REVIEWARTICLE

RUSSIAN POLICY IN 1911-12

PHILIP E. MOSELY

HE second series of the great Soviet publicationon Russian foreign

policy, 1878-1917,has now been inauguratedwith the appearanceof
_ - ATolumes XVIII and XIX.1 Of the third series,which made its debut
in 1931, ten volumes, in thirteen parts, have been published,covering the
periodfromJanuary14, 1914, to April 13, 1916;furthervolumesare to carry
this great task of editing to November7, 1917. A part of the third serieshas
also appearedin German. The first seriesis to embracethe period1878-1900.
Meanwhile,the secondseries,which is to deal with the years 1900-1914, in-
stead of 1904-14,as originallyannounced,has begunto appear. With twenty-
fourvolumesplannedforthe secondseriesalone,it is a safepredictionthat the
Soviet publicationwill eventually surpasseven Die 9rosse Polittk in size and
detail.
VolumesXVIII and XIX of the new seriescover the twelve monthsfrom
May 14, 1911,to May 13, 1912. They contain1,763documents;of them, 414,
or nearly 24 per cent, have been publishedpreviously- 105 each in Siebert's
Ententediplomacyand the worldand in the OrangeBook on Persia, 74 in
KrawnyarkAiv,63 in Materialypo istorii franko-russkikhotrzoshenit, 42 in
Stieve'sDerdiplomatwshe Izwolskis,and a scatteringelsewhere.
Schriftwechsel
Despite this limitation and despite the fact that German,English, French,
Austrian,and Serbiandocumentsare already available for this period, the
1 Me1RRyHapORHOle OTHOMeHMSB 3n0xy ZMNepHaJZ3Ma. AORyMeHTH H3 apXZBOB
rxapcicoroz speMeHHoro IIpasuTeJI^cTs,1878-1917 [Internationalrelationsin the epoch
of imperialism.Documentsfrom the archivesof the imperialand provisionalgovern-
ments,1878-19lT1.2d series(1900-1913).Vol. XVIII, Part 1, AIay14, 1911- September
13, 19J1. Vol. XVIII, Part i, September14, 1911 Nouember1S, 1911. Vol. XIX,
Part 1, November14, 1911-January 13, 912. Vol. XIX, Part 2, January14, 1912-
May 13, 1912. Editedby the COMMISSION FORTHEPUBLICATION OFDOCUMENTS OF
T1IEEPOCH OFIMPERLKLISM, A. P. BOLSHEMENNIKOV, A. S. YERUSALIMSKY, A. A.
MOGILEVICH, and F. F. ROTSHTEIN. Vol. XVIII, edited by A. S. YERUSALIMSEY,
with the help of A. I. AVTOERATOVA and O. I. STANISVSEAYA. Vol. XIX, edited by
L. A. TELESHEVA, with the help of E. S. ALTSEIJLER and E. M. GLYAZER. MOSCOW:
Gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvopoliticheskoyliteratury,1938. Pp. xvii+470; xvi;+382;
xiv+sSi; xviii+551. Twelve rublesfor each half-volume.
Unless specificallynoted, referencesare to volumeand numberof docurnent.The
superiorfigurefollowingthe volume numberrefersto the part number.Dates are in
the westerncalendar.
69

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 70 PUTT,TPE. MOSELY
new Russianmaterialsare extremelyimportantfor an understandingof pre-
1914 diplomacy.
Their value has been enhancedby drawingon a variety of sourcesin addi-
tion to diplomaticcorrespondence,such as reportsof military and naval at-
taches and of consuls,reportsto the tsar, correspondenceamongthe ministers
of foreign affairs, war, marine, and finance, the presidentof the councilof
ministers,and the viceroyof the Caucasus,and even a numberof intercepted
dispatchesof foreignenvoys. On the otherhand, in comparisonwith the Brit-
ish series, there is a paucity of runningcomment by leading officialsand of
memorandapreparedwithin the ministry of foreign affairs. This lack is in
part made good by the minutes of infrequentmeetingsof the councilof min-
isters and of the special conferenceswhich dealt with Far Eastern arldPer
sianaSairs. As comparedwith the pungentand occasionallypenetratinganno-
tations of WilliamII, Nicholas'commentsare stereotyped. In a few casesthey
go beyond the usual "true," "right," "agreed." In October,1911, Neratov,
the acting ministerof foreignaffairs,emphasizedthe need for solidaritywith
Japan in meetingthe contingenciesraisedby the Chineserevolution; Nicho-
las noted:
I approvethe considerationswhichyou have put forth. I have always,sincethe end
of our war, been of the opinion that Russia should go hand-in-handwith Japan in
the Far East [XVIII2,679].
When Neratov, in November, 1911, mentionedthat the council of ministers
wishedto shapeRussianpolicy towardPersiaso that it "wouldbe comprehen-
sible to public opinionat home and abroad,"Nicholas protested:
The referenceto public opinionat home and abroadis unnecessarywhen Russia's
interests and dignity are affected. Measurestaken to maintain and strengthenorder
are comprehensibleto every right-thinkingman [XIX1,p. 98, n. 1].
On a dispatch dealing with the appointmentof Swedish instructorsfor the
Persianarmythe tsar noted: "Afterall, we are mastersin the northof Persia"
(XVIII2, 537).
The editorsof the Russianserieshave chosento followa strictlychronologi-
cal method of presentation,without the addition of analytical tables, on the
model of the French series. The Russian system of detailed indexesis inade-
quate; the rubricsare not numerousenoughto includeall topics; nor does the
list of numbersunder a given rubricalways includeall items relatingto it.2
One further difficultyin using the documents is that they have been ar-
rangedaccordingto the day of dispatch,without indicationof the date of re-
ception. Althoughone can usually determine,by internalreferences,to what
precedingitems a documentrefers,this is a cumbersomeand not always reli-
able procedure.Since documentsfor a given date are arrangedaccordingto a
2 The by-line for the Greco-Bulgarian
rapprochement (XIX2, p. 547) shouldalso in-
clude Nos. 716, 772, and 777; that for the Serbo-Bulgarianalliance (XIX2, p. 548)
should includeNos. 825, 865, and 877 to give only two examples.

