
tension that endangers the organism. To sum up: the analogy between social and biological
organisms in Huber's theory seems to have exercised a substantial influence on the thinking of
the Aaland Commission.23

In my view, it is plausible that this analogy provided a helpful analytical tool to approach the
Aaland question in a pragmatic way. Huber's use of biological analogies prompts, however,
further questions and some skepticism. In his doctoral thesis of 1898, for example, Huber writes
that sociology is a variant of the natural sciences. He reasons that both are based on precise
observation of nature. For Huber, the analogy is an appropriate concept for explaining all kinds
of social facts and developments. It is, he writes, a ‘complete one’. The slope in using biological
analogies is slippery – and Huber slips. He assumes, for example, that every nation has naturally
given characteristics that also determine the structure of the states. He also recognized a naturally
given hierarchy between certain peoples and races, when he recommended in 1904 to not abuse
‘highly developed institutions’ for ‘inferior races’. Biological aspects of his thinking survived
World War I and his shift from sociological to theological thinking. In 1934, Huber still regarded
the idea of a hierarchy between the races and nations as part of the natural order of things, even if
he admitted that it is difficult to define the word ‘race’ precisely. As late as 1939, Huber wrote
that colonization is a multiplication of civilization. Huber showed in his life and work a
remarkable nose for fundamental problems in international law and society, but he was for the

23
Pertti Joenniemi, The Åland Islands Issue, in C. Archer & P. Joenniemi, The Nordic Peace, Aldershot, Ashgate,
2003, 88-104. For an overview of demilitarized and neutralized territories in Europe see Christer Ahlström,
Demilitarised and Neutralised Territories in Europe, Mariehamn, The Åland Islands Peace Institute, 2004; Sia S.
Åkermark What makes the Åland example still relevant (forthcoming in M.Chillard (ed.), La question des Iles Åland,
Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009).
most part unable to see the disastrous potential of such ideas. Whatever the reasons for his
inability, others were able to do so.24

Legal Character of the Principle of Self-Determination

The third aspect of the Aaland report of interest against the background of Huber's theory
concerns the legal character of the principle of self-determination. The relevant passages in the
report are remarkably obscure. The Commission enigmatically holds that in situations of
‘readjustments’ the principle of self-determination ‘may be called into play’. It further states that
the community of states has an interest in transitional situations and that ‘effects of certain
sections of a nation’, when they come to the surface, may produce effects that must be taken into
account ‘in the interests of internal and external peace of nations’. How do the Commission's
considerations fit with Huber's concept of international law? Did Huber's concept provide a basis
upon which attributing the principle of self-determination could be attributed a kind of legal
status?

Huber's concept of international law may be said to be motivated mainly by his uneasiness about
the fact that only a part of what is ‘international law’ is observed in practice. Huber questions the
legal character of many of these rules and seeks to provide a precise criterion that enables legally
binding rules to be distinguished from non-binding rules. He rejects the positivist doctrine
according to which consensus is the basis of obligation in international law as blurring the
differences between several categories of rules. His own concept is more power-oriented. For
Huber, who was also influenced by Rudolf von Jhering's writings emphasizing the role of
interests in law, the ‘permanent collective interests of the states’ are the basis of obligation. His
concept is evolutionary. Collective interests and with them international law developed gradually
from the late Middle Ages, caused mainly by a steady increase in the problems concerning more
than one state. It became, in other words, more and more difficult for states to pursue their own
interests in isolation. In Huber's view, 1648 was the year in which it was officially recognized
that collective interests had emerged. The increase in economic relations undoubtedly played an
important role in the development of collective interests, but more important was the inability of
any of the Great Powers to establish permanent predominance. In the balance of power system,

24
Barros, James. The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1968. Print.
the Great Powers act as representatives of the society of states and of the collective interests.
Huber further tries to determine exactly which rules are legally binding and which are not. To
this end, he introduces a fundamental distinction between ‘territorial’ and ‘extra-territorial’ rules.
The former are those rules that deal with the states’ territorial basis. They all have legally
binding character. Extra-territorial rules are only binding if they are necessary for the
‘coexistence of states’. Huber does not, however, expound upon this concept, and it remains
unclear which of the extra-terratorial rules are necessary for the coexistence of states.25

