CRIMPROC

RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Mendoza vs. People, G.R. No. 197293, 21 April 2014

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

JUNO CARS, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 197293
April 21, 2014

FACTS:
A complaint filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on
January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against accused, Alfredo Mnedoza
(Mendoza, for brevity). Juno Cars alleged that it hired Alfredo as employee. Its
Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia (Garcia, for brevity), conducted a partial audit of the
used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by the accused
without Garcia's or the finance manager's permission.

The Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause
and recommending the filing of information against accused for qualified theft and
estafa. Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice. While Alfredo's motion for
reconsideration was still pending, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were
filed before the Regional Trial Court. Mendoza filed a motion for determination of
probable cause before the trial court. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. Juno Cars Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.

Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause
and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the
public prosecutor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of probable cause belongs to the public prosecutor
and not the trial court. (YES)

RULING:
The court ruled that conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the
public prosecutor. The conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the
public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient
basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with
the court. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there
is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of
probable cause exists.
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Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco–
Umali correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case Nos. MC08–11604–05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
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Callo-Claridad vs. Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, 20 March 2013

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, PETITIONER, V. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN AND

TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 191567
March 20, 2013

FACTS:
Around 5:30 p.m. of February 27, 2007, Chase returned home from visiting his
girlfriend, Ramonna Liza “Monnel” Hernandez. Around 7:00 p.m., Chase’s sister Ariane
was sitting at the porch of their house when she noticed a white Honda Civic car parked
along the street. Recognizing the driver to be Philip, Ariane waved her hand at him.
Philip appeared nonchalant and did not acknowledge her gesture. Ariane decided to
stay behind and leave with their house helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus,
only after Chase had left on board the white Honda Civic car. Marivic Rodriguez, a
house helper of Shellane Yukoko, the resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes,
was with her co-employee nanny Jennylyn Buri and the latter’s ward, Joei Yukoko,
when they heard somebody crying coming from the crime scene: “Help! Help!” This was
at about 7:30 p.m. Even so, neither of them bothered to check who had been crying for
help. It was noted, however, that No. 10 Cedar Place, which was owned by one Mrs.
Howard, was uninhabited at the time.

Based on the initial investigation report of the Megaforce Security and Allied Services,
Inc., the Estebans were illegally parking their cars at Mrs. Howard’s carport. The initial
investigation report stated that the SGs would regularly remind the Estebans to use their
own parking garage, which reminders had resulted in heated discussions and
altercations. The SGs kept records of all the illegal parking incidents, and maintained
that only the Estebans used the carport of No. 10 Cedar Place.

Around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban (Teodora) arrived at Ferndale
Homes on board a vehicle bearing plate XPN 733, as recorded in the subdivision SG’s
logbook. At that time, three cars were parked at the carport of No. 10 Cedar place, to
wit: a Honda CRV with plate ZAE 135 parked parallel to the Honda Civic with plate CRD
999, and another Honda Civic with plate JTG 333, the car frequently used by Philip,
then parked diagonally behind the two cars. Some witnesses alleged that prior to the
discovery of the Chase’s body, they had noticed a male and female inside the car
bearing plate JTG 333 engaged in a discussion.

At around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village,
noticed that the side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which
prompted him to move towards the parked cars. He inspected the then empty vehicle
and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked the cars and discovered that
the rear and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were smeared with blood. He
saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was then that he
found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. The body
was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the chest, and with only
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the socks on. SG Sarmiento called for back-up. SG Rene Fabe immediately barricaded
the crime scene.

Around 7:55 p.m., SG Solis received a phone call from an unidentified person who
reported that a “kid” had met an accident at Cedar Place. SG Solis later identified and
confirmed the caller to be “Mr. Esteban Larry” when the latter entered the village gate
and inquired whether the “kid” who had met an accident had been attended to.
Moreover, when SG Fabe and SG Sarmiento were securing the scene of the crime,
they overheard from the radio that somebody had reported about a “kid” who had been
involved in an accident at Cedar Place. SG Fabe thereafter searched the village
premises but did not find any such accident. When SG Fabe got back, there were
already several onlookers at the crime scene.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to charge the respondents of murder. (NO)

RULING:
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed
and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with
every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient,
therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase
derived from the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and
Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of the
subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of
February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was
nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses
could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. To be sure, some
of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths
upon matters connected with the performance of their official duties undeniably lacked
the requisite certifications to the effect that such administering officers had personally
examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that the
affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen in the
company of respondent Philip must be established by competent evidence required by
the rules in preliminary investigation. Here, it was allegedly Chase’s sister, Ariane, and
their two household helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw respondent
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Philip pick up Chase at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Yet,
such fact from which the inference is derived was not duly proven. The statements of
Marivic and Michelle both executed on February 28, 2007 were not sworn to before the
proper officer.