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 RUSSIAN POLICY IN 1911-12 71

fixed scheme, a telegramfrom St. Petersburgin reply to an inquirymay ac-

tually precedethe inquiryitself; for example,in VolumeXIXl, No. 126 is a
reply to No. 133, No. 127 to No. 134, and No. 230 to No. 236.
There is a numberof disappointingomissions. In some cases documents
alludedto in footnotesmight better have been publishedin full, amongthem
the Russo-Turkishagreement of March, 1900, on the Anatolian railroads
(XVIIIl, p. 1, n. 2), and a memorandumof the ministryof financeon the same
question,of April,1911(XVIIIl, p. 1, n. 3). It is hardto understandthe omis-
sion of two memorandaby A. Giers on the Straits question, of May 11 (the
content of this memorandumis describedquite differentlyin XVIIIl, p. 227,
n. 2, and in XVIIIl, 310) and of October3, 1911 (XVIII2,p. 50, n. 1), and of
an undated draft of the Russo-Germanagreementon the Persian railroads,
evidently containinga complete list of Germancounterproposals.3It would
have been interestingto see Charykov'sreport on Pan-Islamicpropaganda
among the Tartars of Russia (XVIIIl, p. 33, n. 3). Several reports on the
Ukrainianmovementin Galiciaservemerelyto whet the appetite (XIX2,437,
695, 812).
Asidefromthe Agadircrisis,Russianpolicy in 1911-12was almostentirely
concernedwith the Near, Middle, and Far East. There it was confrontedby
nationalistmovementswhich it understoodbut indifferentlywell, but which
it tried to exploit, to add to Russia's territory, strategic advantages, and
wealth. In dealingwith a Turkey in processof rene>Tal, it hesitated between
a policy of outright hostility and partition and one of veiledprotectorate,
modeledon Unkiar-Skelessi.Amongthe Slav states of the Balkans,it favored
the striving for national unificationand expansion,without having any clear
idea of what Russia stood to gain or lose thereby. In Persia and China it
watched the painful birth of modernnationalismwith hostility, skepticism,
and uneasiness,ever readyto seize some immediateadvantagefor itself. Pro-
tected in Europeby its alliancewith Franceand its entente with England,the
tsarist governmentsought acquisitionsof influence,territory,and concessions
the length of its southernand easternfrontiers. Its naval attache in Turkey
might write that
if, in the next few years, Russia fights China, Turkey, or Germany,tllis will by no
meanssignifythat Russianeededthat war,but will merelyserve to prove the govern-
ment's incapacity and frivolity. That will be cruel and unjust toward the Russian
muzhik [XVIII1, 99].

13utthe makersof Russia'sforeignpolicy held no such hereticalconceptionof

her "vital interests,"amongwhich the controlof the Straits had long ranked
near the top of the list. One of the more extraordinaryepisodesof this Rus-
sian diplomacywas the attempt, betweenOctoberand December,1911,to se-
cure the openingof the Bosphorusand Dardanellesto Russianwarships.
These negotiationsconductedby Charykov,the ambassadorat Constanti-
3 XVIII1,p. 37, n. 7; it shouldhavebeenpublishedforcomparisonwith XVIII1,159.

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 PHILIP E. MOSELY
nople,now appearas morelogical,moredeliberate,and moreofficialthan has
been assumed.4The immediatemotive for the new effort to open the Straits
lay in Turkey'schallengeto Russiannaval supremacyin the Black Sea and in
her plans for a networkof railroadsin eastern Anatolia. After receivingde-
livery of the new dreadnoughts,ordered in June, 1911, the Turkish navy
wouldhave the upperhand in the Black Sea. Only by openingthe Straits for
the passage of dreadnoughtsproducedin Baltic or foreign shipyards could
Russia recover her naval preponderance,accordingto the memorandumof
A. Giersof May 11, 1911 (XVIII1,310, 210, and p. 227, n. 2.)
To this view tlle ministry of marineexpressedstrong opposition; in any
case, Turkeywouldnot let Russiabringdreadnoughtsinto the Black Sea, and,
if the Straits were opened to Russia, other states would simultaneouslyde-
mand,and secure,free accessto the Black Sea; the best long-runsolutionwas
for Russia to seize and fortify the upperBosphorus(XVIII1, 231). To these
argumentsGiers made a sharp rejoinder(XVIII1, 233), and on July 27 he
cited a furtherargumentfor openingthe Straits: if Turkey collapsedbefore
Russia securedfree passage throughthem, they would then be thrown open
to all the powers,to Russia's detriment,and Russia would be unpreparedto
claim her full share in the ensuing partition of Turkey (XVIII1, 253). On
August 11 the ministryof war expressedits agreementwith Giers'sview; the
closing of the Straits was no guaranteeagainst invasion, it merelyprevented
Russia from reinforcingher Black Sea fleet (XVIII1, 310). Meanwhile, the
idea of a broadapproachto the Straits problemhad taken on more concrete
form, in a letter of August 7 from Neratov, the acting foreignminister,to
Kokovtsov, the ministerof finance,in which he proposedthat Turkeyshould
be persuadedto open the Straits to Russian warshipsin return for Russian
consent to the building of the eastern Anatolian railroads (XVIII1, 301).
Kokovtsov, however, saw no organicconnectionbetween the two questions
and opposedraisingthe Straitsquestionthen (XVIII1,pp. 306-7, n. 2). None-
theless, apparentlywithout furtherconsultationwith his colleagues,Neratov
raisedthe issue in this very form less than two months later.
B7henCharykovreturnedto his post at Constantinopleon September24,
he assumedthat he was to continueRussia'sBalkan understandingwith Aus-
tria-Hungaryand Italy, whichhad avertedthe dangerof warbetweenTurkey
and Montenegro during the recent insurrectionin northern Albania. On
September29, however,he droppedthese talks with his Austrianand Italian
colleagueson directordersfromNeratov,who telegraphedthat specialinstruc-
tions were being sent to him (XVIII2, 483). In letters of the thirtieth,
Charykovurgedthat Russia take advantage of the Tripolitanwar to secure
from France and Italy recognitionof Russia's special interest in the Straits,
4 W. L. Langer,"Russia,the Straits questionand the originsof the BalkanLeague,

1908-1912,"Poltttcalsczencequarterly,XLIII (1928),321-6,S,is excellentforthe English

and Frenchattitudes and for the final stages of the negotiation.