First, there is the report's reference to the ‘interests’ of the community of states when the role of
the principle of self-determination in transitional situations is discussed. This reference recalls
Huber's concept of the discretionary power of states as being limited by the ‘collective interests’
of the society of states. Second, there is the Commission's reasoning that the Aaland islanders’
claim may have effects on ‘internal and external peace’ that international law must take account
of. Its reasoning is similar to Huber's distinction between the territorial rules and the extra-
territorial rules necessary for the coexistence of the states on the one hand and the rest of the
extra-territorial rules on the other. The binding character of rules in this concept seems directly
linked to a concern with maintaining peace. In both the report and in Huber's theory, the legal
quality of a rule seems to depend on its relevance for international stability. The report seems in
this regard to be influenced by Huber's ideas as well.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Aland Islands consist of approximately 300 islands between Finland and Sweden. These
islands are geographically part of Finland, as a small chain of islands called the archipelago
connect the Aland Islands to Finland, while a channel of water separates the islands from
Sweden. However, most inhabitants speak Swedish.

Sweden occupied the islands from 1157-1809.The Aland Islands are geographically important to
Sweden. Napoleon claimed the islands to be the key to Stockholm, Sweden’s capital, and so the
key to defeating all of Sweden. In 1809, Russia created the Grand Duchy of Finland after a
victorious war against Finland and Sweden. The resulting treaty of Fredrikshamn signed on
25
jackson, J. Hampden. Finland. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. Print.
September 17, 1809 allowed Russia to take possession of Finland and the Aland Islands from
Sweden.

Russia begins to fortify the Aland Islands in 1834. The Franco-British fleet forced the
demilitarization of the islands during the Crimean War in 1855. The Paris Peace Conference’s
treaty of Paris in 1856 finalized the demilitarization of the Aland Islands. The Russian October
Revolution begins in 1917, and Finland declared independence from Russia on December 6,
1917.

The Aland Islands hold an unofficial plebiscite in late December 1917 and petition to become
annexed by Sweden. Russian, Red and White Finnish, Swedish, and German troops all occupied
the Aland Islands during the Finnish Civil War.26

The League of Nations waits for the decision of the Supreme Council used by the two countries
and the invitation of Swedish Count Albert to begin mediation of the conflict. The League of
Nations uses caution when opposing the Finnish government to decide the conflict.

Finland presents the Aland Islands with the Aland Pact of 1921, where the Finnish Diet offered
partial autonomy and demilitarization to the islands. The Aland Islands refuse this offer and
continue to push for a union with Sweden.

Finn-Swedish relations worsen after further conflicts between the two countries over the Aland
Islands. The League forms a Commission of Jurists chosen by the League Council to determine
if League interference was appropriate.

Professor Ferdinand Larnaude resides as president, and Max Huber and Antonius Struckyen
complete the commission. The Jurists conclude the matter is out of Finland’s jurisdiction and
falls under international law instead, and use the 1856 convention to keep the Aland Islands
demilitarized.

The League forms a Commission of Inquiry again chosen by the League Council to determine
the fate of the islands. Baron Eugéne Beyens resides as president, and Abram I. Elkus and Felix
Calonder complete the commission. The Inquiry decides in 1921 Finland had sovereignty

26
Mazour, Anatole G. Finland Between East and West. 1956. Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1975. Print.
because of the Finnish declaration of independence from Russia in 1917, and that this
sovereignty applies to the Aland Islands.

Other factors influencing the decision included: The islands legally were a part of Finland since
1809. The islands are geographically part of Finland. Separation of the islands from Finland
would cause political chaos. Possession of the islands by Finland poses no military threat to
Sweden. The 1856 convention of demilitarization still holds. The Aland Islands are to remain
neutral. The Inquiry recommends Finland implement four guarantees to the Aland Islands, and if
the guarantees are not provided, the League of Nations would require Finland to hold a plebiscite
for the Alanders. The guarantees are as follows27

1. On the islands, the schools are taught in Swedish Alanders receive the right of preemption
when purchasing land from outsiders.
2. Alanders receive franchise if they stay for five years. Alanders provide the government with
a list of three candidates from which to choose the next governor.
3. Sweden accepts the Commission’s decisions. Russia attempts to fortify the islands once
again with the start of WWII through a Finn Swedish agreement in 1939.
4. The League of Nations refuses this attempt and expulses Russia from the League for
aggression to Finland.

