Problems: Syntax

PROBLEMS
IN SYNTAX
STUDIES IN LANGUAGE
Editorial Board :
Noam Chomsky - Femand Vandamme
Liliane Tasmowski - Dominique Willems
Technical editor: Etienne De Vlieger

STUDIES IN LANGUAGE
2
PROBLEMS
IN SYNTAX
W. Abraham, Cl. Blanche-Benveniste, A. Colen, B. Comrie, M. Dascal
R. Declerck, S. Dik, M. Dominicy, G. Fauconnier, J. Koster, S. Kuno
J. McCawley, L. Melis, C. S. Smith, W. van Langendonck, A. Zaenen
Edited by
Liliane TASMOWSKI
Dominique WILLEMS
PLENUM PRESS • NEW YORK AND LONDON
COMMUNICA TION AND COGNITION • GHENT

Distributed in the U.S.A. and Japan by
Plenum Press,
a Division of Plenum Publishing Corporation, 233 Spring Street, New York 10013
ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-9691-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4613-2727-1
DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4613-2727-1
@ 1983. Communication and Cognition, Blandijnberg 2, B-9000 Ghent.
English edition first published in 1983 simultaneously by
a) Communication and Cognition, Ghent
b) Plenum Publishing Corporation.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1983
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or trans-

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CONTENTS
Presentation ix
The definition of [unctions and categories
Bernard COMRIE, Syntactic-morphological discrepancies in Maltese

sentence structure 3
Werner ABRAHAM, Heuristic problems concerning the identification

of grammatical relations: the case of the Westgermania (Dutch -
English -. German) 29
Claire BLANCHE-BENVENISTE, Verb complements and sentence

complements: two different types of relation 55
Alexandra COLEN, Observations on the syntax of English nominals 85
Constructional properties of the sentence
Renaat DECLERCK, The structure of infinitival perception verb

complements in a transformational grammar 105
Willy VAN LANGENDONCK, Passive in a semantic dependency

network 129
Annie ZAENEN, Verb-first clauses in Icelandic, successive cyclic

. wh-movement and syntactic binding lSI
Ludo MELIS, The construction of the infinitive with causative move-

ment verbs in French 181
Gilles FAUCONNIER, Generalized union 195
vii
viii CONTENTS
Simon DIK, On the status of verbal reflexives 231
Susumu KUNO, Reflexivization in English 257
Tense and aspect
. Carlota SMITH, The temporal reference of the English futurate 273
Marcelo DASCAL, Prolegomena to a semantic analysis of phase-

indicating verbal periphrases in Portuguese 289
Marc DOMINICY, Time, tense and restriction (On the French peri-
phrasis 'venir de + infinitive') 325
The organization of grammar
Jan KOSTER, The configurational matrix 347
James McCAWLEY, TOwards plausibility in theories of language

acquisition 361
References 377
PRESENT AnON
1. After a long period of paradigmatic stability, research in syntax has been

thoroughly questioned and a considerable number of alternative proposals have
been put forward. Until approximately fifteen years ago, transformational
generative grammar was so preponderant that one may argue without too much
exaggeration that studies in the field were divided into transformational and
non-transformational ones. At present, there are no indications that any of these
tendencies will become predominant.
In short, it is seen that alternative proposals challenge the place of syntax
within the total grammar, the levels of representation, the nature of the
operating rules, the kind of entities they operate upon and the degree of
abstractness and formalization to be achieved. The question arises whether
current practice in the field allows recognition of some common research
strategy despite the tremendous variety of models proposed. In this perspective,
a few outstanding scholars have agreed to offer here their solutions to problems
relevant for syntax. Admittedly, the points of view could have been multiplied.
In connection with the question put forward, however, we believe that nothing
really distinct would have resulted.
II. The themes developed by the contributors to this volume can be divided
into three main areas :
1. articles dealing with problems of definition or recognition of functions
and categories.
2. articles dealing with constructional properties of the sentence
3. articles dealing with tense and aspect.
Two further articles are exclusively concerned with the general question of the
organization of grammar.
1. What characterizes the first group of articles, concerned with the definition
and delimitation of certain complement-classes or functions, is the variety in the
range of the proposed arguments and the differences in hierarchy between them.
In the relation between syntactic and morphological arguments, for instance,
Werner Abraham and Bernard Comrie defend opposite points of view.
ix
x L. TASMOWSKI - D. WILLEMS
BERNARD COMRIE, relying on the structural pattern of certain Maltese

sentences in order to determine the subject, defends a point of view that is pure-
ly syntax internal. Despite morphological evidence, constructions as g'tland-i
ktieb, "at-me (a) book", are to be analyzed as "have I (a) book", if one is to do
justice to the general behaviour of subject, negation and topicalization. Comrie
thereby caBs attention to the fact that in the course of history, syntax has more
than once induced changes in morphology.
WERNER ABRAHAM, on the other hand, considering Dutch sentence
patterns such as the ones illustrated by Marie gat een boek aan Jan, "Mary gave
a book to John", and Marie gat Jan een boek, "Mary gave John a book", states
that neither position nor presence/absence of a preposition is a reliable criterion
for identifying direct and indirect objects, and neither is the passive. The
suggestion is rather that in such cases one should look at cognate morpho-
logically richer languages, where grammatical functions are overtly marked,
and generalize cross-linguistically.
The variety of argumentation, including also intonational patterns, is a
striking characteristic of the contribution by CLAIRE BLANCHE-BENVE-
NISTE. Concerned with the precise delimitation of French verb-complements
as opposed to sentence-complements, the author shows that actual - as opposed
to Old French - morphology and syntax do not permit reliable predictions in
this connection, and that the V-dependents are to be recognized by a bundle of
characteristics such as intonational patterns, mobility and inclusion in the scope
of modality markers.
The enlargement of the range of arguments, taking into account not only
syntactical, but also semantic and pragmatic features is also characteristic of
ALEXANDRA COLEN's analysis of English nominals. She argues for an analysis
of independent sentences as a conglomerate of dependency, modal and thematic
features. This analysis permits one to state the differences between that-clauses,
infinitivals together with gerunds, NP's with a deverbal head and NP's with a
simple N-head, in terms of exactly those features.
2. The next group of contributions, concerned with constructional proper-
ties, clearly illustrates how, starting from the failure of transformational
grammar to account for constructional characteristics, as pointed out by
Declerck, Van Langendonck and Zaenen, a variety of new solutions and frame-
works emerge: relational grammar (see Fauconnier), dependency grammar
(see Van Langendonck), functional grammar (see Dik), lexical functional
grammar (see Zaenen) and functional sentence perspective (see Kuno).
PRESENT AnON xi
Despite the divergences, e.g. concerning the basic entities that are posited,
common properties emerge. Most of the proposed frameworks show little
interest in formalizing, do away with the notion transformation and are
concerned with a more surface oriented syntax - relational grammar being an
absolute exception. The tendency to be as general as possible and to integrate
a variety of facts within the same analysis is striking. Finally, the importance
given to lexical, semantic and pragmatic considerations in the argumentation
is to be underlined.
As for the research strategies used and the relation between theory and facts,
the contributions could be grouped into two main tendencies: those which,
starting from the facts, classical or new ones, tend. to evaluate the existing
theories and/or look for an adequate description which would account for the
facts (Declerck, Van Langendonck, Zaenen, Melis, Kuno) and those which,
starting from a general rule', look for adequacy throughout a variety of data
(Fauconnier, Dik).
RENAAT DECLERCK examines the various attempts made by trans-
formational grammars to establish a deep structure that could account for the
properties of English verbs of perception. He demonstrates the practical failure
of every such attempt, the most adequate seeming to be Postal's Raising analysis.
WILLY VAN LANGENDONCK also starts from the impossibility of a trans-
formational account for passive sentences in Dutch. He opts for dependency
grammar, which allows him to account for the variety of constructions available
in Dutch to mask the agent.
ANNIE ZAENEN, adducing material from Icelandic, shows how V/I is
triggered by a "topicalized" context. As Chomskyan scholars make stylistic
inversion dependent on WH-movement, they offer no general solution here. The
facts are, on the contrary, naturally fitted by lexical-functional grammar as
developed by Kaplan and Bresnan.
Without situating himself in a particular framework, LUDO MELIS analyses
sentences involving French transitive causatives of movement. He proposes
two different syntactic patterns for J'envoie Marie promener, "I-send-Mary-
walk", and J'envoie promener Marie, "I-send-walk-Mary". Treating as
complementary the figurative and the concrete use of the first pattern, he posits
a structure with a prepositional complement of locality for it.
GILLES F AUCONNIER treats together a whole range of facts formerly
considered to be quite distinct: French factitives, passives, predicative
constructions and tense. They are analysed as different manifestations of a single
principle, Union, the amalgamation of two predicates into one, which provokes
xii L. TASMOWSKI - D. WILLEMS
the inheritance of the complements of the second predicate by the complex

new one.
SIMON DIK, on the other hand, studies the manifestations of the decrease
in the number of V-complements in a variety of languages. If a predicate has
originally two arguments, an Agent and a Goal, one or the other can be deleted.
The reflexive form of the pronoun must be considered the mark of such a
deletion, for it is found where either Agent or Goal is absent, but lexically
reconstructible, with a subsequent typical range of interpretations.
With the contribution of SUSUMU KUNO on reflexivization in English,
the limits of a purely syntactic approach and the boundaries between syntax
and semantics are analysed. He proposes a two-level analysis: firstly, the syntax
rule of reflexivization applies blindly to all coreferential clause mate NP's, and
secondly, the distinction between surface reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns
is taken care of by a low-level spelling rule of a semantic nature. This rule will
account for the large range of semantic constraints.
3. The importance of semantic and pragmatic factors in syntactic research
is more obvious in the next topics, concerned with tense and aspect. In fact,
it could be stated that in these contributions, syntax is mainly used on the
argumentation level as an argument amongst others for an essentially semantic
analysis.
CARLOTA SMITH argues that the English futurate progressive be analyzed
as a construction that associates a present situation with a prediction about a
future situation. The difference between simple and progressive futurates, on
this account, is not truth conditional. Rather, the choice of aspect represents the
speaker's choice to look at the present situation from different points of view.
MARCELO DASCAL is concerned with the semantic representation of the
Portuguese phase-indicating devices and concentrates more specifically on
come~ar a + INF on the one hand, and come~ar por + INF/come~ar +
GERUND on the other. The semantic formulae make use of the facts that
come~ar itself seems perfective and that the periphrasis includes the suggestion
of some further extension of the initiated situation.
MARC DOMINICY studies the French construction venir de + INF, which
is translated by a restrictive adverb in some Romance languages, in Latin and
in Germanic languages. He proposes truth conditions, supplemented with
pragmatic principles for the proposition exhibiting such a restrictive adverb
bearing on a scalar element. For some of these adverbs, restrictions on two
different scalar elements, one of them being temporal, coaiesce. As venir de +
INF can be replaced by a perfect tense in some contexts, it is compared to the
PRESENTATION xiii
category of restrictive adverbs and analyzed as "just accomplished (now) =

accomplished only now".
4. Much of the work presented so far presupposes or suggests a particular
view on the organization of grammar. The remaining contributions take this
standpoint as their specific concern.
JAN KOSTER's propositions bear on the Chomskyan government/binding
framework. He argues that there is no distinct characteristic of the trace-a
relation that could justify its being treated in any other way than the
reflexive/reciprocal-antecedent relation. It thus suffices to generate the traces
in the base. Koster suggests that the standard version of the government/binding
framework allows a so far unmotivated proliferation of levels of analysis and
seems to have in mind simply S-Structure"" Phonetic Representation. At S-
, Semantic Representation
structure, the relation between a and 'Y has four properties: obligatoriness,
uniqueness, prominence of a and locality (a and 'Y in the same domain).
JAMES McCAWLEY, in the context of the problem of language acquisition,
proposes a view of the grammar in which bundles of semantic features are
endowed with morphological characteristics not necessarily constant in the
course of derivation. The knowledge of syntax is made dependent on the
previous acquisition of the sense of the words and of the morphology.
Acquisition of syntactic superficial well-formedness rules then develops, as the
child generalizes from already assimilated data to new structures. In this
perspective, knowledge of the factors involved precedes knowledge of the
rules, and knowledge of a language cannot be equated with knowledge of the
grammar of the language.
III. A discussion of the fundamental and less fundamental differences separating

the various schools is to be found in Current Approaches to Syntax (Syntax and
Semantics 13, 1980). To us, it is of more importance to extrapolate the common
tendencies, to see for instance how a particular concept, once recognized as
valuable, is adopted by whatever system, and to place the different approaches
in relation to one another.
1 . Concerning the position of syntax in relation to semantics and pragmatics,
two tendencies appear in this volume. While a smaller group of articles points
towards a revival of "hard" syntax, most contributions iIIustrate the impact
of semantics and pragmatics on syntactical research.
1.1. In relation to this question, let's first observe that the notions Agent,
Patient, Experiencer etc. are employed almost everywhere, be it generally in
xiv L. TASMOWSKI - D. WILLEMS
an intuitive way. They appear however with divergent status, as primitive entities
(in functional grammar), as semantic labelling of functions (in relational
grammar and traditional grammar) or as elements appearing in the description
of the lexicon (Chomskyan grammar). This signifies that the relevance of
semantics for syntax is at least implicitly recognized. A similar phenomenon
shows up in the lexical subclassification of the verbs, taken together under the
heading "verbs of movement" or "of causation" for instance, or in the sub-
classification of the nouns, such as "picture nouns", applied in many of the
contributions. In this connection it should be remembered that other trends,
not represented in this volume (cf. Gross), try to measure the impact of syntax
on semantics, precisely by defining and delimitating such lexical subclasses on
the basis of their syntactic behaviour. It may also be noticed that McCawley
more specifically calls attention to the general significance of the morphological
categories. Semantic correlates are thus ascribed to both functions and (sub)-
categories.
1.2. Another manifestation of the importance of semantics and pragmatics
for syntax is to be found in the explanatory principles admitted for the constraints
on particular constructions. It is for instance argued by Kuno that in reality
semantic and contextual factors, such as the degree of agentivity or of aware-
ness of the subject and the tension between topic and subject, are involved in
cases where explanations used to be sought in the purely syntactical Specified
Subject Condition.
The ever increasing importance of non-syntactic descriptions is also notice-
able in the way particular constructions have come to be handled, the passive
(here studied by Van Langendonck) being a case in point. It may be remembered
that, as they were fully aware of the differences in theme/rheme between an
active and a passive construction, most traditionally oriented European scholars
never accepted the idea of a transformational, purely syntactic relation. It
sufficed to falsify the active/passive synonymy to recognize the passive as a
construction in its own right. But the argument starts as to what should be
considered as such. As no single morphological device is unambiguous, semantics
and pragmatics come in again, finding, for instance, a partial explanation and
definition in the principle of the theme/subject coincidence. The range of
possible "passives" left open by such an approach induces one to look for the
semantic impact of every device to be found in the construction.
1.3. It is of course to be expected that the more deictic elements come in,
the less syntax will playa primary role, as is inaeed the case in the studies on
tense and aspect. Here, syntactic representation is only seen as a means of
PRESENTA nON xv
indicating the scope of Tense/Aspect and of temporal and aspectual adverbs.

Ultimately, semantics submitted to Gricean maxims unifies syntactic structures
without any common grammatical category (see Dominicy's contribution).
1.4. Whereas most syntactic studies tend to integrate semantic and pragmatic
considerations, achieving very often in return a considerable refinement of
semantic analysis, some articles in this volume illustrate however another
tendency: a return to bare syntax, often strongly formalized in spite of a
general rejection of deep structures. In this group are situated the contributions
by Koster and Zaenen, and perhaps the relational approach of Fauconnier.
Let us remind that Comrie, for his part, insists on the independence of syntax
from morphology.
2. A remarkable characteristic of current linguistic' studies apparent in this
volume is the extraordinary expansion of the syntactic domain. New
connections between hitherto unrelated facts are systematically explored. The
domain of investigation tends to be as general as possible, for what concerns
the range of constructions explained by the same analysis, as well as for the
phenomena employed as explanatory means. Cross-linguistic data are readily
adduced in the argument, as well as diachronic material or evidence from
language acquisition. This broadening of the perspective favours the search for
universals, but leads also, and this in apparent contradiction with the former
attitude, to a renewed interest in sophisticated detailstudies in a given language.
3. A further manifestation of the tendency to broaden the perspective of
syntactic research can also be found in the fact that the question of the
organization of the sentence within the context of discourse is more
systematically considered. This is achieved by different means and in divergent
perspectives. Zaenen provides a presentential place for generating the topic.
Kuno explains the impossibility of a reflexive form by a thematic position. It
is still another thing to mark the topic in the course of generation as is done in
functional grammar.
The point is however that such phenomena are recognized and explored.
This seems to reveal a renewed interest in the realization conditions of the object
of investigation. In the same vein, it can easily be explained that intonational
facts and suprasegmental prosody are re-assessed, be it in a sporadic way. This
largely unexplored sector has evident connections with syntax, semantics and
discourse perspective.
4. The interrelation between syntax and other linguistic disciplines can be
illustrated with the help of the following scheme, which enables us to situate
the various frameworks in relation to one another:
xvi L. TASMOWSKI - D. WILLEMS
1. CASES 8. PHONjMORPH 6. SEMANTICS 7. PRAGMATICS
2.DEPE~ENCY· 5.~CALREP~ATION
"
~. LEXlCON~4.SJAX/
t 9. SEMANTIC FEATURES
In this scheme, functional grammar passes through all the stages, and this is in
general true of European traditional perspective. Dependency grammar brings
together 2, 4 and 6 and lexical functional grammar 3, 4 and 5. Relational
grammar situates itself at 1, 2, 3, and 4. Functional sentence perspective is
concerned with 4, 6 and 7. Problems of tense and aspect are approached through
5, 6 and 7. McCawley passes from 9 to 8 before attaining 4. Finally 4 is the
central concern of Koster's contribution.
IV. The articles irt this volume, by their variety and originality suggest some
directions for further research.
1. The broadening of the perspective calls into question the definition of the
object of investigation. For more than twenty years, language was generally
simply equated with the infinite set of grammatical sentences of that language,
a point of view that is challenged here by McCawley. But it is not clear whether
the notion "grammatical sentence" has been adequately defined. On the one
hand, since a presentential place is foreseen in which the topic is generated, one
wonders if oral utterances such as Cette villa, on ne peut pas dormir ("This
villa, one can't sleep", produced by Blanche-Benveniste), which does not fit
into any kind of left dislocation, must be accounted for. And the reasons why
a post-sentential place for some coda isn't provided for (cf. J'ai un bon conseil
a te donner, toi "I have some good advice to give you, you", or C'est sur qu'il
y ressemble a un cluImeau "Sure-that-he-resembles-it, -a-camel" as compared with
?A un chameau, c'est sur qu'il y ressemble) are not obvious. It seems that the
left and right boundaries of the sentence are not definitely fIXed.
If, on the other hand, one leaves autonomous syntax and admits the influence
of non syntactic factors, the notion "grammatical sentence" must become
undetermined. Indeed, the acceptability of an utterance is a function of prosodic
factors (La~me Jean veut\vs .. */ii pomme Je"iiiiVeilt "The apple John wants"),
of semantics (John said of Mary that Tom is boring is only acceptable if Tom
PRESENTATION xvii
can be interpreted for instance as referring to Mary's husband, Gross 1968)

and of pragmatics (cp. I read as I would like people to read me [I = a writer]
! I eat as l would like people to eat me [I == a cook]). The output of purely
syntactic rules can thus never be tested as such, and the defInition of
"grammatical sentence" should interrelate theoretically the interferences of the
distinct aspects.
2. For the time being however, little consensus exists on that point as can be
seen from the various points of view to be found in this volume : surface
syntactical patterns are paralleled by intonational patterns but without one-to-
one correspondence (Blanche); surface syntactical functions are paralleled
by morphological characteristics, whereby Abraham would suggest that there
is one-to-one correspondence while Comrie definitely claims there is not; surface
structural phenomena are influenced by the speaker's point of view (Smith);
different cross-linguistic surface structures can be explained by reference to a
single semantic representation (Dominicy); one surface structural expression,
when it can be shown to have different characteristics, is to be put in
correspondence with different deep structures, each of them related to a single
meaning (transformational point of view resumed by Declerck); one surface
structural expression, even if it seems to have different characteristics, may be
put in correspondence with a single fundamental meaning (Dik) etc.
All theses divergences reduce to the option of considering the subdisciplines
either as autonomous fields or as interfering domains, the ultimate consequence
of the latter being an attempt to construct the sentences stepwise, without
continuity solution, as is done in Dik's functional grammar.
3. As stated above, the awareness of the mUltiplicity of factors involved in
the construction of the sentence caused many constraints imposed by traditional
approaches to be put aside and new connections between hitherto unrelated
facts to be systematically sought for. However, no agreement has been reached
on the question of how, by means of what units of analysis, this ideal of
generality should be obtained and this needs further consideration.
Indeed, as basic entities are posited semantic features, semantic roles,
grammatical functions, grammatical categories, categories further analysable
as a bundle of features and so on.
Further, even when there is uniformity as to the terms employed, they do
not cover the same kind of notions. If we take "subject" as an example, we see
that for Abraham it would primarily be characterized by a particular morpho-
logical case, whereas for Comrie it is essentially a phrase that conforms to
certain constr).lctional patterns on a surface structure level. But of course, where
xviii L. TASMOWSKI - D. WILLEMS
several criteria are used, the necessity of hierarchy arises, which forms a new
source of divergences. Therefore, some linguists, such as Fauconnier, will take
subject as an undefined primitive. Dik considers it to be the product of a choice
at a certain stage of the generation, and for Koster it is probably configurational-
ly determined with respect to some head.
This situation certainly results from the impossibility of laying down a set
of syntactic postulates that might in some way be considered "principled".
Admitting that an adequate characterization of every language utterance would
be that it is physicalization of thought, and that this is necessarily so because
communication rests on perception, and supposing that predicativity is an
essential feature of communication, then a system taking that notion, or an
analysis of that notion, as a primitive term, would seem to rest on rather
plausible grounds. And indeed, if similarly conditioned primitives could be
established for each separate level of analysis, some comparison between the
explicit choices would become possible.
4. Another point that needs clarification is the extraordinary variety of
linguistic data presented here. First, the customary set of facts - the positive
ones and the complementary ones that have to be filtered out - is extended by
the addition of tokens from spoken language, dialect variants, historical data,
data from other languages, with or without historical links, and data from
language acquisition. Their complexity can furthermore be enhanced by the
recognition of various styles and registers of language, in fact implicitly present
in every grammaticality judgement, since saying that a particular construction
belongs to the language often implies that it is acceptable in a particular
situation, in accordance with the speaker's status, point of view, knowledge and
intentions. Variety being as essential a characteristic of language as regularity,
it certainly has to be taken into consideration. But if the primary data are a
heterogeneous collection, varying along the dimensions of space, time, speakers
etc., the rules themselves provide theoretical unity and delimit the object of
investigation, free to restrict or extend the range of facts that are considered.
Now, apart from logical questions of internal consistency and scientific require-
ments of explicitness, one evaluation criterion for a theory is its adequacy
with regard to the facts: the number of facts it is able to predict and the
adequacy of the prediction with regard to the known facts. In the actual absence
of a theory of variation and of an explicit stratification of linguistic facts
however, the criterion of descriptive adequacy seems quite arbitrary, not to say
useless.
PRESENT AnON xix
v. A number of original and exciting solutions to specific problems in syntax

have been presented by the contributors to this volume, and new directions
for investigation have been opened. At the same time, by their very "re-
pre~entativity" of current linguistic approaches, they suggest the need for a
theoretical clarification of some points (a reflection on the notion "sentence",
the interrelation between the linguistic subdisciplines, the search for units of
analysis at each level, the establishment of a theory of variation).
The convergences found between most contributions further suggest the
following paradox: problems in syntax are not necessarily syntactic problems.
Liliane Tasmowski
Dominique Willems
SYNTACTIC-MORPHOLOGICAL DISCREPANCIES IN
MALTESE SENTENCE STRUCTURE*
Bernard Comrie
University of Southern California, Los Angeles
1. Introduction
1.1. Morphology and language structure
One area of considerable controversy in current linguistic theory and

descriptive practice is the relationship between morphology and syntax, the
central problem being as follows: does the morphology of a lan~ua~e reflect
the structure of the language, i.e. is there a single function for each morpho-
logical opposition in the language, or is it possible for there to be discrepancies
between form and function, such that a single morphological form would serve
a variety of different functions? Transformational-generative grammar has
typically emphasized discrepancies between form and function, concentrating
for instance on areas where superficially similar constructions can be aSSigned
radically different underlying representations, or where superficially quite
distinct constructions can be assigned essentially the same underlying
representation. Perhaps in part as a reaction against this, the doctrine 'one form
- one function', an extreme version of the view that morphology does provide
a direct insight into language structure, has become quite popular.
Much of the 'argumentation' between these opposing positions has been
aprioristic, often involving unsubstantiated appeals to 'ease of learnability'
or elegance. The present paper aims not to add to this aprioristic literature,
but rather to look at some real data which, it is hoped, will show that there is
at least one language, Maltese, where a number of constructions show clear
discrepancy between the morphological form and the syntactic function of
3
4 B. COMRIE
certain elements. Indeed, for the constructions examined, the discrepancy is

almost total: the morphology seems to be pointing in one direction, but a
variety of independent syntactic tests all point in the other direction. It thus
remains open to test in each individual instance in each language whether or not
the morphology provides direct insight into the structure of the language.
1.2. The Maltese language
The data used in the present paper are from Maltese, the dominant and
co-official (with English) language of the Republic of Malta in the Mediterranean,
some S8 miles south of Sicily. Maltese is, genetically, a variety of North African
vernacular Arabic. However, since the twelfth century Malta has been culturally
cut off from other forms of Arabic and subject to a strong Sicilian and, later,
standard Italian influence: this influence has been primarily on the lexicon
(including phraseology), and has also led to certain changes in morphology (in
the forms themselves, not in the range of categories distinguished). More recent-
ly, Maltese has borrowed a number of lexical items from English, though these
are not in general integrated into the overall system of the language, as the
Siculo-ltalian loans are. Maltese is treated here, however, purely from a
synchronic perspective, a part from some brief diachronic asides in section 7.
Although I have not systematically compared the aspects of Maltese syntax to
be discussed below with the corresponding constructions in other forms of
Arabic, unsystematic glances at what information is available on the syntax of
Arabic vernaculars, in particular those of North Africa, suggest that many of
these aspects may be quite widespread within vernacular Arabic (and thus not,
incidentally, attributable to Siculo-ltalian influence on Maltese). Development
of this theme, however, and also comparison with Classical Arabic and Modern
Written Arabic, must remain a task for future research. Maltese is here treated
simply as a language in its own right.
Some general features of Maltese sentence structure must be given before
the detailed presentation of the following sections. The basic word order is
Subject - Verb - Object, although other word orders, including Verb - Subject -
Object (the older Semitic order), are found; for further discussion, see Agius
& Kalmar (forthcoming). Most of the other features of canonical Verb - Object
order are present: in particular, adjectives and genitives follow their head noun,
auxiliaries precede the main verb, and Maltese has prepositions rather than post-
positions. These features are illustrated and elaborated in the discussion below.
SYNTACTIC-MORPHOLOGICAL DISCREPANCIES 5
2. Subjects and objects: clear cases
Here, I present some of the characteristics of clear instances of subjects and

objects, since it will be necessary to contrast their behavior with that of the un-
clear cases, presented in section 3 and analyzed in sections 4-6, where I will
claim that morphology and syntax are at odds.
2.1. Subjects}
In Maltese, the subject usually precedes its predicate, although, as noted in

section 1.2, other word orders are possible, making word order a less than
certain test for grammatical relations. Subjects in Maltese are not case-marked;
since certain direct objects, and all nondirect objects, are marked by pre-
positions, case-marking can in certain instances be used as a test of grammatical
relation. However, the clearest morphological test for subjecthood in Maltese
is provided by Subject-Yerb-Agreement: in Maltese, the verb must agree in
person and number and, in the third person singular, in gender with its subject.
The affixes indicating Subject-Yerb-Agreement are set out in Table 1; although
these affixes undergo a certain amount of morphophonemic variation, their
occurrence should be clear from the morpheme boundaries and glosses provided
in the examples below. Note that Maltese distinguishes two simple tense-aspect
forms: the Perfect (as a simple tense-aspect, with past perfective meaning)
and the Imperfect (as a simple tense-aspect, with present imperfective meaning);
the terms Perfect and Imperfect are traditional, and are here used as convenient
labels only.
Table I. Conjugation of finite verb: kiteb 'he wrote'
Subject pronoun Perfect Imperfect

Singular} jien(a) ktib-t n-ikteb
2 int(i) ktib-t t-ikteb
3 masculine hu(wa) kiteb j-ikteb
feminine hiGa) kitb-et t-ikteb
Plural } a1ina ktib-na n-iktb-u
2 intom ktib-tu t-iktb-u
3 huma kitb-u j-iktb-u
6 B. COMRIE
Given that the verb shows the person and number (and gender) of the subject
to the same extent as do separate pronouns (except for the limited syncretism
of first and second person Singular in the Perfect, and of second person singular
and third person singular feminine in the Imperfect), subject pronouns are
usually omitted if unstressed; we may thus distinguish between unstressed and
stressed pronouns, a distinction that will be relevant also in the discussion of
direct objects. The following sentences illustrate these points :2
(1) (lien) n-ikteb.

I S l/SU-write
'I write.'
(2) (Hi) kitb-et
she wrote-S3F/SU
'She wrote.'
(3) Pawlu j-ikteb.
Paul S3M/SU-write
'Paul writes.'
In addition to simple tense-aspect forms, Maltese also has a range of complex

verb forms (verb complexes). Some of these involve invariable particles: thus
the future is usually indicated by placing the particle sa before the Imperfect,
and the progressive by placing qed before the Imperfect:
(4) (Jien)sa n-ikteb.

I FUTURE Sl/SU-write
'I will write.'
(5) Pawlu qed j-ikteb.
Paul PROGRESSIVE S3M/SU-write
'Paul is writing.'
Other complex forms utilize a conjugated auxiliary verb. Thus, addition of the
Perfect of 'be' before a conjugated verb form throws the time reference of that
verb form further into the past: if the main verb is Imperfect, the sense is past
imperfective; if the main verb is Perfect, the sense is pluperfect:
(6) (Intom) kon-tu t-iktb-u.

you-P . was-P2/SU P2/SU-write
'You used to write.'
(7) Pawlu kien kiteb
Paul was-S3M/SU wrote-S3M/SU
'Paul had written.'
Note that all the conjugated verb forms in such complexes must be of the same
person, number and gender: combinations like kon-t kiteb are ungrammatical
and meaningless; Maltese does not, incidentally, have an infinitive verb form
lacking person, number and gender (though there are nouns derived from verbs,
with clearly nominal rather than verbal form and function).
More complex forms also occur. For instance, the time reference can be
thrown into the future by using sa with the Imperfect of 'be' as an auxiliary,
or progressive qed can be added to complex forms whose first conjugated form
is Imperfect; these more complex forms, however, add nothing to the data
possibilities that are relevant to the present discussion.
In addition to verbal sentences, Maltese also has verbless (nominal) sentences,
namely with an adjectival, noun phrase, or adverbial predicate in the present
tense. (In other tenses, the verb kien 'be' is used.) Except in elliptical sentences,
the subject must be expressed even if an unstressed pronoun (given that there is
no possibility for Subject-Verb-Agreement). If the subject is a full noun phrase
then, under conditions which merit more detailed investigation, a coreferential
pronoun may be inserted between subject and predicate:
(8) Hu tabib.
he doctor
'He is a doctor. '
(9) Hu fqir.
he poor
'He is poor.'
(10) Hu hawn.
he here
'He is here.'
(11) Pawlu (hu) tabib.
Paul he doctor
'Paul is a doctor.'
(12) Marija (hi) fqir-a.
Mari she poor-F
'Mary is poor.'
(13) Pawlu hawn.
Paul here
'Paul is here'.
2.2. Direct objects
The overt encoding of direct objects is somewhat more complex. Direct

objects usually follow the verb, though they may also be preposed, in particular
by Topicaiization, discussed further below. Some direct objects require the
8 B. COMRIE
preposition iii (variant 'I), which otherwise indicates indirect objects (recipients),
some direct objects allow this preposition, while yet others cannot take lil.
The most detailed discussion to date is by Borg (1981: chapter 2) and can be
summarized as follows: lil is required for stressed pronouns and for proper
names of persons; lil is possible with other definite animate noun phrases, and
marginally possible with definite concrete inanimate noun phrases; otherwise
(with indefinite noun phrases, and with inanimate, especially abstract, noun
p!uases), it is impossible. By constructing paradigms of sentences including
noun phrases from these various sets, one can tell whether a given noun phrase
is a subject (never with iii), an indirect object (always with Ii!), or a direct object
(presence or absence of lil according to the above criteria). Illustrative examples
of direct objects are:
(14) Marija qatl-et far.

Mary killed-S3F ISU rat
'Mary killed a rat'
(I5) Marija qatl-et lil Pawlu.
'Mary killed Paul.'
(16) Marija qatl-et il-farjlil-I-far.
'Mary killed the rat.'
(Note that Maltese has no indefinite article; the definite article is (i)I-, with
morphophonemic alternants that are not relevant here.)
For unstressed personal pronouns, Maltese has a special set of verb suffixes,
as set out in Table 2. These suffixes are always distinct from the corresponding
Table 2. Direct object suffixes: qatl-et (qat/-it-) 'she killed'
Singular I qatl-it-ni
2 qatl-it-ek
3 masculine qatl-it-u
feminine qatl-it-ha
Plural I qatl-it-na
2 qatl-it-kom
3 qatl-it-hom
Note: After vowels, the third person singular masculine suffix takes the form -h.
SYNTACTIC --MORPHO LOG ICAL DISCREPANCIES 9
Subject-Verb-Agreement affix, providing a clear morphological distinction

between subject and direct object (and also other objects). For 'I killed him',
the following two versions give, first, a stressed direct object pronoun (for the
form lil-u, see section 2.3), second an unstressed direct object pronoun:
(17) Qtil-t Iil-u.

killed-SI/SU S3M/PO
(18) Qtil-t-u.
killed-S I/SU-S3M/DO
'I killed him.'
It was observed above that direct objects can be fronted by Topicalization.

In this construction, the direct object appears sentence-initially, with or without
iii, while the verb has an object suffix agreeing with the preposed noun phrase:
(19) Il-far/lil-I-far Marija qatl-it-u.

the-rat Mary killed-S3F ISU-S3M/DO
'The rat, Mary killed (it).'
Note that topics which are not subjects do not trigger Verb-Subject-Agreement,
i.e. such agreement distinguishes between subjects and topics. It is also possible
to have, without Topicalization, cooccurrence of a full noun phrase direct
object and a coreferential object suffix:
(20) Marija qatl-it-u I-far/lil-I-far.

'Mary killed the rat.'
The conditions under which sentences like (20) are possible, and the distinction
in force, if any, between (20) and (16), require further investigation.
2.3. Prepositional objects
As noted in section 1.2, Maltese has prepositions, and these combine with
a following full noun phrase without any further marking. Thus, with the
preposition gtumd 'at the place of (cf. French chez), we have ghand Pawlu
'at Paul's place' ,g~and ii-mara 'at the woman's place'. With unstressed pronouns,
however, pronominal suffixes are attached to the preposition, as indicated in
Table 3; thus 'at my place' isghand-i. These suffixes are the same as those for
direct objects of verbs, except in the first person singular (-i, or -ja after vowels,
10 B. COMRIE
rather than the direct object suffix -ni).
Table 3. Prepositional object suffixes: gliand 'at the place of
Singular I gtiand-i
2 g"ttand-ek
3 masculine gnand-u
feminine gtiand-ha
Plural I g"ttand-na
2 g"ttand-kom
3 ghand-hom
Note: After vowels, the first person singular suffix has the form -ja, and the
third person singular masculine the form -h.
Finally in this section, we may note that Maltese also has indirect object
suffixes on verbs: these take the form of an / (etymologically cognate with the
preposition lil) followed by the prepositional object form of the pronoun
suffixes, e.g. kitb-it-/-i 'she wrote to me', kitb-it-hom-/-i 'she wrote them to me'.
Such forms playa marginal role in what follows (section 6.1).
3. Problematic constructions
In this section, I present two classes of construction which are problematic

as regards the relation between their morphology and their syntactic structure.
For each class of construction, I present two analyses, one following the
morphology, the other diverging from it radically. In section 3, the two analyses
are simply presented without justification, while in sections 4-6 I will argue that
the second analysis, going contrary to the morphology, is in fact correct. In the
following section, informal labels have been given to the classes of construction
involved: these should be treated as purely informal, arbitrary labels, and imply
no commitment as to analysis.
3.1. Possessive predicate
Where English uses the verb haJle to express a possessive predicate, Maltese
uses a construction which can be described formally in the following terms.
In place of an item having the morphological properties of a verb, the

preposition ghand is used. Henceforth this will be glossed, in all its uses, simply
as 'at'. Where the possessor is an unstressed pronoun, this appears as a
prepositional object on gnand .• The item possessed typically follows g'ttand :
(21) Gtiand-i ktieb.

at-Sl/PO book
'I have a book.'
The construction thus bears a close formal relationship to a locative

construction: in fact, if one wanted to say 'the book is at my place', the
construction would be almost identical:
(22) Il-ktieb gfumd-i.
The difference in word order (g'lia.nd typically before the item possessed, but
after the item located) could readily be attributed to the difference in topic-
comment structure. Thus an analysis close to the form of (21), equating
morphological and syntactic structure, would say that the possessed item is
subject of the sentence, and that gtuznd is the locative preposition, taking as
its object the possessor.
The alternative analysis, claiming a morphological-syntactic discrepancy,
would claim that in (21), the prepositional object suffix in fact encodes the
subject, i.e. the possessor is a morphologically irregular subject; the item g~nd
would be an irregular verb, agreeing with its subject as if that subject were a
prepositional object; while ktieb would (probably - see footnote 4) be
considered a direct object. Presented as baldly as this, the second analysis might
seem woefully inadequate, if not downright immoral: criticism of it would
center on the complete failure to consider the forms of Maltese in their own
right, attempting rather to impose on Maltese the alien syntactic structure of
the English construction I have a book. For now, I simply present the two
analyses, to return in sections 4-6 to demonstrate that the second analysis,
despite first appearances, is in fact the correct analysis of this construction.
3.2. Quasi-auxiliaries
The name given to the phenomenon to be discussed in this section is even

more arbitrary than other terms, and is used solely as a catch-all term for a
12 B. COMRIE
group of forms with similar morphological and syntactic behavior, all of which
indicate various tense-aspect or mood features of the sentence. They are g~ad
'still', gliodd 'almost', donn 'seem', and qis 'be like, as if. Each of these items
functions as an invariable stem, to which can be attached direct object suffixes;
this form is then followed by a finite verb with a subject affix corresponding
to the direct object affix of the quasi-auxiliary:
(23) Gnad-ni n-ikteb.

still- Sl/DO Sl/SU-write
'I still write.'
(24) Ghodd-ni waqaj-t
almost-Sl/DO fell-Sl/SU
'I almost fell.'
(25) Donn-u j-af.
seem-S3M/DO S3M/SU-know
'He seems to know.'
The analysis following form would argue that in a form like gliad -ni the suffix
-ni correlates with a direct object, and indeed the form -ni is, qua form, unequi-
vocally the first person singular direct object suffix. The alternative analysis
would say that these suffixes correlate with the subject, i.e. the quasi-
auxiliaries are irregular verbs which agree with their subjects (as all Maltese
verbs must do), but by taking the morphology of direct object suffixation.
With quasi-auxiliaries, the first analysis, following form, can in fact be taken
a step further. The stems g~odd-, donn-, and qis- are etymologically the
imperative singulars of verbs meaning 'consider', 'consider', and 'measure',
respectively, and gfiodd and qis still function synchronically as imperatives of
these verbs 3 . Thus, for gfiodd and qis at least, one might maintain, in terms of
an analysis advocating one-one correspondence between form and function,
that these are synchronically second person singular imperatives, i.e. not only
does the suffix not refer to a subject (but to a direct object), but there is a
different subject, second person singular. Below, I will show that either variant
of the first analysis is incorrect. Incidentally, gfzad seems to have a different
origin: it still survives as an adverb, and can be used before an Imperfect verb
to indicate future time reference:
(26) Gtiad n-ikteb.

still S I/SU-write
'I will yet write.'
Note that in this use, it takes no suffix. However, it is not clear that the two
uses of g~ad can be given a uniform analysis, even by those who advocate
absolute correspondence of form and function, since the quasi-auxiliary has one
clear verb property that the adverb gtiad lacks: it takes the unequivocally
direct object suffix -ni (first person singular).
The discussion of sections 1-3 essentially recapitulates and reorganizes the
treatment of these various constructions given, with various degrees of explicit-
ness, in traditional grammars of Maltese. Even the competing analyses set out
above can be found, implicitly or explicitly, in such traditional grammars. The
original contribution of the present paper, however, contained in sections 4-6,
is to show that it is possible to evaluate between these competing analyses by
careful consideration of the properties of verbs and grammatical relations in
Maltese, without any appeal to aprioristic or aesthetic considerations. Although
some of the criteria used below have been alluded to occasionally in earlier
works -- for instance, Schabert (1976: 133-134) mentions negation as a test for
verbhood -, I am not aware of any attempt as detailed as this to marshal the
evidence in favor of one analysis or the other.
4. Full noun phrases in problematic constructions
In the presentation of problematic constructions in section 3, most of the

examples involved unstressed pronouns. In section 4, I turn to corresponding
examples with full noun phrases.
4.1. Possessive predicate with full noun phrase
In the true locative construction, with the preposition g1iand in its literal
meaning 'at (the place ot)', the preposition governs a full noun phrase directly,
i.e. full noun phrase and prepositional object suffix are in complementary
distribution:
(27) Il-bajda gtiand-u.

the-egg at-S3M/PO
'The egg is at his place.'
(28) Il-bajda gnand Pawlu.
'The egg is at Paul's place.'
In the possessive construction, however, this is not the case. In this

14 B. COMRIE
construction, g'liand must always have a suffix. If the possessor is a full noun
phrase, then it simply precedes gtzand, which takes the suffix of the same person,
number and gender as the possessor:
(29) Chand -u bajda.

at-S3M/PO egg
'He has an egg.'
(30) Pawlu g1i.and-u bajda.
Paul at-S3M/PO egg
'Paul has an egg.'
(31) Marija glland-ha bajda.
Mary at-S3F /PO egg
'Mary has an egg.'
In the possessive sense, it would not be possible to say ghand Pawlu bajda or
gtumd Marija bajda, yet this is precisely what would be predicted by the analysis
which claims a one-one correspondence between morphology and sentence
structure.
One might ask how adherents of such an analysis might in fact deal with
the data of (30)-(31). The only obvious solution, maintaining other aspects of
their position, would be to say that some kind of Topicalization is involved, i.e.
Pawlu is topic, not subject, of (30) and, as usually in Maltese, the topicalized
nonsubject is taken up again by an unstressed pronoun. However, the absence of
any untopicalized version of this sentence (in particular *g1fand Pawlu bajda)
makes this dubious as a synchronic analysis. (For the diachronic possibilities,
see section 7.) In other words, attempting to maintain a neat one-one corres-
pondence between form and syntactic structure in one area leads only to
complication elsewhere, since the putative Topicalization would not have the
distinctive function it has elsewhere, where topicalized and nontopicalized
variants contrast.
The second analysis presented in section 3.1, however, actually predicts the
data of (30)-(31). Since the possessor, on this analysis, is a subject, it naturally
comes first in the sentence, preceding the verb. Since gTiand is analyzed as a
verb, it naturally follows the subject, and obligatorily agrees with the subject in
person, number and gender. The only irregularity is that gfiand agrees with its
subject by taking prepositional object suffixes rather than subject suffixes,
which is of course the hallmark of the analysis advocating morphological-
syntactic discrepancy.4
SYNTACTIC- MORPHO LOG ICAL DISCREPANCIES 15
4.2. Quasi-auxiliaries with full noun phrase
The behavior of full noun phrases with quasi-auxiliaries parallels exactly

their behavior in the possessive predicate construction (section 4.1) : the full
noun phrase precedes, in the most typical order, the quasi-auxiliary, and the
quasi-auxiliary must have a suffix (formally, a direct object suffix) agreeing in
person, number and gender with that full noun phrase:
(32) II-far g1iodd-u waqa'

the-rat almost-S3M/DO felJ-S3M/SU
'The rat almost fell.'
It is not possible to construct the full noun phrase as a direct object of the quasi-
auxiliary:
(33) *G1iodd il-far/lil-I-far waqa'.

almost the-rat fell-S3M/SU
If (33) means anything, it is 'consider the rat; he has fallen', i.e. with gtlOdd
taken as the imperative of 'consider'.
As with the possessive predicate construction, advocates of the 'one form -
one function' analysis would be forced to establish an obligatory instance of
synchronic Topicalization, lacking' a nontopicalized variant, to make any sense
at all out of sentences like (32). The alternative analysis, however, again actual-
ly predicts the observed pattern: in (32), ii-far is subject, therefore the verb
gflOdd must agree with it, the only irregularity being that this verb takes direct
object suffixes to show Subject-Verb-Agreement. Incidentally, exactly the
same pattern is evinced by ghad, without there being even a conceivable inter-
pretation for (34) :
(34) II-baqra g1iad-ha t-orqod.

the-cow still-S3F /DO S3F /SU-sleep
'The cow still sleeps.'
(35) *Gha&' il-baqra/lil-I-baqra t-orqod.
16 B. COMRIE
5. Negation
5.1. Negation in clear cases
The formal side of negation is somewhat complex in Maltese, so that it will

be necessary to establish the rule(s) for negation in clear cases before turning
to the application of those rules in the problematic cases. For nonimperative
verb forms, Maltese negation is expressed by means of a particle rna (rn' before
a vowel sound, thus including the silent letters hand gli) and a suffix _x.S
The particle immediately precedes the verb, while the suffix is attached to the
verb; for most verb forms, the addition of the suffix occasions a stress shift
one syllable to the right, which may in turn occasion vowel change, e.g. un-
stressed e to i and word-final a to ie. The following examples give parallel
positive and negative sentences :
(36) (Hi) kitb-et.

'She wrote.'
(Hi) rna kitb-it-x.
'She didn't write.
(37) (lien) n-ikteb.
'I write'
(Jien) rna n-iktib-x.
'I don't write.'
(38) Marija qatl-it-kom.
,
'Mary killed you.'
Marija rna qatl-it-kom-x.
'Mary didn't kill you.'
(Note that the negative suffix follows pronominal suffixes.)

In compound verb forms, only the first finite verb form takes the circumfix
rna ... -x,'
(39) (Intom) kon-tu t-iktb-u.

'Y ou used to write.'
(Intom) rna kon-tu-x t-iktb-u.
'You used not to write.'
The provisional generalization is thus: place the circumfix rna ... -x around the
first word of the verb complex.
The situation is complicated, however, by complexes where the first word
of the verb complex is not a verb, e.g. the particle sa indicating futurity. Here
we get the following pattern :
(40) (Intom) sa t-iktb-u.

'You will write.'
(Intom) m'intom-x sa t-iktb-u.
'You won't writ~.'
(41) Pawlu saj-ikteb
'Paul will write.'
Pawlu m'hu-x saj-ikteb.
'Paul won't write.'
In these examples, we have insertion of a form consisting of a pronoun of the

same person, number and gender as the subject, but with the circumfix rna ... -x
(see further the second column of Table 4).
Table 4. Personal pronouns
basic Negative
Singular I jien(a) M'inie·x (majinie-x)
2 int(i) m'inti-x
3 masculine hu(wa) m'hu-x (m'huwie-x)
feminine hiGa) m'hi-x (m'hijie-x)
Plural anna m'atmie-x
2 intorn rn'intorn-x
3 huma m'humie-x
Similarly, if the predicate in nonverbal, negation is expressed by insertion of

a pronoun of the same person, number and gender as the subject, but with the
circumfix rna ... _x. 6 Given that this 'negative pronoun' expresses the person,
number and gender of the subject, an unstressed subject pronoun may be
omitted. Note that, if a coreferential subject pronoun is optional or obligatory
in the affirmative, the negative pronoun takes its place in the negative:
(42) Hutabib.
'He is a doctor.'
(Hu) m'hu-x tabib.
'He isn't a doctor.'
(43) Pawlu (hu) fqir.
'Paul is poor.'
18 B. COMRIE
Pawlu m'hu-x fqir.

Paul isn't poor.'
(44) Marija hawn.
'Mary is here.'
Marija m'hi-x hawn.
'Mary isn't here.'
(45) Jien fqir.
'I am poor.'
(J ien) m'inie-x fqir.
'I am not poor.'
The full generalization for negation is thus :
(46) If the first word of the verb complex is a verb, prefix ma (m 'before a
vowel sound) and suffix -x to that first word; if the first word is not a
verb, insert before the verb complex a form consisting of the circum fix
m(a) ... -x on a pronoun agreeing with the subject.
The negative corresponding to an imperative is the second person of the

Imperfect with t~e suffix -x; there is usually no prefixed particle, though la
(not rna) may be used:
(47) Ikteb!
'Write !'
(La) t-iktib-x !
'Don't write!'
5.2. Negation of the possessive predicate
In the strict locative construction, in the present tense, there is no verb, so

negation, by the second part of generalization (46), involves insertion of a
negative pronoun:
( 48) Il-ktie b g1iand -u.

'The book is at his place.'
Il-ktieb m'hu-x gtiand-u.
'The book isn't at his place.'
(49) Il-baqra gnand-i.
'The cow is at my place.'
Il-baqra m'hi-xgliand-i.
'The cow isn't at my place.'
With the possessive construction, however, this is impossible. Instead, the cir-
cumfix rna ... -x is added tog~and with its pronominal suffix:
(50) Ghand-i bajda.

'I have an egg.'
M'gli.and-i-x bajda.
'I don't have an egg.'
(51) Pawlu g1iand-u bajda.
'Paul has an egg.'
Pawlu m'gliand-u-x bajda.
'Paul doesn't have an egg.'
No variant is possible for these negative possessive constructions with a negated

pronoun; thus, for (51), we cannot have (52), with a third person singular
masculine pronoun (cf. Pawlu), or (53), with a third person singular feminine
pronoun (cf. bajda) :
(52) *Pawlu m'hu-x gnand-u bajda.

(53) *Pawlu m'hi-x gnand·u bajda.
Here, there seems to be no way in which the 'one form - one function'
approach can provide a motivated analysis of the negative construction: the
possibility of taking the circumfix rna ... -x is elsewhere clearly a criterion for
verbhood, and the negativ~ possessive predicate construction behaves radically
differently from the negative locative construction. The second analysis,
whereby the possessor is subject and ghand is an irregular verb, predicts the data
given above, most crucially in that g~and is negated like a verb.
5.3. Negation of quasi-auxiliaries
For most of the quasi-auxiliaries, there is no doubt about their being verbs,
so the negation test, which primarily distinguishes verbs from nonverbs, is not
directly relevant: both the 'one form - one function' analysis and its rival main-
tain that the quaSi-auxiliaries are verbs (the 'one form - one function' analysis
on the basis that they take direct object suffixes). It should, however, be noted
that this test does encompass the quasi-auxiliary gfiad, which is not a verb in
origin :
(54) Il-baqrag1iad-ha t-orqod.

'The cow is still sleeping. '
20 B. COMRIE
(55) Il-baqram'gnad·hie-x t-orqod. 7

'The cow is no longer sleeping.'
Negation of quasi-auxiliaries does demonstrate that these forms are not,

synchronically, second person singular imperatives, since the negative imperative
(optional la, with the second person of the Imperfect with the suffix -x - see
section 5.1) is excluded:
(56) *Il-baqra (Ia) d-donn-hie-x t-orqod. 8

'The cow doesn't seem to sleep.'
6. Other tenses
6.1. Possessive predicate in past and future
All the examples of the possessive predicate so far have been present. In the
past and future, Maltese uses a construction which, in terms of its formal
relation to the present, involves irregularity by any account. In the past,gfiand-
is replaced by kell-; in the future, gfiand- is replaced by sa jkoll-. These forms
take the same pronominal suffixes as g'liand, and have exactly the same syntax,
for instance with regard to full noun phrases and negation (though sa jkoll-,
having sa as first word of its verb complex, falls under the second par.t of
generalization (46) concerning negation) :
(57) Kell-i ktieb.

'I had a book.'
(58) Ma kell-i-x ktieb.
'I didn't have a book.'
(59) Pawlu kell-u ktieb.
'Paul had a book.'
(60) Pawlu rna kell-u-x ktieb.
'Paul didn't have a book.'
(61) Marija sa jkoll-ha ktie b.
'Mary will have a book.'
(62) Marija m 'hi-x sa jkoll-ha ktieb.
'Mary won't have a book.'
These past and future forms are etymologically the third person singular
masculine form of the Perfect (kien) and Imperfect (j-kun) of 'be', respectively,
followed by an indirect object pronoun suffix, although it is doubtful whether
SYNT ACnC-MORPHOLOGICAL DISCREPANCIES 21
this analysis is still felt synchronically. One point that should, however, be
emphasized is that if the possessed item in the future is feminine (e.g. bajda
'egg'), the form of the possessive predicate remains jkoll-, even though the j
is etymologically a third person singular masculine prefix, and is not replaced
by the feminine form to give *t-koll- :
(63) *Pawlu sa t-koll-u bajda.

'Paul will have an egg.'
Note also that in (62), the negative m'hi-x agrees with the feminine possessor
Marija; such negative pronouns never agree with the object possessed.
Since the behavior of these other tenses exactly parallels that of g'liand in
the present, the set of predictions made correctly by the analysis advocated here,
and incorrectly by the 'one form - one meaning' approach, is precisely the
same in these other tenses.
6.2. Quasi-auxiliaries in complex tenses
In section 2.1, I observed that the time reference of a sentence can be pushed
into the past or future by use of the Perfect or sa plus the Imperfect of kien
'be', respectively, with the further proviso that the auxiliary 'be' and the main
verb must be of the same person, number and gender. We may now turn to such
constructions with the quasi-auxiliaries. In section 3.2 we had examples like
'the rat almost fell', so let us now push this sentence further into the past, as
'the rat had almost fallen'. The following examples give parallel versions of
simple Perfect (past time reference) and Perfect of kien with Perfect of main
verb (Pluperfect time reference) of examples with 'almost' :
(64) G1iodd-ni waqaj-t.

almost-Sl/DO fell-Sl/SU
'I almost fell.'
(65) Kon-t g1iodd'ni waqaj-t.
was-Sl/SU almost-Sl/DO fell-Sl/SU
'I had almost fallen.'
(66) Marija ghodd-ha waqgii-et.
Mary almost-S3F /DO fell-S3F /SU
'Mary almost fell.'
(67) Marija kien-et g1iodd-ha waqg1i-et.
Mary was-S3F /SU almost-S3F IDO fell-S3F I SU
'Mary had almost fallen.'
22 B. COMRIE
In each such example, the aUxiliary kien agrees in person, number and gender
with the noun phrase expressed as direct object of g'liodd. Similar examples can
be constructed withgltzd, donn, and qis.
This is clearly not what is predicted by the 'one form - one function'
analysis, in any of its variants. If gtiodd is a singular imperative, then we would
expect no grammatical sentence with an auxiliary, since in Maltese the
imperative does not combine with a preceding form of kien; or perhaps a second
person singular auxiliary, but this is not possible (except, of course, irrelevant-
ly, if the sentence is 'you had almost...'). If gtiodd is first person singular (see
footnote 3), we would expect a first person singular auxiliary, but this again is
not possible (except, of course, irrelevantly, if the sentence is 'I had almost...').
If ghodd is some kind of invariant verb, one might expect an invariable third
person singular masculine auxiliary, the usual unmarked agreement form in
Maltese, but again this is impossible (except as per footnote 6, and in any event
the possibility of ')ther 'negative pronouns' contradicts the analysis of gfiodd
as an impersonal verb).9
Yet, once again, the paradigm of (64)-(67) is precisely what is predicted by
the alternative analysis rejecting the facile assumption of 'one form - one
function'. Despite the morphology, the verb forms kon-t and gTzodd-ni have the
same subject, first person singular, as do kien-et and gfzodd-ha, third person
singular feminine. Syntactically, then, these quasi-auxiliaries (and, of course,
any auxiliaries forming a verb complex with the quasi-auxiliary) must agree in
person, number, and gender with the subject of the main verb.
6.3. Related considerations
The crucial aspect of the discussion in section 6.2 was the requirement, in
the construction considered, that all verb forms have the same subject. There are
several other constructions in Maltese that have a similar requirement on verb
sequences. For instance, the verb sata' 'be able' requires that the following verb
have the same subject as itself. The restriction noted in section 3.2 that the
object suffix of a quasi-auxiliary must be coreferential with the subject of the
following verb is another similar example. (The statement of this last
generalization is neutral between the 'one form - one function' and the
alternative analyses; under the latter, however, it is simply a special case of the
like-subject constraint.) By creating chains of forms involving quasi-auxiliaries,
possessive predicates, etc., we can provide further evidence of the grammatical
relation subject advocated here: I 0
(68) N-ista' g't1and.i ktieb.

SI/SU-can at-SljPO book
'I can have a book.'
(69) G1ia.d-ni g1iand-i ktieb.
still-S 1100 at-S IIPO book
'I still have a book.'
(70) Qis-ek g"tiand-ek g'hajn.
as-S2/DO at-S2/PO fountain
'You practically have a fountain.'
(71) Kien-et qis-ha g1i.ad-ha fqir-a
was-S3F ISU as-S3F 100 still-S3F 100 poor-F
'She was as if still poor.'
The precise delimitation of the range of possibilities, and of impossibilities,

here is striking confirmation of the essential correctness, including predictive
power, of the analysis advocated here.
7. Conclusions and reflections
The most immediate aim of this paper has been to demonstrate, with a range
of independent arguments, one particularly clear instance of morphological-
syntactic discrepancy in a natural language, across a range of constructions.
In fact, with Maltese, it is possible to find even more instances of such dis-
crepancies, though to avoid charges of 'over-kill' I will restrict myself to
discussing just one further example. ii Maltese hemm, like English there, can be
used in both locative and existential constructions:
(72) Il-bctida hemm.

'The egg is there.'
(73) Hemm bajda fuq il-mejda.
'There is an egg on the table.'
In terms of overt form, the main difference between (72) and (73) is in the word
order. Nonetheless, the structures of the two sentences are radically different.
Sentence (72) exhibits a nonverbal predicate, as can be seen from its negative
and past correspondents:
(74) Il-bajda m'hi-x hemm.

'The egg isn't there.'
(75) Il-bajda kien-et hemm.
'The egg was there.'
24 B. COMRIE
In sentence (73), however, hemm is an impersonal verb, which can be glossed

as 'there is', as can be seen from its negative and past correspondents:
(76) M'hemm-x bajda fuq il-mejda.

'There isn't an egg on the table.'
(77) Kien hemm bajda fuq il-mejda
'There was an egg on the table.'
The form m'hemm-x in (76) shows that hemm is a verb, while the invariable
kien in (77) shows that bajda is not subject, otherwise, since bajda is a feminine
noun, one would have expected third person singular feminine kien-et, as in
(75).
How, more precisely, do all these considerations relate to the 'one form -
one function' controversy? Clearly, it has been shown that there is one pervasive
aspect of Maltese sentence structure, namely the identification of the verb and
of grammatical relations, that is largely independent of the morphology yet
still interacts with other factors in determining the grammaticality or ungramma-
ticality of sentences, i.e. morphology cannot be the whole of language structure.
However, an advocate of the 'one form - one function' approach might retreat
to a slightly weaker position, arguing that while the aspects of Maltese structure
discussed in this paper do not relate directly to morphological oppositions,
there are other aspects of structure that do relate directly to such morphological
categories. All I can reply to this is that I am not aware of any such struct"ural
aspects of Maltese : certainly, in the discussion of this paper, it has never been
necessary to refer to such aspects (other than strictly in the discussion of
morphology), while it has frequently been necessary, and not just advisable, to
refer to aspects of structure not directly encoded in the morphology, for
instance in order to know how to negate sentences, place them in other tenses,
and even to replace pronouns by full noun phrases. Thus the onus is clearly on
anyone who would maintain the 'one form - one function' approach to
demonstrate that there are aspects of Maltese sentence structure that either
require or prefer direct correlation with the morphology.
Does it then follow from all this that the relation between Maltese syntax
and morphology is arbitrary, with regard to those instances where a morpho-
logical-syntactic discrepancy has been demonstrated ? With regard to the strict
synchronic analysis of Maltese, I think the answer is 'Yes'. However, from a
broader perspective, an explanation, invoking diachronic and typological
considerations, can clearly be given. During the development of the cited
SYNTACTIC-MORPHOLOGICAL DISCREPANCIES 2S
constructions from Proto-Arabic to Maltese, there seems to have been a shift of

the syntactic subject properties from that noun phrase which looks morpho-
logically to be the subject to the noun phrase which is, synchronically in
Maltese, the subject. This can be illustrated briefly with reference to the posses-
sive predicate construction. In Arabic, it is possible to have a construction
formally similar to Maltese sentences like (30) :
(78) Mu1].ammad-un ginda-hu kitaab-un

MU1].ammad-NOMINATIVE at-S3M/PO book-NOMINATIVE
'Muhammad has a book.'
However, in Arabic this can be analyzed synchronically as an instance of

Topicalization, because Arabic also allows the corresponding nontopicalized
variant:
(79) <1nda MuQ.ammad-in kitaab-un

at Mu1].ammad-GENITIVEbook-NOMINATIVE
(In Arabic, all prepositions govern the genitive case.) Moreover, we know that
shifts in subject properties often arise via Topicalization, Le. by a topic being
reanalyzed as a subject; this process has been documented for several
constructions in a variety of languages by Cole et al. (1980), possessive
predicates being one of the constructions most likely to undergo this kind of
reanalysis, no doubt because possessors, being high in animacy, are more likely
to be topic than are possessed items.
There are even traces of ongoing reanalysis in Maltese, in particular of the
reanalysis of nonverbs as verbs in the kinds of construction discussed in this
paper (though the reanalysis of grammatical relations seems complete). Although
I have analyzed the possessive predicate gtzand as a verb, it still takes the pre-
positional form of the first person object suffix -i, rather than the variant ani
expected with a verb. In addition to gfiand, possession can also be indicated,
though more rarely, by the preposition bi 'with'; as a preposition, bi gives
bi-ja 'with me', but when used in the possessive construction, it has assimilated
to verb form to the extent of taking the suffix ani, Le.bi-ni 'I have'. Similarly,
fi 'in' gives fi-ja 'in me', but as a verb fi-ni 'I have in me, I contain'. Although
gRad 'still' is not etymologically a verb, it invariably takes the first person
singular suffix in the form ani. Another item which fits into the set of quasi-
auxiliaries is it- 'ago'. This is not etymologically a verb, and in the first person
26 B. COMRIE
singular usually appears as il-i; however, i/-ni is found as a variant (Aquilina

1965: 106).12
Thus, overall, we have in Maltese clear instances of discrepancy between
morphological and syntactic criteria, which cannot be resolved synchronically,
where they remain as discrepancies, but can be resolved diachronically. More
generally, morphology and syntax are distinct, though closely related; and
synchrony and diachrony are distinct, though closely related. And progress in
our understanding of language as an overall phenomenon can only be helped by
treating each of these aspects with the respect that it deserves, rather than by
attempting to establish facile relationships of identity between the one and the
other.
FOOTNOTES
*In the preparation of this paper, I have benefited immensely from previous
accounts of Maltese syntax, in particular Sutcliffe (1936), Aquilina (1965),
and Borg (1981). I am grateful to Albert J. Borg for detailed comments on an
earlier version of this paper, and also to the faculty and students who offered
comments on my presentation of this material at the Linguistic Circle of the
University of Southern California and in the Linguistics Program of the
University of Utah. Interpretations of data remain, of course, my own
responsibility.
I For a discussion of subjecthood in Maltese from a rather different perspective,
including relations to semantic roles and thematic structure, see Borg (1981 :
chapter 3).
2Maltese examples are presented in standard orthography, though with the
addition of relevant morpheme boundaries. The following abbreviations are used
in glosses: DO - Direct object; F - Feminine; M - Masculine; P - Plural;
PO - Prepositional object; S - Singular; SU - Subject. Each abbreviated gloss is
made up as follows: first, a letter indicating number, followed by a figure
indicating person, followed where relevant by a letter indicating gender; then,
separated from the first part of the gloss by an oblique stroke, a letter
combination indicating whether the morpheme encoded by that abbreviation has
the form of a subject, direct object, or prepositional object affix (note that these
glosses refer solely to the form of the affix, not necessarily to its syntactic
function). These appended glosses are added after the stem gloss for subjects of
verbs in the Perfect (including the third person singular masculine, morpho-
logically nUll), for direct objects, and for prepositional objects; they are added
before the stem gloss for subjects of verbs in the Imperfect (including the plural,
where morphologically person is indicated by a prefix and number by the plural
suffix ·u). Affixes and verb stems undergo a number of morphophonemic alter-
nations, which are commented. upon here only where problems might arise in
SYNTACTIC--MORPHOLOGICAL DISCREPANCIES 27
recogmzmg a given form. Note that Maltese has two genders, masculine and
feminine, though no gender distinction is made in the plural. Nonhuman nouns
are distributed essentially arbitrarily, from a semantic viewpoint, between the
two genders; nouns ending in -a in the singular are usually feminine (e.g. bajda
,egg', baqra 'cow'), others masculine (e.g. far 'rat', ktieb 'book'). Adjectives
agree in gender and number with their noun, the feminine suffix being -a.
3Bravmann (1953: 27) argues that the forms gflOdd and donn (and, presumably,
qis, though this is not mentioned explicitly) derive not from imperatives, but
rather from the first person singular Imperfect, which in Classical Arabic took a
prefix consisting of just a glottal stop where Maltese has no. While this derivation
is as plausible phonologically as that from the imperative, it fails to take into
account the fact that the replacement of the first person singular prefix by n-
must be very old in Maltese - this replacement is found throughout Western
Arabic vernaculars, and as such must antedate the final separation of Maltese
from other forms of Arabic at the end of the eleventh/beginning of the twelfth
century. Even if the derivation from first person singular is correct, however, the
arguments below still go through, mutatis mutandis: in the synchronic structure,
the subject is the noun phrase indicated by the direct object suffix on the quasi-
auxiliary, not first person singular (unless, of course, that subject noun phrase
happens to be first person singular).
4There is, further, evidence that the possessed noun phrase is a direct object,
given the occurrence of the preposition 7 (see section 2.2) in such examples as :
(i) Gnand-i '1 Marija.
at-Sl/PO Mary
'I have Mary.'
5With certain negative words, the suffix -x is not used; thus rna ... qatt means
'never'.
6Formally, the structure NP rna Pronoun-x- Predicate is the negation of the
structure NP Pronoun Predicate, cf. examples (11)-(12) above. This latter
structure presumably arose via Topicalization of the original subject, thereby
leading to a resumptive pronoun. Diachronically, it seems that the pronoun in
this structure has been reinterpreted as a (copular) verb - despite its clearly
nonverbal morphology -, thereby acquiring the negation possibility (rna ... -x)
of a verb. This would thus be a further example of syntactic-morphological
discrepancy. However, there is evidence that the diachronic development has
moved even beyond this stage, with loosening of the relation between the
'negative pronouns' and basic pronouns. First, 'negative pronouns' occur in
many environments where the basic pronouns are impossible (other than via
dislocation), e.g. (40), (41), (45), or only optional, e.g. (43). Secondly, the third
person singular masculine 'negative pronoun' rn 'hux is used, though typically
with a shortened vowel, as an unmarked negative in constituent negation (e.g.
rn 'hux hawn 'not here'), and even shows a tendency in the current language to
replace the negative pronouns with distinctions of person, number, and gender
(e.g. rn 'in torn-x in (40), rn 'hi-x in (45».
7Note that it is also possible to negate the second verb, with a different
meaning:
28 B. COMRIE
(i) Il-baqra gnad-ha rna t-orqod-x.