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 RUSSIANPOLICYIN 1911-12 73

and then proceed to settle the Straits question with Turkey (XVIII2, 497,
498).5
On October2 Neratov sent Charykovdetailed instructionsfor his negotia-
tion, togetherwith fourdraftagreementsdealingwith the Anatolianrailroads,
the Straits,Russia'sconsentto an increasein the Turkishcustomsduties, and
the transferto Russia of the contract for the dreadnoughtsorderedby the
Porte (XVIII2, 509). Neratov regardedthe outbreakof the Tripolitanwar
as an exceptionallyfavorablemoment,and on October6 he pressedCharykov
to lose no time in opening the negotiation (XVIII2, 538). On October7 he
telegraphedthe emperor'sapproval of the projected negotiation (XVIII2,
550) and assuredCharykovthat his suggestionof securingthe assentof France
and Italy to the proposedchangewas alreadybeingcarriedout (XVIII2,548).
On the same day Charykovagain urgedNeratov to securethe assent of the
powers before openingnegotiationswith the Porte (XVIII2, 556, 557).6 On
the followingday Charykovraisedother pertinentquestions. In addition to
the consent of France and Italy, which he now assumed to be assured,he
urgedNeratov to secureEnglish backingfor his negotiation. He also wanted
to know exactly what area was included in the Russian guaranteeof "Con-
stantinople and neighboringterritory," and whether this involved Russian
protection of Turkish territory against Italian attack during the war then
goingon. At the sametime, Charykovproposedthat, in additionto othercon-
cessions,Russia might offer to maintain good relationsbetween Turkey and
her Balkan neighbors(XVIII2, 570). This suggestion is the basis of the ac-
cepted suppositionthat Charykovwas urgingthe formationof a I3alkanfed-
eration inclusiveof Turkey. Actually he had been emphasizingthe incipient
rapprochement betweenBulgariaand Serbiaand betweenBulgariaand Greece;
on September30 Charykovhad even proposedthat Russia workfor a Balkan
confederation,exclusiveof Turkey, to preservethe statusquoand to prepare
the way for the peacefulpartitionof the Turkishheritage(XVIII2,470, 496).
AlthoughNeratov now warned Charykovto use caution, particularlyre-
gardingthe suggestedoffer to maintain good relationsbetween Turkey and
the Balkan states (XVIII2,59o), Charykovhad already includedthis hinted
otferin his openingstep of October14, since the Ottomanministersof foreign
affairsand war seemed especially interested in this possibility (XVIII2, 601,
602, 630). Despite his criticismsof Charykov'sopeningmove (XVIII2, 690)
Neratov took his suggestionseriouslyenoughto proposeto the Russianmin-
isters at SofiaandBelgradethat the formulaforthe projectedSerbo-Bulgarian
5 This confirmsCharykov'sassertionthat his plan to securethe free passageof the

Straits "coincidedin Septelrlber,1911, with one elaboratedby our foreign offlceitself

...." (N. V. Charykov,Gltmpsesof htghpoltttes: throughwar and peace, 855-8929
[New York, 1931],p. 276).
6 This fundamentalmisunderstanding betweenCharykovand Neratovoverthe order
of procedureis confirmedby Charykov(p. 277).

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 74 PHILIP E. MOSELY
alliance should be framed so that Turkey could adhere to it (XVIII2, 752).
This suggestion, rejected subtlely by Neklyudov, the Russian minister in
Sofia, and scornfullyby Hartwig, the minister in Belgrade,faded out of the
picturevery quickly; indeed,Charykovhimselfdid not referto it again.
Meanwhile,in accordancewith Charykov'sadvice, Neratov told Izvolsky,
the ambassadorin Paris, and Benckendorff,the ambassadorin London,of the
proposedStraitsagreement. Benckendortfwas promptto point out that Eng-
land would not favor a Russo-Turkishtreaty duringthe war; it would ruin
the campaignto win Italy to the side of the TripleEntente, and, in any case,
Russia could not give a guaranteeto the Porte without abandoningher pro-
claimedneutrality (XVIII2,723, 724). Undeterredby this warning,Neratov,
on receivinga rumorthat the Italians were planninga direct attack on Con-
stantinople, telegraphed Charykov to take advantage of the panic which
would then follow, to completehis negotiation (XVIII2,767, 776).
In mid-Novemberthe Turkishpremiersuggestedthat officialnegotiations
on Charykov'sproposalsmight be opened after the Turkish delegationhad
returnedfrom Livadia (XIX1, 6). Accordingly,on November 27, without
specificinstructionsfromNeratov, Charykovofficiallysubmittedto the Porte
a draft of the proposedagreement(XIX1, 124). AlthoughNeratov later ex-
ploited this step to disavow Charykov, at the time he merely criticizedhis
procedureand suggestedchanges in the draft (XIX1, 164). On December8
Charykovexpectedto go aheadwith the negotiationand proposedthat Russia
and Turkey in their new pact follow the precedent which had been set by
Franceand Germanyin agreeingon changesin the Algecirastreaty and then
askingthe other signatoriesfor their assent (XIX1, 182); this suggestionwas
approvedby NicholasII on December16. On December9, however,Sazonov,
the foreignminister,then in Paris on his way back to St. Petersburgto take
up his duties again, gave the quietus to the entireproject. In the face of Eng-
lish and Germanoppositionhe instructedNeratov to drop the badly bungled
undertaking,and denied through the press that Russia was conductingany
negotiationabout the Straits (XIX1, 186, 207).
The jettisoning of the Charykovnegotiationnow restoreda degree of co-
herenceto Russia's Balkan policy; freed of its Turkophilincubus, it strove
with even greaterenergyto create a united front of the Balkan Slavs against
both Austria and Turkey. The new documentsthrow some light on an ob-
scure episode in the Serbo-Bulgarianrapprochementthe Milovanovich-
Toshev conversationsof April and May, 1911. At this time Milovanovich,
the Serbianforeignminister,apparentlyurgedBulgariato join in a waragainst
TurkeywithoutforewarningRussia;Russiawouldnot begina warfor the sake
of the Balkan Slavs, but, if they took the initiative against Turkey, Russia
would have to support them (XVIII1, 6). Milovanovich was much embar-
rassedwhen Geshov, the Bulgarianpremier,reportedall these details to the
Russian charge d'affaires;but Hartwig defended the Serbs vigorously and

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 RUSSIAN POLICY IN 1911-12
75
claimedthat Geshovwouldnever make an agreementwith Serbiaexcept un-
der Russianpressure(XVIIIl, 31). Hartwigwas eager to hasten to Sofia, to
apply this pressurein person,but Neratov refusedpermission,since his visit
would lift the veil of secrecy (XVIII1, 65). At this time the attempt to set
Serband Bulgarspheresin Macedoniawas a failurebecauseof the fundamen-
tal conflict over Uskub (Skoplje) (XIXl, p. 269, n. 1). Relations between
Sofia and Belgraderemainedin their usual state, and rumorsof an Austro-
Bulgarian alliance were again current in June and August (XVIIIl, 120,
298).
For the history of the originsof the Serbo-Bulgarianalliance,betweenSep-
teInber,1911,andMarch,1912,muchsignificantmaterialhas beenpublished,7
but the new materialscompleteand clarify importantaspectsof the problem.
Of the diplomatistsdirectly concerned,Neklyudov, in Sofia, comes off best.
As early as October, 1911, he gave a far-sightedanalysis of the projected
agreement. A Serbo-Bulgarianpact could not be directedto the maintenance
of the status quo; to have morethan a declaratoryvalue, it must be based on
the partition of Macedonia. Despite this, it would not lead to war if Russia
kept a firmhand on the two Slav states and at the same time took steps to im-
prove the conditionof the Slavs in Turkey,for example,by revivingthe plan
for lMacedonianautonomy with Austria's co-operation (XVIII2, 757, 758,
769). When Hartwig at Belgrade joined Neklyudov in rejecting a purely
status quo formula, to which Turkey could also have adhered, Nicholas II
gave his approvalto their arguments,and nothing furtherwas heard of this
vague proposal, to which Charykov and Neratov had been giving some
thought (XVIII2, 829).
By the beginningof January,1912, the Serbianand Bulgariannegotiators
hacl agreed on a complete line of demarcationin Macedonia except in the
southwest, near Struga on Lake Okhrida;for this area a compromisesettle-
mellt was advanced by Romanovsky,the Russianmilitaryattache in Sofia.
XVhenthe Serbsrejectedthis proposal,Neklyudovfelt that the entirenegotia-
tion had failed (XIX2, 354). AlthoughHartwig had been uncompromisingly
"Serb" during the long negotiation, Sazonov orderedhim, on January 19,
to give his full supportto the Romanovskycornpromise(XIX2, 371). Hart-
wig counteredby proposingthat the small disputedarea be left to later arbi-
tration by the tsar (XIX2, 374); Sazonov now changedhis mind and ordered
Neklyudov to supportHartwig'sproposal(XIX2, 388). Shortly after, Sazo-
nov again instructedHartwig to support the Romanovsky line (XIX2, 448,
489). Again the Serbspreferredto leave the Struga section for later arbitra-
tion (XIX2,502, 511). The Bulgariansnow offeredto acceptthis arrangement,
providedRussia wouldsecretly promisethem the disputedarea (XIX2, 520).
In reply Sazonov,on February24, urged both cabinets to accept the line as
7 A. L. Popov, ''Diplomaticheskaya
podgotovkabalkanskoyvoiny 1912g.," Krasny
arkiziv,Vols. VIII and IX.