Neither was the affidavit dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane Claridad duly notarized nor is
there any explanation why the same was belatedly executed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 20, 2009.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

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Uy vs. Javellana, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, 05 September 2012

GERLIE M. UY AND MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, COMPLAINANTS, VS.

JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law
and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and
Bascug of PAO against Presiding Judge Javellanaof the Municipal Trial Court, La
Castellana, Negros Occidental.

In People vs. Cornelio, a case for malicious mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant
of arrest after the filing of a certain criminal case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. According to Judge Javellana, the necessity of holding the
accused in detention became evident when it was revealed during trial that the same
accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in another case.

In People vs. Lopez, a case for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary
examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming
that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material
facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said
case. Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and added that he could not dismiss the case
outright since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence.

In another case for trespass to dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to
dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. According to Judge Javellana, the Lupong
Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictional requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said
ground was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of theRevised Rule on Summary
Procedure. (YES)

RULING:
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al.
were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in
Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six
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(6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio
is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically
stating that "the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to
appear whenever required."

Also, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under Rule 16, but In People v. Lopez,
Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or
justified.

Further, a case which has not been previously referred to the LupongTapamayapa shall
be dismissed without prejudice.

WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the

law and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other
benefits for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day with a STERN WARNING that
the repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his records with this Court.
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Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ATTY. LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 212140-41
January 21, 2015

FACTS:
The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two criminal complaints for
plunder against him. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints
filed their counter-affidavits.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
Filings” (“Request”).

Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine
the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on
record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen.
Estrada and his co-respondents with plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the issuance of a new
resolution dismissing the charges against him. Without filing a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed
the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the
latter Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the quantum of evidence is necessary during preliminary investigation.
(NO)

RULING:
First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent
with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not
provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
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part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of
his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of

determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
“engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof.

A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. 

Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 212140-41.

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Callo-Claridad vs. Esteban, Supra.

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, PETITIONER, V. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN AND

TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 191567
March 20, 2013

FACTS:
The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani "Chase" Callo Claridad, whose
lifeless but bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between
vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar Place,
Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with
respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) according Chase's sister, Ariane, and their
two household helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, less than an hour before
the discovery of his lifeless body.

The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. The
OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence
sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder and that the circumstantial
evidence could not link Philip to the crime. On petition for review, the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43, Rules
of Court. The CA, however, dismissed the petition for review.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 43 was the proper remedy for resolutions issued by the Secretary of
Justice. (NO)

RULING:
The SC held that Rule 43 is not the proper remedy for assailing resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice. It stated that it was a grave mistake that immediately called for the
outright dismissal of the petition. The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to
review the Secretary of Justice's resolution on the determination of probable cause was
an improper remedy. Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the
Secretary of Justice.

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies,
particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however,
the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In
reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the
Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether
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the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was
probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.

On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination
of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when
the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is
disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 20, 2009.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

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Artillero vs. Casimero, G.R. No. 190569, 24 April 2012

P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, PETITIONER, VS. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO,

OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN;
BERNABE D. DUSABAN, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ILOILO; EDITO AGUILLON, BRGY. CAPT., BRGY.
LANJAGAN, AJUY, ILOILO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 190569
April 25, 2012

FACTS:
On 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the evening, the municipal station received
information that successive gun fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo.
Thus, petitioner, together with Police Inspector Idel Hermoso (Hermoso), and Senior
Police Officer (SPO1) Arial Lanaque (Lanaque), immediately went to the area to
investigate. Upon arriving, they saw Aguillon, wobbling and drunk, openly carrying a
rifle. According to petitioner and Hermoso, although Aguillon was able to present his
Firearm License Card, he was not able to present a PTCFOR. Petitioner and Hermoso
executed a Joint Affidavit alleging the foregoing facts in support of the filing of a case for
illegal possession of firearm against Aguillon. Petitioner also endorsed the filing of a
Complaint against Aguillon through a letter sent to the Provincial Prosecutor on 12
August 2008.