'The cow is not yet sleeping.'
This is a difference between the quasi-auxiliary construction and a verb complex
(see section 2.1). Note further that the semantic contrast between (55) and (i)
correlates precisely with whether or not g1iad 'still' is in the scope of the
negation. With donn 'seem', again either main clause or subordinate clause verb
can be negated, though with little or no difference in meaning, as in the English
glosses:
(ii) Donn-ha rna t-af-x.
'She seems not to know.'
(iii) Ma donn-hie-x t-af.
'She doesn't seem to know.'
8The second person singular Imperfect prefix t- assimilates to d- before stem-
initial d.
9Maltese does, however, have other, impersonal, constructions where, given the
absence of any subject, an auxiliary is invariably third person singular masculine.
This occurs, for instance, with jisem 'be called', which takes a direct object
suffix for the person whose name is referred to, e.g. jisim-ni Pawlu 'I am called
Paul', kien jisim-ni Pawlu 'I was called Paul' , not *kon-t jisim-ni Pawlu. This
emphasizes the empirical -nature of the relation between morphology and
sentence structure: jisim-ni and g~odd-ni have the same morphological
structures, but different syntactic behaviors. In the case of jisem, there does
seem to be parallelism between morphological structure and syntactic behavior.
See also the discussion of existential hemm 'there is' in section 7.
IONonverbal predicates cannot be used crucially in these tests, because in
dependent constructions, as also in the nonpresent tense, the verb kien 'be' is
used, i.e. the predicate becomes verbal.
liThe following constructions, at least, would be relevant to a complete
discussion. First, the English construction 'still have, have left over' can be
expressed in Maltese using the verb 'baqa' 'remain' and an indirect object
pronoun suffix encoding the possessor, e.g. baqagh-l-i ktieb 'I have a book left
over'. Secondly, English 'must, have to' is expressed in Maltese by precisely the
same forms as discussed above under the heading of possessive predicate,
imposing moreover a like-subject constraint on the following verb, e.g. g'Hand-ha
t-mur 'she must go' (literally 'at-S3F /PO S3F /SU-go), kell-ha t-mur 'she had to
go'. Finally, the other constructions mentioned at the end of this section would
be relevant: bi-ni 'I have', [i-ni 'I contain', il-(n}i 'I ... ago/since' (e.g. i/-i siegiia
ni-tkellem 'I have been talking for an hour').
12The etymology suggested by Sutcliffe (1936: 196-197) is the noun fjin
'time' followed by indirect object suffixes, i.e. i/-i would derive from *liin-l-i.
HEURISTIC PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE IDENTIFICATION
OF GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF THE
WESTGERMANIA (DUTCH-ENGLISH-GERMAN)
Werner Abraham
The University of Groningen
The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Sciences at Wassenaar
In this paper three themes are taken up from recent literature on linguistic
problems of Dutch and English, and developed in some detail. Its purpose is to
show how, in certain questions of detailed linguistic analysis and description,
the morphology. of case inflection, verbal prefixation, adverbial marking,
morphological indication of directionality vs. local non-directionality as well
as the closeness of an argument indicated by lexical compounding can essential-
ly contribute to, and enhance, the quality of the identification and
interpretation of syntactic structure. This would seem to be of specific weight
when looking at related languages such as three Westgermanic ones (English,
Dutch, and German). Their typological characteristics are still much disputed
(English SVO; Dutch SVO in independent, SOY in dependent sentences; German
- V-in independent, --V in dependent sentences - this if we follow a non-
transformational surface typology), and it is even doubtful whether the three
languages are to be judged on a par with respect to their categorial analyzibility:
English is beyond doubt a language characterized by the prominence of
grammatical relations (configurational language). Is the same true for German
with its widely free word-order and a good degree of topic prominence (non-
configurational ?)?
It is against the background of such questions that this attempt at a
comparison, with focus on three linguistic details, has been made. No conclusive
answers will be given, however. Rather, what lies at the base is my feeling that
what occasionally appears to be a heuristic and methodological misunder-
29
30 W.ABRAHAM
standing of one author is really a very fundamental dilemma of linguistic

analytical work. To cast it in the form of a question: What are the characteristics
and methodological guide-lines controlling the identification of grammatical
relations (syntactic functions), grammatical categories (parts of speech), and
consequently, structural relations? Does the relatively rich morphological
structure of German turn out to its structural advantage over the morphological-
ly somewhat poorer Dutch and English? Can arguments of a morphologically
uncorroborated, purely distributional, and/or semantic nature, let us say in
Dutch, be "improved on" by other, morphologically founded, arguments from
German ?
It is such questions that are at issue in this paper. What the disregard of
careful distributional evidence in an analysis can lead to, in the absence of
eye-catching morphological identifiers, is illustrated by the following example.
(I) Hii betaalt ziin medewerkers een hoog loon

He- pays- his- staff- a- good-salary
(2) Ziin medewerkers worden door hem goed betaald

His- staff- are- by- him-well- paid
Booij (1981) draws the conclusion from (1) and (2) that (2), apparently the
passive conversion of (1) with some restrictions on the constituent een haag
loon "a high salary" that he regards as minor, presents proof of the fact that
zijn medewerkers "his staff' is DO (transitive or direct object) in (1).A careful
distributional analysis (one in which he would have to give a strict account of
een haag loon in (I» however shows that the constituent in question is 10
(intransitive or indirect object) in (1), and that (2) is not directly related
syntactically. Note that there can be no doubt whatsoever in German
(presenting, as it were, the consonant-shifted version of the Dutch examples).
(3) Er bezahlte seinen (dative) Mitarbeitern(dative)einen (accusative) hohen

(accusative) Lohn
(4), the German passive parallel to (2), however, is structurally equivalent to

(5).
(4) Seine Mitarbeiter wurden von ihm gut bezahlt

THE IDENTIFICATION OF GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS 31
(5) Er bezahlte seine (accusative) Mitarbeiter (accusative)gut
It is hard to see why the author would not have tried one of the well-known
tests for the IO-status (aan-conversion, nominalization). It is intriguing to believe
that a practice common in generative semantics (to pay a good salary = to pay
wei£) may have induced the above analysis. But this is pure speculation. The
phenomenon acquires a specific dimension by the fact that the status of 10
in colloquial Dutch is increasingly giving way to the re-analysis as ditransitive
object (see e.g. van Langendonck 1968; Nieuwborg 1968; more recently v.d.
Toom 1981; Zaalberg 1981).
1. On the structural status of 10 vs. DO in the domain of reflexives

and reciprocals
In Dutch (as well as in other Germanic languages) there is no trivial straight-

forward answer to the question whether (6) or (7) are adequate syntactic
structures of sentences such as (8) and (9) (generally three-place sentences with
two objects, neither of which is coreferential with the subject).
(6) (7)
==
NP NP
,/ v"'" -V
(10) (DO) / ' ""
NP V
(10)
(8) Ik gee! die mensen elkaars adres

1- give- these- people- each-other's-address
(9) Ik gee! de hond een been

1- give-the- dog- a- bone
In opting for (6), Daalder and Blom 1976 (henceforth D & B) make use of
Chomsky's asymmetrical superiority relation (Chomsky 1973: 246).
(10) " ... the category A is 'superior' to the category B in the phrase marker
if every major category dominating A dominates B as well but not
conversely".
32 W. ABRAHAM
D & B (1976: 404f.) claim that (6), but not (7), is an adequate deep structure
analysis of (8), which contains a reciprocal pronoun (elkaar). They assume that
an interpretive rule is operative on the level of the underlying deep structure by
way of which antecedents are attributed to the pronouns. This antecedent-
pronoun relation is warranted, among other general constraints such as the
Specified Subject Condition and the Tensed Sentence Condition, by (10): the
10, after all, is the antecedent of the DO as in (11) or of a reciprocal pronoun
incorporated in DO, as in (8). Consequently, 10 has to be superior.
(11) Ik gun die mensen elkaar

I- grant- those- people- each-other
From among (6), (7), and (12), (13), (14), all except (6) are rejected for the
analysis of (8), (9), and (11): (7) because the required IO-relation does not
satisfy the superiority relation; (12) and (13) since the first major category
dominating the antecedent, PP, does not in turn dominate DO; and (14) because
Chomsky's constraint is violated that the dominating hierarchy must not hold
conversely likewise (I am following Hoekstra's argument: Hoekstra (1978:
48; cf. Daalder and Blom 1976: 404f.)
/,"
(12) (13) (14)
/,p",,-
NP PP V NP NP V
(DO)/ "'- (10) (DO)
P NP
(10)
The underlying structures (12) and (13) have been devised by D & B (1976)
to account for the fact that Dutch lOs generally can have PP-(aan- )equivalents.
I will not touch on this claim in the rest of the discussion (see Hoekstra 1976:
48 for comments on D & B's conclusions). It is perhaps to be noted that (12)
and (13) are not extensions of Chomsky's notion of the superiority relation
applied to sentences like (8) since Chomsky explicitly excludes PP from the list
of major categories.
1 would like to show that D & B's fundamental assumption about the
identification and distribution of grammatical relations in (8) and (9) is wrong.
Quite obviously this has its repercussions on the authors' final conclusions that
they arrive at on the basis of such assumptions. Whatever their fault, however,
they seem to be on safe ground as far as the normal distribution of lOs and DOs
but not as far as their respective surface order in Dutch is concerned. My
argument, then, will be that distributional arguments per ana/ogiam (more
specifically here: between NP-IOs and NP-DOs, on the one hand, and
reciprocal/reflexive pronouns of such relational status) need not be conclusive
and should, in the absence of better, non-distributional arguments, be
abandoned.
Let me first sketch what is normally held to be a good distributional
argument per ana/ogiam that whould seem to corroborate D & B's initial
assumptions (D & B: 404f.).
D&B WA
(15) Ik gee! die mensen 1 het adres van die mensen 1 IO-DO IO-DO
(16) Ik gee! die mensen 1 elkaars 1 adres (=(8» IO-DO IO-DO
(17) lk gun die mensen 1 die mensen 1 IO-DO IO-DO
(18) Ik gun die mensen 1 elkaar 1 (=(11)) IO-DO "* DO-IO
lk heb de toekomstige echtgenoten elkaar

op het pe"on aangewezen IO-DO "* DO-IO
The analyses sketched in the boxes on the right-hand side are, if for no better
reason, analogical inferences from (15) and (17) to (16) and (18), respectively.
However, as the analyses under "WA" suggest, D & B's relational distribution
for (18) is doubtful, whereas it seems correct for (16). Now, D & B could have
signalled the correct analysis had they made use of another distributional and
transformational test. See the following sentences which are aan-(PP-)
equivalents to (9) and (17).
(19) Ik gee! een been aan de hond DO-PP (+--10)
(20) Ik gun die mensen 1 aan die mensen 1 DO-PP (+-10)
The lexicalization of the reciprocal relation in (20) renders:
(21) Ik gun die mensen 1 (aan) elkaar 1 DO-PP/IO

34 W.ABRAHAM
Note that in order to obtain DO-status for the reciprocal in (22) below some-
thing like the following analogy would be necessary.
(22) DO PP 0 10 DO
.,
+-'
;:3
Ik gee! een been 0 een been
aan de hand till Ik gee! de hand
0
~
Ik gun die mensen aan elkaar t:: Ikgun die mensen elkaar
'"
It is quite obvious, however, that the analogy is ill-structured: the fourth

sentence (right column, below) has to reverse the order of the objects yielding
the unacceptable */k gun elkaar (10) die mensen (DO). The reciprocal, quite
unmistakingly, has 10-status whether we follow the structural analogies sketched
in (19) - (21) or those sketched in (22).
In order to account for the ungrammaticality of (23) and (24) the two
authors posit the underlying structure of (13).
(23) *Ik gee! elkaars 1 adres aan die mensen 1

1 givs-each-others address- to- these-people
(24) *Ik gun elkaar1 aan die mensen 1

1- grant-each-other-to- these-people
/f~
(13)
NP PP V
(DO) / "-
P NP
(10)
Since the IO in (13) has the status of a PP and not, as has been argued before,
that of an NP, (23) and (24) turn out to be ungrammatical. Hoekstra (1978:
48ff.) has presented evidence from Dutch that the assumption of (6) plus
Chomsky'S superiority principle cannot be held to explain that (23) and (24)
are non-sentences in Dutch. First, by way of inducing a false structural analogy,
he shows that (26) should be correct if D & B's arguments were extended by
analogy from the structurally equivalent (25). However, (26) is out on all
fOunts.
(25) Ik laat Jan een foto zien

1- let- Jan-a photograph-see
(26) *Ik laat elkaars foto's aan de kinderen zien 1

1- let- each-other's-photographs-to- the-children- see
Furthermore, Hoekstra shows that (13) maps certain sentential structures which
are by no means ungrammatical thereby disproving the validity of D & B's
disclaimer. See (27).
(27) Hij vertrouwt de kinderen aan elkaars ouders toe 2

He-entrusts- the-children-to- each-other's- parents- to
It is safe to say that D & B's analysis, for one, rests on insufficient distributional
evidence and, furthermore, disregards one stringent surface condition explaining
the phenomenon of reflexives and reciprocals, namely that they are excluded
from the superficial antecedent position. Note that this is a necessary, but by
no means a sufficient, requirement for a correct analysis of reflexives and
reciprocals. Furthermore it leaves intact the option that any such structural
principle as the superiority condition is operative.
It is to be noted that a language such as German, while very close to Dutch
historically and synchronically, quite effortlessly avoids these pitfalls. See the
following equivalents to the Dutch examples above.
(8') Ich gab DEN (dative) Leu ten {gegenseitig IHRE (accusative) Adressen
DIE (accusative) Adressen voneinander
(11 ') Ich gonne DIE (accusative) jungen Leute { e~nhander .,
SIC gegenseltlg
In (8'), dative object and accusative object are morphologically distinct. (11 ')
is just as unambiguous since the preceding object NP is in the accusative leaving
but the dative, and consequently the 10, for the reciprocal. Misinterpretations
such as D & B's for the functional distribution in (11) [(18)] are impossible, be
it merely for reasons of morphological transparency of the functional
distribution. Appeals to (transformational) control characteristics as those
employed by Hoekstra for Dutch, are superfluous. The morphological
distinctions in German accompany a number of further functional and
distributional properties 3 .
36 W.ABRAHAM
[{ I~} . . dative,{~~} ... accusative]
(28) feh ganne dir den Mann

1- grant- you-the-man ... .i°i DO·
J
(29) feh ganne dieh dem Mann
1- grant- you-(to)- the man .... do i 10·
J
(30) fell ganne sie { sieh
einander .... do i iOi
1- grant- them-(to)-Jthemselves
Leach other
(31) *Ich ganne ihnen{ sieh

einander
1- grant-(to)- them {themselves
each other
(30) is relationally equivalent to (11), which, as we remember, was the

controversial example in the first place. The reflexive and reciprocal is the dative
10, by inference from the morphologically unambiguous, antecedent accusative-
DO sie. Note that D & B arrive at the conclusion that the reciprocal in (11)
(equivalent to (30) be DO by way of the assumed validity of both (6) and the
asymmetrical superiority principle as well as the strength of the requirement
of an antecedent to the reciprocal. That is what they say explicitly (D & B
1976: 410; 412). However, there must be another hidden premise to their
conclusion: Why otherwise would it be that they take the left of the two
objects to be the IO ? It would be just as safe with respect to the superiority and
the antecedent claim to consider the left NP to be the DO instead. The solution
can lie only in the fact that the authors consider the underlying structure in
(6) to mirror essential properties of the surface order of (11): Le. an order
where only the verb has been moved out of its final position into second place
in the sentence, with DO in verb-closest position as in the assumed underlying
(6). The German examples prove beyond doubt that this line of argument fails
its target completely for German, and since the situation in Dutch with respect
to reciprocals is congruent with the one in German I would suspect it does so
for Dutch too. First of all, it is not the underlying but the surface order of
elements that determines the antecedent-postcedent relationship; see the
analogous (29) and (30) (Hoekstra 1978: 49). Second, what seems to be at play
in the grammar of reciprocals is the condition that the reciprocal in 3-place
sentences (i.e. with two objects) is the 10 (Hoekstra makes a passing remark to
this effect without giving it any weight in his critique of D & B; cf. Hoekstra
1978: 49 below). What this amounts to, in brief, is that D & B's basic
assumption that (6), and not (7), is an adequate analysis of three-valued
sentences in Dutch is correct. However, it is obtained by virtue of incorrect
structural arguments. Specifically, their hidden ordering premise is mistaken,
although in line with much of what is being held in generative grammar
nowadays; and they have failed to see one important condition, namely that the
reciprocal in 3-place sentences needs to be in the 8-role (grammatical relation)
of 10; see (31) to this effect 4 . It is worth noting that, of course, no such
condition holds in two-place sentences. Possible counter-examples to the
assumed relational condition, namely RECIPROCAL = 10 in 3-place sentences,
are (32) and (33).
(32) Sie missgonnten einander dem Besucher

They- grudged each-other-( to )-the-visitor
(33) Die Haremsdamen versprachen einander dem Schah-in-Schah

The-ladies-of-the-harem- promised- each-other-(to)- the-Sha-in-Sha
(32) and (33) seem to have readings which are not equivalent with readings
with reflexives. Other tests including verbs like geben, hingeben, garantieren,
verpflichten, das Leben kosten, verbieten, [ehren, failed to render readings
with REC = DO, NP = 10 (dative). However, I am somewhat at a loss at having
to decide whether (32) and (33) are fully correct and whether they would con-
sequently invalidate the rule REC = 10 (dative) with 10 and DO.
One final point addressed to the condition that there must be a (pro-)nominal
antecedent when the reciprocal elkaar/einander is to be realized (Hoekstra 1978:
50; 0 & B 1976: 408ff.
(34) Einander j hatten sie j gewiss lieb, aber filr Aussenstehende hatten
Each-other- had- they-certainly- dear, but- for-outsiders- had-
sie keine Gefilhl

they-no-( warm)-feelings
(35) Vanelkaarjhielden ze j weI, maar daarbuiten ontwikkelden ze geen ge-

voelens
38 W.ABRAHAM
(36) (Aan) elkaar1 gunden ze 1 niets, maar wei

(To) each-other- granted-they- nothing, but-(they)- certainly-(did)-
de beesten die ze [okten

(to)- the-animals-that-they-bred
Such clause-initial reciprocals are acceptable also for any of the 3-place examples
where any of the two objects (but not the subject) stands in an antecedent
relation to the REC-relation. However, the examples below show that the
sentence-initial position is a special case that has to be exempted from the other-
wise valid restriction that the REC has to have an antecedent to relate to.
(37) *Ich gonne einander die jungen Leute

(38) *Ich gab Sdie Adressen voneinander den Leuten
1gegenseitig die Adressen den Leuten
Compare (8') and (11') on page 7. The pragmatic function of the reciprocal
in (34) - (36) is that of contrasting focus. I will not dwell on the question
whether this movement can be handled within the rule that excludes (37) and
(38). It remains to point out that the position of the REC in the last two
examples cannot be saved with the function of focus; i.e. no reading can be
obtained by contrastive accent on these elements.
2. On the relationship between 10 and prepositional phrases
In Janssen 1977, it is argued that the (free) object of the possessive dative
and the (obligatory) internal object are on a par with respect to their syntactic
status, whereas the (likewise obligatory) external, i.e. prepositional, object is
structurally and semantically different. In order to account for both the
difference and the syntactic and semantic relationship between internal (pre-
positionless) and external (prepositional) objects in 3-place sentences, Janssen
chooses a format of lexical description developed by Jackendoff 1975. Jacken-
doff establishes a symmetric relationship "is lexically related to" by way of a
redundancy rule which, in case the prepositionless (dative) object is realized,
assigns a lexically empty P-node to the sentence. This amounts to a format of
the lexical entry where the P-node is assigned to both underlying structures,
but which, provided the dative N-node is filled, assigns a lexical null-element
to the P-node 5 .
To corroborate this analogical transfer Janssen takes a look at phenomena

in Dutch which to him appear as cases of ellipses of the noun in the
prepositional phrase. I shall take issue with his 5 cases in support of his argument
without drawing any consequences as to where Janssen is left with his line of
argument in the absence of any validity to his corroborating arguments. That is,
I will not try to invalidate Jackendoff's proposal for the format of lexical
description of "ellipsis of valency participants".
a. Is aan nothing else but a preposition?
The semantic relatedness between, and the distributional syntactic properties

of (39) to (41), warrant, according to Janssen (1977: 14f.), a format oflexical
entry which maps the syntactic structures in (42). (I disregard other character-
istics of Jackendoff's format, which make visible what he tries to capture as the
semantic "similarity relation" between verbs.)
(39) Peter geeft de krant aan Fred

Peter-gives-the- journal- to- Fred
(40) Peter geeft Fred de krant
(41) Peter geeft Fred de krant aan

Peter-gives-Fred-the-journal- to
Peter passes- the journal to Fred
( 42)
==~S,,= ..
Nl /V",
I V
...P
_I \
Peter
(Prep Obj)
N2
/"=N3
V Prep
(D10) I I I
de krant geeft aan Fred
The reading for" .... " is "is lexically relating to".
I believe that Janssen's argument is not well-t~en. To be specific, (41),

with what appears to Janssen to be a "residue of a P" (1977: 15), is not a good
candidate to appear in Jackendoff's Similarity relation. For one, the semantic
40 W.ABRAHAM
similarity seems to be due to the specific relation between aan en geven. A wide
number of simple/complex pairs such as aan + geven do not readily lend them-
selves to the relation of similarity. What is more important, aan in (41) has no
separate categorial status, but is a separable prefix to geven. The lexical entry,
in its canonical infinitive, is aangeven. It is part of the distributional properties
that sentences with aan + V-predicates can double up onaan (albeit rated some-
what clumsy stylistically) :
(43) De ober {bOOd aan de gast de hete thee aan, maar de

gaf
The-waiter {Offered to- the- guest-the-hot- tea- to,- but- the
gave
gast wilde zich niet de vingers verbranden

guest-wished-himself-not- the-fingers-bum
The restriction to this doubling up of aan seems to lie in the dimension of

euphony and stylistics. It is not, however, a grammatical question.
In the remainder of this discussion I shall draw the conclusion that the
morphological decay in English and Dutch not only hides such differences
between separable verbal prefixes, prepositions, and adverbials, but that it lures
the linguist, who is unaware of the respective formal differences in languages
with richer morphologies, into drawing incorrect conclusions from
distributional characteristics alone. Note, for example, that German keeps
morphologically distinct what is "semantically" one and the same preposition,
but what are two different categories.
(44) Der Polizist trat an ihn heran (infinitive: herantreten)

The-officer- stepped:t"o-him-to-(up)
(45) Der Bauer hob den Heuballen flYf den Wagen hinfWf
The-farmer-lifted- the- truss-of-hay- on- the- wagon-to-up
(infinitive: hinaufheben)
There is no restriction for stylistic reasons (cacophony) on a doubling up on

homonymous prefix and preposition.
(46) Er legte seinen Massstab fll1 ihn !lll (infinitive: anlegen)

He-laid- his- scale- on-him-on
He judged him by his own standards
THE IDENTIFICATION OF GRAMMA TICAL RELATIONS 41
b. It is demonstrable by a number of cases that the prefixal (or adverbial)

status of a lexical element (in discontinued position) has a distribution that
excludes the option sketched in (42).
(47) Hij geeft hem toe

He-gives-him-in
He gives in to him
(48) *Hij geeft toe hem
c. Accent is another distributional shibboleth. Note that the preposition does

not carry the main accent except in echo or focus utterances, whereas the
separable prefix cannot be realized unless it carries the accent (wide-space).
(49) Hij staat voor het rode gezelschap

He-stands-in-front-of- the-red- assembly
(50) Hij staat het rode gezelschap voor (infinitive: v66rstaan)

He-stands-the-red- assem bly- pre-
He presides over the red assembly
It is in line with this observation that Janssen's conclusion from (51) and (52)
is incorrect (I 977: 15).
(51) Fred heeft de schijn tegen zich (tegen *zich)

Fred has the looks against himself
Everything speaks against Fred
(52) Fred heeft de schijn tegen(*tegen)
d. Besides that, it seems idiosyncratic to argue with hebben/have as in (51)

and (52). No other verb, it seems, allows the ellipsis of the reflexive or any
other pronoun.
(53) Fred is tegen dit voorstel

Fred-is-against- this- motion
(54) Fred is *(er) tegen (not without the pronominal or

deictic adverbial er except in
echoing statements)
See the German equivalent :

42 W.ABRAHAM
(55) Fred ist dagegen/ist *gegen
56) Fred ist dafil.r/ist * ffir
In fact there are even counter-examples to the hebben + Prep (+ PRO)-

structures in (51) and (52), which, oddly enough, Janssen himself has listed,
albeit in support of a different argument (l977: 16).
(57) Fred heeft de wind aehter/tegen (zieh)

Fred-has- the- wind-behind/against- him
There are, as far as I can see, two ways to a structural assignment of aehter/
tegen : one is an adverbial modifying wind (wind van aehteren/uit de tegenrieh-
ting "wind from behind/from the opposite direction"). The second solution
assigns a modifying adverb to the verb hebben : note the quotative form de wind
tegen/mee hebben, German den Wind mithaben/dagegen/aehterlings haben,
where Wind is in the transitive accusative and mit a verbal prefix, dagegen an
adverb to the predicate.
e. Janssen (1977: 16) claims that naar zieh toe in (58) is the full variant of the
elliptical toe in (59), just as mee in (60) is the ellipsis of met + PRO + mee.
(58) Fred krijgt de krant naar zieh toegeslingerd

Fred-gets- the-paper-at- himself-toward-thrown
(59) Fred krijgt de krant toegeslingerd
(60) Peter brengt/neemt de brief (met ziehl mee

Peter-brings/takes- the- letter- (with himself)- with
Peter brings/takes along the letter
But met zieh mee is no variant of mee in any interesting, non-trivial sense,
nor are naar zieh toe and toe. Rather, mee and toe are separated verbal prefixes,
while the prepositional alternant with additional naar/met zieh mee is doubling
up on the semantic interpretation that the respective sentences have just as well
without the prepositional phrases. Note that English would render Dutch mee
in (55) with the adverbial along (without the possibility of doubling up),
whereas German makes a verbal prefix of it (m it nehmen. See von Polenz
1977 for German).
f. Other, more dialectical phenomena are probably no prepositional ellipses

at all, contrary to Janssen's claims. See (56).
(61) Fredheeftde brief bij (hem)

Fred-has- the-letter- with-(him)
German would either render a verbal prefix (m i t haben), or, in colloquial

Upper Bavarian, an adverbial (with, as far as my intuition goes, a tendency to
prefix it to the verb): dabei haben or dabeihaben. da in its most general
semantic and distributional function is a local-deictic element and has an
adverbializing function with a wide variety of prepositions. As such it may, but
need not, be a pronominal element. Janssen's claim that it has to be regarded
as a pronominal element rests solely on the semantic equivalence relation to the
(6l)-altemant with zich. Given examples like (62) and (63) I doubt whether this
is an argument of sufficient general force.
(62) *Peter brengt de brief met zich
(63) *Peter neemt de brief met zich
Compare the slightly but crucially contrasting (60). What my argument amounts
to is that the dialectal variant of (61) without the reflexive pronoun cannot,
in the absence of other confrrming examples and given the counter-examples
(62) and (63), be regarded as an instance of a general PRO-ellipsis with the
preposition left stranded, but rather as an idiosyncratic instance. All other
analogous examples present themselves as structures with something else but the
prepositional category.
My arguments that Janssen's semantic identification of stranded prepositions,
bared of all morphologically and structurally/categorically supporting evidence,
is inconclusive, if correct, have been of a negative nature so far. If I set myself
the aim to make evident that the categorial status of prepositions depends
crucially on their cooccurring with nominals, then any identification as an
adverbial or verbal prefix hinges on a plausible structural distinction of pre-
positional phrases, adverbials, and verbal prefixes. In the remainder of this
chapter, I will dwell briefly on this question.
"Adverb", to begin with, is a functional class with a large and diversified
number of members (see, for example, Jackendoff 1972 and Bartsch 1972 for
a discussion of its semantic and syntactic varieties). From among this variety,
44 W.ABRAHAM
I can, I believe, restrict myself to that category which, if it is not felt to be a

prefix to the verb, has close cohesion to the predicate, closer even than the
direct object. Consequently, unless a discontinuous element is an integral part
of the lexical entry of the verb, it will have to have the following structural
analysis.
(64)
Adv v
Adv, of course, then is a grammatical category, and no longer a grammatical
relation. It will include a number of other categories, among them prepositional
phrases (but not prepositions alone), adjectives, and particle-like elements with
no derivational characteristic. Instances of this relational category are along
in the English versions of (60), most probably also all instances cooccurring
with hebben/have/haben and zijn/be/sein; cf. (53), (57) and (61). Note that
our hesitance, particularly in the German cases, whether to identify one element
as a verbal prefix or an adverbial argument, is best represented by this structural
closeness. It seems the most plausible solution. See also (44), (45). (46) and
(51). Naar zich in Janssen's variant of (59) (Janssen 1977: 16) is a different
case, however. Its underlying structure is probably something like (65).
(65)
3. Passive as a lexical property
In his context-free constituent structure grammar Gazdar (I 979) distinguishes

two lexical entries of promise: one with a sentential complement, and another
one with a NP-complement.
(66) (a) Ax(V'(VP'(x»(NP'»

(b) (promise (John) (to leave (the premises»
VP NP NP VP VP VP
(c) (Someone) promises John to leave (the premises)
(67) (a) Ax(V'(x~NP'i)(NP'j»

(b) (promise (John) (a present) )
VP NP NP NP NP NP
(c) (Someone) promises John a present
The lambda-format serves the purpose to construe a complex function VP by

combining the DO (the premises) and the verb (the variable x stands for what-
ever goes lexically for the subject). This VP has the 10,John, as its argument.
Gazdar's reasoning is purely syntactic: (67), but not (66), can be
passivized. In other words, Gazdar's distinction tries to account for the fact that
the English promise cannot be passivized if the VP is complex (V + (infinitival
VP VI>
+ DO», whereas passivization is possible if the predicate verb is non-complex,
VP VP
V (+Np(+NP».
This analysis is in line with Gazdar's argument concerning the syntax of
10 and to + NP in three place to give. This is what he proposes.
(68) (a) Ax(V'(x)(NP'i»(NP'j)

(b) give' (PP'd) (NP'j)
(c) Someone) gives <John;> a bookj <to John z >
(69) (a) A x (V'(x) (NP'j» (NP'i)
(b) give' (NPl.> (NP'i)
(c) (Someone) gives Johni a bookj
46 W. ABRAHAM
(NP', PP', V' etc. stand for the lexical interpretations of the respective
elements).
The underlined parts are equivalent to transitive functions, or, in categorial

terms, TVP, i.e. those verb (complexes) that take a transitive object to yield an
intransitive structure. The lambda-translations for the verb give in (66) - (68)
enable Gazdar to predict the following passive grammar of give:
(70) A book was given to him (following (68) (a) + (b»

(71) He was given a book (following (69) (a) + (b»
(72) *A book was given him (no rule source 6 )
When we try, on the basis of this line of argument, to account for geven-passives
in Dutch we arrive at an impasse, since the structure corresponding to (71)
is unacceptable (if we accept Standard Dutch, ABN, only).
(73) *Hij werd een boek gegeven (cf. (71»
In sub stratal Dutch, however, the 10 with geven together with a vast number of
other indirect verbs can be passive-converted (v. Langendonck 1968, v.d. Toorn
1981, Zaalberg 1981) and would therefore seem to be accounted for by Gazdar's
proposal. In German, not only is the 10 not passive-convertible in terms of
DO ~ SUBJ (it is, however, in terms of the bekommen-passive comparable to
the Dutch, though greatly restricted, krijgen-passive) but there is no general
correspondence between 10 and PPd (alternation between dative and pre-
positional object). That is, German will only have one passive rule (as far as the
genuine passive with DO ~ SUBJ is concerned), namely (74).
(74) (a) A x (V') (x) (NP'd» (NP'a)
(b)geb'(dem OnkelNP ) (einBuch NP )

d a
(Underscoring indicates that the complex function can be passivized with
the argument outside the TVP-domain converted to subject of the passive
structure. Even if we disregard Gazdar's proposal in (69) as a structural solution
for Dutch we are still faced with Gazdar's general proposal in (68) as an account
for something that English and Dutch have in common: namely the semantic
equivalence of 10 and Prep + NP. Note that PPd in Gazdar's (68) can only
mean that the 10 is the closest argument to the verb. If this is compared with
(66) and (67), however, we note an unexplained contradiction: in (66b) the DO
(or, more precisely: the non-IO 7) forms a complex function with the verb,
with the 10 as an argument to this complex function. This difference will
obviously have to be resolved in either two ways: either the underlying
definition of TYP in (66) is correct and has to supplant (68); or (68) is the base
of TYP, in which case (66) will have to be replaced. If we can believe Faltz
(1978) or Ziv and Sheintuch (1979) there are undisputable syntactic differences
between "dative" and prepositional object. Such observations alone would not
make it impossible, however, to collapse the dative object and Prep-Obj into one
specific rule. All that (66) - (68) account for is the syntactic property of give
with respect to its syntax of passivization. What appears to be a stronger
argument in Keenan's type of reasoning for the degree of closeness of an
argument to the verb (Keenan 1977). It is the DO, not the 10 or Prep + NP,
together with the verb that yields a new, and often idiomatic, meaning as
compared to the simple verb: give the kicks, give a try, give a treatment. In
idioms without prepositional objects, the object is invariably a DO, never an
10 : kick the bucket, hit the sack, give way, playa prank. And, fmally, cognate
objects are always DOs: sleep a sound sleep, dream an exciting dream, run a
fast race/run, etc. All this justifies the conclusion that the DO is a closer
argument to the verb than the 10 (in three-place constructions). And this in turn
means that we have to opt for (68) as the most general passive rule.
An ever better case for such a general solution can be made for Dutch and
German. Both Dutch and German have a class of two-place verbs that take dative
(intransitive) objects only. While Dutch cannot identify those dative objects
morphologically they are clearly non-transitive since they cannot be passivized.
This observation (see Hoekstra 1981 : 87 for Dutch) justifies the following
hierarchical relation.
(75)
~IVP _ _ _ _ _ _ _
NP DTVP~
(10) / ~
NP TVP
(DO)
48 W.ABRAHAM
TVP stands for the class of verbs (or verbal complexes) that take a direct object
to form DTVPs. DTVP is the class of verbs (or verbal complexes) that take
indirect objects to form IVPs. DTVPs comprise: two-place verbs with one non-
accusative object only (Dutch bevallen "please", ge/ukken "succeed", German
gefallen, geUngen, passieren, folgen, walten, sich erinnern, sich schiimen, etc.)
as well as three-place verbs with a surface DO. IVP is the category of intransitive
verbs (or verbal complexes) that take a subject to form a sentence. This category
comprises one-place verbs like laugh, run, and complexes made up from two-
and three-place verbs such as discussed above. This hierarchical, structural,
tripartition is well motivated for with respect to the grammar of passivization:
English can passivize both TVPs and DTVPs, but not IVPs. Dutch can passivize
TVPs and IVPs (er wordt gezongen "there-is-sung" = "there is singing"), but not
DTVPs (except for a restricted class of verbs that allow the krijgen-(3 ~ 1-)
passive). German resembles Dutch closely in all respects except for the 3 ~ 1-
passive: The class of verbs that can undergo the bekommen/kriegen-passive is
much less restricted than that in Dutch (Eroms 1980). Hoekstra (1981: 87)
correctly observes that the strategy to account for the differences in the
grammars of passivization by way of a categorial distinction thus receives an
independent justification_ Moreover, such a categorial distinction allows for
a unified treatment of lOs that is amiss in Gazdar's proposal.
Let us turn back to (67). We have argued that Gazdar's bipartite treatment
of promise is ill-conceived because (a) it is in contradiction to (68), and (b)
it fails to account for the closeness-evidence of DOs. Now, let us have a look
at German. The syntactic analogy between the accusative NP-complement and
the sentential complement (without case marking) is so forceful that the
transitive character of the clausal complement is felt to be self-evident. This is
so notwithstanding the fact that the clausal DO cannot be promoted to subject
by way of a regular passivization. See the following examples:
(76) Der Vasall versprach dem Konig {ihm Gefolgschaft zu leisten

auszu tre ten
The-retainer-promised-( to)- the- king {( to )-him- to-serve
to-leave
(76) corresponds to English (66).
(77) *Dem Konig wurde vom Vasallen versprochen t (*(ihm) Gefolgschaft

zu leisten
auszutreten
(To)-the- king- was- by- retainer-promised- {(to)-him- to serve
to-leave
die Gefolgschaft }
(78) Dem Konig wurde vom Vasallen [der Austritt aus der versprochen
Gefolgschaft
(78) is the version corresponding to (67). Note that the infinitives of (76)
have been conflated in the verb-derived NPs in (78).
I would like to suggest that there are a number of fully acceptable and less
acceptable structures that relate between the German equivalents of (66) and
(67), (76) and (77).
?
(79) . Dem Konig wurde vom Vasallen die/dessen ( /*seine) Gefolgschafts-
leistung versprochen /zugesagt.
(79) would be a passive version of (76) in the strict sense, although it is felt to
be clumsy (bureaucratic style). die Gefolgschaftsleistung is the passive subject,
nominalizing the infinitival complement in (76) word by word, and as such is
structurally reminiscent of the DO-status in the corresponding active sentence.
This faces us with a dilemmatic setting: should we account for the fact that
versprechen + infinitival does not allow a passive conversion, or are we to give
credit to the syntactic closeness of the infinitival complement to a DO-nominal-
ization ? The consequences to either alternative are exclusive of one another:
phenomenon one forces us to register two separate lexical entries; the second
fact suggests that we describe versprechen in a unified lexical format.
The solution seems straightforward enough, since it is desirable to account
for both properties, i.e. formulate one single lexical entry but distinguish the
two different syntactic properties depending on the categorial analysis of the
complement. Compare (80).
(80)
(81) and (82) show that there is more involved than simply the question whether
or not the complements/verbs such as versprechen are structurally complex or
not.
(81) Dem Direktor wurde vom Gewerkschaftsftlhrer die Aussperrung

The- director- was- by-the- union-leader the locking-out-{(of)
50 W. ABRAHAM
zugesagt }
(aller Arbeitsnehmer) { zuges tan den
versprochen
all- workers)- { conce.ded}
promIsed
(82) {zugestanden }
Dem Direktor wurde vom G. *zugesagt (aUe A.) auszusperren
*versprochen
Note that the TVPs zugestehen, erlauben other than zusagen, versprechen as
matrix verbs do not render acceptable passive versions. See also (83) and (84).
(83) Der Kunde versprach dem Geschilftsftlhrer den Laden zu verfassen

The-customer- promised- the- manager- the-shop- to- leave
(84) *versproChenJ
Dem G. wurde vom K. { zugestanden den Laden zu verlassen
. erlaubt
Infinitive structur.es in German obviously are constrained by co-reference

conditions with respect to the surface NPs and the empty node, e.
(85) {verSpreChen} : (NP i ( {verSpreCh} (NP) «ei) (NP k ) verlass» )

zusagen S VP zusag VP S
(86) [zUgestehen l : (NP. ( {zuges.teh}

erlauben } S ~P erlaub
These facts demonstrate that the syntactic property of (non) passivizability,

which by convention is to be part of the description in the lexicon, does not
follow from the mere class membership of verbs with infinitival complements,
but that there are distinctions within this class of verbs marked by coreference
characteristics that come to light in underlying representations such as (85)
and (86). This, of course, does not invalidate the suggestion that it is accusative
marked DTVPs that playa major role in German infinitival constructions. DTVPs
with just non-accusatives are out.
The aforegoing discussion suggests the following conclusions as regards the

systematics with which grammatical relations such as IO and DO are assigned in
English, Dutch and German:
ENGLISH
(i) Arguments to the effect that the preposition less (dative) object and to
+ NP with 3-place verbs like give are identical with respect to their
relational status (i.e. 10), bear on semantic intuitions, but not on syntactic
control properties (no common passive conversion) and distributional
characteristics (dative phrase only to the left, never to the right of the
DO; to + NP appears to have a less restricted distribution).
(ii) The relational identification of 10 and local adjunct seems more or less
based on accidental, rather than generally valid, syntactic evidence
(Kruisinga and Erades 1947). Faltz (1978) presents semantic arguments
in favour of the identification of 10 and dative, while distributional
characteristics are a disclaimer to /0 = to + NP (see Faltz 1978; Ziv and
Sheintuch 1979).
DUTCH
(iii) Distributional criteria are held to motivate aan +NP = /0 relationally

(F. Jansen 1978: 70f.; Hoekstra 1978). Th. Janssen (1977) presents
observations to the opposite effect on a semantic level. It is difficult to
say how general his findings are. It is unclear methodologically what
shades of difference or similarity would count to rate two semantic
readings equivalent or non-equivalent.
GERMAN
(iv) Identity is to be argued for on a semantic level at most (compare dir

geben and an dich iibergeben) : semantic valency appears to be identical
(i.e. RECEIVER). Morphological and syntactic properties are criteria
ex negativo at best (dative permits no general conclusion as to its relational
status, either semantic or grammatical; no 4-1-passive conversion is
possible in either case, while there is a 3-1-passive for either construction).
In general, however, pure prepositional objects hardly ever contrast
paradigmatically with dative objects.
What is more easily identifiable are verbal prefixes and deictic or pro-
nominal adverbs, this in contrast to both English and Dutch. The reason
is that the relative morphological abundance and its strategy to compound
52 W.ABRAHAM
closely coherent prepositions, adverbs/adjectives (and even nouns) with

simple verbs in German warrant a variety of grammatical and semantic
identification that remains cryptic in morphologically poorer English
and Dutch.
Conclusion
Little else needs to be said given my reiterated suggestion that morpho-

logical properties serve to identify grammatical relations and consequently
contribute essentially to semantic interpretation. Whether accusative is a
misnomer for a more deeply rooted structural condition remains to be seen8 .
Should there exist a form-function identity between the accusative morphology
(or, more generally, case morphology) and one grammatical or semantic relation
then certainly any language uniquely marking transitivity or the accusative
would be in an advantageous position. Whatever such form-function identity
ifl German, the identification of grammatical relations and categories remains,
as I have pointed out from the literature, a much demanding task for the
linguist. Especially within the Westgermania, it seems to warrant valuable
insights to consider German phenomena parallel to those in Dutch and English.
FOOTNOTES
1(25) will probably have a bisentential deep structure in which Jan (subject in
the deeper sentence) satisfies the superiority relation with respect to the DO,
foto. Exactly this holds also for (26) : kinderen is superior to elkaars fotos.
~s~
NP /VP"
NP V
I I
~s------:..aat
NP ~VP~
I /'" ~
Jan NP V
de kinderen I I
een foto zien
elkaars foto
D & B's claim that the required antecedent relation is spelled out in the deep
structure, quite obviously, makes the incorrect prediction that (26) is an
acceptable sen tence.
2(27) satisfies the superiority condition: the DO, de kinderen, is superior to the
PP, aan elkaars auders. Furthermore, (27) fits the structural description of
(13) and should consequently be unacceptable. There is no doubt, however,
that (27) is a good sentence.
3The following relations between case markers and grammatical relations seem
to hold in German :
- 0 (not correct): dative NP ~ 10 (since there are "free" datives in German)
- 0 (not correct): 10 ~. dative NP (since there .are lOs in the accusative)
- 0 (not correct): accusative NP ~ DO (because of accusative lOs)
o (correct) : DO ~ accusative NP (with the restruction that, by force of
idiosyncratic lexical distinctions, DO subsumes a variety of syntactically distinct
properties; see Saltveit 1968). .
4The structural relation between 10 and DO as sketched in (6) will not be
defended here. See section 3 of this paper for one independent line of reasoning
that supports (6). In order to clarify my own point of view, let me emphasize
here that I do not claim that the (logical) conjunction of (6) and the superiority
relations account for sentences such as (11) : Ik gun die mensen (DO) elkaar
(10). What I do claim, however, is that D & B, under the force of their
assumption that this conjunction does in fact explain the grammaticality of (11),
give the two objects different functional interpretations (Le. die mensen = 10,
elkaar = DO) so as to make them fall under these restrictions.
5My presentation lacks in accuracy. What Iackendoff aimed at was a format to
relate to one another verbal pairs such as the 2-place and the I-place break.
What I have presented here is Ianssen's transfer of Iackendoffs arguments to
the Dutch option between the dative object and the prepositional object.
6Dieter Kastovsky (Vienna) pointed out to me that (72) is a tolerated form of
the passive restricted, as it seems, to give and write. It belongs to the terse,
abbreviating register of speech employed by speakers who as recognized
authorities can afford to set a new norm. What this would amount to is a
modified(68),namely: {PP'i}
give' ( ) (NP'j)
riP \
7I assume that the distinction between DO and non-DO is the crucial distinction
that Gazdar has in mind. This, of course, considerably weakens my suggestion
that this treatment of 10 is inconsistent. However, since Gazdar does not
indicate a separate categorial status of non-DO in contrast to 10, I see no reason
not to identify his non-DO as 10.
8Van Riemsdijk (1981), in the vein of other recent generative linguistic work,
suggests for German a hierarchy of NP- (or argument-) closeness to the verb
ranging from accusative/direct object via dative/indirect object to genitive/
oblique. The arguments for this hierarchy is based on observations of errors in
the case morphology of parenthetical object doublettes. Clearly, this suggestion
wants further empirical substantiation.
VERB COMPLEMENTS AND SENTENCE COMPLEMENTS:
TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF RELATION
Claire Blanche-Benveniste
Universite de Provence
Many syntactic analyses distinguish between "verb complement" and

"sentence complement", whatever may be the vocabulary they use to express
this distinction 1 For French, the adverb "heureusement" (happily) often
exemplifies the difference between the two types. Used as a verb complement,
as in:
cela s'est termine heureusement

(it ended happily)
it is said to relate the "idea of happiness" with the verb. Used as a "sentence
complement", as in :
heureusement, cela s'est termine

(happily, (luckily), it came to an end).
it is supposed to be related to "the whole of the sentence", as a verbal predicate

of the form: "it is happy that..." 2.
I don't intend to present a survey of the different analyses existing 3.
I am only interested in the typology of the relations involved in the usual
distinctions made on this point. I shall try to explain why I think it better to
define two radically different relations, which can hardly share the same name
of "complement". For the so-called "sentence complement", I shall recall the
syntactic properties (generally negative) which constitute its grammatical status.
I shall then propose to extend its field both by collecting evidence from
contemporary spoken French and by using examples from an old state of the
language, in which there existed morphological clues to identify it.
55
56 CL. BLANCHE-BENVENISTE
1. A brief resume of each type of analysis
1 .1. In both cases, authors propose one identical relation and distinguish
only between different secondary properties. To use the same word "comple-
ment" in both cases implies that there exists a relation in some way identical,
be it with a verb or with a sentence. The differences would then come from the
basis of the relation. It is nothing more, then, than a question of parenthetizing 4 .
1.2. It is described as the same relation, but with different degrees. The
relation between the verb and its complement is viewed as "more integrated",
"tighter". It is considered to be a more "peripherical" or "looser" one between
the sentence and its complement. This concept of degrees in the relation mayor
may not be related to other syntactic relations 5 .
1.3. It is described as the same relation, but the properties are different.
The differences are explained by the fact that the verb is the predicative center,
or because there are various "areas" in the sentence, or because there is a
distinction between what is in the sentence and the mode of insertion of the
sentence in the utterance 6. Sometimes it is difficult to see why the same
relation is maintained in both cases 7, if the different levels are supposed to be
distinctive. Such is the case with generative grammars which relate the "sentence
complement" to a higher sentence, "outside the proper sentence" 8.
1.4. It is not described as the same relation: one is grammatical and the other
is not. For the "verb complement", it is a syntactic relation established on
grammatical schemas. For the "sentence complement", it is a discursive relation,
without syntactic rules.
This position was often assumed in French description of spoken French or
dialects; "sentence complements" were identified with "non-built comple-
ments", escaping the usual rules of syntax, "expressive phenomena belonging to
the style more than to the syntax" (Camproux, 481). This kind of analysis was
frequently used for the description of facts exterior to standard French
grammar, such as :
"l'afecieu de sa mamo, la drolo mouriguet"

(the love for her mother, the little one died)
(Camproux, 430).
VERB COMPLEMENTS AND SENTENCE COMPLEMENTS 57
The notion of "sentence complement", accepted for instances like "heureuse-

ment", seemed inadequate for such examples, which appeared to be "too far"
from grammatical French. The relation is then somehow rejected outside the
field of grammar 9 .
1.5. Both relations are considered to be within. the grammar of the language,
but they belong to distinct orders; this is the position I will assume.
I think it useful to consider examples of spoken French and dialects ,10,
but I think the sentence complement has a grammatical status.
By relating a verb and its complement, the relation links two morpho-
syntactic categories. Obviously, the verb is a morpho- syntactic category in
French; but we have to admit that its complement, by the fact it is built as a
verbal complement, is also a defmite morpho-syntactic category. Such is not the
case for the so-called "sentence complement" in its relation to the sentence.
They are held together by the virtue of what Bolinger calls "togetherness", but
the "sentence complement" is not organized in systematic paradigms as is the
verbal complement. When we seek its properties in terms of categories, we only
find negative ones.
As I intend to avoid the fallacious word of "complement", I shall from
now on use the terminology of "government" for the verbal syntax: the verb
"governs" an element which is inside its "government". The "governed" element
is governed by its verb 11. For the relation between the sentence and the
adjuncted element, I shall use the term of "association". In "quant amoi, ya va"
(As for me, it is all right), "quant a moi" (as for me) is associated to the verb,
it is not "governed" 12. Government rules and association rules both belong
to the grammar, as I think we can prove from the fact that some languages -
as for instance XIIth century French - have morphological clues to distinguish
between the two types of rules.
2. Distinctive properties of the two types of relation
2.0. A given lexical unit is cften involved in both relations, so that it is not
possible to give regular lists of governed vs. associated elements. Some are
specialized in one kind of relation, such as the clitic elements "la, lui", always
governed by a verb. Some others, such as "quant amoi" (as for me), are always
associated and never governed. These clear examples will be used as typical
tokens in the beginning, until ambiguous examples can be classified by
distin~tive PI"?perties.
S8 CL. BLANCHE-BENVENISTE
Distinctive properties often alluded to are: place, intonation and compatib-

ility with modalities. In French, place and intonation must be combined if we
require useful indications; remarks on modalities have to be related to the para-
digmatic organization which characterizes the governed elements.
2.1. Place and intonation.
The place of an element relative to the verb is not as distinctive as it is usually

said to be. Mobility has often been presented as a characteristic of the associated
element, located before the verb as well as after it.
c'est termine, quant a moi

quant amoi, c'est termine
(it is all over, as for me I as for me, it is over)
and even inserted into the verbal group :
c'est, quant amoi, termine,

(it is, as for me, all over).
In the actual use of spoken conversational French, governed elements have the
same mobility :
17ansila(AG4719)
(17 he is)
pour les memes ils se prennent (AG 19927)

(the same people they think they are)
que des zeros il a recolte (AF 52)
(nothing but zeros he got)
on etait a bloc ras des banes on etait (Rit 9)
(we were full up right up to the benches we were)
amourir des discussions entre femmes on avait (AL 9)

(no end of women's talk we had).
When the element is in front of the verb, it can be followed by "que" :

non, les sciences que je devais faire (Turs II 16)
(no, sciences I was supposed to study).
It is possible to find an ambiguous item such as "heureusement" in its governed

use, in front of the verb:
heureusement c;a s'est termine

(in happiness did it end).
But in this case, there is an interesting into native fact: the governed element,
located in front of the verb, has a melodic schema analogous to the final schema
of the utterance 13. There is a descending schema on :
c;a s'est termin'e,
there is descending (or flat) one on :
heureusemenl,
so that the whole of the utterance has no intonative contrast
heureusement, c;a s'est termine~
It would be the same for a governed element such as "a lui" (of him) in an
affirmative utterance :
oui,a lut je pense\yes, of him I think);
and it would be the same in an interrogative utterance such as :

-J---/
alui, tu penses ? (of him, you're thinking?)
with an ascending schema on the final part, and an ascending or flat one on the
first part. It seems impossible to trigger a contrastive intonation such as :
a lui~ tu pens:s ?
The melody of the preposed element reproduces that o!the final element, with
less amplitude, and never contrasts with it. Such a melody ·shows a kind of
integration into the verbal government. On the contrary, there is a contrast for
the associated element. When preposed to the verb, an element such as "quant
a moi" (as for me), must be pronounced according to a non-fmal intonative
schema, contrasting with that of the final:
1 ------~
_ _ _ _ _ _- J
quant a moi c'est termin~ (as for me, it is over)

and never:
quant amotc'est termin~

Place and intonation give interesting indications for the clear examples. But
it would be difficult to base a general classification on only these into native
properties. We get bad results with postposed elements 14.. We cannot assert
that all non-fmal intonative schemas correspond to associated elements, because
this is, for instance, the typical schema for a nominal subject :
__________ ~I ____________ ~
Ie frere de Marie est tres interessan~

(Mary's brother is very interesting).
The "place and intonation" analysis must be completed by other properties.
2.2. Modalities
2.2.1. A governed element can receive a whole set of modalities, which an

associated element cannot. This distinctive property has often been identified
for negative and interrogative modalities.
Clearly associated elements such as "quant a moi" cannot receive interroga-
tion or negation :
*pas quant a moi, celava bien (not as for me ... )

*ce n 'est pas quant amoi... (it is not as for me ... )
*est-ce quant a toL.. (is it as for you that ... )
They remain outside the scope of verbal negation or interrogation:
quant a moi cela ne va pas bien (as for me it is not going very well)
cela va-toil bien, quant Ii toi ? (is it going well, as for you ?)
On the contrary, clearly governed element receive modalities :
pas alui~ je pensais'(not of him I was thinking)
and fall within the scope of verbal interrogation or negation:
je ne pensais pas Ii lui (I was not thinking of him)

pensais-tu Ii lui? (were you thinking of him).
According to this property, it has often been proposed to separate "parce que-
phrases", and "puisque-phrases" 15 :
Ce n'est pas parce que tu Ie veux qu'ille fait

(it is not because you want him to that he does it)
*Ce n'est pas puisque tu Ie veux qu'ille fait
(it is not since you want him to that he does it)
est-ce parce que tu Ie veux qu'ille fait 1
(is it because you want him to that he does it ?)
*est-ce puisque tu Ie veux qu'ille fait 1
(is it since you want him to that he does it 1)
An ambiguous lexical form such as "heureusement", accepts the modalities for

its typically governed interpretation:
pas heureusemen!,du tout;c;a s'est Jermine'

pas heureusement, c;a s'esf fermme 1
but it excludes modalities for the typically associated interpretation (it is lucky
that) :
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- J / _ _~----~
*pas heureusement, c;a s'est termint
It would be the same for other items of the kind, such as :
betemellt. il a repond~ (stupidly did he answer)

betement, il a repondu'(stupidly, he anllwered)
or "personnellement, franchement, honnetement, curieusement, r6ellement,

naturellement, etrangement" (personally, frankly, curiously, really, naturally,
oddly).
2 2 2. Other modalities such as restriction and comparison can be added to

governed elements but cannot be added to associated elements:
iJ ne Ie fait que parce qu'on l'exige

(he does it only because we demand him that he does it)
*11 ne Ie fait que puisqu'on l'exige
(he does it only since we demand him to)
ille fait plus parce qu'on l'exige ...
(he does it more because you demand him to that...)
*11 Ie fait plus puisqu'on l'exige
(he does it more since we demand him to).
These modalities share a common characteristic : they allow the introduction

of lexical contrasts based on the governed element: "pas a lui mais aelle" (not
of him but of her), "est-ce a lui ou a elle ?" (is it of him or of her), "seulement
a lui, pas a elle" (only of him, not of her). This contrastive possibility is ex-
cluded for associated elements. We notice that items such as : "quelqu'attitude"
(whatever attitude) or "qui que" (whoever), which semantically suspend the
modalities and prevent any possibility or contrastive effect, never act as
governed elements, but always as associated ones. For instance, they cannot
stand for the accusative of any verb :
*J'adopterai quelqu 'attitude qu 'on prenne

(I'll adopt whatever attitude is taken)
*j'accepterai qui que tu choisisses
(I'll accept whomever you choose)
They are always linked with the special "place and intonation" schema of
associated elements :
quelqu'attitude qu 'on prenn:, je suivrai '

(whatever attitude is taken, I'll follow).
Alternative expressions such as "peur ou pas peur" (fear or no fear), in which

modalities are semantically neutralized, can act as associated elements:
--------/ ~---.,
peur ou pas peur, je sUivrai\rear or no fear, I'll ... )
but cannot act as governed elements:
*je supporterai peur ou pas peur

(I'll bear fear or no fear).
There can exist no contrast between different modalities of "peur", and this
impossibility seems to be related to the impossibility of acting as a governed
element.
2.2.3. Contrastive possibilities are introduced into governed elements by

general procedures, which can be called "systematic procedures" : every element
governed by a verb can receive the set of modalities. Apparent exceptions can be
predicted. For instance, "indefinite". and "interrogative" items are reluctant
to restriction :
*il ne parle que de tout

(he speaks only of everything)
*tu penses a qui mais pas a lui

(you are thinking of whom but not of him).
We have to state these kinds of "reluctance rules"Jor semantic incompatibilities

anyway, whatever may be the use of "tout" or "qui" in the utterance. These
semantically located rules do not infirm the idea that modalities systematically
apply to governed elements.
Verbs with negative or positive polarity also hinder the modalities. "line
levera pas Ie petit doigt" (he won't raise his little fmger) cannot receive a restric-
tion, "*i1 ne levera que Ie petit doigt" (he will raise only his little finger). Here,
the nominal element "Ie petit doigt" is not equivalent to a pronoun ("i! ne Ie
levera pas", he won't raise it), so that it cannot be considered as a governed ele-
ment. We therefore try here to maintain the idea that governed elements, being
compatible with the set of modalities, are compatible with systematic contrasts.
Such is not the case for associated ones. For instance, "heureusement", taken in
its "associated" interpretation (it is lucky that) has only one negative correspon-
dent:
heureusement, malheureusement, r,:a s'est termine.
This lexical negation is the only modulation allowed here. It is built on a

derivational type, which is, in French, a non-systematic process. The para-
digmatic possibilities, which can be extended for the governed use of "heureuse-
ment", do not go beyond this two-fold series "heureusement/malheureusement"
for the associated type :
governed associated
heureusement + +
malheureusement + +
pas tres heureusement +
plus heureusement que +
seulement heureusement +
The governed type has a regular paradigm, allowing several contrasts; this regular
minimal paradigm reveals a larger one, which is lacking for the associated type.
2.3. Proportional equivalence with pronouns 16.
2.3.1. We consider as a rule that governed elements have a particular relation

with representative pronouns of their paradigms. Pairs such as :
il pense aPaul / il pense alui

il pense ace monsieur / il pense alui
il pense a qui / il pense alui,
exhibit a constant relation. Whatever the lexical realization (Paul, ce monsieur,

qui), there holds a constant relation with the pronoun. Adverbs such as "heureu-
sement, gentiment, comment" present the same constant relation with a generic
adverb like "ainsi" (in this way) :
9a se termine heureusement / 9a se termine ainsi

illui a parle gen timen t / illui a parle ainsi
9a s'est termine comment / 9a s'est termine ainsi.
This constant relation with pronominal forms has been used as a basis for a
systematic analysis of French syntax, in the studies proposed by K. Van den
Eynde and myself 17. Pronouns such as "a lui", "ainsi", "comment", can be
used as useful clues as long as they act as generic and classificatory terms. All
the elements of the paradigm have the same constant relation with this kind of
term. An element such as "Ie petit doigt" (the little finger), in "i! ne levera pas
Ie petit doigt", not having the same relation with the pronoun "Ie", cannot be
considered as a governed element of the verb "lever".
The paradigmatic affJliation established between an adverbial form like
"heureusement" and a generic pronoun "ainsi" or "comment" permits us to
neutralize the lexicon and consider only the syntactic relation of the governed
element.
2.3.2. Associated elements have no systematic relations with generic

pronouns which could reveal their paradigmatic affiliation. If we compare
"heureusement, ainsi, comme 9a" in the associated use:
_ _ _ _--" - - J , _ _ _ _.......
heureusement, ainsi, com me 9a, 9a se termine~
we do not obtain a homogeneous list as for the governed use:
9a s'est termine heureusement, ainsi, comme 9a ...

The effect of grouping into one and the same series is lost; moreover, we observe
that interrogative "comment ?", which occurs in the governed elements, does
not occur in the associated ones:
----~/----------~
*comment, IVa s'est termine~
Many typically associated elements such as "quant a moi" (as for me) have no
pronominal correspondence at all. No pronominal equivalence would fit here.
There is no constant relation between:
a
Quant moi / ainsi / a!ors / c'est termine
(as for me / in this way / then / it is all over).
Elements listed here do not show the typical paradigmatic coherence we

find for governed elements. Associated elements are not organized in systematic
paradigms as are governed elements.
2.4. Compatibility with the modalities and systematic proportionality with

the pronouns can be viewed as two manifestations of the same fundamental
property: systematic paradigmatic organization. I suggest that this property
is characteristic of the governed elements. Associated elements have no similar
property: the small paradigmatic list we have found, such as "heureusement/
malheureusement", gives only a haphazard commutative list; but the lexicon
which can appear in this small list cannot be summed up by large morpho-
syntactic categories. The systematic organization of the governed elements
must be related to the "government" principle: the governed element
contributes to the lexical structuration of the verb; reciprocally, the governor
function of the verb contributes to the lexical organization of the nominal
element, in that it entails a paradigmatic structure for the complement.
The characteristics here described: place-intonation, modalities,
proportionality with pronouns, can now allow us to identify more accurately
the associated status and to apply it to a larger field than is usual with the con-
cept of "sentence complement".
3. Associated elements
3.1. Extension of the field.
We can try to analyse ambiguous examples without having to rely only

upon more or less conclusive differences in apparent meaning 18. For instance,
we have to control whether, when a so-called "movable" element is placed in
front of the verb, with a non-final intonation, it thereby loses the possibility of
receiving the set of modalities and the proportional relation to the pronouns.
a) quand- phrases (when)
- The governed type has a final-like intonation:
quand il est mort, ses fils sont partis~

(when he died did his sons went away).
Modalities can apply:
ce n 'est que quand il est mort que ses fils sont...

(it is only when he died that his sons went away).
Resulting contrasts can occur :
quand il est mort et pas avant, ses fils sont partis

(when he died and not before, his sons went away).
There is a good proportionality with the pronouns:
ses fils sont partis quand il est mort / quand / alors

(his sons went away when he died / when / then).
- The associated type has a non-final intonation:

__________-JI ____________ ~
quand il est mort, c'etait onze heure~

(when he died, it was eleven o'clock).
A final-like intonation would not fit :
*quand il est mort c'etait onze heures~
Modalities seem somehow odd :
(?) est-ce quand il est mort qu'il etait onze heures

ce n'est que quand il est mort qu'il etait lIh
c'est plutOt quand il est mort qu'il etait lIh
(was it when he died that it was 11 ? It was only when he died that ...
It is rather when he died ... )
There exists no proportional relation with the pronouns, for instance with
the interrogative one :
(1) quand etait-il IIh 1 quand i1 est mort

(when was it 11 1 when he died).
There can exist such a relation with "alors" (then):
alors, il etait 11 h
(then it was 11),
but this relation is not linked with a whole paradigm. The same demonstration
would fit for examples such as :
quand je l'ai entendu, il etait trop tard

(when I heard him, it was too late).
Such examples give good results because verbs such as "it was 11" or "it was
too late" tend to reject any temporal governed element. To ask "when was it
11 ?" sounds inconsistent, as would be the case for most stative verbs. Semantic
features of this kind entail an interpretation of the "complement" as being
outside the verbal government. Such stative verbs can be associated to temporal
indications as long as they stay outside the verbal government. What comes
under discussion then is not the mere possibility of applying a temporal
indication to the verb but the type of relation existing between the temporal
indication and the verb. With a non-stative verb as in "ses fils sont partis" (his
sons went away), both interpretations can hold, and we grasp the slight
difference in meaning by opposing the two into native patterns:
- governed pattern,
quand il est mor~ ses fils sont parti~
(meaning for instance: ''when he died and not at another time")

- associated pattern,
quand il est mor:, ses fils sont parti$'
(here no contrast with ''when he died"). In this interpretation the temporal

part will not fall into the negative or interrogative scope of the verb :
quand il est mort"ses fils sont-ils partis 1

quand il est mort, ses fils ne sont pas part is,
which would be the case if the temporal part stood for a governed element:
ses fils sont-ils part is quand il est mort?
Within this interpretation, the temporal part cannot commute with the inter-
rogative pronoun :
--/
*quand, ses fils sont-ils partis ?
Non-final intonation, lack of contrast and modalities, absence of proportion-

ality with the pronouns are correlated. The semantic difference between both
interpretations is not obvious. We could comment on it by paraphrasing: in
the governed interpretation, the temporal phrase gives an indication about the
departure of the sons; in the associated interpretation, it gives a kind of frame-
work. But such differences could not be used to state two distinctive relations,
if we did not have other paradigmatic properties to define them.
Here are some examples of "quand-phrases" associated with a verb in conver-
sational spoken French; it would be difficult to commute these quand-phrases
with an interrogative "quand ?", and this provides a clear indication about their
associated status. "Si", "avec", "comme" give the same examples.
les gens quand ils rient ils ont pas honte de rire (AG)
(People when they laugh, they are not ashamed of laughing.)
(?) quand est-ce qu'ils n'ont pas honte de rire ?
(? when is it that they are not ashamed of laughing ?)
parce que quand on a fini ses devoirs heu qu'on veut jouer on aime-
rait plutot jouer dehors (Nelly E3 4)
(because when you've finished your homework and you want to play
you'd rather play outside)
hi-bas quand il y a des mariages ils durent au moins trois jours (Tujk
1020)
(over there when they have weddings, they last at least three days)
(?) quand est-ce qu'ils durent trois jours ?
(? when is it that they last three days ?)
The associated "quand-phrase" often goes with a cleft sentence such as "quand ...
c'est que ... " (when ... it means that ...) :
quand tout marche bien c'est que les chefs sont bons (apud Chetrit
134)
(when everything is all right, it means that the bosses are good).
It may be associated with a non-verbal sentence, such as :
je connais des femmes moi quand leur marl il rentre ala fin de la quin-
zaine prrt les so us a moi (AG 4 40 9)
(I know women I do, when their husband he comes home at the end of
the fortnight, hep ! the dough for me).
b) si-phrases
- Governed by the verb, and placed in front of the verb, it has a final-like
intonation :
si cela etait vraiment urgent je vous derangerai; (radio)
It is then compatible with modalities:
seulement si c'etait urgent, je vous derangerais

(only if it were very urgent would I ask you)
est-ce si c'etait vraiment urgent qu'on vous derangerait ?
(is it if it were urgent that we would ask you ?)
No typical pronoun can correspond to this governed use of "si-phrases";

we find instead a list of commutable elements such as "dans ces conditions, en
ce cas, alors" (in these conditions, in that case, then ...).
- associated with the verb it is pronounced with a non-final intonation:
Si- Mme Weil y a renonce, elle a maintenu un classement

(though MW gave it up, she retained a classification)
si Mara a la scene est un miracle, ala ville elle est une star (Newspapers)
(while M. is a miracle on stage, in town she is a star)
Final-like intonation would seem rather odd:
*si Mme Well y a renonce elle a maintenu ...
Modalities would not fit :
*ce n'est que si Maill a la scene est un miracle que ...

(it is only while M. is a miracle on stage that...)
Commutations with "dans ces conditions, en ce cas, alors ..." do not maintain
the serial effect of pertaining to a paradigmatic list:
dans ces conditions Maia a la scene est un miracle ...

(in these conditions M. is a miracle on stage ... )
As in the well-known example,
si tu as soif il y a de la biere au frigidaire 19

(if you feel thirsty, there is some beer in the fridge).
the "si-phrase" implies no conditional meaning, in the usual sense of "condi-

tional". It rather acts as an equivalent to the verbal phrase.
c) avec-phrases
- governed by the verb it has a final-like intonation:
avec vou; j'ai envie de sorti?,
and it often goes with a contrastive effect: "avec vous et pas avec quelqu'un
d'autre" (it is with you and nobody else). Modalities do not change this type of
relation:
ce n'esL qu'avec vous que j'ai envie de sortir

(it is only with you that I feel like going out)
est-ce avec vous que j'ai envie de sortir ?
The governed element forms a paradigm with many pronominal items: "avec
qui, avec quelqu'un, avec lui" (with whom, with somebody, with him).
- associated with the verb, it has a non-fmal intonation:

________ ~~I ______________ ~~
avec ces enfants, on ne peut pas travailler'(CIB)

(with those children, you cannot work)
je crains Ie car moi deja je crains Ia voiture mais enfin avec man mari
avec Ie vent ~a va (Lic 2 7)
(I get sick in coaches I do, even in cars I get sick, but with my husband
and some fresh air, I can manage).
A final-like intonation changes the interpretation:

----------...."
avec man marl va
--..
~a
by implying a contrast, "with my husband but nobody else ... " Modalities would
be odd; interrogative is excluded and the equivalence with pronominal type like
"ainsi" (like that) does not parallel with "avec hti" (with him).
d) com me-phrase s
- governed by the verb, as in :
elle conduit ses affaires comme elle veut,
it can be preposed to the verb, with a final-like intonation:
comme elle veut'elle conduit ses affaire~

(the way she wants she manages her business).
Modalities are compatible with this intonation:
c'est plutot comme elle peut que com me elle veut que ...
(it is rather the way she can that the way she wants ... )
moi c'etait comme 9a et pas autrement que je l'ai vecu

(me, it's that way and not another way that I would have taken it).
The "comme-phrase" falls into the paradigm of "ainsi, comme cela, comment,
autrement" (so, how, like that).
- associated with the verb, it has a contrastive intonation:

------__________JI ______________ ~
comme elle est energique, elle conduit ses affaire~

(as she is vigourous, she manages her business)
and here, final-like intonation is inadequate. No contrast seems to be con-

venient :
comme elle est energique mais pas comme elle l'etait...

(as she is vigourous but not as she used to be ... )
Relations with pronominal forms of the previous paradigm do not give a good
serial effect:
(1) com me elle est energique / autrement / ainsi...

e) negative phrases like "pas de N", "pas du N".
- when governed by the verb, these phrases have the form "pas de N" or "pas
du N" if there is a contrast :
je n 'ai pas demande de cafe

(I did not ask for coffee)
je n 'ai pas demande du cafe mais du th~
(I did not ask for coffee but for tea).
"Pas du N" occurs in front of the verb, whether there be a formal contrast
or not, with final-like intonation:
pas du cafe (mais du th6) j'ai demande "-

(not coffee but tea I asked for).
"Pas du N" is the only form compatible with modalities such as restriction
or interrogation:
pas rien que du cafe } .

n 'est-ce paS du cafe que tu as demande
"Rien que de cafe" could not act as a governed element.
- associated with the verb, we find only "pas de N" form :

_ _ _.-JI _ _ _---.
pas de cafe, je m 'en vais"
(no coffee, I leave).
It is impossible to get "pas du N" with the contrastive intonation:

_ _ _--i/ ,
·pas du cafe, je m 'en vais.
It is equally impossible to get any modality:
·pas du cafe mais du the, je m'en vais

(not coffee but tea, I leave)
·pas de cafe mais de the, je m'en vais
(no coffee but tea, I leave).
In the governed element "pas du cafe", pas appears to be a negation focusing

on a quantified nominal element, du cafe. It behaves as any other modality
would do, when directed to a nominal element:
pas }
rien que + du cafe
seulement
In the associated element "pas de cafe", pas de operates as a negative

quantifier parallel to "aucun, zero" :
pas de }
:;;:n + cafe
nen comme
It does not contain any modality. The two different analyses can be presented
as follows:
governed element associated element
modality + quantifier +N quantifier +N
pas du pas de
rien que beaucoup de cafe du
plutot quatre beaucoup de cafe
aucun
rien comme
f) locative or temporal phrases, without preposition.
Some well-known locative or temporal elements can be governed by a verb,

without any preposition. Such are phrases like : "Ie matin, l'apres-midi, Ie soir,
la nuit, Ie jour, l'ete, l'hiver, l'automne, rue Gambetta ... " (the morning, the after-
noon, the evening, the night, the day, summer, winter, autumn, Cambetta,
Street...)
il se repose Ie matin, I'hiver, rue Gambetta 20

(he is resting (in) the morning, (in) winter, G. Street).
These phrases belong to special taxinomies (which I do not intend to analyse

here). Many locative or temporal phrases are excluded from this use, such as :
*11 se repose l'aube, Ie midi, Ie crepuscule, les vacances, les saisons, la

campagne, la maison, Ie port...
(he is resting dawn, noon, twilight, holidays, seasons, countryside, the
house, the harbour ... )
In an associated use, locative or temporal elements can occur without any pre-
position and there does not seem to be any taxinomic organization to rule its
occurrence :
l'aube on n'arrive pas it partir

(at dawn you can't leave)
ce metier on se deplace ,tous les jours

(this job you're moving about every day)
la campagne i1 faut des voisins

(the countryside you need neighbours)
cette villa personne n 'arrive it dormir

(this cottage nobody can sleep)
septembre il a fait tres chaud

(september it was very hot)
mon premier mari on avait une voiture

(my first husband we had a car)
A mere relation of "togetherness" seems to hold here, without any hint of the
previous organization characteristic of the governed elements.
This cursory examination enables us to see some examples of governed ele-

ments opposed to associated elements, with apparently identical forms. I do not
claim to describe the whole field. I do not think, either, that associated elements
constitute a clear homogeneous class; but I do think it important, at least, to
gather some fundamentals features of both types.
3.2. Principal meanings ascribed to associated elements
Many authors insisted on the fact that what we call associated elements
characterize the way the utterance is viewed more than the verb itself 21
In such examples as "franchement, honnetement, c'est beau" (frankly, honestly,

it is nice), the utterance itself is said to be "frank" or "honest". Examples like
"puisque-phrases" have been analysed by appealing to the presupposition ef-
fect 22. The notions of ''way of looking at a fact" 23 or "transpropositional
implication" 23 have been used. "Inclusion effects" have been described for
locative or temporal elements which seem to include the similar governed
locatives and temporals 24.
----/-----------------
aParis, il va au cinema rue d'Alesi~
(in Paris he goes to the movies in Alesia Street)
cannot be reversed :
------~/------------~,
rue d'Alesia, il va au cinema aParis,
unless the intonation has a final-like patterning:
rue d'Alesi~ il va au cinema aPari~
Examples such as "cette villa on ne peut pas dorrnir" (this cottage nobody can
sleep), as far as they have been described, have often been analysed as having
a theme, "cette villa", linked to the predicative part of the utterance 25.
Throughout these various meanings, there appear some constant character-
istics. Associated elements often give the effect of a preliminary framework for
the content of the verbal utterance. The relation is explicitly given as such
when the lexicon renders explicit the relation, as in "legalement parlant" (legal-
ly speaking). The relation looks hazy when such is not the case. In "cette villa
on ne peut pas dormir" (this cottage nobody can sleep), it can be inside the
cottage, with this cottage nearby, because of this cottagr, since there is this
cottage, when dreaming of this cottage, etc. Various interpretations are open to
us. The relation is not shaped by a paradigmatic organisation and thus appears
hazy and of a rudimentary type. No special meaning can resume all the meaning
possibilities implied by associated elements. Many are essentially characterized
by opposition with governed elements.
4. An illustration drawn from an analysis of medieval French, by

Skarup
In his study on Les Premieres Zones de fa Proposition en Ancien Franrais,

76 C1. BLANCHE-BENVENISTE
Skarup indirectly gives the distinction between governed and associated

elements, and this distinction is linked with morpho-syntactic signs. I hope I
can use Skarup's analysis, without distorting it too much, and present it in our
terminology .
Skarup (416-429) distinguishes elements "inside the proposition" (or "in-
side the principal"), and elements "outside the proposition" (or "extraposed",
"dislocated"). Clitic pronouns are useful clues to observe this distinction. Clitic
pronouns are governed by the verb and they can occur in two precise places
in relation to the verb (at least in "principal propositions").
- A. word-order :
....verb + clitics used as + subject
complements clitic
- B. word-order :
.... clictics used as + verb subject
complements clitic
In front of the clitics -and-verb block, there occur elements such as "ne", pre-
fix reo, or adverbial onques (34). After the block, adverbial or, negatives pas
or mie. The whole forms the "verbal zone" (hereafter noted within bars).
A. Examples:
... et/ .... torna s'en ...1Ii marchis (375)

(and the marquis went back)
...I ...avra la elle .. ./ (371)

(will she have it)
....I.r alons nos en . ./ (384)

(let us go back)
B. Examples:
apres /s 'en va ... /a son ostel (350)

(and then goes he to his hostel)
maintes fois I Ie t'avoie je ...1desfendu (216)

(many times had I forbidden it to you)
done, fet il / Ie vos dirai gie/. .. (226)

(so, he says, I shall tell you).
Word order A occurs when no governed element (not even the subject of the
verb) precedes the verbal group (cf. 368-418). This is the case when nothing
precedes the verb, or only an exclamative "ha", or a coordinator "et" :
....ha/gardez Ie moil (369)

(hey keep it for me)
....etl refut les mout chierementl (375)

(and received them very lovingly)
It is also the case when an associated element precedes the verb:
que que ce soit, I dites Ie nasi (383)

(whatever it may be, tell us)
puisqu'il plaist anostre sauveur I graciims l'entl (384)

(since it pleases our Lord, let us absolve him for it).
Word order B occurs when the verbal group is preceded by a governed

element (only one governed element is then possible). It can be :
- a direct complement of the verb :
Ie cheval I vas garderai gie ( 191)

(the horse will I keep for you)
sire, vostre nom / me direz vos / (195)

(Milord, your name you will tell me)
- a prepositional complement :
contre un des noz I en on il quatre ( (219)

(for one of ours, they have four)
car il de riens I ne s'i foloiel (434)

(for he for nothing did he care)
- an adverbial phrase:
un an avant (. .. ) I l'avoit iljajuree et fiance I (216)

(one year past had he already engaged his faith to her)
- a completive verbal phrase:

que Ii dus venoit / lor non~a / (269)

(that the duke was coming he announced them)
Skarup represents these facts in different "zones". The verbal group and
the governed elements constitute the "proposition"; associated elements are
"outside the proposition". The proposition itself is divided into "preverbal
zone", "verbal zone" and "post-verbal zone". If the preverbal zone is empty,
we fmd word order A. If the preverbal zone contains a governed element, we
find word order B.
outside outside
the prop. proposition the prop.
pre-verbal verbal post-verbal

zone zone zone
- V + pro
+ pro + V
When a verb subject is preposed to a verb, it can be considered either as an

associated element (outside the proposition), then the preverbal zon~ is
empty and the complement clitics come after the verb :
et la chiere sainte pucele, /parti s 'en gloriuse e bele / (397)

(as for the dear holy maiden, she left glorious and radiant)
or as a governed element (in the preverbal zone), and then complement clitics
come before the verb :
ja Ii corners / ne nos avreit mestier / (449)

(not even sounding the horn could be of use to us)
In this case, it seems to give a contrastive effect, as it happens also in modern

French.
A noun which occurs "redundantly" with a pronoun is always considered as
an associated element, with word order A :
que enfant n'orent, / pesa lur en forment / (372)

(having no children, this was a heavy grievance to them)
de vostre fiz, bau sire, / pregne vos en pith! / (372)

(on your son Milord may you have pity)
Skarup succeeds in correcting some usual interpretations of the texts, by fol-

lowing this rule. For instance in :
ceus qui m'ont escute, / lor pri iou qu'il n'oblient/ (184)
the complement clitic is in front of the verb; this means that the nominal group
which comes before is governed by the verb and cannot be redundant with the
clitic, it has to be translated by : "those who have listened to me, I pray them
(other ones) not to forget".
Such terms as "in the proposition" and "outside the proposition" embarrass
Skarup, and he explains his choice (416,429). It leads him to distinguish between
subordinate clauses which are "in the proposition" and others which are "out-
side". But terminology is of little importance. His classification selects very
interesting semantic facts, among which we often find parallels with modern
French. Here are some clear oppositions given for the same phrases, in governed
or associated use.
- "si com" phrases
Used as a governed element, "si com" has the meaning of comparison, and
could be translated by "the same way ... "
si com je voel / m 'en sui jou / par mon gre tomes (283)
(the way I wanted did I leave as I willed)
et einsi come il t'avint en avision / t'est-il/pie9a avenu (284)

(and as it came to you in a dream, so did it happen later)
As an associated element, it has the meaning of "since ..."
si com c'est voir, Sire, et Ie creon, / deffendez nos / de mort et de pri-

son (384)
since true it is, milord, and we do believe it, defend us against death
and jail
si com paiens l'unt si accuilliz, / lancent Ii / lances (384)

(since pagans gave him such welcome, they throw spears at him).
- "quant" phrases
When it is a governed element, it has a temporal meaning, and often a

contrastive effect, such as "even when ... "
quan t on Ie voit / si ne Ie pue t on/ conoistre (461)

(even when you see him you cannot recognize him)
quant en ont anfone mort / s 'an partirent/totes les genz (271)
(when they buried the corpse, all the people went away).
When it is an associated element, it has a meaning similar to "since ... "
quant paien veient que ne l'ateindrunt enfin /Iessent Ie aller (387)

(when pagans see they will not get at him, they let him go).
- "se" phrases
Used as a governed element, it may have a concessive value ("even if..."),

especially when the verb is negative:
se vos assailloient Ii chiens ( ... ) / en istriez vos / sanz dolor (273)

(even though the dogs attacked you, would you come out without
damage)
s'ele m'oblie / ne I'oub/ieraije mie 1(274)
(even if she forgets me I will not forget her)
Used as an associated element, it never has such meaning:
se il vos plaist, I repleviscies les nos /

(if it pleases you renew your plege to us)
s'a mesfait sunt puis pris I purrez les/ justisier (389)
(if they are thereafter caught in mischief you will be able to judge
them)
- "apres" phrases
When a governed element, "apres" means "after", with a contrastive shade.

Skarup proposes to write it without a comma, to indicate its link with the verb:
apres I s ~zn val a son ostel (350)

(and then goes he to his hostel)
When associated, it corresponds to "later". Skarup always writes it with a

comma:
apres, / distrai vas / dels aanz (400)

(later on will I tell you about it)
- "puis que" phrases
When they are governed elements, they have a temporal meaning:
puis que vendra au grand destroit / Ii rendrez vos / trestout son droit
(283)
(when then he reaches the great strait will you give him all his due)
pus ke il vint a moi / l'ai jeo/taunt arne (283)

(since the time he came to me have I loved him so much)
In an associated use, they mean rather "since" :
puis qu'il plaist a nostre sauveur, / gracions l'ent/ (384).
The distinction between governed and associated elements is not apparent in

all circumstances: there must be a clitic complement and the framework of a
principal proposition. This is a sort of fragmentary morpho-syntactic character-
istic, but it is indeed a grammatical one. The differences between the two types
of interpretation are very similar to those we observe in modern French
examples.
5. Conclusion
I have proposed the following hypothesis:

- the difference between verb complements and sentence complements is a
difference between an element governed by the verb and an element associated
to the verbal construction.
- by associated element, we mean at the same time circumstancial elements as
usually identified, and elements which stand in the utterance without being
constructed by the verb, (cf. "this job, you're moving about every day")
- associated elements have no systematic paradigmatic· organisation. Governed
elements have such an organisation, due to the fact that they are constructed by
the verb.
- In Modern French, place, intonation, modalities and pronominal paradigms

give convergent clues which allow such an analysis.
- the distinction was marked by a morpho-syntactic difference in Old French.
- the relations are radically different: it is not possible to say that it is one and
the same relation, having more or less direct links with the verb, or having two
different bases.
- the two relations are parts of the grammar of the utterances. It is not
convenient to call associated elements "non-grammatical elements". It is not
easy, either, to treat them as relations between different sentences.
- the relation existing between an associated element and the rest of the
utterance may occasion very different meanings. None of these meanings can
prevail over the others, or be the basis for explaining the others. To understand
the global meaning of the various uses, we would need to grasp the difference
between two orders of relations: one built on systematic categories of the
language, and one built on the link of "togetherness" in an utterance.
NOTES
I I treated this subject, in the same perspective, in Blanche-Benveniste (1981).