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 76 P"TTjTPE. MOSELY
alreadydrawn,subject to later Russianarbitrationfor the small Strugaarea;
in his telegramto Sofiahe first addedthat he could not make any promiseto
the Bulgarsas to the results of the Russian arbitration,but, thinkingbetter
of it, he crossedout this passage (XIX2, 527, 528). VVhenthe Bulgarsstill re-
fused to sign unless promisedthe disputedzone east of Struga,Sazonovgave
in; on March 1 he promisedthat Bulgaria would secure the small disputed
zone throughRussia'sarbitralaward (XIX2, 546, 626, and p. 199, n. 1). The
signing of the alliance could then be completed in a few days. The long-ac-
cepted conception of the large "disputed zone," stretching across central
Macedonia,must now be abandoned.8Properlyspeaking,there was no dis-
puted zone, for the line drawnin the Serbo-Bulgariantreaty was to stand as
the future boundary between the two states except for a small strip near
Struga,which Sazonovhad secretlypromisedto the Bulgarians.
On March 13 Neklyudov had a most interestinginterviewwith King Fer-
dinand,on occasionof the signingof the alliance. Ferdinandpressedthe Bul-
garian claim to Adrianople,only to have it firmly rejected by Neklyudov
(XIX2, 625).9 As early as November4, 1911, the Russianenvoy had removed
from the preliminarydraft of the allianceany referenceto Adrianople,which
Russia regardedas a necessarybastion of the Straits (XIXl, 4). In his inter-
view with Danev at Livadia, on May 10, 1912, Sazonov again threw cold
water on the Bulgarians'ambitionto possessAdrianople(XIX2, 878).
The signingof the alliancewas followedby negotiationsfor a militarycon-
vention, apparentlywithout Russian participation. The Bulgariansat first
refused,but finallyconsented,to includein it provisionfor joint actionagainst
Austria (XIX2, 772). The conventionwas signedon May 12//April29 (XIX2,
888).1° In April it was clear to the Russian charge in Sofia tllat the alliance
coul(lonly lead to a war against Turkey, since Bulgariawas unwillingto fight
Austriafor Serbianinterests (XIX2, 777).
The Serbo-Bulgarianmilitary convention, it was assumed, would be fol-
lowedby a similarpact betweenRussia and Bulgaria. Negotiationsfor it had
been pursuedin desultoryfashionduring1910.ll In August, 1911,Neklyudov
warnedSt. Petersburgthat Russia must help Bulgariain an active policy by
concludinga militaryconventionif Bulgariawas to cease vacillatingbetween
Russia and Austria(XVIIIl, 298). Duringthat same month the problemwas
discussedby Neratov, Nicholas II, and the ministry of war (XVIIIl, Appens.
I-IV). Neratov urged caution; Russia was still awaiting a reply to her pro-
8 The traditionalconceptionis repeatedin E. C. Helmreich,The diplomacyof the

Balkanwars,1912-1913(Cambridge,1938), pp. 55-56 and map.

9This was omittedin Neklyudov'saccountof the interview (A. Neklyudov,Diplo-
maticreminiscencesbeforeand d?>ring the WorldWar,1911-1917 [New York, 1920],pp.
61-66).
0Not on April 16/29, as stated by Helmreich(p. 53).
Helmreich,P 30

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 RUSSIANPOLICYIN 1911-12 77

posals of December,1910, and ought not to show undue eagernessto renew

the negotiations;the recent amendmentof the Bulgarianconstitution,giving
Ferdinalldpower to concludeallianceswithout ratificationby the Sobranie,
was a further reasonfor circumspection.The ministry of war, on the other
hand, arguedthat Bulgariahad to have an alliancewith either Russia or Aus-
tria; the conventionwas essentialunlessRussia intendedto withdrawentirely
from the 13alkans.In this conflictof views Neratov's opinionprevailed.
Whenthe Serbo-Bulgariannegotiationsopenedin real earnest,in October,
1911, Neklyudov reportedthat the Bulgarianleaders desired a Russo-Bul-
garian convention as a complementto the proposedalliance, and also as a
safeguardagainst Austriaand Rumania,while Hartwigopposedany Russian
cornmitmentto Bulgaria, since it would only encourageher to act rashly
(XVIII2, 545, 563, 598). On October23 Neratov informedNeklyudov that
Russia wanted a military conventionwith Bulgariaonly as part of a Serbo-
Bulgarianpact; it was better not to push it for the time being, but first to let
Serbiaand Bulgariaagreeon Macedonia(XVIII2,699). Assumingthat these
instructionsstill held good, Neklyudov raised the question with Ferdinand
in his interviewof Afarch13, 1912; the militaryattache also reportedthat the
Bulgariansexpected to conclude a military agreementwith Russia (XIX2,
625, 626). AlthoughDanev expressedthe same hope in April, he apparently
did not mentionthis subject in his interviewwith Sazonovon l\/Iay10 (XIX2,
772, 878).
In that interview Sazonov warned Danev strongly against enlargingthe
Serbo-Bulgarianalliance to include Montenegro(XIX2, 878). Although the
Russianswere supplyingKing Nicholas with 600,000 rublesa year, together
with military instructorsand equipment, they entertained no illusions re-
gardinghis characterand policy. So far from arousinga feeling of gratitude,
the Russian subsidy was, for Nicholas, a constant source of irritation,for it
gave the Russians a whip hand over his policy. In June, 1911, he was re-
strainedfrom attacking the Turks by Russia's withholdingpart of the sub-
sidy (XVIIIl, 131,and p. 143, n. 1). King Nieholaswas now eagerto be rid of
article7 of the Russo-Montenegrinmilitaryconventionof December15, 1910,
which forbadehim to undertakeany aggressiveaction or to enter into any
other military agreementswithout Russia's consent (XVIIIl, 251). This in-
trigue was thwarted by the minister of war in October, 1911, and again in
February,1912 (XVIII2, 508; XIX2, 420).
King Nicholas played for all it was worth on Russian jealousy of Austria.
In November, 1911, he wanted to know whether Russia would oppose an
Austrianreoccupationof the Sanjak of Novibazar; if not, Montenegromust
come to an agreementwith Austriain orderto obtain compensationin north-
ern Albania (XVIII2, 847). The Russians took alarm at the conclusionof a
Montenegrinloan in Vienna, at the proposalto establish an Austrianmort-
gage bank in Cetinje,at the invitationof Austrianinspectorsof the judiciary,

