Case Analysis:

1. Name of the case: Bargaining Assn. Vs. British Columbia

Citation: 2007 SCC 27

Facts of the case: At the time, there was already a well-established collective bargaining relationship
between the provincial government of British Columbia in both public and private sector (healthcare
sector specifically). When the new government came into power, there were substantial changes to
labour relations which largely pertained to cost cutting. The impact of the legislation was that it
stripped employees in health services of rights that had been bargained for in collective agreements.
The new government passed the legislation very quickly.

Issues rose: Can the provincial government strip employees of rights that they collectively bargained
for?

Ratio Decidendi: The right to bargain collectively with an employer enhances the human dignity,
liberty and autonomy of workers by giving them the opportunity to influence the establishment of
workplace rules and thereby gain some control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work.
Collective bargaining is not simply an instrument for pursuing external ends…rather [it] is intrinsically
valuable as an experience in self-government. Collective bargaining permits workers to achieve a
form of workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in the workplace. Workers gain a voice
to influence the establishment of rules that control a major aspect of their lives.

Conclusion: Held a victory for the unions and indicated that s.2(d) does protect collective bargaining.
SCC says that it’s reasonable to infer that s.2(d) provides at least the same level of protection as that
provided in international labour law.

Further, concepts of human dignity, liberty and equality and the enhancement of democracy
underlie the Charter which was seemingly a factor in their decision in that they took issue with the
fact that there was no notice given to the respective union the ineffective nature of many of the
contractual provisions that they are bargained for. And further it is seemingly unfair that the
government can bargain w/ the union and then take those rights away from them by way of
legislation.

Collective Bargaining as the subject matter of industrial adjudication

2. Name of the case: Karol Leather Karamchari Sangathan v. Liberty Footwear Company

Citation: AIR 1990 SC 247

Facts of the case: The respondent-1 is a registered partnership firm carrying on its trading activities
in leather foot wears at Karnal and some other places under the name and style of 'Liberty Footwear
Company'. It had a serious dispute with the workers. The workers' union complained that the
management has illegally terminated more than 200 workers. The respondent denied that claim and
asserted that the persons whose services were alleged to have been terminated were not its
employees at the material time. This dispute however, remained unsettled and the workers went on
strike which took a violent turn. The management had to lay off certain workers and that added fuel
to the fire. The agitation of the workers before the factory premises created law and order problem
attracting the police to intervene. The Labour Commissioner and other top officials of the District
arrived and they initiated conciliation proceedings.

The then Labour Minister and the Public Health Minister of the State Government were also alerted.
They also came and extended their good offices to bring about a settlement. They succeeded in their
efforts. The parties entered into an agreement containing the terms of settlement of their dispute.
On behalf of the management, the agreement assigned by respondents 1, 7 and 8. On behalf of the
workers, it was signed by the President and Secretary of the workers' union. It was mutually agreed
that a committee consisting of five persons, two from the management and two from the union with
the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal as the President should be constituted. They would be the
arbitrators to determine the said dispute. The committee of arbitrators was accordingly constituted.
The Committee gave its award which led to litigation. The management did not reinstate the
workers. It challenged the validity of the award by way of writ petition in the High Court.

Issue Rose: whether non-publication of the arbitration agreement as required under sub sec. (3) of
sec. 10-A, renders the arbitral award invalid and unenforceable?

REASONING: The parties entered into the above agreement and referred the dispute for arbitration
under sec.10-A of the Act. Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the employer
and the workmen agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, they may, at any time before the dispute
has been referred under sec. 10 to a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal, by a written
agreement, refer the dispute to arbitration and the reference shall be to such person or persons
(including the presiding officer of a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal) as an arbitrator or
arbitrators as may be specified in the arbitration agreement. "Collective bargaining is a technique by
which dispute as to conditions of employment is resolved amicably by agreement rather than
coercion." According to the Court, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 seeks to achieve social justice on
the basis of collective bargaining.

Conclusion: The Court went on to talk about the advantages of Arbitration. It also said that Section
10 and 10-A are alternate remedies. Once the parties have chosen 10-A, the Government cannot
refer the dispute under Section 10.

Directions:

1. The State Government shall publish the agreement in the gazette within 4 weeks

2. Reference under 10(1) is quashed

3. Management shall withdraw Letters Patent Appeal and writ pending in the HC

The Tribunal shall dispose of the matter expeditously - no later than 6 months from the date of first
appearance.

Appeal therefore disposed of.

Case analysis

3. Name of the case: Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel

Citation: 1976 SCR (2) 280

Facts of the case: In the instant case the appellant charged the respondent workmen with assaulting
three new workers of the company who were employed by it after a lay-off of the permanent
workers. In the domestic inquiry the respondents pleaded victimisation on the part of the employer
for their trade union activities. They were, however, dismissed from service. Since an industrial
dispute was pending before the Tribunal the appellant made applications under ss. 33(2) and (3) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Three of the respondents were protected workmen. Even after
finding that the domestic inquiry was in order the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the findings
of the inquiry officer were perverse and not bona fide. On the refusal of the Tribunal to grant
approval and permission for the dismissal of the workmen the appellant moved the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution, which petition was summarily dismissed by the High Court.
Allowing the appeal to this Court

Issues rose: Whether and under what facts and circumstances a Tribunal will accept the plea of
victimisation against the employer will depend upon its judicial discretion.

Reasoning: “Collective bargaining, being the order of the day in the democratic, social welfare State,
legitimate trade union activities, which must shun all kinds of physical threats, coercion or violence,
must march with a spirit of tolerance, understanding and grace in dealings on the part of the
employer. Such activities can flow in healthy channel only on mutual cooperation between the
employer and the employees and cannot be considered as irksome by the management in the best
interests of its business. Dialogue with representatives of a union help striking a delicate balance in
adjustments and settlement of various contentious claims and issues.”

Judgment: In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court as well as the orders of
the Tribunal is set aside. The Tribunal committed an error of jurisdiction in not allowing the
applications. The Tribunal is, therefore, directed to record appropriate orders allowing the
applications under section 33. The appellant will however, pay the costs of the Respondent as
already ordered.