XI.
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES of said documents was submitted for the consideration and decision of the
Purpose and Importance of the guaranty
Alvero vs. Dizon [76 Phil. 637 (1946)]
This is a petition for certiorari with injunction originally filed in this court.
In the petition it is alleged that petitioner Aurelio S. Alvero has been accused of
treason, in criminal case No. 3 of the People's Court; that at the hearing on his
petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain
documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States
Army, accompanied by Filipino guerrillas, in the petitioner's house; that petitioner
immediately objected to the presentation of said documents, and called the
attention of the respondent judges to the fact that he had filed a petition, in
which he protested against the procedure of the government in the seizure of
said documents, and asked for their return to the petitioner; that the respondents
permitted the prosecution to present said documents as evidence, which were
considered, upon the termination of the presentation of the evidence for both
parties, in denying said petition for bail; that the petition filed on December 1,
1945, for the return of the documents allegedly seized illegally in petitioner's
house, was not considered by the respondents, before the commencement of the
trial of petitioner's case, on the merits, due perhaps to an involuntary oversight;
that at the commencement of the trial of said criminal case No. 3, and during its
course, the prosecution again presented, as evidence, against the petitioner said
documents which had been taken from his house, and petitioner renewed his
objection thereto, and asked for their return to him, alleging that their seizure
was illegal and that their presentation would be tantamount to compelling him to
testify against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights; that in deciding the
question so raised, the respondent judges, in open court, stated that the
prosecution might in the meanwhile continue presenting said documents, without
prejudice to the final resolution of said petition, when the prosecution should
finish presenting its evidence; that in concluding the presentation of its evidence
and resting the case, after offering said documents as part of its evidence, the
petitioner again raised the question of the admissibility of said documents, and
the respondent judges then ordered the substantiation of said allegations of
petitioner, and set for hearing his petition for the return of said documents; that
said petition was heard on February 16, 1946, and at said hearing, the petitioner
and his wife testified, without any contradiction that, on February 12, 1945, on
the occasion of the arrest of the petitioner by soldiers of the United States Army,
the latter searched the house of the petitioner and seized, among other things,
the documents which he had in his house; that when said petition for the return
respondent judges, the latter, on February 26, 1946, issued an order denying
said petition, and admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by
the prosecution, marked as Exhibits A, C, G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1, R-2, U, Z, CC,
DD, FF, HH; that on the same date that said order was issued, denying the
petition for the return of said documents, petitioner asked for the reconsideration
of said order, which was also denied. (Petition, pars. 1-12.)
And herein petitioner now claims that the respondent judges, in denying the
petition for the return of said documents, acted without jurisdiction and
committed a grave abuse in the exercise of their discretion, alleging that even
the seizure of documents by means of a search warrant legally issued, constitutes
a violation of the rights guaranteed in paragraphs 3 and 18 of section 1 of Article
III of the Constitution, and, consequently, when their seizure cannot be justified
by the corresponding search warrant, the court should order their immediate
return; that the petitioner has no other speedy and adequate remedy for the
protection of his rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other than this petition
for certiorari, as the right of appeal granted by law to a person accused of a
crime, is costly and highly prejudicial to the petitioner, as it presupposes that the
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused by means of legal and
competent evidence, as alleged in the last three (3) paragraphs of the petition.
Consequently, herein petitioner asks for the annulment of the order issued by the
respondent judges, on February 26, 1946, in said criminal case No. 3, entitled —
People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio S. Alvero, — the return to him of the
documents presented by the prosecution, mentioned above, and the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. .In their answer filed on March 21, 1946, herein
respondents have substantially admitted the allegations made and contained in
the first twelve (12) paragraphs of the petition, except the portions alleging that
the documents in question had been obtained by means of force and intimidation
or through coercion; and that certain soldiers of the American Army took certain
personal properties of herein petitioner, at the time the search was made; and
that the acquisition of said documents was manifestly a violation of petitioner's
constitutional rights and that their admission, as evidence for the prosecution,
would be tantamount to compelling petitioner, as accused, to testify against
himself — all of which portions have been expressly denied by the respondents.
Respondents have also expressly denied the allegations contained in the
remaining three (3) paragraphs of the petition.
And as defenses, respondents allege (1) that petitioner himself has admitted the
legality of the seizure of the documents in question in his motion for
reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946; (2) that petitioner has not proven that
said documents had been illegally seized for him; (3) that the seizure of the
documents in question took place, on February 12, 1945, in Pasay, Rizal, which
was then still a combat zone, and that the seizure of certain papers in the house
of the petitioner was made by soldiers of the United States Army of Liberation or
its instrumentalities; (4) that said seizure was effected lawfully under the terms
of the proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the United States Liberation
Forces, dated December 29, 1944, in which he declared his purpose to remove
alleged collaborators, when apprehended, from any position of political and
economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the
duration of the war; (5) that the documents in question had been properly
admitted as evidence for the prosecution in criminal case No. 3, as herein
petitioner, as accused in said case, had expressly waived his right to object to
their admissibility, particularly Exhibits A, FF, HH and P; (6) that petitioner's
evidence of alleged ownership, relative to Exhibits C, G, H, K, I, P, R, R-1 and R-
2, is altogether insufficient, and petitioner himself has expressly admitted that
said documents are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New
Leaders' Association, which was proven to be an organization created, for the
purpose of collaborating with the enemy; (7) and that none of the exhibits
referred to in the petition has been satisfactorily identified by the petitioner as
included among the papers allegedly wrongfully seized from his house and
belonging to him.
Considering the allegations made by the parties in their respective pleadings, and
their supporting papers, as well as the admissions made therein, the following
facts appear to have been sufficiently established:
(1) That on February 12, 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of
the United States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed
herein petitioner under arrest, having been suspected of collaboration with the
enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal;
(2) That on or about October 4, 1945, petitioner was accused of treason, in
criminal case No. 3 of the People's Court; after which, on December 1, 1945, he
filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly seized and taken
from his house;
(3) That petitioner also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the
prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which were admitted as
part of its evidence, and said petition was denied;
(4) That at the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented
said papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and
were marked as exhibits, as described in the petition for certiorari, filed in this
court;
(5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the admission of said
papers and documents at the hearing on said petition for bail, and at the trial of
the case on the merits, in not having insisted that the question of the legality of
the search and seizure of the papers and documents taken from his house should
have been litigated and finally decided first, and thus practically waived his
objection to their admissibility, as evidence for the prosecution;
(6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the papers taken from his
house, held after they had been admitted as part of the evidence for the
prosecution, at the hearing on the petition for bail and at the trial of the case on
the merits, herein petitioner had failed to identify satisfactorily the documents
now in question, and his ownership thereof; and
(7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration, dated February 26,
1946, admitted the legality the legality of the seizure of the documents taken
from his house, and at the hearing on his petition for bail, he himself called for
some of the documents in question.
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein
petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without
It is true that on December 1, 1945, herein petitioner filed a petition, demanding
any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under
the return of certain papers and documents allegedly seized and taken from his
the provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the
house at the time of his arrest; but when he consented to their presentation, as
Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing
part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on his petition for bail and
the seizure of military papers in the possession of prisoners of war (Wilson,
at the trial of the case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of
International Law, 3d ed., 1939, p.524); and also under the proclamation, dated
the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents
December 29, 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief
should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion, made before
of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of
the trial, for their return, he was and should be deemed to have waived his
the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in
objection to their admissibility as part of the evidence for the prosecution; since
violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be waived. (Weeks vs.
Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of
United States, 232 U. S., 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U.
political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint
S., 385; Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298; People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil.,
for the duration of the war. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 148, 149.) As a matter of
626, 630, 631.)
fact, petitioner himself, in his motion for reconsideration, dated February 26,
1946, expressly admitted the legality of the seizure of his personal papers and
documents at the time of his arrest.
At the hearing on his petition for bail, petitioner himself requested the production
of the document marked as Exhibit A, which was a letter sent by him to Dr. Jose
P. Laurel; the document marked as Exhibit HH, which was a memorandum to Col.
The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of
Suzuki, dated December 30, 1944; and the document marked as Exhibit P, which
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made
was a memorandum on Nippongo classes. And he is now, therefore, estopped
either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to
from questioning their admission.
search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is
arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means by which it was committed. (Agnello vs. United States, 269 U. S.,
20.) Furthermore, petitioner could not properly identify many of said documents, such
as Exhibit FF, nor satisfactorily establish his ownership thereof; while the
prosecution has sufficiently established the fact that some of the papers now in
question, such as Exhibit C, had been received at the Office of the CIC of the
When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his possession
United States Army in the City of Manila, since February 11, 1945, that is, one
or in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer
day prior to the seizure of certain papers and documents in the house of the
has the right to make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the
petitioner. And with reference to Exhibits C, G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1 and R-2,
officer upon reasonable grounds to have committed a felony. (Carroll vs. United
petitioner himself admitted that they are not his personal papers but part of the
States, 267 U. S., 132.).
files of the New Leader's Association. And it is well established rule in this
jurisdiction that in a petition for the production of papers and documents, they
must be sufficiently described and identified, otherwise the petition cannot
The majority of the states have held that the privilege against compulsory self-
prosper. (Liebenow vs. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., 39 Phil., 60, 67, 69; Rule 21,
incrimination, which is also guaranteed by state constitutional provisions is not
section 1, Rules of Court.)
violated by the use in evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure. (People vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.)
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and
unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted. (Adams vs. New York, 192 U. S., 585.) But it does not prohibit the
Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a
private person or under authority of state law. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.
S., 383; Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465.)
As the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain papers
and documents from the residence of herein petitioner, on February 12, 1945,
were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came in the possession
of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the
CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers
and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against herein petitioner, at the
trial of his case for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally
attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on
any other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States in similar cases. (Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs.
United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petition for certiorari with
injunction, filed in this case, is absolutely without merit, and it is, therefore,
hereby denied and dismissed with costs. So ordered.
To Whom Directed
People vs. Andre Marti [193 SCRA 57 (1991)]
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of
Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view
of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box
one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top
of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the
box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening
on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents
thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of
Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6,
1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in
the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p.
38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes.
He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana
leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also
opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said
effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's
stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents
requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the
NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the
same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the
Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the
dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER
CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF
THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3
(2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the
United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements
of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in
Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the
process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1
[1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of
its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill
ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987
Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has
struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache &
Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA
299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14,
1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to
the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion
by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US
757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the
Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right
of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a
parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof
found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that
the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its
agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621,
49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court
there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen
— the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left
behind a travel case containing the evidence*** complained of. The search was
made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious,
called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available
to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an
illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case
which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In
both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the
proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of
the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7,
1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he
took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place
of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment
and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI
agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US
v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23,
10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where
the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the
manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the
essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against
the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and
the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if
the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has
been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly
declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8,
Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not
govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that
the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate
to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the
responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June
30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the
restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
 WITNESS:

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only
be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused
sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by
the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected
any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being
through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation,
investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial
non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant
communication.
while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court
erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the
constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of
the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant
was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without
the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was
informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be
given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is
clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any
written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the
NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused
here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to
believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited
drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a
pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation,
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost
of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the
next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as
incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could
not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court,
"(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at
that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a
complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not
simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the
same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p.
91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain.
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per
records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by
the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that
the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66;
Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People
v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see
also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327
[1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show,
appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or
passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of
the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment
(Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract
as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that
things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering
the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Who May Invoke the Right?
Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz [37 SCRA 323 (1971)]
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache
& Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to
declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on
February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the same
and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as
well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by
petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and
effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to
the petition but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon
and his witness, respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but
still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio
subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by
respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a 1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his
note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of witness.
respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent
Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised
notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the Rules of Court are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent
de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition,
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
issued.
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
served the search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the
ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
boxes of documents.
by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to
pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18,
1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition.
After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, "SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must,
1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
Court.

The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required
by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and not by
others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,"
appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by Delegate
Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of x x x
Seven. The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel,
Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is
enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because
we are incorporating in our constitution something of a fundamental character.
"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.
Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he must be under the
obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any
witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten
los fines de la justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo
del delito, no cree Su Señoria que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more
apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia
emphatic and candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant,
o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de compaginar
to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes
he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
etcetera, etcetera.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is

"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria
necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a
pregunta por la siguiente razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene
probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec.
que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of
alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona
warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or not a
que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o alguna persona que
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal
solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos
of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to
consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea
the contrary.
peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin
examiner a los testigos.

In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent

Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante
Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s application for search warrant
por escrito siempre requeriria algun tiempo?.
and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the
answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado
was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to
minimizamos en todo lo posible las vejaciones injustas con la expedicion
have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings
arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males debemos
before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to
escoger. el menor.
recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1,
1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court
below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales,
Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his
witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that
time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge
was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar,
complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber
and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge
then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special
Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge
requested or instructed them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and
warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and without legal basis, he
can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio
whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit
executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the
stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted
by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules
require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the
intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of
the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that
the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining
them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the
proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent
Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate
and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound
initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training,
was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable
cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question is: Was the said
search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by
Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of
the Tax Code referred to above. Thus we find the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for
rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return
or to supply the information required under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or
manufactures any article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the
privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling,
rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific
tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or
association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be
responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or
gross value of output removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under
the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the
filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of
Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec.
208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation
of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of
output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different
titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs.
208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19,
1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable, because there the search warrants were
issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of
only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more
apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident,
which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on
January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the
phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now
Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’"
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars,
receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments
received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and
deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting
and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and
withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
1970."cralaw virtua1aw library
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the
warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects
to be searched for and seized, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or paper showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.’
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to
all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants."cralaw virtua1aw
library
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No.
2-M-70, the said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the
Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used
therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had
occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made, — that abuses may not
be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional
provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under
the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The
herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the
articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should
come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the
dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of
payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes,
deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and
withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the
warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file
a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The
contention is without merit. In the first place, when the questions raised before
this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon
by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before
certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et.
Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the
of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be
right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures,
entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar
time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by
respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner
corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes "As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of
supra.) them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
protection against unreasonable search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
the contention.
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity . .
corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its
."cralaw virtua1aw library
creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we
do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to
In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices
immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective
whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score,
body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against
Stonehill.
by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as
claimed by petitioners — at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents —
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that
based on the documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70.
a different rule applied to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged
Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half
from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against
months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication
unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might
that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those
have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v.
assessments should therefore not be enforced.
United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No.
2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are
permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents,
papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners;
and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives
are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex
"G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the
documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified,
and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Stonehill vs. Diokno [20 SCRA 383 (1967)]
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of
which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1)
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3)
the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made
in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned
or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants
in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that,
in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of
the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a)
those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b)
those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each
of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11
Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one
were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the
other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure
can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose
property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore,
that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer
& Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ
of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question,
and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not,
and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under
the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects
to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to
all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that
the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an
illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach
and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true
no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures,
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions
on the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said
Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the
right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years
on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the
Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form
of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the
right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right
newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused
had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last
year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because
it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him
to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled,
and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to
the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the
party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon
the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for
the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a
probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that
violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they
do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21
of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party
for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this
Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of
Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included
among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized
in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of
said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for
the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal
courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of
and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged
"personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended
petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in
the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions
said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits
and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we
agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate
cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it
is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and
void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences
are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and
other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 U.S. 54 (1978)]
Syllabus
Respondents, a student newspaper that had published articles and photographs 2. The District Court's new rule denying search warrants against third
of a clash between demonstrators and police at a hospital, and staff members,
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against, among others, petitioners,
law enforcement and district attorney personnel, claiming that a search pursuant Page 436 U. S. 548
to a warrant issued on a judge's finding of probable cause that the newspaper
(which was not involved in the unlawful acts) possessed photographs and
negatives revealing the identities of demonstrators who had assaulted police
parties and insisting on subpoenas would undermine law enforcement efforts,
officers at the hospital had deprived respondents of their constitutional rights.
since search warrants are often used early in an investigation before all the
The District Court granted declaratory relief, holding that the Fourth Amendment
perpetrators of a crime have been identified, and the seemingly blameless third
as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth forbade the issuance of a
party may be implicated. The delay in employing a subpoena duces tecum could
warrant to search for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime
easily result in disappearance of the evidence. Nor would the cause of privacy be
unless there is probable cause, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, to
served, since search warrants are more difficult to obtain than subpoenas. Pp.
believe that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable. Failure to honor the
436 U. S. 560-563.
subpoena would not, alone, justify issuance of a warrant; it would also have to
appear that the possessor of the objects sought would disregard a court order not
to remove or destroy them. The court also held that, where the innocent object
of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests make the search 3. Properly administered, the preconditions for a search warrant (probable cause,
constitutionally permissible specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized,
and overall reasonableness), which must be applied with particular exactitude
when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search, are
adequate safeguards against the interference with the press' ability to gather,
"only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important
analyze, and disseminate news that respondents claim would ensue from use of
materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a
warrants for third-party searches of newspaper offices. Pp. 436 U. S. 563-567.
restraining order would be futile."

550 F.2d 464, reversed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Wilson vs. Layne [(98-83) 526 US 603 (1999)]

Syllabus
Held:

WILSON ET AL. v. LAYNE, DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL, ET AL.