2Chervel (1977) gives a good survey of the tradition on circumstantial comple-
ments.
3Melis (1979) gives an excellent bibliography.
4"verb adjunct" and "sentence adjunct" is in Z. Harris.
5"peripherical" and "integrated" are used in Quirk and Greenbaum. "Ambiant
complement" is in Damourette and Pichon's terminology.
6cf. Culioli (1976).
7cf. Guillaume and Moignet (1974)
8cf. Ross (1966) and Bolinger (1968)
9cf Camproux (P. 465), the discussion on "constructed sentences and amorph
sen tences".
10Inquiries on Spoken French, by the Departement de Linguistique Fran<;aise,
Universite de Provence.
1 1This terminology based on "governed elements" and "associated elements"
("regis et associes") is presented in Blanche-Benveniste (1981). It has been ela-
borated within the framework of a collective study with K. Van den Eynde (to
be published).
12cf. Bolinger (p. 136) : "The first rule of syntax (. .. ) is that things belonging
together will be together (. .. ) Togetherness may be no more than a nearness in
time if a message is spoken, a nearness in space if it is written, or a grouping

under a single rhythm or intonative curve".
13 cf. Ph. Martin (1978).
14cf. Boulakia (1978) and Deulofeu (1979).
15 cf. Ducrot (1973) and Groupe L (1975).
16cf. Blanche-Benveniste (1975).
17 cf. Blanche-Benveniste and Van den Eynde (1979).
181 selected the examples according to the interest of their properties for
meaning, because the demonstration was then much easier.
19Example from Culioli.
20cf. Grevisse (par. 911) : "the preposition is sometimes dropped. In this case,
the relation between the terms is sufficiently suggested by the mere juxta-
position of words". This attitude often tends to judge that conversational speech
presents relations which are not "sufficiently suggested".
21 cf. Culioli.
22 cf. Ducrot.
23 cf. Melis.
24cf. Quirk and Greenbaum (p. 227).
25 cf. Culioli.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYNTAX OF ENGLISH
NOMINALS
Alexandra Colen
aspirant NFWO - R.U.G. Engelse taalkunde
I Introduction
In traditional grammatical descriptions of English, Word-formation deals only

with lexical structure, i.e. with the internal structure of the units of the linguistic
system. It is not relevant to the description of the relations which are contracted
between these units in the syntactic structure of the system. This view is found
in the description of e.g. Koziol (1937), Kruisinga (1931), Poutsma (1928),
Sweet (1900) and Zandvoort (1948).
Derived forms are often described in terms of the part-of-speech to which
their bases belong. In this way a distinction is drawn between denominal,
deverbal and deadjectival nouns, such as weekender, enjoyment, happiness.
The recognition of the part-of-speech to which the base belongs is not, however,
based on the syntactic function or structure of the base in the complex word.
The parts-of-speech are used as a convenient means of classifying derived forms
in terms of the meaning of their bases (adjectives denoting quality, verbs actions
or processes, nouns entities). Moreover, in the case of derived nominals this
practice has obscured insight into exactly that feature which characterizes these
forms syntactically. Whatever the part-of-speech to which the base of a derived
nominal belongs, in the syntactic structure of the derived form the base
functions as a predicate. Modern linguists have taken this as evidence of the
syntactic status of derived nominals. They are syntactic constructions, albeit
constructions of a specific kind, and must be dealt with in syntactic descriptions
of the linguistic system.
85
86 A.COLEN
Within the framework of transformational generative grammar, the syntactic

parallelism between derived nominals and sentences is accounted for by deriving
the former from kernel-sentences (in the standard theory: from syntactic deep
structures) by means of transformations. In this "transformationalist" view
derived nominals are transformed embedded sentences (Lees 1960; Lakoff
1971). Within the TGG school, however, there is disagreement concerning the
place of derived nominals in the grammar. Not all linguists are in favour of
incorporating this aspect of word-formation into the transformational rule
component.
The significant difference between lexicalists and transformationalists resides
in their treatment of the structural parallelisms and differences existing between
sentences and nominal phrases. In itself the fact that NPs with derived nominal
heads have the internal structure of NPs rather than that of sentences is not a
valid argument against the transformationalist position. Transformations are
meaning-preserving, but not structure-preserving rules.
In the transformationalist view the structural differences between sentences
and NPs are formalized in the base component, whereas the similarities (at least
between derived nominal NPs and sentences) are accounted for in the trans-
formational component.
In the lexicaIist view both the similarities and the differences between
sentences and NPs are accounted for in the generative base component. In other
words, they are not transformationally related. In fact their relationship is more
fundamental. The base rules generate structures which are baSically dependency
structures, i.e. phrases, and which are not subcategorized syntactically (Chomsky
1970, lackendoff 1977).
It is our opinion that the generative treatment of derived nominal phrases
provides a more adequate account of the facts than the transformational treat-
ment. However, the X Bar Convention does not solve all the problems
encountered in attempts to relate derived norninals to their cognate sentences.
Some problems are due to the fact that all functional distinctions relevant to
sentence structure are accounted for in terms of its subject-predicate structure.
Others are caused by the fact that the structures and functions fulfilled by ele-
ments in a sentence are reduced to hierarchically arranged categories and sub-
categories. The subject and predicate functions e.g. are represented as the cate-
gories NP and VP respectively.
The evidence from derived nominals, as well as from nominal clauses which
were not regarded as problematic in the controversy between lexicalists and
THE SYNTAX OF ENGLISH NOMINALS 87
transformationalists, indicates that further revision of the syntactic deep struc-

ture is needed.
II. Analysis
The following is an examination of the syntactic characteristics of English

nominals, which leads to the conclusion that neither a transformationalist
account nor a generative account in terms of the syntactic deep structure of ST
and X-Syntax can capture the facts in a consistent way. The data consists of
clauses and phrases which fulfill nominal functions in sentences, yet are not
NPs with simple noun heads (the nominal clause types are those distinguished
by Quirk et al 1972). Examples a. are sentences containing various types of
nominals. The same matrix sentences, in which the nominals are substituted by
NPs headed by simple nouns, are listed under b. The sentences in c. represent
the syntactic paraphrases of the nominals embedded in the sentences of a ..
Elements which are overt in the nominals but missing in the paraphrase
sentences are underlined; elements which are explicit in the paraphrase sentences
but missing in the corresponding nominals are placed in brackets.
1. That-clauses.
a. IllEJ. she was still alive consoled him.
b. Mary consoled him.
c. She was still alive.
2. Wh-interrogative clauses
a. I cannot imagine what made him do it.
b. I cannot imagine the house.
c. What made him do it ?
3. Yes-no interrogative clauses

a. Do you know whether the banks are open?
b. Do you know the story?
c. Are the banks open?
4. To-infinitive nominal clauses

a. He likes everyone to be happy.
b. He likes animals.
c. Everyone (is) happy.
5. Nominal -ing clauses

a. He enjoys deceivi!lK his own family.
b. He enjoys good food.
c. He deceivers) his own family.
88 A.COLEN
6. Deverbal noun NPs

a. He appreciated his friend's competent handling of the matter.
b. He appreciated beauty.
c. His friend handl(ed) the matter competent(ly).
7. a. She was surprised at John s violent reaction to the news.

b. She was surpn'sed at the sTie of the building.
c. John react(ed) violent(ly) to the news.
The nominals in the above examples all fulfill the functions of nouns and
NPs in their matrix sentences. All of them may function as subjects, objects and
complements of the copula. Apart from the fact that they fulfill the same
functions as simple nouns, they also have in common the fact that all of them
can be paraphrased by sentences (as in c.). These paraphrase sentences make
explicit the structural relations which hold between the constituents within the
nominals. These structural relations are interpreted as grammatical relations
(such as those between subject and predicate, or between verb and object)
typical of sentences, rather than as modifier-head relations typical of NPs.
This indicates that the structures underlying these nominals are not NP
structures. Derived nominals like 6-7, which have the surface structures of NPs
containing simple heads and underlying structures which are not NPs, must be
regarded as products of processes which radically change their internal
structure. They are referred to as "structure-changing" nominais, to distinguish
them from the "structure-preserving" nominals of examples 1-5, whose under-
lying and surface structures do not conflict. The nominals in examples 1 to 7
represent sentences in their entirety, i.e. sentences which are inserted into empty
noun slots of the matrix sentence (Vendler 1968, 31). They are called "sentence
nominals". Their structure can be represented as follows: (US = underlying
structure; SS = surface structure).
matrix structure [------] NP -I- V + NPJ-(US) [NP+V+NP]NP+V+NP

inserted structure NP+ V + NP
e.g.
--- consoled him} -(US) [she was still alive] consoled him
she was still alive _(SS) that she was still alive consoled him
The class of sentence nominals (SNs) is distinguished from nominals which

represent not sentences but NPs consisting of a nominal head and a sentential
THE SYNTAX OF ENGLISH NOMJNALS 89
complement to the head (Vendler 1968, 31). The structure of such RCNs
("restrictive complement nominals") is represented as :
matrix structure [N+---- ]NP-i V+NPJ-(US)[N+[NP+V+NP]]

inserted structure NP+V+NP NP+V+NP
e.g.
The man --- met hert _(US)[The man [the man had quarelled]]met her
The man had quarreled)
. ~(SS) the man who had quarreled met her
In terms of underlying structure the following deriv~d nominals are RCNs :
There were indications of pending disaster

He was the best shoemaker in town.
He used an electric drill.
RCNs represent processes of adjectivalization. The following observations con-

cern only SNs.
II. 1. Underlying sentence structure
In connection with the basic observation that nominals do not represent

underlying NPs the question may be raised as to what underlying structure
they do represent. In both the transformationalist and the generative (or lex i-
calist) theories the basic construction in underlying structure is the sentence.
The sentence is defined by the categorial component as a subject-predicate
construction with components belonging to different categories (NP and VP).
Our analysis is based on the observation that sentences are not basic structures,
but incorporate a number of superimposed component structures which cannot
be reduced to a single non-complex string of categories (as in generative
grammar). First of all a sentence includes two major types of dependency
relations, those obtaining between a noun and its complements within a NP
(the determinant-determinatum structure of a NP: see Tesniere 1969; Hays
1964), and those between a verb and its complements within a VP. In this sense
a sentence is a VP, which has as its head the main verb of the sentence and as its
complements the other obligatory constituents of the sentence, including the
subject. In J ackendoffs formalization of dependency relations, this fact is
captured by equating the sentence with V (Jackendoff 1977). Henceforth the
90 A.COLEN
term "VP" is used in this sense rather than in the restricted sense in which it is
used in generative grammar (viz. to denote only the predicate of the sentence).
The number and type of complements within a VP depend on the valency of
the head. The dependents within a VP are NPs. The valency structure within a
VP differs in kind from the dt-dm structure within a NP. Valency accounts for
the obligatory constituents of a sentence (those which represent the participant
cases of case structure : see Fillmore 1970).
The optional constituents of a sentence, viz. adverbial adjuncts of various
kinds, represent another type of component structure. Similar optional
constituents are found in NPs. In sentences these constituents belong to two
types: sentence-modifiers (which can be regarded as modifiers of higher per-
formative verbs) and modifiers of the main verb, such as time, place and manner
adverbials. The former are not considered here. The latter modify the heads of
VPs in sentences but are not inherent parts of these VPs. The corresponding
optional modifiers in NPs are similarly not regarded as inherent parts of the NPs.
Such modifiers constitute the "circumstancial contextualization" of the VPs
and NPs in which they occur. The grammatical relations between verbs and their
adverbial modifiers (i.e. their circumstancial contextualizers) are different from
those between verbs and their valency dependents.
A third type of structure which is reflected in sentences determines the
relation between main verbs and the morpho syntactic markers of tense, aspect
and modality which are associated with them. The relations of temporal,
aspectual and modal contextualization also differ in kind from the valency
relations within sentence VPs. A fourth type of structure which is reflected in
sentences but is not inherent in the structure of VPs is that which distinguishes
between subject and predicate functions. This structure accounts for the
syntactic relation between subjects and predicates which is not explained by the
valency structure of the VP. This relation is marked by the morphosyntactic
phenomenon of concord. It may be argued that the subject-predicate relation
is a grammatical reflection of one aspect of information structure. This
grammaticalized level of information structure may be referred to as "thematic
structure" in order to distinguish it from those aspects of information structure
which are not grammaticalized (e.g. emphatic components of information, and
the distinction between presupposition and focus are signalled by the
nonsegmental phonological component of language rather than the syntactic
component).
The distinction of different types of structure which are incorporated into
the sentence is set up on the basis of differences in the functions fulfilled by the
relevant constituents in the sentence. These functional differences embody

differences in the type of relationship which is contracted with the main verb
of the sentence on each component level of structure. They are obscured in the
hierarchies and categories of Chomskyan phrase structure (Chomsky 1965,
1970).
The main verb is the pivotal element in each component structure of the
sentence. The relationships which are specific to each of the component
structures differ syntactically and semantically. Syntactic differences include
that between optional and obligatory constituents of the sentence, that between
inflection (e.g. for tense) and the addition of constituents (obligatory and
optional complements of the verb), that between elements which govern the
verb syntactically (e.g. the subject with respect to concord) and those which
do not. Each syntactic distinction corresponds to a semantic distinction, as the
following summary shows.
- VP structure: is characterized syntactically by necessary complementation
of the main verb in the sentence. It expresses semantic relations which are in-
herent in the meaning of the verb, i.e. which are an essential part of the action,
event, etc. denoted by the verb. These semantic relations constitute the role-
structure of the verb (Langendoen, 1970).
- circumstancial contextualization : is reflected in the optional constituents of
VPs and NPs. They function as the modifiers of the main verb in the sentence.
They add information concerning the circumstances of the activity, event, etc.,
or concerning the non inherent characteristics of the entity.
- temporal, aspectual and modal contextualization : all sentences are marked or
unmarked for these oppositions. They are marked by inflection or the
occurrence of auxiliaries associated with the main verb. Sentences cannot be
complete unless they are contextualized in these three respects.
- thematic structure: is an cbligatory part of sentence structure. Each sentence
has an obligatory subject (if necessary a semantically empty subject). The
subject governs the verb (apparent in person and number concord where this is
applicable). The subject functions as a separate constituent opposed to the rest
of the VP (the verb and its objects) with respect to various transformations
(such as passivization). Thematic structure represents the basic structure of a
message (Le. a complete and independent unit of information). Semantically a
sentence always conveys a message. Hence the structure of the message is an
inherent part of sentence structure.
92 A.COLEN
11.2. Sentence structure components in nominals
This analysis of sentences as simultaneous realizations of distinct and

separable types of component structures is further justified by evidence from
nominalization. Within a sentence the component structures cannot be
separated. They are, however, reflected separately or in combination in the
various types of nominals. Not all nominals represent all aspects of sentence
structure, but all of them reflect one of the component structures that are
grammaticalized in sentences.
11.2.1. The structure which underlies all SNs is the dependency structure of
VPs. In all types the non-adverbial and non-adjectival complements within the
nominal represent NPs or Ns which function as obligatory complements of the
main verb in the corresponding sentence paraphrase (non-predicating adjectives
as in presidential address, have a special status in this regard, see: Levi 1978).
That this is true also of NPs headed by derived nominals is apparent in the
following comparison with NPs containing simple heads:
8. John:r violent reaction to the news

John reacted violently to the news.
9. The furious building of office blocks

(They) are furiously building office blocks.
10. The brand new red car

The car which is brand new and red.
The X-Bar Convention provides a convenient means of formalizing the VP

dependencies which underlie sentences and SNs.
11.2.2. Circumstancial contextualization occurs in all types of SNPs. This com-

ponent structure, however, is not restricted to VPs, but occurs also in NPs.
The adverbial modifiers of main verbs in sentences recur without formal changes
in the corresponding clausal nominals. In SNs with NP structure these circum-
stancial contextualizers are realized as adjectives. Their relation to the head of
the NP is the same as that of the corresponding adverbials to the head of the VP.
With respect to temporal, aspectual and modal contextualization, however,
nominals may differ from the corresponding sentences. The semantic
distinctions which are obligatorily realized in sentences may be absent in the
corresponding nominals. Thematic structure, too, is not marked in nominals
as it is in the corresponding sentences.
11.2.3. Thematic structure is reflected in nominal clauses. All clauses contain

an obligatory subject in their underlying structure. Moreover, wherever it is
relevant there is concord of person and number marking between the subject
and the predicate verb. Under certain circumstances the subject of a nominal
clause may be deleted from the surface structure. This is possible if the referent
of the subject in the nominal clause is identical with that of a preceding nominal
constituent in the matrix sentence. Subject deletion is ungrammatical in that-
clauses:
11./ knew that I had made a mistake.

*/ knew that had made a mistake. deleted subject =I
Subject deletion is possible in all other types of nominal clauses. It is obligatory

in to-infinitive and -ing clauses. (The role of determiners, such as demonstratives
and possessives, which can fill the subject-slot of -ing clauses is not investigated
here. See Schachter 1976).
12. wh-interrogative clause

/ do not know how I should go about it.
/ do not know how to go about it. deleted subject = /
13. whether-clauses
She could not decide whether she should go or not.
She could not decide whether to go or not. deleted subject = she
14.to-infinitive nominal clause

He likes everyone to be happy.
?He likes himself to be happy.
He likes to be happy. deleted subject = he
15.nominal -ing clauses
No one enjoys people vandalizing property.
*No one enjoys themselves vandalizing property.
No one enjoys vandalizing property. deleted subject = no one.
In NPs headed by derived nominals, as in 6. and 7., the constituent which

corresponds to the subject of the paraphrase sentence is optional. This indicates
that the subject-predicate structure of sentences is not mirrored in the
corresponding derived nominal NPs. These NPs have underlying structures which
correspond to those of non-sentence VPs, underlying structures which are
94 A.COLEN
defective with respect to a major component of sentence structure, viz. thematic

structure. Consequently these NPs cannot be analyzed as desentential transforms
(as they are in transformationalist theory), unless, of course, the requirement
that transformations preserve meaning is relinquished. (It is assumed here that
the thematic structure of a sentence is an inherent part of its meaning. In view of
its inherent function in sentence structure this seems to us to be beyond doubt).
In that case the claims implicit in a transformational analysis become vacuous
and the term "transformation" is actually being used to denote a different type
of rule. On the other hand, if the rules deriving nominals from underlying
structures are meaning-preserving rules, then the structures underlying these
nominals are clearly not sentences. They have something in common with
sentences, viz. their VP structure, but miss the essential thematic structure
component which accounts for the subject-predicate structure of sentences.
11.2.4. Temporal, aspectual and modal contextualization in the form. of

inflections and auxiliaries is found in all finite nominal clauses (i.e. in that-
clauses, wh-interrogative clauses and whether-clauses). Under certain conditions,
however, the oppositions marked by these contextualizers may be neutralized
or absent. The oppositions in question are:
- oppositions on the time dimension (past, present, future), marked by tense
forms and by the auxiliaries shall and will.
- oppositions of modality, which are expressed by the modal auxiliaries will,
shall, can, may, might and must.
If time and modality are not explicitly marked in the sentence, the unmarked
or neutral time (in "timeless clauses" such as oil floats on water) or modality
(in e.g. she makes lace as opposed to she can make lace) is expressed.
- aspectual opposi:ions of progressive versus non-progressive, reflected in the
be -ing form of the verb as opposed to the unmarked form, and of completed
versus not necessarily completed (phase : see Palmer 1974) reflected in the
distinction between the perfect form, have -en and the unmarked form.
Oppositions of time are neutralized in constructions containing non-finite
verb forms. These forms represent an unspecific, neutral tense, which is inter-
preted as referring to the same time as the matrix sentence. In other words, the
time oppositions denoted by main verbs are neutralized if the environments
of the verbs consist of matrix sentences of clauses which are marked for specific
tenses. Such neutralization is not found in that-clauses, but occurs in wh-inter-
rogative and whether-clauses with deleted subjects. The necessary co-occurrence
THE SYNTAX OF ENGLISH NOMINALS 9S
of subject deletion and time neutralization in these cases indicates that thematic
structure and temporal contextualization are in some way closely related or
interacting components of clause structure. Modal contextualization is also ex-
cluded in non-finite clauses. The non-finite forms in wh-clauses cannot be
marked for aspect (constructions expressing progressive or perfect aspect are
only marginally acceptable in standard English:
f would not have known where to have gone.

f hesitated whether to be going.).
To-infinitive nominal clauses represent the paradigm case of time and

modality neutralization. These oppositions are also neutralized, however, in
nominal -ing clauses. The traditional distinction between these clause types is
based mainly on the difference in the form of the non·finite verb. Syntactically,
however, they belong to a single clause type. They are in complementary
distribution with respect to the morphosyntactic opposition of progressive and
non-progressive aspect, but may both contain markers of phase. As they do not
differ with respect to the other components of sentence structure, they can be
treated as a single type, the non-finite nominal clause, which represents a
neutralization of time and modality and which is inflected for the aspectual
distinctions of perfect and progressive. Any restrictions on their complementary
distribution is due to the incompatibility of the meaning of the main verb
in the matrix with either of the aspectual categories, as in :
16.He failed to carry out his mission.

*He failed carrying out his mission.
17.She refused to speak to him.

*She refused speaking to him.
The selection restrictions of fail and refuse exclude objects denoting ongoing
actions or events. The meanings of the verbs imply that the action denoted by
the object has not occurred, and consequently cannot have duration. On the
other hand, process denoting verbs, such as finish and practise can only have
nominal -ing clauses as complements, as their meaning requires that the action
or event denoted by the object be marked as ongoing, i.e. as progressive.
Similarly, the semantic difference between "putative" and "factual" meaning
that is often associated with the choice between to-infinitive and ·ing clauses is
restricted to certain classes of matrixes, such as those containing the verbs
96 A.COLEN
begin, cease, start, or those containing emotive verbs such as like, love, hate,
prefer, the verbs regret, remember and forget, and verbs of permission such as
allow, authorize, advise, permit, recommend (Jespersen 1914-1949; Dekeyser
et al 1979). In all cases this semantic distinction can be explained as a function
of the meaning of the matrix verb and the progressive, respectively
non-progressive aspect inherent in the non-finite clauses. Consequently, the
semantic restrictions on the use of the to-infinitive and -ing clause nominals do
not provide sufficient evidence for regarding them as two distinct and unrelated
types of nominal clause.
The -ing clauses, then, may be analyzed as clauses containing a progressive
form of a verb in the to-infinitive form (i.e. the neutral tense) from which the
element to be has been deleted (see example 18). The semantic redundancy of
these forms increases the likelihood of their being deleted in these cases.
18.a. 1 hate to drive home alone at night (= non-progressive)

b. 1 hate to be driving home alone at night (= progressive)
c. 1 hate driving home alone at night (= progressive + deletion).
Similarly, the deletion of to from the non-progressive verb form accounts for
the occurrence of clauses containing the bare infmitive as non-progressive
counterparts of -ing clauses, as in 19.
19.a. 1 saw him drive a red sportscar ( deleted to)

b. 1 saw him driving a red sportscar (= progressive + deleted to be)
c. ?I saw him to drive a red sportscar (= non-progressive)
d. 1 saw him to be driving a red sportscar (= progressive +undeleted to be)
e. He was seen to drive a red sportscar (non-progressive) --
f He was seen to be driving a red sportscar (= progressive)
g. He was seen driving a red sportscar (= progressive + deletion).
Though to is obligatorily deleted in the subject clause of see in a. (cfr. the un-
grammaticallity of c.), it is not deleted in the corresponding passive matrix
with subject-raising from the nominal clause to the matrix (example e.). This
indicates that the deletion of to is a surface structure phenomenon. The
corresponding progressives occur with or without deletion of to be. The non-
deleted progressive form of d. is more acceptable than the corresponding non-
progressive without deletion in c.
The SNs with deverbal noun heads cannot be marked for the progressive and
perfect aspects in the same way as the corresponding sentences :
20. *Brown:SO deft having painted of his daughter (perfect)

*Brown:SO deft (to) paint of his daughter (non-perfect non-progressive)
*Brown:SO deft being painting of his daughter (explicit progressive).
Similarly, these SNs cannot contain modal auxiliaries:
21.*Brown:SO deft can painting of his daughter.
As far as tense is concerned, these SNs do not contain any forms apart from the
-ing form which occur in sentences as tense-markers. As sentence constituents
they share the temporal contextualization of the matrix main verb. This is the
case for all nominals, both non-finite clauses and NPs. The nominal constituents
of a sentence share its temporal contextualization by the implication that their
referents exist or occur simultaneously with the action, event, etc. denoted
by the main verb. The fact that derived nominal SNs cannot be marked for
aspect may indicate that they are not marked for time, i.e. rather than being
located at an unspecific point on the time dimension, they have no temporal
contextualization at all. In this respect derived nominal SNs are closer to NPs
with simple noun heads than to nominal clauses.
The above observations are summarized in table 1., which shows how the
various components of sentence structure are reflected in sentence nominals.
III. Theoretical implications.
If[ 1. Sentences and nominals
In view of the separability of its component structures, a sentence may be

defined as a VP which has thematic structure and is contextualized with respect
to time, aspect and modality. Consequently it is not sufficient to define the
sentence solely as a subject-predicate construction (as is the practice in
traditional grammar and in transformational generative grammar) or solely in
terms of its dependency structure as a VP (as in dependency grammar: Tesniere
1969; Hays 1964). Such definitions account for only certain parts of sentence
structure, and consequently lead to difficulties in linguistic descriptions which
take these definitions as their starting-point. In the Standard Theory of
generative grammar (Chomsky 1965), e.g., the definition of a sentence as a non-
complex structure consisting of a subject and a predicate makes it impossible
98 A.COLEN
Table 1. The realization of sentence structure components in SNs.

Q)
~ .1:: -"'I
.S .S :s~
~
~~
Q) ,
:s
·c> ·s0 CI..
u :s
....=
Q)
~ oS
u
....
=S ~ Z
CI..
Z
=
Q)
'"
~
..c::
....
1:
~
=00-
c::: u
Q)
"0 =
VP str. + + + + + -
thematic
structure + + + + - -
aspectual cont. + + + + - -
temporal cont. + + + - - -
modal cont. + + + - - -
circumst. cont. (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Key : +: oppositions reflected in internal structure

-: oppositions not reflected in internal structure
non-fmite nominal clauses : include to-infinitive and -ing clauses
wh-clauses : include wh-interrogative and whether-clauses
NP : NP with a simple noun as its head
to account in a non-arbitrary way for the parallelisms which exist between

sentences and SNs that do not have this basic structure. The X-Bar Convention
(Chomsky 1970, Jackendoff 1977) formalizes the observation that the basic
parallelisms between sentences and SNs must be explained in terms of their
dependency structure. However, in collapsing dependency structure and subject-
predicate structure (as Chomsky 1970 and Jackendoff 1977 do), the
fundamental parallelism is obscured (see also: Stockwell et al 1973, ch. 1.).
In this respect Chomsky's and Jackendoff's models are incapable of capturing
the relationships between sentences and NPs.
In the alternative models of dependency and case-grammar the sentence
is defined in terms of its dependency structure, and its subject-predicate
structure is accounted for outside the base component (i.e. the generative com-
ponent) of the grammar. In our proposal the sentence is regarded as a basically
complex structure. If any of the obligatory component structures is missing the
sentence is defective, i.e. the construction in question is not a sentence and
cannot be used as an independent sentence.
The component structures of temporal, aspectual and modal contextualiz-
ation are relevant to the gradient distinction between sentences and various
types of SNs. This is obscured in the models of standard generative grammar.
There, temporal, aspectual and modal distinctions are formalized as morphemes,
specifically as optional constituents of a category "aux". In this way the
corresponding distinctions between SNs can be captured (Lees 1960). Never-
theless, in reducing functions operating on sentences to constituents of a non-
immediate sentence constituent there is a certain loss of explicitness. In the pro-
posed model these functions are formalized directly as functions operating on
sentences, and consequently as indispensable elements of sentence structure.
If the definition of a sentence as a complex of distinct co-occurring
types of structures is accepted, it is possible to account for the syntactic
characteristics of different types of SNs in a simple systematic way. Some NPs
have an underlying structure which resembles that of sentences, i.e. of
thematicized and contextualized VPs. Other are similar in underlying structure
to VPs which are thematicized but only partially contextualized (see table I.).
Yet others correspond to unthematic and uncontextualized VPs, in this way one
can account for the intermediate position which SNs occupy on the scale which
has at one extreme all the syntactic characteristics of sentences and at the other
extreme the syntactic characteristics of NPs. In other words, this proposal
explains the existence of the phenomenon of "nouniness" (Ross 1972; 1973).
Potential occurrence as a sentence is the defining characteristic of VPs as
opposed to NPs. This explains why they can be interpreted as having predicative
force (Jespersen formalized the notion of latent versus explicit predicative force
by means of the concept of "nexus": Jespersen 1924; 191449). In the
proposed model of syntactic structure the primitive linguistic categories are
NPs and VPs. The syntactic structure of SNs indicates that the initial category
of a generative PS component should be the VP rather than the sentence. The
latter can be defined in terms of the former. (The way one accounts for SNs
in terms of underlying sentential structures depends on one's implicit definition
of the sentence. Depending on whether greater importance is attached to its
dependency structure, its thematic structure or its contextualization, different
100 A. COLEN
analyses are provided, all of which claim to be de sentential analyses. In this

way the use of a single, inadequately defined term obscures the existence of a
heterogeneous variety of possible syntactic descriptions).
The component structures underlying sentences are graded in terms of a
hierarchy of relevance to sentence structure. The basic component is the VP,
which provides the categorial constituent structure of the sentence. The
structure of the VP is a dependency structure. (In itself the head of the VP may
have any number of dependents. The minimal requirement for a VP is that it
contain a verb as its head).
In the sentence a thematic structure is imposed on the VP. The thematic
structure is a prerequisite for valency, but does not constitute a sentence itself
unless it is combined with a VP. Temporal and modal contextualization are
lower in the hierarchy. Valency and thematic structure may co-Occur without
such contextualization, but contextualization is only possible in constructions
which reflect both of these. In order to determine whether aspectual
contextualization necessarily correlates with thematic structure, and whether
temporal and modal contextualization are separable structure components (see
table I.), evidence· is needed from syntactic data other than that discussed here.
Even so, this hierarchy explains formal differences between SNs in terms of
their internal underlying structure rather than in terms of idiosyncratic restric-
tions imposed by the matrix verb (as e.g. in the case of to-infinitive and -ing
nominal clauses).
Circumstancial contextualization does not participate in the hierarchy of
component structures within sentences. It is not distinctive for VPs as opposed
to NPs. (The formal differences between adjectives and adverbs relate to the
syntactic distinction between NPs and VPs (Jespersen 1914-49, Vol. 11,12.2),
not to distinctions in the circumstancial modifiers themselves).
Valency restrictions are valid only in thematicized VPs. In unthematicized
VPs the dependents of the verb are optional, just as the dependents of the noun
in NPs are. The inherent syntactic distinction between NPs and VPs is latent,
unless it is made overt by thematicization. A thematic structure consists of both
NPs and VPs. The NPs which participate in the basic structure of the themati-
cized VP are obligatory. Without them, the construction does not convey a
complete message, and is consequently deficient in its thematic structure (as
thematic structure is the grammaticalization of messages, which are defined as
independent and complete units of information). The thematic structure of a
sentence reflects the semantic unit of information, the message. The distinction
between VPs and NPs also has its semantic correlate in the distinction between
role-structure (reflected in valency structure) and specification (reflected in
noun modification). Role structure is inherent in the relational concepts ex-
pressed by verbs, whereas the semantic relation of specification obtains between
nonrelational concepts (such as the individuals and entities denoted by simple
nouns: Lyons 1977). Apart from having a role-structure, relational concepts
are also those which can be contextualized on the time dimension. This provides
the semantic (and ultimately cognitive) explanation of why the same elements
are pivotal with respect to valency structure and contextualization.
The functional distinction between VPs and NPs is made in terms of thematic
structure. VPs function as predicates, and their heads as predicate verbs. NPs
may function as subjects or as non-pivotal elements of the predicate. Outside
of thematic structure the predicating function of the VP is latent. In nominals
which are derived from VPs there is a conflict between their latent function and
their actual function. They are VPs, i.e. potential sentences, but fulfill the
functions of NPs as the internal structure of non-thematic VPs does not differ
from that of NPs (both types of phrases consist of a head and a number of
optional dependents).Non-thematic VPs in nominal functions are realized as
NPs in surface structure: their actual nominal function overrides their latent
predicating function (and consequently their latent valency), and determines
the internal structure of the construction. When the underlying VP is actualized,
by thematicization, in its predicative function, its valency-structure is also
actualized. The valency of a VP overrides its nominal function in the matrix
and determines its realization in surface structure. Thematic VPs in nominal
functions are realized as clauses. Non-thematic VPs (i.e. VPs whose latent
predicative function and valency are not actualized) in nominal functions are
realized as NPs.
1//,2. Semantic correlates and rules
It seems highly plausible that the level at which the underlying sentence
components are defined is not a purely syntactic level, but a logical one, i.e.
one where lingUistically organized semantic and syntactic structure are simul-
taneously represented. Both sentences and sentence nominals can be related to
logical structures containing many-place predicates and arguments
(corresponding to the verb and its dependents in the VP). On this level the se-
mantic structure of messages is reflected in the distinction between the logical
102 A.COLEN
subject and the predicate (thematic structure). The various types of

contextualization which are actualized in sentences reflect higher-level predicates
which operate on the predicate of the thematicized proposition. This explains
why the scope of these contextualizers includes the scope of the whole VP.
SNs reflect logical propositions which are embedded as arguments in higher
logical structures. The embedded propositions may, but need not, be
contextualized.
On the semanticosyntactic level the constructions of surface structure are
related to the meanings they convey (at least those aspects of meaning which are
lexicalized and grammaticalized in language). This level formalizes the
correspondence between the various SN types and the meanings which they can
convey. Clausal and derived nominals characteristically refer to second-order
and third·{Hder entities. The former are "events, processes and states-of-affairs,
etc., which are located in time and which, in English, are said to occur or take
place, rather than to exist" (Lyons 1977, 443). The latter are "such abstract
entities as propositions, which are outside space and time". Lyons notes that
there is a fairly clear distinction in English between the set of nominals that
refer to second-order entities and the set of nominals that refer to third-order
entities. If the structures underlying the syntactic types of SNs are semantico-
syntactic, they formalize the relationship between second-order entities and
nominal clauses (that-clauses and -ing clauses: see Vendler 1968) and that
between third-order entities and derived nominal SNs. The fact that it is not
clear how a non-sentential syntactic deep structure should be characterized
(except as a syntactic translation of the logical structure outlined above)
supports the view that the structures underlying syntax are logical and semantic
rather than purely syntactic.
The rules relating underlying component structures to surface structures
are realization rules, operating between two distinct levels. They translate
the units and relations of one level into the units and relations of the other level
without altering ("transforming" or "converting") them.
Even in this model, however, transformations have a place. There is evidence
that at some level of syntactic structure the structures directly reflecting under-
lying logical structures may be altered in such a way that the meaning formalized
in the logical structure is not changed. These rules are severely restricted in their
application. They involve deletion, permutation and the addition of semantical-
ly empty constituents (such as the subject-slot fillers it and there). Such trans-
fonnations account for subject deletion in non-finite nominal clauses and for
the deletion of to be in nominal -ing clauses.

Naturally, the conclusions formulated here may prove to be untenable on
further examination. The present study is limited to certain syntactic character-
istics of nominals in English. Attention must also be devoted to the status of the
's genitive complement in -ing clauses and derived nominal NPs, to "passive
nominals" (like Chomsky's example: the destruction of the city by the enemy j,
to the role of determiners in SNs. Similarly, a consideration of the various types
of adjectivalization may provide evidence in the light of which our proposal
can be assessed. Nevertheless, the implications of this, admittedly restricted,
syntactic analysis for the status of the sentence in generative grammar and the
clarification of the notion of "underlying structure" may deserve investigation
in other areas of syntactic structure.
THE STRUCTURE OF INFINITIVAL PERCEPTION VERB
COMPLEMENTS IN A TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR
Renaat Declerck
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven-Kortrijk
1. Introduction
This article will be concerned with the structure of Infinitival Perception

Verb Complements (henceforth: IPVC's), i.e. with constructions involving
'bare' ('naked') infinitives, as in I saw/heard/smelt Tom light a cigarette. For
structures like this no fewer than five analyses have been proposed within the
framework of transformational grammar. In this paper I will go into these and
come to the conclusion that everyone of them raises serious problems, though
the traditional raising analysis fares somewhat better than the others. The over-
all conclusion will be that English IPVC's still present a serious problem for
transformational grammar, especially for the version that has been developed
by Chomsky (1973 and later work) 1
2. The Equi analysis
Rosenbaum (1967) and Fiengo (1974) propose an analysis in which the

superficial object NP of the perception verb occurs twice in underlying
structure: once as object of the perception verb and once as subject of a
complement S. In this analysis (1 ,a) is thus derived from something like (1 ,b)
by Equi NP deletion of the subject of the embedded S and subsequent de-
finitization of that S.
(1) (a) I saw Mary come in.

(b) I saw Mary S [Mary come in]S
105
106 R.DECLERCK
Objections of various sorts can be raised against this analysis:
2.1. The reason for assuming (1 ,b), with two occurrences of the NP Mary, is
that in (I ,a) Mary will generally be interpreted as functioning both as direct
object of saw and as subject of come in. However, the fact that Mary can be
interpreted as object of saw follows pragmatically from the fact that IPVC's
always express direct perception and from the nature of the perception verb:
'I saw Mary' is a necessary inference from 'I saw Mary come in'. However, with
other perception verbs this pragmatic inference may fail. Thus, (2,a) does not
imply that 1 heard Mary herself and as noted by Gee (1977 : 474), it does not
follow from (2 ,b) that 1 felt Tom:
(2) (a) I heard Mary listen to the radio.

(b) I felt Tom hit me with a stone.
Since there is no thematic object-of relation between the perception verb and
the NP following it (though such a relation may often be pragmatically inferred),
the NP in question cannot be generated in (deep) object position. Further
evidence of this is that the head of the NP may be an abstract noun, whose
referent cannot be directly perceived (see De Geest (1973), Kirsner & Thompson
(1976)) :
(3) I have seen faith accomplish miracles.
2.2. The 'subject' of the IPVC may be one of various elements that cannot be
generated as objects in underlying structure, e.g. existential there (which is not
base-generated but transformationally inserted), an idiom chunk that must be
a deep subject, or the 'expletive'it "
(4) (a) We saw there arise over the meadow a blue haze. (example from
Kirsner & Thompson (1976»
(b) We heard all hell break loose. (example from Gee (1977).
(c) I heard it chime one o'clock as I was turning out of the gate.
2.3. The superficial 'object' of the perception verb cannot normally undergo
Object Shift (Tough-movement), although base-generated objects normally can
(cf. Lightfoot (I 976 : 27 6)) :
(5) *The choir was easy (for us) to hear sing a song.
INFINITIVAL PERCEPTION VERB COMPLEMENTS 107
2.4. As noted by Gee (1975 : 349-350), it is impossible for Equi-verbs (per-

suade, force, etc.) to be followed by an extraposition construction involving
an adjective of the tough class. Rather, tough-movement (Object Shift) applies
obligatorily :
(6) (a) I persuaded John to be easy to please.

(b) *1 persuaded it to be easy to please John.
However, IPVC's may have the form of an extra position construction:
(7) (a) I've seen John be hard to please before.

(b) I've seen it be hard to please John before.
2.5. In sentences like (8) (in which be is normally deleted from the IPVC) it
results from extraposing a subject clause and cannot, therefore, be generated
in (deep) object position :
(8) I heard it [be] said that John was ill.
2.6. True Equi-verbs allow VP deletion, as in (9). Perception verbs, by contrast,

do not allow VP deletion. Thus, (lO,a) need not be interpreted as synonymous
with (I O,b) :
(9) John forced/persuaded Bill to take the examination, but he did not
force/persuade Tom [to take the examination].
(lO)(a) I've seen/heard Ann come in, but I haven't seen/heard Tom yet.
(b) I've seen/heard Ann come in, but I haven't seen/heard Tom come
in yet.
2.7. It may be pointed out, finally, that an Equi analysis of IPVC's is definitely
ruled out if one assumes the Chomskyan version of transformational grammar.
On the assumption that IPVC's are S's (cf. below), there are a number of
restrictions which, in the Chomskyan framework, must be accounted for in
terms of the S.S.C. (or Opacity Condition). For example:
(11 )(a) *Johni saw Mary look at himselfi in the mirror.

(b) *The boysi heard Mary speak about each otheri.
However, Mary cannot be a specified subject on an Equi analysis, since deleted

NP's do not qualify as specified subjects (cf. Chomsky (1976».
108 R.DECLERCK
3. The nonsentential analysis.
According to Gee (1975) and Akmajian (1977), IPVC's should not be

analysed as S's in underlying structure. Rather, (1 ,a) is assumed to have the
structure represented in (12), not only on the surface but also underlyingly2 :
(12)
~s~
NP VP~
I v·~Jp VP
I I ~
saw Mary come in
Akmajian's only serious argument in support of this analysis is that IPVC's

"consistently test out as non constituents" (p. 439) :
(13)(a) *What we saw was Mary take a bath.

(b) *It was Mary take a bath that we saw.
(c) *?We could hear, but we couldn't see, Mary take a bath.
l d) *Mary take a bath is a breathtaking sight to see.
(e) *Mary take a bath has been seen by many a boy.
However, sentences like these make clear no more than that Mary and take a
bath do not form a constituent on the level of surface structure. Assuming that
IPVC's are no S's in underlying structure is not the only way of accounting for
this. Any analysis in terms of a transformation which breaks up the S node
from underlying structure (e.g. Subject Raising, or Verb Raising) also offers an
explanation. Moreover, the claim that IPVC's never behave as constituents is
disproved by the fact that entire IPVC's can be coreferential with pronouns,
as in
(14)1 saw Mary take a bath, and Bill saw it too.
The argumentation in Gee (1975) is equally weak, since all the syntactic
arguments adduced concern not perception verbs but other verbs followed by
'naked' ('bare') infinitives, like help, let and make. However, the mere fact that
all these verbs are followed by an infinitive without to can hardly be a sufficient
reason for assuming that there cannot be a structural difference between them.
There is only one argument that concerns perception verbs directly, and it is of
a semantic nature. Gee points out that when an intensional verb is followed by
INFINITIV AL PERCEPTION VERB COMPLEMENTS 109
an S complement, the VP of the S complement cannot be interpreted 'de re'

(transparently) (i.e. as not being within the scope of the intensional verb) :
(15) *Mary believes your brother stole her car, though she doesn't realize
it was stealing.
Gee also points out that perception verbs too set up an intensional context.
For this reason a VP dominated by an S functioning as a PVC cannot (according
to Gee) be transparent with respect to the perception verb :
(16) *Mary saw that your brother was stealing her car, though she did
not realize it was stealing.
However, the VP of an IPVC can be transparent :
(17) Mary saw your brother steal a car, but she didn't realize it was stealing
According to Gee, this proves that the VP of an IPVC is not dominated by S.

As f1r as I can see, this ingenious argument (which is repeated in Gee (1977))
fails in at least two ways. First, there is no a priori reason for assuming that the
complement of an intensional verb is necessarily an S if it cannot be interpreted
'de re' and a VP if it can. It seems logically more motivated to assume that
intensional verbs are always followed by propositions, i.e. S's. In other words,
there is no basis for assuming that the fact that IPVC's can be transparent while
that-PVC's cannot has anything to do with their syntactic structure or categorial
status. The difference could equally well be related to the semantic difference
between the two types of PVC's (lPVC's expressing 'direct perception', that-
PVC's expressing 'indirect perception' - see e.g. Spears (1977), Declerck
(1981 b). Secondly, Gee's argument hinges on two generalizations which are
not correct : it is not true that perception verbs always set up an intensional
context, nor that IPVC's are always interpreted 'de re'. Consider the following
sentences:
(18)(a) Bill saw John steal a car.

(b) As far as he was concerned, Bill saw John steal a car (but in fact
it was not stealing since John had a right to take it).
There is no intensional context in (18,a). What is expressed is merely the direct

perception (rather than an interpretation) of an event. In (18,b), on the other
hand, there is an intensional reading, but this is due to the contextual additions,
110 R.DECLERCK
which make clear that what is being expressed is Bill's interpretation of the
event. It follows that the IPVC can be interpreted 'de re' in (IS,a), but not in
(lS,b) :
(19)(a) Bill saw John steal a car, but he did not realise it was stealing.
(b) *As far as he was concerned, Bill saw John steal a car, but he
did not realize it was stealing.
So, neither the claim that perception verbs always create an intensional context
nor the claim that IPVC's can always be interpreted 'de re' appears to be correct.
Gee's argument consequently has no force at all.
While there seems to be no real evidence for Gee's and Akmajian's non-
sentential analysis, there is certainly plenty of evidence against it :
3.1. The analysis assumes that the NP following the perception verb is base-
generated in object position, thus raising again several of the problems that
have been pointed out in connection with the Equi analysis (e.g. the fact that
the NP in question need not be interpretable as object, or that it may not be
generable in object position, for example when it is the existential there, or the
expletive it, etc.).
3.2. In sentences like (20), the reflexive pronoun refers back to the NP follow-
ing the perception verb, not to the subject of the head clause:
(20)John saw Peter look at himself in the mirror.
Since it is well-known that reflexive pronouns (except those occurring in picture

of NP's and idioms like leave someone to himself, protect someone against
himself) are always coreferential with a subject NP, this means that Peter must
be in subject position at some stage in the derivation, hence that the IPVC must
be (derived from) an S. (Notice that this conclusion does not crucially depend
on a particular analysis of reflexivization. If reflexivization is a clause mate
rule (as in Postal (1974», the facts of (20) prove that there must be an S
involving Peter and himself, but not John. If, on the other hand, reflexivization
is not a clause-internal rule (cf. Chomsky (1973)), the fact that himself cannot
refer to John must be explained by means of the S.S.C. (or Opacity Condition-
see Chomsky (19S0», which, inter alia, prevents coindexing (coreference)
across a specified subject. If this is correct, it also follows that Peter must be
a subject NP, hence that the IPVC must be (derived from) an S.)
INFINITIVAL PERCEPTION VERB COMPLEMENTS III
3.3. A similar argument can be derived from Reciprocal Marking (irrespective

of whether this is a transformational or interpretive rule). In
(2 1) Peter and John saw the children look at each other.
each other refers to the children, not to the subject of the matrix. On a clause
mate analysis this means that there must be a complement S containing each
other and the children, but not Peter and John. In the Chomskyan framework
the IPVC must also be a complement S since the children acts as a specified
subject blocking coreferentiality between each other and Peter and John.
3.4. As noted above, Akmajian's and Gee's treatment of IPVC's as

non constituents is disproved by the fact that entire IPVC's can be coreferential
with anaphoric and relative pronouns:
(22)(a) I saw Mary run away, and Bill saw it too.

(b) 1 saw Mary run away, which surprised me.
3.5. As appears from (23), emphatic compound personal pronouns like myself
can 'float away' from the 'subject' NP's of IPVC's. This proves that the NP's
in question must be true subjects at some stage in the derivation (rather than
being directly generated in object position), since it is well-known that emphatic
pronouns can float away from subject NP's only (cf. (24,a-c)) :
(23)I've never seen John steal peaches himself, but I've seen his wife
do so.
(24)(a) 1 spoke to Mary myself.

(b) *1 spoke to Mary about John herself.
(c) *They've invited the king to their party himself.
3.6. As noted by Postal (1974: 196), adverbials like by himself can occur in
connection with subjects only3 :
(25)(a) Mary spoke to John by herself.

(b) *Mary spoke to John by himself.
(c) *Mary helped us by ourselves.
(d) *John was spoken to by Mary by herself.
However, adverbials like by himself can easily be related to the 'subject' NP's
of IPVC's :
112 R.DECLERCK
(26)(a) I've· seen lohn paint the whole house by himself before.
(b) I've never seen Mary go out by herself.
This proves again that the relevant NP's must be subject of an S at some stage
in the derivation.
3.7. As noted by Gee (1975) and Kirsner & Thompson (1976), it is possible to
apply there-insertion to IPVC's4 :
(27)(a) I've never seen there be anyone executed here without being
given a chance to confess first.
(b) I saw there arise over the meadow a blue haze.
This possibility of inserting there proves that the IPVC must be an S when
there-insertion takes place, since (a) there-insertion is a sentence-cyclic trans-
formation (cf. Bresnan (1971 b)), and (b) it is well-known that there can only be
inserted in subject position.
3.8. In sentences like (28,a-b) the nonfinite adverbial clause is taken to have
the same subject as the matrix. The object NP of the matrix cannot be the
controller NP.
(28)(a) Peter met lohn before leaving the country.
(b) Peter watched lohn without saying a word.
Sentences such as (29) are ambiguous, because the adverbial clause can be
embedded in the highest S as well as in the complement S, as shown in (30,a-b).
It follows that the NP controlling the intesretation of the nonfinite clause in
(29) can be I or John, but it cannot be Mary .
(29)1 had seen that lohn kissed Mary before leaving.
(30)(a) I had seen [that lohn kissed Mary] before leaving.

(b) I had seen [that John kissed Mary before leaving].
Consider now :
(31)(a) Peter saw lohn kiss Mary before going home.

(b) Peter watched John beat Mary without saying a word.
Sentences (31 ,a-·b) are ambiguous in exactly the same way as (29). The fact
that the controller NP can be John (the 'object' NP of the perception verb)
can only be explained on the assumption that John (or its trace) is in subject
position at the time when Equi-NP deletion (or whatever rule governs the
possible interpretations) applies. An underlying structure of the form of (I 2),
in which John is generated directly in object position is therefore inadequate:
it wrongly predicts that only Peter can be the controller NP in (31 ,a-b),
3.9. A similar argument can be derived from sentences involving infinitival result
clauses:
(32)(a) Bill had to read the poem to us so often as to get tired of it.
(b) Bill had to read the poem to us often e,nough to get tired of it.
Again, only the subject NP (Bill) can be taken to be the subject of the non finite
clause. However, in (33) not only John but also Bill can be the controller NP.
In (34) the latter interpretation is even the only plausible one:
(33)John heard Bill read that poem to us so often as to (or: often enough
to) get tired of it.
(34)John saw Bill hit the girl so hard as to (or: hard enough to) hurt
her badly.
It follows that in (33) and (34) Bill (the superficial object NP of the perception
verb) must be a subject NP at some stage in the derivation.
3.1 O. The nine above arguments concern English directly, as they are based on
sentences from this language. However, it may be interesting also to point out
that in some languages the infinitive in IPVC's is inflected to agree with the
'object' NP of the perception verb. Thus, Perlmutter (1972 : 88) notes that in
Portuguese "we find sentence pairs like the following:
(35)(a) *Vi os cavalos correr.

(b) Vi os cavalos correrem.
'I saw the horses run'
(35,a) has the ordinary infinitive correr, but in (35,b) the infinitive has the
plural ending -em, in agreement with its subject (as cavalos)".6 Since I know of
no attested cases where Number Agreement is not a clause-internal rule involving
a verb and its subject, I think this can be taken as evidence that os cavalos is
114 R.DECLERCK
subject of co"erem on some level, hence that the IPVC is (derived from) a
sentential structure.
3.11. It should be pointed out, finally, that, contrary to what is suggested by

Akmajian (1977), there is no way of incorporating the nonsentential analysis
of IPVC's into the framework of 'formal syntax' developed by Chomsky.
Chomsky has stressed repeatedly that in his framework "there is no non-clausal
source for infinitives" (Chomsky (1980: 9». Several of the most basic
hypotheses that underlie Chomsky's theory of grammar are incompatible with a
nonsentential analysis of IPVC's. To give one illustration only : in accordance
with Bresnan (1970 and later work), Chomsky assumes that all (and only) S's
have a (possibly nUll) COMP node associated with them. He also assumes that
WH-movement obligatorily goes COMP-to-COMP. It follows that any verb
complement from which elements can be extracted by WH-movement must
necessarily be sentential. A nonsentential analysis of IPVC's is therefore in-
compatible with Chomsky's theory, since WH-movement can extract elements
from IPVC's :
(36)(a) which house have you seen John go into?

(b) That is the house that I saw John go into.
The general conclusion from this discussion of the non sentential analysis
must be that there is ample evidence - eleven arguments have been advanced -
that the analysis is untenable, both within and without the Chomskyan frame-
work.
4. The bare S analysis
Since IPVC's are S's in underlying structure, the most plaUSible analysis
within the framework of Chomsky would seem to be a 'bare S' analysis similar
to the analysis which Chomsky assigns to sentences like I believe John to be
an idiot. (The term 'bare S' was initially used in the sense of "an S without a
complementizer'. However, since the S's in question can be argued to have a
null COMP, I will use the term here in the sense of 'a null complementizer S'.)
On a bare S analysis the sentence I saw Mary come in is assumed to have a
structure something like (37) on both the underlying and the superficial level.
No transformation is involved in its derivation.
(37)1 saw S[Mary come in]S

As far as I can see, such an analysis of English IPVC's encounters at least

the following problems:
4.1. Chomsky (1973) proposes a bare S analysis for sentences like (38,a-b),
which Postal (1974) wants to derive by means of Subject Raising:
(38)(a) I believe that man to be a foreigner.

(b) Mary found the child to be a nuisance.
According to Chomsky there is a constraint (called the 'Subject Condition'

in Chomsky (1973)) which blocks all extraction of 'proper' parts of subject
NP's. Thus, NP's can be extracted from phrases like pictures of NP or stories
about NP when these occur as nonsubjects, as in (39, a-b), but not when these
phrases are subjects, as in (40, a-b) :
(39)(a) Who did you buy pictures of ?

(b) The only person that I have never heard any stories about is Ted
(40)(a) *Who did pictures of hang on the wall?

(b) *The only one who stories about were told was John.
Now, Chomsky notes that we cannot say
(41)(a) *Who did you believe pictures of to be on sale?

(b) *Who do you expect stories about to terrify John?
Chomsky concludes from this that the complex NP's stories about NP and
pictures of NP are true subjects in (41, a-b), i.e. cannot have been turned into
objects by Subject-to-Object Raising. When applying this kind of argument to
sentences involving IPVC's we notice that NP's can easily be extracted from
complex NP's that are subjects of IPVC's :
(42)(a) Which actor did you see a friend of talk to Mary?

(b) Which community have you seen a member of walk naked in
the park?
(c) That is the only college that you see students of roam the streets
at night.
It follows that the 'subject' NP of an IPVC cannot be a true subject in surface

structure, hence that superficial IPVC's must have lost the S status which they
have in underlying structure.
116 R.DECLERCK
4.2. As pointed out by Chomsky (1973), some of the conditions proposed hold
not only for transformations but also for rules of interpretation. For example,
for the interpretation of a sentence like (43,a) it is necessary that not be
associated with enough rather than with understand. This association is blocked
by the S.S.C. in (43,b), so that this sentence "receives no direct interpretation".
(43)(a) You didn't understand the proofs of enough of the theorems

(for me to be justified in giving you an A).
(b) *You didn't understand Euclid's proofs of enough of the theo-
rems (for me to be justified in giving you an A).
Consider now :
(44)(a) You haven't heard me utter enough English sentences (to be able
to conclude that I speak English perfectly).
(b) I haven't seen him visit sufficient pubs (to conclude that he is
a hard drinker).
Sentences like (44,a-b) are impeccable. Yet they would" have to be blocked
by the S.S.C. if the 'subject' of the IPVC were really in subject position in the
surface structure. (Note that the S.S.C. does operate as expected in (45), which
therefore receives no interpretation:
(45)*You haven't heard that I uttered enough English sentences (to be

able to conclude that I speak English perfectly).)
4.3. In English (like in many other languages) it is possible for a negator whose
scope is an entire sentence to be incorporated in one of the lexical items of that
sentence. Thus, structures that have the logical form of something like (46,
a-c) may lexicalize not only as (47,a-c) hut also as (48,a-c) :
(46)(a) NOT (I saw somebody)

(b) NOT (I knew something)
(c) NOT (I went somewhere)
(47)(a) I did not see anybody.

(b) I did not know anything.
(c) I did not go anywhere.
(48)(a) I saw nobody.

(b) I knew nothing
(c) I went nowhere.
I will not go here into the question of whether this incorporation should be
accounted for in transformational terms or in terms of a rule of interpretation.
What is important is that in both cases the rule is subject to the general
conditions pointed out by Chomsky. For example, although it is possible for a
structure with the logical form of (49,a) to reach the surface as (49,b), (SO,a)
cannot be realized as (SO,b) because of the S.S.C. (the specified subject being
John's).
(49)(a) NOT (I like stories about some of those subjects)

(b) I like stories abou t none of those subjects.
(SO)(a) NOT (I like John's stories about some of those subjects)

(b) *1 like John's stories about none of those, subjects.
Consider now :
(Sl)(a) I saw her go nowhere at all.

(b) We saw him speak with no one else.
(c) 1 saw her go to none of those places.
In all these sentences the negator which is incorporated in one of the lexical
items of the IPVC really bears on the matrix. (For this reason the sentences
can be supplemented with and neither did John, but not with and John did
so too.) If the IPVC's were S's on the surface (as would follow from a bare S
analysis), the 'subject' NP's of the IPVC's would be true specified subjects and
the sentences would be blocked by the S.S.C.
4.4. Sentences like (51 ,a-c) disprove a bare S analysis in still another way. The
process of negator incorporation is clause-internal in the strictest sense: the
negator cannot be incorporated in any lexical item belonging to a higher or
lower S. This is clear from examples like (S2,a-b) and (S3,a-b), where the (a)
and (b) sentences are not synonymous: in the (a) sentences the negator bears
on the matrix (so that we can add and neither did John), whereas in the (b)
sentences the incorporated negator bears only on the embedded S, leaving the
matrix positive (so that we can add and so did John) :
(S2)(a) I did not notice that she spoke to anybody else.

(b) I noticed that she spoke to nobody else.
(S3)(a) I haven't forgotten lending you some books.

(b) I've forgotten lending you no books.
118 R.DECLERCK
Since the negator which is incorporated inside the IPVC in (51 ,a-c) really
bears on the matrix, it follows that (51 ,a-c) must be superficially simplex,
hence that a bare S analysis (as well as Rosenbaum's Equi analysis) is
disconfirmed.
4.5. In spoken English the pronouns them and him are often reduced to 'em
and 'm. This reduction happens independently of whether the pronoun in
question is a normal object (as in I saw 'em, I heard 'm) or is the 'subject' of
an IPVC (as in I saw 'em come in, I heard 'm say it). Now Bresnan (1971 a : 6)
argues that an item that undergoes vowel reduction must necessarily be a surface
'syntactic dependent' (sister constituent) of the item to which it adheres.
Because of this, the fact that want to go can be reduced to wanna go is taken by
Bresnan to mean that there must be a transformation turning to (which is
initially a syntactic dependent of go) into a syntactic dependent of want.
If Bresnan's theory is correct, it follows that reduced pronouns like· 'em
and 'm must be syntactic dependents of the perception verb. In other words,
in surface structure we must have the configuration (54), which is incompatible
with a bare S analysis.
(54)
/Vp~
V NP
I
saw
,mI
4.6. It is inherent in a bare S analysis that the S in question must not be
dominated by an NP node. If there were an NP over S, both the A-over-A
principle and the Subjacency Condition would prevent moving any NP out of
the S and into the matrix. :
(55)1 saw NP[S[COMP a boy swim in the lake]S]NP
In actual fact, however, NP's can be extracted from the complement clause :
(56)(a) It is a boy that 1 saw swim in the lake.

(b) Which boy did 1 see swim in the lake?
Because of sentences like these a bare S analysis has to assume that the S which
dominates the IPVC is not itself dominated by NP. However, there are several
indications that, as far as IPVC's are concerned, this assumption is dubious.
To mention only the most obvious one: some of the perception verbs after
which IPVC's are found are prepositional verbs, as in the following sentences 7 :
(57)(a) 1 looked at the servant make up the fire.

(b) She listened to John come up the stairs.
Since prepositional phrases are expanded by the categorial rule PP ~ P NP,

while there is no categorial rule of the form PP ~ P S, the sentential structure
from which the IPVC's in (57,a-b) are derived must be dominated by an NP
node - a conclusion which is incompatible with a bare S analysis.
4.7. According to Postal (1974), (58,a) is derived from (S8,b) by Subject-to-

Object Raising and subsequent reflexivization :
(58){a) 1 believe myself to be a genius.

(b) 1 believe S[ I be a genius ls
Postal bases his derivation (among other things) on the claim that reflexivization
is a clause-internal operation. Chomsky (1973) rejects this claim, saying that
reflexivization can apply across an S boundary as long as none of the general
conditions are violated. Thus, reflexivization applies directly to (S8,b).
According to Chomsky there is therefore no evidence for a Raising analysis
and (S8,a) simply has a bisentential surface structure. It should be noted that
this bare S analysis implicitly rejects the claim that only object NP's can be
reflexivized (or marked as coreferential with the subject NP by a rule of
construal). Postal (1974) by contrast, maintains this claim, on the basis of
examples like
(59)*1 believe that myself is a genius.
But Chomsky holds that the ungrammaticality of (59) follows from the violation
of the Tensed S Condition (or PIC or NIC), not from the fact that a subject
NP is reflexivized.
However, there is one problem for Chomsky's analysis that does not arise
on the assumption that subject NP's cannot reflexivize. Bisentential underlying
structures similar to (58,b) seem to be required for several classes of verbs in
English, but if the two clauses have the same subject, the second subject NP
cannot be reflexivized. Rather it has to undergo Equi-NP deletion. For example:
120 R.DECLERCK
(60)(a) John i tried dPRO. work hard]S

(b) John tried (*himse~f) to work liard.
(61)(a) Johni wanted dPRO.leave]S

(b) John wanted (*himse~f) to leave.
(62)(a) Ii had forgotten S[PRO i tell John that]S

(b) I had forgotten (*myself) telling John that.
Sentences like these appear to bear out the claim that subject NP's cannot
reflexivize (since Chomsky's conditions will not block reflexivization in the (b)
sentences)8. Sentences like (58,a) are then evidence against a bare S analysis,
since on this analysis the reflexive pronoun is in subject position.
When we try applying this argument to structures with IPVC's we find that
these can undergo reflexivization, but not Equi-NP deletion:
(63)(a) In the photograph shei saw S[PRO i reach the top]S

(b) In the photograph she saw lierself reach the top.
(c) *In the photograph she saw reach the top.
Sentences like these tend to disconfirm a bare S analysis of IPVC's and suggest
that Raising applies in their derivation.
4.8. In English it is possible for a time adverbial to occur between a verb and its
direct object, provided the latter is a superficial clause or has undergone
Complex NP Shift:
(64)(a) *1 saw at that moment Bill.

(b) 1 wanted at that time to be alone with Mary.
(c) I saw at that moment the girls and the boys that we had already
met that morning.
However, time adverbials cannot be inserted in front of IPVC's, which suggests

that IPVC's are not clauses in the surface structure:
(65)*1 saw at that moment Bill arrive.
4.9. As noted by Postal (1974 : 83), Complex NP Shift cannot operate on NP's
that are subjects at the point of application 9 :
(65)(a) *1 regret the fact that were destroyed so many of our relics.
(b) *Are happy all of the men who recovered from mononucleosis.
However, sentences like (66 ,a -b) appear to be grammatical. This suggests that
the 'subjects' of the IPYC's are no longer subjects when Complex NP Shift
applies.
(66)(a) Into the garden I saw run the fattest cat in Urbana. (example
from Bolinger (1977 : 516))
(b) I saw come into my house a respectable English family with
four children
4.10. A further weak point of a bare S analysis is that, as has already been
noted, IPYe's never behave as single constituents in the surface structure. In
spite of the fact that a bare S analysis treats them as superficial S's, they cannot
appear as S constituents in any of the constructions that are commonly used
as tests for constituency (even if the constituents in question need not be NP's).
Compare:
(67)(a) I heard, but I did not see, that someone fired a shot. (Right
Node Raising) 10
(b) *?I heard, but I did not see, someone fire a shot.
(68)(a) What I heard was that someone opened the door. (Pseudo-
cleft)
(b) *What I heard was someone open the door.
(69)(a) That someone had opened the door, I saw at once. (Topicalization)
(b) *Someone open the door, you will see at once.
(70)(a) What did you see? - That someone went into the house.
(b) What did you see? - *Someone go into the house.
Sentences like these suggest that IPVC's are no longer constituents in the surface
structure. (Notice that this fact is consistent with a raising analysis).
4.1l. According to Chomsky (1977), Object Shift (Tough-movement) is an NP

movement that goes COMP-to-COMP and can therefore be considered a special
instance of WH-movement. If this is correct, a bare S analysis of IPYC's will
run into problems, since the object of an IPYC can never undergo Object Shift,
in spite of the fact that none of the Chomskyan conditions can block this move-
ment:
(71 )(a) *Mary was difficult for me to see John kiss.

(b) *The room was easy for us to hear John en ter.
122 R.DECLERCK
4.12. Consider the following sentences:
(72)(a) We saw the boys drink so much whisky that they got drunk.
(b) We saw the boys drink so much whisky that we could not believe
our eyes.
In (72,a) the contents of the that-clause are a function of the quantity of whisky
that the boys drank; in (72,b), on the other hand, the contents of the that-
clause are a function of the quantity of whisky that we saw the boys drink.
In the Chomskyan framework this means that the rules of interpretation must
relate the phrase containing so much to drink in (72,a) and to saw in (72,b).
However, on a bare S analysis the rule establishing a relation between so much
and saw should be blocked by the S.S.C., since the boys is a specified subject.
The fact that the S.S.C. does not operate in (72,b) therefore disconfirms the
bare S analysis. (Notice that the S.S.C. does operate as expected in senten~es
like (73,b) an:d (74,b), which are therefore semantically deviant:
(73)(a) We resented their drinking so much whisky that they got drunk.
(b) ·We ·resented their drinking so much whisky that we punished
them.
(74)(a) We saw that they drank so much whisky that tht!y got drunk.
(b) ·We saw that they drank so much whisky that we could not be-
lieve our eyes.)
Concluding this discussion of the bare S analysis of IPVC's we can say that
evidence of various kinds appears to disprove this analysis. Some arguments
concern the fact that IPVC's do not always satisfy the conditions (more
specifically, the Subject Condition and the S.S.C.) which they should satisfy on
a bare S analysis. Other arguments make clear that the 'subject' NP of an IPVC
must be a syntactic dependent of the perception verb in the surface structure,
and that the S underlying the IPVC must be dominated by NP. Still other pieces
of evidence show that the 'subject' NP of the IPVC can no longer be subject in
the surface structure, that IPVC's cannot be clausal constituents on the surface,
and that sentences involving IPVC's must be superficially simplex.
5. RaiSing
It is clear from the above summary that a raising analysis along the lines of
Postal (I974) will encounter none of those problems. On this analysis the IPVC
is an S dominated by NP in underlying structure whose subject NP is raised so

as to become the direct object of the perception verb on the surface. It follows
that the IPVC is no longer a clausal constituent in the surface structure, that its
'subject' NP is no longer in subject position there but has become a syntactic
dependent of the perception verb, and that, on the assumption that the comple-
ment S is pruned after raising (see, however, below), the whole sentence
containing the IPVC is superficially simplex.
The raising analysis thus does not meet any of the problems raised by the
bare S analysis (or any of the analyses that have been discussed). Still, it does
not fail to raise a number of difficulties, mainly of a theoretical nature: .
5.1. For many linguists the most serious objection against this raising analysis
will no doubt be that it is quite incompatible with the Chomskyan framework
(see also below). Indeed, Postal (1974) explicitly rejects Chomsky'S conditions
in favour of a theory that crucially involves 'clause mate rules' like
reflexivization, reciprocal marking, passivization and the inclusion constraint
(disjoint reference). As pointed out by Lightfoot (1976 : 275--6), the existence
of a rule of raising would therefore ruin the otherwise good results that come
from the Chomskyan framework. On the other hand, it must be admitted that,
in the particular case of IPVC's, raising yields far better results than the
Chomsky an analysis.
5.2. An argument that has often been adduced against Subject-to-Object Raising
is that the putatively raised NP cannot undergo Object Shift (Tough-movement)
(see e.g. Gee (1975 : 352), Ughtfoot (1976)) :
(75)(a) *The plane was difficult for us to see fly at that distance.
(b) *John was easy for me to hear come into the house.
However, I do not think that this is a particularly strong piece of evidence. The
logic of the argument is that the possibility of applying Object Shift is not only
a sufficient but also a necessary test for establishing whether an NP is an object
in the surface structure. However, it is not logically necessary that this should
be the case. There is no a priori reason why the possibility of Object Shift should
not be restricted to base-generated objects only. As a matter of fact, precisely
this claim is made in Berman (1973 : 39), where it is argued "that Tough-move-
ment may not move any NP that has been previously moved by any other trans-
formation, or, otherwise stated, that Tough-movement may move a NP only
124 R.DECLERCK
from its position in underlying structure". Berman's examples involve not only
sentences with putatively raised NP's but also sentences in which the superficial
object NP has already been moved by a prior application of Dative movement,
About-movement (cf. Postal (1971 )), and passivization. If Berman is correct, the
ungrammaticality of (75,a-b) does not disprove the raising analysis but actual-
ly confirms it.
5.3. A truly difficult point about the raising analysis is the question of whether
or not the S should be pruned after its subject has been raised. According to
the pruning convention argued in Ross (1967 : 26), the S node (and the NP
above it) should be pruned because the node does not branch any more (i.e. it
dominates only VP) once raising has applied. However, Postal (1974: 231-
232) explicitly rejects that pruning takes place. The reason is that, if the S is
pruned, the ungrammaticality of sentences like the following becomes inex-
plicable :
(76)*The boys saw me look at themselves (or: at each other).
On the assumption that raising and S pruning have operated here, (76) is super-
ficially simplex and clause mate rules like reflexivization and Reciprocal Marking
should yield grammatical results. The ungrammaticality of (76) therefore obliges
Postal to reject that raising is followed by S pruning.
However, if S is not pruned after raising (that is, if the output structure of
raising is not superficially simplex), a raising analysis of IPVC's is inadequate,
since we have seen that sentences involving IPVC's are superficially simplex (cf.
especially 4.4.). A further piece of evidence confirming this point is provided
by sentences like (66,a-b) (partly repeated here) :
(66)(a) Into the garden I saw run the fattest cat in Urbana.
As noted by Emonds (1976 : 112-113), Complex NP Shift (which has operated

in (66,a)) cannot take place across a VP-final S constituent. This is clear from
examples like
(67)(a) *Into the garden I saw that ran the fattest cat in Urbana.
(b) *She asked whether it looked like rain a man who was near her.
(c) *1 persuaded to help me the senator who came from Texas.
The grammaticality of (66,a-b) is therefore inexplicable if one maintains that

raising is not followed by S pruning.

So, the question of S pruning is a real problem for the raising analysis. For
some types of sentences the pruning convention appears indispensable, for
others it is quite unacceptable.
6. Raising within the trace theory.
Lightfoot (1976) argues that, if strong arguments were found in favour of a

raising analysis of Postal's (1974) sentences, this would not vitiate Chomsky's
theory, since the theory of traces makes it possible for the Chomsky an
conditions to apply even when Subject-to-Object Raising has applied. Thus,
even if we assume that raising has applied in the derivation of (68,a), the fact
that himself refers to Bill and not to John can be explained without recurring
to a clause mate condition on reflexivization because in the trace theory (68,a)
has the superficial structure (68,b), in which t is the specified subject that blocks
coreference between himself and John :
(68)(a) John saw Bill look at himself in the mirror.

(b) John saw Billi [t i look at himselfi in the mirror]
However, Lightfoot's claim that a raising analysis can be incorporated within

the Chomskyan framework without further problems arising is rather too
optimistic. A closer examination rapidly makes clear that several of the problems
that crop up on the bare S analysis but not on the raising analysis arise again
on the raising+t analysis. For example:
6.1. As we have seen, the fact that IPVC's can follow prepositional verbs like
look at and listen to seems to be an indication that the S dominating the IPVC
is itself dominated by NP. This is in accordance with the raising analysis but
presents a problem for the bare S analysis since, in the Chomskyan framework,
the A-over-A principle and subjacency must block any transformation (even
WH-movement) extracting an NP from the S, whereas in actual fact extraction
does not yield ungrammatical results at all (cf. above). If raising is incorporated
within the Chomskyan framework this problem crops up again. Even raising itself
cannot apply then without violating subjacency if it operates on an S dominated
byNP.
6.2. In the discussion of the bare S analysis I have pointed out several types of
126 R.DECLERCK
sentences involving IPVC's which are quite grammatical but should be blocked
by the S.S.C. (or Opacity Condition) on the bare S analysis. On the Raising+t
analysis these cases are equally inexplicable, since the t that is left behind when
the subject NP of the IPVC is raised is the specified subject no less than the
original NP so that the S.S.C. should again block the sentences in question.
6.3. Since the complement S cannot be pruned on a raising+t analysis, this

analysis too is disconfirmed by the observation that sentences involving IPVC's
are simplex in the surface structure.
6.4. As noted in 4.11., a direct object occurring in an IPVC cannot undergo

Object Shift. If Object Shift goes COMP-to-COMP, as argued in Chomsky
(1977), this impossibility raises a problem for any analysis within the
Chomskyan framework, as none of the Chomskyan conditions is able to block
the NP movement in question.
7. Conclusion
7.1. When comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the bare S analysis,
raising and raising+t we come to the following conclusions:
a. The bare S analysis raises numerous problems, which have to do with (a)
the impossibility of having NP above S; (b) the fact that in several cases the
S.S.C. does not operate as expected;(c)the fact that in at least one case the
Subject Condition does not operate as expected; (d) the fact that the 'subject'
NP of the IPVC cannot be treated as a syntactic dependent of the perception
verb; (e) evidence that the 'subject' NP of the IPVC is no longer subject in the
surface structure; (f) evidence that IPVC's are no longer clausal constituents on
the surface; (g) evidence that sentences involving IPVC's are superficially
simplex; and (h) the impossibility of applying Object Shift to the object of an
IPVC.
b. A raising analysis (without t) creates none of those problems but raises
some difficulties in connection with S pruning and (possibly) the impossibility
of applying Object Shift to the raised NP. It also ruins the (otherwise fairly
good) results of the Chomskyan framework.
c. A raising+t analysis raises both problems (a), (b), (g) and (h) of the bare S
analysis and the difficulties connected with raising (without t).
7.2. Everyone of the 5 theoretically available analyses of IPVC's encounters

at least a couple of serious problems. On balance, Postal's (1974) raising theory
appears to create the least difficulties. By contrast, the problems for an analysis
in the Chomskyan framework are (still) numerous.
FOOTNOTES
IThis conclusion does not hold for Dutch (and probably German and French)
IPVC's. which can be satisfactorily analysed in terms of Verb Raising. (see
Declerck 1981a).
2This phrase-marker has been simplified so as not to contain such nodes (e.g.
S, COMP, AUX, Tense) as are irrelevant to the argumentation.
3The restriction in question holds only for the adverbial use of the by-phrase.
It does not prevent it being used as subject complement or object complement
(predicative adjunct) ;
(i) I have never seen John (as he was) by himself.
4Examples of this construction are not very numerous because there-insertion
is not very usual with nonstative verbs, whereas IPVC's only exceptionally take
a stative verb.
5Actually, interpretation (30,a) is less acceptable than interpretation (30,b)
because (30,a) violates Ross' Internal S Constraint (which is a surface constraint
saying that a sentence containing a clause-internal S in surface structure has a
reduced acceptability).
6The reference numbers in this quotation have been adapted.
7For some speakers sentences like these may only be marginally acceptable.
The reason is that 'active' perception verbs like look at and listen to imply a
durative perception and are therefore normally followed by PPVC's (Participial
Perception Verb Complements) (e.g. I looked at the servant making up the fire).
However, as argued in Declerck (1981c), IPVC's differ from PPVC's only in
that the former are non progressive whereas the latter are progressive. (That is,
I saw John coming is in fact a reduction of 'I saw John be coming'). Apart
from this difference of aspect there is no structural difference between IPVC's
and PPVC's (at least if we disregard special uses of PPVC's - see Declerck
(1981 c, 1981 d». It follows that the argument that there must be an NP above
the S dominating the IPVC is unaffected even if it should be necessary to
substitute PPVC's for the IPVC's in (57,a-b).
8Chomsky (1976) attempts to obviate this problem by assuming that reflexiviz-
ation always takes place but that the reflexive pronoun "is obligatorily deleted in
the context [or - VP. Thus, he claims that I want to leave at once is derived
from 'I want for myself to leave at once' by obligatory deletion of [or myself
However, this is an ad hoc solution which necessitates assuming a [or-comple-
mentizer after some verbs (e.g. remember) which can never be overtly followed
by [or. Moreover, the solution does not cover cases like (62,a-b) where the
128 R.DECLERCK
complement clause isa gerund, since gerund clauses by definition do not involve
the complementizer for.
9Bresnan (1976 : 486-487) challenges this claim on the basis of sentences
like the following:
(i) Near the fountain sat a large purple gorilla.
However, Gazdar & Pullum (1980) show (on the basis of facts concerning
Number Agreement) that there has been deleted from Bresnan's sentences,
hence that the complex NP's were not subjects when they were shifted.
Bresnan's objection is therefore vacuous.
10For a discussion of the usefulness of Right Node Raising as a test for
constituenthood see Postal (1974: 125), Bresnan (1974), Bresnan (1976:
493) and Abbott (1976 : 639).
PASSIVE IN A SEMANTIC-SYNTACTIC DEPENDENCY
NETWORK
W. Van Langendonck
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
O. The aim of this paper is to give an account of passive constructions in a

semantic-syntactic dependency network. The linguistic material on which the
analysis is based will come from English and especially from Dutch. First, we
will consider some recent characterizations of passive. Second, we will look at
the status of passive agent- or by- phrases and at passive auxiliaries. Mainly on
the basis of phenomena in Dutch, it will be concluded that agent-phrase prepo-
sitions and auxiliaries are lexical items in their own right. Thereupon, an analysis
in our framework will be presented for different passive construction-types.
1. In recent literature, it has been stressed that passive cannot be described

universally in terms of wordorder, cases or verbal morphology, if only because
there are languages where these notions are irrelevant in this respect. Sinha
(1978) contends that even the relational primitives subject and object fail to
characterize passive. His own viewpoint is worthwhile quoting. He distinguishes
as the two chief characteristics of passive:
a) an overt foregrounding of the affected NP (which differentiates it from
an active sentence), and
b) a'back-grounding' of an overt (or implied) NP which differentiates it
from the real intransitives (Sinha 1978 : 454).
For Dutch, Kirsner (I 976) extensively argues that in active sentences agents
are focussed or foregrounded, i.e. are in the center of attention. In passives the
patient is foregrounded, while the agent is backgrounded, mostly even 'under-
stood'. As a consequence, the agent-phrase in passives "is interpreted not as
fully new information but as 'something extra' : either a parenthetical or a
129
130 W. VAN LANGENDONCK
contrastive specification of an agent whose presence on the scene is already

signaled by the passive morphology itseIr' (Kirsner 1976 : 409). On the other
hand, Kirsner thoroughly examines Dutch subjectless passives, formed with in-
transitive verbs. In these cases, there is no foregrounding of the patient, but of
the event as such. Subjectless passives display the same morphology and the
same (normally) optional door-phrases (corresponding to English by-phrases),
compare:
(I) Het meisje werd gekust (door de jongen).

The girl became (=was) kissed (by the boy)
(2) Er werd gedanst. (door iedereen)

There became danced (by everybody) = Everybody danced
As Kirsner (1976 : 389) states, "in both its uses, passive morphology (worden +
past participle) is one linguistic sign signaling the single, relatively abstract
meaning high participant not focussed, which may be roughly paraphrased as
'the logical subject is not the grammatical subject"'. The latter principle recurs
in Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979 : 148). It is even claimed to be a universal. How-
ever, these two authors do not consider passive subjects, passive morphology,
passive agent-phrases to be essential for the characterization of passive. If this
is correct, as I think it is, it entails passive status for patterns as exemplified in
Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979) :
(3) Ik hoor een fuga spelen (door Piet)

I hear a fugue play (by Pete) =
I hear a fugue being played (by Pete)
(4) a. That girl is pretty to look at.

b. Dat was door niemand te voorzien.
That was by nobody to foresee = Nobody could foresee that
(5) This often retold story
(6) De door de leerlingen op te lossen sommen

The by the pupils to solve sums = The sums to be solved by the pupils
Nominalisations might be added :

(7) a. Het wegnemen van de borden (door de kelner)
b. The taking away of the plates (by the waiter)
PASSIVE IN A DEPENDENCY NETWORK 131
(8) a. De adoptie van een kind door een alleenstaande vrouw

b. The adoption of a child by an unattached woman
Even such cases as (9) could be envisaged:
(9) The conference by the minister
All of these patterns display optional door- or by- phrases. As to verbal

morphology, only (5) shows partly passive morphology in its past participle
retold. In (9) not even a verb or derived nominal is present. As to the passive
subject: in all of the examples, the affected NP is mentioned, but nowhere
does it assume the role of passive subject. Intuitively, we are inclined to assign
more passive status to a sentence the more passive characteristics show up.
In their analyses most linguists seem to do the same thing. Thus Kirsner (1976)
seems to take passive morphology into account; Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979 :
148) regard the possibility of a door- phrase as a test for passive status. Indeed,
one might hesitate to assign passive status to sentences where a door- or by-
phrase is impossible, as in :
(lO)a. Ze raakte gekleed.

b. She got dressed (Stein 1979: 103)
where there is coreference between the affected person and the agent. Moreover,
a typical passive auxiliary is absent. Nevertheless, we can speak of a background-
ing of the agent in this case as well, since an active counterpart with a fore-
grounded agent can be constructed: She dressed (herself). The possibility of an
active counterpart is another passive test. According to this criterion, (3) looks
more passive than (4) - (9), because only (3) clearly corresponds to an active
sentence with a foregrounded agent: Ik hoar Piet een fuga spelen 'I hear Pete
playa fugue'.
In light of these observations, it would probably be wise to adhere to a fuzzy
passive concept. As fully passive we would view cases like (1), where all passive
features show up. The socalled pseudopassive ill (2) is less passive because it
lacks an affected NP, and so on. On the other hand, we would retain the hard
core of passive: the backgrounding of the logical subject. Hence, we see no
passive status at all in sentences like:
(11) Ze werd ge boren te Gen t.

She was born at Ghent.
(1 2) The applause was by everyone.
As Pollmann (1975 : 151) points out, geboren is not a passive participle but an
adjective since no infinitive corresponds to it. This explains that an agent-phrase
is out in (11). The verb worden does not function here as a passive auxiliary,
but as a copula combinable with an adjective and meaning 'become'. No agent
or logical subject seems to be implied at all, so we cannot speak of a passive.
In (12) we encounter a by-phrase, even a true agent-phrase, but we cannot say
that the agent is backgrounded, for semantically, the preposition by functions
as the main predicate unlike in passives.
2. The above informal characterization of passive of course bears on its formal

analysis. Partly because of such characterizations as the above the thesis is
gaining ground that active and passive must not be related to each other in a
direct semantic or syntactic (transformational) way. The two voices should be
viewed as being basically independent indeed 1. Certain defenders of a trans-
formational approach, such as Johnson (1976: 79), are themselves bothered
by the 'mysterious appearance' of the auxiliary be and the preposition by in
passives. It seems to become imperative to regard these passive elements as full
lexical items with their own semantic and syntactic functions. We want to go
into the phenomenon of agent-phrases in section 2.1 and into that of passive
auxiliaries in 2.2. Especially Dutch material will be adduced here.
2.1. The background position of passive by-phrases correlates with the fact that
they are mostly optional, sometimes even impossible (cf. 10). The majority of
English and Dutch passives simply lack an agent-phrase (80 to 87 %) according
to Stein 1979 : 35 and Kirsner 1976 : 392). Coetzee (1980 : 208) mentions for
English that "the long passive is of later date, and perhaps a literary invention".
This squares well with the observation that in the dialects of Dutch, passive
agent-phrases seem to be extremely rare. In a few languages such phrases do not
even exist.
By-phrases share their backgroundedness with other adverbial prepositional
phrases. The latter are also mostly optional. In just a few instances, agent- and
other adverbial phrases are obligatory, compare:
(13)a. His first insult was followed by an even worse one. (Stein 1979 :
103)
b. She put it on the table.
Furthermore, not only agent-phrases as in (12) can function as foregrounded,

obligatory adverbials; compare the obligatory locative adverbial in :
(l4)John is in the garden.
A number of investigators focus their attention on the preposition of the agent-

phrase itself. Hoard (1979 : 322) and Keenan (1979) argue that the by in passive
agent-phrases is the same by as the one in nonpassive environments like (12),
and therefore should not be derived transformationally. The Dutch language
offers even more striking examples. In (15) the preposition door 'by' is used
with the same meaning in both sentences. Moreover, both door-phrases are back-
grounded and optional. However, the a-sentence is a passive, the b-sentence is
not, though only one word differs: the past participle is left out in (15b) :
(15) a. Door jou werd het mogelijk gemaakt.

By you was it possible made
= It was made possible by you
b. Door jou werd het mogelijk.
A similar case is
(16) De mens B. kan bezwaarlijk beter gekarakteriseerd worden dan dit

gebeurt door enkele vrienden ...
The man B. can hardly be characterised better than this happens
(= is done) by some friends ...
While English would use a form with to do to replace the process verb, Dutch
can insert the verb gebeuren 'happen'. But this is an intransitive active verb.
Nevertheless, it obtains the same door-phrase as the antecedent passive clause.
We could leave out the expletive form dit gebeurt 'this is done' in (16) without
harming the meaning of the sentence at all.
That the agent phrase preposition preserves its meaning is also suggested by
the circumstance that sometimes a different preposition is utilized. Coetzee
(1980 : 205) adduces a couple of English examples:
(17)a. He is known to me.

b. The room was permeated with gas.
It is however not absolutely clear that we have to do with passive morphology

in (17). More convincing are Dutch examples where the typical passive auxiliary
worden shows up :
(18) De zoon werd vergezeld van zijn vader.

