The Genesis of Military River Operations: Alexander the Great at the Hydaspes River

Author(s): T. T. JONES
Source: The Military Engineer , November-December 1964, Vol. 56, No. 374 (November-
December 1964), pp. 424-426
Published by: Society of American Military Engineers

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 The Genesis of Military
River Operations
Alexander the Qreat at the Hydaspes River

By LT. COL. T. T. JONES

Corps of Engineers, United States Army

he camped at Haranpur and crossed at Jalalpur. A

tary operations throughout history. The em-
diagram of the battle that took place after Alexander
RIVERS - tary- phasis
phasiseach
operations
historianhaveplaceseachonplayed historian throughout an important places history. on part their The in impor- mili- em-
their impor-
had crossed the river is also shown in Figure 2. The
tance varies. Dams and locks have created added details of the battle itself are omitted here except to
obstacles as in World War II, when Germannote damsthaton
Alexander defeated Porus.
the Roer River affected not only crossings, but Whenalso
Alexander arrived at Haranpur, he recog-
tactical operations as a whole. In militarynized history
that the army of King Porus was well disci-
rivers have had a variety of roles. In one battle or plined and trained, and that it could effectively op-
campaign, a river may have been important only on pose a crossing. Alexander had about 8,000 cavalry
the tactical level, and in later years important strate- and 18,000 infantry, while Porus had some 4,000 cav-
gically, and from an offensive or defensive viewpoint. alry and 30,000 infantry, plus attached elephants and
Rivers have provided critical channels of approach scythed chariots. Although outnumbered, Alexander
deep into enemy territory, such as the Potomac, Ten-was confident that he could defeat Porus if he could
nessee, and Cumberland Rivers in the Civil War. The
importance of these rivers and the Mississippi in di-
viding the Confederacy has been neglected by some
historians. The natural bend of the rivers toward the /( 7 S KINGDOM OF KASHMIR
interior of Russia allowed advancing German armies y / ' UNDER king abisares
to rest their flanks on strong river barriers in World
War II as they advanced, but later this same configu-
ration favored the Russians in their attacks on broad
s&Phen ' i O0 2/X r'
fronts.
There are many instances of strategic river cross- TAXILA
ings in which an entire army moved across a major / RAWALPINDI
barrier before being detected or stopped. An example ( *3" •. XV I GRAND TRUNK
was Napoleon's crossing of the Nieman in Poland en
route to Russia in 1812. In any review of river op- p i .pvPp
erations through the ages, there are certain factors NANDANA PAS
that have influenced and will continue to influence op- f HARANPUR N. C £/ L
ß Jr JALALPUR
erations, such as the weapons, especially their range
and accuracy, the speed and reliability of communi- y
J J' ^
cations, river crossing equipment, and the relative
mobility of opposing forces.
An early campaign in which a river was of great
influence was in 326 B.C. when Alexander the Great
Invaded the region that is now West Pakistan. The
Kiąg of Taxiles surrendered his kingdom and the
large city of Taxila to Alexander to obtain his łielp in
defeating King Porus, whose kingdom started at the
/ //
Hydaspes River (now Jhelum). (See Figure 1.) On
his march to the Hydaspes, Alexander had to fight
Spitakes, an ally of Porus, to get through Nandana
Pass in the Salt Range. Alexander arrived at the river
iff the summer when it was at flood stage, about a
Laif mile wide, and unfordable. (In the winter or dry J) ALEXANDER'S ROUTE
season it is fordable in many places.) King Porus
had his powerful army drawn up on the far side' ofNOTE: Names of rivers in ( ) n 125Mii«s M¡ll.4
the river when Alexander arrived. are current-day names 2£ul9 n , , , - 125Mii«s M¡ll.4
Alexander's crossing site as related to the geogra-
phy of today is shown in Figure 2. It is believed that Figure I. Northwest India or the Punjab (Western Pakistan)