1. A State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from
issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor
of the place to be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.
The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the property owner is CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
suspected of crime, but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the "things" CIRCUIT
to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is
sought. Pp. 436 U. S. 553-560.
No. 98-83. Argued March 24, 1999-Decided May 24,1999
 Syllabus

While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners' son in their home, respondents,

deputy federal marshals and local sheriff's deputies, invited a newspaper reporter
(b) It violates the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring
and a photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention of such a
members of the media or other third parties into their home during the execution
"media ride-along." The officers' early morning entry into the home prompted a
of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of
confrontation with petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was
the warrant's execution. The Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of
not in the house. The reporters observed and photographed the incident but were
respect for the privacy of the home, which apply where, as here, police enter a
not involved in the execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published
home under the authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the
the photographs they took of the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in their
suspect named in the warrant, Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 602-604. It
personal capacities for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were entitled to enter
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (the federal marshals), and 42 U. S. C. § 1983
petitioners' home that they were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer
(the sheriff's deputies), contending that the officers' actions in bringing the media
with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a
to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. See, e. g.,
their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents' motion for
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 325. Certainly the presence of the reporters,
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In reversing, the Court of
who did not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the police in their
Appeals declined to decide whether the officers' actions violated the Fourth
task, was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the
Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time of the
apprehension of petitioners' son. Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced by
search that media presence during a police entry into a residence constituted
respondents to support the reporters' presence-publicizing the government's
such a violation, the right allegedly violated was not "clearly established" and
efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law enforcement
thus respondents were entitled to qualified immunity.
activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting suspects and the officers-fall
short of justifying media ride-alongs. Although the presence of third parties
during the execution of a warrant may in some circumstances be constitutionally
Held: A "media ride-along" in a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but
permissible, the presence of these third parties was not. Pp. 609-614.
because the state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in
this case took place, respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Pp.
609-618.
(c) Petitioners' Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of
the search. "Clearly established" for qualified immunity purposes means that the
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
(a) The qualified immunity analysis is identical in suits under § 1983 and Bivens.
understand that what he is doing violates that right. His very action need not
See, e. g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394, n. 9. A court evaluating a
previously have been held unlawful, but in the light of pre-existing law its
qualified immunity claim must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged
unlawfulness must be apparent. E. g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635,
the deprivation of a constitutional right, and, if so, proceed to determine whether
640. It was not unreasonable for a police officer at the time at issue to have
that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Conn v. Gabbert,
believed that bringing media observers along during the execution of an arrest
ante, at 290. P.609.
warrant (even in a home) was lawful. First, the constitutional question presented
by this case is by no means open and shut. Accurate media coverage of police
activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the
604 Fourth Amendment's general principles that the officers' conduct in this case
violated the Amendment. Second, petitioners have not cited any cases of
controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time in question which clearly
established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could
not have believed that his actions were lawful. Finally, the federal marshals in
this case relied
605
on a Marshals Service ride-along policy which explicitly contemplated media entry
into private homes, and the sheriff's deputies had a ridealong program that did
not expressly prohibit such entries. The state of the law was at best undeveloped
at the relevant time, and the officers cannot have been expected to predict the
future course of constitutional law. E. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555,
561. Pp. 614-618.
141 F.3d 111, affirmed.
Existence of Probable Cause
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff [133 SCRA 800 (1984)]
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants
issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched,
and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives,
assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set
for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners'
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that
respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal
of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of
the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the
public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The
existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent
power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos
in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of
the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case
from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.
Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued
on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on
June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
 negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of
the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No.
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search
warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully
belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not
filing of the petition thus:
and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,

Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the
than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
search warrants in question.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an
this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule
everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be considered
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on
August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent
judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to
the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through
counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two
vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego,
distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to
were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground
that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e.,
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo] Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he
On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to
search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides,
the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in
the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which
executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of
the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for
which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent
judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's
prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would
seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued
the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been
said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that
although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b
belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties
that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one
of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen
property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it
may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is
directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized
under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill
Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the
owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon
application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the
Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro
statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the
the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were
premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with,
December 7, 1982.
and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents

could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
1973 Constitution which provides:
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint
affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court in Alvarez case.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
"WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and
news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously
facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot 2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
respondent judge to have done so.
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and
other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search
for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In
like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of
SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be
used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute
dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the
English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to
search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode
would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes
a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state
of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of
the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any
person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with
implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National
Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view
of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported
that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military
authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7,
1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration
of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in
the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain
at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is
further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the
letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to
President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply
dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment
and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b]
issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and
void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction
for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Chandler vs. Miller (D-96-126, April 15, 1997)
Syllabus
CHANDLER ET AL. v. MILLER, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 96-126. Argued January 14, 1997-Decided April 15, 1997
A Georgia statute requires candidates for designated state offices to certify that
they have taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for
nomination or election and that the test result was negative. Petitioners,
Libertarian Party nominees for state offices subject to the statute's requirements,
filed this action in the District Court about one month before the deadline for
submission of the certificates. Naming as defendants the Governor and two
officials involved in the statute's administration, petitioners asserted, inter alia,
that the drug tests violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court denied
petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction and later entered final judgment
for respondents. Relying on this Court's precedents sustaining drug-testing
programs for student athletes, Vernonia School Dist. 4- 7 J v. Acton, 515 U. S.
646, 650, 665-666, Customs Service employees, Treasury Employees v. Von
Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 659, and railway employees, Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 608-613, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The
court accepted as settled law that the tests were searches, but reasoned that, as
was true of the drug-testing programs at issue in Skinner and Von Raab, the
statute served "special needs," interests other than the ordinary needs of law
enforcement. Balancing the individual's privacy expectations against the State's
interest in the drug-testing program, the court held the statute, as applied to
petitioners, not inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Held: Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test does
not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches. Pp. 313-323.
(a) It is uncontested that Georgia's drug-testing requirement, imposed by law
and enforced by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The pivotal question here is whether the searches
are reasonable. To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See
Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 652-653. But particularized exceptions to the main rule
are sometimes
306
Syllabus
warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement." See Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619. When such "special needs" are
alleged, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the
competing private and public interests advanced by the parties. See Von Raab,
489 U. S., at 665-666. In evaluating Georgia's ballot-access, drug-testing
statute-a measure plainly not tied to individualized suspicion-the Eleventh Circuit
sought to balance the competing interests in line with this Court's precedents
most immediately in point: Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. Pp. 313-317.
(b) These precedents remain the guides for assessing the validity of the Georgia
statute despite respondents' invitation to apply a framework extraordinarily
deferential to state measures setting conditions of candidacy for state office. No
precedent suggests that a State's sovereign power to establish qualifications for
state offices diminishes the constraints on state action imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. pp. 317-318.
(c) Georgia's testing method is relatively noninvasive; therefore, if the "special
need" showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for excessive
intrusion. However, Georgia has failed to show a special need that is substantial-
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion. Respondents contend that unlawful drug use is
incompatible with holding high state office because such drug use draws into
question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public
functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public
confidence and trust in elected officials. Notably lacking in respondents'
presentation is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from
the Fourth Amendment's main rule. The statute was not enacted, as respondents
concede, in response to any fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials. A
demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the
validity of a testing regime, see Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 673-675, would shore up
an assertion of special need for a suspicionless general search program, see
Skinner, 489 U. S., at 606-608; Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 662-663. In contrast to
the effective testing regimes upheld in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia,
Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to identify candidates who
violate antidrug laws and is not a credible means to deter illicit drug users from
seeking state office. The test date is selected by the candidate, and thus all but
the prohibitively addicted could abstain for a pretest period sufficient to avoid
detection. Respondents' reliance on this Court's decision in Von Raab, which
sustained a drug-
307
testing program for Customs Service officers prior to promotion or transfer to
certain high-risk positions, despite the absence of any documented drug abuse
problem among Service employees, 489 U. S., at 660, is misplaced. Hardly a
decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches, Von Raab must be read
in its unique context. Drug interdiction had become the agency's primary
enforcement mission. The covered posts directly involved drug interdiction or
otherwise required Customs officers to carry firearms, the employees would have
access to vast sources of valuable contraband, and officers had been targets of
and some had succumbed to bribery by drug smugglers. Moreover, it was not
feasible to subject the Customs Service employees to the kind of day-to-day
scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments. In telling
contrast, the day-to-day conduct of candidates for public office attracts attention
notably beyond the norm in ordinary work environments. What is left, after close
review of Georgia's scheme, is that the State seeks to display its commitment to
the struggle against drug abuse. But Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug
problem among the State's elected officials, those officials typically do not
perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification
immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed is symbolic, not
"special." The Fourth Amendment shields society from state action that
diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. Pp. 318-322.
(d) The Court expresses no opinion on medical examinations designed to provide
certification of a candidate's general health or on financial disclosure
requirements, and it does not speak to drug testing in the private sector, a
domain unguarded by Fourth Amendment constraints. P.323.
73 F.3d 1543, reversed.
People vs. Chua Ho San [308 SCRA 432 (1999)]
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal and the
reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, finding him guilty of transporting, without
appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance methamphetamine
hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, 1 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by
R.A. No. 7659,2 and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof,
the judgement was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station,
of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted
a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter
ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel
looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six of his men led by his Chief
Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to
Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that
the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy
his men in strategic places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his
men to take up positions thirty meters from the coastline. When the speedboat
landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this
time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and
issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA,
however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared
impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but
he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but
still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed "sign language;" he
motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to
proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not
to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features of
the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed the
man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a
counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his men to find a
resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an enterpreter. In the
meantime, BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substance which he and CID suspected was
shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man
was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police authorities were satisfied
that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their
uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the
man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely
showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its
contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan,
San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA was
detained at the Bacnotan Police Station.1âwphi1.nêt
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann
Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police, Region I, received a letter
request3 from CID — incidentally her husband — to conduct a laboratory
examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored
strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,4 she stated that her qualitative
examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos,
to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No.
4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an indictment for
illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was subsequently amended
to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos
of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or
authority to transport the same" in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425
as amended by R.A. 7659.
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. The RTC
was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended information read to him in
Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter, Thelma Sales Go.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese
Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. However,
it was only after directing the request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA.
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the above
narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID, its first
witness, and whose testimony, in turn, was substantially corroborated by
witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry report in
that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for
chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. She also explained that they were unwashed, hence they appeared
yellowish.
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu.
He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and
repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was instructed by his employer Cho
Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latter's 35-tonner ship which would
embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival
at their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with two
bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to
CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine
waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached Dagupan, Pangasinan
on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small
speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him from China. While, sailing,
RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG
asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they
were riding. Apparently, the person on shore could not see them so they cruised
over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low on fuel and telephone
battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the
bags to shore. The tasks completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while
CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child
thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much to RONG's dismay
when he learned of it. When a crowd started to mill around them, the police
arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The police
immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures
and hand movements, they escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer who CHUA
guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and
a bag. They presented the bag to him, opened it, inspected and weighed the
contents, then proclaimed them as methaphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth. He denied
he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights,"
particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently, his arrest was tainted with
illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have
been regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID never
graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao beach.
BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away, as such thought failed
to make an impression in his mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and
knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone exercised
dominion over the same.
Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member, recalled that
on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with the police. He saw CHUA
standing with a bag beside him. He also remembered hearing from the people
congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain
policeman Anneb had chased the latter's car. He additionally claimed that when
the crowd became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police
headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation — he opened CHUA's
bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a forensic chemist surnamed
CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he ordered his officials to
find an interpreter. Throughout the proceedings, photographers were busy taking
pictures to document the event.
Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who
narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach when two men and a lady
arrived. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they detected
the arrival of the local police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed
ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not CID.
In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that the
prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA transported
28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
Invoking People v. Tagliben5 as authority, the RTC characterized the search as
incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of
the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the
futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the
language barrier and the observation that such irregularity was "rectified when
accused was duly arraigned and . . . (afterwards) participated in the trial of this
case." The RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which
did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred
on the testimonies thus delivered.
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged employer
RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of prohibited
drugs on Philippine shores, but with several other members of an organized
syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such predilection was plainly
evident in the dispositive portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and established by
convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had conspired and acted in
concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention Chen Ho Fa, the Skipper of the
35-tonner ship they used in coming to the Country from China and Taiwan, this
Court finds the accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 as charged in the Information, and considering the provisions of
Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
quantity sold/possessed/transported is "200 grams or more" in the case of
Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity involved in this case is 28.7
kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling specified in said Act, coupled
with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a member of an organized
syndicated crime group, this Court, having no other recourse but to impose the
maximum penalty to accused, this Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua
Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to pay the costs.
The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine
National Police to immediately form an investigating Committee to be composed
by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity, who will conduct an exhaustive
investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was negligence or
conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons
who approached the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La
Union, and attempted to take the remaining bag from accused, as well as the
whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this Court a copy of the
report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance herewith sixty
(60) days from receipt hereof.
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is
ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in
accordance with the law.
The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of
the government and to be turned over to the Philippine National Police, La Union
Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal seaborne
activities.
SO ORDERED. 6
Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as competent
evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride since they
were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2) granting weight and credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on material
points; and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an organized
syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since this was not alleged in
the information.
The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the
search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure warrants
as circumstances immediately preceding to and comtemporaneous with the
search necessitated and validated the police action; and (2) that there was an
effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures since he consented to the search.
We reverse the RTC.
Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home and person.
It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose.7 Inseparable, and not merely corollary or
incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.8
The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does
not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a
reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a
judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved.9 Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined on the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; "otherwise such search and
seizure become "unreasonable" within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision."10 This interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures
have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence11 in instances of (1) search
of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or
consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search),12 and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuan to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
13
This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest,
search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a valid
exemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly and quite understandably,
the prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag searched
without the benefit of a warrant.
In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may
without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such
facts14 or as recent case law15 adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The term
probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.16 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine
laws.
arrested. 17 In People v. Montilla,18 the Court acknowledged that "the
evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges, and correlatively,
for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized." Noting that
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of
the previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima facie
the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana
evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause, the Court
or other prohibited drug,20 confidential report and/or positive identification by
explained:
informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they
will transport/deliver the same,21 suspicious demeanor or behavior 22 and
suspicious bulge in the waist23 — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima facie
warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a
evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue
foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the
under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides
date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer
in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary
or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance
investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender as well founded belief" as
to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process
to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent's probable guilt
of perpetrating an offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA
thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts
attempted to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely walking and
of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the
oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him. This
respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists." It should, therefore, be
cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the claim, thus:
in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be
considered as legally authorized." (emphasis supplied)19

Q: How far were you when the accused put the bag on his sholder?

Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on record
reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going
A: We were then very near him about three meters away from the male person
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the
carrying the bag.
obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but
predicated mainly its decision on the finding that was "accused was caught red-
handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended." In short, there is no
probable cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower Q: To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his shoulder?
court's finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was acting suspiciously, on
the spot identification by an informant that accused was transporting prohibitive
drug, and the urgency of the situation) constitutive of probable cause impelled A: To the east direction.
police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the
Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable
cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other Q: In relation to you, where were you.
contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry
into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities,
A: With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached the accused
and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in Tagalong, English and Ilocano
which accused did not understand because he did not respond.
Q: When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that time?
A: He was walking.
Q: To what direction he was walking?
A: He was walking to the east direction. (sic)
Q: He was walking away from you or going near you?
A: He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the right arm of
the accused.
Q: Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?
A: Yes sir and he stopped.24
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not obvious to
the police. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception and view were CHUA
disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking casually towards the road, and
CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey any
impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores. Neither were these overt
manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA's criminal behevior as
clearly established in CID's testimony, thus:
Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced yourselves:
A No, sir.
Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused because he was
not doing anything wrong?
A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever or whatever
assistance that we can give we will give.25
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a
contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver
dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime
and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he
might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy,26 a valid arrest
must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.27
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the
Rules of Court28 as already shown. Fom all indications, the search was nothing
but a fishing expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing
themselves, the police officcers immediately inquired about the contents of the
bag. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate
interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony had indeed
been committed by CHUA — in effect to "retroactively establish probable cause
and validate an illegal search and seizure."
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to open his bag?
search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, A No, sir, there is no answer.
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.29 CHUA never exhibited
that he knew, actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable
Q No answer?
searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. This can be inferred from
the manner by which the search performed, thus:

A Yes, sir, no answer.

Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing that you did
when you approached him (CHUA)?
Q And when there was no answer what did you do next?

A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.

A I used sign language sir.

Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?

Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you demonstrated that sign
language of opening the bag mr. (sic) witness?

A That is normal practice in our part, sir.

A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this sir.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves what did you do?

SHERIFF:

A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word,

The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then
manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand
Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?
from left to right or from the opening to the end of the zipper.

A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir.

COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end of the
zipper.
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.
(The witness repeating the motion described on record.)
COURT: Did you open that personally?
WITNESS:
A No, your honor.
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open the bag?
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir.
Q Why, why was it — no, I reform my question your honor. Is it normal
procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody to open his bag?
A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect the baggage,
it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir.
Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to open his bag?
A yes, sir.
Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to open his bag?
A No, sir.
Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?
A Yes, sir.30
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed
him. The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA in three
languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The police hence concluded
that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. When CHUA failed to
respond again to the police's request to open the bag, they resorted to what they
called "sign language." They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand
motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what
was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign
language." More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged
cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and
consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. This Court is not
unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and
seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects
was orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for
doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instances, the
accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also
understood the nature and consequences of such request.31
It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated subtance. But
this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even if
tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of
felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous trees32 how much more of
"forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise
as in this case — because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial
suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the remaining
evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain CHUA's
conviction.
 To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of
protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless
Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported methamphetamine
and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.
hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But the constitutional guarantee
1cräläwvirtualibräry
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded,
as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the
Constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds,
For automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario
blundered. "There are those who say that . . . 'the criminal is to go free because
Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, guilty
the constable has blundered.'. . . In some cases this will undoubtedly be the
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
result. But . . . 'there is another consideration — the imperative of judicial
of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and
integrity . . . The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."33

The information against accused-appellants reads:

As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the posecution
witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer to insignificant details
which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a passing note, this Court calls That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
the attention of the trial court regarding its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with
This aggravating circumstance is without question unsupported by the records. each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in
Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the pleadings or their possession 946.9 grams of dried marijuana which are prohibited.
proceedings of the trial court. It is also fundamental that conspiracy must be
proven just like any other criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond
reasonable doubt.34 CONTRARY TO LAW.5cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence not being sufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty
to the accusation against them. 6 Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution
presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr.,
and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Costs de oficio.

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the

SO ORDERED. Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received
an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao
People vs. Molina (G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)
City. 7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names
and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1
Paguidopon only after they were arrested. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City any
time that morning. 9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he
called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which
immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to
proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the
alleged pusher to pass by. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned
in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants
as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the
trisikad. 11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the
accused-appellants were accosted. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At that point, accused-
appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-
appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police
officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. 13 Molina replied,
Boss, if possible we will settle this. 14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the
bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-
appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
15cräläwvirtualibräry
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them
is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 16 The demurrer
was denied by the trial court. 17 A motion for reconsideration was filed by
accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence
from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their
counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense
charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic
Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to
suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act
8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation
to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the
entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila,
for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate
action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.19cräläwvirtualibräry
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
Accused-appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN
SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT
OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF
RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS
LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20cräläwvirtualibräry
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein
he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent
provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined
under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 22 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so
too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom
from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Courts high
regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
23cräläwvirtualibräry
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; 24 and (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search). 25cräläwvirtualibräry
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be
reversed. 26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in
hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
27cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a
finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent
search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants
were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. 28 This brings
us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the
present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San, 29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto
arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative
or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, 30 probable
cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that reliable information
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin, 31 it was held that the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as
the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, 32 the Court did not consider eyes... darting from
side to side ... [while] holding ... [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30
in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion
and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in [the arresting officers] presence. So also, in People v. Encinada, 33
the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a
motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 34 the trial court concluded that
petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was standing at the corner of
Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking
at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. 35 In declaring the
warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.36cräläwvirtualibräry
It went on to state that -
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving
very fast - an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner
was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from
all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu.37cräläwvirtualibräry
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. 38cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that
would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-
appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded Boss,
if possible we will settle this to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting officers
that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not
participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a
surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted
that he only learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is
doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is
worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only
once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road.
These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle
when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-
appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before
the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-
appellants even before the arrest, to wit -
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and
how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and
Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon.
He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is
Nazario Molina39cräläwvirtualibräry
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1
Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the
surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants name and address prior
to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers,
more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of
accused-appellants identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for
evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew
appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latters illegal gambling
activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by
the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the
warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that [t]he
prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant
disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such
bare circumstances. 40cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 41cräläwvirtualibräry
such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700, 000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on
December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:

Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under
the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person
was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers
could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is
thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess
and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated
drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of
said law.

While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this CONTRARY TO LAW .2
drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on
the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

WHEREFORE , the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17,
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of
said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug,
evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias
under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Boboy, are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are
validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

CONTRARY TO LAW ,3

SO ORDERED.