The son became (was) accompanied of (by) his father
An interesting case of impersonal passive is provided by
(19) In ons land wordt er opvallend veel getrouwd tussen hier wonende
buitenlanders en Belgen.
In our country there becomes strikingly often married (= there is an
awful lot of marrying) between foreigners living here and Belgians
Obviously, the preposition tussen 'between' preserves its ordinary meaning.

What is worse for the transformationalist approach is the impossibility of
constructing an exact active counterpart for (19); compare the following trials:
(20)a. *In ons land trouwt men opvallend veel tussen .. .

In our country one marries an awful lot between .. .
b. ?In ons land trouwen opvallend veel (= vaak) hier wonende buiten-
landers en Belgen.
In our country, foreigners living here and Belgians marry strikingly
often
Sentence (20a) is ungrammatical; (20b) is awkward and does not necessarily

mean that foreigners and Belgians marry each other. We conclude that door,
van and tussen in Dutch passive agent-phrases are lexical items in their own
right and should figure as such in semantic as well as in syntactic structure. In
the transformationalist approach neither is the case. In the lexicalist approach of
Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979) door is recognized as a fullfledged preposition in
the lexical and the syntactic component, but not in the semantic representation,
where an active structure is produced. This does not do justice to the back-
grounding of the agent-phrase, which is essentially a semantic phenomenon.
2.2. With respect to passive auxiliaries, the same line of argument can be
followed as in the case of by-phrases. As a rule, in transformationalist
approaches the passive auxiliary is not a basic lexical item, but a derived one.
This is even the case in the 'nontransformationalist' phrasal analysis of passive
in Keenan (1979). Passives here are VPs derived from transitive VPs (TVPs),
e.g.
(21)a. The can was opened with a screwdriver.

b. VP = [Pass, [TVP (open) (with a screwdriver)]]
In this approach we still need an operation converting the operator PASS into
[be ... + -ed]. This entails that there are at least two verbs be, one being the
normal auxiliary, the other being transformationally derived in view of passive.
More embarrassing is the fact that be is not the only passive aUxiliary in English.
Coetzee (1980 : 205) mentions others: get, become, stand, e.g. in :
(22)a. He got arrested by the sheriff.

b. He became disturbed by my presence.
c. He stands rebuked by the court.
It is hard to see how such structures are to be generated in Keenan's frame-

work.
In Hoekstra & Moortgat's approach, the passive auxiliary is a full lexical and
syntactic element, but disappears in the semantic representation, as the pre-
position door did. Yet, Langacker (I978 : 859-60) argues that auxiliaries like
be and do are not semantically empty markers serving only to bear tense. He
posits that "be predicates the existence of a state, and do the existence of a
process". According to Beedham (1979) passive auxiliaries carry the notion of
aspect just like the perfect and the progressive. In contrast to be-passives,
become-passives show durative, and get-passives perfective aspect.
Dutch displays an interesting opposition between two passive auxiliaries,
usually neglected in the literature. Often, only the unmarked auxiliary worden
'become' is mentioned and the other one zijn 'be' is forgotten. Relevant to the
choiceofworden and zijn is the dichotomy between states and occurrences. It
seems not to matter whether perfective occurrences (events) or imperfective
occurrences (processes) are involved 2 . As a rule, in passive state predications,
which constitute a minority, we encounter the auxiliary zijn, whereas passive
occurrence predications take worden. An interesting test to determine the
character of the predication consists of the formation of a pseudo-deft clause
with the verb gebeuren 'occur' preceding the sentence to be tested, compare:
(23)a. Wat er gebeurde, was dat de vluchtelinl! gedood werd (*was)

door een kogel.
What happened was that the fugitive was killed by a bullet [event]
b. Wat er aan 't gebeuren is, is dat de ekonomie ondermijnd wordt.
What is happening is that the economy is being undermined
[process]
(24)a. De les was door iedereen gekend.

The lesson was known by everyone [state]
b. *Wat er gebeurde, was dat de les door iedereen gekend werd/was.
136 W.VANLANGENDONCK
Certain verbs sometimes refer to an occurrence, sometimes to a state. This

category takes worden in the case of a passive occurrence, and worden or zijn
when a state is involved, e.g.
(25) Wat er gebeurde was dat plotseling de hele zaak door iedereen werd
(*was) verstaan.
What happened was that suddenly the whole matter was understood
by everybody [event]
(26)a. In de middeleeuwen werden/waren vele fysische verschijnselen

niet goed verstaan (door de geleerden).
In the Middle Ages many physical phenomena were not well under-
stood (by the scholars) [state]
b. *Wat er gebeurde was dat in de middeleeuwen vele fysische ver-
schijnselen niet goed werden/waren verstaan (door de geleerden)
The extension of worden to state predications as in (26) can be explained by

markedness theory, which says that the forms of unmarked categories are often
extended to the expression of the corresponding marked categories (Van
Langendonck 1979). As worden pertains to occurrences and as occurrences are
the unmarked category in passive predications 3 , this auxiliary is unmarked (in
passives !) as opposed to the aUxiliary zijn, which refers to state predications.
There are, however, restrictions to the use of worden in passive state predica-
tions. If with a verb ambiguous between occurrence and state a passive state
predication with worden is built, the door-phrase is obligatory unless the logical
subject fulfils a role where animacy is essential, viz. agent or experiencer. In
(26) the door-phrase can be left out since door is followed by an NP referring
to an experiencer 4 . Thus, in instances where an ambiguity between a state and
an occurrence is possible, and the door-phrase is omitted, an occurrence inter-
pretation remains as the only possibility; compare
(27)a. De tuin wordt ommuurd door de metselaar.

The garden is walled in by the bricklayer [occurrence]
b. De tuin wordt ommuurd door een betonnen afsluiting.
The garden is walled in by a concrete fence [state]
c. De tuin wordt ommuurd.
The garden is walled in (by somebody!) [occurrence]
As a rule, passives with zijn instead of worden do not need by-phrases 5 ,

apparently because they unambiguously refer to states, compare:
(27)c. De tuin is ommuurd.

The garden is walled in [state]
Finally, it can be remarked that worden and zijn require different dummy
subjects when the real subjects are extraposed clauses: worden entails the use of
er 'there', zijn the use of het 'it'6:
(28)Er (*Het) werd gezegd dat het twintig graden vroor.

It was said that there were twenty degrees of frost
(29)Het (*Er) is geweten dat vele Salvadorianen folteringen ondergaan.

It is known that a lot of Salvadorians suffer torture.
3. The formal analysis of passives will have to meet the above considerations
and requirements. Especially, we will have to account for the autonomy of
passive with respect to active, the backgrounding of the logical subject, the
lexical status of the passive auxiliary and the preposition of the agent-phrase
(if these elements figure in the sentence), and the irrelevance of word order or
transformational operations.
A suitable framework to handle passive (and other structures or operations !)
seems to me to be dependency grammar. This format enables us to separate
constituent structure rules from wordorder rules. If one allows networks in
addition, it is possible to deal with a lot of 'operations' for which otherwise,
transformations or even global rules would be needed (see Hudson 1976;
Schachter 1978; Hoard 1979). As for the notion of dependency itself, one can
distinguish between syntactic and semantic dependencies (Heringer e.a. 1980;
Nichols 1978). Certain authors only work with semantic dependencies (Hoard
1979; Langacker 1978), others only with syntactic dependencies (Hudson
1976). It may well be that we need both of them (Schachter 1978). A good
starting-point is Langacker's theory of space grammar. This grammar yields
semantic structures of sentences where form reflects meaning in a direct way.
Langacker claims that "even simple sentences like He may see her and He was
sad involve several propositional layers or STRATA, each having a distinct
predictional function in the composition of the complex type of predicational
unit we call a sentence" (Langacker 1978 : 854-5). The above two sentences
are assigned a semantic or PROPOSITIONAL structure as exemplified in figures
(30a-b). Important to the present approach is the fact that Langacker uses
dependency trees, "though these are to be regarded as convenient abbreviations
for a more basic SHELL or LAYERING structure representing part-whole
relationships" (ibid.), cf. fig. (30c) :
GROUND G (G) G
I I
EPISTEMIC MAY (E) DIST
I I
EXISTENTIAL DO (3) BE
I (OC)
I
OBJECTIVE SEE SAD
CONTENT /"""HER
HE HE
I
Fig. (30a) He may see her Fig. (30b) He was sad. Fig. (30c)
In these figures, an epistemic path leads from the speaker to the objective
situation. The latter is designated by the lowest stratum: OBJECTIVE
CONTENT (OC). The EXISTENTIAL stratum (3) predicates existence of this
situation, whereby do predicates the existence of a process, while be indicates
the existence of a state. The EPISTEMIC layer (E) contains an optional modal
as well as tense. (In 30a there is simply no tense; in 30b the DISTAL label re-
places the traditional past tense). The term GROUND (G) specifies the speech
act involved and refers to the speaker. In the present paper, the main concern
is of course the level of OBJECTIVE CONTENT. As Langacker (1978) essential-
ly deals with the epistemic stratum, the analysis of the objective content layer
is not very elaborate. It is e.g. not clear whether his dependency structures
are networks or just trees. The difference is highly relevant to the analysis pro-
posed here. It amounts to the following 7 : if the arguments in the sem~ntic
representations are to have only a single predicate, we speak of a dependency
TREE; if the arguments are allowed to have more than one predicate, a
dependency NETWORK is created. The predicates are displayed above their
arguments and are said to 'dominate' them. Each predicate plus the arguments
it dominates form a proposition. The propositions themselves may in turn
function as arguments of complex propositions. The resulting semantic repre-
sentations thus contain only propositions and their elements.
3.1. Hoard's article on passive makes use of a similar dependency framework,

but stresses the importance of the network device. In his analysis, which is
inspired by Langacker & Munro (1975), passives arise from a bisentential source
consisting of one sentence embedded within another. His example and diagram
are respectively :
(31)Homer was executed yesterday in Athens by terrorists.

(31)'
S BY
I.
terronsts
BE
I
execute
~Homer
L'>.
Here the main proposition [BE[EXECUTE (Ll,Homer)]] functions as an

argument of all three secondary predicates yesterday, in and BY. We have a
network since one (propositional) argument depends on several predicates
simultaneously. The dummy Ll is an unspecified argument, i.e. "one whose
existence is semantically implied, but which is identified by neither reference
nor lexical content" (Langacker & Munro 1975 : 791). Keenan (1979) objects
to (bi-)sentential (and lexical) analyses of passive and propounds himself a
phrasal account. He argues convincingly that passive is not merely lexical. The
semantics of passive requires that certain types of propositional phrases, among
others agent-phrases, be involved in the passive derivation. Other instances where
more than a lexical transitive VP is involved are conjoined VPs, 'raised' and
'equi' structures etc. As a consequence, passive has to be at least a phrasal ope-
ration. It should not be more than that, since the subject does not concern the
passive operation: "the position and case marking of the subject does not
differentiate passives from actives" (Keenan 1979 : 8)8. It may well be that a
phrasal analysis is called for in a phrase structure grammar, which is an out-
spoken syntagmatic grammar. But even within the various frameworks of
syntagmatic grammar, the category VP is not so well established as the category
S. In the past and more recently, doubts have been cast on the validity of VP
as an underlying constituent in universal grammar (Johnson 1976). Looking at
the passive itself, we observe that in certain languages (Thai, Vietnamese) a bi-
sentential origin of passives appears to be necessary (le 1976; Davison 1980 :
58, fn. 6).
The category VP was, in fact, a product ofimmediate Constituent analysis
and was, subsequently, carried over into phrase structure grammar. In a de-
pendency grammar, the VP simply does not exist, since it does not make use of
140 W.VANLANGENDONCK
constituents or phrases but of dependency relations between words (see Hudson

1980 a,b). Therefore, Keenan's phrasal approach does not make sense in our
case. Yet, we can wonder whether a dependency format takes into account his
position that the subject does not concern the passive operation. I think the
dependency approach is in the spirit of Keenan's argument. When we compare
the passive structure in (31) with the representations of simple sentences as in
(30), we can formulate the same rule or condition to determine the 'surface'
subject: take the fIrst simplex specified argument depending (in)directly on
the main predicate as syntactic subject. In (30) that argument is he; in (31) it
is Homer. Thus the passive subject is indicated in the same way as the active
one (but see below).
Nevertheless, a couple of objections can be raised against Hoard's diagram.
1) In stemma (31) the secondary predications are directly connected with
the passive auxiliary be. It is more plausible to connect these secondary pre-
dications directly with the predicate execute. Several points support this move.
a) As was observed above, the semantic nature and the optional vs. obligatory
character of the by-phrase depend on the main verb, not on the auxiliary. Even
the preposition can vary according to the meaning of the main verb : in (19)
the preposition tussen 'between' is selected in view of the verb trouwen 'marry'.
b) There exist passive patterns with agent-phrases but without passive auxi-
liaries, cf. the sentences (3) - (9). Here the agent-phrases will have to be
connected with the infinitival or nominalized verb (see also below). When we
act likewise for (31), the secondary predications are to be attached to execute.
c) In (31) the secondary predications are hardly in background position.
If there was not the somewhat artificial node S, which is not quite necessary in
a genuine dependency grammar, the 'secondary' predications would rather be
primary! However, when they are attached to the predicate execute, their
position is backgrounded in a natural way.
2) It is not clear whether Hoard's neglect of syntactic dependencies is on
principle, but in the end it will be inevitable to take into account syntactic as
well as semantic dependencies 9 . Hudson (1980b : 504) offers this definition of
a syntactic dependent or modifier: "X is a modifier of Y if and only if it fills
a slot in the structure of Y, but it [the definition] also requires that this slot be
an OPTIONAL one. A slot is optional for Y if Y belongs to a class of words for
which the slot is optional..." According to this definition, in diagram (31) the
following syntactic dependency relations can be added. Arrows go from the head
to the dependent. (To meet the first objection to Hoard, the semantic
dependency network is. adapted) :
(32) DISTAL YESTERDAY IN BY
( AtJ~s~rr~~sts
As can be read from the diagram, there is some overlap between semantic and
syntactic dependencies: for both kinds of dependencies, EXECUTE depends on
BE, Athens on IN and territorists on BY. Apparently because of their secondary
character, the secondary predications take the form of (backgrounded)
adverbials in syntactic structure and therefore depend syntactically on the (non-
fmite) verb, though semantically they dominate it (plus its arguments). The
DlST AL predicate depends morphologically on the auxiliary. The greatest
discrepancy regards the passive subject. Whereas semantically it is the object of
EXECUTE, syntactically it depends on BE, not also on EXECUTE, as Hudson
(I976) would hold. Deciding on syntactic dependencies is facilitated by two
criteria given in Nichols (1978) :
i) There is syntactic dependency between X and Y if wordorder rules have
to refer to X in establishing the position of Y or vice-versa. Applying this to
(32), we can state that subject and fmite verb are in a syntactic dependency
relation because they follow each other directly in this and most other
sentences. This does not obtain for the subject and the past participle
execu ted 10.
ii) The second test says that elements with a syntactic dependency relation
can form a minimal utterance. As I can say Homer was, but not Homer
executed, this criterion confirms the first one.
3.2. To prove the usefulness of syntactic dependency relations for the analysis
of certain typically passive phenomena, let us turn to more sophisticated
patterns.
142 w. VAN LANGENDONCK
3.2.1. For English we have to deviate sometimes from the above principle
that the first simplex specified argument under BE obtains the status of
syntactic subject. In certain cases where the active sentence displays an indirect
as well as a direct object, the corresponding passive allows either object to
become the subject, e.g.
(33)a. My doctor denies me this happiness.

b. This happiness is denied me by my doctor.
c. I am denied this happiness by my doctor.
The difference between (33b) and (33c) can only be read from the syntactic
part of the stemmas :
(33)'b. (33)'c.
!J. happiness me
•
this
In Standard Dutch, as in a lot of other languages, structures like (33c) are not
allowed. However, in informal, colloquial and dialectal Dutch, they are fairly
frequent (cf. Van Langendonck 1968). As in many other languages where such
patterns do not occur freely, they are mostly found with possessive NPs and/or
in adversative contexts 11 (Davison 1980), e.g.
(34)Hij is al zijn tanden uitgetrokken.

He has been extracted all his teeth
However, even in colloquial Dutch an indirect object with a preposition cannot

become a passive subject, nor can any other NP with a preposition, whether it
functions as a prepositional object or an adverbial; compare:
(35)a. Ik heb aan ni~mand iets beloofd.

I didn't promise anything to anybody
b. *Niemand was iets aan beloofd (door mij).

Nobody was promised anything
(36)a. Men keek naar hem.

One looked at him
b. *Hij werd naar gekeken.
He was looked at
(37)a. Men heeft nog niet op deze stoelen gezeten.

One has not sat on these chairs yet
b. *Deze stoelen zijn nog niet op gezeten 12.
These chairs have not been sat on yet
3.2.2. Complementary to the adversative structures of the foregoing paragraph,

Dutch often employs a kind of pseudo-passive circumlocution with the verb
krijgen 'receive' as head in order to express benefactive events:
(38)Hij kreeg een boek aangeboden.
He got a book offered
The passive participle aangeboden functions as a predicative ad nominal adjunct

(co-predicate) to the NP een boek, which is itself the semantic object of kreeg l3 .
Likewise, hij is at the same time an argument of kree! and aangeboden.
Syntactically, hij and een boek exclusively depend on kreeg 1 :
(38)' DISTAL
(I~
hfIJG~~k ~lEDEN
t
een
Apparently, the v~rb krijgen is not to be regarded as a passive auxiliary (yet),

but still shows its usual meaning of 'receive'. Yet, we meet with a past participle
aangeboden 'offered'. This counters the claim in Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979 :
148) that the choice of the [ge-... -d] or [ge-... -en] morphology represents a
property of the auxiliaries hebben 'have', worden 'become' and zijn 'be,IS.
3.2.3. Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979: 155ss.) treat of Dutch passive patterns
exemplified by :
(39)Ik hoor een fuga spelen (door Piet) 16

I hear a fugue play (= being played) (by Pete)
In a lexicalist framework, they set up the following syntactic phrase structure for
(39), in an SOV order:
(39)'
PP v
I I
door Piet spelen
Surprising is their claim that een fuga would be the direct object of hoar and
at the same time the syntactic subject of spelen. The reason for this move is
apparently that in thi.s nontransformational phrase structure grammar, there is
hardly another way to analyse the like patterns. But from a methodological
point of view we should be careful in assigning to an NP the functions of
syntactic object and subject simultaneously, even if different verbs are involved.
In such an approach, the definition of subject and object is certain to become
extremely complicated and ad hoc. It is then a pity that any motivation for the
move is lacking. Indeed, a pronominalization test proves that een fuga in (39)
can only be a direct object by normal standards: Ik hoar haar spe/en (door
Piet). The pronoun haar is an accusative form, hence cannot be a syntactic
subject. And as long as no special evidence is given, we have to assume the most
obvious interpretation, viz. that een fuga is simply the direct object of spelen,
not of hoar.
Via a particular dependency criterion, a dependency approach reaches this
conclusion. In Van Langendonck (forthcoming) the following test to identify
a syntactic dependency relation between words is set up (for Dutch) : words
which in a main clause can occur together before the finite verb, are related
syntactically. Application of this criterion to the crucial elements of (39) yields:
(40)Een fuga spelen hoor ik (doen), en niets anders!
This means that there is a dependency relation between een fuga and spe/en.
In other words, een fuga functions as the direct object of spe/en 17 .
In agreement with the above considerations, sentence (39) receives the
following dependency diagram :
(39)"
ik
pRE~ P7
SPELENpl
t::.
/~fuga
+
een
Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979 : 157, fn. 18) remark that in the complement of
verbs like horen 'hear' no pseudo-passives, i.e. passives with intransitive verbs (as
in patterns like 2) can occur. Sentence (41) is deemed ungrammatical:
(41)*Hij liet door Jan ontbijten.

He let by John breakfast = He let John breakfast
The awkwardness of (41) is, however, rather due to a pragmatic factor. Such
marked passives as the pseudo-passive do not take agent-phrases as easily.
Especially, if an agent-phrase is chosen, it should have some length and second,
the NP in it should not refer to a concrete individual like John in (41) but rather
to a non-particular referent, which is likely to occupy a background position 18.
Observing this pragmatic condition allows us to construct better examples than
(41) :
(42)a. De hotelier liet niet door iedereen tegelijk ontbijten.

The hotel-keeper let not by everyone at once breakfast =
The hotel-keeper did not let everyone breakfast at once
b. Ik hoor alleen spreken door mensen die er niets van snappen.
I hear only speak by people who don't understand anything of it =
I only hear people speak who don't understand anything of it.
Sentence (42a) can be diagrammed as follows:

146 W. V AN LANGENDONCK
( 42)'a
,sI
NIET
'(In
TAL
.r-~TEN
(/ ~ ~OOR
hotelier ONTBIJTEN I)
iedereen
dt t
I tegelijk
3.2.4. If we can handle impersonal passives as (42), we should also be able to

assign a structure to impersonal passives in main clauses of the form (2) Er
werd gedanst (door iedereen). Peculiar to this pattern is the insertion of er
'there' as the syntactic subject of werd for lack of any specified subject. Let us
represent (2) as :
(43) DISTAL
(I
WORDEN~ DOOR
er "'---;:'~SEN ~ ied~feen
I
f,
The markedness of this type is also illustrated by the constraint that the logical
subject should refer to a human agent. This obtains for the logical subjects in
(42) as well.
3.2.5. The next type requires an agent as logical subject; it concerns a peculiar
Dutch pseudo-passive with the verb gebeuren 'happen' as head of the sentence.
The proper content of the utterance is given in the subject of gebeuren, which
is a nominalized structure. Moreover, a door-phrase can be attached to gebeuren,
though it is an active intransitive verb 19 ! Consider the example (and compare
sentence 16) :
(44) Het verven van het huis ge beurde door de eigenaars.

The painting of the house happened (= was done) by the proprietors.
This pattern receives the following tentative stemma :

(44), DISTAL ~ DOOR

GEJ~UREN ~
"
I)
EIGENAARS
r./ ""-
het'
VERVEN~
~
-van
}
•
de
[:, hUIS
•
het
Although the agent-phrase is syntactically optional and semantically back-

grounded in this pattern as well as in normal passives, it tends to receive
pragmatic focus. In (44) the fact that it was done by the proprietors is
stressed 20.
3.2.6. Last, but not least, we want to say a few words about so called 'raising'
in passive structures, as occur in Latin and English (but not in Dutch), e.g.
(45) Lapides conjici coepti sunt. (Tesniere 1959 : 246)

Rocks were begun to be thrown
The 'raising' of /apides from (logical) object to subject can be accounted for by
the joint semantic and syntactic structures of the following tree:
(45)' ESSE
I)
COEPISSE
I)
CONJICERE
/~lapides
t:,
where ESSE is to be converted to sunt in order to agree with /apides. The

verbs COEPISSE and CONJICERE are both assigned passive morphology.
Keenan (1979 : 37) mentions an English sentence that cannot be handled
in his own phrase structure framework:
(46)There were believed to be mice in the bam.
We would venture this dependency diagram for it :

(46)' DI"AL
BE
~I)
( _ BELIEVE"
th". /~)
BE
,
!::.
IU~
mice
~~barn
the
The deeply embeddded logical subject mice of IN becomes the syntactic subject
of BE by the above principle: take the first simplex specified argument as the
syntactic subject. The same principle is applicable to the Latin sentence (45).
The element there can be assigned the role of a presentative functor as was
proposed in Hetzron (1975).
Notice that for these raised structures we do not even need the network
device : a single dependency tree is sufficient.
4. In this work I tried to give an account of various passive structures encounter-

ed in Dutch and English in a semantic-syntactic dependency network. The con-
clusion of a few recent approaches that active and passive are basically indepen-
dent voices was corroborated. The motivation was found in the non-
derived status of passive by-phrases and auxiliaries and in the background
status of the logical subject in passives. The latter was considered to be the hard
core of passive. Yet, contingent characteristics such as morphology, by-phrase,
existence and foregrounding of an affected NP, an occurrence interpretation
of the verb in question, can make a passive 'more passive'. The prototype of
passive is thus exemplified in (1).
The background character of the logical subject and the irrelevance of
wordorder and transformations for passive are very well accounted for in a
semantic-syntactic dependency format. Such a grammar seems to be capable
of giving suitable representations for a variety of marked passive structures as
well as for the prototype. On the other hand, various flaws were discovered in
the recent phrase structure approach of Keenan (I979) and the lexicalistic
analysis of Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979).
FOOTNOTES
I For detailed recent evidence see Langacker & Monro (1975), Kirsner (1976),
Hoard (1979), Stein (1979), Coetzee (1980), Keenan (1979).
2For these notions see Mourelatos (1978).
3The reason why occurrences are the unmarked class in passives lies in the
circumstance that passives can only be formed with verbs (not with adjectives),
and verbs normally refer to occurrences.
4Pollmann (1975 : 23ss., 146ss.) overlooks cases with experiencers and mentions
only agents. In general, for the use of worden in passives, not agency is relevant,
but the notion of occurrence, as posited above; see examples like (25). Even so,
problems remain (cf. Pollmann 1975 : ISO).
50nly with locational predications do adverbial phrases, possibly by-phrases,
seem obligatory: Het huis is omgeven door het bos 'The house is surrounded
by the forest' (*Het huis is omgeven); Het terrein is gelegen op het platteland
'The plot is situated in the countryside' (*Het terre in is gelegen).
6For other phenomena in connection with er and passives, see Pollmann (1975 :
112ss.).
7See especially Hoard (1979); also Hudson (1976; 1980a,b), Schachter (1978).
8As Keenan (1979: 13) himself admits, his other criticisms of the sentential
account exclusively apply to transformational analyses, not to bisentential
accounts like Langacker & Munro (1975) or, consequently, Hoard (1979).
9The father of dependency grammar did not even mention semantic dependen-
cies (Tesniere 1969). Hudson (1976) mentions them, but works exclusively
with syntactic dependencies.
I OJ ackendoff (1977: 32, fn.2) makes a similar claim with respect to the
sentence John is tall: he admits a syntactic relation between John and is, not
between John and tall, though there are se1ectional restrictions between the
latter two . .Interestingly, he uses quite different arguments to corroborate his
claim.
11In an adversative context the event described possesses an adverse character,
e.g. in (34).
12Notice that deze stoe/en 'these chairs' can function as topic in colloquial
Dutch, the preposition being stranded: Deze stoelen is nog niet op gezeten.
Agreement is not (yet) possible. In English it is, cf. Sinha (1978 : 450), Davison
(1980 : 44).
13 For the treatment of co-predicates in phrase structure and in dependency
grammar, see Nichols (1978) and Van Langendonck (forthcoming).
14 In this way we avoid Johnson's (1977: 159, fn. 14) dilemma whether the
passive subject (in equivalent German structures) is a case of indirect object
deletion or of a promotion from indirect object to subject.

15 Furthermore, other patterns with a passive participle occur without an
auxiliary, e.g. Gesteund door de artillerie, vielen ze aan 'Backed by the artillery,
they attacked'; Ze wisten zich achternagezeten 'They knew themselves chased'.
16Identical patterns exist in French: On voyait tirer les filets par les pecheurs
'One saw the nets being drawn by the fishermen' (Tesniere 1959 : 245).
17This entails that we are to analyse spelen in (39) and (40) as an active, not
as a passive form; but that is what we expect an infinitive to be.
18Compare two variants with an English type of marked passives: 'This throne
was sat on by Sam vs. This throne was sat on by generations of kings (Sinha
1978 : 450).
19This contradicts the rigorous statement in Hoekstra & Moortgat (1979 : 153)
saying that the addition of a door-phrase to an active VP leads to ungrammatical-
ity. I can even pronominalize (44), so that no indication of passive is left except
the door-phrase itself: Het gebeurt door de eigenaars.
20For the pragmatic focusing of agent-phrases, see Kirsner (1976).
VERB-FIRST CLAUSES IN ICELANDIC, SUCCESSIVE
CYCLIC WH-MOVEMENT AND SYNTACTIC BINDING
Annie Zaenen
Harvard University
In their important 1978 paper, Kayne & Pollock argue that Stylistic Inversion
in French provides independent evidence for the successive cyclic movement
hypothesis argued for in Chomsky (I977) and references cited there, on the
basis of island phenomena. Bresnan (I975) and Grimshaw (I975), on the other
hand, show that both in the comparative construction in Modern English and in
relative clauses in Chaucerian English, the successive cyclic wh-movement hypo-
thesis runs into trouble and that in these constructions, unbounded deletion
should be allowed. Nevertheless, both comparative subdeletion and presumably
relativization in Chaucerian English obey the "island" constraints that the
successive cyclic wh-movement hypothesis was meant to explain. The same
state of affairs obtains in Irish, according to the analysis given in McCloskey
(I979), in Kikuyu as argued in Clements (I979), in Old English (Allen (I 977)),
and Old Icelandic (Maling (I 976)).
The findings of Kayne & Pollock (1978) and those of Bresnan (I 975) and
Grimshaw (1975) are not incompatible: it could be that the French
constructions that they are analyzing are to be derived by successive cyclic
movement, whereas in other cases "extraction" phenomena have to be
accounted for by unbounded deletion 1. Chung (forthcoming) for instance, de-
fends explicitly an analysis under which relative clauses in Chamorro are derived
via unbounded deletion, whereas questions are formed by successive cyclic wh-
movement. The drawback of such an approach is that in the cases referred to
above, the unitary explanation for island constraints would be lost, except if
successive cyclic wh-movement and unbounded deletion are augmented with
some other mechanism like the indexing procedure outlined in Bresnan &
151
152 A.ZAENEN
Grimshaw (1978). A prediction made by the proposal that both successive

cyclic wh-movement and unbounded deletion exist and that successive cyclic
wh-movement sanctions Stylistic Inversion is that phenomena like French
Stylistic Inversion should never occur in cases in which it can be argued that
unbounded deletion has applied.
In this paper I will argue that one can find phenomena like French Stylistic
Inversion in cases where either unbounded deletion or a totally different move-
ment rule should be postulated in a transformational framework. The case
I will discuss in some detail is found in Icelandic. Similar arguments can be
deduced from the work of McCloskey (1979) and Clements (1979) on Irish and
Kikuyu respectively (see section 4.2. for further discussion). Instead of reverting
to the transformational analysis that allows both movement and deletion and
requires some kind of binding mechanism as proposed in Bresnan & Grimshaw
(1978), I will propose an analysis that does not postulate transformations but
only a binding mechanism and hence does away with the inelegant redundancy
of the Bresnan-Grimshaw account. My account involves a minor elaboration of
the mechanisms proposed in Kaplan & Bresnan (1982)'s Lexical Functional
Grammar (henceforth LFG).
1. Icelandic Extraction Rules and successive cyclic wh-movement
The successive cyclic wh-movement analysis can account for Icelandic

constituent questions in a way similar to the account given for English (with the
complicating factor, though, that the island constraints in Icelandic are not
exactly the same as in English (see Zaenen (1980) and Maling & Zaenen (1981)
for details). The account however, runs into trouble when used for the
derivation of relative clauses and of topicalizations. I will discuss these problems
briefly here (for a more extensive discussion see Zaenen (1980».
1.1. Reiativization
The only type of relative clause that is used in Icelandic nowadays is

equivalent to the so-called that-relatives in English. It is exemplified in (1) and
(2) :
(1) Ma6urinn, sem eg talaiH vi~, heitir Jon

The man that I talked with is called John.
VERB-FIRST CLAUSES IN ICELANDIC 153
(2) Ma~urinn, sem eg sa,

er Jon
The man that I saw is John.
Within the EST-framework, assuming successive cyclic wh-movement, relative

clauses of this type would be analyzed as follows:
Underlying structure :
(2) a. Maburinn [ [sem] eg sa hvem] edon

!'COMP
Wh-movement:
(2) b. Maburinn, [ [hvem sem] eg sa t] erJon

S COMP
Wh-deletion :
(2) c. Ma~urinn r [sem] eg sa t] erJon

! COMP
The postulated wh-deletion rule in Icelandic has to be different from the one
proposed for English by the proponents of a similar analysis of English that-
relatives. In English we have both that and wh-relatives, hence, one can say that
there is no obligatory deletion in COMP, but just an output constraint
prohibiting doubly filled COMP nodes in the surface. In Icelandic the wh-consti-
tuent must be obligatorily deleted, leaving no overt sign that wh-movement has
applied in the derivation of any relative clause.
The problem arises in connection with the pied piping cases. From a source
(3), we can get (3a) :
(3) Ma~urinn J [sem] eg ta1a~i vi~ hvem] er Jon

S COMP
(3) a. Maburinn [ [vib hvem sem] eg ta1a~i t] er Jon

S COMP
Witness the grammaticality of the corresponding indirect question:
(3) b. Hann spur~i, vi~ hvem eg talabi.

He asked with whom I talked.
154 A.ZAENEN
But now a simple-minded deletion rule will produce either (3c) or (3d) :
(3) c. *Ma~urinn, sem eg ta1a~i, er Jon

(3) d. *Ma~urinn, vi6 sem eg talabi, er J6n
Both these sentences are ungrammatical; (3c) is obtained by assuming that all
the material in COMP preceding sem has been deleted ,whereas in (3d) only the
wh-word has been deleted.
Instead of having a rule that deletes wh-elements in COMP, we could also
have a filter that excludes the ungrammatical sentences once they are generated.
A possible filter would look as follows:
(4) * [PP sem]

COMP
It would rule out all prepositional phrases in COMPo But such a filter would· not
be strong enough : prepositions are not the only kind of pied piping that is dis-
allowed in relative clauses. Possessives have also to be excluded. Whereas we have
the questions in (5), the corresponding relatives are not well-formed:
(5) a. HYers m66ir mun hjalpa mer?

Whose mother will help me ?
(5) b. MMir hYers mun hjaIpa mer?
but:
(6) a. *6Iafur, hYers m6l'>ir munhjalpa mer, er (slenskur.

Olaf, whose mother will help me is an Icelander.
(6) b. *6Iafur, m6~ir hYers mun hjalpa mer, er fslenskur
So it is not enough to rule out PP's; one has also to rule out some types of
NP's, but of course not all of them, otherwise there would be no relative clauses
left under the proposed analysis.
One can achieve this result e.g. in the following way: first one deletes the
wh-word (and only the wh-word) in COMP and then if there is still some
material left in COMP except for sem, one filters out the result. So we have the
following two rules:
(7) a. [X wh-word Y sem]"""'> [X Y sem]

COMP COMP
(7) b.*[Y sem] whereY is not null.

COMP
Whereas this type of filtering is allowed by a theory as that proposed in

Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and has not the disadvantage noted for Middle
English in Grimshaw (1975), namely that the filtering has to be non-local, this
is nevertheless a very undesirable analysis: the filtering here is used to mimic
the result of what would be the characteristic of a deletion rule in a theory that
allows such rules, namely that the deletion occurs under identity with the
controller of the deletion.
Taken alone this argument would of course be insufficient to reject the wh-
movement analysis of relatives in Icelandic, but when we see that in language
after language some instances of unbounded dependencies can only be fitted
into the procrustian bed of the movement analysis by allowing ad hoc
complications of each grammar whereas a deletion analysis would be straight-
forward, one ends up with the suspicion that successive cyclic wh-movement
analysis does not provide the right mechanism to capture the generalizations
about this type of dependencies.
It is clear that assuming that the arguments presented in Grimshaw (1975)
and Bresnan (1975) are valid and that unbounded deletion should be allowed,
Icelandic relatives should be analyzed as involving the application of that rule
rather than that of successive cyclic wh-movement 2 .
1.2. Topicalization
The problems with a successive cyclic wh-movement analysis of topicalization

are less well discussed in the literature than those encountered by relativization
and I will spell them out in a bit more detail. Again, it is not impossible to fix
up the successive cyclic wh-movement analysis to take care of this case, but as
before, the fact that one needs recourse to a variety of ad hoc mechanisms to
do so makes it undesirable to maintain that type of analysis.
Chomsky (1977) proposes the following base rule for topicalized
constituents:
::&
(8) S ~ TOP S
Hence the topic is in its surface position in the base; what is moved is a wh-
constituent that is moved up from its base position to the COMP position of the
156 A. ZAENEN
S in a successive cyclic fashion and that is deleted there. This proposal is meant
to account for both topicalization and Left-Dislocation by the same base rule.
A first problem that arises in Icelandic is that topicalization but not left-
dislocation is allowed in embedded clauses. A relevant contrast is given in (9) :
(9) a. *Hann segir ab 6lafur. hann hafi ekki heyrt fni honum.
He said that Olaf (N), he had not heard from him.
b. Hann segir a~ 6lafi hafi hann ekki heyrt fni
He said that Olaf had he not heard from.
If we allow for the introduction of topics and left-dislocated elements with the
same PS rule, we have to invoke a separate mechanism to avoid the generation
of sentences like (9a).
Another type of problem arises in cases where topicalization is possible but
question movement is not. These are admittedly rare in Icelandic but we find the
following contrast :
(lO)a. Kaupa bn munhUn.

Buy a car she will.
b. *Hva~ mun hUn ?
What will she?
Munu is one of the rare verbs that subcategorizes for VP but not for NP and in
Icelandic, as in English, there are no pro forms for VP's. Hence the wh-element
that should be moved under Chomsky's (1977) analysis is not available. One can
invoke an abstract pronoun here, but note that one has also to give it a
distribution that is quite different from that of overt pronouns, in that it has to
have a VP-form. A prediction that would have been made by the wh-movement
analysis ohne weiteres, namely the parallel behavior of pre posed topics and
preposed wh-phrases, is not borne out and a special assumption is needed to ex-
plain the lack of parallelism.
A third problem is that it is not clear how reflexivization facts should be
handled under Chomsky'S (1977) analysis. Reflexivization is a sentence internal
process in Icelandic. The conditions on it are too complicated to state here (see
Thrainsson (1976) for data and Zaenen (1980) for a summary). However
complicated, the conditions are perfectly well stateable in terms of the structure
prior to topicalization under the standard assumption that in topicalization, the
topicalized constituent itself is moved (and not base generated in situ as under
Chomsky's proposal). But if we assume the PS rule under (8) as the underlying
structure for topicalization, we can not account for the reflexives in topic
position at all, especially not given the fact that they are impossible in Left-
dislocated structures as shown by the following contrast:
(ll)a. Peysuna sinai finnur 6lafuq hvergi.

His own sweater finds Olaf nowhere.
b. *Peysan sini, 6lafur finnur hana hvergi.
His own sweater, Olaf finds it nowhere.
(Icelandic like all Scandinavian languages has a special reflexive form for the
possessive ).
This problem cannot be solved by assuming that the moved abstract wh-word
is marked for +- / - reflexive because as the example in (II) shows, the topicalized
constituent itself doesn't have to be a reflexive; it can contain one. Even in these
cases reflexivization is obligatory as the ungrammaticality of the following non-
reflexive version of (11) (a) shows:
(11) c. *Peysuna hansi finnur 61afuri hvergi.

His sweater finds Olaf nowhere.
For more complicated examples see Zaenen (1980).

At this point it seems more adequate to base-generate the constituent to be
topicalized in its within-sentence position and to topicalize it after conditions
for reflexivizlltion (and casemarking) have been checked. But in that case of
course we are no longer moving a wh-element hence we can no longer trigger
syntactic binding phenomena in such a context by the presence of a wh-element
in COMP as is done in Kayne & Pollock (1978)3.
So both the analysis of relativization and topicalization in Icelandic suggest
that we should not find phenomena like Stylistic Inversion co-occurring with
these constructions: neither of them seems to involve successive cyclic wh--
movement per se and according to the hypothesis stated in Kayne & Pollock
(1978), Stylistic Inversion is triggered by the presence of a wh-element in the
COMP of the clause exhibiting the Stylistic Inversion.
I will now briefly discuss their analysis of French and then turn to some facts
of Icelandic that are similar in nature and argue that the conclusion stated above
is incorrect.
158 A.ZAENEN
2. Successive Cyclicity and the notion 'binding domain'
2.i. The Kayne & Pollock (J 9 78) analysis of French Stylistic in-
version
Kayne & Pollock (1978) discuss French sentences of the type illustrated in
(12) :
( 12) Avec qui croit-elle qu 'a soupe Marie '!

With whom thinks she that has supped Mary?
In (12) the verb precedes the subject in the embedded clause contrary to the
normal French word order where it follows. Kayne & Pollock (1978) argue that
this rule of Stylistic Inversion (henceforth SI) should be stated as follows:
(l3)WH (que) NP X -+ 1 2 e 43.

1 2 3 4
where wh is a constituent containing a wh-word.

This rule will have the right results when we assume the following derivation
for a sentence like (12) :
(l2)a. [elle croit [[ que] [Marie a soupe avec qui]]]
Wh-movement into the lowest COMP :
b. [elle croit [[avec qui que] [Marie a soupe t]]]
Stylistic Inversion:
c. [elle croit [[ avec qui que] [a soupe Marie t]]]
WH-movement to the higher COMP :
d. [[avec qui] [elle croit] [[t que] [a soupe Marie tm
Verb-pronoun inversion:
e. [[Avec qui] [croit-elle] [[t que] [a soupe Marie tm
The Structural Description of SI is met after movement of the wh-phrase into

the lower COMP and hence SI can apply (it is an optional rule). The statement
of the rule depends on the assumption that wh-movement is successive cyclic
because otherwise the SD would not be met on the lower cycle.
2.2. A first reformulation of the environment for Sf.
The effect of the rule in (13) and the assumptions made is that SI will be
possible in all clauses that intervene between the position of the wh-word in
underlying structure and the position where it ends up in the surface. I will
call these clauses, including the one the wh-word originates in, a binding domain.
It can be defined as follows (adapted from Clements (1979)4 :
(14) A binding domain consists of all the clauses dominating a bindee and
not dominating its binder. (Where the bindee designates the indexed
trace and the binder, the wh-word in its surface position).
This is diagrammed in (14a) :
(14) a. S - . - - - outside of binding domain

~
/y~
binder XPj S binding domain
~
S
binding relation
...-/\" S
(movement: or ~
deletion) XPjS - bin dee
outside of _ _ _ ~
binding ~
domain
Now as the definition just given shows, this domain can be easily defined
without appealing to successive cyclic wh-movement. So the condition on SI
can be restated: SI applies in binding domains.
But under the assumptions made in the introduction to this paper, namely
that both successive cyclic wh-movement and unbounded deletion are allowed,
there is an empirical difference between the formulation in (12) and one that
would use the notion 'binding domain' as defined in (14) : following (12) we
would predict that no SI phenomena will be found in cases where it can be
argued that unbounded deletion has taken place, whereas under an account
160 A. ZAENEN
incorporating (14) we make the prediction that both wh-movement and un-
bounded deletion can give rise to SI-type phenomena (if we assume that both
rules leave indexed traces)5. I will now show that the latter prediction is borne
out in Icelandic.
3. Icelandic Binding Domain Phenomena
3.1. Word Order in simple embedded clauses in Icelandic
In Mating & Zaenen (1981), it is argued at length that there exists a word
order constraint in Icelandic that requires the tensed part of the verb to be in
second position in all embedded clauses 6 . This constraint was proposed to
account for the following contrasts:
,
(15)a. Eg held a~ trimin muni taka smalann a morgun.
I think that the trolls will take the shepherd tomorrow.
a
b. *Eg held a~ tri)Jlin smalann muni taka morgun.
I think that the trolls the shepherd will take tomorrow.
a
c. *Eg held a~ muni trollin smalann taka morgun.
I thin,k that will the trolls the shepherd take tomorrow.
,
(16) a. Eg held a1"l smalann muni trimin taka a morgun,
I t)1ink that the shepherd will the trolls take tomorrow.
a
b, *Eg held a~ smalann trollin muni taka morgun.
I think that the shepherd the trolls will take tomorrow.
(17)a. Hann spurbi hvern trollin myndu taka a morgun.

He asked who the trolls would take tomorrow.
b. *Hann spun'H hvern myndu troll in taka a morgun.
He asked who would the trolls take tomorrow.
c. *Hann spur~i hvern trollin a morgun myndu taka.
He asked who the trolls tomorrow would take,
These examples illustrate that the tensed verb is in second position under the
highest S-node and assume that the structure is (18) (a) for indirect questions,
and (J 8) (b) for topics:
(18)a. s (b)
'"
/~
COMP s
I ./
WH NP .~ ..
v .....
The ungrammatical examples show that this second position is obligatory.

Further evidence for this word order constraint comes from sentences with
"dummy" elements. Icelandic has at least two rules that demote subjects; the
first one is impersonal passive illustrated in (19) :
(19) pad var dansab { gaer.

There was danced yesterday.
Here a intransitive verb has been passivized, hence no new subject is created
but the old one has disappeared. What is interesting for our purposes here is the
conditions under which the dummy ba~ shows up7. It appears only when other-
wise the verb would not have been in second position. (20) illustrates this
pattern :
,
(20)a. Eg held al'J pal'J hafi veril'J dansa~ f gaer.
I think that there has been danced yesterday.
b. Eg held a~ f gaer IJab hafi veri~ dansal'J.
c. ~g held al'J (gaer hafi veril'J dansa<'l.
d. ~!} held al'J (gaer hafl t>a~ veri<'l dansab.
e. *Eg held a~ hafi verii'J dansab (gaer.
f. *Eg held al'J hafi ~al'J veri() dansa~ (gaer.
In (20) (b) and (d) a constituent has been fronted and pa?J has been inserted
at the same time; we see this is ungrammatical whether the insertion is before
or after the verb. In (c) a constituent has been fronted and no dummy inserted
and the sentence is grammatical. (£) is ungrammatical with a dummy inserted
after the verb and (e) is again ungrammatical because no fronting has occurred
and no dummy has been inserted. (a) is grammatical because the dummy has
been inserted and nothing else has been fronted. These examples show that
pa?J does not behave like a subject in the sense that there and it in English
do : pa(J only occurs in preverbal position and only when the verb would other-
wise not be in second position.
A similar situation is found with respect to indefinite NP post-position8 .
This construction is illustrated in (21) :
,
(21)pal'J drekka margir Yin aIslandi.
There drink many (people) wine in Iceland.
As the example shows, the construction is not limited to intransitive verbs in

Icelandic (although it is more frequent with these). The rule can be distinguished
from the rule of subject-verb inversion that we find with topicalization : the
162 A. ZAENEN
latter rule only postposes the subject to the position immediately after the
tensed verb, whereas the rule of indefinite subject postposing can put the subject
after an indefinite number of (adjacent) verbal elements. The contrast is
illustrated in (22) : (a) -- (c) are attempts to do subject-verb inversion (the only
rule that could apply with a definite subject), whereas (a') - (c') are cases of in-
definite subject extraposition.
(22)a. Tv6 ~r mun 6lafur hafa veri~ farinn.

Two years must Olaf have been gone.
b. *Tv6lr mun hafa Olafur veri~ farinn.
c. *Tv6lr mun hafa veri<'J Olafur farinn.
a'. AIslandi munu m6rg tr~ hafa veri~ rlllktut>.
In Iceland will many trees have been raised.
b'. Aislandi munu veri<'J morg tre rlllktu~.
c'. A fslandi munu hafa veri~ rlllktu~ m6rg ttl.
The pattern of pafJ insertion found in this construction is exactly the same
as that found with impersonal passives, as shown in (23) :
a
(23)a. Eg held ai'> pal'> drekki margir vfu islandi.
I t)1ink that th~re drink many wine in Iceland.
a
b. *Eg held ai'> Islandi pa~ drekki margir vm.
c. Eg held a~ ~ ISlandi drekki margir vi"n.
d. * ~g held ai'> l Islandi drekki ~ai'> ,margir vfu.
e. *~ held ai'> drekki margir vi"n a Islanpi.
f. *Eg held ai'> drekki pai' margir vm ~ Islandi.
Again the dummy shows up when, otherwise, the verb would not be in second
position.
3.2. Some non-predicted cases of verb-first word order.
There is, however, one exception to the pattern sketched above that is not
discussed in Maling & Zaenen (1981). Contrary to what our exposition up to
now would lead us to suppose, there are some cases of verb-first embedded
clauses. Some examples are given in (24) to (26) :
(24)a. Hann spur<'Ji hvar drekki margt folk vtn.

He asked where drink many people wine.
b. Hann spur~i, hvenlllr vlllri dansai'>.
He asked where was danced.
(25)a. Vodka er drykkur, sem drekka flestir {R6sslandi.

Vodka is a drink that drink most people in Russia.
b. Skipi~, sem var dansal'J ~, sokk.
The ship that was danced on, sank.
(26)a. Vodka held eg ar, drekki margt folk f Russlandi.

~odka think I that drink many people in Russia.
b. A skipinu held eg a~ hafi veri~ dansa~.
On the ship think I that has been danced.
It is fairly easy to see what all these cases have in common: first they all
have a verb-first clause that is subjectless because either impersonal passive or
indefinite subject post-position have applied, and second, the sentences involve
the application of an extraction rule, question movement in (24), relativization
in (25), and topkalization in (26)9.
It remains to be seen what exactly the relation is between this verb-first word
order and extraction rules. In the examples given up to now, the extraction site
is in the clause that has the verb-first word order; this is, however, not
necessarily so. We find also examples like the following:
(27) a. HvaC'l heldur ~u ab se taIi~ ab Olafur drekki ?

What think you that is believed that Olaf drinks.
b. Vodka er drykkur, sem er taIi~ a~ Olafur drekki.
Vodka is a drink that is belie~ed that Olaf drinks.
c. Vodka veit eg a~ er taM a~ OIafur drekki.
Vodka know I that is believed that Olaf drinks.
So, the verb first pattern can also be found in clauses that are "between" the
extraction site and the controlling position. It cannot be found, however, in
clauses that are embedded further down than the extraction site. An example
is given in (28) :
~ /
(28) *1 Russlandi sagCli hann aCl drekki margir vodka Ii Islandi.
In Russia said he that drink many vodka in Iceland.
The presence of the locative phrase d /standi insures that the locative i Russlandi
cannot be construed as belonging to the lower clause. The contrast in
grammaticality between this sentence and the previous bnes, shows that what is
at issue is the binding domain, as defined in section 2.2. In (28) the lower clause
is outside of the binding domain and the verb-first word order is ungrammatical.
To show that the verb-first pattern is limited to subjectless sentences, I will
now give a few ungrammatical examples where definite subjects (i.e. the only
164 A. ZAENEN
ones that are clearly subjects) are in post-verbal position in the same environ-
ment.
(29)a. *Hvac) heldur ~u al'> telur J6n a~ drekki margt f61k i Russlandi ?
What think you that believes John that drink many people in
Russia?
b. *Vodka er drykkur, sem eg veit a~ telur J6n a(') 61afur drekki.
Vodka is a drink that I know that believes John that Olaf drinks.
c. *Vodka veit eg al'> telur J6n al'J drekki margt f61k i Russlandi.
Vodka know I that believes John that drink many people in
Russia.
As can be seen from these examples, verb first order is impossible in clauses
that have subjects.
Finally the following examples show that no pao-insertion can occur under
the conditions under which the verb first word order is possible:
(30)a. *Hann spurl'li hvar pa<"> drekki margt f61k vrn. (cf. (25)a)
H~ asked where there drink many people wine.
b. * A slsipinu held eg a~ ~a~ var dansac). (cf. (26)b)
On the ship think I that there was densed.
c. *Vodka er drykkur, sem l>a~ er talit'J ab 61afur drekki (cf. 27(b».
Vodka is a drink that there is believed that Olaf drinks.
This does not mean that the verb necessarily has to be first. There is a minor
fronting rule in Icelandic that allows for the pre posing of some elements like
participles in the clause type that I am discussing here. I will not discuss its
effects, for more information see Mating (1980).
It is clear by now that the domain in which dummy insertion is not allowed
in subjectless clauses, even if nothing precedes the verb, is exactly the binding
domain as defined in section 2.2., hence the same domain in which SI applies
in French. In section I., however, I argued that neither relatives nor topicalized
sentences are an instance of successive cyclic wh-movement in Icelandic but
that the former is a case of unbounded deletion and the latter a case of another
type of unbounded movement rule. Under these assumptions the analysis given
by Kayne & Pollock (1978) cannot be extended to these new cases without
further ado, whereas the account in terms of binding domains as proposed in
Clements (1979) can.
VERB--FIRST CLAUSES IN ICELANDIC 165
4. A unified account of binding domain phenomena.
The previous section showed that contrary to the prediction made by the
account given in Kayne & Pollock (1978) together with the arguments that both
movement and unbounded deletion have to be admitted as possible rules in the
grammars of natural languages, SI-type phenomena are not limited to construc-
tions in which it can be argued that successive cyclic wh-movement has applied.
It shows that the account for SI-type phenomena has to be generalized so as
to allow their occurrence also in contexts in which unbounded deletion or other
"extraction" rules have applied. We have now reached a rather paradoxical
situation because both types of arguments for successive cyclic movement,
namely "island constraints" and "SI-type-phenomena" are now shown to be
independent from successive cyclic wh-movement itself and also to apply in
contexts where for independent reasons a successive cyclic wh-movement
analysis is undesirable. Hence it seems that the attempt to capture the
generalizations involved by way of the successive cyclic wh-movement
hypothesis was wrong and that we need a mechanism that would generalize
over both movement and deletion cases. As said before, such a mechanism was
proposed in Bresnan & Grimshaw (1978). Their account, however, seems to
invoke a redundant number of mechanisms: not only have we a movement and
a deletion rule, in top of those two processes we have also an index mechanism
that basically retraces that path of the transformational rules. An easy way to
avoid this type of redundancy is to assume that, in fact, no transformations
have applied in the derivation of either questions or relatives or topic
constructions, but that all of them are base-generated and subject to a kind of
binding that I will call syntactic binding. This type of binding can capture island
constraints and SI phenomena in a way similar to successive cyclic wh-movement
but without suffering from the inadequacies presented by that account in the
cases of so-called unbounded deletion. In this section I will sketch one such
account based on the mechanisms available in Kaplan & Bresnan (I 982)'s
Lexical Functional Grammar.
4.1. Some relevant features of Lexical Functional Grammar
In Lexical Functional Grammar (henceforth LFG), long distance

dependencies of the kind described above (namely wh-question formation,
relativization and topicalization) are treated in a non-transformational way. No
166 A. ZAENEN
movement or deletion is involved, but a dependency is established by means of

a set of equations. LFG uses two types of equations to transmit information:
local ones, symbolized by t and ~ and "linking" equations, symbolized by tt
and H. I will first illustrate the local ones and then come to the linking ones
that are more relevant for the representation of long distance dependencies.
The PSR of LFG are annotated with information about the grammatical
function that the constituents have in the expansion of the 'rule. This is done
through equations as illustrated in (31) :
(31) S~NP VP
(tSUBJ) =~ t=~
The equations here tell us that the NP to the right of the arrow is the subject
of its mother node, i.e., of the S; and that all the information about the VP is
also information about the S in functional structure (f-structure). This latter
equation is actually redundant under the assumption that both Sand VP are
projections of V because LFG states explicitly what is often assumed in X bar
theory, namely that the features and the functions of the head of a category
are transmitted automatically to the dominating expansions of that category
and vice versa. This convention that I will call the head convention (adapting
the terminology used in Gazdar, Pullum, & Sag (I 981), who propose a similar
principle in Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG)), will play an
important role in the statement of the proposal that I will make in the next
subsection. The equation added to the NP illustrates the second way in which
information can be transmitted locally in LPG, namely by stating that a
particular node has a particular function with respect to its mother node.
In LPG, syntactic binding or constituent control is effected through the
instantiation of another set of equations, namely linking equations, which are
represented as tt and H. An example is given in (32)10 :
(32) S ~ XP S
~=H t=~
XP~ e
t=H
This PSR together with the other PSR's required for the expansion of Scan
create a tree configuration like the one illustrated in (33) :
(33) S
/~ S
XP x'"
.1 ~
~=H XP
I X45
e
t = tt
All the nodes in (33) are equipped with variables and what the instantiation
procedure of Hand tt's does is to insure that x3 = x45 in the example given.
As discussed in Kaplan & Bresnan (1981) and in Zaenen (1980), the domain
in which this instantiation can occur has to be constrained. A first constraint is
that the binder has to c-command the bindee. (I would like to state a stronger
constraint: only sentential categories can be the right sister of a binder. There
seem, however, to be exceptions to this stronger version: tough-constructions
in English and topicalization in Makua as described in Stucky (1980). A weaker,
more adequate, constraint might be that only projections of V can be the right
sisters of binders.)
Further, I will assume that all S-nodes are bounding nodes (i.e., "boxed"
in the Kaplan & Bresnan notation) except if stipulated otherwise. To illustrate
this with a diagram, in the configuration under (34), only the highest S (i.e.,
what is above the dotted line) constitutes the binding domain.
(34)
/s~ \
XP S \
~=~~ ~,
s~
that S
' . . . _// A.
More deeply embedded S's can be made accessible to binders by PSR's that
introduce tt = H equations. For instance in English, we have the following
rule:
(35) S -+ that S
tt=H t=~
168 A. ZAENEN
In (35), the binding domain is extended to the S-domain immediately dominated

by the S-node that is the right sister of the element bearing the tt = H
equation. Embedded questions, however, are introduced by the following rule
(leaving out details that are irrelevant here) :
(36) S~ XP [+wh] S
~=H t=~
Since no tt = H equation appears on the wh-word, the binding domain is not

extended further down, and as a result, binding into an embedded question is
not possible in English. In other languages, a rule otherwise similar to (36)
might have a tt = H associated with the S and hence allow for binding within
embedded questions.
Note also that when I say that the binding domain ends at the next S-node
down, I mean this quite literally: in the following configuration the binding
domain is again indicated by a dotted line 11 :
(37)
Another notion that I will appeal to is that of root node. For a definition I
refer to Kaplan & Bresnan (1982). Here it is sufficient to point out that the
notion of root node as defined there treats the circled S in both cases in (38)
as a root node.
(38)
(a) /~ (b) /~
X S y fs\
~=H tt=H \V
~ ~
Intuitively: a root S is an S that is the right sister of a node with a H. (Other
cases are aJlowed : see Kaplan & Bresnan (1982). For the purpose of this paper
the generalization just stated is sufficient.)
A last notion we need is that of "constraining equation" : a constraining

equation expresses a condition that must be satisfied by a functional structure.
This type of equation is not used to construct functional structures but to
encode conditions that have to be satisfied by them. Constraining equations
are represented as follows: =c. The subscripted c distinguishes them from the
other types of equations.
With these notions which were developed inter alia to account for island
constraints at hand, we now turn back to the data described in section 2.
4.2. Icelandic verb/1 and other 'binding domain' phenomena in Uni-

versal Grammar
Given these general assumptions, there are several ways of representing

the facts sketched above; what has to be prevented is the occurrence of a
configuration like the one diagrammed in (39)12 :
(39)
A first way to do this that comes to mind is by way of a filter; e.g., the following
would do :
(40) *
It is, however, not clear that it is desirable to allow filters like (40) in LFG.
Note that (40) is not strictly a "surface" filter: it refers to the functional in-
formation attached to the first node (because in general of course, the
configuration in whichpa~ follows a S - initial element is allowed.) In that sense,
it is not a filter on strings or even on strings in a certain tree configuration, but
one that combines information of two levels, the constituent structure level and
the functional level. Instead of adding this new type of mechanism, and hence
the assumption that this mixed information is needed in filters, it would be more
interesting to see if the facts can be described with mechanisms already available
170 A. ZAENEN
in LFG and used to handle other phenomena.

To get an idea of what representation might be appropriate, it is useful at
this point to look for similar phenomena in other languages because, ceteris
paribus, it is preferable to treat similar facts by the same type of mechanism
across languages as one can assume that they are different manifestations of the
same underlying, universal, distinctions.
Not too many different cases have come to my attention. The first one has
already been mentioned, namely Stylistic Inversion (SI) in French; a second
case is Irish complementizer selection as described in McCloskey (1979), and a
fmal case is Kikuyu downstep deletion as reported in Clements (1979). I cannot
go into detailed description of these cases here. They are summarized in Zaenen
(1981). Here I will give one example of each case and summarize what the
authors have taken to be the most important characteristics.
In McCloskey (1979) it is shown that Irish Complementizer selection is
conditioned by the same environment as French SI and the Icelandic V/1
embedded clauses. Normally that in Irish, a VSO language, is rendered as goN.
as illustrated in (41) (a), but when the complementizer occurs in a binding
domain, it is aL. as illustrated in (41 ) (b) 13 :
(41)a. Deir siad goN stJ.eann an t-athair goN bp6sfaidh Stie e.

Say they that thinks the father that will marry Sheila him
h. An fear aL deir siad aL shi1eann an t-athair aL ph6sfaidh .St1e.
The man that say they that thinks the father that will mary Sheila
(From McCloskey, 1979).
In some dialects, this change is optionally accompanied by a change in verb form

(for examples, see McCloskey (1979». What is interesting for our purposes is
of course that the relevant domain of change is again the binding domain as
defined in section 2.2. Moreover, McCloskey (1979) argues at length that Irish
unbounded dependencies should not be analyzed as instances of successive
cyclic wh-movement, but rather as cases of unbounded deletion. So, as in the
Icelandic case, the proposal made by Kayne & Pollock (1978) cannot be
extended to the Irish case without ad hoc complications of the grammar of
Irish.
Kikuyu, an SVO Bantu language, exhibits a complex system of syntactically
conditioned tone rules, some of which are described in Clements & Ford (1979).
For our purposes, the following is relevant: normally a downstep (represented
as !) is associated with the verb; where this downstep will show up in the surface
structure depends on other rules. The crucial fact however is that in a binding
domain there is no evidence for the downstep at all : it is deleted. A contrast
is given in (42) :
(42)a. Kamau Aire ka:nake ate karidki atemiri m6t~

Kamau told Kanake that Karioki cut (the) tree.
b. NM kamau €:~irE kii:nake ate otemire mote?

Who did Kamau tell Kanake that cut the tree?
The change in the tone pattern associated in (b) with ate and mote are the
consequence of this downstep deletion rule (A slightly more detailed description
is given in Zaenen (1981); for full details see Clements (1979)).
Again, Clements (1979) argues that unbounded dependencies in Kikuyu
should not be captured by successive cyclic wh-movement, but are an instance
of unbounded deletion. So again the formalization proposed in Kayne & Pollock
(1978) could not be extended to this case.
What strikes one when looking over the array of facts of these different
languages, is that only two elements in the sentence seem to be clearly affected
by their occurrence in a syntactic binding domain: the verb (either "morpho-
logically" as in Kikuyu or optionally in some Irish dialects, or "positionally"
as in French and in Icelandic 14), or the complementizer as in all versions of
Irish. We never see, for example, the morphology of the subject noun, or the
direct object or an adjective or an article being changed. Data from four
languages are of course insufficient to claim that this is an unshakeable universal,
but then data of 400 languages would be similarly insufficient. What I will do
in the next subsection is assume that the generalization just stated is correct,
and investigate what type of representation of the facts it suggests, and hence
what insight it gives us into the interdependencies that can be found in natural
languages.
4.3. Representing binding domain phenomena in LFG
Assuming that only verbs and comp-elements (i.e., subordinating

conjunctions) are affected by their occurrence or non-occurrence in a binding
domain, how can we represent these facts within the framework outlined in
4.1.?
Note first that the verb and the comp-element have a privileged position
with respect to the sentential nodes: as the comp-element is immediately
172 A. ZAENEN
dominated by the S (I do not assume an intervening COMP-node; "comp" is

an abbreviation for a position, not a node label), information associated with
it can be transmitted to the S-level by local equations in the way defined in
4.1 . Similarly, the information associated with the verb will be percolated up to
the sentential level because the verb is supposed to be the head of the sentence
and by the head convention, the information will be passed on.
The only lexical categories that can transmit information to the sentential
level in this way are elements immediately dominated by a sentential category
of verbal elements; consider what would happen if we tried to introduce some
feature with a lexical element under N : the feature would be transmitted to the
NP-level by the head convention but there it would be blocked from percolating
up, and its occurrence or non-occurrence could not be made dependent on
requirements on the S-level because the information is not available on that
level.
Now, what we seem to need is a feature characterizing binding domains that
is constrained at the sentential level (the relevant domain for syntactic binding)
and is introduced at the lexical level with comp-elements or verbs. I will call
this feature BND ,(for bound), and as it is locally transmitted, it is represented
as (tBND):= +/-.
Universally, S's that are root nodes will carry a constraining equation
(tBND)c = +, and non-root S's will carry the constraining equation (tBND)c
:= -, unless explicitly specified as positive by a PSR.
Before showing how this system works technically, I will argue that it relies
on natural assumptions about the terms in which the syntax of mode/tense
systems of natural languages should be represented in a grammar like LFG.
What I am assuming is that the BND-feature is part of a set of features that en-
code tense and mood distinctions and that are basically part of the inflectional
sytem of a language, more specifically, part of the verbal inflectional system.
I also assume that in LFG all inflectional features are introduced with lexical
categories (but are subjected to syntactic constraints by PSR.)
Universally, this class of features is, as is well known, rather large and not all
of its members are realized in all languages. This is the case with the BND
feature. (Unfortunately, no full-fledged treatment of tense/mode phenomena
is available so I can only give intuitive evidence for the place of BND within
the LFG system.)
Consider a case like the Irish one, where a particular form of the comple-
mentizer goes together with a particular fOfm of the verb. This is the same type
VERB--FIRST CLAUSES IN ICELANDIC 173
of dependency that we find, for example, in English between that and a + FIN
(finite) verb form, or in French between avant que and the sUbjunctive.
Interestingly enough, we find in most of the languages discussed here, and
in other ones, evidence that the mode system of the language and the possibility
for binding within certain domains are related. As Kayne & Pollock (1978)
point out, SI is in fact not limited to binding domains but can also occur in
subjunctive clauses. Hence, we should actually allow for two cases: verbs that
are "bound" and subjunctive verbs. In Kikuyu, downstep "deletion" is not
limited to binding domains but can also be found in a few other, e.g., the
negative, tenses regardless of syntactic context.
Moreover, there are languages where the mode of the verb determines the
binding possibilities. It has long been assumed that in Russian, binding into
embedded clauses was impossible. Pesetsky (personal communication), however,
has found that this only holds for indicative clauses, and that extraction out of
subjunctives is possible. Hence the following contrast:
(43)*Kogo ty skazal, eto Masa celovala ?

Who you said that Masha was-kissing?
(44)Kogo ty xotel, Ctoby Masa celovala?

Who you wanted that+SUBJ Masha was-kissing?
It might be considered stretching the notion "inflection" a bit far to main-

tain that word order phenomena are a case of inflection. Apart from the in-
felicity of the terminology, however, there is nothing farfetched about this;
note that distinctions that are coded sometimes in a morphological way or by
the choice of a particular conjunction are in other cases coded in terms of word
order distinctions or both, even within the same language: for instance the
counterfactual in Dutch can be expressed by the selection of indien ('if) with
the subjunctive or the indicative, as illustrated in (45a), or by using inversion as
illustrated in (45b) :
(45)a. Indien hij hier was/ware, zou dat probleem al opgelost zijn
If he here was/were, would that problem already solved be.
b. Was hij hier, het probleem zou al opgelost zijn.
Was he here, the problem would already be solved.
It seems thus reasonable to assume that the BND feature belongs with the
mode/tense indicators in natural languages and also that word order can be used
as an indicator in that system as well as morphology (or phonology for that
174 A.ZAENEN
matter; cf. the tones in Kikuyu.)

I will now give the rules and constraints for Icelandic.
4.4. Icelandic verb/} clauses in LFG
The only language specific problem that Icelandic presents is that the PSR
that generate impersonal passives and indefinite subject postposition sentences
have to combine on the one hand with ]Jab and on the other hand they have to
be able to occur in binding domains, without being able to occur in both these
environments at the same time. Within the LFG framework as I have developed
it here and in Zaenen (1980) there is only one way to do this, namely, by
assuming that pa~ is introduced by a PSR that at the same moment stipulates
that the S that is the right sister ofpalJ is a +BND sentence. This PSR rule is
given in (46).
(46) s ~ pab s
(tBND)c = +
This rule does not associate a linking equation with paiJ, insuring that this S
cannot be the root of a binding domain. It nevertheless characterizes it as a
+ BND sentence to allow for the following rule introducing impersonal passives
and indefinite subject sentences. (I represent what follows the verb here by an
X in order to leave open the question of what the exact c-structure is that should
be given to impersonal passives and indefinite subject sentences in Icelandic.)
(47) s~ V X
(tBND) = +
This is intuitively not totally unsatisfactory; what the dummy actually does
is to allow for the sentence type in which nothing is topicalized, not even the
subject that in general acts as a discourse topic by default; hence the dummy
acts as a contentless topic 15 . Unfortunately, we cannot equipfta~ with a binding
equation because it doesn't really bind anything, so our formalism does not
treat pa'J as a topic. The sentence type that combines with it is, however, the
sentence type that normally combines with topics and this is captured by cha-
racterizing that type in both cases as being + BND.
4.5. }.xtending the analysis to French Sf.
It is easy to see that the generalization proposed by Kayne and Pollock

(1978) can be captured without any problem in the representation proposed
here. A sentence like (12), repeated here for convenience, would be derived
under Kayne & Pollock's assumptions as diagrammed in (48) :
(12)Avec qui croit-elle qu'a soupe Marie?

With whom thinks she that has supped Mary?
(48)
In the system developed in section 4.3., the equivalent of a clause with a wh-
element in COMP is a root-sentence and, as we have seen, root-sentences are
universally constrained to be +BND; hence to achieve the effect of (13) as
diagrammed in (48), the only thing we have to do is to insure that SI is intro-
duced by a PSR that contains a verb that is + BND, as for example, the following
will do:
(49) S~ (NP) VP
(tSUBJ)=.j, t=.j,
VP~ V x NP y
(BND)= + (tSUBJ)=.j,
t=.j,
The given expansion of VP will only combine with an S that is constrained

to be + BND. Note that (49) allows us to expand the PSR for French in such a
176 A. ZAENEN
way that we get sentences with double subjects. French doesn't have such
sentences nor does any other language to my knowledge. In LFG they are ruled
out by the principle of functional consistence that requires every grammatical
feature of each grammatical unit to have a unique value. If we choose an
expansion of the PSR in (49) that would give us two values for SUBJ, the re-
sulting f-structure would be filtered out by the consistence requirement. (For
further discussion see Grimshaw (1981) and Kaplan & Bresnan (I 981 ».
The variables in the expansion of VP are an expression of ignorance: the
exact surface structure of sentences with SI has not been worked out. (See
Kayne (1972) for the most detailed description)16.
Other PSR's introduce V's that are not specified for the function BND,
which can occur both in bound and in non-bound sentences. This immediately
explains the optionality of inversion.
Kikuyu and Irish can be handled in an equally straightforward way. The
interested reader is referred to Zaenen (1981) for the relevant rules.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I have assumed that the evidence gathered in several languages
warrants the conclusion that not all extraction phenomena can be handled by
successive cyclic wh-movement. Given that assumption, the formalism proposed
in Kayne & Pollock (1978) to handle French Stylistic Inversion predicts that
phenomena like French Stylistic Inversion will only be found in cases where
there is no evidence against a wh-movement analysis as compared to a deletion
analysis or an analysis involving another type of movement rule. I have first
argued that this is not the case. This negative conclusion then warrants a treat-
ment of binding domain phenomena that abstracts away from the difference
between movement and deletion. Such an approach can be found in the non-
transformational analysis of unbounded dependencies proposed in Kaplan and
Bresnan (1981). I have taken this account as a basis and worked it out to
account not only for French SI, but also for Icelandic V/1 clauses. The
mechanism proposed also applies trivially to Irish and Kikuyu "binding domain"
phenomena. Hence it has the advantage of being universally applicable, whereas
the proposal in Kayne and Pollock (1978) is limited to French and only
generalizable to cases of successive cyclic wh-movement.
NOTES
*The following people are thanked for help and comments: J. Bresnan, N.
Clements, E. Engdahl, J. Grimshaw, J. Higginbotham, R. Kaplan, J. Maling, D.
Pesetsky, J. Schindler, and S. Weisler.
IThroughout this paper I will use transformational metaphors when describing
syntactic phenomena. The scientific terminology used in the theory I will adopt
in section 3 is explained there.
2Examples that show that the rule is indeed unbounded will be given in
section 3.
3This is not to say of course, that topicalization is not a movement rule in
Icelandic (under a transformational analysis), just that the movement rule does
not fit into the theory proposed in Chomsky (1977).
One might consider this a minor problem and propose that any element (but no
that-element) in COMP could have the effect that Kayne & Pollock ascribed to
a WH-element. But notice that even under that hypothesis, we do not
immediately get the right results in Icelandic: wh-elements in COMP do not
trigger inversion, whereas topics would. If we assume that both are in COMP,
we have to complicate the word order rules to make them sensitive to the
feature +/- who This treatment no longer allows for a straightforward statement
of the word order constraints discussed in Maling & Zaenen (1981). Notice also
that the distinction between -+ wh or -wh will only be relevant on the cycle
where the moved element ends up, and not on the intermediate cycles, as would
be predicted by the successive cyclic movement analysis.
4In Clements' own terminology, an "open sentence" is defined as "a clause
dominating an anaphoric element bound by an obligatory rule of grammar to
an antecedent which the clause does not dominate." Notice that the notion of
open sentence allows for the statement of the French SI-facts in an EST frame
work without successive cyclic wh-movement and without running into the
problems Kayne and Pollock's straw men run into.
SOne theoretical drawback of this formulation is, however, that it does not
allow us to state the condition on SI without reference to essential variables.
One might consider the most important achievement of subjacency theory to
be that it allows the restatement of rules with essential variables as rules not
involving such variables. The account that I will give in this paper is an account
with a program that attempts to exclude the use of such unbounded variables
and hence, limits the grammar to local rules.
6Some version of this generalization has been noted long ago. E.g. Wackernagel
(1892) discusses it. Wackernagel seems to want to reduce to the same "law"
the position of clitics in several ancient Indo-european languages and the
position of the verb in modem German main clauses. There are problems with
this reduction: first, there is no evidence for Wackernagel's conjecture that the
verb in older stages of Indo-european, being unstressed, would be put in second
position; and secondly, the second position relevant for clitics is the position
after the first word in the sentence (or after the first word and other clitics),
whereas the German verb is in second position after a major constituent. This
178 A. ZAENEN
might be a "parameter" according to which verb-second constraints can vary,

but it suggests a greater difference between the two phenomena, clitic place-
ment and verb placement, than Wackernagel seems to assume.
Note also that in Greek and in Sanskrit, clitics could be moved out of their own
subordinate clauses into second position in the main clause, as in the following
example from Homeros, given in Wackernagel (1892) :
(i)
6e
xa{peL Ill" t)OT~ E8e{p-qlt
pleases it, who works
who works it (the field) pleases himself.
7This is not the only use of paJin Icelandic. In other constructions, pa~ can
invert and has a more subject-like behavior: see ThrAinsson (1979) for some
data on different types of}aJ.
81t is well known for English there-insertion that the relevant notion of definite-
ness is not the occurrence of the definite article. I have not investigated which
notion it is exactly in Icelandic; for our purposes, the approximation stated
in the text is sufficient.
90ther possible extraction rules have not been studied extensively in Icelandic;
the prediction made here is that the same phenomena will occur in them.
lOAn alternative is to attach the linking equations to the S-node. It has the
advantage of accounting in a more straightforward way for cases like that-less
relatives in English, as discussed in Weisler (1980). On the other hand, it
complicates the statement of some generalizations in this paper.
I I This proposal does not allow a statement of the generalization proposed in
Rizzi (1978) for Italian, because in that treatment, nonadjacent bounding nodes
have to be counted to determine if a binding will be grammatical or not. I have
not had the opportunity to investigate the Italian facts in any detail, but Rizzi's
generalization seems to run into trouble in the case of binding of PP's (see
Engdahl (1979) for some examples.)
12See Zaenen (1980) and Zaenen & Maling (1977) for a discussion of the sur-
face structure ofpaJ clauses.
13GoN and aL are the transcriptions proposed in McCloskey (1979). See that
work for information about their pronunciation.
140ne might want to argue that in Icelandic, it is not so much the verb as the
dummy that is affected. However, as we have seen in section 1.2, the insertion
of a dummy in Icelandic is closely linked to the position of the verb.
15The use of the term, "topicalized", is not meant to be very precise here. What
I mean is whatever discourse function it is that questioned elements, topics, and
heads of relatives have in common.
16There are potential differences between the transformational treatment and
the one presented here. As Kayne & Pollock (1978) point out, in their
treatment, the triggering of SI is local in the sense that the trigger and the
element to be inverted are adjacent to each other; in my treatment the facts
are also described in a local way, but reference is made to hierarchical structure
and not to string adjacency. I know of no data that distinguish between the two
formulations. Another difference is that, under my formulation, it must be

possible to introduce the postposed subject and the verb with the same PSR,
hence they have to be sisters. This is a possibly more troublesome requirement
and how tenable it is depends on one's assumptions about clitics and other
aspects of the constituent structure of French VP's. This is a far from settled
matter. In a left-branching verbal complex, as proposed in Emonds (1978),
the sister-condition would be rather difficult to fulfill. There are, however,
compelling arguments against Emonds (1978). See, for example, Zagona (1980).
An advantage of the analysis presented here is that it does not force a
successive cyclic wh-movement analysis of comparatives. That SI can occur in
comparatives was first pointed out in Milner (1978), where the following
example is given:
(i) Pierre a plus de Iivres que n 'en a Jean.
Peter has more books than (thereof) has John.
Pinkham (1982), however, argues that French comparatives should not be
analyzed as instances of successive cyclic wh-movement.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFINITIVE WITH
CAUSATIVE MOVEMENT VERBS IN FRENCH
Ludo Melis*
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Causative movement verbs! are characterized by a construction with three

main constituents, NP 1 V NP 2 PP loc :
Jean envoie Marie ala gare

Jean envoie Marie en quete de nouvelles
Jean envoie Marie a la gare en quete de nouvelles
III'yenvoie.
The subject, NP I' is to be interpreted as the controling instancy (Melis 1982 :

Il.I.3.) and the object, NP2 , as the moved and moving element; the PP, having
locative properties, reports the objective of the process either in spatio-temporal
terms or as an action to be performed by NP 2 at the end of the moving. These
causative movement verbs can also occur with different infinitival constructions;
on the basis of the place of NP2 - immediately after the main verb or after the
infinitive - and of the presence or absence of the locative preposition d, we can
')
distinguish three constructions" :
NP 1 V NP2 VinfX: Jean envoie Marie chercher du pain
NP 1 V V inf NP 2 X : Jean envoie chercherIMarie

ldu pain
NP 1 V NP 2 d Vinf X : Cela Ie mene a fuir Marie
181
182 L. MELIS
Syntactic and selectional properties .'
In order to analyse these constructions and to situate them in the system of

infinitival complementation in French we will consider their behavior with
respect to the following seventeen properties:
(1) NP I is animate;
(2) the movement verb refers to a 'real' movement;
(3) NP 2 is the object of the main verb; if it is a full NP its position is imme-
diately after the main verb, if it is a clitic pronoun it precedes that verb;
(4) NP2 is the object of the movement verb and of the infinitive; if it is a
clitic pronoun it precedes the tensed verb, if it is a full NP it follows the
infinitive;
(5) the infinitive takes normally only the simple active form and it isn't
accompanied by a negation;
(6) in addition to (5), a passive infinitive is, although marginal, acceptable;
(7) the inchoative aspectual verb commencer can precede the infinitive; other
aspectual verbs are excluded as are modal devoir and pouvoir;
(8) in addition to'(5), negation of the infinitive is sometimes possible;
(9) the infinitive may be accompanied by its own complements; these depend
only on the infinitive for their selection and construction;
(IO) in the construction schema of the movement verb the infinitive occupies
the same place as the PP;
(\ 1) the infinitive shares some locative properties with the PP loc ;
(J 2) the infinitive and NP 2 are jointly selected by the main verb;
(J 3) NP2 can be interpreted as the subject of the infinitive;
(\4) in addition to (13), NP2 can also, under certain circumstances, be inter-
preted as the object of the infinitive;
(\ 5) the movement verb and the infinitive form a complex verb;
(16) there exist idioms containing a movement verb and an infinitive;
(17) the movement verb and the infinitive can be replaced by a single verb
and they form a single lexical entry,
Using this set of properties, we can construct the following comparative table 3 :
THE INFINITIVE WITH CAUSATIVE MOVEMENT VERBS 183
V NP2 Vinf V NP2 d Vinf V Vinf NP 2
-1 +
2 + +
3 + +
4 +
S + + +
6 + +
7 + +
8 + +
9 + +
10 + + ?
II + + +/-
12 + +
13 + + +
14 +
IS +
16 ')
+
17 +
Table 1
Analysis of the V NP2 Vinf and V NP2 d Vinf constructions:
The table presents overwhelming evidence for the claim that the V Vinf
NP 2 construction is radically different from the other two constructions; it also
permits the conclusion that the two first constructions are much alike, differring
chiefly in their behavior with respect to the first two properties 4 . These proper-
ties are linked : the figurative use of the verb commands the modification of
the selectional restrictions on NP I . So we can conclude that there is only one
basic construction, NP I V NP 2 (d) Vinf, and that the two observable construc-
tions are different realisations of that basic construction; the opposition
concerning (1) and (2) needs to be explained in semantic terms and the comple-
mentary distribution between the bare infinitive and the prepositional one is,
perhaps, commanded by the same facts S .
The results for (6), (7), (8), (9), (15), (16) and (I7) indicate that the
184 L. MELIS
infinitive functions as a constituent distinct from both the main verb and NP 2
(see also (3)); properties (10) and (11) permit an interpretation of the infinitive
as a locative complement, a PP with the preposition d or ~; (3) leads to an
analysis of NP 2 as the direct object of the sentence. So we propose the following
analysis for
Jean envoie Marie chercher du pain

Cela mene Pierre a fuir Marie.
NP V NP [pp (d)[vp V NPll
/s~
~P /IP~
V NP PP
I /~
I P VP
:
I I
V/ ~NP
I I
I
I I I I I I
Jean envoyer Marie ~ chercher du pain
Cela mener Pierre a fuir Marie
If this analysis is accepted, the constructions belong to a group of infinitive

constructions characterized by the presence of a subject and an object NP and
of a third constituent, the infinitive, having a syntactic function 6 :
- indirect object, belonging to the paradigm of en! de quai? :
Pierre dissuade Marie de venir

Ill'en dissuade
- indirect object, belonging to the paradigm of y/d quai? :
Pierre force Marie Ii venir

Pierre l'y force
- predicative complement (fr. 'attribut de l'objet') :

Pierre voit Marie courir

IlIa voit Ie faire.
In aU these constructions there exists a particular link between NP 2 and the

infinitive; such a link also exists in the construction with movement verbs (see
(12) and (13». At some level 7 NP2 and Vinf form a unit that is ~elected as a
whole by the main verb and that seems to be a presentential nucleus, containing
a subject-like element, NP2 , and a predicate, Vinf and its complements,but no
tense (see the exclusion of past infinitive by (5». Sentences with causative
movement verbs have thus, at some level, a binodal structure:
That binodal structure doesn't appear in the syntactic structure; it is only ne-
cessary to explain the selection of NP2 and Vinf as a whole and the interpre-
tation of NP 2 as the 'subject' of Vinfo
Such a situation does also exist with the perception verbs (voir, entendre,
sentir, iaisser, ... ) in the construction V NP Vinf (Morin 1978). The other verbs
we are alluding to -- dissuader, forcer, ... -, the so-called EQUI-verbs, possess
also an underlying binodal structure but the two elements, the object NP and the
infinitive, are selected separately and, in current analyses,the infinitive is seen as
the remnant of a sentence-like structure and it can, in certain circumstances,
be replaced by a subordinate clause:
Pierre convainc Marie de partir

. qu'il vaut mieux partir.
With respect to that last set of properties -- presence of an underlying bi-nodal

structure, selection of that structure as a whole, disappearance of that structure
in the syntactic structure - a comparison of the causative movement verbs with
perception verbs is legitimate 8 . Insertion of the causative movement verbs in
the same class as the perception verbs (Blanche-Benveniste and Van Den Eynde,
1977: 23) is however prohibited by the other properties. They support a
comparison with intransitive movement verbs (Sandfeld 1965; Gross 1975;
Togeby 1965) as far as the function of the infinitive is concerned 9 .
186 L. MELIS
Analysis of the V VinfNP2 construction:
For the V Vinf NP2 construction, properties (4), (15), (16) and (17) indicate
that an analysis considering the movement verb and the infinitive as a single
constituent of category V composed of two lexical V's, is correct; such an
analysis, and in particular the assignment of the category label V instead of VP
to Vinf' is also supported by (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9). The results for (10) and
(11) indicate also that the infinitive is not a complement of the main verb and
that it has no function but being part of the verbal predicate. On the other hand
(3) and (4) provide an analysis of NP2 as a direct object of that complex verb.
So we propose to analyse
Jean envoie chercher Marie

du pain
as NP [V V V] NP
~S~
NP /P~
/V~ NP
V V
I I
I I I I
I I
Jean envoyer che~cher Marie
du pain
Properties (13) and (14) point to the existence of a sentence-like underlying

nodal structure in which relations of subjecthood or objecthood exist between
NP 2 and Vinfo This structure is not a sentence, given the absence of tense (see
(5)). At this point, the situation is much alike to that of the other construction
we analysed, as far as the existence of an underlying binodal structure is
concerned; but the selection of the elements is done in an other way: (12)
indicates that the nodal structure is not selected as a whole, but that the
infinitive is selected first, forming with the main verb a complex entry and that
NP,., is selected afterwards. This way of selection is consistent with the gramma-
tical structure containing a complex verb 10.
Perception and causation verbs (jaire, iaisser, voir, entendre) can occur in a
construction with absolutely the same properties on all levels 11 . It is reasonable
to consider both movement verbs and perception and causation verbs who
enter the IPVC with complex verb as belonging to the same class, but only with
respect to this construction.
As a conclusion we can say that the properties characterizing infinitival

constructions are, at least partially, independent. For the constructions with
causative movement verbs we have to distinguish four sets of properties:
- function and category of Vinf ;
- interpretative links between Vinfand an NP in the sentence;
- existence of an underlying bi-nodal structure;
- way of selection of NP2 and Vinf.
Each set permits a comparison of the movement verb with a particular class of
verbs and so it allows us to establish a classification of verbs relative to some
property or some construction. The independence of the properties, each having
its own distribution and its own value, prohibits on the other hand an absolute
classification of the verbs. It also prohibits, to a certain extent, the prediction
of some property from another.
FOOTNOTES
*1 wish to thank L. Tasmowski for invaluable comments on an earlier version.