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 78 PHILIP E. MOSELY
and at an Austrian concession to build strategic highways in the country
(XIX1, p. 180, n. 1; XIX2, 485, 425, 477, 500, 521, 574). In February,1912,
Prince Mirko frankly accused his father and eldest brotherof "taking from
two pockets"and "doingnothing for either" (XIX2, p. 229, n. 4).
Despite the absence of genuine confidencein the leaders of the Balkan
Slavs, Russian diplomacy,with a kind of somnambulisticfatalism,prepared
diligentlyfor the fulfilmentof what Hartwig,with repetitiousgrandiloquence,
called "Russia'sgreat, historic Slav mission." But other Russian diplomats
did not see eye-to-eye with Hartwig. His policy was condemnedbitterly by
Giers,the Russianambassadorin Vienna (XIX2, 646, 877). Its repudiation
was impliedmoresubtlely in Charykov'swarningof March30, 1912, that to
drive the Turks out of Europe, without at the same time partitioningtheir
Asiatic empire,would only rejuvenatethe Turkishstate by makingit ethni-
cally homogeneous(XIX2, 713). But if the Russian government pursued
rathernebulouspurposesin the Balkans, its aims and methodsin Persiawere,
by contrast, obvious and forthright.
Russian policy in Persia in 1911-12 revolved around the attempt of the
formershah to regainhis throne, the effortsof the nationaliststo reformthe
adrninistrationand consolidatethe territorialintegrity of the country, and
Russia'sdesireto securea maximumof influenceand advantagewithout caus-
ing an open breach in the entente with England. The new documentsshow
that as early as June, 1911 a full month beforethe monarchistrevolt broke
out the Russian foreignministry regardedthe prospect of MohamedAli's
restorationwith a favorableeye (XVIIIl, 133). As soonas civil war flaredup,
Neratov declaredthat Russia's"neutrality"madeit impossiblefor her to help
or hinderMohamedAli from crossingRussia to join his supportersin north-
ern Persia (XVIIIl, 204). Although the British governmentat first main-
tained that Russia and England were bound to uphold the governmentin
Teheran,it was finallyforcedto accept the Russians'conceptionof "neutral-
ity," whichthe latter interpretedvery elastically(XVIIIl, 219, 228, 229, 249).
For example,in Augustthe Russianministerat Teheran,Poklevsky,promised
to reconcilethe feudalBakhtiarichiefswith the formershah (XVIII1,338); in
November they again came to him with an offer to overthrowthe Teheran
government(XIXl, 57). Nicholas II was contemptuousof the weak Persian
government;in August he noted: "The governmentin Persia is an empty
sound;of that we shall soon be convinced"(XVIIIl, 309).
As soon as the Americanadviser,\v. MorganShuster,was grantedbroad
reformpowersby the mejliss,in June, 1911,he faced the unrelentinghostility
of St. Petersburg. In August, when he proposeda compromisearrangement,
which was favored by Poklevsky and Benckendorff,he met with the tsar's
absolute veto (XVIIIl, 351, 355, 411). The Russian leadersnow determined
on the use of forceto put a stop to the reformmovementin Persia. On Octo-
ber 12 Neratov informedPoklevskythat Russiawas readyto apply repressive

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 RUSSIAN POLICY IN 1911-12 79

measures,includingthe occupationof Teheran,and wouldnot be sorryif this

resulted in Shuster'sdismissal (XVIII2, 592, 593). Later on that same day
Neratov was furnishedwith the long-soughtpretext for militaryilltervention,
thanks to a conflictbetweenthe Russianconsul-generalin Teheranand Shus-
ter'sagents.
Only a month before, Poklevsky had advised strongly against extending
Russian protectionto the propertyof monarchistrebels in case the Teheran
governmentdecided to seize it (XVIII1, 436). XVhenShuster's agents pro-
ceededon October11 to sequestratethe propertyof a leadingrebel, Shoa-es-
Soltane, Poklevsky opposedmaking any protest; the Russian-heldmortgage
on his estate was purely fictitious and was known to both Russiansand Per-
sians to be such (XVIII2, 603). Polslevskystrongly condemnedthe Russian
consul-generalfor his interferenceon behalf of Shoa and demandeddiscipli-
nary action against him (XVIII2,616). Neratov, however,took the consul's
side and demandedreparationfor the "insults" inflictedon Russia; further-
more,Poklevsky shouldprotect the formershah'sfollowers,for "Russiamay
need their help in the nearfuture" (XVIII2,636, 640). On October18 Poklev-
sky protestedagainst these ordersand asked to be relievedof his post rather
than carrythem out (XVIII2,661, and p. 183, n. 1). Again Neratov rejected
Poklevsky'sview of the Shoa incidentand orderedhim to preparethe way
for the occupationof Teheran (XVIII2,691-95, 7Q6). For the third time the
Russian envoy refutedNeratov's arguments,and he accusedthe consul-gen-
eral of provokingthe incidentto bringRussia into the civil war on the side of
the formershah (XVIII2,745, 746). After receivingperemptoryordersfrom
Neratov, Poklevskyat last presentedthe Russiandemandsorallyon Novem-
ber 2, in writtenformon the eighth (XVIII2,764, 793, 841). But Persiansub-
missionto them was not enough. Despite the oppositionof the mejlissand of
nationalistopinion,the Teherangovernmentwas preparingto accept the de-
mandswhenNeratov, on November21, orderedPoklevsky to delay receiving
its reply long enough for Russian troops to reach Enzeli, so that additional
demandscould then be advanced (XIX1, 47). On the twenty-third,Neratov
was threateningto occupy Teheran,removethe regent, dismissShuster, and
dissolve the mejliss (XIN1, 71).
Although alarm had been growing in England as Russia's demandswere
continuallyenlarged,and Sir EdwardGrey,the foreignsecretary,was greatly
worriedfor the future of Anglo-Russianco-operationin Persia and of the en-
tente, Neratov, in his reportto the tsar of December5, refusedto take these
fears seriously (XIX1, 140, 153). MvhenBenckendorff,in great alarm, ex-
plainedthe situationto Sazonovin Paris, the latter calledNeratov to account
in his Persianpolicy, as well as in his Straits negotiation. On December8 he
telegraphedNeratov not to take any irrevocablesteps until he himselfcould
returnto St. Petersburg(XIX1, 178). Three days later Neratov promisedthe
British ambassadora delay of ten days beforethe Russianforceswould leave