Partially Valid Warrant When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4
whereupon he was tried.
People vs. Salanguit (G.R. 133254, April 18, 2001)

This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit
y Ko guilty of violation of §16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing him for
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico,
forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the
Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of
Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence
established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant5 in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-
appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The
sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was
taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L.
Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen,
along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to
serve the warrant.6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened
it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police
operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and
his group started searching the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box
also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams.10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but
the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to
Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had
seized.12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.13
The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those
contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks
of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to
be marijuana.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were
about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof
of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long
firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of
paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for
his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read
it.16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house
while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his
bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry , and canned
goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after
putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on
EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony.
Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and
took away canned goods and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE(SHABU)

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR

VIOLATION §8, R.A. No. 6425
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
MARIJUANA
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and,

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the
admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence
against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment
of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of

marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure21 provides that a
to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
SO ORDERED.20
may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of
the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of
regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant
VALID unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT
NO.160 For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath
SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA,
PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his
possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as
shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the
day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite,
Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that
there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the
search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the
place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends,
however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was
presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not
have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence
officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the
issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM,
do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q – Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or
surveillance?
A – Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located Q – Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know
at Binhagan St., San Jose Quezon City, Sir. where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?

Q – Do You know the person who occupies the specific place? A – Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.

A – Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert. Q – How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?

Q – Are you familiar with that place? A – When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his
room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.

A – Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area
and established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend Q – Do you know who is in control of the premises?
who introduced me to the former.

A – Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

Q – In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?

Q – How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT
A – When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of @ Robert is genuine shabu?
shabu, sir .

A – After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to

Q – Were you able to buy at that time? our office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to
him the 2.12, grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our
Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC,
A – Yes, sir. for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as
shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19
December 95.
Q – How much if you can still remember the amount involved?

Q – Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?

A – I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of
Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
A – Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I
wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis
at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
 items not supported by the evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of
the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an
Q – Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

A – Yes, sir.24
Specificity of the Offense Charged

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for
the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
of R.A. No. 6425.27 It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
to dispose of this contention:
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,25 the
warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in
articles. It was held:
connection with "Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable
cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No.628 Comia
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that
St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and
it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other
certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of
merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The
the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs
invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to
Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity.
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search
The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered
warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of
illegal by the defects concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to
the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things
suggest that invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
to be seized." 28
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which
are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement
of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A.
expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property
6425," without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it
specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be
authorized the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and
tolerated.
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable

cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more
be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other
than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3)
separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for
illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of
paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of
P .D. No.1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant
was questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any
particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which punished several offenses. We held,
however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D.
No.1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed
within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866.
Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various
provisions of the said law.
Particularly of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search
Warrant Case No.160 contained several documents which identified the premises
to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the
premises to be searched was located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street,
San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises
as "a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City;
and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact,
the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector
Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and
in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover,
the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was
really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained
through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they
actually started their operation.32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched.33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of
Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and
six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an
Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street,
Malboro Mass."34 In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being
indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant
described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.1âwphi1.nêt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-
appellant's residence, Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant
being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath
or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is
being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of
the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented in evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there
must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and
(c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.36 The
question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to
the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets
of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting
the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
-and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct
of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of
shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of
the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.18 The rationale
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a
weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found,
i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the
warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality
to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we
declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the
said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents.
We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of
the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it
and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was
visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it; Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said
to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer .40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process
when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution.41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of
accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial
in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko
been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
guilty of possession of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution
as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison
to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in
term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4)
accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of
confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
the drug must be upheld.

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed
accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs
by the searching party in effecting the raid.
under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However,
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure42 provides:
the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court
is AFFIRMED .
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
SO ORDERED.
part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or
any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxicorp. (G.R. 140946, September 13, 2004)

The Case

Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his
house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’
unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of
Decision2 dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999
disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order3 of the
presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC"), denying respondent Maxicorp,
Inc.’s ("Maxicorp") motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued
against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order
copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section
to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-
29 of PD 49")4 and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party
Code ("RPC").5
knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the
searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
Antecedent Facts
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they
do so.
 counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI
Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador
was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants
in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and
Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the
Hence, this petition.
applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants
Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against
Maxicorp.
The Issues

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search
of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
search warrants.

1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;

On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants
alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the
warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC denied Maxicorp’s 2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;
motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorp’s motion for
reconsideration.
3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI
Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician 4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS."
Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during
their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented
certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform
The Ruling of the Court
the witnessed activities using petitioners’ products.

The petition has merit.

On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search
warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999.

Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of law.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact,
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the which this Court should not consider in a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners
counter that all the issues they presented in this petition involve questions of law.
Petitioners point out that the facts are not in dispute.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions
of law.6 Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on
appeal,7 subject to exceptions as when the findings of the appellate court conflict
with the findings of the trial court.8
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on
a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple, determining
the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For
example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in
dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without
need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence.9 The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.10 If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual.11 Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno12 is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not
the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or
not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to
contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear
and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should
be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs
of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all
these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this
situation does not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into
questions of law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition – the legal personality of the
petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause
– only the first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there
was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question of fact. At first
glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concern
itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue
would require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence
presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them.13
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments
requiring an examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented
during the search warrant proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us
substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals by
conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the situation which
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise
only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of
this court to analyze or weigh evidence.14 When we give due course to such
situations, it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the
presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.15
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the
Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of the RTC.16 Since petitioners
properly raised the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this
Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition
 prosecuting it are legally just and proper."19 Thus, probable cause for a search
warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects
since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.20
General as representative of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the
general rule but the exception governs this case.17 We ruled in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals18 that the petitioner-complainant in a
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally
petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of
examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must
the Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack
refer to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
of due process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."21 The applicant must have
Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to
personal knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient.22
warrant the application of this doctrine.
Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the
complainant and his witnesses.23

On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants

The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that
the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on
prove conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The
the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano.
Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a
Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals disregarded the overwhelming
connection between the offense charged and the place searched.
evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence of probable cause.
Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC.
Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29
conducted was defective.
of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these
charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer
technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First,
Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but
the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he
one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how
bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair
Second, the fact that petitioners’ other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted
competition.
that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.

We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s findings.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as
will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the
witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw
Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also
saw how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged within Maxicorp’s
premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the
products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without
giving the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates
of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances
when Maxicorp installed petitioners’ software into computers it had assembled.
Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners’ software within Maxicorp’s
premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable
cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp
engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of
petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man,24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.25 Probable cause is determined
in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it was improper
for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales
receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in
his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only
proof that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant
application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer
unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-
installed petitioners’ software.27 Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent
Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit.28 Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to
the judge the presence of petitioners’ software on the same computer unit.29
There was a comparison between petitioners’ genuine software and Maxicorp’s
software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano
purchased.30 Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of "Joel
Diaz," which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the
operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals’ ruling on Sacriz’s testimony. The fact
that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not
eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair
competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a
whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including
the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies
of petitioners’ witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution
and the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine personally and
thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable
cause. The RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the
applicant and his witnesses.31 For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve
great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof
that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason.32 Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings
reveal any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily
see, here the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and his witnesses. To
demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution
would be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its
evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for
trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects
to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be
seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a
protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no
unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.33
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
search warrant shall issue "in connection with one specific offense." The articles
described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
issued.34 Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles
subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission
of a specific offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and
lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized. After
examining the wording of the warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of Maxicorp and reversed the RTC’s Order thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioner’s store can be
seized on the ground that it is "used or intended to be used" in the illegal or
unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private respondents’ software and
their manuals.35
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e)
of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly
worded warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase "used or intended to
be used," were previously held void by this Court.36 The disputed text of the
search warrants in this case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft software
bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION contained in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft instruction
manuals and/or literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase
orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in the recording of
the reproduction and/or assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions
in connection with fake or counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights
and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks,
CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying
machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in
the illegal and unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and
their manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the
authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and
copyrights; and
f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all
computer hard drives, data bases and other information storage devices
containing unauthorized Microsoft software.37 (Emphasis supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow.38 The description of the property to be seized need not be
technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary
according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of
concern.39 Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a
general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified
physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the
offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or
intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software.
This language meets the test of specificity.40
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the
Court found the warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not
because of the mere use of the phrase "used or intended to be used." In
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of "television
sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x" were found too
broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes.41 The
mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the defendant’s store does not mean
that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in
this case is different. Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the
warrants because they authorized the seizure of records pertaining to "all
business transactions" of the defendant.42 And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of
articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally
connected with the legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes."43
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity.
Paragraph (c) states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for
personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair
competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have
bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c)
simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether
legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in
copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective
in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the
other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains
valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant.44 A search warrant is
severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying
the whole warrant.45 The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of
the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained
through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under
paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f,
should be returned to Maxicorp.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect
to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452,
96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to
Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Personal determination by judge
Sta. Rosa Mining Co., vs. Fiscal Zabala [153 SCRA 367 (1987)]
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the
then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated.
The facts of the case are not disputed. On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a
complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the
installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against
private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin
Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary
investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated
August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed
against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was
approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought
reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a
resolution dated October 14, 1974.
On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal
Case No. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October 14, 1974.
On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by
telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al.,
review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review."
The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the
Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among other things, that
an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed against private
respondents for which reason the request for review has become a moot question
as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted
theft.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed
the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said
prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but
the latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial
Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie
evidence against private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25,
1976.
Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order
dated February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied.
Trial of the case was reset to April 23, 1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of
Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial
Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case.
This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated
April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not
prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein.
Hence, this petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
"commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or
appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the
Court of First instance of Camarines Norte" (Petition, Rollo, p. 27).
There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addresses to the
sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the
information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court
of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the information, in
the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so (People vs.
Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already been filed in court,
"fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss
or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further
proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court"
(U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra).
However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a
motion by the fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge
may properly deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary
investigation, there appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution.
This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court and, therefore, within
its discretion and control (Abela vs. Golez, 131 SCRA 12).
This ruling is just being consistent with the principle first laid down in U.S. vs.
Valencia (1 Phil. 642) where it was held that "after the complaint has been
presented, and certainly after the trial has been commenced, the court and not
the fiscal has full control of it. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal
without the consent of the court." It is discretionary on the court where the case
is pending to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same (Asst. Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914).
In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on the
ground that there was a prima facie case against private respondents. The
question presented for determination now is-after a case has been filed in court,
can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss it
has been denied?
This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue. Notwithstanding his
personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of
presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not
shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the
hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted
under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the
entire proceedings wig be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361).
In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for
the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State."
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so
because "the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer (Suarez
vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556).
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he
simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to
prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal
action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is
to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of
evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and
control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289).
Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his
duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide
the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties.
The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the
case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the
motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no
justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court
where the case is filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. Very recently,
this Court in Mario Fl. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul (G.R. No. 53373,
promulgated June 30, 1987) ruled:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
 In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely
Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary
retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on
left entirely for the determination of the Court.
October 14, 1988. The trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this
omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby Granted. Public respondent or any other person
to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."
who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered
to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit,

Felizardo Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime
SO ORDERED.
charged.
Paderanga vs. Drilon (G.R. 96080, April 19, 1991)

In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further
preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public
conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner at the instance of the
respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39
latter's counsel, per his resolution dated July 7, 1989. In his first indorsement to
for multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain
the Department of Justice, dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor requested
them from prosecuting him.
the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the
preliminary investigation against herein petitioner.

The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple
murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter
Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife
Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred
to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and
has not been apprehended since then.
In a resolution dated September 6, 1989,1 respondent State Prosecutor Henrick
F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of the previously
amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the
accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,2 contending that the
preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was
promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding
counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his
alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by
respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990.3

From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review4
with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition
with Memorandum,5 and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,6 attaching thereto an affidavit of
Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of
March 30, 1990 wherein he implicated herein petitioner. d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution No. 6487 dismissing the
said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, petitioner then flied the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition.
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
as to him was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or
probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means

of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a vengeance; and
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is
taken in jeopardy.8 j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.

The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court.9 Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will
not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.10 The case of Brocka, et al. vs.
Enrile, et al.11 cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however,
will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid
exceptions. Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed.

1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
reason of the fact that at the time the resolution of September 6, 1989 was
issued, there were still several incidents pending resolution such as the validity of
the testimonies and affidavits of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as bases
for preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed, and the
clarificatory questions which were supposed to be propounded by petitioner's
counsel to Roxas and Hanopol. Petitioner likwise claims that he was deprived of
the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit to the subpoena of April 25, 1989.
These contentions are without merit.
Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit,
pursuant to the subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he
controverted the charge against him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his
political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this is
sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court,
specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show
that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989 involved a separate complaint
charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in the complaint
attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are
matters of defense best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and
evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not
absolute.1âwphi1 The fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he
will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. As clearly
provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they
may submit questions to the to the investigating officer which the latter may
propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of
preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is
frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an
appellate court."12
2. Petitioner further submits that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable
cause, or sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public
trial, on the basis of the following grounds: the questioned resolution of
respondent Gingoyon is full of factual misrepresentations or misapprehensions;
respondent's reliance on the decision of the Regional Trial Court against Felipe
Galarion suffers from constitutional and procedural infirmities considering that
petitioner was not a party thereto, much less was he given any opportunity to
comment on or rebut the prosecution evidence; reliance on Rogelio Hanopol's
testimony is likewise "contemptible," it being merely hearsay in addition to the
fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine Hanopol at
the time he testified in court; and the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30, 1989,
which is the only evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his
affidavit of retraction dated June 20, 1990.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose
of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.13
The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wen
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.14 We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in
the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement
in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of
Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the
opportunity of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has
no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present.
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent Constitution, as well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other process of law.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded
an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. There is no controversy as to the facts. We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion
and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during the separate trial
of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the
examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was
Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-
never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies
Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers,
preliminary investigation.
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic
and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several
has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by officers and members of various student organizations.
its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we
find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In
addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the
published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol
may not be admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the
prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such testimonies,
petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance
admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco
compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross- Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila,
examination. seeking to enjoin and or restrain said defendants and their agents from
confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

SO ORDERED.
By order dated December 8, 1983 the Court set the hearing on the petition for
Pita vs. CA [178 SCRA 362 (1987)] preliminary injunction on December 14, 1983 and ordered the defendants to
show cause not later than December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for should not
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men’s magazine", seeks the review be granted.
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 rejecting his appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes,
in particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and
burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition
for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing’s pronouncement to
continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining
order on December 14, 1983.chanrobles law library
In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27, 1983 defendant Mayor
Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials
on December 1 and 3, 1983, but claimed that the said materials were voluntarily
surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and that the said
confiscation and seizure was (sic) undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as
amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
In opposing the plaintiff’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
defendant pointed out that in that anti-smut campaign conducted on December 1
and 3, 1983, the materials confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners
and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials, and that the
plaintiff’s establishment was not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his Comment and or Rejoinder Memorandum
in support of his opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing
on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of
whether the publication ‘Pinoy Playboy Magazine’ alleged (sic) seized, confiscated
and or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not"
On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order granting plaintiff’s motion to be
given three days "to file a reply to defendants’ opposition dated January 9, 1984,
serving a copy thereof to the counsel for the defendants, who may file a rejoinder
within the same period from receipt, after which the issue of Preliminary
Injunction shall be resolved"
Plaintiff’s supplemental Memorandum was filed on January 18 1984. Defendant
filed his Comment on plaintiff’s supplemental Memorandum on January 20, 1984,
and plaintiff filed his "Reply-Memorandum" to defendants’ Comment on January
25, 1984.

On January 5, 1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the
defendants. and or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize
plaintiff’s magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine
is obscene or not"
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case
for lack of merit. 2
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things,
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The restraining order issued on December 14, 1983 having lapsed on January 3,
1984, the plaintiff filed an urgent motion for issuance of another restraining
We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of
order, which was opposed by defendant on the ground that issuance of a second
allegedly obscene publications or materials deserves close scrutiny because of the
restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated
constitutional guarantee protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9,
January 11, 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation
Art. IV), and the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides that a temporary restraining order
searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art. IV). It must be equally conceded, however,
shall be effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as
indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960
and P.D. No. 969). Also well settled is the rule that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there
is consent to the search or seizure, (People v. Malesugui, 63 Phil. 22) or search is
an incident to an arrest, (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil.
637) or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure (See Papa v. Magno, 22
SCRA 857). 3
The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order
seize and confiscate petitioner’s magazines on the basis simply of their
determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in
effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any
hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the
application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction. 4
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to
pronounce what "obscene" means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic
literature. Early on, in People v. Kottinger, 5 the Court laid down the test, in
determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." 6 "Another test," so Kottinger further
declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency." 7 Kottinger hastened to say, however, that" [w]hether a picture is
obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case," 8 and
that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it." 9
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely
in generalizing a problem that has grown increasingly complex over the years.
Precisely, the question is: When does a publication have a corrupting tendency,
or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is
to beg the question to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting influence
because it is obscene, and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same
breath, it would leave the final say to a hypothetical "community standard" —
whatever that is — and that the question must supposedly be judged from case
to case.
About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a
prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go Pin was also even
hazier:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and
paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be
viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense
committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s
sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic
qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was
of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the
main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be
surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees
for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art
and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their
artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and
taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of
their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill
and perverting effects of these pictures. 11
x x x
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have
neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if
"the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but rather for
commercial purposes," 12 the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
protection.
It was People v. Padan y Alova, 13 however, that introduced to Philippine
jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that should accompany the work, to save
it from a valid prosecution. We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or
moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity
and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was
involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and
sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the
human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an
actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have
no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it
but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals,
inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a
corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. . . . 14
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than answers. For
one thing, if the exhibition was attended by "artists and persons interested in art
and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their
artistic tastes," 15 could the same legitimately lay claim to "art" ? For another,
suppose that the exhibition was so presented that "connoisseurs of [art], and
painters and sculptors might find inspiration," 16 in it, would it cease to be a case
of obscenity?
Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial arbitrament,
which has permitted an ad lib of ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as
to what is obscene and what is art.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, 17 the Court, following
trends in the United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the average person,
applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest." 18 Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked
departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the
"dominant theme" of the work rather than isolated passages, which were central
to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community
standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook
moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question
and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto
law enforcers.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity
continues to journey from development to development, which, states one
authoritative commentator (with ample sarcasm), has been as "unstable as it is
unintelligible." 19
Memoirs v. Massachusettes, 20 a 1966 decision, which characterized obscenity as
one "utterly without any redeeming social value," 21 marked yet another
development.
The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, 22 which expressly abandoned
Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," 23 to wit:" (a) whether ‘the
average person, applying contemporary standards’ would find the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 24
(A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling v. United States, 25
which repeated Miller, and Jenkins v. Georgia, 26 yet another reiteration of Miller.
Jenkins, curiously, acquitted the producers of the motion picture, Carnal
Knowledge, in the absence of "genitals" portrayed on screen, although the film
highlighted contemporary American sexuality.).
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes standards for proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after all, is
"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the the plaint specifically raised in the petition.
constitutional dimension of the problem. 27 Apparently, the courts have assumed
that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption
that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates However, this much we have to say.
predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. And"
[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a state
of rest, or that it will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
speech nonetheless, although it is subject — as in all speech — to regulation in
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has
the interests of [society as a whole] — but not in the interest of a uniform vision
consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and
of how human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed." 28
present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. 30 But, so we
asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 31 "the burden to show the existence of grave
and imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the authorit[ies]." 32
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut — provided it is smut. For
obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it
equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences,
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of
and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our
the existence of such clear and present danger." 33 "It is essential for the validity
forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
of . . . previous restraint or censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely
generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet
on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require." 34
their works are considered important literature today. 29 Goya’s La Maja desnuda
was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the world’s most
prestigious museums.
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to
satisfy the clear and present danger test." 35

But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of
opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women
that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a
solution — so only we may arrive at one but rather as a serious attempt to put
the question in its proper perspective, that is, as a genuine constitutional issue.