I also thank M. Jaspaert for correcting my English.
lThe most important verbs in this group are conduire, envoyer and mener.
Other verbs are men tioned by Damourette and Pichon (par. 1110), Gross (1975:
table 3) and Sandfeld (1965: par. 108, 154); they are not considered in this
paper, given the rather marginal acceptability of sentences with those verbs and
an infinitive. For some verbs, such as mettre other analyses are possible (Melis,
forthcoming).
2The third construction doesn't exist for envoyer; that verb is mostly employed
in the second construction. In a normal sentence NP2 has to be present. Gre-
vi sse (1981 : par. 1066, 4 0 ) mentions nous enverrons Ie prendre besides nous
I 'enverrons prendre, but no example supports this possibility that remains theo-
retical; Sandfeld (1965: par. 154) gives one example of the prepositional
construction without NP2; the context, however, permits to interpret unequi-
vocally the sentence.
3See the appendix for evidence supporting the data in the table and for some
comments on the properties.
4The opposition between the two constructions relative to (1) and (2) is typical
188 L. MELIS
for the opposition between literal use and figurative use of a lexical item. As
noted in the appendix, properties (6) and (8) are more frequently observed
with the prepositional construction, but those differences are minor. A
weakening of the contraints also is typical for figurative use.
5The alternation can be described by a deletion rule, though the constraints
governing such a rule are difficult to describe in syntactic terms. Notice that an
underlying d and a deletion rule are posited on other grounds by Emonds (1978)
and by Seelbach( 1978) for the intransitive movement verbs.
6An analysis of the first two groups is given by Blanche-Benveniste and Van Den
Eynde (1977); an analysis ofIPVC as 'verb -j- object + predicative complement'
is implied by Damourette and Pichon (par. 1060 and passim), Blanche-Benvenis-
te and Van Den Eynde (1977) and Morin (1978); the commutation with other
predicative complements, present participle or relative clause, points to the
same analysis (Rothemberg 1979).
7 Pending on the theoretical framework adopted, that binodal structure can be
interpreted either as a syntactic element or structure linked to the 'surface'
structure by a transformation, probably 'raising', or as a component of the
lexical or of the interpretative structure, linked to the syntactic structure by
rules of interpretation. We avoid discussion of this problem; for us, it is
sufficient to indicate that such a structure exists and to describe for which pur-
poses it must be established: selection of Vinf and NP2, interpretation of the
links between these constituents.
8This position is taken by Damourette and Pichon (par. 1060), stating that the
two classes are alike in that the verbs are constructed with an "about dicephale
binodal" but that they differ on other points: movement verbs are followed by
a "progredience" and perception verbs by a "conspicience". Gross (1975: 168)
says that laisser belongs to the same class as the causative movement verbs;
this is certainly correct for the locative interpretation ('laisser' = 'faire ne pas
mouvoir') but it is unclear whether that analysis can be extended to cover the
other uses of the verb.
9In the case of the intransitive movement verbs (aller, entrer, monter, ... ) the
infinitive is linked to NP I; Lamiroy (1981) says that the infinitive also has
locative properties, but she doesn't accept an underlying bi-nodal structure; this
question seems however pending.
10 As indicated in the appendix such a two-step selection mechanism is necessary
to give a uniform treatment of idiomatic and non-idiomatic uses. If the idio-
matic expressions are to be considered as lexical items of a particular kind, they
must be inserted as such; in that case the bi-nodal structure cannot be posited
at a syntactical level, but it must belong to the interpretative component.
II See Radford (1975), Kayne (1975), Morin (1978), Blanche-Benveniste and
Van Den Eynde (1977), Emonds (1978) for analyses of that construction;
they all consider that there is a complex verb in the (superficial) syntactic struc-
ture. In our discussion, differences between these authors on other points may
be disregarded.
APPENDIX
To support the judgments in the comparative table, we present the following

evidenc~:
0), (2) :
Jean envoie Marie chercher du pain, et, pour cela, elle doit traverser la ville
Jean envoie chercher du pain et, pour cela, Marie doit traverser toute la
ville
* Cela envoie Marie chercher du pain
* Cela envoie chercher (Marie/ du pain)
a
L'attitude de Pierre conduit Marie rejeter cette solution;
In this case, an animate subject is possible, but with 'a non agentive interpre-
tation :
Pierre conduit Marie a rejeter cette solution par son attitude negative.
(3), (4) :
Ill'envoie en chercher
* Ill'en envoie chercher
* II envoie I'en chercher
Jean envoie chercher du pain/ Marie

Jean en/!' envoie chercher
* Jean envoie en/la chercher
Cela mene Pierre a fuir Marie

Cela Ie mene ala fuir;
(5), (6), (7), (8) :

* Jean envoie Marie avoir cherche du pain
(?)On enverra Ie Masque de Fer etre enterre vivant a Pignerol
(?)Le Premier Ministre enverra ce secretaire etre attaque par la Chambre
Le bureau envoie jules commencer a travailler a Vitry
a
* Le bureau envoie Jules etre en train de travailler Vitry
* Le bureau envoie Jules devoir travailler a Vitry
J'enverrai Jeanne ne pas ceder a ce chantage
Jean en voie chercher Marie

* Jean envoie avoir cherche Marie
* Jean envoie etre cherche du pain
* Le bureau envoie commencer a travailler Jules
* Le bureau envoie etre en train de travailler Jules
* Le bureau envoie devoir travailler Jules
* l'enverrai ne pas ceder Jeanne
190 L. MELIS
Cela mene Pierre a fuir Marie

* Cela mene Pierre aavoir fui Marie
Cela mene Pierre a Hre condamne de tous
Cela mene Pierre acommencer adouter de ta theorie
* Cela mene Pierre aetre en train de douter de ta theorie
* Cela mene Pierre a devoir douter de ta theorie
Cela mene Pierre ane plus vouloir ceder.
The acceptability of the passive infinitive and of the negation is greater in the
last series; in the first case, the passive form is habitually replaced by se laire +
infinitive:
On enverra Ie Masque de Fer se faire enterrer vivant a Pignerol
Le Premier Ministre enverra ce secretaire se faire attaquer par la Chambre.
A negated infinitive is better if it is equivalent to an expression with a positive
meaning:
Jean envoie Marie ne pas ceder a JUles
'ne pas ceder = resister'
a
?* Jean envoie Marie ne pas parler Jean.
The set of restrictions is based on pragmatic facts: the infinitive reports the
action to be performed at the end of the movement; such an action cannot be
accomplished or be in course of accomplishment (5,6,7); it cannot be in the
focus of a modality operator, or of the negation (7,8).
(9) :
* Jean envoie chercher Marie du pain
Cela mene Jean a fuir Marie
Jean envoie Marie parler de cette question aux autorites locales

* Jean envoie parler Marie de cette question aux autorites locales
Cela Ie mene Ii parler de cette question aux autorites locales.
(10) :
Habitually, mener requires the presence of a PP :
Pierre mene Marie au bal
* Pierre mene Marie;
sentences with an infinitive instead of a PP are also acceptable:
Pierre mene Marie danser
Pierre mene danser Marie
a
Cela mene Pierre fuir Marie.
Other infinitival phrases, such as final pour + infinitive, cannot replace the PP :
* Pierre mene Marie pour danser
* Cela mene Pierre pour fuir Marie.
So the infinitive plays the same role as the PP. In the case of the V Vinf NP2
construction, things however, are not so clear; sentences without PP are
acceptable, but a locative PP can be adjoined and it must be attached to the
main verb and to the infinitive:·
Pierre mene paitre les brebis dans les Alpes

il mene les brebis dans les Alpes'
'les brebis paissent dans les Alpes';
the two constituents thus seem different. In the other cases, either the intro-
duction of a PP is impossible
* Cela mene Jean a Paris a abandonner ce projet
or it leads to the formation of a complex expression:
Pierre conduit les invites au jardin voir les roses.
Sentences such as
Pierre conduit les invites voir les roses dans Ie jardin
do not constitute counter-examples; the locative PP is only attached to Vinf.
So we can say that Vinf occupies certainly the position of PPloc in the construc-
tion scheme of the movement verb in the constructions V NP2 Vinf and V NP2
d Vinf, but that it is not certain that it is the case in the construction V Vinf
NP2·
(11) :
In the V NP2 Vinf and V NP2 d Vinf constructions, the infinitive can be coor-
dinated to a locative PP (SandfeId 1965 : par. 102).
"elIes n 'avaient pas manque de demander a ce qu 'on les menat dans les
petits theatres et sou per au cabaret" (Sandfeld 1965 : par. 102).
Cela l'a mene a abandonner Paris et donc a la solitude morale la plus
complete;
it corresponds also to the locative clitic pronoun y (Sandfeld 1965 : par. 102):
Quand me conduiras-tu ramasser des fraises des bois? Je t'y conduirai ce
midi meme
Est-ce que cela pourrait Ie mener a abandonner les negociations? Cela
l'y menera certainement.
it is a good response to the locative question ou ? (Sandfeld 1965: par. 102;
Gross, 1975: 168).
"Ou Paul envoie-t-il Pierre? -- Voir Marie" (Gross 1975 : 168).
OU cela Ie menera-t-il ? A rejeter toute certitude;
it forms finally with a locative PP a complex but unique constituent:
On l'a envoye a Rome voir Ie Pape
On l'a envoye a Rome en ambassade.
These properties don't exist in the case of the V Vinf NP2 construction:
* elles n'avaient pas manque de demander a ce qu'on menat dans les petits
theatres et puis souper les invites.
* Quand enverras-tu chercher Marie? J'y enverrai ce midi meme.
* Ou enverras-tu Marie? - J'enverrai chercher Marie.
* On a envoye a Rome voir Ie Pape.
(12) :
In all three constructions, the infinitive reports an action, a 'faire' according to
Lamiroy (1981 : 49, 116ss). This depends not only on the infinitive but also on
the links between the infinitive and its subject, as can be seen in the following
cases:
Pierre envoie Gerard amuser Marie
192 L. MELIS
* Pierre envoie la chaise amuser Marie

Gerard amuse Marie (agentive)
La chaise amuse Marie (non agentive)
Pierre envoie Ie medecin degOllter Marie de fumer

* Pierre envoie Ie medecin degol1ter Marie par ses manies
Le mMecin dego(lte Marie de fumer (agentive)
Le mMecin degol1te Marie par ses manies (non agentive).
Cela conduit Ie medecin adegol1ter ses amis de fumer

* Cela conduit Ie medecin a degoo.ter ses amis par ses manies.
In the case of the V Vinf NP2 construction there are some difficulties, because
the subject of the infinitive can be absent, it isn't possible to make reference to
it in order to explain the constraints on the infinitive and, in some cases, there
isn't any sentence-like structure involved:
Jean envoie bouler Pierre
* Pierre boule
* On boule Pierre.
For this two reasons it seems difficult to admit that Vinf and NP2 are selected
as a whole in all cases, though such a view is possible in cases as
Pierre envoie chercher Marie
and, perhaps, also in
Pierre envoie chercher du pain.
(13) :
Jean envoie Marie chercher du pain et elle cherche ce pain
Cela mene Pierre a rejeter la solution et i1 la rejettera effectivement dans
une lettre fameuse
Pierre envoie chercher Marie et elle cherchera pendant plusieurs heures.
(14) :
* Jean envoie Marie chercher et on la cherchera pendant des heures
* a
Cela mene Pierre chercher et on Ie cherchera pendant des heures
Pierre envoie chercher du pain et on en cherchera longtemps.
In the last case circumstancials introduced by Ii or by par can be inserted in the

sentence, especially when the main verb is envoyer; they report either the
interested person or the agent:
J'enverrai chercher cette lettre par la secretalre
J'enverrai lire ce rapport au directeur.
Similar complements can appear with perception or causation verbs, see Melis
(1982 : lI.2.) and references given there.
An apparent counter-example to the interpretation as a subject is :
pour mener mon frere inciser
(Damourette and Pichon par. 1060 and passim);
this isolated example is, however, rejected as ungrammatical by most informants;
despite the comments of the authors, we will consider that it is a occasional
use of the structure that violates some constraint on NP2.
(15) :
The arguments given by Radford (1975) for the analysis of je ferai pendre Jean
as a construction with a complex verb do all apply in this case.
(16) :
There exist two series of idiomatic expressions involving the construction V Vinf
NP2; in the first series we can list expressions as
envoyer paitre, promener, bouler, se faire pendre ... ;
in the second
ne pas Ie lui en voyer dire.
For the first series, the dictionaries propose also the fomula envoyer quelqu 'un
promener (with the construction V NP2 Vinf) but they don't give any example
of this construction. Informants interpret habitually
II a envoye Pierre promener
as
'il a envoye Pierre en promenade'
and
II a envoye promener Pierre
as
'il s 'est de barrass6 de Pierre'
(17) :
As seen under (16) envoyer promener and similar expressions are equivalent to
'se d6barrasser de'; Damourette and Pichon (par. 1112) consider envoyer
chercher as a lexical unit.
GENERALIZED UNION
Gilles Fauconnier
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - Paris
Universite de Paris VIII
The fo Howing analysis has several goals:

- reducing causative constructions (jaire taire) to one sin~ple process_
- showing that this process, Union, is responsible for many verbal or predicative
amalgams, traditionally associated with types of raising, or complement subject
deletion (equi), or predicative, auxiliary, and modal structures.
- showing how personal and impersonal passives are also regular cases of Union.
- explaining in a uniform way the distribution of clitics and reflexives in such
constructions.
A relational point of view is adopted: grammatical relations rather than
configurations are primitive; a clause has several strata of grammatical relations;
to each element of the clause there may correspond one grammatical relation
on each stratum. I will use the general framework and some of the notations
devised by Postal and Perlmutter I as well as their Unaccusative hypothesis 2
I. Prolegomena
a) two analogies between 'sembler' and '[aire'
Since Kayne (1975)'s study, the following facts about taire are well known:
(1) J'ai fait envoyer Ie paquet a Paul. (I had the parcel sent to Paul)
(2) Je lui ai fait envoyer Ie paquet. (I had the parcel sent to him)
Paul in (I) may be either the sender or the receiver ofthe parcel, i.e. "logical-
Iy", the subject, 1, or the indirect object, 3, of the clause which is itself the
object of taire. Similarly, the clitic lui in (2), just like its counterpart Paul in
(1) may be interpreted semantically as the subject or the indirect object of
envoyer (sender or receiver).
195
196 G. F AUCONNIER
(3) Je lui ai fait envoyer Ie paquet d Paul.
On the other hand in (3), where we find both the cIitic lui and the full form
a Paul, the possibility of having two interpretations vanishes : lui is necessarily
the sender of the parcel, Paul is necessarily the receiver. The second interpreta-
tion (lui receives, Paul sends), which might be expected given (I) and (2), is
excluded.
There have been attempts to relate these observations to the interaction of
clitic movement with the derived structure of the faire faire construction. But
there exists a distribution quite parallel to (1), (2), (3), which involves neither
faire nor the "movement" of the cIitic into a higher clause :
(4) Luc semble fidele dJeanne. (Luc seems faithful to Jeanne)
(5) Luc lui semble fidele. (Luc seems faithful to her)
(6) Luc lui semble fidele d Jeanne. (Luc seems to her to be faithful to
Jeanne)
Like (1), example.(4) allows two interpretations: "it seems to Jeanne that Luc
is faithful" or "it seems that Luc is faithful to Jeanne". Similarly in (5), the
corresponding clitic, lUi, may be interpreted as a complement of sembler, or as
a complement of fidele : "it seems to her that Luc is faithful" or "it seems that
Luc is faithful to her".
But (6), just like (3), allows only one interpretation: "it seems to her that
Luc is faithful to Jeanne" and not "it seems to Jeanne that Luc is faithful to
her", i.e . lui complement of sembler and d Jeanne complement of fidele.
Floating quantifiers also reveal a parallelism between the two constructions.
As we know, a quantifier may quantify a superficially distant noun phrase:
(7) Voila les gens d qui j'ai d chacun donne 1000 F.

(Here are the people such that I gave 1000F to each of them)
In (8) and (9) we find the same ambiguities as in (I) and (4) :
(8) Voila les gens d qui je ferai d chacun envoyer un paquet.
(9) Ce sont des gens auxquels cette fille semble d tous tres attachee.
(8) may be understood with the people (Ies gens) either sending or receiving
a parcel. In (9), either it seems to them that the girl is very attached (to some-
GENERALIZED UNION 197
thing or someone), or it seems that the girl is very attached to them. As in (3)
and (6), the presence of a clitic lui excludes one interpretation:
(10) Voihlles gens d qui je lui ferai envoyer un paquet.
Ol)Ce sont des gens auxquels cette fiUe lui semble tres attachee.
In (10), the people (les gens) can only be the receiver, while in (11) auxquels
must be the complement of attachee, and lui the complement of seem
(semble).
Now, in these configurations, floating quantifiers, although possible with
both interpretations in (8) and (9), become entirely excluded:
(12) *Voila les gens aqui je lui ferai d chacun envoyer un paquet.
(3) *Ce sont des gens auxquels cette fille lui semble d tous tn!s attachee.
b) '[aire a three place predicate

JJ
In simple constructions involving no embedding or clause union the verb

laire may take two arguments or three arguments:
C2 faire quelque chose (to do something)

C3 a
faire quelque chose quelqu'un (to do something to someone)
Relational as well as transformational analyses commonly assume that the

two argument construction (C 2 ) underlies the clause union construction laire
laire and that the superficial indirect object of faire after Clause Union (faire
avaler la salade au lapin (make the rabbit swallow the salad», is also at some
other level or stratum the subject of the complement clause (faire [Ie lapin avaler
la salade ]).
I will take a different position here and consider (perhaps a simpler hypo-
thesis a priori) that C2 and C3 can both undergo Union and that the super-
ficial indirect object of laire in such constructions is also the indirect object of
faire (a 3 in relational terms) at all levels. Pending further justification for this
move, notice that it strengthens the analogy between faire and sembler pointed
out in sec. a) : just as lui in (6) is the indirect object of sembler (this is not
controversial) lui in (3) is the indirect object of the "main" verb faire. And by
the same token lui in (10) and (11) is the indirect object on all strata of faire
198 G. FAUCONNIER
and sembler respectively.

This position entails that taire, just like forcer, obliger, laisser etc. is an Equi
verb that also undergoes Union. In many, if not most, varieties of French, Union
is obligatory with [aire 3 , as it is, we shall argue, with many other predicates
such as etre, avoir, rendre, devenir...
From this point of view, the surface [aire [aire construction is the result
of Union, which makes one clause out of two, applying with or without Equi,
depending on whether the first stratum has two or three arguments. So,
schematically and intuitively for the moment:
(14) clause a
1st stratum
r ,A
clause b
,
Equi
, ir
....... ~
je faire a Ie lapin [ ~ avaler la sa lade 1
subject predicate object
1 P 2
subject predicate indirect object

"--- 'V"
object ---
P 3 2
(15)
2nd stratum clause a
~
rje faire avaler fa safade
~
Ii Ie lapin
subject predicate predicate object indirect object
PI P2 2 3
Example (14) (15) involves construction C3 and therefore Equi. Example

(16) - (17), as will be seen later in detail, involves only construction C2 (two
arguments), there is no Equi, and there is no indirect object:
(16)
1st stratum clause a
~
---
~
/ claus~ b
r[ -..
je faire fondre 1a glace]
predicate object
P 2
subject predicate ---- ~
object
../
P 2
(17)
-
2nd stratum clause a
je faire
./""-
fondre
--....
la glace
subject predicate predicate object
PI P2 2
After agreement, this yields the sentence Je [ais [andre la glace (I make the ice
melt.
Assuming the perspective just outlined, we must answer two general types
of questions regarding Union:
(18) The problem of Union
(1) Under what conditions can two clauses a and b (b subordinate to

a) merge to form only one clause? (under what conditions ==
under what kind of predicates, what kind of clauses ?)
(2) When two clauses a and b unite to form a single one, a, what
relations do the elements of the "initial" clauses a and b bear
with respect to the resulting clause a ?
c) 3 to 2 advancement in french
Consider the following exarnples4 :
(19)a. On vole sa bicyclette Ii Claude (Someone steals Claude's bicycle)

2 3
200 G. F AUCONNIER
b. I On vole Claude. (Someone steals from Claude)

2
(20)a. On conseille cette strategie d Jean (Someone suggests (=advice)

2 3 this strategy to Jean)
b. On conseille Jean. (Someone advises Jean)

2
(2l)a. On requisitionne leur maison aux voisins. (The neighbors have

2 3 their house requisitioned)
b. On requisitionne les voisins (id.)5

2
In all these cases, we see an alternation between a three argument structure

and a two argu~ent structure, in which the indirect object of the former
corresponds to the direct object of the latter. We shall say that in the b.
examples there is an advancement from relational position 3 to relational
position 2, as schematized in stratal diagram (22), for example (I 9)
(22)
vole
on
For some verbs like fournir 6 , this advancement is possible in the presence of a
direct object, 2, which then becomes a "chomeur" :
(23)a. On fournit des armes aux soldats. (The soldiers are provided with
I 2 3 weapons)
b. On fournit les soldats en armes id.

1 2 cho
But in general, 3 to 2 advancement is favored by the absence of an object:
(24)?* On vole Claude de sa bicyclette. 7
(25)*On conseille Jean {~:} cette strategie.
(26)*On requisitionne les voisins de leur maison.
Furthermore, if there is no direct object, the advanced form is preferred to the

unadvanced one:
(27)a. On a vole Claude.

b. ?On a vole aClaude
(28)a. On a conseille Claude.

b. ?*On a conseille aClaude.
(29)a. On a requisitionne les voisins

b. *On a requisitionne aux voisins
What is of interest in the present context is that among the verbs which
advance their indirect object in the absence of a direct object we find the
faire+ V combinations produced by Clause Union :8
(30)Alice fait voir Ie tableau d Georges. (Alice shows (lit. makes see)
1 2 3 the painting to Georges)
(31) *Alice fait courir Ii Georges.

1 3
(32)Alice fait courir Georges. (Alice makes Georges run)

I 2
So the superficial direct object in sentences like (32) is actually the indirect
object of faire, after 3 - 2 advancement in the absence of another object, as in
19, 20, 21. This is confirmed by the possibility for many speakers in some sen-
tences of not applying advancement, leaving the object with relation 3, as in
(27); Kayne and Postal cite the following examples, whose form is indeed widely
attested in everyday spoken French:
(33)Elle lui fera telephoner a ses parents 9. (She will make him phone his
parents.
202 G. FAUCONNIER
(34)Cela lui fera penser a sa mere 10. (That will make him think of his
mother).
Other arguments based on unaccusatives and double datives will be given below.
d) Clities and Relations
Extrapolating from properties of "simple" sentences, I will assume in what

follows that clitics of the type il, lao le, lui... correspond to terms, i.e. elements
bearing relations 1,2, or 3, and moreover, that they are (final) terms of the
clause containing the verb to which they are attached. Hence
-----
(35) clause a
r- ----....
clause b
je vous force a r~ les

-----lui donner
--..
-
2 3
........... /
2 oblique
(I force you to give them to him/her)
(36) clause a
~-----------~---------~-
je les lui fais voir
2 3
I make her/him see them)
The clitics en and y correspond to obliques or noun complements.

This hypothesis implies among other things that a ch6meur cannot be a cIitic,
and that on the last stratum, a cIitic bears the relation indicated by its morpho-
logy. The following networks correspond to (35) and (36) :
(35') a
les
(36')
les
Note that Equi in these diagrams is "represented" as a mUltiple attachment

(vous in (35'), lui in (36')). The second stratum in (36') stems from Union -
the "disappearance" of clause b, as a clause, is indicated ad hocly by /J; the
elements of this clause, les and voir, are attached to a on the second stratum.
This "reattachment" is what Union consists of. The fundamental question 18.2
which confronts us is to determine in general what new relations are assigned
when this attachment takes place.
e) the final 1 law
The following formulation of the "final I" (or final subject) law 11 will
be defended :
(37)Every final clause must have a final 1.

204 G. FAUCONNIER
X is a final 1 of clause ~ if X bears the 1 relation on the last stratum of ~.

In (35'),je is the fmall of a, vous is the finall of b.
A clause is final if it doesn't "vanish" : b is final in (35'); but b is not final
in (36'), having been "destroyed" by Union. Therefore, (37) allows (38), blocks
(39), but not (40) :
(38)11 pleut (it rains)
(39) * pleut
(40)Dieu fait pleuvoir (God makes it rain)
In (40), p/euvoir has no final subject, but the corresponding clause is not final.
The corresponding networks are :
(38')
a
~
pleut il
(40')
Dieu
f) the Agent relation
As we shall see, under the present analysis, there is no rule of Passive; rather,
constructions traditionaIly called Passive arise through a regular combination of
Union and Unaccusative advancement. In harmony with this overall analysis,
by-phrases will no longer be Passive chomeurs, but rather, more simply, Obli-
ques on the first stratum. Like" other obliques in some constructions, they may
advance to 1, provided that the 1 position is empty (i.e. no element

bears the 1 relation on the previous stratum). This provision, incidentally, will
turn out to be a property of all advancements to 1.
More specifically, and following a suggestion by Milton do Nascimiento, I
will assume that in French, only predicates with no object (direct or indirect),
i.e. no 2 or 3, can have a first stratum I - these are verbs like dance, run, think
of, laugh ... For the others, advancement to I (Unaccusative, Agent to 1,
Oblique to 1, ...) will produce surface subjects in simple sentences. For example
( 41)
We
telephone
(42) Luc telephone a Jeanne
Motivation for such a view will become clear as the overall analysis unfolds.
Notice at this point that Agent ~ 1 will often have to apply in order for the net-
work to meet the final 1 Law (sec. e) :
(43)*
(44) *Saboter Ie projet par nos allies.
(45)*Telephoner a Jeanne par Luc.

206 G. FAUCONNIER
II. Union
We start out by formulating a partial answer to question (18) :
(46) Union
1. If two clauses a and b unite (b subordinate to a)1 then
- the elements of a keep their relation, except for b, which
"disappears" .
- any element e bearing the relation {3 in b, now bears the same
relation {3 in a, except if e is a term and some element in a already
bears relation (3; in this case, element e becomes a chomeur
in a (p).
2. Union is blocked if b has a full subject (1) on its last stratum.
46.1 is an inertia principle: an element "inherits" in a the relation it had in b,

except if that relation is 1, 2, or 3 (term) and already taken. In some sense, the
restrictive condition in 46.1 follows from the Stratal Uniqueness Law, which
prevents two or more terms on the same stratum from bearing the same relation.
This principle excludes "total" inheritance of the relations in b and accounts
in part for certain elements becoming chomeurs.
The interpretation of 46.2 is as follows: Union will be possible if either b has
no subject (1), or if b has an empty subject (Equi has applied).
Given the principles formulated in sec. I, Union (46) will directly yield the
various [aire [aire constructions. Let's review these constructions, not forgetting
that the linear word order is determined independently of the processes at work,
by the relations on the last stratum:
(47)Order in French:
clitics P p' 2 3 ObI. CM
Examples:
-[aire with three arguments

la
couleuvre
au chameau, a 3 complement in a controls Equi in b : the subject of b is empty;

Union may apply: the elements of b, avaler and la couleuvre inherit their rela-
tions ina according t046.1 ; finally, word order, 47, yields (49) :
(49) Le petit prince fait avaler la couleuvre au chameau. (The little prince
makes the camel swallow the snake)
In accord with sec. I.d final positions 2 and 3 in (48) can be cliticized, to give
sentences like:
(SO)Le petit prince fa lui fait avaler.
- faire with two arguments
par Ie
chameau
Network (51) is well formed since b has no subject; fa couleuvre and par Ie
chameau are respectively 2 and Agent in a by simple inheritance, since a has
no 2 after the eradication of b 12. The linear output, according to (47) is (52) :
208 G. FAUCONNIER
(52)Le petit prince fait avaler la couleuvre par Ie chameau.

(The little prince has the snake swallowed by the camel)
Notice, however, that if the "rule" Agent -+ 1 applied in b, Union would be

blocked by 46.2. (53) is ill-formed:
fait
Now consider the case where the downstairs clause b has an indirect object
3. Then Union will cause a stratal uniqueness conflict if faire already has a 3
(netwcrk like (48)) and this conflict, by 46.1 will lead to the chomage of the
downstairs 3; there will be no conflict and therefore no chomage if faire has
two arguments (network like (52)). Networks corresponding to these two situa-
tions are (54) and (60) :
three arguments:
(54)
- - - - - - : . u destinataire
fait
Crucially, the 3 complement in b (au destinataire) cannot inherit the 3 relation

in a, since a already has a 3, au facteur. The downstairs 3 therefore becomes a
chOmeur, by 46.1 , and therefore cannot be a c1itic (clitics are terms - sec. I.d)
or uitk to floating quantifiers13. This is precisely what the examples (3) and (12)
of sec. La attest. In (54), only au facteur (the top 3) can be replaced by the
cUtic lui, not the downstairs 3, au destinataire :
(55)Le petit prince lui fait envoyer Ie paquet au destinataire.

(The little prince makes him send the parcel to the addressee)
(56)*Le petit prince lui fait envoyer Ie paquet au facteur.
(started of course under the interpretation ~here lui is the receiver

and Ie facteur (mailman) the sender).
Similarly (3) Je lui ai fait en voyer Ie paquet a Paul, has only the reading in
which Paul is the receiver, and (12) Voila les gens aqui je luiferai achacun en-
voyer un paquet, shows the impossibility of a floating quantifier associated with
a
a chOmeur (3), qui.
Of course, other relational positions, obliques in particular, may cIiticize
without conflict :
(57)C'est au facteur que Ie petit prince y fera envoyer un paquet au

destinataire.
Finally, the conflict in (54) is the same if b has no direct object, 2, but
it is "superficially" masked by 3 to 2 advancement:
(58)*
lui
210 G. FAUCONNIER
In (58), like in (54), Union corresponds to the third stratum of a at which

Marie is still a 3, indirect object of fais. Then, since this stratum has no 2,
Marie undergoes 3 to 2 advancement. But network (58) remains ill-formed,
since a cliticluicorresponds to a chomeur "
3. Hence the anomaly of (59) :
(59)*Je lui fais telephoner Marie.
In contrast, if proposition a has no 3, there will not be any constratal unique-

ness conflict, the 3 element in b will inherit its relation and will be able to
cliticize or float quantifiers:
(60)
Ie petit prince
par
Ie facteur
Position 3 in b becomes a position 3 in a, and is cIiticizable and floatable:
(61) Le petit prince lui fait envoyer Ie paquet par Ie facteur.

(The little prince has a parcel sent to him by the mailman)
Examples like (2) and (8)
(2) Je lui ai fait envoyer Ie paquet.
(8) ... les gens d qui je ferai d chacun envoyer un paquet.
correspond to networks exactly like (60) except that b happens not to have
an element bearing the oblique relation Agent.
A different case from the first two is that in which clause b is unaccusative.
Here again, Union with two-argument [aire will be possible, since b, having no
subject on its first stratum will directly meet condition 46.2. Verbs like taire
(to be quiet) are interesting in this connection because for them, Unaccusative
advancement (2 ~ 1) is superficially manifested by the presence of a reflexive
pronoun. In general, Unaccusative advancement may be reflexive or not,
depending on the verbs involved :
(62) (63)
la neige
tombe
La neige tom be la cheminee s'ecroule

(the snow falls) (the chimney collapsed)
(64)
taire les enfants
les enfants se taisent (the children keep quiet)
In a simple clause, 2 to 1 advancement must apply; otherwise there would be no

final 1 on the last stratum. Union, on the other hand, will apply if the clause
has no subject, i.e. (in the absence of an upstairs 3 to trigger Equi) ifUnaccusa-
tive advancement has not applied. In the case of verbs like iaire, t!vanouir, ...
2 to I advancement is obligatorily reflexive (les enfants se taisent; *les enfants
taisent). So the presence of the reflexive is a "signal" that 2 to 1 advancement
has occurred; and its absence means that it hasn't.
Accordingly, an example like (65) unambiguously shows Union applying to
an unaccusative structure (with no 2 ~ I advancement) :
212 G. FAUCONNIER
(65) il fait taire les enfants
les
enfants
The same analysis is valid of course for other unaccusatives that require a
reflexive in simple clauses but not in causative constructions:
(66)a) La princesse s'evanouit. (The princess faints)

b) *La princesse evanouit.
c) La piqfire a fait evanouir la princesse. (The sting made the
princess faint.
(67)a) *Les oiseaux envolent. (OK:s'envolent) (The birds flyaway)

b) Le clairon a fait envoler les oiseaux. (The bugle made the birds
flyaway).
Note how the final 1 Law operates in such cases: clause b has no final 1, but it
is not a final clause since Union absorbs it. So the absence of se in (65) corre-
lates with the absence of il (or Ie) in "Dieu fait pleuvoir" and perhaps in "j'ai
fait ressortir que X" (compare : "iJ ressort que X").
It may be useful to emphasize that nothing blocks Unaccusative advance-
ment in networks like (65), but then b acquires aI, and Union is possible only
if this 1 is empty, i.e. controlled by a 3 complement of faire :
P7~~~----- SE taire
it fait Il fait se taire les enfants
A surprising confirmation for the interaction of Union with Unaccusatives

as in (65) is provided by the behavior of clitics. If the unaccusative clause b
has an indirect object 3, this indirect object, in contrast to those of (54), (56),
(59) etc., should be able to inherit its relation by Union, since jaire doesn't
have a third argument. Consider venir which takes an initial 3 :
(69) Des idees lui viennent. (Ideas come to him)
des idees
viennent lui
(70) II luivient des idees.
lui
214 G. F AUCONNIER
(72)S:a lui fait venir des idees. (It makes ideas come to him)
(72) is good: the clitic lui, corresponding to an indirect object of venir is a real
term, 3, on the last stratum of a. The important contrast, then, is between (72)
and (59), which is ungrammatical, although superficially similar:
(59)*Je lui fait telephoner Marie.
This contrast reflects the difference between networks (71) and (58); in the
latter as opposed to the former faire has a third argument whose 3 relation
induces the chOmage of the 3 element in b, by 46.1 (inheritance and stratal
uniqueness conflict).
III. Generalized Union
a) the case of 'sembler'
This paper started out in sec. I by pointing out the analogy between sembler
and faire in certain constructions. These constructions are superficially
characterized by the presence of complement clitics, not in front of the predi-
cate of which they are "logically" arguments, but in front of the predicate
sembler or faire :
(73) Luc y fait entrer Pauline.
t t
(74)Luc y semble attache.
f· t
Compare with (75) :
(75)Luc pretend y entrer. (Luc claims/wants to get in)
I will now proceed, in the spirit of Aissen and Perlmutter (1976), to consider
in general that the configuration
cl P P'
t t
where a clitic dependent on P' ends up in front of P, is a superficial manifesta-

tion of Union. Hence, ordinary cases of Raising like
(76)Luc semble l aIlr (Luc seems to go there)
will be distinguished from cases of Union like (74).

For the time being, I make the purely descriptive observation that with
Raising the second predicate P' is an infinitive, while in the case of Union with
sembler the second predicate is an adjective or participle. Recall that the
network corresponding to Raising (for 76), would be (77), given that sembler is
an unaccusative predicate :
(77)
"'1..------ - ___
Y
~aller
The clausal status of b remains unchanged; Lue is "raised" into a 2 position

in a according to the Relational Succession Law 14 and then advances to 1 by
Unaccusative Advancement 2 ~ 1.
In contrast, Union, for (74), corresponds to network (78) :
attache
216 G. FAUCONNIER
Adjectives being unaccusative, Lue is initially a 2 in b, so that b satisfies

condition 46.2 for Union: no full subject. According to 46.1, Luc, y, and
attache inherit their relations in a (no stratal conflict); finally, Lue, a 2 in a,
undergoes 2 -+ 1 advancement with unaccusative sembler. Word order (47)
then correctly positions the clitic y in front of the first predicate in the clause.
It is now easy to understand the behavior of sembler exemplified by (4),
(5) and (6) at the beginning of the present study:
(4) Luc semble fidele d Jeanne (ambiguous: "seems to Jeanne" or "faith-

ful to Jeanne")
(5) Luc lui semble fidele. (same ambiguity)
(6) Luc lui semble fidele d Jeanne. (only one reading: "faithful to
Jeanne")
(5) may correspond either to network (79) or (79'), but (6) can only correspond
to (80) - network (80') is not well formed.
(79)
lui
(reading: faithful to "lui")

(79')
we
(reading: it seems to "lui" that Luc is faithful)
In (79), lui is a 3 complement of fidele in b which inherits its 3 relation in a

by Union: there is no stratal conflict since a has no 3 complement of its own.
In (79'), lui is initially a 3 complement ofa (sembler aquelqu 'un ... ).
(80)
In (80), position 3 in a is already occupied by the complement of sembler;

the 3 complement in b, a Jeanne will therefore become a chomeur in a and
hence no clitic is possible in that position: (80') is ill-formed and (6) can have
no interpretation for which lui would be the complement of fidele.
218 G. FAUCONNIER
(80') *
lui
The situation is therefore in all respects identical to the one for laire in
networks like (54), and as suggested already by the superficial parallelism, the
properties of sentences (6) and (3) are the same effect of the same cause:
Union 46.1 and the Stratal Uniqueness conflict which puts "extra" elements en
chomage.
The unacteptability of (13) has the same origin.
(13) * ... des gens auxquels cette fille lui semble Ii tous tres attachee.
(13) has two indirect complements auxquels and lui that correspond to positions
...
3 and 3 in (80). Being a clitic, lui cannot
,., be a chOmeur and so necessarily corres-
ponds to 3; auxquels must then be 3, and being a chOmeur, cannot be linked to
a floating quantifier. In (9) on the contrary, position 3 in a is not occupied,
auxquels is therefore an employed 3, hence the acceptability of the quantifier:
(9) Ce sont des gens auxquels cette fille semble a tous tres attachee.
In sum the analogy between sembler and laire comes from two shared proper-
ties:
- they both undergo Union
- they both have an optional 3 complement.
b) other Union predicates: 'rendre', 'croire', 'etre' ...
For convenience, I will use the following classification of verbal and adjectival
predicates by means of the features +V (verbal) and +A (adjectival) :
adjectives: +A -v
past participles: +A +V
other verbal forms :-A +V
Predicates of the faire. laisser type allow Union only with a downstairs
predicate [ +V, -A] (a "pure verb") :
(81) On a fait poursuivre Cesar par les Gaulois. (They had Caesar chased
by the Gauls)
(82)*On a fait Cesar poursuivi par les Gaulois.

[+A,+V]
(83)*On a fait Cesar genlil.

['r A,-V]
Very close to faire semantically, the predicate rendre differs by allowing Union
only with "pure" adjectives [+ A, -V] :
(84)On a rendu Cesar genti!.
(85) *On a rendu Cesar poursuivi par les Gaulois.
(86)*On a rendu Cesar poursuivre par les Gaulois.
In other respects, the Union phenomenon is the same, as suggested by the

position of the clitic in (87) and by network (88) :
(87)Cette potion lui rendra Cerbere fidele. (This potion will make Cerbere
faithful to her/ him).
(88)
lui
cette potion
220 G. FAUCONNIER
Cerbere inherits its 2 relation, and lui inherits the 3 relation since rendre has no
initial indirect object. Therefore the corresponding positions are cliticizable :
(89)Cette potion Ie lui rendra fidele.
(90)Elle en rendra Cesar amoureux.
A predicate like croire (believe) allows Union with [+A] predicates 15 :
(91 )On lui croyait Brutus fidele. (Brutus was believed to be faithful to
[-V,+A] him).
lui
(92)On y croyait Henri conduit par Ie desespoir. (They believed Henri

[+ V, + A] to be driven to it by despair)
Another verb traditionally analyzed in terms of Raising to Object followed by

deletion of be (that is etre) is trouver, which like rendre allows Union only
with [ -V, +A] :
(93)On lui trouvait Cesar fidele. (They found Caesar to be faithful to him)
(94)*On y trouvait Henri conduit par Ie desespoir.
Turning now to the unaccusative verbs which are Union triggers, we find
that devenir requires [-f A, -V] while etre, like sembler, requires only [+ A] :
(95)Cerbere lui devient fidele. (Cerbere becomes faithful to him)

a
lui
(96)*Cesar devenait poursuivi par les Gaulois.
(97)Cerbere lui est fidele.
lui
222 G. FAUCONNIER
(98)Henry y est conduit par Ie desespoir.
In (97) and (98), the Union stratum (second stratum of a) has no 1 and so
Unaccusative Advancement 2 -+ I operates (3rd stratum); if it didn't the
network would violate the final 1 Law.
c) Passive
It is important to emphasize that for all the predicates considered until

now, the Union process is always the same (46.1 and 2). The superficial
differences stem only from the type of downstairs predicate [±V, ±A j, and from
the number of arguments in clause a. faire and sembler may have or not have
a 3; fa ire, rendre, croire... have an initial Ag, while sembler, erre, devenir...
are Unaccusative and will undergo 2 -+ I advancement (this is independent of
Union of course). etre, devenir, croire, rendre, trauver, ... never have an initial
3.
It turns out then quite naturally - (98) is the first example - that structures
traditionally analyzed as "passive" are only ordinary cases of Union with the
verb are. Under this view, classical passive is the result of two processes
operating independently in the grammar :

- Union applying to the Unaccusative etre and to a downstairs predicate [+ A]
- 2 ~ 1 Advancement, which applies to Unaccusatives in general and therefore
in particular to etre.
Notice furthermore that the various by - constructions, constructions with
par that are felt to be intuitively "passive" result from the very same kind of
network:
(99) Cesar est poursuivi par les Gaulois.
( I 00) Cesar sem ble poursuivi par les Gaulois
(101) On croit Cesar poursuivi par Ie:; Gaulois.
(102) II fait poursuivre Cesar par les Gaulois
(103) is the sub-network shared by all these examples:
(103)
~ _ _ _ _ par les
Gaulois
The full networks will differ in that:

- with sembler, etre 2 will advance to 1 (Unaccusative)
- with/aire, croire there will be an Ag advancing to 1
- with /aire the downstairs predicate will be -A (poursuivre), with croire, etre,
and sembler it will be +A (poursuivi)
d) Impersonal passives
If Union occurs with etre, but there is no downstairs 2, there will subsequent-
ly be no upstairs 2 available for Unaccusative advancement; in order to meet
the final 1 Law a dummy il comes in, giving the so-called impersonal passive
224 G. FAUCONNIER
constructions :
(l04) II est obei au capitaine par les soldats. (The captain is obeyed
by the soldiers)
au
capitaine
(105) II est (souvent) danse dans les rues. (There is often dancing in
the streets)
dans
les rues
However, if Union occurs with a verb like [aire in such cases, the upstairs clause
will already have aI, and there will of course be no dummy-insertion:
(106) On fera telephoner Ii l'hOtel par Max. (We will have Max call the
hotel)
a
l'hatel
(107) On fera danser dans les rues.(We will have dancing in the streets)
dans
les rues
Notice the "teleological" assumptions behind such an account: dummy-in-

sertion of it in networks (104) and (lOS) is a last ditch effort to save structures
which are otherwise unable to produce final 1's through 2 -+ 1 or Ag -+ 1 ad-
vancement. Dummy insertion does not apply if advancement is possible:
(l08) *11 a ete respecte Ie capitaine par les soldats.
(109) *11 a ete danse la polka dans les rues.
(110) Le capitaine a ete respecte par les soldats. (The captain was
respected by the soldiers)
( Ill) La polka a ete dansee dans les rues. (They danced the polka in
the streets)
226 G. FAUCONNIER
It might be asked what prevents Ag -* 1 from applying in (104). I suggest that

this is a property of the verbs involved: just as Unergatives allow Ag -* 1
Advancement but not 2 -* 1 Advancement, Unaccusatives allow 2 -* 1 Adv.
but not Ag -* 1.
IV. Remarks about the analysis
An appendix to this paper, in preparation, will show how the distribution of

reflexives fits in with the Generalized Union hypothesis. It will also consider
double dative and double accusative phenomena l6 . I will only note at this point
that in addition to presenting a unified account of constructions traditionally
looked upon as distinct, the above analysis does away with a number of rules
or processes found in generative and relational approaches. The most notable is
perhaps the Passive rule itself; others are Union1 (cf. Fauconnier 1981), be
deletion after Raising, and Agent deletion.
The analysis is one possible natural extension of Aissen and Perlmutter's
Clause Reduction mentioned above. In fact it is striking to find that they impose
the following condition ((97) in their paper) on Union for verbs like querer
and soler in Spanish:
(97)Clause Union is possible with these verbs only if the complement

has no 1.
And this is of course condition 46.2 in the definition of Union in sec. II. except
that it now applies regardless of the verbs or adjectives involved. It follows
that Union will also apply to tense auxiliaries like avoir, under the assump-
tion that they also trigger Raising and select [+ A + V]. Example (I 12) will
correspond to network (113) :
(112) Le prince a donne la hache au bourreau. (The prince gave the ax

to the executioner)
(113)
la
nadle
Note also that under the present approach, the I AEX law will no longer
cover the same range of facts as in Postal and Perlmutter (1978). Impersonal
passives of unaccusatives will be out simply because the unaccusatives have no
first stratum agents and because a 2 is always available for 2 ~ I advancement:
(114) Les feuilles sont tombees. (resultative meaning: the leaves are
fallen).
(115) *11 est tombe les feuilles.
In fact, if the type of analysis outlined here for French could be extended to
other languages, the 1 AEX Law would follow from a more general condition:
(116) Advancement to I is possible from stratum i to stratum i+ I

only if stratum i has no I.
(116) is mere speculation at this point. It fits in with the "teleological" view
mentioned above that advancements and dummy insertion conspire to meet the
final I Law. Something like (116) might also hold, at least as a tendency, for
other advancements: it was noted in sec. I.c that 3 ~ 2 Advancement is highly
favored if there is no 2 on stratum i.
The Generalized Union hypothesis provides a straightforward analysis of
passive constructions with no Passive rule. It should be underscored that the
resulting view of passive is in itself by no means new conceptually. In fact,
rather remarkably, it is essentially "isomorphic" to the account suggested in
Langacker and Munro (1975). On the basis of Mojave and Uto- Aztecan data,
Langacker and Munro propose the following "underlying" structure for
passives:
( 117)
v
I
be
228 G. FAUCONNIER
and emphasize that "BE is considered as a predicate with real semantic content",
"no instrumental or agentive phrase is posited as an integral part of the passive
construction per se", "a passive sentence does not derive from the same abstract
representation that underlies the corresponding active sentence", "there is no
single rule that can be felicitously referred to as a "passive transformation" ".
The approach is also in harmony with the hypothesis in Hertz (to appear)
that "les phrases passives impersonnelles ne sont de fa~on generale pas derivees
via NP Pre posing (in the present framework 2 ~ 1 Advancement)". I would
also agree in spirit with Hertz's functional interpretation of passive morphology,
adding however that the very possibility of such morphology stems from
Generalized Union.
Finally, Clause Union properties of passive have been pointed out for
Japanese by Shigeru Sakahara. Note that French uses so.called causative laire
with a purely "passive" meaning, as in (118) :
(118)· Je me suis fait happer par une voiture (I was hit by a car)
(119) Je me suis fait demander I'heure par un inconnu. (A stranger

askod me for the time).
The "Inheritance Principle", condition 46.1, which characterizes Union in

a crucial way, belongs to Nature's "principles of least effort" and accordingly
pleases the mind. (Its relational formulation was discovered in America by J.
Gibson and E. Raposo and in France by votre serviteur - cf. Gibson and Raposo
(to appear), Fauconnier (1981)).
FOOTNOTES
For suggestions, criticisms, discussions ... , thanks to J. Gibson, S. Moreira da
Silva, M. do Nascimiento, P. Postal, E. Raposo, S. Sakahara and especially D.
Perlmutter, who, among other things, first suggested that adjectives might
behave like other predicates in Union phenomena, a key idea for the analysis
attempted here.
1Cf. Perlmutter (1980).
2Cf. Postal and Perlmutter (1978).
3But a number of speakers, myself included, allow laire with Equi and no
Union: Je te ferai la regarder.
4Cf. also Leclere (1978).
521 b) is ambiguous, since people themselves may be "reqUisitioned".
6Cf. Postal (1981).

7 Note however that "On a vole Claude de 1000 F" is fine.
8This view is of course quite different from those which treat Georges as a
downstairs subject - cf. Kayne (1975), Comrie (1976) and relational accounts
of the form: Absolutive -jo 2, Ergative -jo 3.
9Kayne (1975).
10Postal (to appear)
llCf. Perlmutter and Postal (to appear)
12 Ag is presumably subject to Stratal Uniqueness.
130nly terms, not chomeurs, can "launch" floating quantifiers.
14Cf. the presentations of Relational Grammar already mentioned.
15Word order places 2 before P' +A.
16Cf. Postal (to appear).
ON THE STATUS OF VERBAL REFLEXIVES
Simon C Dik
Institute for General Linguistics
University of Amsterdam
o. Introduction
In describing reflexive relationships (relationships between some entity and

itself), languages can follow different strategies (cf. Faltz 1977). In the nominal
strategy, one of the term positions of a predicate-frame is filled with a nominal
or pronominal constituent which explicitly indicates referential identity with
some other term in the predication. This gives us familiar constructions such
as:
(1) a. English: John saw himself in the mirror

b. German : Johann sah sich im Spiegel
c. Dutch: Jan zag zichzelf in de spiegel.
Less familiar is the verbal strategy, in which there is no specific reflexive

(pro )nominal element, but in which the verb is marked in such a way as to make
it clear that the Subject relates to itself rather than to some other entity.
Consider the following opposition from Yavapai (Kendall 1976 : 129) :
(2) a. m-c8ul-r
you-wash-imperative 'Wash him !'
b. m-c8ul-v-{
you-wash-R-imperative 'Wash yourself!'
This paper discusses some properties of the verbal reflexive strategy. It argues
for the following points:
(i) Typically, verbal constructions of type (2b) are not specifically reflexive
constructions, but more general 'reduced' or detransitivized constructions which
can be used for a variety of purposes, only one of which is to indicate reflexive
relationships.
231
232 s. DIK
(ii) Within the framework of Functional Grammar (FG, cf. Dik 1978, 1980)
such constructions can be described by means of a rule of predicate formation,
which reduces the number of argument positions of a given predicate-frame
by one.
(iii) Such a rule of reduced predicate formation can be assumed to have a
unified semantic effect on the output predicate, the different uses of reduced
predicates can be understood as different interpretations of the general meaning
of the reduced predicate-frame.
(iv) Although reduced predicate formation can historically arise through a
reinterpretation of an earlier nominal reflexive construction, there is no reason
to assume that this is its only possible historical source.
The structure of this paper is as follows: section 1 summarizes some points
made in Faltz's (1977) typological study of reflexive constructions; section 2
presents a general theory of reduced predicate formation within the framework
of FG, and shows how different interpretations of reduced predicates ·can
be understood in terms of one unified underlying meaning; section 3 describes
the appearance of reduced predicates in four languages of different types;
section 4 gives some conclusions, discusses some implications of the analysis,
and sketches some wider perspectives. It also contains a brief comparison with
Langacker and Munro (I 975). who treated similar phenomena within a different
theoretical framework.
J. Faltz's typology
In his well-documented study of the typology of reflexive constructions,

Faltz (1977) makes a basic distinction between NP-reflexives and verbal
reflexives. NP-reflexives (or nominal reflexives) can be subdivided into several
subtypes, depending on the formal properties of the reflexive nominal element,
and on the different constraints which allow or forbid its occurrence in different
conditions.Faltz's study is mainly concerned with detailing this sUbtypology of
nominal reflexives.
Concerning verbal reflexives, he tries to establish the following points:
(a) a distinction must be made between verbal reflexives proper, and 'middle'
constructions. The former are specifically used for indicating reflexive relation-
ships, the latter are 'general purpose' intransitives which, in one of their possible
uses, can be made to indicate reflexive relationships.
(b) nominal reflexives may historically develop into verbal reflexives, typical-
THE STATUS OF VERBAL REFLEXIVES 233
ly via cliticization of the (pro )nominal reflexive term, and subsequent

incorporation of the cliticized element into the verb.
( c) verbal reflexives only come into being through the historical process
sketched in (b).
(d) verbal reflexives may historically develop into middle constructions; this
typically involves a widening of their range of possible uses.
With respect to these points, I should like to make the following comments.
As to (a), I believe it is to be doubted whether there are any truly 'verbal'
reflexives: verbally marked constructions which are only used for indicating
reflexive relationships I. What one finds again and again in languages of quite
different types is that the alleged verbal reflexive also has other uses, which·
cannot easily be understood in terms of a derived or metaphorical application
of a basically reflexive meaning. This would suggest that the basic dichotomy
is not between nominal and verbal reflexives, but between nominal reflexives
and verbal 'middles' which can also be used for reflexive purposes.
This has certain consequences for points (b )-(d): if there are, in fact, no
truly verbal reflexives, then the two steps specified in (b) and (d) must be
assumed to constitute a single step: the reinterpretation as 'middles' of original·
Iy nominal reflexives. Indeed it seems true that those nominal reflexives which
have historically developed into verbal constructions, have also acquired the
general properties of middle constructions.
As to point (b) : although a historical development from nominal reflexive
towards verbal middle construction can be documented in the history of the
Slavic, the Scandinavian, and the Romance languages, there is no reason to
assume that reinterpretation of nominal reflexives forms the only historicitl
source of middle constructions (or 'verbal reflexives', if they exist at all). Note
that Faltz's argumentation for thesis (b) is not particularly strong. It goes as
follows: we know that some verbal reflexives historically derive from nominal
reflexives; we have no other documented source for verbal reflexives; it is
simpler to assume a single historical source for a given construction than a
multiple one; therefore, we may assume that all verbal reflexives historically
derived from earlier nominal reflexives.
As we shall see below, for certain middles which can be used for reflexive
duty there is no reason to assume that they go back to earlier nominal reflexives.
On the contrary, there is some evidence that they don't. I return to this point
in section 4.2. below.
234 S. DIK
2. A theory of reduced predicate formation
Many languages have productive rules for detransitivizing transitive

predicates. Such rules have recurrent effects on the meaning of the output pre-
dicate, in this sense that detransitivized predicates in quite different languages
are used in a similar range of applications.
Within the framework of FG, such detransitivizing operations would be
captured by means of rules of 'predicate formation'. Predicate formation rules
are productive rules which take predicate-frames as input and deliver derived
predicate-frames as output. Since they are necessarily productive rules, they have
predictable effects on both the form and the meaning of their output.
Some general properties of predicate formation rules were discussed in
Dik (1980 : chapters 2 and 3). Some types of predicate formation may affect
the argument structure of the input predicate: they may increase or reduce the
number of argument positions of the input predicate-frame. We can now see
detransitivizing rules as examples of the latter: predicate formation rules which
reduce the number of argument positions of the input predicate-frame by one.
I will now give a general schema for detransitivizing predicate formation
rules, and then discuss some of their recurrent properties:
(3) DETRANSITIYIZING PREDICATE FORMATION

input: predy (xI)(X2)
output: predy-R (Xl)
MEANING: 'the relation expressed by predy applies in XI'
Thus, the rule takes in a two-place verbal predicate-frame, and delivers a derived
predicate-frame with only one argument position, marked by some element R
(= Reduction) which symbolizes its derived nature. The derived meaning is that
the original input relation is applied only to a single entity.
A more concrete example of this schema could be something like:
(4) input: hity (XI)Ag (x2)Go

output: hity-R (xI>
MEANING: 'the relation of hitting applies to XI'
Now, the derived meaning of predicates formed in this way would seem to
present something of a paradox: how can a two-place relation be relevant to
only a single entity? This paradox, however, is precisely what I would wish
to regard as the whole point of the detransitivization operation. Indeed, the
derived predicate can be regarded as presenting a riddle, which can be solved in

different ways. Let us formulate this as a task for the interpreter :
. (5) TASK:
Given a two-place relation R2 and a single entity a, construct an
interpretation in which R2 is applied to a.
Let us first assume that the single entity a indicates an individual of a kind which
would normally appear as the first argument (in the case of (4), the Agent) of
the input predicate. In other words, let us assume a construction of the form:
(6) The man hit-R
In that case, there would seem to be two possible solutions to task (5) :
(A) unspecified second argument interpretation
In this interpretation, the interpreter reconstructs a general second

argument for the relation R2, and comes up with an interpretation along the
lines of :
(7) 'The man hit (something or other)'
Graphically, this interpretation can be represented as :
where x indicates the reconstructed second argument.

The question now arises: if (8) is the intended interpretation, why should
the second argument of R2 remain unspecified? One reason may be that the
identity of x is completely unimportant to the message to be transmitted: the
emphasis is on a's relating to something in an R2-way, not on the particular
entity to which a relates in this way. This may easily lead over to a 'de-
actualized' interpretation, in which the expression involved is not taken to
describe some actual event in time and space, but rather some general property
or disposition of a's, along the lines of :
(9) 'The man is a (habitual, potential) x-hitter'

236 s. DIK
(B) reflexive interpretation
Another way in which task (5) can be solved is by assuming that a does not
only provide the first, but also the second argument to R2. This would lead to
an interpretation along the lines of :
( 10) The marl hit himself'
which can be graphically represented as :
(II) 0~ R2
Since in this interpretation both the first and the second argument are equally
specific (both are provided by a), there is no reason to expect any 'de-
actualizing' effect in this interpretation.
Note that we are assuming that, although construction (6) can in this way
get a reflexive interpretation, it is not, in itself, a reflexive construction: the
reflexive interpretation comes out as one of the possible solutions to the task
posed by the general meaning of the construction.
Let us now assume that the single entity rather indicates an individual which
would normally appear as the second argument of R2. For instance, let us
assume a construction of the form:
(12)The ball hit-R
In such a case, a third solution to task (5) would be more probable:
(C) unspecified first argument interpretation
In this interpretation, the interpreter reconstructs a general first argument

for the relation R2, and interprets along the lines of :
(13) '(someone or something) hit the ball'
which can graphically be represented as :
(14) 0 R2_0
In this interpretation, then, the detransitivized predicate would have an effect

quite similar to an Agent-less passive such as :
(15 )The ball was hit
Note that we do not say that (12) is a passive construction, but that it can get
an interpretation which is quite similar to that of a passive construction. Since
a reconstructed argument is involved, just as in interpretation (A), we might
again expect a possible de-actualization, along the lines of :
(16) 'The ball has the property of typically being hit by some x'
Note that, if a would represent some entity that could just as well be first or
second argument of R2, we might expect the construction involved to be three-
ways ambiguous as between interpretations (A), (8), and (C). Thus, we might
expect an expression such as (6) to also be open to a third interpretation, of
type (C) :
(17) '(someone or something) hit the man'
(18) 'the man is typically hit by (someone or something),
Let us now assume that the single argument of the detransitivized predicate
consists of some expression A, which indicates a set of entities ai' a2' ... , an"
Thus, suppose we have a construction of the form:
(19)The men hit-R
According to (A}--(C), we would at least expect the following possible

interpretations :
(20)(a) 'the men hit (something or other)'

(b) 'the men hit themselves'
(c) '(something or other) hit the men'
In this case, however, there is a further possible solution to task (5), namely:
(D) reciprocal interpretation
In this interpretation, the relation R2 is assumed to hold between the indi-

viduals al' a2' ... , an which together make up the set A. Thus:
(21) 'The men hit each other'

238 s. DIK
or graphically:
(22)
We have thus seen that on the basis of a single detransitivizing predicate

formation rule, and starting from a unified 'paradoxical meaning of the
derived predicate, four different types of interpretation: (A), (B), (C), and (D)
can be derived in different conditions, and that in the case of (A) and (C),
but not in the case of (B) and (D), we may expect a further, 'de-actualizing'
element in the interpretation.
The application of a detransitivized predicate to a reflexive relationship is,
according to this approach, a matter of interpretation rather than of underlying
meaning of the construction as such.
Let us now look at the situation in some languages to see to what extent
this theory sheds light on the actual arrays of possible interpretations found.
3. Detransitivization in some specific languages
In this section I discuss the relevant facts in four languages: Serbo-Croatian,

Dyirbal, Yavapai, and Hixkaryana. This selection cannot, of course, provide a
complete picture of the phenomena involved. But the fact that, although these
languages are from widely divergent families, they still have quite similar proper-
ties in the realm of detransitivization, is at least reassuring with respect to the
general validity of the theory sketched in section 2.
3.1. The case of Serbo-Croatian

In Dik and Gvozdanovic (1981) we have studied the properties of the so-
called pseudo-reflexive construction in Serbo-Croatian. This construction is
exemplified in the following opposition:
(23)a. Ivan gradi kucu (active)

Ivan-nom builds house-acc
'Ivan is building a house'
b. Kuca se gradi (pseudo-reflexive)

house-nom se builds
'A house is being built'
We have shown that constructions of type (23b) might in principle be

described through Subject assignment to the Goal term of the predicate-frame
graditi v (x1)Ag (x2)Go' but that such a description leaves much to be desired
in terms of explanatory adequacy. In particular, the following facts remain un-
explained in such an analysis:
(i) no Agent term can ever be added to constructions of type (23b).
(ii) this construction type is possible only with inanimate terms.
(iii) the construction often has a generic/habitual rather than an 'actual'
meaning.
(iv) there are quite a few other constructions with se which, if the analysis
mentioned is accepted, would have to be assumed to have no connection
whatsoever with constructions such as (23b).
Consider, first, point (iv). By the side of the pseudo-reflexive construction il-
lustrated in (23b), Serbo-Croatian has the following constructions with se :
(a) 'true' reflexive, as in :
(24)Ivan se je ubio
Ivan se aux killed
'Ivan killed himself'
(b) reciprocal, as in the second interpretation of I
(25)Djeca su se vidjela
children aux se seen
== (i) 'The children saw themselves'
(ii) 'The children saw each other'
(c) impersonal, as in :
(26)Spava se na podu
sleeps se on ground
'One sleeps on the ground'
(d) 'modal'
240 S. DIK
This is a special kind of construction, which can be regarded as a pseudo-

reflexive or impersonal se-construction, extended by a term in the dative. The
resulting construction is interpreted along the lines of: 'X feels like .. .'.
Consider:
(27) Meni se gradi kuca

to-me se builds house
'I feel like building a house'
(28)Meni se spava na podu

to-me se sleeps on ground
'I feel like sleeping on the ground'
In order to arrive at a unified account of these different constructions with

se, it was proposed in Dik and Gvozdanovic (1981) that they should all be
handled through a rule of detransitivizing predicate formation of the form
discussed in section 2 above, as indicated in (3). We can then understand se
as the marker of the detransitivized character of the derived predicate, and the
reflexive, the reciprocal, and the pseudo-reflexive uses can be explained as
corresponding to the interpretations (B), (D), and (C), respectively, as outlined
in section 2 above. The impersonal use of the se-construction can be accounted
for if we assume that the relevant rule of predicate formation is not only
applicable to transitive input predicates, but also to intransitive ones. If an
intransitive predicate is reduced by one argument, then no further argument is
left, and the only possible derived meaning would be something like: 'the
property expressed by the input predicate applies'. This, then, could only get
the impersonal interpretation, as in (26). For this reason, the relevant rule of
predicate formation was formulated as a general argument-reduction rule (for
'1
details, see Dik and Gvozdanovic (1981)t.
Now consider what this analysis says about the so-called modal construction
illustrated in (27). A literal paraphrase of the meaning of this construction
would be something like :
(29)'To me, the relation of building applies to a house'
Although this does not immediately give us the desiderative interpretation

'I feel like building a house', it seems at least understandable how such an
interpretation could be arrived at through a specialization of (29).
Now consider the other three properties (i)-(iii) which, as mentioned above,
we would want a description of the se-construction to account for. Fact (i),
that pseudo-reflexives allow no Agent to be expressed, follows immediately

from the analysis: the derived predicate-frame in the case of a transitive input
predicate has only one argument position. Therefore, if that position is not
itself occupied by an Agent term, there is no further room for an Agent term
to be expressed.
Fact (ii) was, that only inanimate terms could occur in the pseudo-reflexive
construction. This does not immediately follow from the analysis. However,
suppose this constraint would not hold. Then, constructions such as (30) would
be ambiguous:
(30)lvan se je ubio
Ivan se aux killed
(0 'Ivan killed himself'
(ij) '(Something or someone) killed Ivan'
The constraint against animate terms in the pseudo-reflexive can now be inter-
preted as a measure to avoid this ambiguity of (30) : it excludes (ii).
Fact (iii), finally, was that pseudo-reflective constructions tend to assume
a generic or habitual rather than an 'actual' interpretation. For examples, see
Dik and Gvozdanovic (1981). This fact we have seen to be predictable when the
interpretation runs along the lines of (C), in which an unspecified first argument
is reconstructed. Note that a construction such as :
(31 ) Matematika se uci lako

mathematics se learns slowly
'Mathematics is learned slowly'
would hardly make much sense as the deSCription of some actual event. It is
quite understandable, then, that the interpretation takes the generic route:
'Mathematics is such that, if anyone wishes to learn it, the learning is a slow
process'.
The different uses of the se-construction in Serbo-Croatian thus seem to be
interpetable in terms of the theory sketched in section 2. A special property of
Serbo-Croatian is, that this construction can also be used in 'impersonal' appli-
cations. This fact could be incorporated within the same theory by the
assumption that se-predicate formation can also be appiied to intransitive input
predicates, which are then deprived of their only argument position and thus
end up as expressions which claim a certain property to apply, without
specifying an entity to which the property applies 3 .
242 s. DlK
3.2. The case of Dyirbal
Dyirbal (Dixon (1972)) is an ergative language, at least as far as nominal

terms are concerned. These take the Agent in the ergative and the Goal in the
absolutive. Pronominal terms, however, have nominative-accusative morphology.
As in other Australian languages, verbs are strictly classified into transitive and
intransitive subcategories, and there are a number of processes by which
transitive verbs can be detransitivized, and intransitive verbs transitivized. One
detransitivization process is the so-called 'antipassive' construction. In Dyirbal,
this construction mainly serves a syntactic purpose : it can be used to get a
transitive Agent (normally expressed in the ergative) into the position of an
intransitive argument, expressed in the absolutive. At the same time the verb is
marked with a suffix -'jay. and the original Goal, which appeared in the
absolutive, now comes out in an oblique case (mostly dative, sometimes
instrumental which happens to be identical to the ergative). The resulting
opposition is illustrated in the following pair:
(32)bayi bargan baI}gul yarangu dYurganYu

det-abs wallaby-abs det-erg man-erg spear
'The man is spearing the wallaby'
(33)bayi yara baI)gul bargandu dYurgananYu (or: bagul bargangu)

det-abs man-abs det-instr wallaby-instr spear (det-dat wallaby-dat)
'The man is spearing the wallaby'
Although there is no clear difference in meaning between (32) and (33), the
opposition is quite important in Dyirbal, because there are a number of
syntactic and discourse rules which require a nominal term which is coreferential
to another nominal term in the abso!utive, to also be in the absolutive. Thus,
if a transitive Agent is the target of such a rule, the antipassive can be used to
get it into absolutive position.
Notice that the derived antipassive verb has all the characteristics of an
intransitive verb. This also means that the dative/instrumental term in (33) is
related to the verb in another, more indirect way than the absolutive term
in (32).
There is another antipassive construction in Dyirbal, which takes another
suffix on the verb (-rry and variants), but otherwise has the same syntactic
characteristics as the -'lay antipassive. Compare the following pair:
(34)balam wudYu bal)gul yarangu dYanganYu

det-abs fruit-abs det-erg man-erg eat
'The man is eating fruit'
(35)bayi yara dYal}gaymarinYu bagum wudYugu

det-abs man-abs eat det-dat fruit-dat
'The man eats fruit'
The construction with.,ry can be used under the same circumstances as the
construction with "'jay, but there is a semantic difference: whereas the -t;ay
construction describes the actual occurrence of an event, the.,(y construction
is used to describe rather the potentiality of some event occurring. Thus, in (33)
the man in question must be actually spearing a wallaby, but (35) can be used
to express that the man is a fruit-eater, even though at the time he may not be
eating at all (Dixon ibid. 91).
The oblique (dative·instrumental) constituents in such constructions as (33)
and (35) are not obligatory: they can be left out, which again shows that the
nuclear construction is an intransitive predication, which can be extended by an
optional constituent in dative or instrumental. Thus, we can have:
(36)bayi dYangaymarinYu
det-abs eat
'He eats'
Now it is this construction which can also be used to describe reflexive

relations. In the case of (36), this is semantically a bit implausible, but compare
the following pair:
(37)bala yugu baI}gul yara.IJgu buy ban

det-abs stick-abs det-erg man-erg hide
'The man hides the stick'
(38) bayi yara buybayirinYu

det-abs 'man-abs hide
'The man hides'
'The man hides himself'
This construction, then, can either be interpreted along the lines of 'the man
is potentially involved in hiding-events', or as 'the man is hiding himself. There
is a way of forcing out the reflexive interpretation, by optionally adding the
suffix -dYilu to the argument of the -rfy construction. Compare:
244 S. DIK
(39)bayindYilu dYaIJgaymarinYu
det-self-abs eat
'He is eating himself'
as used, for instance, of a man who is chewing his fingers.