424 The Military Engineer, November-December, 1964

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 Figure 2. Route of the Hydaspes Crossing and Troop Dispositions

move the bulk of his forces across the river without the site. The road from Haranpur to Jalalpur was 4
being attacked during the crossing. Alexander's or
de-
5 miles back from the river and was partly con-
ception, the key to the successful crossing, providescealed
a from the other bank by hills and woods. Under
model even for today. cover of a violent rain and thunderstorm, Alexander
PLAN OF DECEPTION
moved a force of some 5,000 cavalry and 10,000 infan-
try to the main crossing site. At the main camp, at
His purpose was to lull King Porus into a false Haranpur, he left Craterus with 3,000 cavalry and
sense of security and to deceive him as to the main 8,000 infantry to serve as a fixing force and to make it
appear to Porus that the Greek Army was still in
crossing site. Alexander sent foraging parties into the
surrounding countryside to gather supplies with whichcamp. Alexander had even left a soldier dressed in
he established huge stores, thus lending credence toarmor similar to his to deceive Porus further. Alex-
the stories planted by his agents that he would waitander posted a line of sentinels all the way from the
until the monsoons were over and not attack until main camp to the crossing site so that signals and
after the swollen Hydaspes had receded. Even so, orders could be passed along as needed. These sen-
King Porus maintained a steady vigil. Next, Alexan- tinels were used also to make minor demonstrations
der conducted numerous crossing feints up and down and create noise to add to Porus's doubts about where
the river. Porus responded to each one by sending a Alexander would cross.
large part of his army to meet the expected attacks, Craterus was not to cross the river until Porus
but they never came. At night Alexander lit large moved his forces to meet Alexander's crossing. As
fires, loaded some of his men into boats, and startedshown in Figure 2, both sides had units posted at all
across the river but always returned to camp. He keptthe fords. By posting men at the fords, while the river
was unfordable, Alexander led Porus to believe that
this activity up day and night with small forces. Ini-
he intended to wait for the river to recede before
tially, Porus alerted his troops, and placed them to
meet all the apparent attacks, but he and his troops crossing. Later, in the actual battle, the Greeks crossed
soon grew tired of the ceaseless and unproductive ac- in boats at the fords as Porus's forces were with-
drawn to meet the main force.
tivity and began to respond less and less to the feints.
In the meantime, Alexander had found a crossing CROSSING OPERATIONS
site in the vicinity of Jalalpur where the Kandar Kas
Creek, hidden behind wooded Admana Isle, offered Before dawn, Alexander's crossing forces, loaded on
excellent concealment for assembling his boats and boats and rafts, moved down the Halkiwani Channel,
rafts. Some of the boats he used (a few as large as planning to cross as they cleared the downstream tip
thirty oars) had been dismantled at Taxila and of Admana Isle. At this point Alexander made an
almost fatal mistake. When he landed his force on
brought overland a distance of some 110 miles, and
the remainder, including rafts, were constructed at what he thought was the far shore, he discovered that