What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and
has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We
share Tribe’s disappointment over the discouraging trend in American decisional It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional
law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" issues, mainly, due process and illegal search and seizure.
solution is in sight.

As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a

In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The
rushing to a "perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that
must not only be (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the
speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice.
However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and
present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due
process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way
of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not without
restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic
literature that is offensive to public morals." 36 Neither do we. But it brings us
back to square one: were the "literature" so confiscated "pornographic" ? That
"we have laws punishing the author, publisher and sellers of obscence
publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960
and P.D. No. 969)," 37 is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner
been found guilty under the statute?
violation referred to in Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be
governed by the following rules:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Government to
be destroyed.
(b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an
acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures,
paintings or other materials and articles involved in the violation referred to in
Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of
the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
Chief of Constabulary.
(c) The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary
may, within fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal
the matter to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The decision of the
Secretary of National Defense shall be final and unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No.
960 as amended by PD No. 969.)

Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. — Additional penalties shall be imposed as

The fact that the former respondent Mayor’s act was sanctioned by "police power" follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 38 We defined police power as "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the
promote the general welfare." 39 Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are,
violations of Section 1 hereof, the penalty as provided herein shall be imposed in
arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for
the maximum period and, in addition, the accessory penalties provided for in the
high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be imposed. 40
decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos’), from the commandments
of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees
themselves lay down procedures for implementation. We quote:chanrob1es Under the Constitution, 41 on the other hand:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
virtual 1aw library

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. — The disposition of the literature, effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 42
the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely,
this is the very complaint of the petitioner.
We make this resume.

It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge,
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
Burgos v. Chief of Staff AFP, 43 We countermanded the orders of the Regional
Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan
Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized
reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a
are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough
warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
to warrant State interference and action;
makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have
indicated, speech is speech, whether political or "obscene"

3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor’s sound
The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964
discretion.
rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. — A person charged with an
warrant prayed for;
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense. 44

5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code;
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a
lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no
party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party,
under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or
not the properties seized are indeed "obscene"

We reject outright the argument that" [t]here is no constitutional nor legal

provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable
had been no warrant," 45 and that "violation of penal law [must] be punished." statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code 47 or
46 For starters, there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be the Revised Penal code. 48
"punished." Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered
the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It appears, however, that the magazines subject of
the search and seizure have been destroyed, the Court declines to grant
affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Abdula vs. Guiani [326 SCRA 1 (2000)]
At bench is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of
arrest issued by herein respondent Japal M. Guiani, then presiding judge of
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, ordering the arrest of
petitioners without bail in Criminal Case No. 2376 for murder.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder, docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361, was
filed before the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office
XII against herein petitioners and six (6) other persons1 in connection with the
death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao.2 The complaint alleged that herein petitioners paid the six other
respondents the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul
Dimalen.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Acting on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U.
Panda, in a Resolution dated 22 August 19944 , dismissed the charges of murder
against herein petitioners and five other respondents on a finding that there was
no prima facie case for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however,
recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the
respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an information
for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of
respondent Judge.
In an Order dated 13 September 19945 , respondent Judge ordered that the
case, now docketed as Criminal Case No. 2332, be returned to the Provincial
Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, respondent judge noted that
although there were eight (8) respondents in the murder case, the information
filed with the court "charged only one (1) of the eight (8) respondents in the
name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor
arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the respondent judge reasons, the trial
court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama.
Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T.
Dimaraw for further investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during
the initial investigation of the murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses
were submitted to support the charge of murder against herein petitioners and
the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw
treated the same as a refiling of the murder charge and pursuant to law, issued
subpoena to the respondents named therein.6 On December 6, 1994, herein
petitioners submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits.
After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28
December 1994,7 found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners
and three (3) other respondents.8 He thus recommended the filing of charges
against herein petitioners Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as principals by
inducement, and against the three (3) others, as principals by direct
participation.
Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U.
Panda, who conducted the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge,
added a notation stating that he was inhibiting himself from the case and
authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the case without his
approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was previously handled by him
and that the victim was the father-in-law of his son.9cräläwvirtualibräry
On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 199410 was
filed against the petitioner spouses and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun
Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala
of respondent judge. This information was signed by investigating prosecutor
Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial
Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason for his
inhibition.11cräläwvirtualibräry
The following day, or on 3 January 1995, the respondent judge issued a
warrant12 for the arrest of petitioners. Upon learning of the issuance of the said
warrant, petitioners filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion13 for the
setting aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion,
petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in
abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that the
petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice.
A petition for review14 was filed by the petitioners with the Department of Justice
on 11 January 1995.15 Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon
petitioners pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition wherein petitioners pray for the
following:
"1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining
the implementation and execution of the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995
and enjoining the respondent judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 2376 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al. upon
such bond as may be required by the Honorable Court;
2. this petition be given due course and the respondent be required to answer;
3. after due hearing, the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 be set aside and
declared void ab initio and the respondent judge be disqualified from hearing
Criminal Case No. 2376 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D.
Abdula, et al."16cräläwvirtualibräry
In a Resolution17 dated 20 February 1995, this Court resolved to require
respondent judge to submit a comment to the petition. The Court further
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order18 enjoining the respondent judge
from implementing and executing the Order of Arrest dated 3 January 1995 and
from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 2376.
At the onset, it must be noted that petitions for certiorari and prohibition require
that there be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law available to the petitioner.19 In the instant case, it cannot
be said that petitioners have no other remedy available to them as there is
pending before the lower court an Urgent Motion20 praying for the lifting and
setting aside of the warrant of arrest. Ordinarily, we would have dismissed the
petition on this ground and let the trial court decide the pending motion.
However, due to the length of time that the issues raised in the petition have
been pending before the courts, it behooves us to decide the case on the merits
in order to preclude any further delay in the resolution of the case.
Respondent Japal M. Guiani retired from the judiciary on 16 April 1996. For this
reason, respondent is no longer the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 14 of Cotabato City; and the prayer of petitioner as to respondents
disqualification from hearing Criminal Case No. 2376 is now moot and academic.
Thus, there remain two issues left for the determination of the Court: first, the
legality of the second information for murder filed before respondents court; and
second, the validity of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioners.
With respect to the first issue, petitioners aver that it is the respondent judge
himself who is orchestrating the filing of the alleged murder charge against them.
In support, petitioners cite five (5) instances wherein respondent judge allegedly
issued illegal orders in a mandamus case pending in respondents sala filed
against petitioner Mayor Bai Unggie Abdula. These allegedly illegal orders formed
the basis for a criminal complaint which they filed on 6 October 1994 against
respondent and ten (10) others before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao.21 In this complaint, herein petitioners alleged that the respondent
judge illegally ordered the release of the total amount of P1,119,125.00 from the
municipal funds of Kabuntalan, Mindanao to a certain Bayoraiz Saripada, a
purported niece of respondent judge. The Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao, in an Order22 dated 12 December 1994, found "sufficient basis to
proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case" and directed the
respondents therein to file their respective counter-affidavits and controverting
In its Comment with Urgent Motion for the Lifting of the Temporary Restraining
evidence. From these facts, petitioners argue, it is clear that it is the respondent
Order dated 5 June 1995,26 the Office of the Solicitor-General states that
judge himself who is orchestrating and manipulating the charges against the
petitioners allegation that the respondent judge was biased and prejudiced was
petitioner.
pure speculation as no proof was presented that respondent assumed the role of
prosecutor. Moreover, the OSG argued that the fact that the respondent judge
and petitioners had pending cases against each other did not necessarily result in
Petitioners further state that respondent judge exhibited extreme hostility
the respondents bias and prejudice.
towards them after the filing of the said complaint before the Ombudsman.
Petitioners claim that immediately after the issuance of the Order of the
Ombudsman requiring respondent judge to file his counter-affidavit, respondent
An analysis of these arguments shows that these should have been properly
allegedly berated petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula in open court when she appeared
raised in a motion for the disqualification or inhibition of respondent judge. As
before him in another case Allegedly, in full view of the lawyers and litigants,
previously stated however, the issue as to whether respondent should be
respondent judge uttered the following words in the Maguindanaoan dialect:
disqualified from proceeding with the case has been rendered moot and academic
as he is no longer hearing the case against petitioners. As such, there is no need
for a prolonged discussion on this issue. It is sufficient to say that in order to
"If I cannot put you in jail within your term, I will cut my neck. As long as I am a
disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, petitioner must prove the
judge here, what I want will be followed."23cräläwvirtualibräry
same by clear and convincing evidence.27 This is a heavy burden which
petitioners have failed to discharge. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct
of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can
Respondent judge, in compliance with the Order of this Court, filed a Comment be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.28cräläwvirtualibräry
dated 3 March 1995.24 In this Comment, he argues that petitioners enumeration
of "incontrovertible facts" is actually a list of misleading facts which they are
attempting to weave into Criminal Case No. 2376 for the purpose of picturing
Petitioners next argue that the act of respondent in motu proprio ordering a
respondent as a partial judge who abused his discretion to favor petitioners
reinvestigation of the murder charge against them is another indication of the
accuser.25 He claims that the anti-graft charge filed by petitioners against him is
latters bias and prejudice.29 They claim that the filing of their complaint against
a harassment suit concocted by them when they failed to lay their hands on the
respondent motivated the latters Order of 13 September 1994 which ordered the
amount of P1,119,125.00 of municipal funds which respondent had previously
return of the records of the murder case to the provincial prosecutor.
ruled as rightfully belonging to the municipal councilors of Kabuntalan,
Furthermore, they posit that the latter had no authority to order the
Maguindanao. Respondent vehemently denies having personally profited from the
reinvestigation considering that same had already been dismissed as against
release of the municipal funds. Moreover, respondent points out that the
them by the provincial prosecutor in his Resolution dated 22 August 1994.
allegations in the complaint seem to imply that the Vice Mayor of Kabuntalan,
Bayoraiz Sarupada, was a party to the mandamus case filed with respondents
court when in truth, there was no case filed by the vice mayor pending in his
A review of the pertinent dates in the petition however show that respondent
court. Finally, respondent denies berating petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula and
could not have been motivated by the Ombudsmans complaint when he issued
uttering the words attributed to him in the petition. According to respondent, the
the 13 September 1994 Order. Petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula filed the complaint
last time petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula appeared in his sala on December 28,
before the Ombudsman of Cotabato City on October 6, 199430 or about a month
1994, in connection with the lifting of an order for her apprehension in another
after the issuance of the 13 September 1994 Order. As such, when respondent
case, he neither berated nor scolded her and in fact, he even lifted the said order
of arrest.
issued the said Order, the same could not have been a retaliatory act considering the Provincial Prosecutor as it was signed only by the investigating prosecutor,
that at that time, there was as yet no complaint against him. Anok T. Dimaraw.

With respect to the allegation that the respondent had no legal authority to order
a reinvestigation of the criminal charge considering that the said charge had been
previously dismissed as against them, we hold that respondent did not abuse his
discretion in doing so.31cräläwvirtualibräry
It is true that under the circumstances, the respondent judge, upon seeing that
there were no records attached to the complaint, could have simply ordered the
office of the provincial prosecutor to forward the same. Upon receipt of these
records, respondent judge would then have sufficient basis to determine whether
a warrant of arrest should issue. However, from the bare terms of the questioned
order alone, we fail to see any illegal reason that could have motivated the judge
in issuing the same. The order merely stated that the records of the case should
be returned to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation or
reinvestigation. He did not unduly interfere with the prosecutors duty to conduct
a preliminary investigation by ordering the latter to file an information against
any of the respondents or by choosing the fiscal who should conduct the
reinvestigation which are acts certainly beyond the power of the court to do.32 It
was still the prosecutor who had the final say as to whom to include in the
information.33cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners contention is not well-taken.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on this matter state that "(n)o
complaint or information shall be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or
chief state prosecutor (underscoring ours)." In other words, a complaint or
information can only be filed if it is approved or authorized by the provincial or
city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
In the case at bench, while the Resolution and the Information were not
approved by Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, the filing of the same even
without his approval was authorized. Both the Resolution and information contain
the following notation:*
"The herein Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting himself from this case and
Investigating Prosecutor Enok Dimaraw may dispose of the case without his
approval on the following ground:

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioners only imputed bias
That this case has been previously handled by him, and whose findings differ
against the respondent judge and not against the investigating prosecutor.34
from the findings of Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw; and the victim is a
Consequently, this imputation is of no moment as the discretion to file an
relative by affinity, he being a father-in-law of his son.
information is under the exclusive control and supervision of the prosecutor and
not of respondent judge. Furthermore, petitioners cannot claim that they were
denied due process in the reinvestigation of the charges against them as they
actively participated therein by submitting their joint counter-affidavit. (Signed) Salick U. Panda

Petitioners likewise allege that the information charging petitioners with murder is
null and void because it was filed without the authority of the Provincial
Prosecutor. They note that in the Resolution dated 28 December 1994 and in the
corresponding information, it clearly appears that the same were not approved by
Provincial Prosecutor
It must be stressed that the Rules of Court speak of authority or approval by the
provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor. The notation made by Prosecutor Panda
clearly shows that Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw was authorized to "dispose
of the case without his approval." In issuing the resolution and in filing the
information, the investigating prosecutor was acting well within the authority
granted to him by the provincial prosecutor. Thus, this resolution is sufficient
compliance with the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court.
Having thus ruled on the validity of the information filed against the respondents,
we now address the issue as to the legality of the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent judge by virtue of the said information.
On this issue, petitioners, citing the case of Allado vs. Diokno35 argue that the
warrant for his arrest should be recalled considering that the respondent judge
"did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call the complainant and his
witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts." As proof, he points to the fact
that the information was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January 2, 1995 and
the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or on January 3,
1995. Moreover, petitioner argues, respondent judge did not even issue an order
stating that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, a
clear violation of the guidelines set forth in the Allado case.
Respondent, in his Comment, denies any irregularity in the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. He argues as follows:
"Written authority having been granted by the Provincial Prosecutor, as required
by the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of (the) Rules on Criminal
Procedure, and there having been no reason for the respondent to doubt the
validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary
investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as
against those charged in the Information filed, and recognizing the prosecutions
legal authority to initiate and control criminal prosecution (Rule 110, Section 5)
and considering that the court cannot interfere in said prosecutions authority
(People vs. Moll, 68 Phil. 626), the respondent issued the warrant for the arrest
of the accused pursuant to paragraph (a), section 6, Rule
112;"36cräläwvirtualibräry
The OSG, in defending the act of respondent judge, argues that the allegation
that respondent did not personally examine the evidence is not supported by
current jurisprudence. In support, the OSG invokes the pronouncement in Soliven
vs. Makasiar37 that "(I)n satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses." Moreover, the OSG points out that the judge enjoys a wide degree of
latitude in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest depending on the circumstances of each case.38cräläwvirtualibräry
The OSG further argues that the case of Allado vs. Diokno, relied upon by
petitioners, has no application in the case at bar considering that in the cited
case, the documents submitted before the court failed to establish any probable
cause as they were conflicting and contradictory. Significantly, the OSG
continues, petitioners could not point out a single flaw in the evidence presented
by the prosecutor to negate the existence of probable cause. Finally, the OSG
points out that petitioners unfounded allegations cannot prevail over the well-
settled rule that official duty is presumed to be regularly
performed.39cräläwvirtualibräry
After a careful analysis of these arguments, we find merit in the contention of
petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
"Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." (Undersoring
supplied.)
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine
probable cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the
intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges
than that imposed under previous Constitutions.40cräläwvirtualibräry
In Soliven vs. Makasiar, this Court pronounced:
"What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fisegarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause."
Ho vs. People41 summarizes existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows:
"Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once
more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge.
Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.
The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even
if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence,
there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second , since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the
report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors
report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused
for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This
responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic
law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the
judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of
the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly , it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during
the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do
not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the
arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-
affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if
any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties
and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that
a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the investigating officer." (citations omitted)
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant
as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made
by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and
that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the
information filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely
and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists
as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of
arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendations. He
adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause as his own.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties, which in turn gives his report the presumption
of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on
the certification or report of the investigating officer.
To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
respondents examination of the records should be.42 The extent of the judges
examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances
of the case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before him two
different informations and resolutions charging two different sets of suspects. In
the face of these conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the
certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value. The circumstances thus
require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating
prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the prosecutors determination
of probable cause. The inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant
of arrest and respondents own admission are circumstances that tend to belie
any pretense of the fulfillment of this duty.
Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the
validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his
duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be
declared null and void.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 20 February 1995 in
favor of petitioners insofar as it enjoins the implementation and execution of the
order of arrest dated 3 January 1995 is made permanent. Criminal Case No. 2376
is REMANDED to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City for a
proper determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued and for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Mamaril (G.R. 147607, January 22, 2004)
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963,
finding appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 81 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The Information filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in
the municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana leaves
contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred thirty
six and eighty three hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams, each brick weighing eight
hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand eight hundred thirty
six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without
authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.2
When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty.3 At the pre-
trial conference held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following
facts:
1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the
accused where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan, on
February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in the
afternoon;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4
Faustino Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;
3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;
4. That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was
searched;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued
by the PNP Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong
Cid;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999.4
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Evidence
On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police
Station, represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied5 before the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a search warrant authorizing
the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family residence of appellant
Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan. On
said date, then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued
Search Warrant No. 99-51.6
On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen
Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police
officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented Search Warrant No.
99-51. When they arrived at appellants house, they saw appellants mother under
the house. They asked her where appellant was, and she told them that appellant
was in the house, upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming
out of the room. Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to
run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did.
SPO3 Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house
premises. They showed appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant
looked at the search warrant and did not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen
searched the house. The search was witnessed by two members of the barangay
council in said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo Ramos and Barangay
Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.7
The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri
bag ("bayong") under appellants house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass case;
(3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana
leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two
(2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found
inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures8 of the
confiscated items and prepared a receipt9 of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino
Ferrer, Jr. prepared a certification10 that the house was properly searched, which
was signed by appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.
After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles
to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer.11
The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago
and Rodolfo Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at
Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for examination. Appellant was also
brought there for a drug test.12
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San
Fernando City, La Union, testified that on February 2, 1999, she received from
the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request13 for a drug test on the
person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of the
confiscated specimens.14 After weighing the specimens and testing the same,
Police Superintendent Cid issued a report15 finding the specimens16 to be
"POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x."17
Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report18 that
the examination conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as "shabu."19
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on
March 5, 2000, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with
memorandum20 contending that: (1) the exhibits of the prosecution are
inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said
exhibits were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judges
examination of the complainant and his two witnesses was not in writing; and (2)
said search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. Appellant prayed
that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as evidence or in the
alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be deferred until
such time that he has completed the presentation of his evidence in chief. On
August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied
appellants motion.21
The Defenses Evidence
Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his
parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing
at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara, Pangasinan since
December 18, 1998. Appellant declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his
brother and the latters family who were residing with his mother at Ramos
Street, but on said day, his brother and family were not in the house since they
were at the fishpond.22
Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at
Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited
his mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of
February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents house, about
seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The policemen asked
appellant to go upstairs and they immediately handcuffed him and brought him to
the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony until the search was finished
after more than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr.
Felix and a medical examination was conducted on him. Then he was brought to
the municipal hall.23
Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and
white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the
search when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw
the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in court.
He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly
searched was his.24
Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he
was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he
gave his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the confiscated items were only
planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in Lingayen.
However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his parents house did not
threaten or harm him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with SPO3
Alfredo Rico.25
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, was requested to testify on the available records regarding Search
Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to identify said documents. Atty.
Castillo testified that he only had with him the application for search warrant, the
supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez and the
return of the search warrant.26
Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the
person supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and
answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the
application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was
then a legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.
However, during the trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United
States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he asked Mrs. Liberata Aristons
daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript,
but it has not been found. Atty. Enrico testified that based on the records, there
is no stenographic notes. He added that they tried their best to locate the subject
transcript, but they could not find it.27
The Trial Courts Decision
On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and
penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this Court in the absence of
any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited
in full in service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.28
The Appeal
Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING
THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY
INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED
PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO (EXHS.
"J" AND "I") SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.29
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51
was illegally issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the
required searching questions and answers were made anent the application for
said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court Enrico O.
Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no transcript of
stenographic notes of the proceedings in connection with the application for said
search warrant. Appellant thus asserts that it cannot be said that the judge made
searching questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses, which is in
violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
Appellants contention is meritorious.
 must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination
must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article
form of searching questions and answers.31
III, Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen,

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
Pangasinan, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
office regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
application for search warrant32 and the supporting affidavits33 of PO3 Alberto
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as
persons or things to be seized.
required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:

Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of

xxx-xxx-xxx
Court, thus:

Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application covered by
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
54?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the Philippines.