Now the question is: how do the 'potential' and the 'reflexive' inter-
pretation of the -rly intransitive construction relate to each other. In Dixon's
analysis, these two are seen as two different constructions which happen to
coincide in form. The suffix -ny is primarily described as the reflexive suffix,
and those constructions which receive a reflexive interpretation are described
as 'true ret1exives' (ibid. 90-91). Constructions of this form which get a
'potential' rather than a reflexive interpretation are described as 'false reflexives'.
In his 'deep' analysis of these constructions, correspondingly, Dixon (ibid.
149 ff.) postulates two different transformations for these two uses of the -rry
construction. The reflexive construction is derived from an underlying repre-
sentation of the form (man)(hide)(man), which is transformed into (man)
(hiderefl); the 'potential' construction is derived in the same way as the -'.Jay
construction, through a restructuring transformation which operates on an
underlying transitive construction with different Agent and Goal arguments.
One drawback of this analysis is, that it does not make us understand why
it is that the same form of the verb is used in these two cases: the two
construction types would seem to be totally unrelated. Also, it does not explain
why the reflexive construction takes a verb with intransitive characteristics:
after all, a reflexive relation is a two-place relation in which, however, the two
arguments are coreferential4 .
It would seem that a more unified account of these different constructions
with -rry in Dyirbal could be arrived at in terms of the theory developed in
section 2. Let us postulate the following rule of predicate formation for
Dyirbal:
(40) DETRANSITIY IZING rzy-PREDICA TE FO RMA TION

input : predYtr (x I) (X2)
output : pred-rtYYintr (xl)
MEANING: 'the relation expressed by predYtr applies to xl'
The two applications of ny-predicates can now be seen as exemplifying

solution (A): unspecified second argument interpretation (with a concomitant
'de-actualization' which in this case gives us the 'potential' element in the
interpretation), and solution (B) : reflexive interpretation.
The Dyirbal construction cannot be interpreted according to (C) : unspecified

rust argument, or (D) : reciprocal. This would seem to weaken our theory
considerably, but in fact it does not, because the non-applicability of these
interpretations can be easily explained.
First consider interpretation (C). For this interpretation to be possible we
would need terms in the single argument position of the derived predicate,
which would correspond to the second argument of the input predicate. Thus,
we would expect something like :
(41) *balam wudYu dYangaymarinYil

det-abs fruit-abs eat-R
'(someone or other) is eating the fruit'
Why is this impossible? The answer is simple: there is a much more direct way
of expressing the intended meaning. A peculiarity of Dyirbal is, that in the
transitive ergative construction the absolutive nominal is obligatory, and the
ergative nominal optional.
Thus, given a construction such as (34) above, the ergative Agent can be
left out, resulting in :
(42)balam wudYu dYanganYu

det-abs fruit-abs eat
'The fruit is being eaten (by someone or other)'
Thus, there is no need for any roundabout predicate formation operation

to arrive at a construction with an unspecified Agent argument.
That the ,.ry-predicate does not get a reciprocal interpretation can be
explained by the fact that Dyirbal has another predicate formation rule which
results in explicitly reciprocal constructions. This is also a detransitivizing
operation, but it involves (a) another suffix on the verb, and (b) (partial)
reduplication of the verb stem (Dixon 1972 : 92--93, 212 ff.). Reduplication
of this kind usually indicates that some action is performed 'many times', and
the reciprocal construction requires an argument which designates at least two
entities. The meaning of the derived reciprocal predicate, then, would be
something like: 'The two-place relation R2 is multiply applicable to the
members of the set indicated by the argument term' (cf. Dixon 1972 : 214).
The availability of a specific reciprocal construction can then be taken as
blocking a reciprocal interpretation for the riy-construction.
As Dixon notes elsewhere (1980 : 433), however, other Australian languages
246 S. DIK
use the same suffix for both the reflexive and the reciprocal condition. In such
languages, then, we expect the relevant derived predicate, when applied to a
non-singular term, to be interpretable in the following ways:
(43)a. 'The men are (potentially or habitually) hiding (something)'

b. 'The men are hiding themselves'
c. 'The men are hiding each other'
It seems that even in languages. which use the same suffix for these different
conditions, reduplication of the verb may (optionally?) be used in order to
force out the reciprocal interpretation.
3.3. The case of Yavapai
We saw in (2a-b) above that in Yavapai (a Yuman language described in

Kendall (1976)) a reflexive relationship may be designated through a verbal
form marked with the suffix -V-. This, however, is only one of the possible
functions of this verbal form, which Kendall terms the 'medio-passive'. Other
applications of this form include the following:
(a) unspecified Object, as in the second interpretation of:
(44 );lfia-c ~-ceul-v-km

I-Subj I-wash-R-incompl
(i) 'I am washing (myself)'
(ii) 'I am washing (something)'
(b) pseudo-passive, as in the second sentence of the following pair:
(45)a. 8ala-c hlo si:l-kfi

Thala-Subj rabbit fry-compl
'Thala fried the rabbit'
b. hlo-v-csi:l-v-kfi
rabbit-dem-Subj fry-R-compl
'The rabbit (was) fried'
( c) reciprocal, as in :
(46)'fia-c kula-m hWak-k '-scyut-v-c-kfi

I-Subj Kula-with two I-tattoo-R-plur-compl
'I with Kula, the two of us, tattooed'
= 'I and Kula tattooed each other'
Kendall correctly notes that if these different constructions were to be

described by standard transformational methods for handling reflexives. reci-
procals, etc., all these different uses of verbs with the marker -v- would have
to be derived from different underlying sources. In that case. it would seem to
be a mere coincidence that all these different structures are mapped onto the
same form, and any attempt at finding some common property in them would
be given up. For that reason, Kendall argues for a lexicalist solution, in which
verb stems extended with -r- would be listed in the lexicon by the side of basic
stems, and interpretive rules would be formulated in order to explain the
different possible interpretations of such extended verb stems. Kendall's
rejection of separate syntactic derivations for the different applications of the
medio-passive is surely correct. But it is unfortunate that Transformational
Grammar only provides the lexicalist alternative, which involves the costly
procedure of listing all the derived verb forms which, presumably, could be
formed by productive rule.
It is here that we see the advantage of having, as in FG, a separate component
of productive predicate formation rules (cf. Dik, 1980 : 27). It would seem
correct to assume that the Yavapai verbal forms in -v- are produced by a de-
transitivizing predicate formation rule according to the theory sketched in
section 2 above. Note that the different possible interpretations of these forms
precisely correspond to (A) unspecified second argument, (B) reflexive, (C) un-
specified first argument, and (D) reciprocal. Kendall gives no information as
to whether any kind of 'de-actualization' is or may be involved in inter-
pretations (A) and (C).
There is one further usage of the suffIx -v- which cannot be so easily
explained in the same way. Consider:
(47)ki9ar-c vhe:-v-km
dog-Subj tail-?-incompl
'The dog is tailed', 'The dog has a tail'
First, it seems that -v- is here attached to a nominal rather than to a verbal stem,
and second, no reduction of argument positions seems. to be involved.
Presumably, this -v- expresses another type of predicate formation, in which
a nominal stem is verbalized into an intransitive verb.
We saw in section 3.2. that Dyirbal has a way of forcing out the reflexive
interpretation of the detransitivized verb. The same is true of Yavapai. Consider:
248 S. DIK
(48) ?iia-c kula-m hWak-k yem ?-scyut-v-c-kii

l-Subj Kula-with two l-tattoo-R-plur-compl
'I and Kula tattooed ourselves'
and compare this construction with (46), which was given a reciprocal inter-
pretation. (48) can only get a reflexive interpretation, and this is due to the
optional element yem, which can also be used in non-reflexive constructions
with an adverbial reading such as 'all alone', 'all by oneself. This comes out
quite clearly in the following opposition:
(49)a. hmaii-c yem lap-kii

child-Subj alone strike-compl
'The child struck (it) all by himself'
b. hman-c yem lap-v-kii
child-Subj alone strike-R-compl
'The child struck himself'
Thus, it would be correct to say that (48) and (49b) are reflexive constructions:
they necessarily get a reflexive interpretation. However, they are quite different
from the more familiar nominal reflexives : the reflexive interpretation comes
out as the resultant of a detransitivized verb which merely says: 'the underlying
two-place relation applies to the single entity x', plus an adverbial element which
says that x is involved 'all alone'. Another difference is, of course, that the
latter element is optional, and only used when otherwise the verbal construction
in itself would be too vague to achieve its communicative purposes.
3.4. The case of Hixkaryana
In Hixkaryana (a Carib language of Northern Brazil, described in Derbyshire

(1979», reflexive relationships can be designated by means of verbal forms
marked with a prefix e-j-osj-otj-asj-at, the primary function of which is, as
Derbyshire states (ibid. 62), to act as a 'detransitivizer', as a means of decreasing
the valency of a verbal stem. This suffix is only applicable to transitive verb
stems (and to some neutral stems, where neutral stems are those which must
be morphologically extended for both transitive and intransitive usage). The
derived verb form is intransitive. Not surprisingly, this derived verb form has,
apart from its reflexive interpretation, the following further interpretations:
(a) reciprocal, (b) pseudo-passive, (c) simple intransitive. All these possibilities
are illustrated in the following examples, of which (50a) presents a normal
transitive construction (notice that Hixkaryana has OVS, or Goal-V-Agent

order !), whereas (SOb) gives a corresponding detransitivized construction
(ibid.) :
(SO)a. bHyekomo komo yompamnohyako Nonato, karaywa rwon hoko

child coIl he-taught-them Nonato, non-Indian talk-of concerning
'Nonato was teaching the children concerning Portuguese'
b. nosompamnohyatxoko b+ryekomo komo, karaywa rwom hoko
IIIS-detrans-teach-rec past child coIl, non-Ind. talk-of conc.
(i) 'The children taught themselves, concerning Portuguese'

(ii) 'The children taught each other, concerning Portuguese'
(iii) 'The children were taught, concerning Portuguese'
(iv) 'The children learnt Porguguese'
Note that these interpretations again correspond to (8) reflexive, (0) reciprocal,
(C) unspecified first argument. Interpretation (iv), however, cannot be simply
equated with interpretation (A) unspecified second argument, since in that case
the interpretation should be The children taughi (someone or other), rather
than The children learnt'. Rather, (iv) would seem to be a specialization of
(i) or (iii).
Note that Hixkaryana has no regular passive construction, and that when
the detransitivized verb is used in its pseudo-passive application, it is impossible
for an overt Agent to be expressed (ibid. 90).
It would seem correct to say, then, that the construction is neither reflexive
nor passive as such, but another example of a detransitivized predicate with
'reflexive' and 'unspecified Agent' interpretations.
A detransitivizing predicate formation rule would thus seem to be the
correct means for describing this construction.
4. Discussion
This section discusses some implications of the analysis suggested in this

paper. 4.1. gives some conclusions to be derived from the preceding sections;
4.2. discusses Faltz's guess concerning the historical origin of 'verbal
reflexives'; 4.3. gives a brief comparison with Langacker and Munro's (1975)
treatment of passives and impersonals.
250 s. DIK
4.1. Some conclusions
We saw that in languages of quite different types, constructions which at

first sight might be classed as 'verbal reflexives', at second sight turn out to
have a recurrent range of other uses which cannot be interpreted as special uses
of a basic reflexive meaning. Such constructions, then, should not be regarded
as intrinsically reflexive, but rather as detransitivized or argument-reduced
predicates, with a more general intrinsic content along the lines of : 'the n-place
relation Rn applies to n-l entities'. It was argued that the following distinct
interpretations could be assigned to such a general content in different
conditions :
(A)unspecified second argument interpretation
(i) actual (specific)
(ii) de-actualized (generic, habitual, potential)
(8) reflexive interpretation
(C) unspecified first argument interpretation
(i) actual
(ii) de-actualized
(0) reciprocal interpretation
In some cases in which not all of the interpretations (A)-(O) could be

assigned to a given detransitivized predicate, it was possible to explain the
non-occurrence of a given interpretation in terms of (a) avoidance of ambiguity,
(b) availability of another construction which more directly or more specifical-
ly signified this interpretation.
We further saw that in some languages the detransitivization operation
generalizes to one-place input predicates, resulting in a more general argument
reduction rule, the output of which can also get 'impersonal' interpretations.
Several of the languages considered turned out to have means of 'forcing
out' one or more of the interpretations (A)--(O) by optionally extending the
de transitive predicate by some element which unambiguously signalled this/
these in terpreta tion( s).
Finally, we argued that within the framework of FG the concept of
predicate fonnation rule seemed an adequate means for capturing the relevant
detransitivization or argument-reduction operations. Predicate formation rules
take predicate-frames as input and deliver derived predicate-frames as output.
They thus extend the set of predicate-frames from which predications can be
constructed. They do not form part of the lexicon, which in FG is conceived as

containing only the set of basic (== non-derived) predicate-frames.
4.2. Faltz's guess concerning the historical origin of verbal reflexives
We saw in section 1 above that Faltz (1977) assumes that verbal reflexives
can historically only develop from earlier nominal reflexives. That nominal
reflexives can develop into verbal reflexives (or middles) is beyond doubt:
such a development can be positively attested from the history of different
language families. That verbal reflexives only arise in this way, however, is a
guess based on (a) lack of evidence to the contrary, (b) the assumption that
a single historical source is to be preferred to a multiple one.
From our perspective, we have several reasons for assuming this guess to
be incorrect.
First, note that in our analysis a detransitivization operation is c:ttegorical-
ly different from processes underlying the formation of nominal reflexives.
We must assume that nominal reflexives can get historically reinterpreted in
terms of detransitivization. But there is no logical reason why a language could
not have a detransitivization rule quite independent of any antecedent nominal
reflexive construction.
Second, consider the situation in Australian languages, as described in
Dixon (1980). Most of these indicate reflexive relationships as in Dyirbal, by
means of a detransitivized verb involving a suffix which can even be retraced
to a common proto-stage *-DHirri-y (ibid. 447--8). In different Australian
languages, the reflexes of this suffix have different ranges of application,
but the common denominator always seems to be 'detransitivization' rather
than 'reflexive'. There is no indication that the reconstructed proto-Australian
suffix has some earlier, nominal reflexive source. Some Australian languages
do have nominal reflexive constructions (ibid. 434), but (a) in such languages
the verb appears to behave as transitive rather than intransitive, (b) the reflexive
elements found in such languages seem to bear no resemblance to the
detransitivizing suffix used in the other Australian languages. Thus, it does not
only seem unnecessary, but even improbable that the detransitivizing suffix
arose from an earlier nominal reflexive element.
Third, a positive counter-example to Faltz's guess is provided in Langacker
and Munro's (1975) discussion of the history of Uto- Aztecan 'passive'
constructions. For these languages, an original suffix *-t~wa can be
252 S. DIK
reconstructed with a pseudo-passive and an impersonal usage. From our point

of view, this suffix would certainly be seen as the expression of an argument-
reduction operation similar to the one which we found in Serbo-Croatian. In
some of the Uto-Aztecan languages, an originally nominal reflexive construction
has been extended to or reinterpreted as a pseudo-passive marker. In some,
less frequent cases, however, the passive-impersonal marker has been extended
to reflexive interpretations, as in Tarahumara :
(51) muhe pago-ru

you wash-impersonal 'You wash yourself'
(ibid. 803). This would seem to constitute clear proof that a verbal reflexive
may not only arise through a reinterpretation of an earlier nominal reflexive,
but also through an extension (which, in our approach, is a 'natural' one) of
a detransitivization operation with a reflexive interpretation.
One might of course try to salvage Faltz's guess by claiming that both in the
Australian and in the Uta-Aztecan case, the original detransitivization suffix
itself goes back to an even earlier nominal reflexive. But, as far as I can see, this
would be merespeculation about developments which might have preceded even
the earliest reconstructed proto-stage of these languages. And, from our point
of view, there is no intrinsic reason for wanting such speCUlation to be true.
4.3. Comparison with Langacker and Munro's analysis
Langacker and Munro (I975) discuss data similar to those treated in the
present paper, in the context of an alternative transformational hypothesis
concerning the fundamental nature of 'passive' constructions. Their analysis
is based on (mainly historical) phenomena observed in the Uto-Aztecan
languages, and on (mainly synchronic) properties of Mojave,a Yuman language
related to Yavapai, which we di3cussed in section 3.3. above. But the analysis is
assumed to be extendible to passive constructions in general.
The main features of the analysis concerning the underlying structure of
passives are presented in the following diagram:
(52)
This would provide the underlying structure for a construction such as :
(53)The chicken was killed
Note the following properties of the analysis:

(a) the passive contains an underlying sentence with a unspecified Subject;
(b) this sentence is itself the Subject of a higher verb BE;
(c) the underlying structure does not contain a slot for an overt Agent;
thus, in the case of a construction such as The chicken was killed by Peter,
the Agent phrase must be assumed to originate from some 'outside source'.
The fact that reflexives can be reinterpreted in terms of this structure, and
that this structure can extend to reflexive uses, is accounted for in terms of
the notion 'non-distinct arguments'. In the reflexive, we have two identical
arguments (x, x), and in the passive, we have one specified and one un-
specified argument (t., x); the common factor is, that in both cases the argu-
ments are non-distinct, as opposed to distinct argument pairs of type (x, y).
Langacker and Munro (ibid. 803) consider the following historical develop-
ments as possible, each of them involving a widening of the scope of the left-
hand construction in terms of a generalization towards 'non-distinctness':
(54)a. x x V > x V
{~}
b. x x V > x V
t~}
(55)a. t. x V > V
{~}
x
t. >
{~}
b. x V x V
254 S. DlK
In (54a), a reflexive construction is extended to an unspecified Subject

construction, in (54b) to an unspecified Object construction; in (55a), an
unspecified Subject construction is extended to a reflexive, and in (55b), an
unspecified Object construction is so extended.
Apart from differences in theoretical assumptions, it is clear that the FG
analysis developed in this paper has much in common with Langacker and
Munro's transformational hypothesis. Let us therefore pinpoint the main
differences:
(i) a higher Verb analysis such as incorporated in (52) would not be feasible
within FG. Auxiliaries such as used in passive constructions would rather be
treated in terms of expression rules which determine the form of the predicate,
given the configuration in which it occurs (cf. Dik (I 981».
(ii) our analysis in terms of 'reduction by one argument' potentially
generalizes over 'unspecified Subject' and 'unspecified Object' cases.
Langacker and Munro have to assume two different underlying representations
for these cases. I doubt the correctness of their statement (ibid. 802 n. 20) that
'an affix used to indicate unspecified subjects will not in general be used with
unspecified objects, and conversely'. If this statement is correct, however, de-
transitivization rules of type (3) will have to be reconsidered and to be made
more precise in such a way that they do not only tell us that one argument is
reduced, but also which argument.
(iii) our analysis is formulated at the level of predicate formation, not at the
level of sentence construction; in the relevant cases, we do not have an argument
position which is unspecified, but we do not have the argument position itself.
That is, the argument in question could not even be specified in the derived
predicate-frame. Note that, as in the case of any nuclear predicate-frame,
satellites may be added for indicating the cause, the means, the intermediary
etc. through which the nuclear event occurred.
(iv) our analysis does not generalize to the more familiar type of passive
construction. Passives are treated in FG through assignment of Subject function
to some non-first-argument of a given predication. Such an underlying
predication necessarily contains a position for the first argument; this position
may be filled, resulting in an Agent phrase, or it may be left unspecified, as in
the case of the truncated or Agent-less passive. This draws a sharp line between
constructions which cannot possibly have an overt Agent, and constructions
which can have such an overt Agent, although its position may be left
unspecified even in the majority of actual uses.
(v) our explanation of the interaction between reflexivity and argument-

reduction would be slightly different: in our analysis, the crucial question is
whether we are dealing with a transitive, two-argument structure, or a
detransitivized, one-argument structure. Reflexives are regarded as ambivalent
in this respect. They can be seen as relations with two distinct, but identical
arguments, or as relations which re-apply, loop-wise, to one single argument
position. This would explain why a reflexive construction can get reinterpreted
as a one-argument construction, and conversely, why a one-argument
construction can get a reflexive interpretation.
I fully realize that the analysis suggested in this paper raises perhaps as many
questions as it pretends to solve. Much further research will be required in order
to determine the feasibility of this analysis.
NOTES
IThere is some danger of terminological equivocation here, however, since

Faltz uses the term 'verbal reflexive' not only for verbally marked constructions
which are explicitly reflexive, but also for 'the reflexive use of the middle
strategies' (1977: 15). In general, it is not quite clear which criteria should
be judged necessary and sufficient for deciding whether a given strategy is
nominal, verbal, or middle. For discussion, see Faltz (1977 : 53 fL).
21 would not now use the term 'reflexive predicate form ation', as in Dik and
GvozdanoviC (1981), since, if the analysis is correct, there is nothing specifically
'reflexive' about the derived predicate. Note that Serbo-Croatian presents
another problem for the notion 'verbal reflexive' : the element se is a clitic,
but it is not part of the verb in any sense. Serbo-Croatian c1itics go to second
position in the clause; they do not specifically associate with the verb. In FG,
however, a predicate does not necessarily consist of one word. Thus, the notion
'derived predicate' can be used, even when it consists of a two-word
combination.
3A similar situation seems to have obtained in Uto-Aztecan languages (cf.
Langacker and Munro (1975), and section 4.3. beloW). These had a verbal suffix
which,when applied to transitive verbs, resulted in a pseudo-passive construction,
and, when applied to intransitive verbs, resulted in an impersonal construction.
In some of these languages, furthermore, an original reflexive construction
extended to pseudo-passive and impersonal uses.
4Note that in his later study on closely related YidinY, Dixon (1977 : 273 ff.,
410 fL) does try to account for the common properties of detransitivization
by means of the suffix -:dYin, which in some of its uses corresponds to Dyirbai
-,{Y, but even has wider distribution and some further semantic effects.
REFLEXIVIZATION IN ENGLISH
Susumu Kuno
Harvard University*
1. Introduction
There is a phenomenon in English which yields what Lakoff (1968) calls a

rule-ordering paradox between Pronominalization and Adverb Preposing. For
example, observe the following sentences:
(1) a. Johni found a snake near himi.

b. *Hei found a snake near J ohni.
c. Near himi, Johni found a snake.
d. *Near Johni, hei found a snake.
In a generative theoretical framework in which pronouns are derived trans-

formationally, we start out with a structure that can be represented informal-
ly as follows:
(2) [Johni found a snake near JohniJ
If we assume that Pronominalization is subject to some type of command

condition - for example, the Ross-Langacker condition, which states that a
pronoun cannot both precede and command a coreferential NP - the above
fact can be explained by applying Pronominalization before Adverb Preposing.
We apply Pronominalization to the structure of (2), yielding (la) and (* 1b).
Adverb Pre po sing then applies, generating the structures corresponding to
(lc) and (ld). (ld) is unacceptable because its source structure (lb) is
unacceptable.
Note that the above fact cannot be accounted for by ordering Adverb
Pre po sing before Pronominalization. According to this ordering of the rules,
257
258 S. KUNO
Pronominalization will apply to (2) if Adverb Preposing does not take place,
and to (3) if it does:
(3) [NearJohni, Johni found a snake]
The application of Pronominalization to (2) makes (la) acceptable and (lb)

unacceptable on the basis of the Ross-Langacker condition .. Its application to
(3) should make (I c) unacceptable, counterfactually, because him both precedes
and commands John. Similarly, it would mark (I d) counterfactually acceptable,
because the sentence does not violate the Ross-Langacker condition at all.
Thus, the ordering of Adverb Pre posing before Pronominalization makes wrong
predictions about the acceptability status of the sentences of (1). This firmly
establishes that Pronominalization must be applied before Adverb Preposing.
This ordering of the rules, however, runs into difficulty explaining the follow-
ing set of sentences :
(4) a. Johni found a snake near the girl hei was talking with.
b. *Hei found a snake near the girl Johni was talking with.
c. Near the girl hei was talking with, Johni found a snake.
d. Near the girl Johni was talking with, hei found a snake.
In the same theoretical framework, the following structure underlies these

sentences:
(5) [Johni found a snake near the girl [Johni was talking with]]
If Pronominalization precedes Adverb Preposing, (4d) should be unacceptable

because it is derived from the structure corresponding to (4b), which is un-
acceptable. On the other hand, the acceptability or unacceptability of all the
sentences of (4) is easily explainable if we assume that Adverb Preposing applies
before Pronominalization. If we do not apply Adverb Preposing, Pronominal-
ization applies to the structure of (5), and the Ross-Langacker constraint on
Pronominalization marks (4a) acceptable and (4b) unacceptable. On the other
hand, if Adverb Preposing applies, we obtain the following intermediate
structure:
(6) [Near the girl [Johni was talking with], Johni found a snake]
Pronominalization now applies to this structure. (4c) and (4d) are both possible
because in neither derivation does he both precede and command John. Thus,
REFLEXIVIZA nON IN ENGLISH 259
the data given in (4) firmly establish that Adverb Preposing must be applied
before Pronominalization. However, this rule ordering is in direct conflict with
the ordering established for the data given in (I). Hence arises Lakoffs rule-
ordering paradox.
In the above, I have shown that (1) and (4), in the transformational theory
for pronouns, yield a rule-ordering paradox. The same paradox arises in the
interpretative approach to pronominal reference also. J ackendoff (1972)
assumes that a rule for establishing coreference linkage between a pronoun and
a full-fledged NP applies cyclically at the end of each cycle. This rule basically
follows the same precede-command condition that Ross and Langacker proposed
for their transformational approach. On the basis of the sentences of (1), J acken-
doff assumed that this interpretive rule must apply before Adverb Preposing,
but noted the difficulty such a rule ordering would face accounting for the data
of (4). He left the problem unresolved.
An interpretive approach that assumes that pronominal reference is
established on the basis of surface structure also fails to account for the data
under discussion. Such an approach will try to determine if the pronoun and
John may be interpreted as coreferent in (1) and (4). If the conditon for
pronominal coreference in this framework is to be stated on the basis of some
kind of command relationship, which must be the case in order to establish the
fact that there is no co reference interpretation between he and John in (1 b)
and (4b), it will have a great deal of difficulty in establishing an interpretation
of coreference for (I c) and blocking an interpretation of coreference for (ld).
Thus, this approach has basically the same problem that the transformational
approach with Adverb Preposing before Pronominalization has been sho\Vn to
suffer from.
Reinhart (1976, 1981) has proposed that what controls pronominal co-
reference is not the concept of precede-command, but that of c-command :
while A commands B if A's immediate parent S(entence) node also dominates
B, A c-commands B only if A's immediate parent node, whatever category it
might be, also dominates B. For example. observe the following structure:
(7) [John [found a snake [near Mary lpp lvp ls
In the above structure,John commands Mary and Mary commands John because
John's immediate parent S-node dominates Mary, and vice versa. In contrast,
although John c-commands Mary (because John's immediate parent node also
dominates Mary) Mary does not c-command John because Mary's immediate
260 S. KUNO
parent node PP does not dominate John. Reinhart hypothesized that the
conditions for pronominal coreference can be stated on the basis of surface
structure, without recourse to the concept of "precede", simply by stating that
a pronoun cannot c-command a coreferential nonpronominal NP. According to
this analysis, (1 c) is acceptable because him does not c-command John (because
the immediate parent node PP of him does not dominate John), but (ld) is
unacceptable because he c-commands John (because the immediate parent node
S of he dominates John). However, as Carden (1981) has shown convincingly,
there does not seem to be any way to develop this c-command account of pro-
nominal co reference so as to make the correct predictions on the acceptability
status of the sentences in (4)1.
2. Reflexive Pronoun Analysis
In Kuno (1972b), I proposed to solve the rule-ordering paradox discussed

in the preceding section by hypothesizing that Reflexivization, which is a
cyclical rule, app~es obligatorily to all coreferential clausemate NPs (with the
trigger occupying a major constituent position in the sentence) and marks the
righthand NP as [+reflexive]2. Application of this rule would yield intermediate
structures of the following sort :
(8) [J ohni talked to Mary about J ohni [ + reflexive]]
(9) [Johni found a snake near Johni [+reflexive]]
It happens that the [+reflexive ]-marked John of (8) is obligatorily realized

as himself in surface structure, while that of (9) is realized as him for most
speakers, but I attributed this to the working of a later low-level spelling rule,
which is sensitive to various conditions, unknown at that time, that control the
appearance of surface reflexive forms.
Adverb Pre po sing , which is perhaps a postcyclical rule, applies to the
structure of (9), yielding:
(1 O)[Near J ohni [ + reflexive ], Johni found a snake]
I assumed that an NP that is marked [+ reflexive] cannot be realized as a full-

fledged NP in surface structure, and attributed the impossibility of the co-
referent reading of (ld) to this constraint. In contrast, the righthand John of
REFLEXIVIZATION IN ENGLISH 261
(5) does not receive [+ reflexive 1marking because it is not a clausemate of the
lefthand John. Thus, after Adverb Preposing, the lefthand John of (6) is still
unmarked, and therefore, it can remain unpronominalized. Hence the accepta-
bility of (4d). According to this analysis, while Reflexivization applies cyclical-
ly, Pronominalization applies post cyclically , after all word order changes have
taken place.
The interpretive counterpart of the above analysis requires that nonreflexive
pronouns be treated as potentially [+reflexive]. To start with, it is clear that
the interpretive approach needs a rule for establishing coreference between an
NP and a clausemate reflexive pronoun and disjoint reference between an
NP and a clausemate nonreflexive pronoun:
(11)a. John killed himself. John talks to himself.

b. John killed him. John talks to him
In (11 a), himself must be coreferential with John, while in (11 b), him cannot be
coreferential with John. Let us call the rule which determines this the Reflexive
Rule. The Reflexive Rule applies only forward: namely, only when the reflexive
pronoun follows its coreferent NP. In everybody's analysis, the Reflexive Rule
would obligatorily assign disjoint reference to John and him of both (12a) and
(12b) :
(12)a. John talked to Mary about him.

b. John found a snake near him.
While the assignment of disjoint reference is correct for (12a), it is incorrect

for (12b), because the latter sentence allows an interpretation of coreference
between John and him. It would be futile to resort to the fact that near him
in (12b) is a place adverbial, because in the following sentence under him is a
strictly subcategorized constituent of put, and is surely playing the same
syntactic role as under himself in (13a), but (13b) still allows for a coreferent
interpretation between John and him:
(13)a. John put the blanket under himself.

b. John put the blanket under him.
In order to allow for the interpretation of (12b) and (13b) with coreference,
it is necessary to assume that all non nominative pronouns are optionally marked
as [+reflexive 1as well. Thus, we would have the following structures as inputs
262 S. KUNO
to the Reflexive Rule :
(l4)a. [John talked to Mary about himself[+reflexive]]

b. [John talked to Mary about him [+reflexive]]]
c. [John talked to Mary about him]
(IS)a. [John found a snake near himself[ + reflexive ))

b. [John found a snake near him [+reflexive]]
c. [J ohn found a snake near him]
The Reflexive Rule applies, and obligatorily marks John and himself/him of
(14a, b) and (1S,a, b) as [+coref], and John and him of (14c) and (lSc) as
[-coref). A later low-level spelling rule would block the derivation involving
(l4b) on the basis of non syntactic conditions (to be described in 3.) which
would dictate that the reflexive form be used in this pattern, but it would accept
the derivation involving (1Sb). The same rule would mark the derivation
involving (lSa) as unacceptable for many speakers, unless himself is used
contrastively.
The Reflexive Rule applies obligatorily, before Adverb Preposing. Thus, given
(l6)[He found a snake near John]
the Reflexive Rule would mark he and John as [ -coref] because the rule cannot
apply backwards. This [-coref] marking cannot be cancelled by any later
operations. Hence the impossibility of obtaining a co reference interpretation
for (17) :
(17)Near John, he found a snake.

L.:-.J
[ -coref)
On the other hand, given (I8), the Reflexive Rule does not apply between
John and he because they are not clausemates :
(l8)a. [John found a snake near the girl [he was talking with))
b. [He found a snake near the girl [John was talking with))
Therefore, the Reflexive Rule does not establish a [-coref] linkage between
these two NPs. After Adverb Preposing, the following structures are obtained:
(19) a. [Near the girl [he was talking with], John found a snake]
b. [Near the girl (John was talking with], he found a snake]
REFLEXIVIZA TION IN ENGLISH 263
The Pronominal Rule now applies, and optionally establishes coreference linkage
between John and he both in (l9a) and (19b) because neither violates Ross-
Langacker's precede-command constraint.
I· have given above an outline of my Reflexive Pronoun Analysis of the
phenomenon under discussion, in the framework of both a transformational
and an interpretive analysis of pronominal reference. What was new about my
reflexive analysis was the blind application of the Reflexive Rule to all clause-
mate NPs, with the distinction between surface reflexive and nonreflexive pro-
nouns to be taken care of by a later low-level spelling rule. In the rest of this
paper, I will use the transformational framework for the presentation of further
data and their explication, but the interpretive analogue of the analysis
presented is readily available for those who are more comfortable with an
interpretive approach.
In Kuno (I975), I used the reflexive pronoun analysis to explain the contrast
between (20a) and (20b) :
(20)a. *In Maryi's portrait, shei found a scratch.

b. In Maryi's portrait, shei looks sick.
lackendoff (1975) attributed the contrast to the fact that she denotes "Real-
Mary" in (a), but "Image-Mary" in (b). It is clear that such an explanation would
not work because the following sentences are acceptable even though the
italicized she denotes "Real-Mary", just like in (20a), and not "Image-Mary" :
(21)a. Judging from Maryi's portrait, shei must have been sick.
b. From Maryi's portrait, everyone thinks shei must have been sick.
My explanation for (20) is the following. (20a) is derived from the underlying
structure
(22)[MarYi found a scratch in Maryi's portrait]
where the second Mary receives a [+reflexive] marking before Adverb Preposing.
Therefore, there is no way to keep it unpronominalized, and hence, the un-
acceptability of (20a). On the other hand, (20b) is derived from the structure
which has in Mary's portrait in sentence-initial position as a thematic adverb,
and therefore, Mary's does not get marked as [+reflexive]. Hence, if other
conditions are met, it is possible to keep Mary's unpronominalized 3 .
264 s. KUNO
3. Conditions for Spelling Rules
In Kuno (l97S), I proposed the following:
(23) Reflexivization, which is cyclical, marks as [+reflexive] the second

occurrence of John in sentences such as Johni found a snake near
Johni. A locative, nondirectional [+reflexive] noun phrase is spelled
out by a later rule as a pronoun, and not as a reflexive pronoun.
The above conditioning for spelling out NPs that are marked as [+ reflexive]
is not exactly right. We can be much more specific about the spelling condition
now. Observe the following sentences, in which him and himself are meant to
be coreferential with John. In order to avoid the interpretation in which himself
is used emphatically for contrast, both himself and him should be pronounced
with no stress on them.
(24)a.. John talked to Mary about himself/*him.

b. John fell in love with himself/*him.
c. John has no confidence in himself/*him.
(25)a. John saw the snake next to him/*himself.

b. John has many friends around him/*himself.
c. John has passion in him/*himself.
d. John heard strange noises behind him/*himself.
The contrast like the above has led many to assume that pronouns appear in
locatives, and reflexives in nonlocatives. However, this kind of generalization
does not work for sentences such as the following:
(26)a. John hid the book behind himself/him.

b. John pulled the blanket over himself/him.
c. John put the blanket next to himself/him.
d. John put the blanket under himself/him.
e. John pulled the rope towards himself/him and won the game.
f. John strung the rope around himself/hini.
It is difficult to justify the claim that the prepositional phrases in the above
are locative when him shows up and nonlocative when himself shows up. It is
also difficult to claim that the prepositional phrases are directional when
reflexives show up, and nondirectional when pronouns show up. The crucial
difference between the reflexive and pronominal versions seems to lie elsewhere.
Let us examine the subtle. semantic differences that exist between the
sentences in (26) with him and himself (26a) with himself implies that John
held the book with his hand and put it behind his back. The book was directly
touching him. (26a) with him can be used for, but is not limited to, the same
situation. It can also be used for a situation in which the book was on a chair,
and John was standing in front of the chair so that the book could not be seen.
In other words, the pronominal version is noncommital with respect to the
direct contact of the book with John. Similarly, (26b) with himself implies
that John put the blanket over his head and covered himself with it, perhaps to
hide under it. On the other hand, the pronominal version of (26b) does not
necessarily imply such direct action. Perhaps, John was in bed, under a
comforter, and he pulled the blanket and put it over the comforter. Likewise,
(26c) with himself implies that the blanket was touching John, while there is
no such implication necessary in the pronominal version. (26d) with himself
implies that John was sitting or lying on the blanket, while the pronominal
version can be used to describe a situation, for example, in which John was
sitting on a chair, and he put the blanket under the chair. (26e) with the
reflexive pronoun is acceptable, for example, in a tug-of-war situation, in which
John could keep pulling the rope toward his direction. In this tug-of-war
situation, the sentence implies that it was a big victory for John. On the other
hand, in the same kind of tug-of-war situation, the pronominal version most
likely implies that the rope moved only a little bit in John's direction.
(26f) with himself means that John tied himself with the rope. On the other
hand, the pronominal version of the same sentence can be used to describe a
situation, for example, in which there were four poles standing around John,
and he strung the rope around the poles.
The above observations lead us to the following generalization:
(27)Semantic Constraint on Clausemate Reflexives: Reflexives with

clausemate antecedents require that their referents be the direct
targets of the actions or states represented by the verb phrases.
The direct object of verbs is semantically the direct target of the actions or
states that the verbs represent, and hence, reflexivization of direct objects is
always obligatory with clausemate triggers.
It would not be amiss here to compare (27) with the generalization that
Zribi-Hertz (1980) has proposed for the French nonclitic reflexive lui-meme
'himself (elle-meme 'herself, etc.) versus lui 'him' (elle 'her', etc.) in a similar
sentence pattern. Let us first observe some relevant sentences:
266 S. KUNO
(28) a. Victori rit de luii/lui-memei.

'Victor laughs at himself.'
b. Victori est content de luii/lui-memei.
'Victor is satisfied with himself.'
c. Victori a honte de luii/lui-memei.
'Victor is ashamed of himself.'
(29)a. Victofi est jaloux de *luii/lui-memei.

'Victor is jealous of himself.'
b. Victofi bavarde avec *luii/lui-memei.
'Victor talks with himself.'
c. Victori est en paix avec *luii/lui-memei.
'Victor is at peace with himself.'
While English allows only himself in both (28) and (29), French allows the
nonreflexive lui 'him' as well as the reflexive lui-meme 'himself in (28), but
not in (29). Zribi-Hertz hypothesizes that the following generalization holds,
among others, for the distribution of reflexive and nonreflexive pronouns in
the above sentence pattern :
(30)The more direct the semantic relationship established by the predicate

between the referent of NPI and that of NP2 (where NP2 is co-
referential with NPl), the better the reflexive form and the worse
the nonreflexive form. Similarly, the more indirect the relationship
is, the better the nonreflexive form, and the worse the reflexive form.
The semantic relationship between the referents of NPI and NP2 under
discussion concerns such considerations as whether or not they occupy the
same position in time and space. For example, Zribi-Hertz accounts for the
contrast between (28a) and (29a) by stating that the object of Victor's mockery
in (28a) can be a Victor in the past, but that the object of Victor's jealousy
in (29a) has to be the contemporaneous Victor - Victor in the flesh. Similarly,
in (28c), the Victor who is ashamed and the Victor who is the source of this
feeling of shame do not have to be contemporaneous because one can be
ashamed of oneself with respect to the past action one has taken. Hence, lui
is used when the Victor some time in the past is meant, and lui-meme is used
when the Victor in the flesh is meant. In contrast, in (29c), the two Victors
that are involved must be the same person in time and space. Hence, only
lui-meme can be used.
I do not have space here to go further into the details of the French
facts about reflexive and nonreflexive pronouns that Zribi-Hertz has analyzed 4 .
It suffices here to note only that the French phenomenon briefly described
above is interesting both because of its similarity and dissimilarity with the
corresponding English phenomenon. The similarity lies in the fact that the
choice between reflexive and nonreflexive pronouns is made not on the basis
of syntax, but on the basis of nonsyntactic factors involving the relationship
between the two NPs involved. The dissimilarity lies in the fact that while
English depends upon whether NP2 is the direct target of the action/state
represented by the predicate and would treat (28) and (29) in the same way,
French depends on whether the two coreferential NPs refer to the same object
in time and space or to two separate stages of the same object. It would be
interesting to investigate the sources of this difference between English and
French, but I must leave it for future research.
4. Picture Noun Reflexives
In the preceding section, I have shown that given an NP within an

adverbial prepositional phrase that is coreferential with the clause mate subject,
whether it is to be spelled out as a reflexive or as a nonreflexive pronoun is
determined by a semantic condition, and is not a problem of syntax. I have
proposed, therefore, that it is better to let the reflexive marking rule apply
blindly, and have the proposed semantic constraint control reflexive and pro-
nominal spelling. The same applies to reflexivization within picture nouns. I
believe all speakers agree with the acceptability of (31 a) and the unacceptability
of(3lb) :
(31) a. John found a picture of himself in the morning paper.

b. *John found Mary's picture of himself in the morning paper.
According to the extended standard theory (Chomsky 1973), the

unacceptability of (31 b) is a syntactic fact - it has violated the Specified
Subject Condition.
However, whether we get reflexives or nonreflexive pronouns in picture
nouns is not a black-and-white matter, but is subject to all kind of semantic
conditioning. For example, observe the following:
(32)a. John talked to Mary about a picture of himself/*him.

b. John was asked about all that scandalous gossip about himself/
?him.
c. John was destroyed by all that scandalous gossip about *him-
self/him.
268 S. KUNO
d. Mary wrote to John about a picture of ??himself/him.

e. cf. Mary talked to John about a picture of ?himself/??him.
A definite article or demonstrative adjective on the picture noun serves as a

sort of insulator against reflexivization, as shown in (b). The awareness
condition, first noted by Cantrall (1969) and further extended by Kuno
(1972a), plays an important role, as shown in ( c) and (d). The object is not as
strong a trigger for reflexivization as the subject, as shown in the contrast
between (a) and (e).
Similarly, observe the following sentences:
(33)a. I hate the story about himself/*him that John always tells.
b. I told the story about *himself/??him that John likes to hear.
Jackendoff (1972) suggested that the contrast between (a) and (b) have some-
thing to do with the question of whether the subject is marked with. the
thematic relation Agent by the verb or not. Namely, tell has an Agent subject,
but hate does not. Although Jackendoff did not develop this idea any further,
it seems that picture-noun reflexivization is influenced by this factor.
Furthermore, observe the following contrast:
(34)a. John gave Marya good opinion of *himself/him.

b. John gave Mary a good opinion of herself/*her.
(35)a. John gave Mary a good account of himself/*him.

b. John gave Marya good account of *herself/her.
These examples, which are due to Whitman (personal communication), show

that a covert semantic Agent in picture nouns serves as an intervening NP, just
like Chomsky's Specified Subject, for preventing a reflexivization in picture
nouns. (34a) does not allow a good opinion of himself because the semantic
agent of opinion is Mary: *Mary's good opinion of himself Similarly, (3Sb)
does not allow reflexivization because the semantic agent of account is JohnS.
It is impossible to have a syntactic rule of reflexivization apply discriminating-
ly, sensitive to all the semantic factors that have been shown above. It is much
more plausible to assume that reflexive marking applies blindly into picture
nouns, just like the case of adverbial prepositional phrases discussed in the
preceding section, and have a spelling rule decide between the reflexive and non-
reflexive realizations, subject to a large range of semantic constraints. I presume
that this reflexive marking rule applies in picture nouns even when they have
possessive NPs. There are speakers who consider the following sentences nearly
acceptable:
(36)a. ?j??MarYi isn't interested in anybody's opInIOn of herselfi.

b. ?j??MarYi doesn't care a bit about anybody's opinion of herselfi.
c. cf. * Maryi isn't interested in Bill's opinion of herself i'
presume that many speakers, even though they might regard (a) and (b)
marginal, stilI consider them to be considerably better than (c). What we have
here is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but a continuum, and this continuum
cannot be accounted for by resorting to a syntactic constraint such as the
Specified Subject Condition.
There is a strong motivation for assuming that reflexive marking applies
even into picture nouns with possessive NPs. For example, observe the following
contrast:
(37)a. *In John's picture of Marn shei found a scratch.

b. In John's picture of MarYi, shei looks sick.
Again, Jackendoff (1975) attributed the above contrast to the fact that she
denotes "Real-Mary" in (a), but "Image-Mary" in (b). But it is clear that this
explanation does not work :
(38)a. Judging from John's portrait of MarYi, shei [Real-Mary] must

have been sick.
b. From John's portrait of Maryi, we can assume that shei [Real-
Mary] is suffering from some kind of sickness.
I assume that (37a) is unacceptable for the same reason that (20a) is unaccept-
able, namely, Reflexive Marking applies before Adverb Pre po sing to mark
Mary in the picture noun as [ + reflexive] :
(39)[MarYi found a scratch in John's picture of MarYi [+reflexive]]
Since Mary in the picture noun has been marked as [+ reflexive], it cannot be
realized as an unpronominalized NP in the surface sentence.
The above analysis necessitates the abandonment of the Specified
Subject Condition for explaining the unacceptability of (31 b), and the adoption
of a more semantically-based condition for picture noun reflexives. Such a
reformulation is needed anyway for accounting for the facts of (37) and (38),
as well as for all the other facts discussed in this section. It is also in accord with
270 S. KUNO
the fact that I discussed in Kuno (1980) concerning extraction from picture
nouns with specified subjects. For example, observe the following two
sentences:
(40)a. This is the term that I don't like Chomsky's definition of.
b. This is the story that I haven't been able to get Mary's version of.
Both sentences violate the Specified Subject Condition, but they are acceptable
to all speakers of English as far as I know.
Those who oppose my reflexive pronoun explanation of (37a) on the basis
of the Specified Subject Condition would have to first solve the problem of how
to account for the acceptability of (40) despite the fact that it should be subject
to the same condition 6 .
FOOTNOTES
*A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a colloquium on blocked

forward coreference, at the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society
of America, December 27-30, 1981, New York, N.Y. I am greatly indebted
to John Whitman and Vicky Bergvall, who have given me invaluable comments
on an earlier version of the paper. Research represented in the paper has been
supported in part by the National Science Foundation's grant to Harvard
University (Grand No. BNS 76-81732).
1Reinhart's c-command analysis has difficulties in explaining the acceptab.ility
of (4d) because he c-commands John in this sentence just as in (1 d). The only
way to make the c-command analysis work would be to attach a preposed
adverbial one node higher than the main clause S just in case the adverbial
contains a clause. This analysis would account for the acceptability of (4d)
because he would no longer c-command John:
(i) [[Near the girl J ohni was talking with lpp [he found a snake lsls
However, Carden has shown that the above structure would make a wrong pre-
diction for the following kind of sentences:
(ii) *Near the girlj John was talking with, shej found a snake.
(ii) should have exactly the same surface structure as (i). Therefore, she does
not c-command its antecedent the girl John was talking with. As a result, the
c-command analysis predicts incorrectly that (ii) should be acceptable. There
does not seem to be any way to make the analysis work consistently for all the
data that have been discussed here.
2A constituent of a given S is one of its major constituents if it is an
immediate daughter node of that S, or of that S's VP. The head NP of a pre-
positional phrase of an S is also a major constituent of that S if the prepositional
phrase is a major constituent of that S. The sentences in (ii) are thus
unacceptable because the trigger does not occupy a major constituent
position:
REFLEXIVIZA nON IN ENGLISH 271
(i) a. MarYi killed herselfi.

b. Someone gave MarYi a picture of herselfi.
c. No one has heard a peep from Maryi about herselfi.
(ii) a *MarYi's father killed herselfi.
b.*John showed a picture of MarYi to herselfi.
3Reinhart's c-command analysis can account for the contrast between (20a)
and (20b) because it attaches VP-phrasal adverbials to the main clause S, but
sentential adverbials to a higher S node.
40ne of Zribi-Hertz's generalizations states that in sentence patterns in which
NP2 must be coreferential with NPI, the nonreflexive pronominal form is
obligatory. For example, observe the following:
(i) Jean a pris Ie livre avec luij*lui-meme.
'John took the book with him.'
The pattern prendre x avec requires that the object of avec be coreferential
with the subject. In such a case, the reflexive form is totally unacceptable.
The same holds for English with respect to sentences such as (25b) and (25c).
5This phenomenon is similar to the one that Hayes (1976) observed in con-
junction with Super Equi-NP Deletion. Super Equi-NP Deletion is a rule that is
responsible for deriving (b) from the structures correspondmg to (a) :
(i) Alberti thought it would be difficult ta. for himi} to brush hisi own teeth.
b. ~i
(ii) Boris felt that it was certain that {a. hiS i} washing himselfi in public
b.0i
would be embarrassing.
Grinder (1970) observed that application of this rule is blocked if there :s an
intervening NP between the trigger and its target. For example, observe the
following sentences:
(iii) Horacei felt that Alice didn't look forward to fa. hisil getting himselfi
arrested.
t b. *~iJ
In (iii), there is an intervening NP, namely, Alice, between the triggering NP
Horace and its deletion target his. Hence, the unacceptability of (iiib).
Hayes noted that the following (b) sentences are unacceptable in spite of the
fact that there is no overt intervening NP in the path of Super Equi-NP Deletion:
(iv) Glenni announced that there had been a tremendous uproar about
sa. hisi t having destroyed hisi own piano.
lb. *"iJ
(v) Johni revealed that there had been little talk of {a. hisil getting him-
selfi out of prison.
b. *~i J
Hayes hypothesized, correctly, that what is blocking application of Super
Equi-NP Deletion in (iv) and (v) is a semantic intervening NP that is distinct
from the triggering NP : namely, unspecified or implicit agents of 'a tremendous
uproar' and 'little talk'.
6Freidin and Lasnik (1981) propose that Wh Movement be exempted from the
Specified Subject Condition. This analysis, if adopted, would automatically
account for the acceptability of (40), but would still prevent application of
272 S. KUNO
Reflexive Marking (or its interpretive rule counterpart) from applying to (39),
and would thus leave the contrast between (37a) and (37b) unaccounted for.
THE TEMPORAL REFERENCE OF THE ENGLISH FUTURATE
Carlota S. Smith
The University of Texas
There are two closely-related ways of talking about the future in English,
the will-future and the futurate. The constructions are not interchangeable,
because the futurate involves some kind of plan, schedule, control, or pattern
of events, while the will-future is not so restricted. This restriction on the
futurate is familiar and has been discussed by grammarians at least since
Jespersen 1931. Less familiarly, the futurate does not fit neatly into a general
syntactic-semantic account of temporal reference in English: neither adverbial
nor aspectual forms play their characteristic roles in this construction. Because
it is problematic, the futurate is of some interest for the study of temporal
reference. Particularly interesting are the truth-conditional and presentational
variations of aspect. The futurate in a general account of temporal reference
is the specific topic of this paper*.
The futurate serves also as an area in which to discuss and demonstrate an
approach to the general question of how syntactic and semantic structures
should be related in a grammar. I will argue for intermediate semantic structures
that represent abstract scope relations yet are relatively close to the syntax.
The rationale for this type of structure is that it would serve as input for
different types of semantic constructs, such as model-theoretic and text
structures.
As an introduction, consider the following futurate sentences and two
questions about their temporal interpretation. Present tense and a future time
adverbial are the hallmarks of the futurate construction.
(I) a. Roger is playing squash tomorrow

b. Roger plays squash tomorrow
273
274 C. SMITH
c. The sun is setting at 5 this afternoon

d. The sun sets at 5 this afternoon
e. Emily is leaving tomorrow
f. Emily leaves tomorrow.
The ftrst question concerns the time that a futurate talks about, and the role
of tense and adverhial in specifying it. Intuitively it is clear that the futurate
spans two times, the present moment and the future time indicated by the
adverbial. It also seems clear that the futurate is "about" the present. In
semantic interpretation, to evaluate a sentence for truth or falsity we need to
know what time a sentence is about; to adopt the useful term of Reichenbach
1947, we need to know the reference time of the sentence 1. Generally the time
adverbial contributes to the specification of reference time, but this does not
seem to be the case with the futurate. The matter is discussed in section I below.
Now consider the difference in interpretation between the aspectual pairs
of the sentences in 1. The differences are, oddly, rather elusive. For example,
a and b do not differ - as one might expect - in that the progressive talks about
an ongoing activity of squash-playing whereas the simple form does not. Nor do
the other pairs differ in this way. Certain features can be found that differentiate
between particular aspectual pairs, but it is difficult to generalize them. For
instance in some futurates the progressive form seems to make a slightly weaker
prediction than the simple form; but the pair c and d show that this is not
always the case. Indeed, it seems most unlikely that one interpretive notion
such as uncertainty would be appropriate for the entire range of futurate
sentences. Rather, what is wanted is a semantic account of the futurate that
allows the pragmatic interpretations that occur. I present such an account in
the following sections.
Section I. Generally in English the temporal location of a sentence is the

time specified by the tense and time adverbial, in combination 2 . To evaluate
the truth or falsity of a sentence one finds the time specifted and asks whether
the sentence is true at that time. For example, take the sentence of 2 :
(2) a. Mary worked yesterday

b. We were swimming at 6 o'clock
c. He is sleeping now
d. They will arrive tomorrow
To evaluate these sentences, we look at the time specifted by the combination of

THE ENGLISH FUTURA TE 275
tense and time adverbial and ask whether the event in question occurred at that
time. Thus for 2a one asks whether, at the time yesterday, the sentence Mary
work is true; for 2b one asks whether at the time 6 0 'clock past, the sentence
We swimming is true.
This is not the pattern on which futurate sentences are understood and
evaluated, however. Futurates are not evaluated at the time specified by the
future adverbial but at the moment of speech, or Speech Time (ST). To see this,
consider the examples of 3 :
(3) a. John rehearses tomorrow

b. John is rehearsing tomorrow
To evaluate these sentences we do not find tomorrow and ask whether John
rehearse is true. Nor do we ask the question at ST; whether John is actually
rehearsing when these sentences are uttered is irrelevant. Rather, to evaluate the
sentences of 3 one looks at the situation at ST, to see whether it licenses the
prediction. Thus one might ask whether John's name is on the rehearsal schedule
for the following day, whether he will be in town then, etc. If the situation at
ST licenses the prediction John rehearse tomorrow, the sentences of 4 are true.
Thus the role of the future adverbial is not to specify the time of evaluation, but
rather another time - here, the time of the predicted situation. As noted above,
the time of evaluation of a sentence is Reference Time (RT) in Reichenbach's
terminology; the future time specified in a futurate is Event Time (ET).
I have suggested that the Reference Time of a futurate sentence is the
moment of speech, ST. There is some evidence for this from time adverbials.
Futurates can always have a second time adverbial, that indicates present time
adverbial:
Now
(4) At this moment John rehearses tomorrow
Today
In these examples the standard pattern of interpretation of tense and adverbial

occurs. In this pattern the first (present time) adverbial specifies RT in
combination with the tense, and the second adverbial specifies ET. I have shown
(Smith 1978) that when RT is specified and another adverbial is present, that
adverbial specifies ET. Unfortunately examples like 4 do not give conclusive
evidence for the structure of futurates, because there are other constructions
that also seem to allow a present adverbial. The other constructions are not of
the same type, however. They have special restrictions and are analyzed as
276 C.SMITH
reductions of sentences with sentential complements. For extensive discussion

see Smith 1978.
Stronger evidence for the claim that futurates are evaluated at ST comes from
a comparison of futurates and will-futures. Compare the sentences of 5 :
(5) a. Mary will rehearse at 3 o'clock

b. Mary rehearses at 3 o'clock
The will-future is evaluated at the time specified by the future adverbial: one
looks at a future 3 0 'clock and asks whether Mary rehearse is true. But for the
futurate, one looks at ST and asks whether Mary rehearse at 3 o'clock is true.
And, tellingly, futurates are compatible with a question about what will actually
happen in the future whereas will-futures are not. Thus 6a is good, 6b distinctly
odd.
(6) a. Mary leaves tomorrow but I won't be surprised if she changes

her mind
b. Mary will leave tomorrow but I won't be surprised if she changes
her mind.
This is just what one would expect if the first conjunct of 6a is evaluated at ST
whereas that of 6b is evaluated at tomorrow. (The second conjunct of both is
evaluated at tomorrow.).
These points show that the reference time of the futurate is indeed ST,and
that the future adverb specifies a time that has another function in the sentence.
If a present adverbial is taken as underlying all futurate construction, their
temporal interpretation can be handled with general rules needed anyway for
the interpretation of English. I suggest in Smith 1978 a set of such rules, that
map combinations of tense and time adverbials into times in a framework based
on Reichenbach's account of temporal reference. In the system a combination
of present tense and a present time adverbial indicates a present RT.
I now suggest that the interpretive rules be written so as to map surface
structures, or sentences, onto abstract semantic structures. These structures
would represent the semantic scope of temporal expressions as well as their
interpretation in times4 . Such structures mediate between the syntactic and
semantic structures of a language, by giving information relevant for semantic
structures of different types; they would not be limited to temporal expressions,
of course. For the constructions under discussion here, I propose that abstract
structures roughly along the lines of 7 below, be set up to model the semantic
scope of temporal (and other) expression. Structures like 9 would be the input
to interpretive rules for e.g. model-theoretic or situational semantics, for
constructing text structures, etc. The higher nodes represent general notions
(such as reference time, event time, aspect) and the lower nodes represent
notions and expressions particular to a given language.
----- -------
(7) S"
/empo~ /S'~
I ,/ "- VP
Time Frequency, Aspect /'" S ""-
/" ~ Duration
Tense Adverb NP
I .
{ presentt !Progressive~
Past J tSimple )
In this structure temporal expressions appear under the Temporal and Aspectual
nodes; temporal expressions may also be located in the inner sentence, as shown
in 9. (For the purposes of this paper, I will consider only time adverbials of
location, ignoring frequency and duration; the analysis of modals, induding
will, is also ignored.)
Tense and time adverbial, giving the reference time of a sentence, are
dominated by the Temporal constituent. So, for example, 8 represents a
temporal structure associated with sentence 2a.
(8) S"
~ "----"
Temtoral /S'~
/im~ Asrct /S~

tense adverb Simple NP VP
I
past
I
yesterday
I
Mary
I
work
I propose that in the representation of the futurate a present adverbial occurs

in the Temporal constituent, together with present tense. The future adverbial
is part of the inner sentence. 9 below presents a representation of a temporal
structure associated with sentence 1a.
278 C. SMITH
(9)
---:-- S" ~,
1
.
Tem 0ral /S ~
/Ti~ /S~
Int ::[ T /\
As)ect
ProW,gi.. Ad..,b
Roger play squash tomorrow
It should be noted that structures like 9 are not incompatible with the insights
of Reichenbach about temporal reference. The structure allows two places for
a time adverbial (the Temporal constituent and the inner sentence) and thus for
the specification of two times. Reichenbach's system has three times: Event
Time, Reference Time, and Speech Time. Speech Time is the keystone of. the
system, since past, present and future, the general reference. times, are
determined by their relation to ST. Past time precedes ST, future time follows
ST, present time is simultaneous with ST. Thus although ST and its relation to
RT is not directly specified in structures such as 8 and 9, it is an essential part of
their interpretation.
Section 2. I now turn to the aspectual interpretation of futurate sentences 5.

will show that the progressive does not have its usual interpretation in the
futurate, and then discuss proposals for handling it in the futurate construction.
As a preliminary, consider the more or less standard interpretation of the
progressive and simple verb forms in English. I will assume without discussion
that the progressive and simple forms signal the aspect of a sentence, the
progressive indicating imperfective and the simple perfective aspect 6 . Following
traditional accounts and recent model-theoretic work on aspect, I take the
meaning of the perfectivity contrast to be roughly as follows. The perfective
presents an event as a whole, including its initial and final endpoints and without
regard to internal structure; the imperfective presents an event as activity or
process, ignoring endpoints7 . For events with natural endpoints, process is
associated with a final outcome or result. I do not consider states in this paper;
for discussion, see Smith 1981 and forthcoming.
It is important to note that perfectivity crucially affects the semantic
interpretation of a sentence. Whether a sentence is true may depend on its aspect,
for sentences dealing with certain types of events. Thus for a given situation
THE ENGLISH FUTURATE 279
John was drawing a circle may be true, but John drew a circle may be false;
perhaps John changed his mind in media res and drew an eggplant instead. As
Vendler, Dowty, and others have emphasized, differences like this can arise
because certain events involve completion in their temporal schemata. Such
events have at least two essentially different stages (before completion and
completion itself) and are said to be heterogenous. Some events do not involve
completion - Vendler's example is pushing a cart - and they are homogenous8.
Unlike the aforementioned cases, sentences about homogenous events do not
differ in truth value if they differ aspectually. So, They were running is true
when They ran is true because there is no outcome or result with which the
process of running is associated.
The standard interpretation of the progressive does not hold for futurates,
as Dowty 1977 notes. Consider the interpretation of the following, for
instance:
(lO)a. He is rehearsing tomorrow

b. She is writing the report in the morning
We do not understand these sentences to say that a process of rehearsing or

report-writing is actually going on at ST; yet ST is the reference time of the
futurate, the time being talked about. What we do understand is that certain
preliminaries are under way, and these preliminaries are associated with the
outcomes of rehearsing and report-writing. The general notion of process that
holds for the progressive clearly needs some revision if it is to account for
futurate progressives.
There is a natural extension of the way a process is associated with an out-
come, that might include futurate progressives in a general account of the
progressive9 . We can allow a process associated with an outcome to include the
preliminaries. of a situation - those stages at which plans are made, patterns
noted, schedules organized. The futurate progressive, according to this view,
talks about the early stages of a process associated with an outcome; later stages
might include other processes that are taken as actions rather than preliminaries.
Note that the line between preliminary and actual stages of an activity or process
can be drawn, although there are some unclear cases. To adapt an example of
Vlach's: if I am lying in bed thinking about my morning schedule - which
involves getting dressed and walking to work - it would be appropriate for me
to say I am walking to work this morning because plans and intentions can be
taken as preliminaries; but I cannot say I am walking to work (now) because I
280 C. SMITH
am not actually walking to work yet. Consider in this regard the interpretation
of 11 :
(11) We are building a summer house next year
The situation at ST might involve plans, an architect, shopping expeditions; the

actual activity would be building; the outcome of the process would be the
completion of the summer house.
However, the extended process approach is difficult to generalize to sentences
about homogenous events, events that do not involve completion. For such
events there is no outcome associated with a process or activity: the event
consists only of process or activity. To see the difficulty compare the sentences
of 12, where rehearse is a homogenous event.
(12)a. Mary was rehearsing yesterday

b. Mary is rehearsing tomorrow
12 says that at the time yesterday the process Mary rehearse was going on, and
this is a standard progressive. But for an event such as rehearsing no goal or
outcome is associated with the process. Yet 12b cannot be interpreted as saying
that the process of Mary rehearsing is actually going on; rather, a process
associated with Mary rehearse tomorrow is going on.
The problem with the notion of extended process and events such as
rehearsing is this: in the futurate perspective all events are heterogenous. An ex-
tended process involves an event with stages that are essentially different.
Applying this notion to a homogenous event would require a radical change
in the structure of the event. The appealing simplicity of the extended process
approach cannot be maintained, therefore. Since the notion of extended process
enables a general account of the progressive, there might be some interest in
revising it appropriately. Before attempting a revision, however, it will be worth
while to look more closely at the approach.
Section 3. Further investigating the extended process approach to the

futurate, we now consider a question about the temporal range of the futurate :
how many situations does it include? With the notion of extended process we
have made an unstated assumption about the futurate.
We have assumed that the temporal range of the futurate includes two
situations, the present and a future situation. Futurate sentences are taken to
present both situations: the progressive, for instance, would focus on a process
that is expected to continue into the future. In this interpretation, both pre-
liminary processes and the actual processes they are associated with are
presented in futurate sentences. Consider in this light a sentence like 13, a
standard example.
(l3)The Dodgers are playing the Yankees tomorrow
In the suggested reading, this sentence focusses at ST on a process at the pre-

liminary stage; and it is expected that the actual process will follow.
I will now argue that the assumption of two situations is incorrect. In the
next section I sketch an analysis in which the futurate presents only a present
situation.
If the range of the futurate stretches into a future situation, as suggested by
the extended process analysis, a question arises about the scope of the single
aspectual marker. The question is whether the aspectual applies to both present
and future situations.
For the futurate as sketched here we might propose an abstract semantic
structure that represents two situations, each with an aspectual indication of
some kind. I will assume that a situation always has an aspectual, although for
a wider range of material this may not be the case 10. Now, how would an
underlying structure involving two aspectuals be realized in a futurate sentence?
The syntax of English does not allow more than one verbal auxiliary to a verb-
phrase, and aspect is indicated only in the main verb phrase of a futurate.
This suggests that the aspect of the second situation, the inner sentence of a
futurate, cannot be indicated on the surface.
There is another possibility, an analysis in which a futurate sentence would
realize an underlying structure with two situations. This analysis exploits the
fact that perfective aspect is indicated by the simple verb form (the absence of
an auxiliary). We might claim that the future situation is always presented with
perfective aspect in a futurate sentence. Such a claim is plausible just because the
marker of perfective aspect has no phonological shape. Note that there seems to
be nothing wrong semantically with a structure that has two situations and
two aspects. The problem, in this view, is simply that such a structure cannot be
realized with the English futurate if the future situation is imperfective. The
reason is syntactic: the inner sentence of a future cannot have the progressive
auxiliary. (Of course, a different construction could realize a semantic structure
with two situations and two aspectuals.)
We now have two competing analyses of aspect in futurate sentences, both
282 C. SMITH
maintaining the idea that futurates involve two situations. The analyses make
different predictions about the aspect of the inner sentence, or future situation.
One analysis predicts that the aspect of the inner sentence is always perfective,
because there is no syntactic place for the form that marks imperfective. The
other analysis predicts that the aspect of the inner sentence varies with that of
the main sentence - that the aspect of the main verb has the inner sentence
(that presents the future situation) in its scope.
These predictions can be tested with diagnostics of the aspect of the inner
sentence. I suggest two such diagnostics, one using adverbials and the other
conjunction.
Completive adverbials (in an hour, etc.) are compatible with perfective but not
imperfective aspect, as noted in Vendler 1967. Compare for example the
sentences of 14 :
(14)a. John walked to school in an hour

b. * John was walking to school in an hour
On the intended completive reading, 14b is ungrammatical; comparison with

14a shows that the ungrammaticality is due to the combination of completive
adverbial and imperfective aspect. Following this pattern, completive adverbials
can be used as diagnostic of the aspectual reading we are interested in. What
is needed is a test sentence: a futurate progressive with a completive adverbial.
If the inner sentence of a futurate progressive is indeed imperfective, the test
sentence should be ungrammatical; it is has perfective aspect or is ambiguous,
with a perfective reading, the test sentence should be grammatical. Consider
the following examples:
(15)Mary is writing a report tomorrow in an hour
(I6)Tonight I'm cooking in an hour a dinner that took Julia Child all day
(17) Next semester we're grading all the papers in three days
These examples suggest that the inner sentence of a futurate has perfective
aspect: all three are perfectly grammatical.
One might object that these examples are not convincing, because adverbials
with in are not necessarily completives. They can be taken as part of an event-
description, as in the dialogue of 18 :
(I8)A sees B frantically scribbling at a very short manuscript

THE ENGUSH FUTURATE 283
A : What are you doing?

B : C bet me that I couidn't write a sonnet in 5 minutes, but I'm
doing just that: I'm writing a sonnet in 5 minutes
Here we might say that B was writing-a-sonnet-in-5-minutes, rather than writing

a sonnet; on this reading the adverbial is not a sentence operator semanticallyii.
However examples like 19 merely show that adverbials with in can appear in
more than one structure; the completive readings for the other cases remain
undisturbed. The adverbial diagnostic, then, supports the analysis of perfective
aspect for the inner sentence of a futurate progressive.
Another test for imperfective aspect is whether an imperfective sentence
can felicitously be conjoined with a sentence about completion of the activity
in question. Imperfectives can be conjoined felicitously with an assertion that
the activity was broken off. Perfectives, which involve completion, cannot be
so conjoined with felicity. The examples illustrate:
(19)a. Sarah was making a quilt but she didn't actually make one
b. Sarah made a quilt but she didn't actually make one
19a is intelligible and felicitous, whereas 29b is contradictory. Now consider

conjunctions of this type, where the first conjunct is a futurate progressive. If
the inner sentence has perfective aspect, we would expect these conjunctions to
be contradictory.
(20)Sarah is making a quilt tomorrow, but she may not actually make one
(21)Martin is building a model airplane next week but he may not actually
build it
Both these examples are contradictory, indicating that the inner sentences of
the first conjuncts have perfective aspect. (The judgment is difficult to make
because there is a different, more natural reading, in which the future event
will not occur at all; this is the reading alluded to in the discussion of example
6b above.) Note that the results of both tests go in the same direction.
We now have a fairly reasonable account of the analysis in which a futurate
involves two underlying situations. We have seen that the aspect of the present
situation may vary, but that of the future situation is semantically perfective -
for surface syntactic reasons. In this account, it is interesting to note, syntactic
possibilities constrain semantic ones. The analysis explains quite nicely one's
intuition, noted in the introduction to this paper, about aspect in the futurate
284 r.SMITH
construction. The intuition is that there is little difference in the interpretation

between simple and progressive futurates. The explanation of this account is
that sentences of both types present the future event in the same way, with
perfective aspect. For example 22a and b both present the future situation with
perfective aspect; they differ as to how the situation at ST is presented. of
course.
(22)a. John plays a tennis match with Stuart tomorrow

b. John is playing a tennis match with Stuart tomorrow
There is, unfortunately, a rather serious disadvantage to this analysis. It

allows semantic structures with any number of situations and aspectual markers,
that are related in a grammar to surface structures with only one aspectual
marker. And if we can analyze futurates as involving two situations, why not 3 ?
- the preliminary situation, a situation associated with an outcome (for hetero-
genous events), and the outcome. But then, why not 4 or 5 situations, including
onsets? But this is a reductio ad absurdum. In short, the analysis allows
indeterminate relations between semantic and syntactic structures and there-
fore cannot seriously be maintained.
Section 4. There is another way of looking at the futurate, which avoids

these difficulties while preserving the positive points made above. The basic
idea is that the futurate presents a single situation, that obtains at ST arid is
associated with a future time and a future situation. The role of the future
situation is as final endpoint of the present situation. This interpretation says
that aspectually the future situation functions completively, and it leads to a
simple and satisfying analysis of the futurate.
Simple futurates on this approach present a predictive situation, that is, a
situation at ST that constitutes preliminaries and/or prediction. The situation
extends into the future and its final endpoint is the occurrence of what is pre-
dicted. Predictive situations are heterogenous: there is a change of state when
the outcome of the prediction is reached. The future situation has no internal
structure in the futurate, then: its role is only as final endpoint of the pre-
dictive situation.
The progressive futurate presents a predictive situation as a process (that has
begun before ST) that is associated with an outcome, which is the predicted
situation. The process consists in preliminaries: the schedule, plan,
arrangements, patterns etc that license at ST predictions about the future.
Presented in the focus of imperfective aspect, the preliminary situation is part

of a dynamic process that is associated with the actual occurrence of the event
or state in question. Here too the future situation has no internal structure:
it is presented only as the outcome associated with the predictive situation.
This view of the futurate is consonant with the results of the preceding
section. In both simple and progressive futurates, the future situation is
presented without regard to internal structure. The difference between the
extended process notion and that of preliminary process offered here is this:
in the former, preliminaries are part of a process that may have later, active
stages. Here, preliminaries are the whole process.
We now ask how to derive the preliminary process interpretation from
a temporal structure such as 9. The structure has 'One aspectual and two
adverbials, one dominated by the temporal constituent and the other by the
inner sentence. There are two possibilities, one structural and the other
specifying, associated with specification of the notion of futurity.
On the structural approach a special rule would associate the predictive
interpretation with a configuration such as 9. The approach will work if the
futurate is the only construction that has the temporal configuration of 9.
However, there may be another construction with the same configuration -
the English perfect, which also involves two times. At this point it is not clear
to me whether the perfect has a structure like 9 or a structure in which the
temporal adverbials all occur within one underlying constituent. It is also not
clear to me how much systematic weight should be given to the differences
between the concepts "past" and "future", in rules that deal with temporal
matters.
Another approach would appeal directly to the notion of futurity in some
way to be determined. For instance, rules might allow for the predictive inter-
pretation be made for the relevant configuration, when the inner sentence
specifies the future. This is the specifying approach mentioned above. Analyses
of temporal reference tend to emphasize the symmetry of pastness and futurity;
but in language their asymmetries may be just as important, if not more so.
Syntactically past and future differ in English, of course; and there are other
differences. Of considerable importance here is the area of prediction, which
includes the futurate of course. Sentences about the past are not taken as pre-
dictions in English unless so marked with a modal, as in They will have left
before last Sunday. Sentences about the future are always predictive, whether
they have modal or futurate form.
286 c. SMITH
Section 5. Two aspectual puzzles about the futurate were noted at the
beginning of this paper. On the one hand, futurate progressives do not indicate
events that are "in process" in the usual sense; on the other, the difference
between simple and progressive futurate is difficult to pin down. The first puzzle
is explained by the notion of preliminary process. We are now able to clear up
the second.
The aspectual difference between futurates is elusive for two reasons. The
first reason is that, as we have seen, both perfective and imperfective present
the future situation in the same way - as the final endpoint of a predictive
situation.
The second reason is that the aspectual difference in futurates is not based
on a truth-conditional difference. The same truth conditions hold for both
perfective and imperfective sentences. In other words, the situations in which
a perfective futurate are true, are just those in which an imperfective futurate
are true. Consider for example the sort of situation that whould license futurate
predictions such as 1a and b, repeated here :
(1) a. Roger is playing squash tomorrow

b. Roger plays squash tomorrow
For the perfective prediction to be made, there must be a situation in which

preliminaries are recognizeable. This is exactly the situation that would license
la, the imperfective futurate. The difference between the sentences is the
presentation, or aspect: in the imperfective presentation the preliminaries are
seen as part of an ongoing process. Of course, the two aspects do not lose their
characteristic semantic meanings when they appear in futurate sentences. The
perfective focusses on event-as-a-whole, the imperfective focusses on process.
This difference in focus can be reflected in the articulation of the
truth-conditional relation between sentences and actual situations. Futurates
with different aspects have the same truth conditions, but they do not have
the same truth-condition articulations.
Although aspect can reflect truth-conditional differences, the futurate
construction shows that it does not always do so. Speakers always have a certain
amount of choice as to how to present a situation. In the case of the predictive
situations that license the futurate, the choice is particularly open. One can
focus on a predictive situation as a process to present it in a particular way.
The point that I wish to make here is that this kind of speaker's choice does not
depend on whether the situation in the world is "actually" a process but rather
on what aspect of the situation the speaker wishes to present 12.

The futurate is not unique in offering this type of aspectual choice to the
speaker. Another example can be found in statives, that is sentences about
situations generally thought of as stative 13. Although in standard English
statives do not occur with the progressive, sentences like 26b are fairly common
in colloquial English:
(26)a. Maurice likes his little brother this week

b. Maurice is liking his little brother this week
In 26b, what is commonly thought of as a state is presented as a process or

activity - that is, as an event. As far as I can tell the s.entences of 26 have the
same truth conditions, but they differ as to how the situation in question is
presented.
In this paper, using the futurate construction as an example, I have suggested

that the relation between syntax and semantics be analyzed through the use of
mediating structures. The mediating structures presented for temporal reference
give the scope of temporal expressions within a sentence. Such structures can
serve as input to interpretation of different kinds. I have also shown that in the
analysis of aspect it is fruitful to consider factors that are not truth-conditional.
FOOTNOTES
*1 would like to thank the Cognitive Sciences Seminar at the University of

Texas, and most particularly Mark Steedman and Frank Vlach, for stimulating
discussions of much of the material presented here.
1Reichenbach has presented an important analysis of temporal reference, which
I will draw on below.
2Arguments and rules for this analysis are presented in Smith 1978, 1980,
b 3. Reichenbach argues that the temporal reference of a sentence involves three
times, Speech Time, Reference Time, and Event Time.
4See the discussion of the perfect toward the end of the paper. The perfect,
like the futurate, involves two times other than Speech Time.
S} shall discuss only perfective and imperfective aspect in this paper; references
to the simple form will be to cases where it indicates perfective aspect.
6Adverbials also may contribute to the aspectual interpretation of a sentence,
as emphasized in the work of Vendler and in the references of the following
note; however} shall not be concerned with adverbials and aspect in this paper.
288 c. SMITH
7These matters are discussed in Dowty 1981, Vlach 1981, Bennett and Partee
1972.
8Heterogenous events are, in the terminology of Vendler, achievements and
accomplishments; homogenous events are activities.
9This approach is discussed in Dowty 1977.
lOIt is not clear that situations are always presented with an aspect;
nominalizations fOl example may not have aspect underlyingly. The question
deserves investigation.
II This use of adverbials is not limited to in, e.g.
i A : What are you doing?
B: I'm running as fast as I can; it's good for the cardiovascular system
ii : I went to Paris for three days, and ended up staying for three months.
12This important point was suggested to me in discussions with Frank Vlach.
13 A stative situation is, very roughly, one that is stable and homogenous. For
discussion see Smith, forthcoming.
PROLEGOMENA TO A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF PHASE-
INDICATING VERBAL PERIPHRASES IN PORTUGUESE
A1arcelo l)ascal
Universidado Estadual de Campinas
Tel-Aviv University
I. The construction I am going to discuss in this paper can be approximately

represented by the formula:
come.;:ar 'begin' V in inf

acabar 'finish' , 'end' V in ger.
parar 'cease' +(Prep) + V in past part.
etc. Adj.
Noun Phrase
where brackets indicate an optional element, and curled brackets, the obligatory
choice of one of the elements within them. The 'etc.' refers to verbs which are
less frequent than the three listed, but whose sense is sufficiently close to theirs,
so that the constructions containing them may be considered as belonging to
the same "family", from a semantic point of view. Among such verbs, we in-
clude : entrar a, por-se a, deitar a, deixar de, estar par, terminar, etc. A set of
examples of the constructions schematically represented by the above formula
is given in the appendix. Most of these examples are from relatively recent
Brazilian and Portuguese authors. Some constructions whiCh are no longer
used (e.g. (3)), deserve also to be included, as well as some examples from
spoken Brazilian Portuguese. Concerning the latter, I have relied on my
intuitions as a native speaker in order to provide the customary indications
about acceptability.
Although this study is primarily concerned with verbal periphrases, my list
289
290 M.DASCAL
of examples includes sentences where the relevant constructions are ~ot, strictly
speaking, verbs, but rather adjectives, participles, and even nouns. Their
relevance to this study can be however summarily justified if we recall that, at
least for some kinds of verbs, "the role of the verb melts into that of predicate,
and actions fade into qualities and relations" (Vendler 1967: 109).
As far as I know, a systematic semantic study of this family of constructions
in Portuguese has not been so far undertaken. There are syntactic analyses of
some of them (e.g. Pontes 1973), semantic analyses of other ones (e.g. Kloppel
1960, Castilho 1966), as well as accounts of analogous constructions in other
languages (e.g. Rohrer 1977 for Spanish, Bausch 1963 for French, Perlmutter
1970 for English). Nevertheless, in spite of the obvious relations among the
members of the family of expressions under examination, we do not have so far
an integrated and coherent semantic analysis of them as a whole. Furthermore,
although some of the authors mentioned make use of the methods and concepts
of formal semantics (e.g. Rohrer) - especially of the notion of truth conditions
and of the operators defined within the framework of tense logic - a semantic
application of such tools to this family of constructions, which might go a long
way towards making their semantic description precise and empirically testable,
is still a desideratum. My aim here is, therefore, twofold: to provide an
integrated semantic description of the set of constructions in question by means
of an application, albeit somewhat informal, of the basic notions of formal
semantics and tense logic. If such a purpose is achieved, this paper might well
be "the beginning of the end of a beginning", i.e. a true "prolegomenon" to
a semantic account of such periphrases.
II. I said that the set of constructions illustrated by examples (I) - (26)
will be treated as a semantic "family". I am well aware of the difficulties in
justifying claims of this kind, characteristic of most studies of "semantic
fields". As a matter of fact, the semantic "kinship" of these constructions -
which seems to me to be intuitively well expressed by the general label 'phase
indicators' (Lyons 1977 : 710) - will only be spelled out through the proposed
analysis. It is possible, however, to present from the outset some facts that grant
some initial plausibility to my claim and provide an empirical basis in the light
of which the adequacy of the analysis might be evaluated.
The synonymy of the constructions comerar+por+inf 'begin '-+by '+inf.'
and comerar+ger. 'begin+ger.' is quite uncontroversial l . A sentence such as (9),
for instance, can be paraphrased in a meaning preserving way by
THE PHASE-INDICATING VERBAL PERIPHRASES 291
(27)Teve ainda a arte maior de nao dizer nada aos dous, para que Candido
Neves, no desespero da crise, comer;:asse enjeitando 0 filho e acabasse
por a1canr;:ar algum meio seguro e regular de obter dinheiro.
'He also displayed .... , so that Candid~ Neves ... would begin rejecting
his son and end up by find a regular .. .'
Similarly, in (10), camera falanda 'begins speaking' can be replaced, salva

meaning by camera par falar 'begins by speak'.
Constructions with gerund on the other hand, are quite close, though not
semantically equivalent, to constructions in which camerar is followed by
adjectives, nouns, or noun phrases. Thus,
(28) Ele comer;:ou levando e trazendo recados e. chegou a diretor geral.

'He began (by) taking and bringing messages and became general
manager'
and
(29)Ele comer;:ou (como)moleque de recados e chegou a diretor geral.

'He began (as an) office boy and became general manager'
are no doubt quite close semantically. Their difference has to do with the
more permanent, more state-like (even though only "initial" in the person's
career) nature of being-an-office-boy, as opposed to the more provisional (even
though recurrent) nature of the taking-and-bringing-messages. In some sense, the
state described by the first sentence of (29) is the result of the repetition and, so
to speak, institutionalization, of an activity described by the first sentence of
(28). When the verb in the gerund refers to a process that tends towards a
specific end, the relationship between a sentence with the gerund and the
sentence with the corresponding adjective is one of process to result-of-process :
(30)Candoca comer;:ou amolecendo.

'Candoca began (by) softening'
(3l)Candoca comer;:ou mole

'Candoca began soft'
Notice that (28) and (29), as well as (30) and (31), seem to differ temporally.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that process and product (result) or
activity and state are related as suggested above. Let us assume also that each
pair of sentences refer to the same series of events, so that they may be
compared temporally. One can, then, observe that (31) and (29) locate the be-
292 M.DASCAL
ginnings to which they refer at time points which are after those of the
beginnings referred to by (30) and (28), respectively. Graphically, we would
have, for the pair (30) - (31) :
other events of the series
tl t2 ST
C. begins C. begins (=time of utterance)
softening soft
Notice also that the beginnings under consideration cannot be conceived merely
as the initial phase of the process or activity described by the verb in the gerund
nor of the state referred to by the adjective or noun-phrase. They are rather
presented as the beginning of a series of events, processes or states, of which. the
softening or being-soft are the initial ones. The choice of (30) instead of (31)
pushes the beginning of the series back in time. But neither (30) nor (31) refer
directly to the stages of the softening itself. Both take this process (or its result)
as given en bloc and, as such, as being able to become members of a wider
succession of processes, events, or states. This is confirmed by the fact that, in
many cases, the action that marks the beginning of a series must be considered
completed, in order to be able to function adequately as the beginning of
a series:
(32)Comer;;ou escrevendo urn conto de tres paginas e acabou escritor

prol{fic0 3
'He began (by) writing a three-pages short story and ended up (as a)
prolific writer'
Other constructions, containing prepositional phrases, can be employed in order

to express propositional contents similar (in the relevant aspects) to those
exemplified by (28) - (32) :
(33)Comer;;ou com dez cruzeiros no bolso e acabou miliomirio.