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 80 PHILIP E. MOSELY
Kazvin for Teheran;in addition Russia would not recognizethe formershah
without an agreementwith England (XIXl, 189).
After the anti-]Russianoutbreaksin Tavriz and Resht on December 21
and 22, Sazonovat once orderedvery severemeasuresof repression,including
the executionof armedinsurgentsand deportationof the ringleadersto Rus-
sia (XIXl, 254). But at a special meeting of the councilof ministerson De-
cember 26 he resisted all urgings to present new demands and to occupy
Teheran (XIXl, 264). Despite the official return to the policy of Anglo-
Russian co-operation,there werecontinualcomplaints,from December,1911,
to April, 1912, that the Russian consuls in Resht, Teheran, Astrabad, and
Meshedwereworkingopenly for the formersha.h(XIXl, 278, 344; XIX2, 391,
524). Sazonov abandonedthe "neutrality"proclaimedby Neratov, advised
the former shah to leave the country, and ignoredhis counterofferof a pro-
tectorate over all Persia in return for Russian help in recoveringhis throne
(XIX2, 430, 465).
The internaluncertaintiesin Persia had meanwhileslowed down the con-
solidation of Russia's position there. In June, 1911, Kokovtsov had urged
Neratov to securea Russian concessionfor a railroadfrom Djulfa to Tavriz,
with a branch to Urmia, near the Turkishborder. Kokovtsov was willingto
set aside from one-fourthto one-thirdof the shares in the new companyfor
Persianswho might aid in obtainingthe concession;but, if necessary,he was
ready to build the line by force, without a concession (XVIII1, 107). After
Russia's triumph over Shuster, the mejliss, and the Persian nationalists,
Kokovtsov renewed his urgings (XIX2, 847). Meanwhile,the larger prob-
lem of the trans-Persianrailroadwas advancingat a snail's pace. In May,
1911, the British foreignofficestated its conditions: the railroadshouldenter
the British sphere at Bender-Abbasinstead of Kerman, and in that sphere
should be under English control, under internationalcontrol in the neutral
sphere; its gauge should change on entering the British sphere; and Russia
should refrainfrom building railroadsnear the Afghan frontier (XVIII1, 3).
To these conditionsthe Russiangovernmententertaillednumerousobjections
(XVIII1, 70, 209). However, by January, 1912, it had expressedformallyits
desirefor Frenchparticipationin the future trans-Persianconsortium(XIX2,
373), and on Sazonov's insistence, the British agreed that a large loan for
Persia should be entrusted to the consortium,to facilitate its later negotia-
tion for the railroadconcession(XIX2, 399, 601, 665).
Since the Russians were, as Nicholas II put it bluntly, "masters in the
north of Persia," they watched with hostile eye Turkey's gradualencroach-
ments on Persia'swesternfrontier(XVIIIl, p. 33, n. 2). In October,1911, a
special conferencefor Persian affairsordereda detachmentheld in readiness
to occupy Urmia in force (XVIII2, 592). In November and December,
Yorontsov-Dashkov,the viceroy of the Caucasus,was urging,with Nicholas'
approval, the occupation of the disputed area, including the khanate of

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 RUSSIANPOLICYIN 1911-12 81

Maka (XIX1, 86, 116, 224). On December 26 the council of ministers de-
cided to occupy the strategic line from Khoy to Urmia and to have troops
ready to take Maka (XIX1, 264). In January, 1912, SazonovwarnedPersia
to take a firmline in the frontiernegotiationsabout to open, since otherwise
Russia would adopt strong measures in Persian Azerbaijanto protect her
strategic interestsagainst the Turkishadvance (XIX2, 349).
While the Russians were carefullyguardingtheir "inheritance"in north-
ern Persia, they were also busy staking out claims at China'sexpense. This
could be done most effectively by co-operationwith their fellow-heirs,the
Japanese. In January,1912,Japan and Russia begannegotiationsin orderto
demarcatetheir spheresof influencein western Manchuriaand Inner Mon-
golia. On January 24 the Japanese ambassadorAIotono put forward the
caravanroute from Urga to Shan-hsink'ou as the dividing-line(XIX2, 383).
Sazonov objected to this, since it would cut the Urga-Kalgan-Pekingroute
and depriveRussia of direct contact with Chihliprovinceand Peking (XIX2,
499). In April the Japanese offered to leave to Russia the Urga-Kalgan-
Peliing route, together with a strip to the east; Inner M{ngolia eastwardof
that line would then be in the Japanese sphere (XIX2, 787). On May 1
Sazonovcounteredhy proposingthe meridianof Peking as the dividing-line;
the RussianspherewouldincludeInnerMongoliato the west of that meridian,
Outer Mongolia,and ChineseTurkestan (XIN2, 834).12Mihilethus engaged
in carving out huge slices of Outer China for future absorption,Russian
diplomacywas graduallystrengtheningits hold on Mongolia.
In July, 1911,the councilof Mongolprincesand lamasdeterminedto sepa-
rate fromChina,and sent a delegationto ask for Russianprotection(XVIII1,
260). Russian agents had admittedly encouraged the Mongols to expect
Russian aid, but the governmentwas too busy with the Near and Middle
East to extend a protectorateover them; it was agreed,however,at a special
interdepartmentalconferenceof August 17, that Russia should mediate be-
tween the Mongols and the Chinese governmentwith a view to blocking
Chinese reforms, colonization, and railroad-buildingin Outer Mongolia
(XVIII1, 329). At first unwillingto admit Russia to a discussionof Mongol
affairs,the Chinesewere forced,by the growingrevolutionarymovement,to
agree tacitly not to introducereformsinto Mongolia without previous con-
sultation with St. Petersburg(XVIII1,416; XVIII2, 607, 670).
On December1 the Mongols proclaimedtheir separationfrom Chilla. In
this they were encouragedby Russian promises of arms and by Russian
hints to act while the Peking governmentwas weakenedby the revolution
(XIX1, 136, 192). On December23 SazonovoutlinedRussian policy toward
the new situation. China must agree to Russian supervisionof her measures
12 This was approximatelythe line adoptedin the Russo-Japanesetreaty of July 8,
1912 (E. B. Price, TheRusso-Japanesetreatiesof 1907-1916concerningManchuriaand
Monyolia[Baltimore,1933],pp. 75-76; text of the treaty, pp. 117-20).