A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
Ariston about said transcript?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
together with the affidavits submitted.

A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
she told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.30 Q But until now there is no transcript yet?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge
A Yes, sir.
Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records
of this case together with the application for search warrant as well as the
supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no records available to
have it with you and there is no proof with you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room
which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are
having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.
Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate
said transcript, Mr. Witness?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said
transcript.
Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic
notes?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.
Q That is by a machine steno?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are
using the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)
?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the
transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-54.
34 (Underscoring ours)
Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution
failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his
examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the
existence of an application35 for a search warrant and the affidavits36 of the
complainants witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,37 we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing
judge examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the
applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is
so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos
examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was
put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the
complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together
with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the
Solicitor General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the
time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because
of the confused state of the records in the latters branch when he assumed office.
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his
458).
right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it,
and even admitted during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor
maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence.
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen
showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected40 on constitutional grounds
We disagree. The cases38 cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless
to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the
search. In this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to
trial of the case,41 after the prosecution formally offered its evidence.42 Under
appellant before his residence was searched. At that time, appellant could not
the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from
determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was
his conduct before or during the trial.
only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason
to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a
motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
offered by the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,39 we ruled:
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.43 In Mata v. Bayona,44 we ruled:

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by
the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion
Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object
to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the
case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra) :ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
xxx-xxx-xxx
.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the
legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance
or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.

"x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181). "
Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it.
We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not
complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence
seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against
appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2), 45 Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to
exclude the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to
sustain the conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment
is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the
search and seizure made at appellants residence illegal. For lack of evidence to
establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL
is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is
being held for some other legal grounds.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without
delay this Decision and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial
court is hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Examination of witnesses
Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin [65 Phil 68 (1938)]
This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search
warrant and two orders of the respondent judge, and the restoration of certain
documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usuary
Board.
It appears that on November 10, 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-
Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search
warrant(Exhibit B) commanding any officer of the law to search the person,
house or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The
search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he
has and there (is) just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that
Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating
to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases
made and provided." On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of the
petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the
petitioner's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the
petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several
Papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by
him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable
length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to
the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, six separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of
the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, the petitioner, through
counsel, demanded from the respondent Anti-Usury Board the return of the
documents seized. On January 7. and, by motion, on June 4, 1937, the legality of
the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal
cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of October
5, 1937, the respondent Judge of First Instance denied the petitioner's motion of
June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a
waiver on the part of the petitioner. "En el caso presente," declared the
respondent judge, "teniendo en cuenta que la acusada Por si o por medio de su
representante, no presento protests alguna contra el registro de autos, at
verificarse el mismo, o despues de un tiempo rezonable, el juzgado declare que
la citada con su silencio y conducta, ha renunciado implicitanmente a su derecho
a no ser sometido a un registro irrazonable, por lo que no le es pemitido quejarse
despues, puesto que cualquier defecto queha adolecido lo expedicion de la orden
de registro y su ejecucion, ha quidado implilcitamente subsanado." A motion for
reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of January 3, 1938.
Petitioner registered her exception. The resolution of October 5, 1937 and the
order of January 3, 1938 are sought, together with the search warrant, Exhibit B,
to be nullified in these proceedings.
Paragraph 3, section 1 of the bill of right of our Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and
for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2)
the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure (G. O. No.
58), particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search
warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same
to the corresponding court (secs. 102-104). On more than one occasion, since
the approval of the Constitution, we had emphasized the necessity of adherence
to the constitutional requirements on this subject (Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; People vs.
Sy Juco [1937], G.R. No. 41957; Rodriguez vs. Villamiel [1937], G.R. No. 44328;
and Molo vs. Yatco [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1935) and we do not deem it necessary
to reiterate what has been said or observed in these cases.
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the
judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true
the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not
appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting
the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the
assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of
the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the
warrant, as required by law. (See, secs. 95 and 104, G. O. No. 58.) instead, they
were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building
up cases against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was
issued there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the
warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The
lower court is, therefore, correct in reaching the conclusion that the search
warrant (Exhibit B) was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac.
The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the
circumstances of the present case, there has been a waiver by the petitioner of
her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures. While
the Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the search
warrant was illegally issued, he maintains "(1) that the petitioner had waived her
constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and seizure, and (2) that
the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an
unreasonable length of time after the date of seizure." Doubtless, the
constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. (People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 34 Off. Gaz., pp. 2163,
2164; 56 C.J., pp. 1178, 1179; Cf. Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, supra.) The waiver
may be either express or implied (67 C.J., p. 304). No express waiver has been
made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by
implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it
must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (67 C. J.,
299.) It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search
when it was made. She could not have objected because she was sick and was
not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. (56 C.
J., p. 1183.) Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some
of her papers and documents. But this was precisely the reason why she sent her
attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to demand the return of the
documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her
bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute
an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a
submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol., I, p. 630.) As
the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181.)
As a general proposition, it may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a
failure to object within a reasonable time to a search and seizure illegally made.
It must be observed, however, that the petitioner, on several occasions, and prior
to the filing of criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally, through
counsel, the return by the Anti-Usuary Board of the properties seized. This is
admitted by Adolfo N. Feliciano, acting chief of the board, who said that the
demand was refused simply because no habiamos terminado con nuestra
investigacion. (T.s.n., pp. 24-25.) On July 7, 1936, counsel for the petitioner
wrote a letter to the Anti-Usuary Board demanding again the return of the
documents withheld. And in connection with the criminal cases pending against
the petitioner, similar demands were made on January 7, 1937 and on June 4,
1937. In the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did not
waive her constitutional right. The delay in making demand for the return of the
documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication.
In view of the foregoing, the writ prayed for is granted. The search warrant,
Exhibit B, is hereby declared void and of no effect; the orders of October 5, 1937
and January 3, 1938 of the respondent judge are set aside; and the respondents
Anti-Usuary Board and the provincial fiscal of Tarlac or those acting in their
behalf, are hereby ordered to return and restore to the petitioner all the
properties, documents, papers and effects illegally seized from her, within forty-
eight (48) hours from the time this decision becomes final. Without costs. So
ordered.
Yee Sue Kuy vs. Almeda [70 Phil. 141, (1940)]
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-
Usury Board, dated May 5, 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental
Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special
agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant
commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises
occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the
person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists,
receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection
with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of
law, or such as may be found, and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid
justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, May 5, 1938, at 10:30 a. m.
search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose the Philippine Army,
who seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks,
journal book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in
the inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to owner of the documents,
papers and articles seized Immediately after the search and seizure thus
effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay
together with a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to
retain possession of the article seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of
Act 4109, which request was granted. The first unsuccessfully effort exerted by
Sam Sing & Co. with a view to recovering the articles seized, was when their
attorney, Godofredo P. Escalona, under date of March 4, 1939, addressed a letter
to the Executive Officer of the Anti-Usury requesting the return of said articles,
on ground that the search warrant and seizure of May 5, 1938 were illegal, only
to receive the reply the request "cannot be complied with until after have served
the purpose for which they were seized" and that "the return of the papers must
be with the consent and knowledge of the court which issued the search
warrant." Thereafter, under date of March 11, 1939, the same attorney filed a
motion with the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros praying that the
search warrant issued on May 5, 1938 by the justice of the peace of Sagay and
the seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and that the
articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was
denied in the order dated July 24, 1939. A similar motion was presented to the
justice of the peace of Sagay on October 27, 1939 but was denied the next day,
October 28, 1939, Meanwhile, an information dated September 30, 1939 had
been filed in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock
alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a
violation of Act No. 2655, the case being docketed as No. 11591. Before this
criminal case could be tried, the present petition was filed in this court on
November 6, 1939, in which the petitioners pray that the search warrant of May
2, 1938 and the seizure of May 5, 1938 of the articles described in annex "D" of
the petition be declared illegal and set aside; that the respondents Mariano G.
Almeda and Jose S. Estrada, as agent of the Anti-Usury Board, the ordered and
directed to return to the petitioners the articles listed in said annex "D" of the
petition; that pending these proceedings the provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros
be commanded to refrain from using said articles as evidence in criminal case No.
11591 which was set for trial; on November 13, 1939; that the respondent Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, in case all or more of the
articles in question should be introduced as evidence for the prosecution in
criminal case No. 11591, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Yee Fock (alias
Yee Sue Koy), Y. Tip and A. Sing," be likewise commanded to refrain from
admitting the same.
The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant issued
on May 2, 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure
accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued three days
ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the respondent Jose
Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant,
and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory
provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of
97 of General Orders No. 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by
means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them evidence in the criminal
case against the petitioners, is unconstitutional because the warrant thereby
becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves..
In their answers the respondents deny that the articles in question were seized
by the Anti-Usury Board to provide itself with evidence in the criminal prosecution
against the petitioners, and allege that the seizure of said articles was an incident
of the Government's duty of apprehending violations of the Usury Law, in
connection with which the agents of the Anti-Usury Board are authorized, under
section 4 of Act No. 4109 in relation to Act No. 4168, to examine the documents,
papers and articles seized from the petitioners; that the search warrant complied
of is valid and legal; that, granting the existence of any irregularity in the
issuance of said warrant, the same has been waived the return of the articles in
question because the same constitute of corpus delicti or are pertinent or
relevant thereto.
The petitioners contend that the search warrant herein complained of is illegal
because it was issued three days before the application therefor and the
supporting affidavit were signed by Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada
respectively. This contention finds no support in the record before us. In the
letter of March 4, 1939, written by the attorney for Sam Sing &. Co. to the
Executive Officer of the Anti-Usury Board, requesting the return of the articles
seized, reference was made to the search warrant and seizure "of May 5, 1938."
(Annex F of the petition) In the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros,
praying for the return of the aforesaid articles, the search warrant was again
referred to as having been issued on "May 5, 1938." (Annex H of the petition.) It
follows, therefore, that there is truth in the allegation of the respondents that
although the original order on which the warrant was issued was prepared on
May 2, 1938, when the justice of the peace signed the order for search warrant,
he placed the date "May 5, 1938."
The criticism of the petitioners that the search warrant in question was not issued
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by section 1, paragraph, 3, of
Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders No. 58, is
unfounded. On the contrary, we are satisfied that strict observance of such
formalities was followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application,
swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam
Sing & Co. is lending money without license, charging usurious rate of interest
and is keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and premises occupied by it
situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts,
promissory notes, and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used
by it in connection with its activities lending money rate interest in violation of
the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the
justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing & Co. was
lending money without license and charging usurious rate of interest, because he
personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from said Sam Sing &
Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew that the said Sam
Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and records containing its
transactions relative to its activities as money lender and the entries of the
interest paid by its debtors, because he saw that said Sam Sing & Co. make
entries and records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano
G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge, their
affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if
the facts would turn out to be not as they were stated under oath. (Alvarez vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, et al., 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; People vs. Sy Juco,
37 Off. Gaz., 508; Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, 37 Off. Gaz., 2406.) That the
existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the peace of
Sagay before issuing the search warrant complained of, is shown by the following
statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the
complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the
witness he presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and probable
cause to believe as it does believe, that the above described articles, relating to
the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of
interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premise
occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law." The description of the
articles seized, given in the search warrant, is likewise sufficient. Where, by the
nature of the goods seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas et al., 35 Off.
Gaz., 1183, citing People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384; and People vs. Kahn, 256, Ill.
App., 415.) Neither can there objection to the fact the objects seized from the
petitioners were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being
turned over to the justice of the peace of Sagay, for the reason that the custody
of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention having
been approved by the latter. (Molo vs. Yatco et al., 35 Off. Gaz., 1335.) .
But it is further contended that the articles seizes should be ordered returned to
the petitioners because the seizure is unconstitutional, having been made for the
purpose of using the articles as evidence in the criminal case against the
petitioners. While we reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and documents
by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person whose possession they were found, is
unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent
to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself (Rodriguez et al. vs. Villamiel et al., 37 Off.
Gaz., 2416, citing Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, 42 Phil., 886; Alvarez vs. Court of
First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; Brady vs. U.
S., 266 U.S. 620; Temparani vs. U. S., 299 Fed. 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed.
679; Boyd vs. U. S. 116 U. S. 616; Carroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S. 132), the said rule
has no applicable force in the present case. While in the cases of Rodriguez et al.
vs. Villamiel et al., supra , and Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
supra , it appeared that the documents therein involved were in fact seized for
the purpose of discovering evidence to be used against the persons from whom
they were seized, in the case at bar this fact is not clear and is furthermore
denied. In the application for the issuance of the search warrant in question, it
was alleged that the articles seized were "being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law," and it is now suggested (memoranda for
respondents) that the only object of the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in
keeping the articles is to prevent the petitioners from em plying them as a means
of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state of the record, without deciding
the question whether the petitioners will in fact use the articles in question, if
returned, for illegal purposes, we are not prepared to order the return prayed for
by the petitioners. (Cf. People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384, 394-395.) If it be` true,
furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as alleged by the
respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus delicti of the violation
of the Usury Law, their return to the petitioners cannot be ordered. (People vs.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas et al., G. R. No. 46361,
resolution of February 14, 1939, citing 56 C. J. 1166, 1250 and 1251; Uy Kheytin
vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384; People vs. Malasugui,
34 Off. Gaz., 2163, 2165.)
The petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Alvarez vs. CFI [64 Phil. 33 (1937)]
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any
time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and papers
belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well
as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to
retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the
articles in question be returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David
then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging
that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of
the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements
upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the judge, on said date,
issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the
books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several
agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at
seven o’clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the
following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one
ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four
check stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs,
forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of
lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra,
two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez,
fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan
contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and
stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The
search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the
petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been
brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner,
through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent
Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the
seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared
guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the
court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized
within twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a
period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt of court. On June 10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing
the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said
month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the
articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation. The
attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that,
notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury
Board had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a search
warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his
custody and deposit them in the clerk’s office, and that the officials of the Anti-
Usury Board be punished for contempt o court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed
an ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited
some documents and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far
failed to file an inventory duly verified by oath of all the documents seized by
him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit presented in support
thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed
that said agent be directed to file the documents in question immediately. On the
25th of said month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco
forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with
the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath
of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the petitioner
filed another petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and that
it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in
connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order
be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the
agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges
be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the court
issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently,
should not be cancelled, and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any
contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of
the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible
period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles
seized appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the
petitioner. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of
Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles
seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the
violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the
opposition of the attorney for the petitioner, the court, on September 25th,
issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the time needed by it to
examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be retained,
granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month
the assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be
granted ten (10) days to comply with the order of September 25th and that the
clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents and papers together
with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order of October 2d of said year,
granted him the additional period of ten (10) days and ordered the clerk of court
to send him a copy of the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed
another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to examine the
documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the
inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 , 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of sixty (60) days. In
an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days to
investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not
denied by the respondents, that these nineteen (19) documents continue in the
possession of the court, the rest having been returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it
before the court (section 95, General Orders, No. 58, as amended by section 6 of
Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the
inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed., 241;
Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Boyd v. U. S., 29
Law. ed., 746; Carroll v. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search
and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights
is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional
guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor
of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation
of, the rights secured by them (State v. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State v.
McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it
is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search
warrants must be strictly construed (Rose v. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard
v. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry v. U. S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer v. State, 118
So., 613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal
because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in
whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which
were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had
knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable. To the question "What are your reasons for applying for this
search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being
kept in said premises, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a money- lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting the truth of his
statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent stated that he found them to
be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of
rights, provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of
General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for
probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that
both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party
signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully;
and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it
that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary; State v. Jackson, 137 N. W.,
1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S. ], 7; Pumphrey v. State, 122 N. W., 19;
Priest v. State, 6 N. W., 468; State v. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood v. State, 111
So., 865). The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause (U. S. v. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. v. Michalski, 265 Fed., 839; U. S. v.
Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. v. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused (State v. Roosevelt County 20th Jud.
Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State v. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Unreasonable
searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guaranties
afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined
in the Constitution or in General Orders, No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed,
absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in
general language. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful
ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U. S., 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru v. U. S., 4 Fed.,
[2d], 881; U. S. v. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Agnello v. U. S., 70 Law. ed., 145;
Lambert v. U. S., 282 Fed., 413; U. S. v. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason v.
Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that
the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and
do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be
declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside
from that made by the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search
warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the
applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessarily by him. Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must,
before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the practice
in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant
to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in
this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither
the Constitution nor General Orders, No. 58 provides that it is of imperative
necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of
both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with
that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude,
therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on
the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of
the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its
execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the
search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavit that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have
declared the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it
illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the
search could not legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that
the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the
books and documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit
to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable
cause exists and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular
description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch v. U.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now
S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. v. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. v. Carlson, 292
question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to
Fed., 463; U. S. v. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co.,
the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing
253 Fed., 605; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People v. Kahn, 256 Ill. App.,
a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of
415); but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there
be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this
was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the
would mean that no warrant could issue (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People v.
offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it referred
Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented
not to the search warrant and the incidents thereof but to the institution of
to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books,
criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti- Usury Law. The waiver would have
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented
his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of
to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case
the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is
because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been
writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal
provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby
placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did. Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner
does not lie because he can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are
the subject matter of his petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain, speedy
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion,
search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order
however, that an appeal from said orders would not in this case be a plain,
that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in
speedy and adequate remedy for the petitioner because a long time would have
the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the
to elapse before he recovers possession of the documents and before the rights,
Anti-Usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the
of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo v.
court, it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to
Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc v. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz
enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some
Herrera de Lukban v. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641; Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases
that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of
a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify
against himself (Uy Kheytin v. Villareal , 42 Phil., 886; Brady v. U. S., 266 U. S., 1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to
620; Temperani v. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. v. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd v. search and seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the
U. S., 116 U. S., 616; Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing individual in order to maintain the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full
that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose force;
of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law, which it is attempted to institute
against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the
documents should be returned to him.
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and
fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the
personal property of the individual, they should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a)
Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who
had no personal knowledge of the facts necessary to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the
sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal
proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the
Anti- Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear
positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner
and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to
corroborate the applicant or complainant in cases where the latter has personal
knowledge of the facts, when the applicant’s or complainant’s knowledge of the
facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other
witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists;
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the
articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles to be
seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;
7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of
compromise or settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he
voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure; and
8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him,
would not be an effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, and, consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him lies.
For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3,
1936, and the orders of the respondent court authorizing the retention of the
books and documents, are declared illegal and are set aside, and it is ordered
that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the
immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents designated on
pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Mata vs. Bayona [128 SCRA 388 (1984)]
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed)
is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
was based merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of
private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to
before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly
a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers
pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case
No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao
tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere
from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge
replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal
who attached them to the records.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for
the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent
Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II
INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact
that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to
the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does
not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. 2
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied,
he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated
under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.
We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to
be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which
provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has
become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he
examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned
search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they
were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of
the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his
motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he
was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the
Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the
back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit
obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of
respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge’s
own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants,
that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done
so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such
that, according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear
and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the
warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the
records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore
quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal
gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer
who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in
order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it
more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and
publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a
broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more
technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written
testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of
the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a
witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner,
examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross
interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must
depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the
answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific
offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath
may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far
more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary
but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be
under oath and must be in writing.cralawnad
The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but
the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been
said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance
or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government." 6
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the
search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of
which is prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979
denying the motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21,
1979 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search
warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the
things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao"
issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with
rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by
petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Particularity of description
Olaes vs. People [155 SCRA 486 (1987)]
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
petitioners challenge the admission by the respondent judge of evidence seized
by virtue of an allegedly invalid March warrant and of an extrajudicial confession
taken from them without according them the right to assistance of counsel. 1
They seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (which we have suspended) 2 and ask that
they be acquitted with the setting aside of the questioned orders.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, suggests that the petition should be
dismissed as it is not alleged therein that the respondent judge has committed
grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He adds
that if any reversible error has been committed, it may be corrected not in this
petition but in an ordinary appeal, which may not even be necessary if the
petitioners are exonerated. 3
The petitioners, in their Reply, do not meet these arguments head-on, thus
impliedly admitting the formal defect in their petition, but subject that
technicalities should yield to substantial questions in the interest of justice and to
avoid unnecessarilyor protracted litigation. Their contention is that since there
are important constitutional issues involved, these questions should disposition of
their case 4 be decided in this petition instead of having them debated and
resolved first in the lower court in acconce with the usual procedure, to the
prejudice of the speedy
We are not usually persuaded by this kind of argument, since procedural rules
are intended precisely to insure an orderly administration of justice. Rights are
best established in accordance with the procedure laid down by the adjective law,
which is as binding on the parties as the substantive law since they are supposed
to complement each other. The Solicitor General is obviously correct in faulting
the petition and in contending that, besides being defective, it is not the proper
remedy at this time. There is no disputing this stand.
Worthy of note in this connection is The separate opinion of the present Chief
Justice in Joseph v. Vilialuz, 5 where he declared that:
. . . the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not overrule in a special civil
action the trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for failure
or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence since it cannot review in such
special civil action the prosution's evidence and decide here and now in advance
that it has or has not established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
petitioners-accused. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for
the accused to present their evidence after which the trial court will on the basis
of the evidence presented before it by both the prosecution and the defense
render its judgment of conviction or acquittal. If the verdict be one of acquittal,
the case ends there. If it be a verdict of conviction, then appeal is the proper
remedy - and such appeal in order to have a review of the trial court's findings of
fact hes within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
We reiterate the rule here.
Even so, the Court has decided, without detracting from the validity of the above-
cited observations., to deviate from the established procedure on this matter and
to categorically resolve the issues presented iii the case before us. The
challenged orders are, indeed, interlocutory. Nevertheless, a restatement of the
principles governing such issues wilt it is expected, simplify the proceedings in
the court. below and speed up the disposition of the criminal case against the
petitioners.
The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the respondent judge is
unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they are
supposed to have committed. There is, therefore, according to them, no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in
conformity with the Bill of Rights. In support of this argument, they cite Stonehill
v. Diokno, 6 where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search warrants
issued therein for being based on the general allegation that the petitioners had
committed violations of "Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code." He declared:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal law.
We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant case and find it does
not come under the structures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there
was a bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification of the
particular sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the
hundreds of prohibitions contained in such modifications. There is no similar
ambiguity in the instant case.
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in
connection with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Acts of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause
to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of No. 628 Comia St.,
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of
the offense stated above." 7 Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs
Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search
warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of
the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."
The petitioners also fault the admission of the extrajudicial confessions which
they had given without the assistance or advice of counsel and cite Section 20 of
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution providing that "any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
In the separate sworn statements taken from Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz on
September 24, 1982, 8 it appears that both petitioners were, before being
examined, specifically informed of their right to the assistance of counsel, which
would be provided them by the investigating office at their request. Asked if they
understood, they said "Opo" and affixed their signatures opposite their answer.
This was followed by a statement entitled "Pagpapatunay" or Verification in which
they said inter alia that they did not need the assistance of counsel ("Hindi ko na
kailangan and tulong ng isang manananggol.") which they also signed. It was
only after these preliminary precautions had been taken that the interrogation
began and was recorded in the sworn statement later introduced against them at
their trial. There is no claim that any force, violence, intimidation or threat or any
means vitiating the free wig was employed against them. Their only objection to
the extrajudicial confessions is that they were obtained without the assistance of
counsel. They do not aver in their petition that they were not apprised of their
right to counsel or that they were denied the assistance of counsel when they
asked for it, or, indeed, that they had asked for it.
Even so, their investigation did not conform to the requirements laid down in
People v. Galit, 9 where we declared:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any, He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplislied. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of coursel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
These requirements were made even stricter under Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, providing as follows:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferally of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Applying the above rules, we reach the conclusion that the extrajudicial
confessions should be declared inadmissible as evidence against the herein
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. The extrajudicial confessions are
excluded but the articles seized under the challenged search warrant may be
admitted in evidence. Our temporary restraining order of May 25, 1987, is lifted.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit [180 SCRA 69 (1989)]
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other
rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and
therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the

Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by
respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
an application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus
Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows: In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of
Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before respondent
Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter alia, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant for a Search Warrant?
possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which
the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises
of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit: A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action Division, Western
Police District.

a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor
and other rooms at the ground floor; Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines at
Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
 ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms
are not students who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our surveillance and
ammunition.
observation during the past few days.

On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No.
Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said premises is kept the
87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
following properties subject of the offense of violation of PD No. 1866 or intended
to be used as a means of committing an offense:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath

applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES that
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO
PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are
b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols; subject of the above offense or intended to be used as the means of committing
the said offense.

c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with ammunitions?

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day
or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more
A: Yes sir. particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the
ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr.
Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and
Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons who has or have control forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
of the above-described premises?

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;

A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines.
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the offense of violation of
Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used as the means of committing an c. explosives and hand grenades; and
offense?

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days, we
gathered information from verified sources that the holder of said firearms and
explosives as well as ammunitions aren't licensed to possess said firearms and
and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as
the law directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of
the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the
wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live
fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified
by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand grenade
(live); (b) one (11) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1)
pc.—PRB—423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed
that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal
knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search
warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching
questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the
reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it
failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in
violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was
urgent. 5
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal
Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7
to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the
petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has
decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.12 The probable
cause must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 15 This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it
was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay
evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has
verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting
deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources"
that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess
them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge
of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from
other sources or persons.
 In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying
for a search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises books,
Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record
his activities as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in
to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information
violation of law." The Court held that this was insufficient for the purpose of
acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be
issuing a search warrant.
a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions
and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there
had been a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in
said premises were "fraudulent books, correspondence and records," this was
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only
likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on
Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin
hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had
Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition
conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises
were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the
and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that
Alvarez case:
the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess
them.

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
supporting deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not—

Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a
required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits
search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be
of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
produce and attach them to the record."
applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was
too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his
searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were
deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so
leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs.
much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing
NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant,
and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes
post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols,
assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant,
the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades
were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of
the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the
purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against
unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there
were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place
intended .22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search
warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr.
Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor.
The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and
second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that
it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in
connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent
judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular
provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866
punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific offense
had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a
legal hearsay of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal
Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned:
"For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said
decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified
by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent
Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words,
the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as
to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of
firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life
and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be
subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D.
No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge: 24
The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of PD 1866
can only mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so much so that
the second and third are forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms
under Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and
prosecution arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession
of firearms, ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.'
The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize
the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant
for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of
explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the
above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by
the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
Describably, the servers did not search for articles other than firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is
deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and
enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the
applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search
warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned
warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August
1987, which reads:
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court
having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant
shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that
the issuance is urgent.
it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for
a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an
otherwise valid search warrant.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
questioned orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search
Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y.
Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of
petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Chia vs. Coll. Of Customs [177 SCRA 755 (1989)]
This petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction seeks: (1) to
nullify the warrants of seizure and detention issued and signed by the Collector of
Customs; and (2) to recover the confiscated goods seized under these general
warrants, as well as damages.
Acting on a verified report of a confidential informant that assorted electronic and
electrical equipment and other articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a
syndicate engaged in unlawful "shipside" activities (foreign goods are unloaded
from foreign ships in transit through Philippine waters into motorized bancas and
landed on Philippine soil without passing through the Bureau of Customs, thereby
evading payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes thereon) were
found inside "Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Philippines)" stores
located at 690 and 691 Gonzalo Puyat corner Evangelista Street, Quiapo, Manila,
a letter- request dated April 23, 1976 was addressed to the Collector of Customs
by the Deputy Director of the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center, Manila Bay
Area (RASAC-MBA) for the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention. After
evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Seizure and Detention
Nos: 14925 and 14925-A, directing the Anti-Smuggling Action Center to seize the
goods mentioned therein, which read as follows:
Republic of the Philippines,
_ versus -
Various electronic equipments like cassette tape recorders,
car stereos, phonograph needles (diamond),
portable TV sets, imported long playing records,
spare parts of TVs and radios and other electrical appliances.
TOM'S ELECTRONICS
Claimant Seizure Identification No. 14925-A
SONY MERCHANDISING (PHIL.)
Claimant Seizure Identification No. 14925
To: The Director or his duly-authorized representative ASAC Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City
GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, the above-described articles are liable for forfeiture for having been
imported in violation of Section 2536 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended
in relation to Section 2530 (m)-l of the same Code;
WHEREAS, the said articles are at present in the custody of Tom's
Electronics/Sony Merchandising (Phil.);
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law and in compliance
with Finance Department Order No. 96-67 as published in Customs Memorandum
Circular No. 133-67 dated July 25, 1967, you are hereby ordered to forthwith
seize the aforementioned articles and turn them over to the custody of the
Auction and Cargo Disposal Division of this Bureau. (Annexes A & A-1, pp. 10-11,
Rollo.)
A RASAC team was formed and given a mission order to enforce the warrants,
which it implemented with the assistance of: (1) the National Customs Police
(augmenting the team with two members), (2) the Detective Bureau of the
Manila Western Police District Headquarters (with three detectives), as well as,
(3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western Police District which exercised jurisdictional
control over the place to be raided. The intended raid was entered in the
respective police blotters of the police detective bureaus.
On the strength of the warrants of seizure and detention, the raid was conducted
in the afternoon of April 25,1976 at the two stores of the petitioner. ASAC team
leader Gener Sula, together with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo Manuel, Rodolfo
Molina and Servillano Florentin of Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, assisted by two
customs policemen, Val Martinez and Renato Sorima, and Manila policemen
Rogelio Vinas and John Peralta, recovered from the stores, assorted electronic
equipment and other articles, listed in Annex B of the petition, the customs duties
on which allegedly had not been paid (p. 12, Rollo). They were turned over to the
Customs Auction ana Cargo Disposal Unit of the Bureau of Customs.
On May 17, 1976, in the afternoon, the hearing officer of Acting Collector of
Customs Alfredo Francisco conducted a hearing on the confiscation of the goods
taken by Gener Sula and his agents.
Two days later, petitioner Tomas Chia filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to enjoin the Collector of Customs and/or his agents from further
proceeding with the forfeiture healing and prayed that the search warrants be
declared null and void, that the respondents be ordered to return the confiscated
articles to the petitioner, and to pay damages. Upon filing a Pl,000-bond, the
SEC. 2536. SEIZURES OF OTHER ARTICLES-The Commissioner of Customs and
Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the forfeiture proceedings.
Collector of Customs and/or any other customs officer, with the prior
authorization in writing by the Commissioner, may demand evidence of payment
of duties and taxes on foreign articles openly offered for sale or kept in storage,
The pivotal issue raised in the petition is whether the warrants of seizure and
and if no such evidence can be produced, such articles may be seized and
detention (or Seizure Identifications Nos.14925 and 14925-A) are general
subjected to forfeiture proceedings: Provided, however, that during such
warrants issued in violation of Rule 126, Section 3, of the Rules of Court which
proceedings the person or entity from whom such articles have been seized shall
provides that:
be given the opportunity to prove or show the source of such articles and the
payment of duties and taxes thereon.

A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
The petition is devoid of merit.
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one
Not only may goods be seized without a search and seizure warrant under
specific offense.
Section 2536 of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the goods) are openly
offered for sale or kept in storage in a store as in this case, but the fact is that
petitioner's stores — Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Phil.)" — were
and under Section 3 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution which provided
searched upon warrants of search and detention issued by the Collector of
that:
Customs, who, under the 1973 Constitution, was "a responsible officer authorized
by law" to issue them. Sections 2208 and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code
provide when a search may be made without a warrant and when a warrant is
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects necessary:
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or such other
SEC. 2208. RIGHT OF POLICE OFFICER TO ENTER INCLOSURE — For the more
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
effective discharge of his official duties, any person exercising the powers herein
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
conferred, may at any time enter, pass through or search any land or inclosure or
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
any warehouse, store or other building, not being a dwelling house.
seized (Emphasis supplied.)

A warehouse, store or other building or inclosure used for the keeping or storage
On the other hand, the respondents contend that the goods seized from
of articles does not become a dwelling house within the meaning hereof merely
petitioner's stores by the RASAC-MBA team were only those subject to customs
by reason of the fact that a person employed as watchman lives in the place, nor
duties and taxes but which were not supported by any evidence of payment of
will the fact that his family stays there with him alter the case.
those duties and taxes. Those goods are subject to forfeiture for having been
imported in violation of Section 2536 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, in relation to Section 2530 (m)-l, which provides:
SEC. 2209.- SEARCH OF A DWELLING HOUSE. — A dwelling house may be 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA [164 SCRA 655 (1988)]
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a Judge of the court or such
The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against
other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon sworn application
illegal searches and seizures to raids conducted in connection with the
showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and
government's anti-film piracy campaign. The main issue hinges on whether or not
the person or thing to be seized.
the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the
application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the complaint
filed by the petitioner.
The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general
warrants, as erroneously alleged by the petitioner for they identified the stores to
be searched, described the articles to be seized and specified the provision of the
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film
Tariff and Customs Code violated.
Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI)
assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's
anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain
Upon effecting the seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired
videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and
exclusive jurisdiction not only over the case but also over the goods seized for
renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant
the purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs laws.
violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property).

A party dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector may appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision is appealable to the Court of Tax
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation
Appeals in the manner and within the period prescribed by law and regulations.
of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court
applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private
for review (Secs. 2309-2316; 2401 & 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial
Collector of Customs vs. Torres, et al., 45 SCRA 272).
Court of Makati, Branch 132.

Since petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, his recourse to this
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.
Court is premature (Acting Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila vs. Caluag,
20 SCRA 204; Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377; National Development Co.
vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520). If for no other reason, the petition is dismissible on
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents,
that score.
raided the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of
the items seized was made and left with the private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction which

we issued on May 28, 1976 is hereby lifted and set aside. Costs against
Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by
petitioner.
the private respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8, 1985,
lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024;
issued against Eduardo M. Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro
Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued against Raul M. Sagullo of South Video Bug
Center, Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres. Avenue BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro
Manila; and SW No. 85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix Video
Services of San Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, be lifted.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three search warrants which
could not be a basis of any criminal prosecution, now in the possession of the
National Bureau of Investigation which under the law must be delivered to this
Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to be returned to their
owners through their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or
representatives, against proper receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record
purposes, as proof that said properties have been returned to the possession of
the rightful owners." (p. 34, Rollo)
The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in its
order dated January 2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The petition was
dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context of
the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3,
Article IV, 1973 Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search
warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance.
According to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this conclusion on the basis
of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses which were taken through
searching questions and answers by the lower court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially reproduces
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches and seizures
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have
explained in the case of People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United
States, 385 US 293 119661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative
to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but
likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.
Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life.
(Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United
States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work
(Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize
constitutional right as the embodiment of a "spiritual concept: the belief that to
value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and
that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need,
and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."(ibid, p. 74).
The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers and
effects is circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and
seizures provision of the Constitution.
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800), we defined
probable cause for a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision also demands "no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to convince the
judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of a probable cause. (Alvarez v. Court of First Instance,
64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, supra).
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants
against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for
the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations
of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a
particular film have been committed. Thus the lower court stated in its
questioned order dated January 2,1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the
application for the three search warrants testified of their own personal
knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or
representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video
cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the
alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated
without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has
knowledge of that fact.
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated
tapes was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox,
because, according to him, it is of his personal knowledge.
At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino
Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI,
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the
master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth
of that bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. "
Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of
criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is
required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that
probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time- honored
precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws
should be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in
favor of the alleged offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been
enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed
by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the
respondents' establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by
competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey
debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of
respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape mentioned in the search
warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C
of Opposition p. 152 record). So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to the
Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents,
there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the
film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from
master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