'He began with ten cruzeiros in (his) pocket and ended up a million-
aire'
(34)Comer;;ou na miseria e acabou no maior luxo.
'He began in poverty and ended up in great luxury'
All the examples considered so far in the present section have in common
the fact that they assume there is a sequence - not necessarily specified - of
events, processes or states, and present a certain event, process or state - usually
specified - as the one which begins the sequence. This is not the case, on the
other hand, with constructions of the type comerar+a+inf (examples (1),
(5), (6), (7)). In these cases, the beginning referred to is always the beginning
of the action, process, event or state described by the verb in the infinitive,
rather than the beginning of a series of other events 4 . Such a difference, which
is, no doubt, significant, might suggest that there is a deep semantic gap between
the two types of construction, leading even to the postulation of the existence
of two semantically distinct verbs, comerar 1 and comerar2' Such a position,
besides being anti-economical and anti-intuitive, is hardly justifiable in the light
of a possible integrated account of the semantics of both constructions.
Intuitively, there is no doubt that in both cases the same notion of "beginning"
is at stake: a shift from not-performing-an-action (not-happening-a-process,
not-being-in-a-state) to performing (happening, being) that action (process,
state) in its initial phase. In both cases, it is necessary to be able to conceive
of an action/process/state as segmentable in identifiable and temporally ordered
'phases". The difference between the two types of construction lies mainly in
the different scopes of the action/process/state to whose initial phase reference
is made. All such facts will have to be accounted for in the proposed analysis.
What has been said about the construction comer;ar+por+inf, comerar+
ger. and comerar+adj. can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the analogous
constructions with acabar, as in (11), (12), (17), (18), (19), (22)-(26). To such
examples, one may add cases of acabar+ past part. : (20) and (21). As for
acabar+de+inf, there are some difficulties. Whereas some of the examples
of this construction correspond straightforwardly to the cases of comerar+
a+inf, in so far as they indicate the final phase of a process/action (cf. (13),
(16)), others seem to refer not to a final phase of the process/action, but to the
fact that the process/action has been completed at a time immediately prior to
the time of utterance (e.g. (I 5)). Other examples seem to admit both
interpretations (e.g. (14)). The difference between the two possible readings of .
acabar+de+inf is so neat that it seems to support the thesis that indeed they
correspond to two different, though homophonous, verbs (cf. Pontes 1973 :
122). To this, one may add the fact that, in other languages, the two meanings
are lexicalized in entirely different ways (e.g. Fr. venir de vs. finir). Further-
more, in Portuguese, although expressed by the same form, the two meanings
are in a relation of semantic opposition to two entirely different expressions,
294 M.DASCAL
namely estar por and comerar a, respectively. Finally, if one takes into account
Lyons' claim (1977 : 705) that the system of verbal tenses is essentially deictic
(i.e., every "tense" refers essentially to the time of utterance), whereas the
system of aspects (to which the notion of "phase" should belong) is not, one
would have to admit that the two readings of acabar de belong to different
semantico-syntactic systems, so that it is reasonable to assume that they
correspond indeed to two different homophonous verbs.
In spite of the weight of such arguments, I will still try to include the
apparently independent meaning of acabar+de+inf into the semantic
description of the "family" here considered. The arguments above deserve care-
ful discussion. Here, only a few preliminary remarks are offered. Firstly, notice
that the integrated semantic description of the "family" does not preclude
differences in meaning - even quite radical ones - between its members. What
the analysis purports to do is to disclose the semantic "kinship" between them,
i.e. to explain how their different meanings are, nevertheless, related to each
other. By postulating two homophonous verbs, on the other hand, one merely
acknowledges a difference without taking into account the similarities, and,
therefore, without accounting for them. From a methodological point of view,
this procedure amounts to remaining at the lowest possible level of empirical
generalization, namely, that of a mere compilation of distributional data.
Semantic analysis, however, should go beyond this level. A comparison with
other languages, with its implicit suggestion that there is some universal- (or
merely general) phenomenon underlying the diversity of all (or some) languages,
is already a step ahead. In many cases such a step seems to be fully justified.
For example, the fact that many languages have two different words (Sp. sino
vs. pero, Ger. sondern vs. aber. Hebr. ela vs. aval) for the two different uses of
Eng!. but, Port. mas. Fr. mais, may serve as an argument supporting the thesis
that there are in fact two but, two mas and two mais (cf. Ducrot 1976; Dascal
and Katriel 1977). But, unless there are other ways of supporting such a
hypothesis, the argument in question might be turned upside down: given the
existence of only one but, one mas and one mais, in English, Portuguese and
French, it is equally plausible to suppose, prima facie, that sino and pero,
sondern and aber, ela and aval are semantically equivalent or, at least, very close,
deserving therefore a single, integrated, semantic analysis.
Finally, regarding the difference between the aspect and tense systems, even
if one admits the existence of a radical distinction (in terms of the opposition
non-deictic vs. deictic) between these two systems, it does not follow that they
THE PHASE--INDICA TING VERBAL PERIPHRASES 29S
are expressed in all languages independently, i.e. by means of specific

morphemes or lexemes (Lyons, to be sure, does not even suggest such an
inference). On the contrary, it is precisely the complex interpenetration of the
two systems within the so-called verbal "tenses" that renders the analysis of
these forms so difficult. Such interpenetration, which is much more common
than strict separation, suggests a strong kinship between them, thus supporting
the attempt at an integrated descriptionS. Prima facie, there is no reason, there-
fore, to exclude one of the readings of acabar+de+inf from the family of
expressions under consideration.
Summing up: we have seen, intuitively, that the semantic core of most of
the expressions here analyzed lies in conceiving an action/process/event as
segment able in phases. Each one of these phases is, in turn, an action/process/
event. On the other hand, any given action/process/event can be itself conceived
as a phase of a sequence of actions/processes/events, of wider scope. Such phases
are not restricted to the initial and final ones. There is a set of intermediary
phases, referred to by verbs such as continuar 'continue', recomerar 'start
again', interromper 'interrupt', and so on, which should be, strictly speaking,
included in our 'family". Similarly, it is possible to extend the notion of "phase"
to what happens before the beginning of the action/process/event considered
or after its end. Such "phases" might be called pre-initial and post-final, and
they would be referred to by the periphrases with estar por 'to be about to'
and acabar de (in one of its readings: 'to have just finished to'), respectively.
The analysis proposed is an attempt to spell out such intuitions.
III. The frequent use in the previous section of the expression 'intuitively'
and similar ones already indicates the difficulties that any semantic analysis of
the constructions considered will have to face. It will be necessary to go beyond
a mere intuitive terminology in order to set up the foundations for a satisfactory
formal account. In fact, most of the traditional analyses, although providing
extremely useful material, are satisfied with the appeal to an intuitive
terminology.
A case in point is the notion of verbal aspect. As we have seen its relevance
for the description and differentiation of our constructions is in general
acknowledged. In some languages, special verbal morphemes are used in order
to express precisely what is expressed in Portuguese by means of periphrases.
But the traditional semantic characterization of the aspects is far from explicit,
so that the use of their names cannot be taken as explanatory. According to
296 M. DASCAL
a commonly held view, verbal aspect refers to the 'point of view' (usually that
of the speaker) out of which an action/process/state is considered. Thus, the
temporal reference of two sentences can be the same, whereas they differ only
in their 'aspect'. Consider for example:
(35)0 povo acabou por aceitar essas visitas como uma rotina inevitavel.
'The people ended up by accept(ing) these visits as an inevitable
routine'
and
(36)0 povo comer;:ou por aceitar essas visit as como uma rotina inevitavel.
'The people began by accept(ing) these visits as an inevitable routine'.
Assuming that both sentences refer to the same event (the acceptance of the
routine), one can say that both locate it temporally in the same way as far as
the times of utterance (ST), of reference (RT), and of occurrence (ET) of·the
event are concerned. It is only a difference in "points of view" (in this case of
the speaker) that is expressed in the presentation of the event either as a "be-
ginning" or as an '.'end" of a sequence of events. The first point of view reflects
the "expectation" that other events of the same sequence will follow; the
second, that other events preceded it and in some sense led to it. Furthermore
there is in the former the expectation of an impending change in the situation
generated by the event, whereas in the latter there is an assumption that the
event came about against the background of adverse circumstances or as the
result of an "effort preceding the conclusion of the process" (Castilho 1966 :
65).
All these components will be traditionally considered as a part of the
difference in "aspect" between (35) and (36). The question, however, is to
determine more precisely the nature of such differences. Are they representable
in terms of differences in the truth conditions of the two sentences? Or else
only as differences in their semantic or pragmatic presuppositions? The
traditional notion of "aspect" does not provide an answer for these questions.
The extremely suggestive descriptions (for they are not really definitions)
offered by Tesniere (1969 : 76) of the two aspects relevant for the analysis of
(35) and (36) are clearly insufficient for capturing the semantic peculiarities
of these examples:
"L'aspect correspondant a Ia question quo? est l'aspect terminatif, qui

exprirne Ie temps ligne point, c'est-a-dire a la fois Ia duree pendant la-
queUe Ie proces se deroule sur la ligne du temps, et Ie point de cette ligne

jusqu'auquel il se dthoule et ou s'en trouve par consequence situe I'aboutis-
sement ... "
"L'aspect correspondant a la question unde ? est l'aspect inchoatif, qui

exprime Ie temps point ligne, c'est-a-dire a la fois Ie point de la ligne du
temps depuis lequelle proces se deroule et ou s'en trouve par consequent
situe Ie commencement et la duree pendant laqueUe il se deroule en suite
sur cette ligne ... "
Besides being insufficient for the description of (35) and (36), such definitions
do not even attempt to clarify certain fundamental questions. Thus, does the
'a la fois' in them indicate a logical conjunction of two components that belong
to the same logical level (duration+beginning, duration+end), i.e., of two
components such that the falsehood of any of them would imply the falsehood
of the whole sentence? Or else should 'a la fois' be understood as referring
to components belonging to different levels, one of them explicitly asserted
whereas the other is only presupposed? Maybe these examples fit rather what
Tesniere considers to be another aspect of verbal aspect, namely the "point de
vue affectif' (1969 : 77). Such "point of view", introduced in order to account
for the use of the adverbs encore 'still' and deja 'already', is responsible for the
expectations of prior termination and posterior beginning of the action:
"De ce point de vue, encore correspond a l'aspect terminatif, et exprime
que Ie proces n 'est pas encore termine au point du temps ou l'on s'at-
tendait a ce qu'il Ie filt, ou bien OU on aurait souhaite qu'il Ie filL."
"Du meme point de vue, dejd correspond inversement a I'aspect inchoatif

et exprime que Ie proces est deja commence au point du temps ou l'on
ne s'attend pas a ce qu'il Ie soit, ou bien ou I'on aurait souhaite qu'il ne
ffitpas ... "
Such expectations correspond vaguely to the ones mentioned in our discussion

of the examples, although they don't overlap completely. In a sense, the
constructions with already and still refer to the post-initial and pre-final phases
of the action itself, rather than to its position vis-a-vis a sequence of other
events, as in (35) and (36). Such phases are, apparently, symmetrical to the
pre-initial and post-final phases expressed by estar por 'to be about to' and
acabar de 'to have just finished', respectively. What seems to me important in
Tesniere's account is the fact that it calls attention to the modal component
in the use of deja and encore. The phases referred to by these expressions appear
298 M. DASCAL
indeed within a modal context of "desirability" or "expectation". This has as

a consequence the fact that their adequate semantic treatment will require,
besides the notion of truth.conditions, the use of the concept of possible world.
"They were already drunk at 9 a.m." requires, for its proper understanding,
the imagination of another sequence of events, different from the one in fact
obtaining, i.e. of another "possible world" in which, at 9 a.m. "they" are not
drunk. The other expressions in the "family" here considered also contain
implicit references to "possible worlds", that their semantic analysis will have to
spell out.
The analysis will also have to take into account another set of considerations,
not easily distinguishable from the issue of aspect. It has to do with the inter-
action between come~ar and acabar and the types of verbs in the infinitive or
gerund with which they combine to form our periphrases. I have been using in
a half random way terms such as 'process', 'action', 'event', and 'state' in order
to convey the relevance of a verbal typology for our analysis. The issue can be
somewhat dramatized in the form of a "paradox". Consider the sentences:
(37) Felicio come~ou a correr.

'Felicio began to run'
(38)Felicio correu.
'Felicio run'
(39) Fagundes come~ou a escrever urn romance.

'Fagundes began to write a novel'
(40) Fagundes escreveu urn romance.

'Fagundes wrote a novel'
Let us assume that these sentences are uttered at the same time. Whereas (38)
follows from (37), the same cannot be said of (40) and (39)6. Since the set of
logical implications of a sentence is very intimately connected with its semantic
content, the semantic analysis of (39) and (37) will have to account for their
difference in this respect, in terms of the differences between the two verb
phrases (run and write a novel) they contain.
One might distinguish the two verb phrases in terms of the aspectual
dichotomy imperfective vs. perfective. Some languages, like Russian and Greek,
employ morphological means to mark the difference between an action when
conceived as complete or as tending towards a definite end and an activity not
necessarily completed or successful. The same difference can be expressed, in
languages such as Portuguese, not by aspectual morphemes, but by entirely

different lexemes. Thus the pair tratar 'to treat' vs curar 'to cure' corresponds
to the Russian forms leCit(imperfective )vs.vyleCit (perfective) (Mourelatos 1978 :
418). In order to avoid terminological confusion, I prefer to use the terms 'telic'
and 'atelic' (Cf. Castilho 1966 and Garey 1957) in order to refer to the
distinction just mentioned. The above "paradox" could be then solved by simply
restricting the validity of the inferential schema (41) to the class of atelic
verbs (~) :
(41)S comer;:ou a t-r. S began to t.

Portanto, S .-ou. Therefore, S t-ed.
(Where -r stands for an infinitive and -ou '-ed', for a past morpheme). The same
restriction must be imposed on the inferential schema:
(42)S parou de ~-r. S ceased to ~.
Portanto, S ~-ou. Therefore, S ~-ed.
In this respect, parar+de+inf behaves in the same way as comerar+a+inf

but acabar+de+inf, in the sense of 'finish to', seems to require the opposite
restriction. That is to say, the inferential schema (43) would apply to telic but
not to atelic verbs or verb phrases:
(43)S ~-ou. S ~-ed.
Portanto, S acabou de ~-r Therefore, S finished to ~.
The features of aspect so far considered, however, are not the only properties
of the verb phrase which affect the semantic interpretation of the constructions
here examined. The type of "situation" (a generic term for state, process, event,
and action) normally referred to by a verb is another important factor to be
taken into account. It is what German linguists call 'Aktionsart', and Lyons
(1977 : 706) proposes to call the "character" of the verb. Conhecer 'to know'
and reconhecer 'to recognize', for example, differ in "character" : the former
denotes a "state"; the latter, an "event". Events, in Lyons' terminology, are
"non-extended dynamic situations that occur momentarily in time". Being
momentary, they cannot have, strictu sensu, neither duration nor phases. It is
such a "character" of a verb that disqualifies such sentences as :
300 M. DASCAL
?(44) Varela come90u a reconhecer 0 assassino as 9 da noite.

'Varela began to recognize the murderer at 9 p.m.'
Such a sentence may be acceptable, but it cannot mean that Varela began the
process or act of recognizing the murderer at 9 p.m. Its interpretation might
perhaps be: "Varela began to produce signs of recognizing the murderer at
9 p.m.". Similarly, "Varela esta vencendo", 'Varela is winning', cannot mean
"Varela is in the process of winning", but only something like 'Varela's
performance renders his victory probable' (Cf. Lyons 1977 : 712). It is also the
"character" of reconhecer that disambiguates (45) yielding an interpretation
referring to what we have called the post-final phase:
(45)Olavo acabou de reconhecer 0 assassino.

'Olavo has just recognized the murderer'.
The "character" seems also to be responsible for the total exclusion of (4:6) :
*( 46) Vieira parou de reconhecer 0 assassino.

'Vieira ceased to recognize the murderer'
and for the possibility of interpreting (47) at most in the sense of (48) but not
of (46).
? (47) Vieira deixou de reconhecer 0 assassino.
(48) Vieira nao reconheceu 0 assassino

'Vieira did not recognize the murderer'
As opposed to "events", "states" persist in time, so that they may have an

initial phase as in (7) above. But since it is not telic, a verb of state cannot have,
strictly speaking, neither a completion nor a post-final phase, thus leaving (49)
without an interpretation:
*( 49)Barbosa acabou de morar em Paranagua.

'Barbosa S ceased
.t just finished
Jto live in Paranagua
The examples above clearly show the need to take into account both the
"aspect" and the "character" ~ as well as other properties ~ of verb phrases
in any analysis of the constructions here considered. Lyons' conclusion (1977 :
712) is no doubt correct :
"It has now become clear that such notions as duration, completion,
momentariness, inception and termination (which were listed earlier as
being among the more common notions to which reference is made in
general discussions of aspect) are not all applicable to every kind of
situation ".
But besides acknowledging the distributional constraint derived from such

notions, what is necessary is to show how they interact in determining the
semantic interpretation of the sentences in which they combine. Some of the
studies of verbal typology and of aspects (in its restricted sense) are quite useful
in this respect. I will rely on some of these studies in what follows 7 .
An issue to which I will not address myself in the present paper is the
question of the correct syntactic analysis of the constructions in our "family".
I have been describing them as "periphrases", thus assuming that comerar,
acabar, etc., function as auxiliaries. But there may be arguments agai:lst such a
treatment8 . No doubt, the result of the debate concerning the correct syntactic
analysis of these periphrases, as well as of aspects and tenses in general, is crucial
for the rigorous semantic treatment of the constructions here analyzed. Suffice
it to recall that the syntactic categories of a Montague grammar - a framework
within which much of the formal work in semantics is performed - should
always be semantically relevant. Nevertheless, at the level of my informal
semantic analysis, it is eventually possible to maintain a neutral stand concerning
the various syntactic analyses proposed for the constructions in question.
IV. Let us review now some of the semantic accounts offered for the family
of constructions under consideration here.
Kloppel (1960) studies constructions of the form comerar+(prep) +inf ,
to which he attributes seven different "functions" -- i.e. meanings. These
functions vary with the kind of verb in the periphrase (it can be either
"perfective" or "imperfective"), with the preposition used (a, de, por, or ~),
and with the number of the subject of comerar. They are described in terms of
"Aktionsarten", whose names are suggestive by themselves:
302 M.DASCAL
camerar preposition verb Aktionsart Examples

in the
-.
singular a, de, f1 imperfective INCEPTIVUM (1)
plural a, de,~ imperfective INCEPTIV-SUCCESSIVUM (4),(52)
plural a,de,~ perfective SUCCESSIVUM (3)
singular a,de.~ perfective LENTO-PERFEKTIV . (5)
("medial")
singular a, de, ~ perfective Does not modify the
proposition neither
temporally nor modally;
occurs only in the 17th
J
century
singular a, de, ~ {perfeCtiVe INCEPTIV-FREQUENTATIVUM
imperfectiv or ITERA TIVUM (53), (54)
eingUlar}
plural par
{perfective ,J
1st act/phase of an action/
imperfectiv process of which it is a part (8), (9)
K16ppel's descriptions of these functions contain no doubt precious

suggestions, but he is not concerned with giving the truth-conditions of each of
them, nor with distinguishing between what is asserted, presupposed or
implicated by them.
The INCEPTIVUM is defined as the modality according to which "only
the first moments of an action/process are present to the speaker's or to the
hearer's consciousness" (p. 17). The definition does not make explicit what
are these "first moments". Kloppel correctly stresses - in spite of an apparent
circularity - the fact that inceptive periphrases "express" linguistically only
the beginning of an action or process, and the speaker does not take into
account its result or completion" (p. 18). Still, this is far from making explicit
the meaning of the periphrase in question. Furthermore, Kloppel appeals to the
"contents" present in the consciousness of speaker and hearer, thus apparently
relying on an "ideational" semantic theory of a kind that has been strongly
criticized by contemporary semanticists.
According to Kloppel, the inceptive can only occur with imperfective verbs.
Therefore, if camerar combines with a semantically perfective verb, then either
the character of the verb changes or the periphrase acquires a different function.
One of these other possible functions is what he calls the SUCCESSIVUM.

In this case, the action is considered as a set of individual actions/processes,
some of which may coincide temporally; the effect of employing camerar is
merely that of subdividing the main action in this way (p. 22). From this
description, I will retain the idea of viewing an action/process as a set of other
actions/processes of the same kind. Though acceptable in its general outline,
Kl6ppel's analysis is not sufficiently specific and precise. The idea of temporal
succession is fundamental here, in order to explain the use of camerar. Hence
although some of the actions in the set may indeed be simultaneous, one should
stipulate that there are at least some which are not. If everyone would die
simultaneously, it would be impossible to employ (3) as a correct description
of the situation. Furthermore, though the SUCCESSIVUM indeed requires
a plurality of individual actions, such a plurality is semantic and does not have
to be expressed in terms of the morphological feature "plural" of comerar.
The same SUCCESSIVUM is conveyed by (50) and perhaps even by (51) :
(SO)Nepomuceno come'tou a vencer as carreiras de fundo em seus tempos

de ginasio.
'Nepomuceno began to win long distance races in his high school
times'
.
(SI)A ordem de atirar, come'tou a camificina.
'Upon the order to fire, the slaughter began'
In order to account for cases such as (4) and, more typically (52), Kl6ppel
introduces a distinct function, the INCEPTIV-SUCCESSIVUM :
(S2)A 'tega sanha que em taaes feitos nehuuna cousa esguarda, come'tou
tamto darder nos emtemdimentos do poboo, que aa porta prim 'tip all
da egreja estava, que come'tarom de braadar altas vozes aos de ~ima,
que estavom fazendo que nom deitavom 0 Bispo afumdo ?
The blind hatred that, in such circumstances, does not spare anything,
began to bum so much in the minds of the people assembled at the
main door of the church, that (they) began to shout out at those
above them, what are they doing that prevents them from throwing
the bishop down ?'
Here too we have a sequence of individual actions viewed as members of a

set. The fact that each one of these actions is not in itself complete is irrelevant.
The conditions for the truth of (52) at t (more specifically, for the truth of the
part that refers to the shouting) are analogous to those of (3) : there are no
shouts at an interval before t, there are some shouts at t, and others after t.
304 M. DASCAL
Since, theoretically, a shout could begin at t and go on indefinitely, one must

also specify that other shouts begin after t. Probably, it was this fact, namely,
that we have here a succession of beginnings, that made K16ppel think of a
function different from the successive. Notice, however, that comerar is, itself,
a perfective verb, so that a succession of beginnings does not differ, in this
respect, from a succession of deaths. Besides, the difference between perfective
and imperfective verbs, manifested in their behavior relative to the inferential
schema (41), is partially neutralized when the peri phrase expresses the
SUCCESSIVUM : (3) implies that at least some of the individuals referred to
died and (52), analogously, that at least some of the people shouted 9 .
Notice, finally, that (52) can be interpreted as a true case of inceptive, namely,
when all the people assembled shouted out together. That is to say, the sentence
is ambiguous as between an inceptive and a successive reading. But this is no
reason, of course, to put the two readings together and create an "inceptive-
successive" aspect.
The FREQUENT ATIVE function is described by Kloppel as the one that
indicates "the beginning of an action which becomes customary" (p. 25). It
occurs both with imperfective and with perfective verbs, in which case it is
labelled "iterative" :
(53)Ao entardecer do segundo dia, estando os bois ainda parados, imoveis,

como fincados no chao, Pe. Prudente comec;ou a receber apelos para
fazer qualquer coisa para enxotar 0 gado - orac;oes, ladainhas, coisas
assim.
'At the evening of the second day, when the cows still were standing
still, as if stuck into the ground, Father Prudente began to receive
demands to do something in order to drive away the cattle - prayers,
litanies, something like that'
The former is illustrated by :
(54)No dia seguinte, 0 Freitas "Estudante" comec;ou a trabalhar na

mercearia.
'In the following day, Freitas, the "Student", began to work at the
grocery'
According to Kloppel, what distinguishes the frequentative from the successive

is the fact that, in the former, the subject that performs the actions which
comprise the sequence is the same, whereas, in the latter, the subjects may be
(or even must be) different. The feature "plural subject" thus becomes crucial
to this distinction. Consequently, (50) would be classified by K16ppel as
frequentative (iterative) rather than as successive, as suggested above. But, in

such terms, the distinction in question does not seem to me to correspond to
any deep semantic difference. Consider the passives of (50) and (53), i.e.
(55) and (56), respectively:
(55)Carreiras de fundo cometyaram a ser vencidas por Nepomuceno em

seus tempos de ginasio.
'Long distance races began to be won by Nepomuceno in his high
school times.
(56) ... apelos para fazer qualquer coisa ... cometyaram a ser recebidos pelo
Pe. Prudente ...
' ... demands to do something ... began to be received by Father Pru-
dente .. .'
Since their subjects are in the plural, would these sentences now be said to have
the successive, rather than the frequentative (iterative) aspect, that their
corresponding active sentences are supposed to display? In view of the lack of
a more convincing semantic distinction, the frequentative function should not
be considered as substantially different from the successive.
As for the LENTO-PERFEKTIV, it is characterized by Kloppel as implying
that the action/process, to whose beginnings the peri phrase refers, reaches its
end, though not instantly. Apparently, in terms of the inferential schemata
discussed above, such a characterization amounts to saying that schema (41)
applies to these cases, as it does to atelic verbs. From (5), for example, it follows
that the night fell completely; from (6), it follows that the moon reached the
horizon. Furthermore, since this periphrase keeps its perfective character,
schema (57) too seems to be valid in these cases JO .
(57) S cometyou a ~-r S began to ~.
Portanto, S acabou de ~-r. Therefore, S finished to ~.
Finally, in his description of constructions of the type comerar+por+inf..

Kloppel employs the notions we have already used, namely, that of an en-
compassing action (sequence of actions) and that of an initial stage in that
sequence, without going beyond the following informal, albeit substantially
correct description.
"Erstreckt sich eine Handlung oder ein Vorgang auf einen langeren Zeit-
raum und werden dabei die einzelnen Akte oder Phasen, die zwischen
Anfang und Ende der Handlung, bezw. des Vorgangs liegen (die ihrerseits
306 M.DASCAL
durch Hauptsiitze ausgedriickt werden konnen), sprachlich erfasst, so

kennzeichnet die Konstruktion mit come~ar den erst en AktjPhase inner-
halb der iibergeordneten HandlungjVorgang".
In the light of the preceding remarks, the main functions mentioned by

Kloppel may be reduced to the following basic oppositions ll :
does not imply

completion - - - - INCEPTIVUM
first moments
of an action 12
implies
completion - - - - - LENTO-PERFEKTIVUM
the peri-
phrase the actions in the FREQUENT ATIVUM
refers to sequence resemble ITERA TIVUM
each other SUCCESSIVUM
first action of (paradigmatic INCEPTIV -SUCCESSIVUM
a series of relation)
actions
The actions in the
sequence are not
necessarily similar
(syntagmatic relation) .. "First Phase"
Rohrer's (1977) informal description of the phase-periphrases in Spanish

can be applied straightforwardly to the corresponding four constructions in
Portuguese:
~ ST 1-1- - - - - -......... "imminential phase" estou por fazer

'I am about to do'
l
S = T - - - - - - -.....•.. "inceptive phase" comeyo a fazer
'I begin to do'
ST "action conceived deixo de chorar

in its en~ point" 'I cease to cry'
+
- - - - - -..roI-t ST "egressive phase" acabo de fazer
'I have just done'
(ST = utterance time)
Employing the temporal operators defined by ~quist et al. (1977: 69),

Rohrer (p. 122) proposes the following definition for constructions of the
form 'come9ar (A)" where 'A' stands for a sentence:
(58) i>E3 - AA A "~A

The definition asserts that 'come9ar (A)' is true at t if, and only if, -- A is true
in a time interval immediately preceding t~ A is true at t and A is true in a time
interval immediately following t. Thus, it presents the notion of beginning of an
action as being, essentially, the shift from its non-occurrence to its occurrence
at some time point. Such a beginning need not be an "absolute" one, since the
first conjunct of the definition does not require -A to be true at all time points
prior to t, but only in some unspecified time interval. The third conjunct of (58)
also refers to a time interval. It expresses the idea that a beginning must be the
first, but not the only stage of an action. At least in the immediate future
(relative to t), the action should continue. Rohrer observes that it is this
condition that precludes the use of comerar with punctual verbs, since they
refer to monolithic actions, that cannot 'continue' in time:
(59) Fernando come~ou a achar urn lapis.

'Fernando began to find a pencil'
This condition, however, can be criticized on two counts. Firstly, notice that
even punctual verbs do admit periphrases with camerar. Recall example (6),
as well as :
(60) Foi quando resolveu trocar os pneus, na vigesima quinta volta, que
Piquet come~ou a veneer 0 Grand-Prix de M~naco.
'It was when he decided to change the tires, in the twenty-fifth lap,
that Piquet began to win the Grand-Prix of Monaco'
308 M.DASCAL
To be sure, there is something strange in such examples, something that might

lead one to think of a non-literal use of comerar. But accounts in terms of non-
literalness should be kept, in my opinion, as a last resource. The strangeness of
the examples may be due to the fact that they suggest that the action is, so to
speak, viewed retrospectively, from the "point of view" of its completion.
Sentence (60) would indeed be appropriate for a commentator analyzing the
race after its end. Given - or assumed - its completion, the speaker can go on
to analyze the action as if it has phases 13 . This is why both (6) and (60) imply
the completion of the action. In this sense, they display the characteristic
feature of Klbppel's "LENTO-PERFEKTIV". These 'initial' phases retrospective-
ly considered, can be viewed not as phases of the action itself, but only as
pre-initial stages which, with the help of hindsight, are perceived as leading to
the occurrence of the action. This suggestion preserves the punctual character
of the verbs. It also relates the comerar periphrases with punctual verbs with
the estar por ones. The latter, unlike the former, do not require, however,
completion of the action, i.e. they do not satisfy, in general, inferential schema
(57), whereas the former do.
Secondly, it should be noticed that the third conjunct of definition (58)
can be in fact cancelled, without producing a contradiction:
(61)Policarpo comerrou a chorar, mas nao passou da primeira higrima.
'Policarpo began to cry, but he did not go beyond the first tear'.
Although normally conveyed by Policarpo comefou a chorar 'Policarpo began

to cry', the idea that the crying continues at least for a while after its
beginning, is not in fact part of what is asserted by the sentence. since it is
cancellable. It would seem that the third conjunct has, thus, the status of a
conventional implicature of the sentence in question, rather than that of a part
of its asserted content 14 . Tobe sure, something in the sentence must indicate
the speaker's belief that, if nothing unexpected happens, then the action would
continue beyond its initial stage. The best way to express this "something"
is by means of the introduction of a possible world where the action indeed
continues.
The second conjunct of the definition is perceived as problematic by Rohrer
himself. From definition (58) it follows that, no matter what verb phrase is
attached to comerar in 'comeyar (A)', a sentence like (62) will always entail
its counterpart, (63) :
(62)Vit6ria come'You a esquiar.

'Vit6ria began to ski'
(63)Vit6ria esquiou.
'Vit6ria skied'
That is to say, the definition validates the inferential schema (41) for all verbs.
But, as we know, such inferences should be blocked for telic verbs. Maybe this
is one of the reasons that leads Rohrer to propose the alternative definition:
(64) ~-AI\ -A A~A
Since (58~ is suitable for some cases, and (64) for others, Rohrer ends up with
the disjun~ion (58) v (64) as the general definition for the periphrases under
analysis. But, in fact, this does not help to solve the "paradox", for,
independently of the occurrence of A or -A at t, the inference of schema (41)
remains valid, for all A, because of the third conjunct in the definition. That
conjunct ensures that A will be true, if not at t, then at some time interval
immediately after t. This is enough to guarantee that, at an utterance time after
t (not contiguous to it), one may correctly assert that A occurred. In order to
solve the problem it would be necessary to modify not only the second, but
also the third conjunct of the definition, which is shared by (58) and (64).
Aquist et al. (I977 : 74) propose a much more complex disjunctive definition
than Rohrer's, containing as many disjuncts as needed in order to account for
the diversity of behavior of the periphrase with different kinds of verb:
(65) Begin-to A =df Comes AboutAndThenRemainsA v

v ComesAboutAndThenCeasesA v
v RemainsFalseAndThenComesAbout A v
v CeasesAndThenComesAboutA
This definition, together with the definitions of the operators 'ComesAbout',

'Ceases'and 'Remains', yields the logical equivalence:
(66)Begin-to A =df (( 0t -J-A&A& ~I .1 A) v

v ( 01 .. J-A & A & ~I-"I-A) v
v( ~ .1 --A & -A & ~( - ] A) v
v ( ~ A&-A&~I-"I A»
310 M.DASCAL
Nevertheless, not even this disjunction is able to block inference (41) for verb
phrases like 'write a novel', since for each one of its disjunctions it is a valid
inference. Notice also that, unlike (58) and (64), (65) allows for the use of
camerar with punctual verbs, thanks to its second disjunct. It does not seem to
me, however, that the analysis such a disjunct gives of constructions of the
type camerar+punctual verb explains adequately their meaning, as discussed
above. Furthermore, one might stress that a disjunctive definitions, although
combining in a single formula the truth·conditions of a set of expressions, dis·
play only a superficial generality. For one thing, they do not correlate the
various disjuncts with the lexical properties of each verb, thus leaving unexplain·
ed the selection of one or another disjunct in each particular case.
In his analysis of the "imminential phase", Rohrer is mainly correct in
distinguishing it from the "near future", constructed with the auxiliary ir
'to go' in the present tense. He characterizes the difference as follows: in the
"imminential phase", ST = RT (utterance time = reference time) and both
precede ET (event time); in the "near future", RT = ET and both are preceded
by ST. The identification of RT with either ET or ST is made via the widely
held hypothesis (cf. Smith 1975) that temporal adverbs always indicate RT.
This hypothesis, together with the equation RT = ST in the imminential phase,
would exclude sentences like
(67)Amanha estou porsair.
'Tomorrow I am about to leave'
I have shown elsewhere (Dascal 1979) that there are a few difficulties with the
temporal adverbial hypothesis. But, no matter how one solves them, it seems
clear that there are some important semantic similarities and differences between
the imminential and the inceptive phases, that should not be overlooked. In
both, there is the idea of a passage from the non-occurrence of an action to its
occurrence, at some time. In the imminential periphrase, the passage does not
have to materialize in order for the sentence to be true. There is no contra·
diction in
(68)Fhivia est.i por dar II luz, mas 0 parto nao tern chances de se realizar.
'Flavia is about to give birth, but the delivery has no chances to
come about'
At most, the additional information suppresses an implicature of the first

sentence in (67). But an inceptive sentence will only be true if the passage
indeed takes place. Another difference lies in the fact that, whereas the latter
contains also the idea of a continuation of the action beyond its initial phase,
the former is neutral in this respect. It is not "concerned" with what happens
after the beginning of the action, focussing only on its pre-initial and initial
phases. Hence, its combination with punctual verbs (which are "monophasic")
presents no troubles at all (compare with (59)) :
(69) Chico esta por achar 0 lapis

'Chico is about to find the pencil'
On the other hand, the equivalence we have observed between the construc-
tions comerar+por+inf and comerar+ger., is analogous to a similar equivalence
for estar por, which holds, however, only for punctual verbs: estd chegando
'is coming' = estd por chegar 'is about to come', but estd correndo 'is running'"*
estd por correr 'is about to run'. In other words, only when estar+ ger. does not
admit the progressive reading it is equivalent to estar+por+ in! This is a further
indication of the fact that this peri phrase excludes any mention to a possible
or real continuation of the action (the progressive does make such a mention
- see (72)). It seems to me that the condition that requires the being or function
denoted by the topic of the sentence to "exist" (Rohrer 1977 : 117), derives,
ultimately, from the factors just mentioned. Rohrer calls attention to the fact
that sentences such as
(70)Jaime construini uma nova teoria que esta par destruir definitiva-
mente 0 morfema zero.
'Jaime will build a new theory that is about to destroy entirely the
zero morpheme'
are inacceptable due to the non-existence, at RT, of the object denoted by the
topic of the sentence (Jaime's new theory). But this only shows that the
periphrase focusses on the pre-initial phase: there, not only the topic must
exist, but also all must be practically ready for the action to occur, once time
reaches the ET; on the other hand, nothing is asserted by the sentence about
what will happen after the ET; even the topic may suddenly cease to exist then,
without falsifying the assertion. The periphrase in question expresses, so to
speak, the completion of the "preparations" for the action, according to the
speaker.
Rohrer's treatment of the other two periphrases (acabar de and parar de)
is analogous to his account of the two we have examined, and does not need
312 M.DASCAL
to be reviewed here.
V. At this point we have on the table many of the pieces of the puzzle I
called "an integrated treatment" of this family of expressions. A full solution,
taking into account all the observations presented above, would require a far
more detailed work. Here, in accordance with the prolegomenic nature of this
paper, I will only assemble some of the suggestions already made and propose
a tentative analysis which accounts for the semantic as well as for some
pragmatic characteristics of the constructions analyzed.
Let us recall, first of all, that the "paradox" involving the implications of
the periphrases with acabar and camerar, is analogous to the "imperfective
paradox" pointed out by Dowty, which has to do with the progressive (see
note 6). In order to solve this problem - and not only for that purpose - Dowty
(1977) proposes the following definitions for the operators BECOME (0) and
PROGRESSIVE (~).
(71 )(BECOME (~» is true at interval I if, and only if, (a) there is an
initial boundary interval J for I such that -~ is true at J, (b) there is
a final boundary interval K such that. is true at K, and (c) there is
no non-empty interval I' such that I' C I and such that (a) and (b)
hold for I' as well as for I.
This operator is, according to Dowty, a component of every telic verb. Leaving
aside his doubts concerning the status of condition ( c) (would it be a part of the
truth conditions, or a "felicity condition", in Searle's sense, for the appropriate
use of such verbs ?), which stipulates that the interval I must be the minimal
interval which is able to satisfy conditions (a) and (b), we can represent in the
following diagram the essentials of the definition:
Linda pintou urn quadro (= Linda tournou-se pintora de urn quadro

= BECOME (Linda e pintora de urn quadro;
past))
'Linda painted a picture' (= Linda became a painter of a picture = BE-

COME (Linda is a painter of a picture; past))
THE PHASE-·INDICATING VERBAL PERIPHRASES 313
f----- J ---~ t---K--~
t ) (
ST
...
Linda is not a painter Linda is a painter
ofthe picture of the picture
-~ ~
The other definition is :
(72)(PROG (tn is true at I and at a possible world w if, and only if, there
is an interval I' such that I C I' and there is a world w' for which ~
is true at I' and w is exactly like w' at all time preceding and in-
cluding I.
Schematically, what this definition stipulates is this:
Pedro esta comendo (= PROG (Pedro come))
'Pedro is eating' (= PROG (Pedro eats))
r- 1-,
..
I I
f w
I
:-,
I I
r,I Pedro eats
..
(~)
I w'
I I
4-1'
I
The fact that I' exceeds I both in the direction of the past and the future is
designed to capture the idea, expressed by the progressive, that the described
action goes beyond the interval (or time point) considered. But the fact that I'
belongs to the possible world w', but not to the actual world w, expresses the
idea that the progressive represents such an extension of the action as conceived
(Le. true in a possible world), but not necessarily as actualized.
314 M.DASCAL
Whenever the progressive occurs with a telic verb (e.g. "Linda is painting a
picture"), this corresponds semantically to a combination of the two operators,
namely: PROG (BECOME (~)). A conflation of the two diagrams (cf. Dowty
1977 : 57) will then clearly show that the sub-interval K of I must be conceived
(in w') as a sub-interval of 1', i.e. the action must be completed in w', where
Linda indeed becomes a painter. But, since such a completion needs not occur
in w, the inference "Linda is painting a picture; therefore Linda painted a
picture" is invalid. On the other hand, the hearer has the right to believe that
the conclusion does follow, if the speaker does not provide additional
information that cancels it. That is to say, such an inference has the formal
status of a Gricean implicature 15 .
Periphrases with comerar share some features with the progressive, as we have
seen. They suggest that the action is extended towards the future, beyond an
initial interval or time point, although such an extension is represented as merely
possible (perhaps even probable), but not necessarily actual (cf. example (61)).
On the other hand, comerar itself is, semantically, a telic verb. That is to say,
it must contain, as the other telic verbs do, the BECOME operator. Two of
Dowty's ideas can", therefore, be directly applied to such periphrases. To them,
one must add another notion, discussed above, namely the notion of a temporal
partition of an action in successive phases or stages. The BECOME component
of camerar must apply, in the actual world, at least to the first stage of the
action; otherwise, there would not be, properly, a "beginning" of that action.
What can be missing, however, in the actual world, are the other stages of the
action, without affecting the truth of the assertion that the action began. On the
other hand, if one refers properly to a "beginning" of the action at a time
interval I, then it cannot be the case that the action, at I, is already completed
or even advanced beyond a certain "middle" stage. For instance, it would be
highly misleading to claim that the building of a house is in its beginning if all
that remains to be done is to paint the ceilings. A "beginning", then, must end
somewhere before the "end" of an action, or before "too much" of it has been
performed. The notion "end of the beginning" is notoriously vague, and will
depend heavily on the kind of verb included in the periphrase. Nevertheless,
the analysis will have to take it into account, somehow.
Putting together all the preceding remarks, we propose the following
analysis:
(73)(COME~AR A (~» is true at a time interval I}, in a possible world

w if, and only if :
(a) There. i~ a possible temporal partition fI~ of ., [~1, t2, ....n],

contammg tl, and at least another element, not necessarily
distinct from ~ 1.
(b) (BECOME(tJ}) istrueatIl, in w.
(c) There is a time interval 1', whose lower boundary coincides with
that of I I, such that 11 C 1'; and there is a possible world w',
identical to w in 11 and in all the time points preceding 11, such
that, in w', either
(cl)fI. is such that for all i, ~i = .1, and ~1 is true at 1'; or
(c2) There is a ~k E fI~, K > 1, such that (BECOME (~k» is
true at 1', but not at I.
Graphically, the case corresponding to (C2) can be represented as follows:
) (
~l w
..
I
I
I (-~1) •
I
I . r: BECOME 02 -,
I I
..
I
'"
I w'
I -~1 ) ( ~
fl L BECOME ~3
...-...- BECOME ~l---l
~----------------I'-- ________ ~
Some comments will clarify the clauses of this definition. The nature of the
partition mentioned in (a) is not specified in the definition. It is precisely the
different possible kinds of partition that characterize the different types of
verbs. The only general constraint on such partitions is that ~ 1 be a necessary
component of ~. Such a constraint ensures, together with (b), the truth of -~
at least in an interval preceding its beginning, whatever the partition one has
316 M. DASCAL
in mind.
In an atelic verb, such as run, the action is partitioned in such a way that it
repeats itself (whatever else is also done) at each successive interval, if at all.
This can be expressed by the disjunction:
(74)~ = (f1 at 11) v (~1 at 11 & ~1 at 12) v ...

... V(~1 atl1 &~1 atI2&· .. ·.&~1 at In)
By means of a double set of indices, the upper ones specifying the time interval
and the lower ones, the kind of sub-action, we can abbreviate the above formula
by:
A telic verb, characteristically, involves a final phase. When used in a

comerar periphrase, it refers also to an initial phase. The intermediate phases,
however, are left relatively unspecified. The corresponding temporal partition,
therefore, might have the form:
(76)~~ &V [A(~i), 1 <j <m, 1 < i < nJ & ~~

(where the middle conjunc:t is an abbreviation for the disjunction of all
conjunctions of the form ,~Ji & ~k & .. .', covering all the combinations of the
values of the indices).
There may also be verb phrases which require a strict single ordering of all
the steps of the action. Their corresponding partition would then be :
(77)t = It & I~ & ..... & I~
A punctual verb does not allow for a periphrase with comerar because it is
"monophasic", i.e. it does not allow for any partition. It is, therefore, unable to
fulfill condition (a) of the analysis. As noted, the members of a partition need
not be distinct. Verbs that denote states or activities allow for periphrases
with comerar and can, therefore, be associated with partitions, although the
members of such partitions should probably be all identical, in the sense of being
activities or states of the same kind as the one denoted by the verb. Some
variation on (75) should account for them. It is also in terms of varieties of
partitions that the "frequentative", certain peculiarities of the "successive",
and the "1ento-perfektiv", can be accounted for. Notice that the different types
of partition validate or block inferences under (42), thus explaining away the
"paradox" : a verb which is characterized by a partition like (75) renders the
inference valid, whereas verbs whose characteristic partition is either (76) or
(77) block it.
Condition (c) of the definition takes care of both the continuation of the
action (in a possible world) and the vague notion of "end of the beginning".
It stipulates that at least one of the components of the partition be actualized
in w', in an interval of time posterior to 11' Notice that atelic and telic verbs
receive different treatments, under conditions (cl) and (c2), respectively. The
operator BECOME cannot be used in (cl), since ~1 - the only component of
ment' in this case is satisfied by .1

the partition - must be true at I} (by condition (b». The 'continuation require-
continuing to be true after I l' The 'end of
the beginning' and 'continuation' requirements were conflated in (c2) for the
sake of simplicity. They might, however, be separated by stipulating, for the
t
former, that there is some sub-action of which becomes true at some interval
after 11' and, for the latter, that all phases of the action other than t 1 become
true only after 11' The inclusion of these requirements within the scope of a
possible world w' indicates that their non-fulfilment in the actual world would
simply "mislead" the hearer, but not, strictly speaking, render what he says
false.
By means of the same fundamental apparatus, it is possible now to propose
an analysis of the constructions come~ar+por+inf (which are, for our purposes
here, treated as eqUivalent to come~ar+ger.) :
(78)(C<?MEfAR P<?R (~» is true in a time interval I 1 in a possible world

w, If, and only If :
(a) There is an action/process/event 1/1 and a possible temporal parti-
tion 01/1 of 1/1, [1/11,1/12, ... 1/In1 containing 1/11 and at least another
element, and such that. = 1/11.
(b) (BECOME <t» is true at 11, in w;
(c) There is a time interval 1', whose lower boundary coincides with
that of II, such that II C I'; and there is a possible world w',
identical to w in II and in all the time points preceding it, such
that, in w', for a1l1/li E 01/1, i> 1, (BECOME (1/Ii» is true in 1',
but not in I 1.
The central idea here is that the action/process/event ~ is conceived as the initial
phase of a "broader" action/process/event, 1/1. Such an idea has been defended
in the preceding sections. Condition (c) has been abbreviated (if compared to
(73» because, whenever one uses properly the come~ar+por+inf periphrase,
318 M.DASCAL
one apparently must be thinking of a sequence of different events/actions/

processes. Even if it turns out, for example, that one begins by running,
continues to run and ends up still running, the 'runnings' in question are
conceived as being different in some respect (speed, distance, companionship,
etc.), so that the first "running" is a distinct component of the series. Therefore,
a condition like (c1) can be dispensed with.
An analysis of the truth-conditions of periphrases with estar por 'be about to'
can also be given, with the concepts so far employed. A number of ways might
be followed. One of them - the only one I shall explore here - consists in ex-
tending to the left the partition of ~, in order to obtain a new partition, which
includes the "pre-initial" phase (let us call it '~o') of ~. This phase is
characterized by the fact that all the "preparatory conditions" for the
occurrence of ~ have been completed (according to the speaker's point of view).
In this sense, ~o, unlike the other phases, ~l ... ~n, is not, strictly speaking, a
part of ~. In all likelihood, once ~o is completed, ~ should follow, but this
can fail to occur, so that the occurrence of ~ belongs to a possible world w',
rather than to the actual world w. In the case of punctual or "monophasic"
verbs, the "partition" of ~ which is extended to the left contains a single
member.
(79)(ESTAR POR (.» is true at a time interval 10 , and in a possible world

w, if, and only if :
(a) there is an extension to the leftLn (.), [~o, ~l,
possible temporal partition Il~ of ~.
.2. . fn), of a
(b) (BECOME (~o» is true at 10 , In w;

(c) there is a time interval I', whose lower boundary coincides with
that of 10 , such that 10 C 1'; and there is a possible world w',
identical to w in 10 and in all the time points preceding 10 , such
that, in w', for $1 E Il~, (BECOME (~l)) is true in 1', but not
in 10 ,
Notice that, except for ~ I' the other stages of the partition of ~ are not even
mentioned in condition (c), since they are irrelevant for periphrases with estar
por. A weaker version of the analysis proposed would replace (b) by the req uire-
ment that ~o simply be true in 10 and w, rather than becoming true precisely
in that interval. Something might indeed be about to happen merely because of
the current state of affairs, which happens to be without any noticeable change
for a long time, now. Still, it would be odd to say, for instance, "it is about to
rain" at t if, at some time interval prior and relatively close to t, absolutely
nothing connected with the expectation of rain became true. Hence, I prefer
to maintain the stronger condition, (b).

The analysis of the periphrases with acabar de (in its two senses) as well as
with parar de can be constructed along similar lines. The reader will be able to
explore and develop the consequences of the proposed analyses, thus putting
them to test 16
APPENDIX
(I) Come~o a con tar do meio da minha vida e ja estou com 39 anos.
'I begin to tell from the middle of my life and I am already 39 years old'.
(2) Os homens nem oLharam, e como ensaiados come~aram a assoviar uma

toada muito sem gra~a, vai ver que inventada por eles mesmos.
'The men didn't even look and, as if they had rehearsed, they began to
whistle a rather uninteresting tune, in all likelihood invented by them-
selves'.
(3) E teemdo seu ~erco sobrella, come~arom de morrer na frota, e isso

meesmo dos do arreall, de guisa que hUllS e os outros eram muito anojados ...
'And having besieged it, they began to die in the fleet, even those from
the village, so that each of them was very annoyed .. .'
(4) Haviam come~ado a se interessar pelos favores de Venus, nas sessoes

espiritas.
'They had begun to interest themselves in Venus' favors, in the spiritualist
sessions'
(5) Come~ou a anoitecer e vi 0 ceu do lado da selva se transformar numa

rotunda de estrelas.
'It began to grow night and I saw the sky on the side of the woods become
a rotunda of stars'
(6) A lua come~ava a chegar na linha do horizonte ...

'The moon was beginning to reach the horizon line .. .'
(7) Quando nao havia pesca, nem biscate, nem uma galinha ingenua, quando
enfim, a vida come~ava a significar uma azeda melancolia, 0 Barba~as
abria entao 0 peito aos grandes sacrificios, aceitando uma empreitada
qualquer, ceifa ou colheita de azeitonas, cortes de lenha, etc. - a que ele
se entregava com uma gana de quem tinha pressa em voltar ao repouso.
'When there was no fishing, no small jobs, not even an inocuous chicken,
when, in short, life was beginning to mean a sour melancholy, Barba~as
would then open his chest to the big sacrifice, by accepting any contract
work, harvest or picking of olives, cutting wood, etc. - to which he would
lend himself as someone that hurried to return to rest'
320 M. DASCAL
(8) Come~ou a querer aprender tipografia, mas viu cedo que era preciso algum
tempo para compor bern, e ainda assim talvez nao ganhasse 0 bastante ...
'He began by want(ing) to learn typography, but he soon realized that
some time was needed in order to set up (type) well, and even so maybe
he would not earn enough .. .'
(9) Teve ainda a arte maior de n~o dizer nada aos dous, para que Candido
Neves, no desespero da crise, come~asse por enjeitar 0 filho e acabasse
alcan~ando algum meio seguro e regular de obter dinheiro.
'He also displayed an even higher skill by not tell(ing) anything to both
of them, so that Candido Neves, despaired by the crisis, would begin by
reject his son and end up (by) finding some regular and sure means of
getting money'
(10) A tinta ja anda meio desbotada por aqui e algumas tra~as se locupletaram
em alguns adjetivos, mas a hist6ria come~a falando sobre urn triangulo
de terras que pertencia aos indios amoa~a, arara, canamari e ipurina.
'The ink is already half washed off here, and a few moth succeeded in
becoming adjectives, but the story begins telling about a triangle of land
that used to belong to the amoa~a, arara, canamari, and ipurina indians'.
(II) Ele vai ser como os outros. Come~a duro, acaba amolecendo. Nao e,
Amancio? -
'He will be like the others. Begins hard, ends up softening. Isn't it so,
Amancio ?'
(12) A carreira de Pereira foi a jato: em menos de seis anos comer;ou estudante
e acabou catedrttico.
'Pereira's career was jetlike : in less than six years he began (as a) student
and ended up (as) full professor'
(13) Mandovi esperou 0 homem acabar de achar gra~a, mas vendo que isto ia
demorar urn pouco aproveitou 0 tempo para apanhar as rodilhas inteiras,
deixando os cigarros soltos, que no seu en tender nao lhe pertenciam mais.
'Mandovi waited for the man to finish to find fun (= to laugh ?), but
seeing that this was going to take some time, he took advantage of the
available time in order to collect the whole packages, leaving out the single
cigarettes, which, in his opinion, no longer belonged to him'
(14) Eu tinha acabado de traduzir duas noticias e estava conversando com

Joao Lucio.
'I had just finished to translate two (pieces of) news and was talking to
Joao Lucio'
(I5) Urn dia 0 amante chego!J tarde e falou-Ihe de urn encontro que acabava
de ter com urn amigo na Africa.
'One day the lover arrived late and talked to her about a meeting he just
had with a friend in Africa'
(16) Diziamos que esse raio de comboio nao acabava de passar, home ...
'We used to say that that hell of a train didn't finish to pass, man .. .'
(17) Pouco a pouco, acabei por passar muito rente it porta e demorar-me na
vitrina aver coisas que nao me interessavam.
'Step by step, I ended up (by) pass(ing) very close to the door and to stand
by the show-case watching things that did not interest me'
(18) 0 pulso acelerava-se-lhe, 0 cora9ao pulsava mais forte e ele acabava por
mergulhar numa sonolencia lucida, em que a realidade e 0 sonho se mistu-
ravam.
'His hart beat would accelerate, his heart would beat more strongly, and he
would end up by plunging into a lucid somnolence where reality and
dream mix up'
(19) Longe, a familia, a qual nao escrevera em dois anos, continuaria por mais
algum tempo it espera dele, ou de noticias : mas acabaria por esquece-lo.
'Far away, the family, to whom he had not written for two years, would
go on waiting for him for some time: but it would end up forget(ing)
him'
(20) Mas no palco os nossos entravam em luta com os soldados e acabavam

subjugados.
'But on the stage our (people) fought the soldiers and ended up subdued'
(21) 0 turista brasileiro era eu e acabei impressionado com as sandices desse

espanhol do seculo XIX.
'The Brazilian tourist was myself and I ended up impressed with the ab-
surdities of this Spaniard of the nineteenth century'
(22) Quando ele bate, lento e 0 som de sino fica dan9ando no ar como um
choro, como a voz duma pessoa que esta se queixando, Tina pensa na
vida, na morte, no passado e acaba chorando, chorando desatadamente.
'When it strikes, slowly, and the sound of the bell remains dancing in
the air like a cry, like the voice of a person who is complaining, Tina
thinks about life, death, the past, and ends up (by) crying, crying in
bursts'
(23) Vejo que YOU acabar fazendo uma besteira.

'I see that I will end up (by) doing some foolishness'.
(24) Quem diria que aquele rapaz acanhado, sossegado,apontado como

exemplo, acabasse pondo as mangas assim tao de fora, desafiando a cidade
com aquele namoro agarrado.
'Whe would say that that shy, quiet young man, indicated as an example,
would end up (by) showing so much who he really is, challenging the town
with that scandalous flirt'.
322 M. DASCAL
(25) Amancio acabou se cansando de tanta zoeira, cruzou os brayos e gritou

lei do fundo : ...
'Amancio ended up (by) getting tired of so much noise, crossed his arms
and shouted from the back: ... '
(26) Depois de tantas entrevistas e revelayao dos segredos mais intimos diante
do analista, 0 paciente acabou indefeso.
'After so many interviews and the revelation of intimate secrets to the
analyst, the patient ended up defenseless'
NOTES
I There are, however, some rare examples, spotted by Castilho (1966), in modern
Brazilian authors. where comerar+ger. is equivalent to comerar+a+inf rather
than to comerar+ pod inf :
A partir de outubro a cheia comeya baixando lentamente.
'Since october, the flood begins lowering slowly'
Contempiando essa gente do segundo andar, me ponho imaginando a
classe a que pertence.
'Looking at these people of the second floor, I begin imagining the class
to which they belong'
21 give more or less word by word translations. In English the infinitive cannot
be used in some positions, as in these cases.
3In this case, the temporal difference observed between (30) and (31) does
not seem to occur between (32) and comerou autor de um conto e acabou
escritor prollfico 'He began (as the) author of a short story and ended up (as a)
prolific writer', perhaps due to the different nature of the verb phrases.
4when the aspect is the so-called "successive" (e.g. (2), (3», there is indeed a
sequence of actions, events, etc., but all must be of the same type, and this
type is described by the verb in the infinitive.
5Por further discussion of "aspect", see section III, below.
6This paradox is analogous to the "imperfective paradox" for the progressive,
noticed by Vendler (1967) and dealt with, among others, by Dowty (1977)
and Konig (1979). Whereas (ii) follows from (i), (iv) does not follow from (iii):
(i) John was pushing a card (ij) John pushed a card.
. (iii) John was drawing a circle (iv) John drew a circle.
1Starting with the attempts at systematization by the philosophers Vendler
(1967) and Kenny (1963), the work on verb typology seems to present a certain
convergence, leading to quite similar classifications, such as those of Lyons
(1977) and of Mourelatos (1978). We assume the reader is familiar with at least
one of these works. As for the formaliZation of the semantics of aspects, see
Hoepeiman (1976, 1978).
8The syntactic aspects of these and other periphrases have been discussed,
among others, by Mattoso Camara (1972), Perini (1976), Pontes (1973), Barbara
(1975), in ~onnection with the work of Chomsky (1957, 1965), McCawley
(1971), Perlmutter (1970), Bach (1979), and others.

9There is a difference, though. When some, but not all shouted, one can infer
"they shouted", but the analogous inference from "some died" to "they died"
is clearly invalid. It is as if perfectivity and imperfectivity were reflected some-
how in the use of quantifiers and pronouns.
10Based on their differen tial behavior with respect to these inferential schemata,
one might think of a subdivision of the class of perfective verbs into two sub-
categories, which do not correspond, however, neither to Vendler's "accomplish-
ment" vs. "achievement", nor to Mourelatos' and Lyons' categories.
llCastilho (1966) discusses briefly our constructions within the framework of
an analysis of the aspectual system in Portuguese. For the most part, he follows
Kloppel's suggestions. It is worth noticing his attempt to treat in a unified way
all the periphrases with acabar, taking into account not only their aspectual but
also their temporal differences. However, acabou por receber 'he ended up by
receive(ing)' and acabou recebendo 'he ended up (by) receiving' are described
as displaying "punctual aspect and remote past". Thus, the peculiarity of such
constructions already signalled above, namely, that they refer to some sort of
expectation concerning the action, is not expressed in any way by such an
analysis.
12The term 'action' is here used to refer generically to actions, processes,
states, events, etc. We have not commented KlOppel's fifth function because it
is illustrated only by extremely rare examples.
13 A TV commentator might well say also "Look, now Piquet is beginning to
win the Grand-Prix". Though it would be more appropriate to utter this
sentence in a replay show of the race, after its completion, it might also be
uttered in a live transmission. In that case, it would seem to suggest that the
speaker has some sort of special power of foresight unavailable to his audience.
140n these notions, see Grice (1975, 1978), Dascal (1977), Sadock (1978),
etc.
15 It seems to be, furthermore, a conventional rather than conversational
implicature (cf. Grice 1975, 1977). For a discussion and elaboration of Dowty's
account of the progressive, see Konig (1979).
161 wish to thank Christian Rohrer for letting me use his collection of examples,
as well as for some useful comments, and Rodolfo Ilari for calling my attention
to the problem of the "end of the beginning".
TIME, TENSE AND RESTRICTION
(On the French Periphrasis venir de + infinitive)
Marc Dominicy
Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
o. The verbal periphrasis venir de + infinitive ("have just + past participle")

is, no doubt, one of the most characteristic features of Modern French. Except
for Occitan and occasionally Portuguese, it is found in no other Romance
language l . Moreover Catalan, Spanish and Portuguese have acabar de +
infinitive, whereas Romantsh, Italian and Rumanian do not possess any similar
periphrasis. In these languages the standard translation of venir de + infirtitive
is a perfect tense determined by at least one adverb. The same conclusion holds
for Germanic languages and Latin.
In this paper, I will argue that French only differs in a superficial way from
those languages that do not possess any corresponding periphrasis. I will, indeed,
claim that an adequate grammar of French must assign to each sentence contain-
ing venir de + infinitive an underlying structure which accounts for the super-
ficial properties of the standard translations. My argumentation includes four
steps. First of all, I will show that venir de + infinitive is usually translated
by means of a restrictive adverb which modifies a (deleted or non deleted)
time adverb. It will be proven later on that this phenomenon can be predicted
by a semantic theory of restriction, provided that one adopts an independently
justified analysis of the perfect tenses. Given such a result, it becomes possible
to discover the reason why several languages use restrictive adverbs which
obviously do not modify any time adverb. Finally, I will give some arguments
which support the hypothesis that the "deep representation" of venir de +
infinitive gets close to the surface constructions of Romantsh, Italian, Rumanian
and similar languages.
325
326 M. DOMIN ICY
I. Let us have a look at the adverbs which are normally used to translate
I'enir de + infinitive 2 :
Romantsh: (1) Eu sun be (apaina, gust) gnu
(Bezzola-Tonjachen: 364,460, 572; DRG : J, 313; AIS :
VIII, 1646)
"I have only (hardly, just) come"
Italian: (2) So no appena (giusto) arrivato

(AIS : VIII, 1646)
"[I] have hardly (just) arrived"
Rumanian: (3) Abia (tocmai) am venit

(ALR : V, 1490; VI, 1801)
"Hardly (just) [I] have come"
English: (4) He has just left
Gemlan: (5) (a) Er war gerade (eben) heimgekommen

"He had just (just) come home"
(b) Ich habe es erst gesagt (19th century, Grimm:
III,993)
"I have only said it (= litt. it only said)"
Dutch: (6) (a) Ik ben juist (net, zoeven) aangekomen

"I have just (just, just) arrived"
(b) Ik ben pas aangekomen
"I have only arrived"
Danish: (7) Han var lige (netop) kommet hjem

"He had just (just) come home"
Swedish: (8) Jag har just kommit

"I have just come"
Norwegian: (9) Han er nett (nettopp) reist

"He has just (just) left"
Latin: (10) Modo adveni

(Dominicy, 1974)
"Only [I] have come"
Clearly, these words belong to a rather homogeneous class. Moreover, it is easy

enough to prove that the adverbs of sentences (1-10) which have the lexical
meaning of "hardly" or '1ust" get the restrictive value of "only". On the other
hand, there is much evidence to suggest that all the adverbs of (1-10) modify,
TIME, TENSE AND RESTRICTION 327
at the underlying level, a time adverb like "now" or "then".

1.1. It is a well-known fact that adverbs which mean "hardly" or "just"
exhibit a general tendency to become restrictive adverbs: see e.g., Portuguese
apenas (Holanda : 113), English barely (though the restrictive use is obsolescent
in Modern English, OED: I, 669-70), Colloquial French juste, Rumanian
tocma; (Tiktin: III, 1617), English just (Cohen). Furthermore, this shift to a
restrictive value seems to be relatt:d to some particular properties of sentences
(1-10). Consider, e.g., the English adverb just, as used in (4). In 19th-century
English, it could still combine with the restrictive adverb but 3:
(11)(a) I learned that he was but just arrived in England.

(Bronte, Jespersen 1927: IV, 33)
(b) Alice Wilson had but just come in.
(E.C. Gaskell, Mary Barton, Oxford U.P., 15).
Contemporary English has the group only just (Jespersen 1927, IV, 63) :
(12)(a) What's eating him is all that happened last night and he's only
just be rung in on it.
(R. Chandler, The Big Sleep, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books,
109).
(b) Much of this was described, in 1955, in a lengthy mimeographed
monograph ( ... ) which was made available to interested scholars
and university libraries but has only just been published.
(J. Lyons, Chomsky, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1977, 47).
The following examples are two independent occurrences of these constructions:
(13)Of compounding, comparing, abstracting, etc., I have but just spuken,

having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places.
(Locke, Essay, ed. Yolton, London/New York, Dent/Dutton, 1964, I,
128).
( 14) He could only just catch her answer.

(G. Greene, Brighton Rock, London, Heinemann, 1959,248).
These two sentences undoubtedly give evidence of a restrictive use which we

expect to find in (11) and (12). Such a phenomenon is, in fact, rather common.
In Romantsh, be "only" combines with gUst "just" in sentences like (15) (Cf.
Bezzola-Tonjachen : 460) :
(15) El eira be giist tuoma

"He had only just come back"
328 M.DOMINICY
Similar facts are found in several Italian dialects (AIS : VIII, 1646), and in 19th-
century German, which uses nur erst "only only" (Behaghel : III, 172; Curme :
348; Grimm : III, 993) :
(16)(a) Ich habe es nur erst gesagt (cf. (5b))

(b) Wenn ich nur erst daheim ware !".(If I only (only) home were!)
In Latin, the group modo vix occurs, in which the presence of modo "only"
reinforces the restrictive value of vix "hardly" :
(17)Protinus Italiam con cepit et ARMA VIRUMQUE

Qui modo vix Culicem fleverat are rudi.
(Martial, VIII, 55/56, 19-20).
"Suddenly he had a vision of Italy and ARMA VIRUMQUE
He who had only just mourned over the Gnat in unpolished verse"
If just, gUst, erst, modo, etc. have a restrictive meaning in such examples, then
the very existence of but (on(v) just, be gUst, nur erst, modo vix, etc. can easily
be accounted for. Indeed, languages often express restriction in a redundant
way: a clear illustration is provided by Italian soltanto "only", which stems
from Latin solum tantum "only only" (LOfstedt : 22-3).
1.2. Since we assume now that all the adverbs of (1-10) possess a (lexically
or contextually) restrictive meaning, we have to discover what they modify. Let
us come back, with this view in mind, to the English just (see OED: V, 640) :
(18)(a) I have just now written a letter

(Pickbourn (1789) in McCoard : 124)
(b) That number has just now been specified in eighteen syllables.
(QUine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Harvard U.P.,
1953,134).
(l9)Here made (... J represents C.. ) an event that had fallen out some
considerable Time before: for had it happen'd but just then. whilst
the speaker takes notice of it, or but a little before: hath would
have been the proper expression for it. (White (1761), in McCoard :
33).
In such examples, (but) just modifies a time adverb (now, then). Accordingly,
my conjecture is that an adequate grammar of English must assign to sentence
(4) an underlying structure of the same type (cf. Jacobson: 70). This
hypothesis, which entails that a transformational rule optionally deletes the
time adverb, applies to many other languages, e.g. :
Romantsh: (20) Eu sun rivo be (giist) in quaist momaint

(Bezzola-Tonjachen : 364;DRG : II, 277)
"I have arrived only (just) at this time"
Italian: (2l) Siamo arrivati appena (giusto) adesso

(AIS : VIII. 1646)
"[We] have arrived hardly (just) now"
Rumanian: (22) Abia (tocmai) acum am venit

(ALR : V, 1490, VI, 1801)
"Hardly (just) now [I] have come"
German: (23) Ich bin erst jetzt angekommen

"I have only now arrived"
Dutch: (24) Ik ben nu pas aangekomen

"I have now only (== only now) arrived"
The conditions which trigger the deletion rule would have to be specified for
every language. Some restrictive adverbs, like Rumanian numai and Italian
cognate words, do not allow this transformation to take place (ALR : V, 1490,
VI, l801;AIS: VIII, 1646):
(25)Numai acum (*Numai) am venit

"Only now [I] have come"
Generally speaking, deletion seems to reduce the range of the possible pOSitions
of the restrictive adverb, which is closely tied with the perfect tense. In English,
just now may follow the main verb :
(26)1 have been speaking just now of integration of momentary objects

into time-consuming wholes.
(Quine, ibid., 70)
whereas just occurs either between the auxiliary verb and the past participle or
in pre-auxiliary position (when the past participle has been deleted)4.
2. To sum up, the sentences we have studied so far derive from an under-
lying structure which contains: (i) a "perfect" morpheme; (ii) a "restriction"
morpheme which modifies a time adverb like "now" or "then". In the following,
I will argue that such a "deep representation" can be interpreted through a
semantic theory dealing with restriction and the perfect tenses.
330 M. DOMINICY
2.1. Let p == X( Y)AZ be a sentence such that Y belongs to the category

A; X and Z being possibly nuli. Let p' be the sentence RESTR:X(Y)AZ such
that Y is the focus of a 'restriction' morpheme (see Altmann 1976 and 1978;
Jackendoff; Kuroda on the notion of focus). Sentence p' is true iff:
(27)(a) Presupposition: p is true;

(b) Truth-condition: there is no sentence q such that: (a) q con-
forms to the propositional schema X' (- JA Z: where X' and Z'
are like X and Z except for possible differences due to agreem'ent;
(b) p does not entail q;(c) q is true.
Consider, e.g., sentences (28a) and (28b) :
(28)(a) John eats rice

(b) John eats only rice
Since only, as a surface realization of the morpheme RESTR, focusses on the

NP rice, (28b) will be true iff:
(29)(a) Presupposition: (28a) is true;

(b) Truth-condition: there is no sentence q such that:
(a) q conforms to the propositional schema John eats (-)NP;
(b) (2Ba) does not entail q; (c) q is true.
It follows that a sentence like John eats bread must be false if (28b) is true 5 .
Although I accept the notion of focus, I do not believe that interpretation
obligatorily takes place at the surface level. On the contrary, I have just admitted
that the focus of some restrictive words is (or can be) deleted by a trans-
formational rule, Within an entirely explicit theory, condition (27b(a)) would
perhaps be rephrased. Furthermore, I assume that the standard theory of pre-
supposition is basicaliy correct. I do not think that the main argument of my
paper would be crucially affected if I considered (27a) as a "conventional
implicature" (Karttunen-Peters; Ladusaw: 103, 165-6). However, there is a
significant difference between Ladusaw's description and mine. According to
Ladusaw, (30b) entails (31b) :
(30)(a) John likes apples

(b) Only John likes apples
(31)(a) John and Mary like apples

(b) Only John and Mary like apples
but this entailment is "obscured" by the fact that (30b) implicates (30a) and
that (31b) implicates (31a). If (31b) presupposes (31a), which must be false if
(30b) is true, then (31 b) is neither true nor (classically) false if (30b) is true,
and (30b) is false if (31 b) is true.
2.1.1. The theory which has just been sketched also applies to sentences
like:
(32)(a) One girl in the class is clever

(b) Two girls in the class are clever
(c) Three girls in the class are clever
(d) Only two girls in the class are clever.
Suppose we formulate, after Fauconnier, a "scalar principle" that reads as

follows:
(33)Let p = X(YJAZ and q = X'(WJAZ', where X,Z,X',Z' are as in (27);

Y is higher than W on the scale which is associated with the pro-
positional schema X(-JAZ (in short: Y> W/X(-JAZ) iff p entails
q and q does not entail p.
If p' = RESTR:X(Y)AZ, then (34) holds:
(34)(a) For every W < Y/X(-JAZ, p'presupposes q = X'(W)AZ';

(b) For every W > Y/X(-)AZ, p' entails not-q, q = X'(WJAZ:
Indeed:
(35)(a) p' presupposes p = X(Y)AZ, which entails q = X'(W)AZ: for

every W< Y/X(-JAZ;
(b) For every W > Y/X(-JAZ, p does not entail q = X'(WJAZ:
Hence q must be false if p' is true.
In sentence (32d), only focusses on the numeral two. If three> two> one/
(- )Num in the class is (are) clever, then (32d) presupposes (32a) and entails
not-(32c).
A lot of evidence supports principle (33) (see, e.g., Ducrot 1973; Fauconnier;
Horn). Nevertheless, some particular effects of (33) are blurred by well-known
pragmatic constraints. If, for example, a speaker S utters (32b), the hearer H
will normally infer that S believes that (32d) is true. In order to explain this
phenomenon, I have to define a set of conversational implicatures which are,
in fact, much too powerful (see Seuren : 110; Van Der Sandt: 10-1), but which
fit my present purpose :
332 M. DOMINICY
(36) Let p and q be two sentences such that p entails q and q does not
entail p. If S utters q, then H will infer that S believes that p is false.
Obviously, H's inference rests on his assumption that S complies with Grice's
first maxim of quantity (see also Fauconnier 1976a : 265; Gazdar: Horn 1972 :
37-42).
Though the "no more than" meaning of only amounts to a sub case of its
general meaning, any attempt to describe sentences like (32d) without making
use of some "scalar principle" is doomed to failure (see, e.g., Bartsch: 203-7
and Keenan). On the other hand, it seems impossible to maintain that only is
a "negative scalar operator", i.e. a downwards-oriented mapping between two
points on a scale (Shanon; see also Ducrot 1973). Neither Bartsch-Keenan nor
Shanon-Ducrot account for the ambiguity of sentence (28b) :
(28)(b) = (a) "John eats no other food than rice"

(b) "John eats no more than rice", if, e.g., meal>
rice> bread/John eats (-)NP
Some restrictive adverbs prove sensitive to this ambiguity. De Rooij shows

that Dutch uses aileen (maar) or maar depending on whether the focus belongs
to a scale or not :
(37)(a) Ik heb Salleen (maar) 1 een broer, geen zuslers

l*maar J
"I have only a brother, no sisters"
(b) Ik heb {*alleen (maar) teen broer, maar drie zusters
maar J
"I have only one brother, but three sisters.
(see also Altmann 1976 : 208-15). Moreover, it comes out that adverbs meaning
"hardly" or "just" cannot get a restrictive value if their focus does not belong
to a scale. Consider, e.g., the French sentences in (38)6 :
(38)(a) Jean mange seulement du riz

"John eats only rice"
(b) Jean mange a peine du riz (11 ne mange meme pas de viande)
"John eats only (= litt. hardly) rice (He does not even eat meat)"
(c) Jean mange tout juste du riz (11 ne mange meme pas deviande)
"John eats just rice (He does not even eat meat)"
(38b) and (38c) do not exhibit the ambiguity of (38a). When adverbs of the
same category become leXically restrictive words (Portuguese apenas, English
just, Colloquial French juste), their focus is no longer submitted to any

constraint.
2.1.2. All the languages which were quoted at the beginning of this paper
use at least one restrictive word with the meaning of "not until". Here are some
examples:
French: (39) Pierre est seulement arrive hier

(Blumenthal)
"Peter (has) only arrived yesterday"
Spanish: (40) S610 ahora empieza a trabajar

"Only now [he] begins to work"
Italian: (41) L 'ho imparato soitanto adesso

"[I] have heard it only now"
Rumanian: (42) Numai acum mlf despKr!ii de principele

(ALR: VI, 1801; DLR: VII, 553: Sandfeld-Olsen : II,
234-5,325)
"Only now did [I] leave the prince"
English: (43) Trade Unions only became legal in 1825

(J f/lrgensen)
Latin: (44) lam modo nunc possum contentus vivere parvo (Tibullus)
(Dominicy 1974)
"Now, only now am [I] able to live contented with little'"
In such cases, the restrictive adverb focusses on what Vet (105-26) calls "un
adverbe de temps proprement dit", i.e. a word or a phrase which denotes, even
vaguely, a time point or a time interval and which is, in itself, a correct answer
to the question "When ?". The hypothesis I want to defend here makes the
following claim:
(45)When a restrictive adverb means "not until", its focus belongs to a

scale. Hence X is higher than Y on such a scale iff the time point
(time interval) which is denoted by X precedes the time point (time
interval) which is denoted by Y.
Five arguments support (45) :

(i) The Corsican dialect of Pieve d'Evisa uses the expression pia di ... un "no
more than" with the meaning of "not until" (Ceccaldi : 27-8) :
334 M. DOMINICY
(46) Piii' d 'ava un e isciu tu

"More than now [he] not has gone out = Only now has [he] gone
out"
This apparently strange fact is easily accounted for if the expressions which
denote time points (time intervals) prior to now are higher than avo "now"
on the relevant scale.
Oi) In some Romance languages an adverb meaning "hardly" may substitute for
the restrictive adverbs of (39-42) (AIS : VIII, 1646;ALR : VI, 1801; Sandfeld-
Olsen: 11,235; Tiktin : 1,4) :
(47)(a) Pierre est a peine arrive hier

(b) Apenas ahora empieza a trabajar
(c) L 'ho imparato appena adesso
(d) Abia acum m~ desp~rlii de principele
According to our analysis of 2.1.1. this proves that the focus (hier, ahora,
adesso. acum) belongs to a scale.
(iii) The French expressions au moins "at least" and en tout cas "in any case"
are used when the speaker wants to shift on a scale from a higher point to a
lower one, i.e. when he wants to blur the effects of the first maxim of quantity;
the facts are roughly similar in English and other languages (see Ducrot 1972 :
135; Horn 1972; Kempson: 154; Smith) :
(48)(a) Pierre a trois enfants, ou au moins (en tout cas) deux

"Peter has three children, or at least (in any case) two"
(b) *Pierre a deux enfants, ou au moins (en tout cas) trois
"*Peter has two children, or at least (in any case) three"
Consider now another pair of examples:
(49)(a) Pierre arriverajeudi, ou au moins (en tout cas) vendredi

"Peter will arrive on Thursday, or at least (in any case) on
Friday"
(b) *Pierre arrivera vendredi, ou au moins (en tout cas) jeudi
"*Peter will arrive on Friday, or at least (in any case) on Thurs-
day"
The fact that (49a) is normal whereas (49b) is definitely odd directly follows
from hypothesis (45): jeudi "on Thursday" is higher than vendredi "on
Friday" on the relevant scale.
(iv) Hypothesis (45) also accounts for the striking parallelism between (50)
and (51) :
(50)(a) Only a few students voted for Hubert

(b) *Only all the students voted for Hubert
(51 )(a) Only later did Mary answer Peter's questions

(b) *On1y as soon as possible did Mary answer Peter's question
The oddity of sentences (50b - Sl b) would be allowed in an ironical discourse

(Altmann 1976 : 223-6; Horn 1972 : IS2; Shanon). This fact is easily explained
through a pragmatic principle which - roughly formulated - reads as follows:
(52)If S utters p, H will infer that S believes that H believes that p is false.
Here H's inference rests on his assumption that S complies with Grice's second
maxim of quantity (see also Ducrot 1972). Principle (52) predicts that (SOb)
and (51 b) conversationally implicate:
(53)(a) "s believes that H believes that more-than-all the students voted
for Hubert"
(b) "s believes that H believes that Mary answered Peter's question
earlier-than-as soon as possible"
In other words, the speaker who utters (SOb) or (SIb) acts as if the hearer
believed in the truth of a sentence which is known to be logically or factually
false.
(v) Shanon (66-7) points out the contrast between (S4a) and (54b) :
(S4)(a) John noticed Mary only after Mary noticed him