For his part, Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully
arrested and detained him for illegal possession of firearm, even though the former had
every right to carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to
petitioner. Aguillon further claims that he was duly authorized by law to carry his firearm
within his barangay. According to petitioner, he never received a copy of the Counter-
Affidavit Aguillon had filed and was thus unable to give the necessary reply. In a
Resolution dated 10 September 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo
City recommended the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner
claims that he never received a copy of this Resolution. Thereafter, Provincial
Prosecutor Bernabe D. Dusaban (Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban) forwarded to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman the 10 September 2008 Resolution recommending
the approval thereof.

In a Resolution dated 17 February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Overall
Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro), approved
the recommendation of Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban to dismiss the case. It ruled that
the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal
possession of firearm since he has a license for his rifle. Petitioner claims that he never
received a copy of this Resolution either. On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but it was denied through an
Order dated 23 July 2009. Thus, on 8 December 2009, he filed the present Petition for
Certiorari via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. According to petitioner, he was denied his
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right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit, the
Asst. Prosecutor’s 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February 2009
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner also argues that public
respondents’ act of dismissing the criminal Complaint against Aguillon, based solely on
insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). He thus claims that the assailed
Resolutions were issued "contrary to law, and/or jurisprudence and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when he was not given a copy of
Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutor’s 10 September 2008 Resolution, and
the 17 February 2009 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman. (NO)

2. Whether or not respondent Aguillon is guilty of illegal possession of firearm. (NO)

RULING:
1. Petitioner’s right of due process was not violated. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution, mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without
due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This is a right that
cannot be invoked by petitioner, because he is not the accused in this case. It has been
said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part
thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused
guilty thereof. (U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 716). The
right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. At
most, it is statutory. (II Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 673). It is therefore clear that
because a preliminary investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of parties therein
depend on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on whatever
rights they believe they are entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase
"due process of law."

A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Reply
—this right should be granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the
right to file a Reply to the accused’s counter-affidavit. Furthermore, we agree with
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban that there was no need to send a copy of the 10
September 2008 Resolution to petitioner, since it did not attain finality until it was
approved by the Office of the Ombudsman. It must be noted that the rules do not state
that petitioner, as complainant, was entitled to a copy of this recommendation. The only
obligation of the prosecutor, as detailed in Section 4 of Rule 112, was to forward the
record of the case to the proper officer within five days from the issuance of his
Resolution.
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Even though petitioner was indeed entitled to receive a copy of the Counter-affidavit
filed by Aguillon, whatever procedural defects this case suffered from in its initial stages
were cured when the former filed an MR. In fact, all of the supposed defenses of
petitioner in this case have already been raised in his MR and adequately considered
and acted on by the Office of the Ombudsman. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice
but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." We have said
that where a party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latter’s
motion for reconsideration there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due
process.

2. Respondent Aguillon is not guilty of the crime charged. The authority of Aguillon to
carry his firearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of
P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government
Code (LGC). Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban’s standpoint on this matter is correct. All
the guidelines and rules cited in the instant Petition "refers to civilian agents, private
security guards, company guard forces and government guard forces." These rules and
guidelines should not be applied to Aguillon, as he is neither an agent nor a guard. As
barangay captain, he is the head of a local government unit; as such, his powers and
responsibilities are properly outlined in the LGC. This law specifically gives him, by
virtue of his position, the authority to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial
jurisdiction.

Petitioner does not deny that when he found Aguillon "openly carrying a rifle," the latter
was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain of the barangay. The authority of
punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is
necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays.
Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court deems that,
like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as a peace officer that must be
discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer, a barangay captain may be called by his
constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of his
barangay. As long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his
duty as a punong barangay—to maintain peace and order.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Office of

the Provincial Prosecutor dated 10 September 2008, as well as the Resolution and the
Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 17 February 2009 and 23 July 2009,
respectively.