xxx xxx xxx
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the
absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As
found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the
alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the
issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the
confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken
from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not
give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of
the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial
similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with
the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether
the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought to
be seized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted
the three questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the
xxx xxx xxx
petitioner's allegation that the lower court based its January 2, 1986 order only
"on the fact that the original or master copies of the copyrighted films were not
presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading it to conclude
that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p. 17, Rollo) c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease distribution of the above-mentioned
video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
described." (p. 26, Rollo)
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at
the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause
exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
l] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all document/communications, letters and
facsimile of prints related to "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong
Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476,13 L ed 2nd 431), the search warrant
which authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In
like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of
SDC 13-3703 or otherwise' have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be
used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute
dealing with the crime of conspiracy]"' was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid (68 Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-737). The description of the articles
sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently. (at pp. 814-815)
Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the
articles sought to be confiscated under the questioned search warrants.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are articles
which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of
lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are
generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence,
including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they were
really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes The search warrant too
general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video
store. In fact, this actually happened in the instant case. Thus, the lower court, in
its questioned order dated October 8, 1985 said:
Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain articles of
property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party
should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence
constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual
property, but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a
legitimate business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement
of copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing
Betamax tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in
the Returns of Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the
The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of
video tape industry, and which could not be the subject of seizure, The applicant
much needed revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of
and his agents therefore exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate
national order and discipline. Courts should not impose any unnecessary
personal property usually found in a video cassette store or business
roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy campaign. However, the campaign
establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)
cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To say that the problem of
pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is to
denigrate the long history and experience behind the searches and seizures
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when
clause of the Bill of Rights. The trial court did not commit reversible error.
it lifted the search warrants it earlier issued against the private respondents. We
agree with the appellate court's findings to the effect that:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that the main ground
upon which the respondent Court anchored said orders was its subsequent
findings that it was misled by the applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that
SO ORDERED.
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed
when it issued the questioned warrants.' Stated differently, the respondent Court People vs. Choi (G.R. No. 152950, August 3, 2006)
merely corrected its erroneous findings as to the existence of probable cause and
declared the search and seizure to be unreasonable. Certainly, such action is This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks the reversal of the decision 2 of the
within the power and authority of the respondent Court to perform, provided that Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587, the
it is not exercised in an oppressive or arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the dispositive portion of which read:
respondent Court declaring the existence of probable cause is not final and does
not constitute res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Search
Warrant No. 99-17 is deemed NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. Respondent ATTY.
A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court did BENNY NICDAO is prohibited from using in evidence the articles seized by virtue
not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders. of Search Warrant No. 99-17 in Crim. Case No. I.S. No. 99-8116.
Grave abuse of discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or SO ORDERED.3
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.' But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed The factual antecedents follow.
orders were motivated by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so when the
erroneous findings collided with the constitutional rights of the private
respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even contest the righteousness and
On April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the Economic
legality of the questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged denial of
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance, applied for a
due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
search warrant with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga,
Branch 56, 4 against respondent Christopher Choi for violation of Section 168,
paragraphs 2 and 3 (a) and (c), in relation to Section 169 of RA 8293, 5 also
known as the Intellectual Property Code.6
After examination of the applicant and his witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and
David Lee Sealey, Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued Search Warrant No. 99-17
dated April 27, 1999 worded as follows:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G r e e t i n g s:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath in
the form of searching and probing questions, the applicant, MARIO P. NIETO,
Intelligence Operative, Economic Intelligence Investigation Bureau, Department
of Finance, and his witnesses Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey that there are
good and sufficient reasons to believe that Christopher Choi of No. 25-13
Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd., Angeles City has in his possession, control
and custody [r]eams and packs of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes, as well as
cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes (each cardboard case contains
two (2) [m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro and each [m]aster case contains fifty (50)
reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat in violation of Section 168, par. 2
and 3 (a) and (c) in relation to Section 169 of R.A. 8293;
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime of the day
or night of the above-premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the
aforedescribed items found at the residence/warehouse of Christopher Choi at
No. 25-13 Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd., Angeles City.
THEREFORE, seize and bring the said articles to the undersigned to be dealt with
in accordance with law.
You are hereby further directed to submit a return within ten (10) days from
today.
Given under my hand this 27th day of April, 1999 at Angeles City, Philippines.7
The search was conducted on the same date.8
On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a "motion to quash search warrant" 9 and a
"supplemental motion to quash" 10 on June 22, 1999. Both were denied by Judge
Gatbalite in an order dated November 29, 1999.11 Reconsideration was likewise
denied.12
On June 19, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 13
before the CA. He alleged that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to quash the search warrant, arguing that probable cause
was not sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not probing
and exhaustive and the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be
searched. Respondent also prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao 14 be prohibited from
using as evidence the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant. This was
granted by the CA in a decision dated April 10, 2002.
According to the CA, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe
that the cigarettes purchased by Nieto were fake and in violation of RA 8293, 15
Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching and probing questions of witness David
Lee Sealey.16 The examination of Sealey went this way:
Court:
Q There was testimony here given by Mr. Mario Nieto and Max Cavalera, that
fake Marlboro cigarettes bought by them from Michael Chua, Christopher Choi
and Johnny Chang were turned over to you for examination, is that
correct?cralawlibrary
 A This is my signature, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

Q Do you affirm and confirm other contents of this affidavit?cralawlibrary

Q After the same had been turned over to you, what did you do with the said
merchandise, if you did anything?cralawlibrary
A Yes, your Honor.

A I examined the sample of cigarettes and their packaging bearing the Marlboro
Court:
Trade Marks which were suspected to be produc[ed] and manufactured by La
Suerte or [with] the permission of Philip Morris.

That's all.17
Q What was the result of your examination?cralawlibrary

In addition, the CA ruled that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of

discretion when she merely relied on the conclusion of Sealey that the cigarettes
A Based on the packaging of the packs, the color of the box and the printing on
he received from Nieto were fake. She should have at least required Sealey to
the front side of the packs and the cigarettes themselves, I concluded that they
present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and the genuine ones for
are counterfeit or unauthorized product[s].
comparison, instead of relying on his testimony alone. The CA reasoned that this
was an absolute requirement under the Supreme Court ruling in 20th Century
Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals.18
Q Do you have any knowledge of this person named Christopher
Choi?cralawlibrary

Hence, this petition.

A None, your Honor.

Q There is an affidavit here marked as exhibit, executed by one David Lee
Sealey, do you know this David Lee Sealey?cralawlibrary
A Yes, your Honor, I am the one.
Q Whose signature is this appearing on the printed name David Lee
Sealey?cralawlibrary
The People of the Philippines aver that the CA erred in finding that Judge
Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant
allegedly because she failed to determine probable cause pursuant to Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.19 The People assail the finding of the CA
that, in issuing the search warrant, Judge Gatbalite purportedly did not comply
strictly with the requirement to determine the existence of probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses through searching questions
and answers. The People also assert that the CA erred in applying the doctrine in
20th Century Fox Film Corporation 20 since it had already been superseded by
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.21
We rule for the People of the Philippines.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 state:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend
largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule
governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma.24 The judge must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.25 The questions should not merely be repetitious
of the averments stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the
witnesses.26 If the judge fails to determine probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
before issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of discretion is committed.27

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the
As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.28
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
together with the affidavits submitted.
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.29 Probable cause is determined
in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.30 The entirety of the
questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must be considered
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon by the judge.31
a finding of probable cause. Probable cause means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey, petitioner judge also heard the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.22 The determination of the
testimony of applicant Nieto:
existence of probable cause requires the following:

Q: In connection with Search Warrant 99-17, are you the same Mario Nieto who
(1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally;
is the applicant in this application for search warrant filed today April 27,
1999?cralawlibrary

(2) the examination must be under oath and

A: Yes, your Honor.

(3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching

questions and answers.23
Q: Do you know this Christopher Choi referred to herein?cralawlibrary
A: Yes, your Honor. A: At No. 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville Subd., Angeles City, Pampanga.

Q: Why do you know him?cralawlibrary Q: Upon arriving at the place what did you do?cralawlibrary

A: He was introduced to us by Michael Chua, your Honor. A: Upon arriving at the place, your Honor, I introduced myself as the one who
was referred by a certain Michael Chua who is interested in buying the Marlboro
cigarettes from him and he accommodated me and showed me the sample that
Q: As what?cralawlibrary he has and I was able to procure the samples from him, the samples that like
what we did to the others were inspected by certain Mr. David Lee Sealey, the
representative and authority from the Philip Morris.
A: As the supplier for the goods.

Q: Did you actually buy those samples?cralawlibrary

Q: Subject of the application?cralawlibrary

A: Yes, your Honor, I got the samples form Mr. Christopher Choi and I submitted
them to Mr. David Lee Sealey.
A: Yes, your Honor, in violation of Section 169 of R.A. 8293.

Q: How many Marlboro cigarettes did you buy?cralawlibrary

Q: How did you know him?cralawlibrary

A: We bought only one ream, P17.00 per pack.

A: When I was conducting a test-buy operation against Mr. Michael Chua, Mr.
Michael Chua told me that the bulk of supply if we need more supply we can get
from the source, a certain Christopher Choi, who lives in the same village and
who is actually the supplier for the entire region. Q: Do you know from what particular place the house of Christopher Choi did he
got (sic) those samples?cralawlibrary

Q: Where did you see him. This Christopher Choi?cralawlibrary

A: The volume stocks were found inside the house, they are almost everywhere
in the house of Christopher Choi.
A: I went to his house, your Honor.

Q: There is a sketch here attached to your application, can you point it out
here?cralawlibrary
Q: Where?cralawlibrary
A: Yes, your Honor, at the warehouse, in the storage room as shown in the lay
out of the house, it is adjacent to the residential house as shown in the sketch.
Q: You went to the warehouse?cralawlibrary
A: We were shown [the] entire area by the supplier, Christopher Choi. As a
matter of fact he was trying to show us how much volume he has and his
capacity to supply.32
Max Cavalera, a witness who accompanied Nieto during the "test-buy" operation,
33 also testified:
Q How about this Christopher Choi?cralawlibrary
A As I ve said earlier, he was one of those identified by the informant storing and
selling counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes, so on April 22, 1999 we conducted a
surveillance and we were able to confirm that the said cigarettes are being stored
at the subject place.
Q At what place?cralawlibrary
A At 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville Subd., Angeles City. On April 23, 1999 at
about 8:30 p.m., Mario Nieto and I again went to the subject place to conduct a
test-buy operation. [A]fter Mr. Choi had been convinced of our intention to buy
cigarettes from him, he brought us to his warehouse where he showed to us
several cardboard cases of Marlboro cigarettes.34
Given the foregoing testimonies and applying the established standards in
determining probable cause, we cannot say that Judge Gatbalite committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant. Her questions were sufficiently
probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent
with each other and the narration of facts was credible. The testimonies and
other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to establish probable cause
that the alleged offense had been committed.
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the
judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question
the applicant and his witnesses, 35 the findings of the judge deserve great
weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the
judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.36
We thus find no reason to disturb Judge Gatbalite's findings.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation, insofar as it required the presentation of the master tapes for
comparison with the pirated copies for a search warrant to issue, had already
been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in
20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in copyright infringement
cases needs revisiting and clarification.
xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of
search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases
where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the
pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could
lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a
sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases.
Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their
parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the
writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue
generalization.
 Columbia Pictures, Inc., the judge's exercise of discretion should not be unduly
restricted by adding a requirement that is not sanctioned by law.
xxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear
of Appeals dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587 is REVERSED and SET
to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of
ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-17 as
the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable
VALID.
cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object
evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the
SO ORDERED.
controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the
senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [132 SCRA 152 (1985)]
rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions
or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to
inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value. through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

xxx xxx xxx 1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year),
AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.

MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
particular requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th
Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is
beyond the realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested
but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a court's prerogatives and to
by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and
denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a
P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not
mere ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which
denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had
requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by
previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the
statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all
seasons and reasons in infringement cases.37 (emphasis supplied) 3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners,
not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents
have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late
It is obvious that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation should not be applied to the
on august 6th.
present case since this involves the offense of unfair competition and not
copyright infringement. More importantly, as pronounced by the Court in
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG,
applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-
ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as
a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been
long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña
Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for
rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing
was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Paño.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A.
Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A
Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents
and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including
support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following
may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by
the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and
additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.
3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August
10th, 4 the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of
the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that
TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to
the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and
TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY
FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against
petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos,
presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL,
praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The
Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain
the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are
presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's
Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on
the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the
issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search
Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled
that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying
the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to
them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search
Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on
the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge
Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set
aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his
Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized
Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners'
Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the respondents or their duly authorized representatives from
introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is
a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's
witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend
otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present
petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search
Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically
provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized
as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available
to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable
them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to
the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this
Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
A Almost a month, sir.

The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were
described as 'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description hardly provided
a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be lawfully
seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than, the
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of
Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too general. 7

Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for
search warrant?
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the
seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for
publication, newspaper dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. A Yes, Your Honor.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
is constitutionally objectionable. 8

A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness suspicious persons with documents.
presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.

Q What kind of documents do you refer to?

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition? A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's
Army.

(The deposition instead)—

Q What else?

A Yes, sir,
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...

Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign
and local sources. 9
not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable that,
whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a
criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the
service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case
is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge
in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although,

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned,
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some
"probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely Court, explicitly provides:
upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd
and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.
The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized,
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with
which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of
an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue. 11
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without
a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule
that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality
made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent
of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this original,
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
independent action to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners did
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules,
raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October
there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the
18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence
place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the
obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation on
balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the
August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore, while not denominated
as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a
Warrant.
crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served
for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general
vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT
half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at
CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is
No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for
possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-
ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No.1
to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by
respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside,
and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing
evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents
case hereby made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal
Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without
prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking
said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
PICOP vs. Asuncion [307 SCRA 253 (1999)]
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed
strictly. Where the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search
warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not
of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the
nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23,
1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104,
of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or
an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist
proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and
required the respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20,
1995, Respondent PNP Traffic Management Command filed its 31-page
Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes. 5 On February
22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 6 agreeing with
petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a
Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in
its February 5, 1997 Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to
prepare the memorandum for the public respondents. After issuing a show-cause
order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in its September 24, 1997
Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within
which to file the required memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that
he was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the
case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the
Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its
memorandum within thirty days from notice; "otherwise, the petition will be
deemed submitted for decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the said period,
the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its
memorandum as a waiver of its privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a
search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, Ten (10) M14 US rifles
located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or
ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the
offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein
described.
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]

2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:

Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47
rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.
40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition
reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]
(10) handgrenades.

Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]

Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S.
Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information
and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion Ten (l0) handgrenades
issued the contested search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:

in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms,

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath,
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the
management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice
President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56
Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before
this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search
daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and
to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return
there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP
compound and seized the following: 15
12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco

01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco

(With pending

02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco

case-Casaway Case)

03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco

14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco

04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco

15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco

05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco

16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco

06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco

17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco

07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco

18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco

08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco

19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco

09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco

20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco

10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco

01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco

11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco

02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco

04 BAR 19 pcs.

01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin

01 M16 2,023 rounds

02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin

03 Carbine M1 276 rounds

01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield

04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds

02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield

05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega

06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade

07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.

(Paltik)

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.

01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.

02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.

02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann

03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco

01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.

02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco

02 M16 (long) 1 pc.

03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco

03 M14 8 pcs.

04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec

04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.

Pistol

05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.

05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

Shotguns

01 M16 73 rounds

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

02 M14 160 rounds

01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.

03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds

02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.

04 Rifle Grenade 1 round

03 Intratec 1 pc.

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor

01 M16 147 rds.

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor

02 Cal .30 5 rounds

07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor

03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds

08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor

04 Carbine 5 rounds

09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor

05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds

10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor

06 9 MM 30 rounds

11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor

NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor

01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor

14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor

15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB

03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor

16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not

04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor

Indicated also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to
Suppress Evidence." 17

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied
petitioners' motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second
01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds. contested Order 19 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 20

02 M16 2,349 rds. Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY. Issues

01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs. In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of
their cause: 21

02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs

I

03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant
No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently established and
04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant.

05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.

II

06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant
No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

III
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the
petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave
abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No.
95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a
preliminary matter, we shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition
should be dismissed for raising factual questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for
raising questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the
issuance of the warrant and regularity of its implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present
case, petitioner do not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge;
rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at, a
procedure which they contend was violative of the which those Constitution and
the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only question of law, which
may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the
basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3)
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally COURT:
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
seized. 25

P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:

In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed
to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant,
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the
subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.
COURT:

No Personal Examination
Swear the witness.

of the Witnesses
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)

In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search
warrant was valid, stating that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth
propounded searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to and nothing but the truth before this Court?
determined whether there was probable cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis supplied.) This
was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that "it is
erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound WITNESS:
searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the
witnesses he produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
Yes Ma'am.

As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was
supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio STENOGRAPHER:
T. Moriro, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of
Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod however, none of
the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other personal
Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the circumstances.
search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28
WITNESS:

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the
judge. But his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp Crame,
the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms,
Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Q How do you know that said the properties were subject of the offense?

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several
fact, he failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial
days, we gathered informations from reliable sources that subject properties
judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant
[which] are in their possession and control [are] the herein described properties
and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown,
subject of the offense. (Summary of Information dtd Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad
is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This
and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov '94 are hereto attached). 30
Court has frowned on this practice in this language:

When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This,
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his
witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written
personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation
located at PICOP Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. How come
that you have knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place?
xxx xxx xxx

A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante.
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 29
Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?

Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to

A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are
employees of PICOP.

Facts Personally Known to Him

Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you do? Q Where are those located?

A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Tabon.

Q Inside the compound?

Q What did you find . . .?

A Located inside the compound.

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.

Q Then what?
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.

A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.

Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security
Q By what means? guards?

A By pretending to have some official business with the company. A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP? Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q What did you f[i]nd . . .? Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally
obtained?

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of

PICOP. A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the
verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license. (Emphasis
supplied.)
 ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the
PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency
A I conducted the inquiry.
and its guard were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were
owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trail court PICOP, aside
from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the
Q What did you find out? applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy
aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office
(FEO) of the PNP or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could have
A They are using firearms owned by PICOP. been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where
the unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the Court
held:
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
A Yes, sir. evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of
such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the
negative ingredient of the offense charged — for instance, the absence of a
license required by law, as in the present case — and such evidence is within the
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of their
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if
own?
the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the
applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the
judge.
A No high-powered firearms.

Particularity of the
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside the
compound of PICOP?
Place to Be Searched

A There are M-16 armalite rifles.

Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber
revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the
Constitution to be searched only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this
Court has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the
probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack
of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a
sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in
particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with
particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but
it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is
the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is
made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3
piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred
fifty-five hectares." 36 Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled
and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP
compound. 37
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional
requirement, because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched
when they applied for the warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP
Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those
identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the
police were not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge
Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the
buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions
did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched. 39 Otherwise,
confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant — the place indicated
in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled
for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforces.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no
authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the place
indicated in the warrant, even if they intended it to be the subject of their
application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or
amplified by the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity
lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds
as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that
the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair
nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that
specified in the warrant — [was] exactly what they had in view when they applied
for the warrant and had demarcated in the supporting evidence. What is material
in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not
what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they
submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory,
in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would
open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers
executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be
searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself;
it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives
Inadmissible in Evidence
 enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict observance of the
constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant
No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department
of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right
illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint
reason." 45
was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby

GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is
the preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the
hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
search warrant. They argued, as they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms
could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint. Their motion was denied. A
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State Prosecutor Dacera SO ORDERED.
cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-
Yousef Al Ghoul vs. CA (G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001)
167." 41
Petitioners assail the decision 1 dated September 30, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Branch 123, thereby dismissing petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari. 2
Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an
earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was "the only practical The facts leading to the present petition under Rule 65 are as follows:chanrob1es
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches virtual 1aw library
and seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means On March 31, 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional
evidence means of coercing evidence . . .." 44 Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued
search warrants 54-95 3 and 55-95 4 for the search and seizure of certain items
in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on City.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799
(95). Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the
Complainant and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound
leg to stand on. and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were;

This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions
maintain peace and order in the country; however, it reminds the law
 1 small box of plastic bag of suspected dynamites

1 Bar of demolition charge

One weighing scale

1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with magazine of Caliber
.45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions
Two (2) batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating cord. 5

1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder

The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the
apartments were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.

1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions

Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
123, in informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67, accusing them
2 pieces of fragmentation grenade
with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1866. 6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and
detained.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
1 roll of detonating cord color yellowchanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioners filed a motion for bail on May 24, 1995, the resolution of which was
2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance held in abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation of evidence from the
prosecution to determine whether or not the evidence presented is strong. 7

22 detonating cords with blasting caps

On February 7, 1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being
offered for whatever purpose that they maybe worth" after the prosecution had
½ and ¼ pound of high explosives TNT finished adducing its evidence despite the objection by the petitioners on the
admissibility of said evidence.