The Military Engineer, No. 374 425

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they were on an island and still had a swiftly moving contributing factor to his making the crossing at this
channel to cross. Luckily, a ford was found, and, with time was that he had received word that Abisares,
the men wading chest high in swift water, Alexander King of Kashmir, had broken his previous promise of
was able to cross before Porus could react. Scouts neutrality and was on his way to join Porus.
had spotted this force during the crossing and had
promptly reported it to Porus. Now, the fullAeffect
MODERN EXAMPLE
of
Alexander's deception was felt. Porus was not
A sure
study of numerous successful river crossings
whether the crossing force was another feint fromor the
Alexander's time to the present day will show a
main attack. Porus sent one of his sons with about
striking similarity to the tactics and principles used
2,000 cavalry and 120 chariots to attack Alexander by Alexander over 2,000 years ago.
while he was still astride the river. This was tactically
Probably the greatest duplication of Alexander's
correct, but he reacted too slowly. strategy on a grand scale in recent times was General
When Alexander realized that the force coming to
Eisenhower's crossing of the English Channel in June
challenge him was not the advance guard of the 1944.main This can be considered a river crossing since
Indian Army, he annihilated it, and continued on thehisAllies faced the same problem that any force en-
way. The general battle as it developed is also shown
counters in opposed operations of this kind. The
schematically in Figure 2. The principles applied by
strategy employed follows Alexander's very closely,
Alexander in this crossing and subsequent battlesinceare early in the planning the commanders realized
still applicable in spite of the changes in equipment,
that deception was the key to a successful crossing
weapons, and means of crossing that have taken place.
and lodgement.
CRITIQUE
The Germans knew that the Allies were planning a
crossing and they probably had sufficient force to stop
Prior to the crossing, the actions of Porus showed
it if they could have known where tò place their re-
a completely defensive attitude from the minute the panzer divisions to face the main landing. The
serve
Macedonian conquerors appeared on the opposite deception plan was to make the Germans think that
shore. Even during the actual battle, Porus waited theincrossing was to be attempted in the Calais area, so
place for Alexander to attack him, although he that
hadthe bulk of the German armored reserves would
several opportunities during the prebattle maneuver-
be deployed to react there. The deception was greatly
ing to attack with greatly superior forces. In theenhanced
bat- by the fact that the Germans knew that a
successful attack in the Calais area would be most
tle, Alexander launched his main attack on Porus's
left flank, thereby using the river to protect hisadvantageous
own to the Allies. It had the best beaches
right flank and to keep near his reserves on thealong
far the coast, it was closest to the British ports for
follow-up
bank. Any type of offensive action apparently was support, and close enough to the German
not seriously considered by Porus. He must have
borders to force the enemy to evacuate most of France
known that his infantry forces outnumbered those if successful.
of
Alexander by about 12,000 men, although he was The operations and their outcome are well known.
weaker in cavalry. It is generally accepted that the bombing was concentrated around Calais. Re-
First,
greater the obstacle value of a river, the farther connaissance
back flights were made over the area frequent-
the defender can move from the riverbank, concen- ly. In England, phantom army headquarters were set
up,the
trating his forces as a mobile striking force. Since with actual radio traffic going out over the air.
Hydaspes was at flood stage and unfordable, Alexan-The main German reserves were held in the Calais
area and by the time they could be moved to Nor-
der was limited to crossing by boats and rafts. There-
fore, Porus could afford to defend at the river mandy
line where the landing was made, the beachhead
with light infantry and elephant forces, and hold forces
a were strong enough to repel them. This plan
strong, combined cavalry-infantry force ready toalso induced the Germans to commit their armor in
meet
the main crossing. piecemeal attacks as it reached Normandy. It was
With Alexander operating in a foreign land, it
generally known by the Allies that Rommel had
seems incomprehensible that Porus did not havealways spies reacted this way when faced with sudden
on the west side of the river, especially since the success, so they had planned for this type of
enemy
people just north of the Hydaspes, under King German
Spi- counterattack and it occurred exactly as was
expected.
takes, had been his ally. In defense of Porus, it should
be noted that Alexander generally absorbed as allies The other resemblance between the two crossings
the forces that he defeated or that surrendered towas him.
that both Alexander and Eisenhower made use of
At Taxila, Alexander had added an appreciable badIn-
weather to screen their crossings and to make the
dian contingent to his army. This may explain Alex- most of the enemy's belief that no one would under-
ander's apparently complete control of the west take side crossings in such weather. Naturally, neither
of the river. commander specifically planned to wait for bad weath-
Outstanding characteristics of Alexander's general-er to help him, but they were ready when the chance
ship were his willingness to take calculated risks andcame and they took advantage of the opportunity.
his confidence in his ability to adapt to any situation.In the crossing of the English Channel, General Eisen-
He demonstrated this at the Hydaspes by splitting hower employed many of the strategems that Alex-
his forces to make the crossing. Those left at the mainander had used. As has often been pointed out, history
camp could have been easily contained if they hadcontains many useful lessons if they can be found,
attempted to cross the flooded stream. Alexander took analyzed correctly, and adapted intelligently to cur-
5,000 of his 8,000 cavalry and 10,000 of his 18,000 in-rent conditions.
fantry to make the crossing. This opened the definite Future articles will be published to examine some
possibility that he could have been defeated in detailfamous campaigns or battles, emphasizing the role
if Porus's intelligence service had been more alert. Athat rivers have played.
426 The Military Engineer, November-December, 1964

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