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 PHILIP E. MOSELY
in OuterMongolia;the Russian consul should be empoweredto watch over
the execution of the future Mongol-Chinesetreaty; China must not send
troopsor officialsto Mongoliaand must grant Russia the right to build rail-
roads there, especiallyone to Urga (XIX1, 253). When the Chineserejected
the proposed Russian guarantee, the Russian envoy pointed out that the
Mongols would not sign a treaty without Russian guarantee (XIX2, 345).
During the springof 1912 the Russianskept a close eye on Chineseeffortsto
come to a direct understandingwith the Mongol leaders (XIX2, 732).
In the springof 1911the Russianmilitaryleaderswereanxiousto strength-
en Russia's position in northernManchuria(XVIIIl, p. 22, n. 3); but when
Japan ignoredpointedhints for co-operation,Neratov opposedsingle-handed
action by the Russians. He could, however,assure the ministerof war that
the ministryof foreignaSairsdoes not, for a singleinstant,lose sight of the importance
for us of guaranteeingour Far EasternpossessionsthroughmakingnorthernManchuria
.... a dependablebuffer[XVIIIl, 90, 134].l3
With the outbreakof the Chineserevolutionthe Japaneseattitude changed.
The leaderof the militaryparty, ColonelTanaka,enteredinto directnegotia-
tions with the Russian military attache in Tokio for a joint occupationof
Manchuriaand Chihli (XVIII2,787), and Russiantroopswere held in readi-
ness to move (XIX1, 29). The projectwas droppedwhen the civiliansgot the
upperhand in the Japanesecabinet,and in late Decemberthe Russiantroops
destinedfor Peking were reducedto a peace-footing(XIX1, 118, 255). How-
ever, in January, 1912, the Japanese general staff was still expecting the
triumphof anarchyin China,to be followedby a Russo-Japaneseoccupation
(XIXl, 319).
Meanwhilethe Chinese revolutionwas unwittinglyfavoringRussian de-
signs on anotherremoteprovince,Ili, and its capital, Kuldja. In April, 1911,
preparationswere begun to occupy it with a large detachmentfrom Russian
Turkestan (XVIIIt, p. 22 n. 3). In November,Neratov had to restrainthe
greed of the Russian military for this easy prey (XIX1, 61). Although the
councilof ministersdecided,on February1, 1912, that there was no immedi-
ate reasonto interferein Kuldja, the city was seized in April by a Cossack
detachment,and China'sprotest svas ignored (XIX2, 423, 76o, 890). As the
Russianministerto Peking wroteon AIay 11, althoughthere was no prospect
of an early restorationof orderin China, "we have no reasonto regret this,
from the viewpointof our interests"(XIX2, 887).
In the struggle to safeguard its rights as China's "most favored heir,"
the Russiangovernmentfought a long rear-guardaction against the Chinese
ReorganizationLoan and the Four-PowerConsortium.From that tangled
story only two episodes can be mentioned here. XVhenthe principleof the
powers' financialneutrality in the Chinese civil war was advanced by the
13 This accordswith the desireof the Russianmilitaryto annexnorthernManchuria,

as expressedat the interdepartmentalconferenceof December2, 1910 (B. Siebertand

G. A. Schreiner,Ententediplomac?y and theworld[New York, 1921],pp. 24-27).

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 RUSSIANPOLICYIN 1911-12 83

Americansecretaryof state, Knox, in February,1912,it was readilyaccepted

by Sazonov (XIX2, 482). Yet only two days later he gave his approvalto a
camouflagedloan by the Russo-AsiaticBank (XIX2,492). Throughfinancing
Yuan Shih-k'ai,in spite of the agreementof the powers,Kokovtsov hoped to
secure for the rival, Russian-controlledsyndicate a half-sharein the future
Consortiumloan, instead of one-fifth (XIX2, 519). When the Russian loan
contractcame to public knowledge,as it did almost at once (XIX2, 575), the
Russiangamewas up, the Knox principlewas abandoned,and the Consortium
proceededto advance morneyto Yuan Shih-k'ai (XIX2, 640). In a desperate
gamble Sazonov tried to block this loan in London and Paris; to Poincare,
the Frenchforeignminister,he made the supremeappeal: lendingmoney to
China for arms would compel Russia to transfertroops to the Far East and
would thus weakenthe force of her military conventionwith France (XIX2,
652, 669). This melodramaticappealhad no effect;the Frenchwereunwilling
to sacrificetheir financialinterestsin China,since Russia had ignoredFrench
interests in making the Potsdam agreement with Germany (XIX2, 700).
Finally, on April 6, Sazonov gave up the struggle and agreed to enter the
Consortiumwith a one-sixth share, provided Russia's interestsin northern
Manchuria,Mongolia,and ChineseTurkestanweresafeguarded(XIX2, 733).
Sazonov'sunsuccessfulattempt to play upon the Frenchallianceto secure
special advantagesin China was not an isolated instance. He tried similarly
to exercise a veto over French plans for the development of railroadsin
TurkishAnatolia. After the failureof the Charykovnegotiation,Sazonovap-
pealed to the French government,in February, 1912, to press the Porte to
revise the Russo-Turkishagreementof 1900 (XIX2, 390, 417). Later he was
urgingthe French syndicate to build only the north-southlines, postponing
the east-westones becauseof their strategicdisadvantagesfor Russia (XIX2,
51o). At the risk of the Turks' breakingoff the entire project,Sazonov tried
to have the French delay signing the railroadcontract until the reluctant
Turks had been brought to revise the agreementwith Russia (XIX2, 859).
As soon as Sazonov informedPoincare of the conclusionof the Serbo-Bul-
garianalliance,he expected to see the long-delayedBulgarianloan admitted
to the ParisBourse(XIX2,752, 878). On the otherhand, the Russiansexerted
their full influenceto prevent Austrian loans from being floated in France
(XIXl, 265, 308; XIX2, 358). Despite this very elastic interpretationof
Russia's rights and privilegesunder the French alliance,her governmentdid
not hesitate to sign the Persian railroadagreementwith Germany at the
height of the Agadircrisis. Two months later, in November, 1911, Neratov
gave Berlin sly encouragementto assist Charykov's negotiation on the
Straits:
It wouldseemto lie in Germany'sown interests,in orderto lessenRussia'sgravita-
tion towardthe above-mentionedgroupof powers[the Entente], a gravitationso un-
desirablefor her [Germany],to displaya favorabledispositiontowardus in a question
which does not affecther interestsdirectly.