(b) *John noticed Mary only before Mary noticed him
If principle (52) applies to (S4b), it will yield a conversational implicature which

credits the hearer with a contradictory belief, since the time span prior to Mary's
noticing John does not contain any earliest point. Again irony would perhaps
redeem sentence (S4b).
2.2. I come now to the crucial move of my argumentation. I will, in fact,
show that through adding two elementary hypotheses concerning the semantics
of the perfect tenses, we can account for the facts analyzed in paragraph 1.
There is a well-known incompatibility, in English as in other languages,
between perfect tenses and adverbs like still (e.g. "durative" encore, noch, nog,
etc.). In a recently published paper, Hoepelman and Rohrer argue that this
336 M. DOMINICY
phenomenon can be accounted for by the following hypotheses 7 :
(55)(a) If p is a sentence whose main verb is in a perfect tense, then p

means that some event E is accomplished at some time point
or time interval t;
(b) If an event t: is accomplished at t, then, for every t' such that t
precedes t', E is accomplished at t'.
Consider sentences (56a) and (56b) :
(56)(a) John is still working (now)

(b) *John has still been working (now)
Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that still focusses on the (deletable)
time adverb now, and that (56a) presupposes or implicates that, in a near future,
John will not be working. From this presupposition or implicature the oddity
of (56b) directly follows. Indeed, hypothesis (55b) claims that it cannot be the
case that John has been working and that he will not have been working 8 .
If (55b) turns out to be correct, we come to a crucial result. Let p and q
be two sentences such that: (i) p means that some event E is accomplished
at t; (ii) q means that E is accomplished at 1'; (iii) t precedes t'; (iv) p and q
conform to the same propositional schema. Let X and X' be the expressions
which denote t and t', respectively. According to (33), X is higher than X'
on the relevant scale, since p entails q whereas q does not entail p. Hence, hypo-
thesis (45) predicts that any restrictive adverb which focusses on X or X' will
get the meaning of "not until". In other words, the sentence:
(57)1 have just now written a letter
will be true iff:
(58)(a) Presupposition: the event "write (I, a letter)" is accomplished

now;
(b) Truth-condition: there is no t, prior to now, such that the event
"write (I, a letter)" is accomplished at t.
If we make the auxiliary hypothesis that, under certain conditions, a deictic,

anaphoric or cataphoric time adverb can (or must) be deleted, we are able to
interpret the constructions of (1-10). More specifically, the use of adverbs
meaning "hardly" or 'just" follows from the fact that the focus necessarily
belongs to a scale9 . FUlihermore, the explanation I put forward has an interes-
ting diachronic corollary. Consider, e.g., the examples in (59) and (60) :
(59)(a) Two girls in the class are clever

(b) Only two girls in the class are clever
(60)(a) I have written a letter (now)

(b) I have just (now) written a letter
According to my theory, (60b) presupposes (60a) in exactly the same way as

(59b) presupposes (59a). On the other hand principle (36) predicts that, in most
circumstances, (59a) and (59b) will be pragmatically equivalent. This reasoning
also applies to (60a) and (60b), but the parallel evolution, in different languages,
of perfect tenses from an "aspectual" value to a "temporal" value progressively
blurs the pragmatic equivalence of such sentences. Hence, the use of a restrictive
adverb restores the original "aspectual" value of the perfect tense. To put it in
diachronic terms, I assume that a significant correlation will be found between
the shift of the perfect tense from "aspect" to "time" and the existence or,
then, the frequency of construction (60b).
3. In a purely logical ordering, the next step in my argumentation would

consist in showing that the hypothesis of 2.2 can be extended to venir de + infini-
tive. Yet, some facts would require a rather intricate explanation if I did not
first of all solve a problem which, at first sight, bears no more than a loose
relationship to the main topic of this paper. Consider the following examples:
(61)(a) German: Peter hat nur drei BUcher gelesen

(b) Dutch: Piet heeft maar drie boeken gelezen
(c) French: Pierre n 'a lu que trois livres
"Peter has only read three books"
(62)(a) German: Peter hat erst drei BUcher gelesen

(b) Dutch: Piet heeft pas drie boeken gelezen
(c) French: Pierre n 'a encore lu que trois livres
"Peter has still only read three books, Peter has only
read three books yet"
The difference of meaning between nur/maar and erst/pas may be intuitively

perceived through the French translations and their English eqUivalents. Al-
though some work has been devoted to erst and pas (Blumenthal; ('urme : 348;
Konig; Paardekooper : 261-72; Van Den Toorn), the semantics of these restric-
tive adverbs remains obscure. The analysis I will presently sketch claims that
338 M. DOMINICY
there is a true synonymy between erst/pas and French encore + seulement/ne

... que, German noch + nur, Dutch nog + pas, English still + only/only + yet,
lO
etc. . Consider, e.g., sentence (62c) (see Ducrot 1973: 252-60). The
restrictive expression ne... que "only" focusses on trois (see Barbaud and Piot).
I assume, furthermore, that encore focusses on a deleted maintenant "now"
(cf. 2.2) and gets a wider scope than ne... que. Under such conditions, (62c)
presupposes or implicates that, in a near future, Peter will have read more than
three books. In other words, there is an isomorphism between the scale which
is associated with the propositional schema Pierre a lu HNum til'res and a future-
oriented scale of time points (or non-overlapping time intervals) :
(63)
j
4
3 maintenant
2
I
If it is true that Peter has only read three books so far, then there was a time
prior to now at which Peter had read less than three books and there will
normally be a time at which he will have read more than three books. Thus,
erst and pas differ from nur and maar in a very simple way: their focus must
belong to a scale which is isomorphically related to some future-oriented scale
of time points (time intervals). This hypothesis accounts for the fact that, in
any example similar to (62), nur/maar may substitute for erst/pas, whereas the
converse substitution often proves impossible.
Karttunen and Konig fInd it puzzling that erst and pas also possess the
meaning of "not until" :
(64)(a) Die Prinzessin wachte erst urn neun Uhr auf

(b) De prinses werd pas om negen uur wakker
"The princess didn't wake up until nine"
However, Walloon apreume, American-Spanish recien, Danish flJrst and Finnish

vasta are comparably ambiguous (Dominicy 1980, 1981). My explanation would
run as follows. Consider sentences (65) and (66) :
(65)(a) Peter ist erst zwanzig Jahre alt

(b) Piet is pas twin tig jaar oud
(c) Pierre n'a encore que vingt ans
"Peter is stiII only twenty years old, Peter is only twenty years
old yet" .
(66)(a) Peter is erst jetzt zwanzig Jahre aIt

(b) Piet is nu pas twintig jaar oud
(c) Pierre a seulement maintenant vingt ans
"Peter is only now twenty years old"
Let us assume that there exists an isomorphism such that zwanzig/twintig/

vingt corresponds to jetzt/nu/maintenant. According to principle (52), (65)
implicates that S believes that H believes that Peter is more than twenty years
old, i.e. that Peter was already twenty years old at some earlier time. Converse-
ly, (66) implicates that S believes that H believes that Peter was already twenty
years old at some earlier time, i.e. that Peter is more than twenty years old.
This predicts the pragmatic equivalence of (65) and (66). Diachronically, erst,
pas, apreume, recil?n and f¢rst meant "not until" at a first stage, and shifted
only later to the restrictive value they have in sentences (6 I), (62) and (65).
My hypothesis entails that sentences like:
(67)(a) Wir haben erst begonnen

(b) We zijn pas begonnen
"We have only just begun"
are syntactically and semantically ambiguous, since erst/pas "only just" may
focus either on a deleted nun/nu "now" or on the predicate ll . As a matter of
fact, an indirect argument in favour of such an interpretation can be found in
the history of some restrictive expressions. Rumanian uses numai ce "only that"
in order to translate venir de + infinitive (cf. ALR : V, 1490, VI, 1801; DLR :
I, 2, 243, VII, 553; Sandfeld-Olsen : III, 329; Tiktin : 1,308,319, II, 1064) :
(68)Numai ce am venit (compare with (3) and (25»

"Only that [I] have come = I have just come"
The fact that the complementizer ce "that" introduces a main clause seems
rather strange; however, Latin, Polish, Russian and Bulgarian do have similar
constructions. The origin of this phenomenon becomes understandable if we
look at complex sentences such as :
(69)Numai ce am pus capul pe pernlr, am §i adormit (Avram : 44-59)

"Only that [I] (have) put [my] head on [the] pillow, [I] fell (= litt.
have fallen) asleep = I had hardly put my head on the pillow that
I fell asleep"
Here, the focus of numai "only" is the clause fee) am pus capul pe pernt,
340 M. DOMINICY
which corresponds, by virtue of a scalar isomorphism, to a deleted expression

that denotes the time at which the speaker fell asleep (Dominicy 1981). One
could expIicitely paraphrase (69) by :
(70) "When I fell asleep, I had only put my head on the pillow"
Within sentence (69), abia "hardly" can substitute for numai ce :
(71 ) Abia am pus capul pe pern( am Ji adormit
On the other hand, abia is also able to focus on a time adverb (see 2.1.2), so
that sentence (3) exhibit the same ambiguity as (67) :
(3) Abia am venit
If an analogical process applies to (69), (71) and (3), it will create a restrictive
adverb from a sentential connective:
(72) (71) (69)

=
(3) (68)
4. In this last paragraph, I will try to show that the hypothesis of 2.2 can be
extended to venir de + infinitive. More specifically, I will argue that venir q.e +
infinitive is a surface construction which conflates an underlying restrictive
morpheme (RESTR) and an underlying "perfect" morpheme.
4.1. Evidence shows that the formation of the periphrasis venir de + infini-
tive dates back to the 15th century (see Damourette-Pichon; Flydal; Gougen-
heim; Werner; Wilmet 1970). This fact conforms to the predictions of 2.2 :
during the same period, perfect tenses in French begin to shift from an
"aspectual" to a "temporal" value. Moreover, the underlying presence of a
"perfect" morpheme accounts for some properties of venir de + infinitive.
In contemporary French, any clause introduced by the connective apres que
"after (that)" requires the use of a perfect tense except for a very few
exceptions (Wilmet 1976) :
(73)(a) Pierre est parti apres que Marie est/soit arrivee

"Peter (has) left after (that) Mary came (= litt. has (indicative/
subjunctive) come)"
(b) *Pierre part apres que Marie arrive
"*Peter leaves after (that) Mary comes"
Now, instead of a perfect tense, we can find venir de + infinitive (Wilmet 1976:
144) :
(74)(a) Je l'ai rencontre, apres qu'il venait de faire justicier Vaysset

(J. Valles)
"I (have) met hem, after (that) he (had) just had Vaysset exe-
cuted"
(b) Pierre part apres que Marie vient/vienne d'arriver
"Peter leaves after (that) Mary has (ind./subj.) just come"
Another piece of evidence comes from "errors" made by native speakers:
(75)(a) Je viens de terminer Ie souper et remis mes objets en ordre

(excerpt from a letter) .
"I have just finished (venir de + infinitive) the supper and put
(past participle) my objects back in order"
(b) C'est un magasin qui a dll venir d'ouvrir
(spoken example, in Damourette-Pichon : V, 307)
"This is a shop which must (perfect tense) have jUst opened"
In such cases, subjects generalize a rule which, under normal circumstances, only
applies to perfect tenses:
(76)(a) J'ai termine Ie souper et j'ai remis mes objets en ordre

-+ J'ai termine Ie souper et remis mes objets en ordre
"I have finished the supper and put my objects back in order"
(b) C'est un magasin qui doit avoir ouvert -+ C'est un magasin qui a
dft avoir ouvert (reduplication) -+ C'est un magasin qui a dft ouvrir
(deletion)
'This is a shop which must have opened"
4.2. The underlying restrictive morpheme focusses on a time adverb which is

optionally deleted. Hence the possibility of using venir de + infinitive with
maintenant, alars or equivalent expressions 12 :
(77)(a) Il vient d'arriver maintenant (a l'instant, etc.)
"He has just come now (at this very moment, etc.)"
(b) Il venait d'arriver alors (a l'instant, etc.)
"He had just come then (at that moment, etc.)"
Consider now the following construction (see Vet: 97) :
(78)Pierre vient {SeUlement } (maintenant) d'arriver

(tout) juste
"only, just"
342 M. DOMINICY
This redundancy comes down to a sub case of the general tendency to redupli-
cate the underlying restrictive morpheme (cf. 1.2). In other words, venir de +
infinitive combines with seulement or (tout) juste in exactly the same way as
just combines with but or only in sentences (11) and (12).
However, my hypothesis is mostly supported by semantic arguments. In
examples (79) and (80), venir de + infinitive lies within the scope of a negative
or interrogative marker:
(79)(a) X: Elle s'est levee depuis Iongtemps

(b) Y: Comment Ie sais-tu ?
(c) X: On voit 9a, qu'elle ne vient pas de se lever (spoken example)
"X : She has been up for a long time (already)
Y : How do you know that?
X: You can see it, that she has not got up just now"
(80)Est-ce que tu viens d'arriver ?

"Have you just arrived ?"
The ne .... pas of (79c) behaves as a so-called "minimal" or "ordinary" negation

(pace Flydal: 107 and Roulet : 146), i.e. the subordinate clause of (79c) means
that some event E has been accomplished for a certain time. This phenomenon
is by no means exceptional: I have heard five examples of it, and even found a
literary occurrence (Racine, Berenice, 447). Sentence (80) illustrates another
interesting property of venir de + infinitive. It may be uttered by a speaker who
is present at the very place to which the adressee has just come. Compare with
the oddity of :
(8l)*Est-ce que tu es arrive (ici)?

"*Have you arrived (here) ?"
The analysis of 2.2 provides an obvious explanation. A sentence like:
(82)Pierre vient d'arriver

"Peter has just arrived"
will be true iff:
(83)(a) Presupposition: the event "arrive (Peter)" is accomplished now;

(b) Truth-condition: there is no t, prior to now, such that the event
"arrive (Peter)" is accomplished at t.
Since "ordinary" negation and "ordinary" question do not affect presuppo-

sitions, the denial of (79c) and the questioning of (80) only bear on the truth-
condition.
Sentence (82) conveys an information which precludes the use of the
question word Quand? "When ?". Consequently, venir de + infinitive may be
used to answer a "when-question" (cf. Soemarmo : 362) :
(84) *Quand viens-tu d 'arriver ?

"*When have you just arrived? = When did you just arrive ?"
(85)(a) - Quand es-tu arrive?
(b) - Je viens d 'arriver
"- When did you arrive?
- I have just arrived"
4.3. In 3, we saw that expressions meaning "not until" may, at a later stage,
focus on a term which belongs to a scale isomorphically related to a future-
oriented scale of time points; and conversely, French ne faire que "de (nothing)
but" is a restrictive expression whose focus necessarily contains the main verb
(Piot) :
(86) Le spectacle ne fait que commencer (maintenant)

"The show does nothing but begin (now) = The show is only be-
ginning (now)"
When the focus belongs to a scale isomorphically related to a future-oriented

scale of time points, as in (86), we can add encore "still" :
(87)Le spectacle ne fait encore que commencer

"The show is still only beginning = The show is only beginning yet"
Examples like (86) and (87) are already found in 15th-century French
(Werner: 281-4). Since the 16th century, the infinitive which follows ne faire
que may be introduced by the preposition de (= litt. "from", but more akin to
English to before infinitive).
The presence of de does not imply, nor preclude, the existence of a scalar
isomorphism (see Damourette-Pichon: VI, 222-3; Gougenheim: 129-32;
Moignet 1973: 129 and 1974: 39,43; Tobler: III, 92-3). Yet the 17th-
century grammarian Vaugelas formulated a normative rule according to which de
must (resp. may not) occur when the focus of ne faire que belongs (resp. does
not belong) to a scale isomorphically related to a future-oriented scale of time
points. Vaugelas' rule did not enforce itself upon the French speakers, but it
344 M.DOMINICY
survives in the spurious distinction that grammatical tradition makes between

the restrictive expression ne faire que and the "temporal periphrasis" ne faire
que de + infinitive (see Grevisse : 749-50; Sandfeld : 142-3).
The origin of Vaugelas' rule is clear enough. The preposition de, which was
used to introduce the infInitive after ne faire que, also occurred in the peri-
phrasis venir de + infinitive. However, Vaugelas' rule cannot be reduced to a
purely artiftcial claim. In this case at least, the grammarian's intuition gives us
a hint on the intuition of the native speakers. During the 16th and 17th
centuries, it was possible to use the construction ne venir que de + infinitive:
(88)11 ne venoit que de mener cette dame so us Ie bras it vespres, aula

reine alloit.
(Brantome, Les dames ga/antes, ed. Rat, Paris, Garnier, 1947, 74).
"He had just taken this lady arm in arm to vespers, where the queen
was going"
This phenomenon, of which I know twelve occurrences (see Gougenheim:

124-7), obviously results from analogy. Indeed, the restrictive expression
ne ... que "only" of sentence (88) can neither focus on the predicate nor on a
deleted time adverb. Furthermore, the fourth member of the analogical pro-
portion (90) is attested in Brantome (16th century) and explicltely ruled out by
the 17th-century grammarian Menage (Gougenheim : 131) :
(89)Elle ne venoit que recevoir ung petit poulet de papier de son amy.
(Brant6me, ibid., 341).
"She had just received a little letter (of paper) from her friend"
(90)ne laire que de commencer ne venir que de commencer

ne faire que commencer ne venir que commencer
The formal mixing up of venir de and ne faire que (de) shows that a pragmatic
equivalence holds between the periphrasis venir de + infinitive - i.e. the under-
lying restrictive morpheme which focusses on a time adverb - and the
expression ne faire que (de), when the focus of ne .. , que belongs to a scale
isomorphically related to a future-oriented scale of time points.
FOOTNOTES
1See Dietrich: 147. On Portuguese: Castilho : 86, 93; Cella: 524-5; Rolanda:
1476; Sten : 306.
2The non-English examples are given litteral (but, I hope, understandable)

translations. I will systematically neglect the difference between "have" and
"be" .
30n the restrictive value of but, see: Hatcher; Jespersen 1917 : 127-39; Neva-
lainen; OED: I, 1211.
4See Edmonson et al. : 123; Jacobson. In this paper. I neglect the fact that
just is more and more often used with a past tense, especially in the United
States (Defromont : 105-10; Du~ova; Peterson; Vanneck).
5When I read the first draft of this paper, Hans Kamp pointed out to me that my
description could not deal with a fundamental problem. Consider, e.g., sentences
(28a), (28b) and (28c) :
(28c) John eats fried. rice.
Since (28a) does not entail (28c), (28e) must be false if (28a) is true; which is
paradoxical. I can imagine two possible solutions for this puzzle. The first one
consists in arguing that some logical relation, which has to be weaker than en-
tailment, holds between (28a) and (28c); this relation would substitute for
entailment in condition (29b). The second solution associates with each focus
the class containing all the elements which are compatible with it (e.g. rice
would be compatible with both bread and fried rice, but not with sincerity);
in general, the class of all the elements which are taken into account in a parti-
cular context will be a proper subset of this maximal class. Anyway, I know of
no theory of restriction to which Kamp's objection does not apply.
6Sentences (38b) and (38e) are ambiguous, since d peine and tout juste can
mean either "only" or "almost not" (see Jespersen 1917 : 38-9). Notice that
English hardly cannot acquire the first meaning (Shanon : 52) :
(38c) John hardly eats rice
*- "John only eats rice"
= "John eats almost no rice"
7On the semantics of still and similar adverbs, see Abraham, Doherty, Fuehs-
Leonard, Hirtle, Konig, Morrissey, Muller, Shetter, Traugott-Waterhouse (quoted
in Rombouts, Vandeweghe, Vet). See also Fuchs; Martin; Soemarmo : 366-7.
Hypothesis (55) is more or less explicitely accepted by several authors (Bennett;
Bennett-Partee; Gabbay-Moravcsik : 75; Guenthner; Schnelle: 336-7).
81n fact, hypothesis (55b) is only valid within some pragmatically delimited
domain. In English, this constraint is captured by the intuitive notion of
"current relevance" (see McCawley; McCoard and footnote 7).
9Notice that the oddity of (b) must be traced back to the fact that hardly
cannot substitute for only or just in (a) (see footnote 6) :
(a) Bill haS{?nlY }two cars
Just
*hardly
(b) *1 have hardly now written a letter.
10Konig (I 979b : 159) observes that (a) and (b) are equivalent:
(a) Ich habe Ihren Aufsatz erst fliichtig durchgesehen
(b) Noch habe ich Ihren Aufsatz nur fiiichtig durchgesehen
346 M.DOMINICY
Here is a clear example of still only:

(c) In Argentina, unmade, flawed from its conception, without a history,
still only with annals, there can be no feeling for a past.
(V.S. Naipaul, The Return of Eva Peron, Harmondsworth, Penguin
Books, 146).
In some Dutch dialects, sentences like (d) prove ambiguous (see Rombouts
1979 and 1980; Vandeweghe) :
(d) Er zijn nog maar 53 reizigers in de bus
== "There are still only 53 passengers in the bus, There are only
53 passengers in the bus yet"
== "There are only 53 passengers left in the bus"
This ambiguity disappears in nog (maar) pas (Paardekooper: 261-72; WNT:
XII, 626-7).
II In fact, sentence (6 7a) is no longer ambiguous in Contemporary German,
since erst combines with eben when its focus has been deleted (compare with
examples (5b) and (l6a». The ambiguity of the English translation disappears
if we substitute hardly to only just (see footnote 9).
12See Andersson: 145, 191-2; Damourette-Pichon: V, 274; Gougenheim:
126-7; Sandfeld: 351; Tobler: I, 26. The examples quoted in these works
falsify Vet's conclusions (97). On the general problems raised by· the use of
venir de + infinitive with some adverbs, see Dubsky; Flydal: 104-7; Klum :
220,274,293; Rohrer: 119-21.
THE CONFIGURATIONAL MATRIX
Jan Koster
Tilburg University
School of Language and Literature
1. Levels of representation
One of the basic problems of the theory of core grammar is the determination
of the levels of representation for the sentences of a language, and the character-
ization of the mappings that interconnect these levels of representation.
Traditionally, a distinction was made between deep structure and surface
structure, which were thought to be connected by transformational derivations.
,
At present, the most common model has the following form 1 :
(1) D-structure
"move a"
i
S-structure
PR
~~ LF
D-structure (formerly deep structure) is generated by the base rules, while the
transformational component that yields S-structure is reduced to the schema
"move a" . S-structure is more abstract than traditional surface structure in that
it contains empty elements, some base-generated, like PRO in (2a), others as a
residue of the original positions of moved elements, such as the trace t in (2b)2 :
(2) a. John i tries [PROi to go]

b. John i seems [t i to go]
347
348 J. KOSTER
Both PRO and TRACE are coindexed with their antecedent John in (2).
The level PR (= Phonetic Representation) is close to the traditional notion
of surface structure. It is derived from S-structure by applying certain deletions,
and perhaps stylistic rules that may be seen as instances of "move a".
LF stands for Logical Form and is a level that minimally differs from S-
structure, mainly by application of rules of LF-movement, that can again be
regarded as instances of "move a", although there is no consensus as to the
properties of rules of LF-movement.
In this article, I have nothing to say about PR, only a little about LF, and
somewhat more about D- and S-structure. One of my conclusions will be that
the distinction between the latter two levels is not justified by the available
evidence. Clearly, then, the determination of the number and nature of levels
is an empirical issue.
The major rule leading from S-structure to LF is Quantifier Raising (QR),
as developed by May (1977). This rule picks up a quantified NP and adjoins
it to the minimal S that contains it. Everyone in (3a), for instance, is treated in
this way, giving (3b) :
(3) a. [S John saw everyone]

b. [S everyone i [S John saw tjJJ
According to most conceptions of LF, eJleryone can be further_spelled out asfor

every x, x a person, and t can be replaced by the variable x3 :
(4) [s for every x, x a person [s John saw xl
QR can be seen as an operation that makes the scope of a quantifier more trans-
parent, assuming that the scope of a quantifier is the c-command domain of
that quantifier. Clearly, the existence of a level of LF is dependent on the
existence of rules like QR and the crucial question, therefore, is whether there is
any justification for QR, i.e. evidence beyond the observation that the scope of
a quantifier is the domain defined by the minimal S containing the quantifier.
Evidence appears to be rather minimal and the most interesting claim, namely
that QR has exactly the properties of "move a" (particularly Subjacency), also
appears to be the most problematic. As an example, consider the fact that wh-
phrases cannot be extracted from PPs in Dutch 4 :
(5) *Wie praatte je met t
Who talked you with
'Who did you talk with'
THE CONFIGURATIONAL MATRIX 349
If QR had the same properties as "overt" movement rules, one would expect
the same pattern for QR. Quantifiers are always possible in PPs in languages
like Dutch and, therefore, we see an unexplained difference between QR and
wh-movement 5. There are other differences, and I therefore agree with Chomsky
(1981, ch. 4) that LF-movement does not have the properties of overt
"move a". Since as it stands, scope properties. cannot be derived from the
standard properties of "move a", the most important piece of potential
evidence for QR remains problematic. The other evidence is slight as well, and
for a sceptic, LF-extensions of S-structure might seem rather stipulative at the
moment. This is an active and interesting area of research, however, and perhaps
the issue can be settled in the near future 6.
On the whole, it seems that apart from PR, S-structtire is the best-established
level of syntactic representation. A separate level of LF remains interesting
but problematic while, in my opinion at least, the traditional level of D-structure
has become near vacuous in a theory that incorporates traces.
2. From D- to S-structure
In a theory without traces, a level of D-structure is well-founded. The basic

argument is that a certain configuration that crucially determines certain
information is lost at surface structure. Consider subject - verb agreement, for
instance. This type of agreement is locally checked in the sense that a finite
verb in English must agree with the subject of its clause:
(6) [S John likeJ.Mary]
The -s of likes depends on the local subject John, which is singular. If we do not
want to complicate agreement facts without limit, we have to assume a level of
D-structure, because subjects can drift indefinitely far away from the relevant
subject position:
(7) Which man does Bill think [s ____ likes Mary]
In this sentence, the relevant subject position is empty, as indicated by ____a.

Subject-verb agreement cannot apply anymore, unless we make the odd
assumption that the Wh-subject can be indefinitely far away from the verb. This
would make agreement an irregular process, which it is not. It can be regularized
as a local process by assuming that the subject which man in (7) is base-
350 J. KOSTER
generated in the D-structure position indicated by ___ , where the local process
of subject-verb agreement applies. This is a rather representative argument for
D-structure and it is compelling, I believe, in a theory without traces. Under the
assumptions of trace theory, however, such arguments loose all force. The reason
is that the essential information that was lost in a theory without traces, is
preserved in a theory with traces. Thus, the trace-theory equivalent of (7) still
has a local subject at the place where subject-verb agreement applies, name-
ly ti :
(8) Which man i does Bill think [ t i likes Mary]
This trace can serve as a singular subject, because it is linked to a singular lexical
NP, namely which man.
Traces are always locally bound, in their governing category (cf. Chomsky
1981). If such local links are repeated, we have what is called a chain:
(9) [Wh-phrase ]1 ... ti ... tj ... t n.
The position tn is the D-structure position of the Wh-phrase (cf. t i in (8)),

and positions like ti and tj are intermediate positions through which the Wh-
phrase has been moved. In general, a chain has the following form (where 0'
is a category from the X-bar system) :7
Let us call O'n the functional position (the D-structure position in terms of older
theories). Functional positions are governed, subcategorized, 8-marked, or case-
marked. The first position of the chain, 0'1' is called the head of the chain, which
contains the lexical material of the chain, if present. From a general uniqueness
condition, to be discussed later, it follows that only one member of a chain can
have lexical content. From the binding theory of Chomsky (1981), it follows
that only 0' I of a chain can have lexical content.
Together, these assumptions entail that each chain has one functional
position, O'n' and at most one position with lexical content, 0'1' In general, the
lexical content of a chain has to match its functional position. For instance,
if O'n is 8-marked as an agent, a lexical 0'1 has to contain material that is
compatible with this agent function.
That trace theory undermines the classical arguments for the distinction
between D- and S-structure, follows from the un controversial fact that chains
are represented at S-structure. Consider, for instance, the S-structure of (8) :
(II) Which man i does Bill think [ t i [ t i likes Mary]]
This structure has a chain of three elements (n = 3). Subject-verb agreement

looks for an NP in a functional position that is marked for the subject role:
a3 in (11). Selection of the agreement marker, singular or plural, depends on the
content of an (= a3)' which is under aI' by definition. In (I I), this content is
compatible with the singularity of the verb-ending in the most deeply embedded
clause (Iike-s). The crucial point is that the content of a functional position can
always be read from S-structure, also if there is a chain of exactly one element
(n = I) :
(12) John likes Mary

an =I
Thus, even without "move a", we can distinguish the functional position an
and the matching content al' In (12), the functional subject position anand the
content position al happen to fall together. Since the matching of al with
an is essentially the same for structures with and without "movement" (i.e.
structures with chains of more than one element), the whole concept of "move-
ment" - insofar as it creates chains - loses its significance: nothing can be said
about structures with long chains that cannot also be said about structures with
chains of exactly one element.
As a last illustration, consider the classical argument based on idioms like
to make headway. The classical argument assumes that the idiomatic sense of
this phrase is locally determined, i.e. if the verb make is immediately followed
by the NP-Gbject headway:
(l3)They [ [ y made] [ NP headway]]
After movement, this required adjacency is lost:
(14)[NP Headway] was [y made] by them
Therefore, we have to assume that the deep structure of (14) is like (13), so that
the idiomatic sense, based on adjacency, can be determined.
If chains are represented at S-structure, such arguments have no force.:
352 1. KOSTER
(15)[ NPj Headway 1was [[ V made 1[ NP. e II by them

I
Under the assumptions of trace theory, the information lost in (I 4) is preserved

in (15). In both (I 3) and (15) the verb made is adjacent to an NP with headway
as its content. So, the idiomatic reading can be read from S-structure, without
D-structure, "inheritance", or reconstruction.
Essentially, theil, the classical reasons for the distinction between D- and S-
structure disappear. This is not to say that there can be no other reasons,
conceptual reasons, for instance.
In a recent paper, Van Riemsdijk and Williams (I 981) have argued that, apart
from D- and S-structure, there is yet another level of representation,
NP-structure. This is a level between NP-movement and Wh-movement. Their
arguments have essentially the same structure as the classical arguments for D-
structure and are, therefore, vacuous for the same reason: the information
supposed to be lost (after Wh-movement in this case) is in fact preserved under
the assumptions of trace theory. To illustrate the point I will just mention the
well-known contraction facts. Thus, (16a) can be reduced to (16b) :
(16)a. Whoi do you want [ ej [ PRO to see ~i II

b. Who do you wanna see
The generalization is that want -j to can be reduced to wanna if there is no

lexical material between want and to. In (17), for instance, to cannot be
adjoined to want, because there is an intermediate lexical NP Bill :
(17)a. Who do you want Bill to see

b. *Who do you wanna Bill see
a1
As is well-known, the following ungrammatical sentence forms an interesting

contrast with the grammatical (16b) in many dialects: .
(18) *Who do you wanna see Bill
One of the explanations given is that the structure underlying (I8) contains a
trace between want and to :
(19) Whoi do you want lei to see Bill]
Contrary to PRO in (16), the trace ei is a terminal element, a variable, which

blocks contraction8 .
Van Riemsdijk and Williams rightly point out that (19) is analogous to (17),
and that in both cases there is lexical material (Bill and Who, respectively) that
is responsible for the fact that contraction does not apply. From such facts,
they conclude that there is a level of NP-structure, in which (19) is exactly
analogous to (I7) in that there is actual lexical material between want and to.
NP-structure precedes Wh-movement so that Who i is still in the position of ei
in (19).
I agree with the observed parallelism between (17) and (19), but I see no
argument for NP-structure on the basis of these facts. Also without NP-structure,
(19) is exactly analogous to (17a). This follows from a proper definition of a
lexical NP (i.e. the kind of NP that blocks contraction). If a lexical NP is simply
an NP with lexical content, there is no difference between (17a) and (19).
In both cases, this fact can immediately be read from S-structure by checking
the content of the chain (= al) to which the embedded subject b~longs. In
(17a) this content is Bill, in (19) Who. In both cases the content (under al)
is lexical, so there is no relevant difference 9 .
It should perhaps be stressed that this conclusion can be drawn on the basis
of S-structure without "reconstruction" in the sense discussed by Van Riemsdijk
and Williams. So, it is simply false that we need either reconstruction or NP-
structure. Neither is necessary, given the uncontroversial fact that chains are
represented at S-structure.
Summarizing, then, we see that there is no reason to distinguish D-structure
from S-structure. Nor is there a compelling argument for NP-structure. Pre-
sumably, theories with only S-structure are notational variants of theories with
additional levels like D-structure or NP-structure 10. If this is true, the latter
theories can only be saved from Occam's razor by conceptual arguments of some
sort. Some such arguments will be discussed in the next section.
3. The configurational matrix
Since the beginning of trace theory, Chomsky has stressed that it is possible
to generate S-structure directly, without a transformational derivation from D-
to S-structure 11.
Chomsky has not considered this step very meaningful, however, for a
number of reasons. First of all, "move a" is not really eliminated if the
properties of it show up elsewhere, namely in the interpretive rules that connect
354 J. KOSTER
the S-structure position of "moved" elements with their traces.

The second, more recent argument is a bit more implicit in the literature.
It is the conceptual point that it is natural to have a "pure" representation
of grammatical functions (G F) at some level 12 .
These two major arguments are perhaps interconnected, i.e. the first
argument would not make much sense without the second. Or at least I think
that the first argument is not very persuasive considered in isolation. From the
fact that different sets of interpretive rules meet slightly different conditions,
nothing whatsoever follows with respect to levels of representation. The
conditions for rules of anaphora, for instance, vary slightly for different
anaphors. Nobody would conclude from that fact alone that rules of anaphora
apply at different levels. In other words, the supposedly different conditions
for "movement" rules form only an indirect, supportive argument, if there are
other arguments.
Quite apart from these considerations, we might ask whether the properties
of movement rules are really so different. This is the major issue, and it is only
on this point that I really disagree with the standard Government-Binding frame-
work.
If we study the properties of movement rules, we see immediately that most
of them are very similar to the properties of rules of anaphora. In both cases,
for instance, the antecedent has to c-command the bound element (an anaphor
and a trace, respectively). Later on I will mention other overlapping properties.
I think there is no real disagreement about this overlap in properties. The main
issue has been the alleged difference in locality properties. According to the
standard view, movement rules have a unique locality property, subjacency. In
my own view, subjacency properly reformulated is just a strict variant of familiar
locality conditions for anaphora. The content of subjacency is that no move-
ment rule connects 0: and 1 in:
(20) ... 0: .•. [~ ... [~' ... 1 ... ] ... ] ...
This format mentions two bounding nodes, ~ and W, while the domain state-
ments for bound anaphora (cf. Clause Mate Conditions) are usually formulated
with one bounding node:
(21 ) ...0: ... [/3 ... 'Y ... ] ...
Even then, the differences are not overwhelming. But we can make a stronger
claim: (21) is also the right format for movement rules. This is a non-trivial
unification, with empirical consequences that clearly favor (21) for movement
rules, in my opinion.
All in all, two different research strategies originated from trace theory.
Either one could seek to maximize the differences between the theory of "move-
ment" and the theory of anaphora, or one could seek to unify the two. The
Lectures on Government and Bindmg adopt the former strategy, while, personal-
ly, I believe that the latter approach is correct. At any rate, the issue has
appeared to be productive and led to new insights and facts.
First, I believe that the issue has led to a considerable body of facts that
shows that (21) is the right format for movement rules. I have little to add to
what I have said elsewhere about this topic, and I believe that no new evidence
in favor of (20) has appeared 13.
Second, there have been attempts to dissociate the conditions for anaphora
from the conditions for movement in other respects. Rizzi (I 978), for instance,
argues that the SSC and the NIC do not apply to movement rules, but only to
rules of bound anaphora l4 . Both the NIC and the SSC have not really survived
in the Government-Binding framework. The NIC has disappeared altogether, and
can therefore no longer be considered a condition that distinguishes two kinds
of rules. The SSC has also disappeared, but some elements of it have been pre-
served in the notion "accessible subject" : domains for bound anaphora must
have an accessible subject, in contrast with domains for traces 15. The notion
"accessible subject" is too intricate to discuss here, but things can be illustrated
with an example:
(22)[ S 1 They think [ S2 iti is a pity [Si that pictures of each other are
for sale ]]]
According to the definition of "accessible subject", neither Si nor S2 contains

an accessible subject as an antecedent for each other: Si does not contain a
subject that c-commands the reciprocal, and iti in S2 does not qualify because
it is coindexed with Si. So, only SI is a minimal domain for each other, because
only SI contains an accessible subject, namely they.
It is true that such conditions cannot be found for cases of movement. But
it is false, I think, to believe that there is a difference in type of domain
involved. As I have argued elsewhere, the direct antecedent for each other in
(22) is not they, but the implicit subject a of the picture noun (ak's pictures of
each otherk) (see Koster 1981). So it is this implicit antecedent a that is
356 J. KOSTER
interpreted in accordance with the notion "accessible subject". Interpretation

of implicit arguments, however, is constrained by other conditions than the
binding theory. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the notion
"accessible subject" plays a role in the binding theory, at least not directly.
Bound anaphors are bound just in their minimal S or NP, or in their Minimal
Argument Structure in the sense of Koster (1981). So, apart from the different
values for ~ in (21), there is no reason to suppose that the locality conditions
for bound anaphora and movement are different.
A third issue has been the alleged difference between TRACE and PR0 16 :
(23)a. Johni seems [ TRACEi to go ]

b. Johni tries [ PROi to go ]
Both TRACE and PRO are empty NPs ([Npe ]), but TRACE is supposed to be
a residue of movement, while PRO is considered a base-generated element.
Originally TRACE and PRO were seen as two distinct primitives, while recently,
in Lectures on Government and Binding, the two elements have been defIned
as two contextual variants of the same empty element 17. This recent
reformulation goes in the direction of a closer identifIcation of the two
elements. The differences are now believed to be contextual: TRACE is always
governed, while PRO cannot be governed. This difference in governance has
consequences for the locality conditions. While TRACES are always locally
bound (in their (minimal) governing category), PROs can also have long-distance
antecedents:
(24)Johni thinks [ it is impossible [ PRO i to go ]]
This observation seems correct, but it overlooks the very important fact that
there are two kinds of PROs (cf. Williams 1980). Some PROs are just like
traces: they are obligatorily and locally bound by a c-commanding antecedent.
Only optional PROS, i.e. PROs in for-complements· and gerunds in English,
can have deviant properties such as long-distance antecedents. These differences
can be explained by assuming that the Ss containing obligatory PROs undergo
S-deletion, just like complements to raising verbs. If this explanation can be
maintained, TRACE and PRO in (23) have the exact same properties l8 . I have
tried to show elsewhere that this explanation cannot only be maintained, but
that it also predicts new facts (cf. Koster 1981).
All in all, it seems to me that at present the evidence for the distinction
between configurational properties of rules of anaphora and rules of movement

is practically nil. Perhaps one assumption underlying the opposite view is that
different types of rules are characterized by different clusters of properties.
Although there are differences in content, my claim is that there are no
differences in configurational properties 19. There is only one cluster of con-
figurational properties that characterizes all rules of core grammar. There is a
uniform configurational matrix that can be formulated as a function ~ that
connects an antecedent 0: with a (usually governed) element 'Y. This function
has the following four properties:
(25)a. obligatoriness
b. uniqueness of 0:
c. prominence of 0:
d. locality (0: and 'Y in same domain)
The first property, obligatoriness, is self-explanatory. All bound elements of

core grammar are obligatorily bound. Thus, both reflexives, for instance, and
traces have an obligatory antecedent.
The second property, uniqueness, has insufficiently been explored and is
very interesting. It explains the fact that bound anaphors may not have a split
antecedent. It also explains much of the empirical content of the 8-criterion.
Furthermore, it explains why clauses have only one subject. Since there can
only be, one 0: to a set of VPs (predicates), there can only be one subject. The
uniqueness property also gives a principled explanation for the fact that so-called
VP-analyses for infinitives are inadequate. Under the assumption that the subject
role (or its thematic content) is assigned by the VP, the following structure is
incompatible with the uniqueness requirement 20 :
(26)[NP John] [VP wants [vp to try [yp to go ]]]
In this structure, there is more than one VP that assigns the subject role to the
NPJohn.
Another mechanism constrained by uniqueness is the assignment of lexical
content (case) to functional positions for NPs. Under the assumptions of free
indexing, an ungrammatical expression like *John hits has two possible
structures :
(27)a. *J ohni hits ej

b. *Johni hits ei
358 J. KOSTER
In the first example, (27a) ej is not bound at all. This violates the obligatoriness
condition on such elements: it must be bound. In (27b), ei is bound by the
subject John. But this structure is also ill-formed. Assignment of lexical content
(expressed by case) is obligatory. So (27b) can also be seen as a violation of
obligatoriness, i.e. if ei has no lexical content at all. If we interpret John as
the lexical content of the object ei (a chain interpretation), we would have a
violation of uniqueness. John would not only be the lexical content assigned to
the object position (objective case assigned by hit), but the lexical content
assigned to the subject position (nominative case assigned by INFL).
Prominence principles are the familiar notions of c-command and subject-
hood. Usually 0: c-comrnands 'Y in all processes of core grammar. This is true for
rules of anaphora, "movement", subject-verb agreement, predication (cf.
Williams 1980), complementation (sub categorization , case assignment, and
a-marking), and several other processes. In some cases, 0: must also have the
subject role. This is a somewhat stricter version. There is some variation in this
respect, from language to language, but also from rule to rule.
Locality principles are of the form (21). The (usually governed) element 'Y
must be bound by Q within ~ in :
(28)[~ ... 'Y .•• ]
where the value of ~ varies slightly, again from language to language, and from
rule to rule 21 . .
The configurational function characterizes processes as different as
interpretation of bound anaphors, interpretation of traces, and subject-verb
agreement. It forms a separate module of grammar that is independent from the
rule content of the processes that it constrains. Although many details remain
to be clarified, it is the configurational function that I consider the most
important result of the fruitful linguistic theorizing of the last twenty years22.
The configurational function is intimately connected with the best established
level of syntactic representation, namely S-structure.
NOTES
1See Chomsky (1981).

2Cf. Koster (1978).
3This paraphrase is given here as a matter of exposition. Personally, I do not
feel committed to it.
4For extraction from PP in Dutch, see Van Riemsdijk (1978), and also Koster
(1978) and (1980), where it is assumed that PP is a bounding node for
subjacency (or a proper reformulation of it).
5May (1977) notices some of these discrepancies, but does not offer a solution
in all cases. New suggestions concerning this crucial problem will be given in a
revised version of May (1977) (personal communication).
6There is a large literature on LF. Relevant references can be found in Chomsky
(1981). See also Higginbotham (1979), Kayne (1980), Aoun et al. (1980).
For an interesting discussion of LF and conditions on movement, see Huang
(1981).
7The concept of a chain assumed here is somewhat more general than the
function chains discussed by Chomsky (1981,ch.6), where al is always an NP
(cf. Chomsky 1981, p. 333). The generalized chain conception assumed here,
also covers chains in which a 1 is a Wh-phrase of types other than NP.
8See, for instance, Chomsky (1977).
9Similar considerations apply to the binding of anaphors. Thus, there is no
relevant difference among:
(i) They saw pictures of each other
(ii) Which pictures of each other did they see '!
(iii) They saw each other
In (i) and (iii), each other is (part of) the content of an NP with the minimal
chain length (n == I). In (ii), each other is contained by the head of a chain of
two elements (n =:: 2). In all three cases, each other is (part of) the content of the
chains in question, which is under ai, by definition. Therefore, I assume that a
proper formulation of the binding theory refers to the notion "content"
(== al): anaphors must be (part of) the content of categories that are
c-commanded by the antecedent. Thus, the content itself need not be
c-commanded by the antecedent but only the functional "anchor" of the
chain (= an). That head (al) and functional "anchor" (an) sometimes fall
*"
together (n =:: 1) and sometimes not (n I) is irrelevant in my view. In all (ases,
the crucial insight is that even with a chain of one element (n =:: I), content (a I)
and functional position (an) can be distinguished. This is in fact, I believe, the
idea underlying trace theory: the content of a category is moved, while its
functional "anchor" is left behind.
10Thus, I do not deny, the possibility of empirical distinctions, nor do I have a
strong a priori preference for theories with S-structure only. My point is simply
that the existing empirical evidence for D- or NP-structure is not very
convincing. The available evidence for D-structure is summarized in Chomsky
(1981, p. 346). See also op. cit. p. 89 ff.
II See Chomsky (1981, p. 91) and the references mentioned there.
12See Chomsky (1981,42 ff.)
l3 See Koster (1978) and (1980).
14For the SSC and the NIC, see Chomsky (1980).
15See Chomsky (1981), p. 209 ff.).
360 J. KOSTER
16Cf. Koster (1981), and references given there.

17 See Chomsky (1981, ch. 6).
18This is so because try does not select a for-complement or a gerund, so that
S-deletion can apply.
19Th us, I do not claim that there are no differences of a non-configurational
character. Rules of anaphora, for instance, can be subject to conditions
concerning argument structure that play no role in "movement". Essentially,
this is a matter of modularity. There is a "geometrical" component common
to all rules, that can interact with different other components in different
rules.
20For independent arguments against such structures, see Koster and May
(1981).
21 In other words, {3 can be considered both a language-internal and a language-
external parameter. Within English, for instance, {3 only has the values Sand NP
for anaphors. For all governed empty elements (traces, governed PROs, gaps in
coordinated structure) {3 has the value NP, 5, PP, and AP (cf. Koster 1978).
22It is sometimes said that generative grammar is hard to follow because it is
changing constantly. Fortunately it is, but it should also be stressed that the
prototypes of the fundamental notions of prominence and locality can already
be found in the early sixties in the works of Lees, Klima, and others.
TOWARDS PLAUSIBILITY IN THEORIES OF
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
James D. McCawley
University of Chicago
A number of recent articles (e.g. Braine 1971, Baker 1979) have taken up
the question of how a child can learn a language without reliance on large
amounts of negative grammaticality data, i.e. data of the form 'X is not
grammatical as a sentence of language L'. The authors note that the most
obvious source of negative grammaticality data, namely corrections of the child's
speech by adults and older children, in fact plays only a small role in language
acquisition. Baker also notes that in the case of the most commonly attested
corrections, namely those relating to morphological irregularities ("Don't
say dood, say did"), the positive aspect of the correction provides all the
data that the child needs: since specific rules (as Panini, Kiparsky, and
Koutsoudas et al. tell us) take precedence over general rules, when the child
learns that the past tense of do is did, he will automatically stop saying dood
regardless of whether he ever learned that dood is unacceptable. The child is thus
in an important respect not a little linguist: negative data provide much of the
factual basis for argumentation by big lingUists, but little of the data that the
child has available for use in learning a grammar.
In this paper, I will present some highly speculative suggestions relating to
the more general question raised by Braine and Baker, that of how an account
of language acquisition can be given that makes realistic assumptions about
the nature of the data that the child uses and about what the child can do with
those data at the time at which they are available to him.
The dilemma that Braine and Baker wrestle with emerges from Gold's (1967)
theorems about the learnability of languages on the basis of positive together
with negative data or on the basis of positive data alone. Gold's theorems involve
361
362 J. MCCAWLEY
a notion of "learning in the limit" : a language is learnable in the limit according

to a given learning algorithm if, as data are successively presented to the
algorithm and it is applied to the set of data presented so far, a point is reached
where the output of the algorithm generates the language in question and
presentation of further data does not change the output of the algorithm. Gold
showed that only a pitifully small range of languages were learnable in the limit
on the basis of positive data, while a much richer set of languages were learnable
on the basis of positive and negative data together. The dilemma is that of how
to reconcile Gold's results with the propositions that children do their language
acquisition apparently on the basis of largely positive data and that they learn
languages that in Gold's scheme are not learnable from positive data alone.
Baker's response to the dilemma is to restrict the class of grammars available
to the child in such a way as to make grammars for "more interesting" languages
more accessible than they are in Gold's framework. I wish to suggest the
alternative response of denying one of the propositions that figures in the
dilemma, namely the proposition that children learn a language. In saying this,
I am not suggesting that language acquisition does not take place but am with
malicious intent bringing out the common equivocation over the word 'language'
that permeates theoretical discussions of language acquisition, namely
equivocation between the ordinary sense of 'language' and the technical sense
of a 'language' as a set of sentences. Gold's result has to do with the learning
of a language in the technical sense, and it is not obvious that that topic has any
relation to the learning of a language in the ordinary sense. It is not clear that
an adult, let alone a child, knows a language in the technical sense of the
mathematical models literature, that is, knows which strings of words are and
which ones are not members of a set that can be taken to constitute 'his
language,I. The assumption that he has such knowledge rests, as far as I can see,
on no evidence whatever. The alleged ability of speakers of a language to make
'grammaticality judgements' is in reality a quite different ability, namely the
ability to search for analyses of a given possible sentence, under constraints
imposed by assumptions about the meaning and context of that sentence, and
to report success or failure in carrying out that search. The limiting case of this
ability, that is, an ability to carry out such a search over the whole gamut of
possible meanings and possible contexts, could perhaps be identified with the
ability to make 'grammaticality judgements'. The trouble with that
identification is that hardly anyone is able to carry out that task conSistently
and reliably; my impression is that only the most expert and perverted of
PLAUSIBILITY IN THEORIES OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 363
.punsters possess that ability, and a plausible case can be made that it represents
a pathological condition. In any event, an ability to make reliable
'grammaticality judgements', as they are usually conceived, is of such rarity that
its relationship to general questions of linguistic competence is about as
tangential as that of, say, Broca's aphasia.
The bulk of this paper will be concerned with the acquisition of languages in
the ordinary sense, not with the acquisition of 'languages' in the technical sense.
If it should turn out, through what I would regard as a bizarre fluke, that
acquisition of a language in the ordinary sense has as a side effect the acquisition
of a 'language' in the technical sense, that result would certainly be amusing,
though it is not clear that it would be of any importance. Inter alia, I regard
the question of whether a child acquires a 'language' in the technical sense as
completely independent of the question of whether the linguistic competence
that he acquires has, loosely speaking, the form of a transformational grammar.
I will in fact take as a starting point the assumption that linguistic competence
has, loosely speaking, that form, in the sense that it involves surface structures
that have the form of ordered labeled trees, underlying structures that are also
of that general form (with the qualification that I do not wish to assume that
left-to-right order plays any role in underlying structure), and rules relating
structural configurations in underlying and surface structures. This leaves open a
great number of questions about the details of linguistic knowledge and
linguistic structure, and I will argue below that some of those questions can be
answered on the basis of considerations of language acquisition, that is, certain
answers to these questions but not others can be made on the basis of a scenario
for language acquisition that is plausible in relation to what is known about
developmental stages, individual variation, and data available t(') the learner.
Transformational grammars are generally taken as involving both a system of
transformations, which specify how the different stages of a syntactic derivation
are related, and a two-part system of base rules that specify what deep structures
are possible. The two parts that comprise the base rules are the phrase-structure
rules, which specify what gross combinations are possible in the deep structures
of the given language (e.g. the rule S ..... NP VP specifies that an item of category
S may consist of an item of category NP followed by an item of category VP),
and the lexicon, which specifies what lexical items the language has and what
restrictions there are on the occurrence of each item in deep structure (e.g.
put must be followed by a NP and a directional PP or adverb). A tacit (and
gratuitous) assumption has always been made that the GROSS
364 J. MCCAWLEY
COMBINATORICS embodied in the phrase-structure rules and the PETTY

COMBINATORICS embodied in the lexicon relate to the same level of syntactic
structure. There is in fact no reason why they could not relate to different
levels, e.g. there is no reason to exclude a priori grammars in which a lexicon
specifies what deep structure frames each lexical item can be used in, and a
set of phrase-structure rules specifies what gross syntactic configurations the
language allows in surface structure. The vast bulk of the arguments for
admitting underlying syntactic structures that differ from surface structure
provide reasons for taking petty combinatoric restrictions to apply to underlying
rather than surface structures (e.g. the arguments about selectional restrictions
in actives and passives) but are neutral as to what level of structure the gross
combinatoric restrictions apply to. Indeed, the arguments that have been offered
for Emonds' (1976) conception of 'structure preserving transformations' can
be interpreted as simply showing that the gross combinatoric restrictions in a
language are restrictions on surface rather than deep combinatorics. Rather than
saying, with Emonds, that the passive transformation moves the NP's and inserts
the be into positions where NP's and a V are allowed IN DEEP STRUCTURE,
one can say that they are moved into positions where items of those categories
are allowed IN SURF ACE STRUCTURE and be noncommital as to whether
deep structures are subject to the same combinatoric restrictions, e.g. English
v,
allows the surface configurations [V(NP)~ (PP)olv and [V Vl and whether
such configurations also occur in deep structure is immaterial.
I have argued elsewhere (McCawley 1981 a). that surface gross combinatorics
is part of the grammar of any language.(This is not to say that surface structure
is the only structural level for which rules of gross combinatorics playa role in
language: clearly gross combinatoric principles for semantic structure also play
a role in determining what meanings can correspond to what sentences of a given
language. However, I reject the position that I once subscribed to that surface
combinatoric restrictions are only a reflection of semantic combinatoric
restrictions and lead no life of their own.)
The surface combinatoric restrictions in a language involve distinctions that
in many cases either play no role in semantic structure or are drawn differently
in semantic structure than in surface structure. For example, a surface finite
clause in English must consist of a NP followed by a V. The head of a V must
belong to the lexical category 'verb', as opposed to 'noun', 'adjective', etc. The
distinction N vs. V vs. A etc. does not correspond exactly to any distinction
in semantic structure (e.g. the verb like and the adjective fond appear to
correspond to exactly the same predicate of logical structure), although semantic

characteristics impose restrictions on what lexical category an element of
meaning can be manifested in (see Gupta 1980 for arguments that nouns define
domains of bound variables, and Dixon 1977 for impIicational universals
regarding what meanings can be expressed in the lexical category 'adjective').
The arguments given by me (1972), Bach (1968), and Lakoff (1970) to the
effect that the combinatoric categories of syntax were identical to those of logic
rested on gratuitous assumptions that I now reject, among them the assumptions
that syntactic categories remain constant throughout a derivation (e.g. that
something is a surface V if and only if it is traceable back to a deep structure V)
and that combinatoric rules for the deepest level of derivations determine what
syntactic categories there are. Our arguments showed that the combinatoric
categories of logic (proposition, predicate, argument) playa role in syntax but
showed nothing about whether other factors also playa role.
I regard the bulk of what has been said about syntactic categories. including
the bulk of what I said myself up to a couple of years ago, as grossly muddled,
in particular, as having failed to make clear what it means to say that two things
pelong to the same syntactic category. I am currently pursuing an alternative
approach to syntactic categories that avoids the muddle by in effect avoiding the
notion of syntactic category (McCawley 1977, 1981a): instead of syntactic
categories as such, I recognize simply a list of factors, some of which need not
be inherently syntactic in nature, that can play roles in syntactic phenomena,
and describe the phenomena directly in terms of those factors.
Among the factors that I regard as playing a role in syntax are the difference
between a head and an adjunct, the lexical category (N, V, A, P, etc.) of the
head of the given item, the logical category (proposition, predicate, argument)
of the constituent of logical structure corresponding to the item 2 , and the
difference (corresponding to that between X and X in orthodox X-bar syntax)
between a lexical item and an expression in which that item is combined with
its adjuncts and/or complements (e_g. here, as in X-bar syntax, afraid of snakes
is an A and student of chemistry an N)_ What this approach shares with X-bar
syntax is principally that it decomposes category notions into components and
takes the lexical category of the head of an item to be one of the components
of its category. It differs from orthodox X-bar syntax with regard to what the
other components are (the only other component in orthodox X-bar syntax is
the depth to which the head is embedded in the item, expressed as a number of
'bars'), and with regard to the role that 'categories' play in a grammar. In
366 1. MCCAWLEY
orthodox X-bar syntax categories remain constant throughout derivations,

whereas in the alternative that I am sketching here, category names are merely
informal abbreviations for sets of components, and when any of those
components changes the category changes, e.g. if a V is replaced by a P, the V of
which it had been head becomes a P, as in the derivation that I propose
(M cCaw ley, to appear b) of With Reagan as President, there's a grave danger of
war, in which the verb be is replaced by the preposition as. Some further
differences between my approach and the X-bar syntax of Chomsky's post-
1970 work are : for Chomsky each bar means '?ne level up from the head',
whereas for me a bar means 'consists of head plus any adjuncts or complements',
so that multiple bars are meaningful for Chomsky but not for me; for me but
not for Chomsky, N, V, etc. can appear in recursive configurations such as
[N S]N' (as in the surface structure for restrictive relative clauses for which I
argue in McCawley 1981 b) or [\7 Adv ly; for me but not for Chomsky,
constituents can be unspecified for one or more components of the syntactic
category notions (for example, tense markers belong to no lexical category
but still can be underlying heads of constituents; and prior to lexical insertion
there is no distinction among N, V, and X, since constituents whose heads are
semantic units rather than lexical items are unspecified for the characteristic
that distinguishes among those 'categories'); and I see no reason to expect base-
rule schemata to have the significance that Chomsky 1972 and lackendoff
1977 attach to them 3.
Adoption of the conception of syntactic category that I have just sketched
makes it possible to develop a scenario for the acquisition of syntax in which
syntactic category membership is acquired in the course of the acquisition of
non-syntactic information, rules of surface weIl-formedness can be learned far
in advance of any rules that would enable one to make 'grammaticality
judgements', and rules of surface weIl-formedness, once learned, can be used in
the acquisition of syntactic constructions other than those that provided the
basis for learning the rules. For example, once the learner knows that there are
surface instances of V consisting of V followed by V, he can interpret new
instances of V V as constituents and as belonging to the category V. This
suggests an acquisition strategy that I will provisionally assume that children
apply: to maximally exploit surface configurations that one has already
learned and thereby impose analyses on constructions that one has not yet
learned. For example, by using this strategy, a child would automaticaIly assign
to passive clauses the follOWing structure simply on the basis of their containing
a member (be) of the lexical class V followed by something of the form V, and
would do so even though he has not yet learned rules that tell him what passive
clauses are possible 4 :
For the child to execute this scenario, he will have to identify the lexical
categories of the relevant items. While I have no clear picture of how a child
would do that, I am reasonably sure of the following things: (i) lexical
categories are 'fuzzy', and peripheral members are assigned to them 011 the basis
of the same sorts of principles that determine hO'.v cognitive categories in general
are extended to take in peripheral members (Rosch et al. 1976), (ii) morphology
plays a major role in the identification of lexical categories, i.e. the participation
of an item in the inflectional paradigm corresponding to N, V, or A is a
SUF FICIENT condition for assigning it to that lexical category, and (iii) the
cores of lexical categories can be characterized in semantic as well as in morpho-
logical terms.
On the basis of this picture of how the acquisition of syntax might work,
I tentatively conclude that the acquisition of syntactic categories can be to a
large extent a by-product of the learning of word meanings and of morphology
and that even incomplete learning of syntactic category distinctions is sufficient
to give a child the means to learn rules of surface well-formedness that can then
be put to work in the analysis of more complicated syntactic constructions.
This conception of categories and rules of surface well-formedness allows for
incomplete knowledge about the well-formedness of a particular possible surface
structure, e.g. it makes available to the child a surface structure and a semantic
interpretation for combinations of a given verb with a following V even if the
child does not know what form the verb requires the V to be in (whether
infinitive with to, infinitive without to, present participle, or past participle)
or whether a given V can be used in that form. I lay particular emphasis on this
point because I think that in a number of cases acquisition via a stage of in-
complete learning provides the most reasonable account of a linguistic
368 J. MCCAWLEY
phenomenon. For example, I conjecture that Finnish children first learn that
there are environments in which consonant alternations take place and only
later learn what exactly those alternations areS.
For a further example, consider the acquisition of auxiliary verbs in English.
Suppose that the child has developed to the stage of having a surface
configuration [V Vl Y' As soon as the child identifies the various auxiliary verbs
as verbs, he will, under my hypothesis of maximal exploitation of surface con-
figurations, interpret them as forming V's with the immediately following V,
thus yielding the right-branching surface constituent structure argued for in Ross
1969 6 . Note that this surface structure will be availahle to the child
even if he has not yet acquired knowledge allowing him to judge what sequences
of auxiliary verbs are possible. Furthermore, if he has acquired the
transf<?rmation of Raising (or an equivalent semantic interpretation rule) that
associates certain [V Vl y configurations with semantic structures in which the
lower V is in a sentential subject of the V, and if he can assign to the auxiliary
verbs meanings involving sentential subjects, he is then in a position to under-
stand sentences involving auxiliary verbs piled to any depth. Limber (1973 :
177) observes that 'most auxiliary verbs appear several months after instances
of the complement verbs'. This is exactly what I would expect, given that I
hold (cf. fn. 6) that auxiliary verbs are peripheral members of a fuzzy category
'verb' : a given surface configuration should first be learned for core instances
of the relevant categories and then extended to peripheral members. According
to Limber, the principal exception to his generalization is the early appearance
of modal auxiliaries in yes-no questions such as Can I knock it over? The
v
exceptions thus do not involve the surface configuration [V \fl and hence
should be acqUirable independently of combinations involving that
configuration 7 .
So far I have taken up only surface well-formedness conditions that have
the general form of context-free phrase structure rules: rules that specify what
sequences of syntactic categories can be the daughters of a node of a given
category. There clearly are surface well-formedness conditions of other types,
such as the constraint (Ross 1972) against 'double -ing' constructions such as
*They disapprove of your stopping working, and the constraint in Dutch and
German that a verb is in second position in a 'root' clause but otherwise is final
in its V. 8 I have not yet carried out the obvious project of making a catalog of
well-supported surface constraints and sketching possible scenarios for their
acquisition. I will, though, take up briefly one remaining detail of the 'phrase
structure' type surface well-formedness constraints, namely the obligatory or

optional character of particular constituents. If I believed in standard
'abbreviatory devices', I could say that to learn (a), you'd have to learn both
(b) and (c), and so you wouldn't learn (c) and thus wouldn't learn (a) unless
you encountered instances of A that consisted of just a C without a 8 :
a. A ~ (8) C
b. A ~ 8 C
c. A~C
However, I do not accept 'abbreviatory devices', as normally understood, (for
my reasons, see McCawley 1973a) and do not wish to rule out the possibility
that optionality is the unmarked case, i.e. that extra learning may be involved
in the acquisition of a phrase-structure rule with art obligatory constituent
than in the acquisition of a corresponding rule in which that constituent is
optional. Are there data available to the child from which he could learn that a
constituent is obligatory other than corrections supplied by adults and older
children? While I can offer no thorough survey of possible sources of data, I
can point to one way in which semantic considerations could lead a child to
learn that a particular constituent was obligatorily present. A child could
identify such 'dummy' items as expletive it and existential there as semantically
empty simply by understanding the relevant sentences satisfactorily without
assigning to those items any contribution to the meaning of the sentence 9
and then would be able to conclude that the item is in the sentence for a
non-semantic reason, i.e. that it is there because the position is obligatorily
filled.
This speCUlation leads me to the last major topic that I wish to discuss here,
namely the roles of positive and negative data in language acquisition. I have
suggested a way in which the effect of negative data (here, data as to the un-
grammaticality of sentences without overt subject) can be achieved by
appropriate exploitation of non-negative data 10. I say non-negative rather than
positive data, since we are now in a realm where the dichotomy of positive vs.
negative data is inadequate. What is relevant here is not merely the well-formed-
ness of such sentences as It amazes me that he quit but details of the
correspondence between their surface structures and their semantic structures.
and knowledge of that correspondence is as much negative as it is positive, in
that it incorporates the information that the it does not correspond to semantic
elements that it otherwise might correspond to. Moreover, it may have been
acquired on the basis of negative data that are inaccessible to the investigator,
370 J. MCCAWLEY
e.g. failures in the child's attempts to assign the sentence a satisfactory inter-
pretation in which the it is meaningful. In any case, here semantic data that do
not fit comfortably into the positive/negative dichotomy can do work that
might otherwise be thought to require strictly negative data.
While the scenario of language acquisition that I have sketched above assigns
a tremendous role to positive data (e.g. a child learns a surface phrase-structure
rule V ~ V V simply by identifying instances of the structure [V V]y), I
conjecture that the learning of meanings, of the rules for the correspondence
between semantic structure and surface structure, and of contextual restrictions
on linguistic structures involve data that have both positive and negative aspects.
Moreover, I think that lingUists have been overly hasty in giving up on purely
negative data as a significant factor in language acquisition, their undue haste
being the result of the policy of identifying data with grammaticality data and
of regarding each grammaticality datum as serving only to cause one sentence
to be included in or excluded from the set of sentences to be generated. In an
alternative conception of the function of data in language acquisition, data can
affect the status of a (tentatively learned) rule and thereby affect the role to be
played by subsequent data relevant to that rule; for example, learning that one
particular predicate does not allow Raising or Dative-movement could cause the
learner to classify it as a 'governed rule' and thereafter apply it only with
predicates for which he had learned from positive data that it was applicable.
Note that in that case a little negative data can go a long way: one negative
datum would render unnecessary the scores of negative data that Baker (1979)
sees as being required if a child is to learn to apply a Dative-movement trans-
formation only to the right verbs.
But let us turn to the status of positive data. In an earlier paper (McCawley
1976), I raised doubts about the standard conception of positive data. I noted
that the child's language acquisition is based directly not on what people around
him are actually saying but on his perceptions of those utterances, that his
perception works in terms of his current linguistic system, and thus that he may
systematically misidentify or even fail to perceive elements that are present in
adults' speech II. This suggests to me that to the mind of an 18-month old child,
adults are speaking baby talk but with a severe speech defect, manifested in the
interruption of normal speech by non-speech sounds such as I~~], [:>v], and
liz], in which case the child may go through a stage in which such sentences
as Cookie on plate are not only what his grammar generates but are indeed
primary linguistic data for him - they are adult speech as he perceives it. But
somewhere along the line his linguistic competence changes in such a way that
many of these 'positive data' become 'ungrammatical' for him.
In my 1976 paper I took this as showing that the set of data that the child
uses in language acquisition do not form a 'corpus' - the child can't be
constructing a grammar to fit the whole set of data that he has experienced,
since those data do not all relate to the same language (even if all the ad ult
speech around him has been confined to a single dialect). While I still accept that
conclusion, I now realize that one could treat the earlier 'grammaticality' of
Cookie on plate as not in conflict with the later ungrammaticality of Cookie
on plate by distinguishing properly between negative information and mere
lack of information. Let us take the various 'data' as involving not strings of
words or even whole syntactic structures but rather fragments of linguistic
structures. Suppose that the child learns that a noun may be the head of a NP
at an early stage of his development but does not learn until later what other
constituents a NP mayor must have (or whether the head noun is oJligatorily
present). At the earlier stage, it is not really correct to say that Cookie on plate
is grammatical or ungrammatical as a whole. There are only respects in which it
is grammatical (like its consisting of a NP followed by a predicate expression) 12
and respects in which it is indeterminate as to grammaticality (the child's
grammar might at this point be noncommital as to whether a NP requires any
constituents beyond a noun or whether the predicate phrase of a main clause
requires a verb as its head). While a major part of his language acquisition will
be the acquisition of rules of surface well-formedness, it will not be until a
relatively advanced stage of his linguistic development, if even then, that those
rules will exhaustively partition the class of possible surface structures into a set
of (superficially) well-formed ones and a set of ill-formed ones. I in fact reject
an assumption that I hitherto have appeared to acquiesce in, namely that incom-
pleteness in the coverage of the surface well-formedness conditions is ultimately
weeded out in the course of linguistic development; as far as I can see, it is of no
consequence whether such completeness is ever achieved.
I wish to draw two principal morals from this highly speCUlative and in-
conclusive ,discussion of language acquisition. First, the learning of rules of
surface well-formed ness (in contrast to what would presumably be required to
learn 'base rules' as normally understood in transformational grammar) can be
accomplished on the basis of information that the child acquires in the process
of learning other parts of the grammar, in particular, learning the lexical
categories and meanings of the various lexical items and the correspondance
372 J. MCCAWLEY
between particular surface configurations and semantic structure. Moreover,

these latter pieces of learning are to a large extent independent of one another
(e.g. one need not know morphological differences between 'verb' and other
lexical categories to learn where predicates appear in relation to their arguments,
nor vice versa). Thus, acquisition of the factors that figure in rules of grammar
can be far in advance of acquisition of the rules themselves. This means that
language acquisition must not be identified with grammar acquisition: much
of language acquisition has only an indirect and delayed effect on grammar
acquisition, by affecting the inventory of units and relations that will later play
a role in grammar acquisition. Second, the conjectural scheme of language
acquisition sketched above suggests outlines of a division of labor between
specifically linguistic capacities and more general learning abilities. I reject the
remar~ably popular non-sequitur that has taken many linguists from the quite
reasonable proposition that there are innate mechanisms specific to the
acquisition of language to the much less plausible proposition that general
purpose learning mechanisms play no role in language acquisition 13. If there are
such things as general purpose learning faculties, it is bizarre to suppose that
they shut off when language is being acquired. Language involves not only
specifically linguistic units and relations but also factors that playa role in many
cognitive domains, for example, temporal sequence. It is an open question
whether anything specifically linguistic is involved in the learning of the
temporal sequence of linguistic units other than perhaps innate knowledge that
temporal sequence is significant in language. And that might in fact be most of
the division of labor between general-purpose and special-purpose learning
faculties: perhaps the special-purpose faculties simply tell the general-purpose
faculties what factors to pay attention to, e.g. perhaps the acquisition of syntax
is accomplished by general-purpose mechanisms for the learning of fuzzy
categories, part-whole relationships, temporal sequence, and some other things,
acting under the direction of a language-acquisition mechanism that directs the
general-purpose devices to particular factors and oversees the incorporation of
the results of the general-purpose devices into an evolving grammar. This
shouldn't be taken as suggesting that the contribution of the special-purpose
faculty is trivial: general-purpose devices accomplish nothing unless they are
provided with a user whose purposes they serve.
FOOTNOTES
IThe relationship between a language and a set of possible sentences is

comparable to that between an artistic genre and a set of possible esthetic
objects, in that in either domain all interesting questions can be answered
without any position being taken as to whether various problematic objects
belong to the supposed set. For example, to answer all esthetically interesting
questions about Marcel Duchamp's "Fountain", one need not have any answer
to the senseless question (on which many hours of the lives of numerous other-
wise sane philosophers of art have been wasted) of whether it is a work of art.
(Note to linguists: "Fountain" consists simply of a well-used urinal, displayed,
on a pedestal or otherwise, according to the fancy of the exhibitor; the role it
has played in philosophy of art is comparable in some respects to that of
Colorless green ideas sleep fUriously in linguistics).
2The constituent of logical structure correspond~g to a given surface
constituent need not be the contribution to logical structure made by the latter,
since in the course of the derivation material may have been inserted into or
extracted from that constituent. In addition, there are surface constituents that
correspond to no constituent of logical structure, e.g. expletive it (but cf. fn.
9) or the NP node that dominates a predicate noun. I maintain that the latter
NP node results from adjunction of a semantically empty article to a predicate
noun so as to meet the surface requirement that nouns in surface structure be
heads of NP's. The article of the predicate NP, while semantically emp ty, is
nonetheless chosen on the basis of a semantic condition: that article is used
which would not be incongruous if interpreted literally (Mary is!!. doctor vs.
Scott is ili author of Waverley).
3See McCawley 1975, 1979b for arguments against Chomsky's Xschema, which
expresses a putative parallelism among 'auxiliary', 'determiner', and 'degree'.
To the extent that there is any cross-linguistic correlation between the position
of auxiliaries before or after main verbs and the position of determiners before
or after nouns, it is a negative correlation.
4Note that this claim about the surface structure of passive clauses does not
require that passive be be present in 'deep structure'. Morphemes belong to
their respective lexical categories equally much when they are transformational-
Iy inserted as when they are present in deep structure and are equally subject
to the surface constraints on where items of that category may occur. In the
conception of syntax outlined in McCawley 1981 a, surface constraints heavily
influence what effect particular transformations have. For example, since left
Chomsky-adjunction to the V is the only way to insert be into a position where
V's are allowed, a passive transformation can call for insertion of be without
indicating where it is to be inserted: it will go in the one place where the surface
syntax allows it in combination with the other constituents that are present.
The fact that passive be follows all other auxiliary verbs is a consequence of the
Auxiliary-as-main-verb analysis: auxiliary verbs cannot be passivized for the
same reason that seem cannot be (*Beer is seemed to drink by many Belgians),
namely that Passive cannot extract a NP from a lower VP, and thus, only the
inner auxiliary-less clause can meet the conditions for Passive.
374 J. MCCAWLEY
SIt may be appropriate to formulate the Finnish consonant gradation rule using
curly brackets in which the different alternations are simply listed. The curly
brackets, however, are then not an 'abbreviatory device', since the child learns
the curly brackets before he learns what goes inside them and indeed never
learns the 'rules' that they supposedly abbreviate.
6A similar structure is proposed in Akmajian, Steele, and Wasow 1979 except
that there the different YP's are assigned to different categories (y3, y2, Y 1),
modal auxiliaries are held to be daughters not of a yi node but of the S-node,
and passive be is treated as a sister rather than an aunt of the main verb. I should
qualify my glib reference to a lexical category 'verb' that includes modals. The
defective morphology of modal auxiliary verbs reduces considerably the
morphological basis for identifying them as verbs. Not only do modals (other
than is to) normally exhibit no agreement with the subject, but most of them do
not even have a past tense: must, may, might, should, and for many speakers
also ought and modal need, have only a present tense form. While the child is
thus under far less pressure to identify must as a verb (and not as, say, an adverb
or something unclassifiable) than he is to identify kiss or throw as a verb, if he
hits on the idea of treating it as a verb it will fit into that lexical category quite
well, since it occurs in a verb position (namely as left sister of a V), it fits In to
the same surface configurations (including 'inverted' constructions) as do have
and be, whose morphological status as verbs is clear, it is the only item
identifiable as the .tense bearer of clauses in which it occurs, and it conforms to
the same rule for the relation of semantic structure to surface structure as do
such verbs as seem. However, it would not surprise me if there were consider-
able individual variation as to what modal auxiliary verbs different children
identify as verbs.
7Moreover, the child may well not yet have identified the verbs in question
as belonging to the lexical category Y when he begins using them in apparent
yes-no questions. Cf. Braine's (1976 : 46-47) discussion of a 22 month old child
for whom initial can-I was simply a force indicator, marking the utterance as a
request, e.g. Can-l fiX it 'Please fix it'.
8See Koster 1975 for reasons why the right generalization is 'final in its
Y' rather than 'final in its S '.
9 Since reading Bolinger 1977, I feel uneasy about calling anything semantical-
ly empty. Bolinger makes a persuasive case that most of the items alleged to be
semantically empty carry subtle but non-null semantic content. Even if Bolinger
is right, the notion 'semantically empty' may remain of relevance to language
acquisition. I conjecture that the items in question are initially learned as
semantically empty and that the learner subsequently finds semantic functions
for them to fulfill.
IOCL Chomsky'S (1981 : 9) suggestion that 'a not unreasonable acquisition
system can be devised with the operative principle that if certain structures or
rules fail to be exemplified in relatively simply expressions, where they would
be expected to be found, then a (possibly marked) option is selected excluding
them in the grammar, so that a kind of "negative evidence" can be available
even without corrections, adverse reactions, etc.'.
II Some weak support for this suggestion is found in Brown and Fraser's ( 1963)
report that children at age 2; 0 uniformly omitted articles from imitations of
adult sentences and children at age 2; 1.5 only sporadically produced articles
in the mimicry task. See, however, the study by Katz, Baker, and Macnamara
(1974), in which presence or absence of an indefinite article in phrases in which
IS-month old children were taught made-up words influenced whether they
interpreted the word as a common noun or as a proper noun.
l2Here 'predicate expression' means something of a category X. The child at this
stage need not have learned that main clauses require a tensed V and not just
any old X.
l3The existence of some sort of general-purpose learning mechanism is clear,
in view of the ability of human beings to learn esoteric perceptual tasks such
as chicken sexing and aircraft spotting (see Gibson 1969 for discussion of several
such tasks). It is many millenia to early for us to have genes specific to the
identification of aircraft.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
For valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Greg

Carlson, Jerry Morgan, Valerie Reyna, and Tom Wasow.
377
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Technical editor: Etienne De Vlieger

PLENUM PRESS • NEW YORK AND LONDON

COMMUNICA TION AND COGNITION • GHENT

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or trans-

The definition of [unctions and categories

Bernard COMRIE, Syntactic-morphological discrepancies in Maltese

Werner ABRAHAM, Heuristic problems concerning the identification

Claire BLANCHE-BENVENISTE, Verb complements and sentence

Alexandra COLEN, Observations on the syntax of English nominals 85

Constructional properties of the sentence

Renaat DECLERCK, The structure of infinitival perception verb

Willy VAN LANGENDONCK, Passive in a semantic dependency

Annie ZAENEN, Verb-first clauses in Icelandic, successive cyclic

Ludo MELIS, The construction of the infinitive with causative move-

Gilles FAUCONNIER, Generalized union 195

Simon DIK, On the status of verbal reflexives 231

Susumu KUNO, Reflexivization in English 257

Tense and aspect

. Carlota SMITH, The temporal reference of the English futurate 273

Marcelo DASCAL, Prolegomena to a semantic analysis of phase-

The organization of grammar

Jan KOSTER, The configurational matrix 347

James McCAWLEY, TOwards plausibility in theories of language

1. After a long period of paradigmatic stability, research in syntax has been

BERNARD COMRIE, relying on the structural pattern of certain Maltese

the inheritance of the complements of the second predicate by the complex

category of restrictive adverbs and analyzed as "just accomplished (now) =

III. A discussion of the fundamental and less fundamental differences separating

indicating the scope of Tense/Aspect and of temporal and aspectual adverbs.

1. CASES 8. PHONjMORPH 6. SEMANTICS 7. PRAGMATICS

can be interpreted for instance as referring to Mary's husband, Gross 1968)

v. A number of original and exciting solutions to specific problems in syntax

1.1. Morphology and language structure

One area of considerable controversy in current linguistic theory and

certain elements. Indeed, for the constructions examined, the discrepancy is

1.2. The Maltese language

2. Subjects and objects: clear cases

Here, I present some of the characteristics of clear instances of subjects and

In Maltese, the subject usually precedes its predicate, although, as noted in

Table I. Conjugation of finite verb: kiteb 'he wrote'

Subject pronoun Perfect Imperfect

(1) (lien) n-ikteb.

In addition to simple tense-aspect forms, Maltese also has a range of complex

(4) (Jien)sa n-ikteb.

(6) (Intom) kon-tu t-iktb-u.

2.2. Direct objects

The overt encoding of direct objects is somewhat more complex. Direct

(14) Marija qatl-et far.

Table 2. Direct object suffixes: qatl-et (qat/-it-) 'she killed'

Subject-Verb-Agreement affix, providing a clear morphological distinction

(17) Qtil-t Iil-u.

It was observed above that direct objects can be fronted by Topicalization.

(19) Il-far/lil-I-far Marija qatl-it-u.

(20) Marija qatl-it-u I-far/lil-I-far.

2.3. Prepositional objects

rather than the direct object suffix -ni).