As the introductory geographical information about the islands shows, tensions between Finland
and Sweden over possession of the Aland Islands had been building for some time. The
islanders themselves chose to align themselves with Sweden despite the geographical proximity
of Finland.

Both countries had controlled the islands for large time periods, wanted that control again, and
yet could not simultaneously control the islands. Finland eventually gained control of the islands
after the Russian treaty. Sweden was left without the islands after 650 years of possession. The
turning point took place when Russia began its October Revolution. The turmoil surrounding
Russia loosened Russia’s control on the Grand Duchy of Finland and allowed Finland to declare
independence and officially take the Aland Islands. Once Finland broke away from Russia with

27
Singleton, Fred. A Short History of Finland. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1989. Print
the Aland Islands, continuous fortifications and demilitarization’s of the islands created more
tension between Sweden and Finland.

Both felt threatened by the close presence of military forces, and this became a large enough
issue for Britain and France to interfere and prevent Russian fortification. Sweden especially felt
threatened by the Russian presence on the islands so near to Stockholm and began to strengthen
defenses. The increase of tensions continued even after the Paris Peace Conference solidified the
neutrality and demilitarization of the islands in 1856. Tension between Finland and Sweden
escalated as Sweden attempted to annex the islands in 1915, the Alanders held a petition to
become part of Sweden in 1917, and multiple countries established forces on the islands during
the Finnish Civil War. Finland showed slight aggression to any outside mediation or interference
of the Aland Crisis during this time period, by claiming the crisis to be of a domestic nature and
closed to the League of Nations.28

The tangling of tempers and involvement of outside forces brought the crisis to the brink of
war. Despite attempts by Finland to avoid it, the League of Nations was needed to provide
mediation of the conflict and prevent a war. The League of Nations appointed separate
commissions to handle the situation and reach a decision. This was vital to keeping the League
directly out of the conflict and to avoid possible blame. Swedish accusations that the League of
Nations itself favored Finland before the League even began assessing the situation prompted
the formation of the commissions. Appointing the commissions would also allow more time for
tempers to cool. The second Commission of Inquiry took another measure for the reputation and
security of the League by considering all possible aspects and interpretations of the crisis before
presenting their decision on the fate of the islands. Not only did the commission examine the
geographical aspects, but it also took into account the historical, legal, political, and military
aspects. When the Inquiry declared its decision to give possession of the Aland Islands to
Finland, Sweden and the islands were presented with such a strong argument that the only
possible choice was to accept the decision of the Inquiry. The Inquiry also provided Finland
with the recommendation to give Alanders certain privileges to fully appease the Alanders and
ensure their contentment under Finnish rule. Russian refortification of the Aland Islands at the
start of World War II nearly pushed the Aland Islands Crisis back to its near-war, tense, and
28
Stomberg, Andrew A. A History of Sweden. 1931. New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969. Print. Wuorinen, John H. A
History of Finland. New York and London: Colombia University Press, 1965. Print
irresolvable state. It is highly important the League decided to support the decision of the
Inquiry. The League of Nations could only claim true credit for solving the crisis if the solution
stood the test of time. Because the League stopped Russia’s attempt, the consistency and
commitment of the League to the islands was proven. No other attempts to disobey the decision
of the League would be made after such support was shown as many as twenty years later.

CONCLUSION

The League of Nations remained cautious throughout the Aland Islands Crisis. This tactic solved
the crisis and also gave the League a rare success. Sweden and Finland remained unaggressive
toward one another afterward, and the League also managed to permanently prevent future
outside interference from countries like Russia. The League accomplished this through the use
of commissions separate from the actual League to create a buffer of security. Before mediating
the crisis, the League waited for Sweden’s invitation and also used a first commission to support
the League’s reasons for entry into the conflict. A second commission of new members decided
the fate of the islands and provided guarantees of rights for the Alanders to ensure contentment
of the islanders and Sweden. Finally, the League did not tolerate Soviet meddling and supported
its earlier decision. These techniques guaranteed the League of Nations would successfully
resolve the conflict and create a lasting peace between Sweden and Finland.