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 84 PHILIP E. MOSELY
Neratov must have felt that too definitean interpretationmight be placedon
this hint, for he added, in a postscript:
The considerationexpressedin the last words,of course,must not signify that for
the priceof Germany'sassentin the matterof the Straitswe wouldestablishsomenew
orientationin generalpolicy [XIXl, 18].
The Russians' one-sidedinterpretationof the alliance was broughtout
strikinglyin an interestingbyplay of the winterand springof 1912. Upon the
formationof the strong Poincarecabinet in France, Izvolsky urgedSazonov
to discuss Balkan policy with it; he was haunl;edby the memory of the
Bosnian crisis, into which he himself, when foreign minister, had plunged
Russia without previous concert with her ally (XIX2, 414). Accordingly,
Sazonovproposedon March 7 that Izvolsky discusswith Poincarethe policy
to be followedin three eventualities: (1) an internalcrisis in Turkey, (2) an
Austrianadvanceinto the Sanjakor Albania,and (3) a war betweenTurkey
and a Balkan state (XIX2, 596). With the signatureof the Serbo-Bulgarian
alliance less than a week ahead, Sazonov can hardly be said to have been
frank and above-boardwith his ally. Poincare's reply left Sazonov much
disgruntled.The French foreign minister pointed out that the Franco-
Russianalliancedid not extend to Near Easternquestions;on the otherhand,
almost any question which might arise in the Near East would pit the two
groupsof powersin a trial of strengthand would thus entail the application
of the alliance (XIX2, 699). Offendedby the "dryness" of this response,
Sazonov made up his mind to drop furtherdiscussion.
The question of a more detailed elaborationof all circumstanceswhich might
present themselvescould be taken up only in case we received some guaranteethat
the French government was.unconditionallypreparedto adopt our viewpoint in
evaluatingthe possibilitiesdiscussed.... [XIX2,729].
In other words, Sazonov was willing to discuss Balkan policy only if Poin-
care agreedbeforehandto follow the Russian lead.
Izvolsky came to Poincare'sdefense. His "dryness"was only a reflection
of his clear, legalisticmind; actually, he was the strongestforeignministerin
Francefor several years, and there was every advantage in continuing the
discussion,at least on the question of the Sanjak (XIX2, 747). After a con-
siderable delay Sazonov ordered Izvolsky to discuss the question of an
Austrian reoccupationof the Sanjak (XIX2, 850). This interlude,together
with the scanty and misleadinginformationwhich Sazonov gave Poincare
about the Serbo-Bulgarianalliance,throwsa stronglight on the Russianatti-
tude toward the French ally (XIX2, 708). This almost conspiratorialfear of
discussinghis Balkan policy, even with Poincare,was matched by Russia's
decidedlyambiguousattitude duringthe Agadircrisisjust preceding.
As soon as the "Panther"was sent to Agadir,the French asked Neratov
to speak out in Berlin; the latter telegraphedBerlin "in the mildest possible
form" (XVIII1, 158, 160). Neratov swallowed hook, line, and sinker-

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 RUSSIANPOLICYIN 1911-12 85

Kiderlen-Wachter's transparentassurancesthat the sendingof the "Panther"

had no political significance(XVIII1, 166). When, at the height of the crisis,
France sent word that she might have to call on Russia for military as-
sistance (XVIII1, 359), a special conferencewas held, on August 29, with
Nicholas, Neratov, Kokovtsov, Sukhomlinov, and Zhilinsky present. Its
conclusionwas hardlyencouragingto the French: Russia was much opposed
to war at that time; there would be no enthusiasmin Russia for a war over a
colonialdispute; Russia's military reformswere far from complete. Izvolsky
was to transmit this conclusionto the Frenchleaders"in the most cautious
form." The dispatchwas finally sent with the significantdeletion of a para-
graph hinting that, if war broke out over Morocco, Russia would merely
mobilize against Germany,without taking the of3ensive(XVIII1, 359, 368,
and p. 378, n. 1).
On September4 Neratov was againurgingthe Frenchto make every effort
to reacha peacefulsolution (XVIII1,388). Benckendorff,from London,pro-
tested that he should urge Berlin, rather than Paris, to make concessions
(XVIII1, 423). Despite this less than lukewarm support, and despite the
ostentatious signing of the Potsdam agreement in the thick of the crisis,
Neratov was prompt in presentinghis bill in Paris. In return for supportin
the Moroccanquestion he instructedIzvolsky, on October4, to securefrom
the French cabinet freedomof action in the Straits question and wide sup-
port in the Far East (XVIII2,530, 531, 533). When the Quaid'Orsayshowed
little desireto bind itself, the Russiansinsisted,and finallysecureda vaguely
wordedpromiseof support.
In their relations with England, the third member of the Entente, the
Russian leaders showed little considerationfor their partner'sinterests. In
the Straits question,in Persia, in the Far East, their attitude was constantly
one of rivalry and suspicion. During the Haldanemissionof February,1912,
the Russian military attache in London was chiefly concernedlest England
and Germanyreduce their naval expenditures;Germanywould then have
even more money to devote to her army, to Russias disadvantage(XIX2,
468). When the British naval attache in Berlin suddenly asked his Russian
colleagueto co-operatein securinginformation,the latter was muchpuzzled;
he finally concludedthat the British hoped in this deviousway to get Russia
to increaseher military preparations,thus forcing Germanyto devote less
money to naval construction(XIX2, 462, 555).
TowardItaly, Russia pursueda friendlypolicy, based on commonfear of
Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. Indeed, in March, 1912, London was
alarmedby rumorsof a Russo-Italianalliance against Turkey (XTX2,656).
Fromthe outbreakof the Tripolitanwar, RussiaapprovedFrenchand British
effortsto win Italy to the side of the Entente (XVIII2, 715, 863, 864).
The Russians devoted a surprisingamount of attention to Sweden. The
Swedish army and navy were regularly reckoned as a part of Germany's

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 86 PHILIP E. MOSELY

forces in case of war (XVIII1, 279; XVIII2, 854). When the appointmentof
Swedish instructorsfor the Persian army was first discussed, Neratov ob-
jected strongly,sincehe regardedSwedenas within Germany'sorbit (XVIIIl,
80). Duringthe winterof 1912the Russianswere muchconcernedby a bitter
anti-Russiancampaign,led by the famollsexplorer,Sven Hedin (XIX2, 463).
It is a confusedstory of conflictingpurposesand methodsin Russianforeign
policy which is unfolded in the new documents for 1911-12. Among the
policy-makerstherewas little unity. Neither Sazonovnor his assistant,Nera-
tov, emergeswith a clear and consistentpattern of aims, whiletheirmethods
were often oversubtleor else too brutal. The apparatusthroughwhich they
workedwas franklydividedwithin itself, but probablythis was not altogether
a disadvantage;in the absenceof parliamentaryor even cabinetcontrolover
foreignpolicy, disagreementsand polemics within the diplomaticservice at
least raised questions and objections which might have been entirely sup-
pressed in a more disciplinedinstrument. In revealingthe weaknessof the
policy-makingcentral authority, which submitted to the impulses of its
peripheralagents more often than it imparted clear directives of its own,
these volumesthrowa muchstrongerlight on the workingsof a regimewhich
was stumbling,ratherthan marching,down the path whichled to the Balkan
wars and, from them, to the war of 1914.
UNIVERSITY
CORNELL

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