1 timer alarm clock

On February 19, 1996, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for bail earlier filed,
giving as reasons the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
2 bags of suspected gun powder

To begin with, the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both
2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance offenses under Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the
penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua.
Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution . . . 8
As petitioners’ action before respondent appellate court also proved futile,
petitioners filed the instant petition on the ground that it had acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. They present
for our consideration the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION ARE
ADMISSIBLE;
II. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAIL. 9
The issue on bail has been resolved in our resolution dated November 24, 1998,
where this Court ruled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and
3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives
under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in
its minimum period and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter
of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 . . . 10
x x x was no mention of Apartment No. 8. Thus, we find that the search conducted at
WHEREFORE, the petitioners’ motion is hereby GRANTED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court in the Resolution of November 20, 1996 is
hereby PARTIALLY LIFTED in so far as petitioners’ pending motion for bail before
the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 123 is concerned. The trial court is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of the motion for bail and resolve the same
with dispatch. 11 ,
The issue that remains is whether the respondent court erred and gravely abused
its discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question are
valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3
of the Bill of Rights 12 as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure 13 because the place searched and articles seized were not
described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under
Section 10 of Rule 126 14 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt
for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented
at the trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the
implementation of the search warrant was rebutted by the defense during cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses. According to petitioners, respondent court
failed to appreciate the fact that the items seized were not turned over to the
police evidence custodian as required under Section 18 of the Department of
Justice Circular No. 61 dated September 21, 1993. Finally, they fault the lower
court’s finding that petitioners were in possession of the items allegedly
confiscated from them. 15
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the search of
Apartment 2 was legal, and the items seized therein are admissible in evidence.
However, the OSG agrees with petitioners that the search warrants issued by the
RTC, Branch 125, Kalookan City on March 31, 1995, namely search warrant 54-
95 16 and search warrant 55-95, 17 specified the place to be searched, namely
Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. There
Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in
relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, 18 the place to be searched cannot be changed,
enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from
Two (2) magazines of M16 rifles with live ammos. 21
pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that
constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are To appreciate them fully, we quote the search warrants in question:chanrob1es
constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the virtual 1aw library
.45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.

Search Warrant 54-95

Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly
faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2.
The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, 19 in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. 20
Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized
pursuant to the warrants. Hence, they also question the seizure of the following
articles from Apartment No. 2, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath
P/Sr. Insp. Joel D. Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his witness
SPOI Cesar R. Rivera of District Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District
Command with postal address c/o NPIU, NPDC, PNP, Langaray St., Kaunlaran
Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and
several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2. Nr. 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo
Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

One M16 rifles, Colt AR-15 with 2 magazines and 20 rds ammo live
1. One (1) 45 Caliber Pistol

One (1) bar demolition chargechanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY
and NIGHT of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith, seize and take
possession of the foregoing property, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
One (1) .45 caliber pistol numbers were defaced with magazine and with three
(3) live .45 cal ammos

1. One (1).45 Caliber Pistolchanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

One (1) .22 caliber handgun with live ammos in its cylinder

and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct. 22
One (1) box containing (40) forty pieces of .22 cal. live ammos (magnum)

Search Warrant 55-95

Two (2) pieces fragmentation grenade
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath
P/Sr. Insp. Joel D. Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his witness
SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of District Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District
Command with postal address c/o NPIU, NPDC, PNP, Langaray St., Kaunlaran
Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and
several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2. Nr. 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo
Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosiveschanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY or
NIGHT of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession
of the foregoing properties, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct. 23
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same
kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant above-quoted
appears to us beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were
described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items
ordered to be seized did not require, in our view, a technical description.
Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part
of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind
of things they are looking for. 24 Once described, however, the articles subject of
the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute
concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the
warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species
would suffice.
In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court said, "While it is true that
the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein
and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to
be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow." Where by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that
where the description of those goods to be seized have been expressed
technically, all others of a similar nature but not bearing the exact technical
descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable
purpose of the warrant issued would be defeated by mere
technicalities.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971),
pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description
of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. A careful examination of Search Warrant Nos. 54 95 25 and 55 95
26 shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to
be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 27
and 3 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants
authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no
other.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Lastly, on this score, we note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
waived their right to raise any attack on the validity of the search warrants at
issue by their failure to file a motion to quash. 29 But, in conducting the search
at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered specifically in the
search warrants, the police committed a gross violation we cannot condone.
Thus, we conclude that the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in
evidence, but those articles including guns, ammunitions, and explosives seized
in Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.
Coming now to the two-witness requirement under Section 10, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioners claim the rule was violated because only one
witness signed the receipt for the properties seized. For clarity, let us reproduce
the pertinent section:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 10. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made,
or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a
receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants
of the premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the
search and seizure operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2.
More importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual
occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2. 30 Hence, we find here no violation of
Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that they could not be charged with violation of P.D. 1866
because the seized items were not taken actually from their possession. This
contention, however, cannot prosper in the light of the settled rule that actual
possession of firearms and ammunitions is not an indispensable element for
prosecution under P.D. No. 1866. In People v. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA 158, 168-
169 (1998), we clarified that the kind of possession punishable under P.D. 1866
is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively
with animus possidendi or intent to possess said firearm. Whether or not the
evidence would show all the elements of P.D. 1866 in this case is a different
matter altogether. We shall not preempt issues properly still within the
cognizance of courts below.
Likewise, whether or not the articles seized were planted by the police, as
claimed by the petitioners, is a matter that must be brought before the trial
court. In the same vein, petitioners’ claim that the properties seized were not
turned over to the proper police custodian is a question of fact best ventilated
during trial.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted at
Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45 caliber pistol) seized
therein inadmissible in evidence. However, the search at Apartment No. 2
pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby declared valid and legal, and the
articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in evidence. Let this
case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, for
trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67 with dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Del Rosario vs. People (G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001)
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of
the Court of Appeals 1 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No.
8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging
petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession under his custody and control, the following, to
wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license therefor.
Contrary to law.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not guilty.
3 Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant
Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary
licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal
Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms
and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. On May 10, 1996,
P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a
certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his team
to search the house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil
Fernandez, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217,
authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan.4 On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, a
team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before
proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested
Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon
to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the
house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act No.
appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that 8294, and pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of
After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correctional, as maximum,
house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial and to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).5cräläwvirtualibräry
No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the
masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits
C to C-4) found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the
with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit decision for being contrary to facts and the law. 6
M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess
the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police
officers to seize the subject firearms.
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court as set out in the opening paragraph of
this decision. 7
SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate
inventories of the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The inventories were
signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique, the appellant and the barangay officials who
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2 Montezon prepared a certification of
reconsideration and/or new trial. 8 He contended that the certification issued by
orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the appellant and the barangay
the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating that
officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search.
the person named therein had not been issued a firearm license referred to a
certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to
him. He comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has a
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol valid firearm license.
recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search
including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers.
Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried out,
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking
reconsideration for lack of merit. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after
the police already had finished the search.

Hence, this appeal. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the
search warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution 11 and consequently,
the evidence seized was inadmissible. He also submits that he had a license for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE DEL
the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm,
ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No.
a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine
1866 as charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.
for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios found in his daughters
bedroom, were either planted by the police or illegally seized, as they were not
mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First : whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and
ammunition seized in his bedroom; and
Second : whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his
house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in
his daughters bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial courts. 12 However, this case comes within the exceptions. 13 The findings
of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court unless these
findings are not supported by evidence. 14 In this case, the findings of the lower
courts even directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we review the evidence. The
trial court held that the copy of the license presented was blurred, and that in
any event, the court could rely on the certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr.
Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives
Division, Philippine National Police stating that Vicente Vic del Rosario of
Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder
of any kind and caliber. 15 As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not
the person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y
Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial
notice of the existence of both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in
Norzagaray, Bulacan. 16 In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not taking
judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the
prosecutions submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay
Bigte in the certification was a typographical error. 17 Petitioner presented to the
head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief,
Operations Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license.
The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the
certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of
a firearm license. 18 However, such certification referred to another individual
and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to petitioner. In
this case, petitioner presented the printed computerized copy of License No. RCL
1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993, expiring in January 1995, by the
Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo V.
Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO. 19 On the dorsal side of the printed
computerized license, there is stamped the words Validity of computerized license
is extended until renewed license is printed dated January 17, 1995, signed by
Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch, FEO. 20
Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license fees for the
extension of the license for the next two-year period. 21
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license for
the .45 caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his house on June 15, 1996.
22 As required, petitioner presented the license to the head of the raiding team,
Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique of the Criminal Investigation Division
Group, PNP. 23 As a senior police officer, Senior Inspector Adique could easily
determine the genuineness and authenticity of the computerized printed license
presented. He must know the computerized license printed form. The stamp is
clearly visible. He could decipher the words and the signature of the authorized
signing official of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged to the
same national police organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because,
according to him, it was expired. However, assuming that the license presented
was expired during the period January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession of
the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during
that period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at home, not carried outside
residence. On June 15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of the firearm in
question, possession of firearm with an expired license was not considered
unlawful, provided thatthe license had not been cancelled or revoked. Republic
Act No. 8294, providing that possession of a firearm with an expired license was
unlawful took effect only on July 7, 1997. 24 It could not be given retroactive
effect. 25cräläwvirtualibräry
day of this month) followed by an additional 25% surcharge for all of the
succeeding five (5) months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.

According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license was d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit and/or
automatically applied for upon payment of the license fees for the renewal period. carrying firearm/s in prohibited places.
The expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It served as temporary
authority to possess the firearm until the renewed license was issued. Meantime,
the applicant may keep the gun at home pending renewal of the firearm license
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for any
and issuance of a printed computerized license. He was not obliged to surrender
offense where the penalty carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) months
the weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the computerized license is a notice
or fine of at least P1,000.00.
reading:

f. Dismissal for cause from the service.

IMPORTANT

g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumbmark.

1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license whenever
demanded by proper authority.

3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by permanent

disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in favor of the government.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or
termination of this license. Under any of the following instances, your license
shall be revoked for which reason your firearm/s is/are subject to confiscation
and its/their forfeiture in favor of the government. 4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your firearm/s
to the nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro Manila, surrender should be made
with FEO, Camp Crame.

a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address, and/or
qualification.
5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be deposited
with the nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be relinquished in writing so that
firearms may be disposed of in accordance with law.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six (6)
months from your birth month. Renewal of your license can be made within your
birth month or month preceding your birth month. Late renewal shall be
penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the first day to the last 6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of a
resident of Metro Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for residents of a Province to
secure recommendation letter to the nearest PNP Provincial Command who will
thereafter endorse same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of the permit. License must
be presented before an authority to purchase ammo could be
obtained.26cräläwvirtualibräry
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the
automatic renewal of the firearm license for the next two years upon expiration of
the license in January 1995, as evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186, dated
January 17, 1995. 27 The license would be renewed, as it was, because petitioner
still possessed the required qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the license
was extended until the renewed computerized license was printed. In fact, a
renewed license was issued on January 17, 1997, for the succeeding two-year
period. 28cräläwvirtualibräry
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on January
25, 1995, the Chief, Philippine National Police issued to him a permit to carry
firearm outside residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the firearm in
question. 29 The Chief, Philippine National Police would not issue a permit to
carry firearm outside residence unless petitioner had a valid and subsisting
firearm license. Although the permit to carry firearm outside residence was valid
for only one year, and expired on January 25, 1996, such permit is proof that the
regular firearm license was renewed and subsisting within the two-year term up
to January 1997. A Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that
the party to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in question.
30 Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP renewed petitioners license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question.
31cräläwvirtualibräry
Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum
between January 17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license on January 17,
1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial court
did not accept with alacrity the certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr.
Inspector Edwin C. Roque, 32 Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan
is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt caliber .45 with serial number
70G23792, covered by computerized license issued dated June 15, 1995, with an
expiry date January 1997. 33 Reinforcing the aforementioned certification,
petitioner submitted another certification dated August 27, 1999, stating that
Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued
firearm license No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with Serial Number
70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13, 1993 to January 1995,
and the extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997. 34
Had the lower courts given full probative value to these official issuances,
petitioner would have been correctly acquitted, thus sparing this Court of
valuable time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and
(b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
license or permit to possess the same. 35 The essence of the crime of illegal
possession is the possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject
firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal possession. After
possession is established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of course
to determine whether the accused has a license to possess the firearm. 36
Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or
license therefor is not first obtained. The absence of license and legal authority
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm
and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative
fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense
which the prosecution has the duty not only to allege but also to prove beyond
reasonable doubt. 37 To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and
explosives under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive
which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or
by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and
(b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or possess
the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or
certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive. x x
x We stress that the essence of the crime penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily
the accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or possess the firearm,
ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not prohibited by law. 38
Illegal possession of firearm is a crime punished by special law, a malum
prohibitum, and no malice or intent to commit a crime need be proved. 39 To
support a conviction, however, there must be possession coupled with intent to Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked from
possess (animus possidendi) the firearm. 40cräläwvirtualibräry you?

In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.
officer Jerito A. Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties by the police officers. 41 This is a flagrant error
because his testimony is directly contradictory to the official records of the Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?
Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which must prevail. Morever, the
presumption of regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional presumption of
innocence. 42 Right from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
petitioner possessed a valid license for the caliber .45 Colt pistol in question.
Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and charged
him with illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent portions of the
testimony of petitioner: Q: What did he say next?

Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your cal. .45 A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me because I
pistol and the alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your kitchen? am a police officer, sir.

A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my firearm, give Q: What was your comment to what he said?
him ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell who among the people in
our barangay have unlicensed firearm, sir.
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not conform
with officials like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir.43cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?

The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that it is a matter of judicial
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir. notice that a caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a private individual. 44
This ruling has no basis either in law or in jurisprudence. 45cräläwvirtualibräry

Q: And what did you answer him?

Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was
illegal.

A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will not
give him, sir, because he was just trying to squeeze something from me.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police
raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to
say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and
issued for the search of petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search
and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
provision. 46 Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search.53cräläwvirtualibräry
search warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright
nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
him. The prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
possession or control of the petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of the subject firearm in his
searched and persons or things to be seized. 47 Seizure is limited to those items
possession or control. In People v. de Gracia, 54 we clarified the meaning of
particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without
possession for the purpose of convicting a person under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. 48 Evidence seized on the
x In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and
occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for
intent to possess. While mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental
convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. x
49cräläwvirtualibräry
x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one where
the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same. 55 That is the meaning of animus
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was possidendi. In the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm
found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioners house. This incurs no criminal liability.
firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the
seizure was illegal. 50 The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in
plain violation of the law and the Constitution. 51 True that as an exception, the
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of
police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband
petitioners daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized items were
for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, [t]he seizure of
inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria, 56 the plain view
evidence in plain view applies only where the police officer is not searching for
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior
object. 52 Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when there is:
justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees
in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also
seized in the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was absolutely no reason for
the seizure. The radios were not contraband per se. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios at its discretion. 57
The burden is on the prosecution to show that the two-way radios were not
licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency
authorized to seize unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly, the
two-way radios were not mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the
seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the petitioner
was not charged with illegal possession of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The
possession of such radios is not even included in the charge of illegal possession
of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the Information.
WHEREFORE , the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of
violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his
caliber .45 Colt pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the five (5) extra
magazines and twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition, and the two 2-way
radios confiscated from him. The Chief, Philippine National Police, or his duly
authorized representative shall show to this Court proof of compliance herewith
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The .22 caliber revolver with Serial No.
48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber
Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 126, Sec. 3, Rules of Court (ROC)
Unilab vs. Isip (G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005)
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors
of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524,
Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines,
owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for violation
of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB),
particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or
distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase
orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON
multivitamins.1
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents,
Search Warrant Case No. 04-4916 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court.
Appended thereto were the following: (1) a sketch2 showing the location of the
building to be searched; (2) the affidavit3 of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo
Protection and Security Agency hired by United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who
allegedly saw the manufacture, production and/or distribution of fake drug
products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of
UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor of
Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized
production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure; (4)
the letter-complaint4 of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and
Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit5 of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and
Rolando Besarra containing the following allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE
AND SECURITY AGENCY named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
November 2003, at the said premises located at No. 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz,
advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or
Manila. MR. RABE averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR.
distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
ERNESTO ISIP and that the said premises which is known as SHALIMAR
PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to manufacture counterfeit
UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was already
patented by UNILAB since 1985; c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase
orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON
multivitamins.7
3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-
story structure, with an additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It
has a tight security arrangement wherein non-residents are not allowed to enter
or reconnoiter in the premises; The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a
true inventory thereof executed under oath.

4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, and has a new address as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI
the area of counterfeiting operations are the first and second floors of Shalimar agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No
Building; fake Revicon multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the
first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI
agents in the presence of respondent Isip, contained the following:
5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures
of the area especially the places wherein the clandestine manufacturing
operations were being held. At a peril to his well-being and security, the Asset QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION
was able to take photographs herein incorporated into this Search Warrant
792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.
Application.6
30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.8

NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized

A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the
in which he declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar
application for the search warrant. After conducting the requisite searching
Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in
questions, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-
the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return
4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a
of Search Warrant,9 alleging that no other articles/items other than those
search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571,
mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the
of the items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox
following items:
be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for
examination.10 The court issued an order granting the motion, on the condition
that the turn over be made before the court, in the presence of a representative
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), from the respondents and the court.11
particularly REVICON multivitamins;
The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to
Suppress Evidence."12 They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI
conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building
at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in "open display"
were allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was
different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and second
floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin
and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized
in the search warrant.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the
search was limited to the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located
at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They
averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application,
Rabe’s affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the
building where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street
corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address, and the new address was No.
1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the warrant was
not implemented in any other place.13
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the
NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used
by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents,
and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The
respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending
that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents
moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record.
Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were
contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue
corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating
on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized
in the search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court
itself. The respondents emphasized that the Shalimar Laboratories is authorized
to manufacture galenical preparations of the following products:
Products:
- Povidone Iodine
- Chamomile Oil

In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those
listed in the search warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the
- Salicylic Acid 10 g.
building located at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the
premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court.14 In accordance with
the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of Appeals,15 the respondents served a
copy of their pleading on UNILAB.16 - Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution

On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order17 granting the motion of the - Aceite de Alcamforado
respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox,
were not those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial
court issued an advisory18 that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in - Aceite de Manzanilla19
evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had
already been quashed.
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of
the counsel of UNILAB, and insisted that it was not authorized to appear before
the court under the Rules of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that the
BFAD was the authorized government agency to file an application for a search
warrant.
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file
the motion for reconsideration because it was the one which sought the filing of
the application for a search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings
and filing pleadings. The only parties to the case were the NBI and UNILAB and
not the State or public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party,
or the holder of a license to operate, may intervene through counsel under
Section 16 of Rule 110, in relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by
the NBI officers.20 In their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular
inspection was the option to look forward to.21 However, no such ocular
inspection of the said premises was conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of
the Disudrin and Inoflox samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar
Building. On its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD
declared that the substance failed the test.22 The BFAD, likewise, declared that
the examined Disudrin syrup failed the test.23 The BFAD had earlier issued the
following report:
PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS
1.Phenylpropanolamine Unilab 21021552 3- -Registered,
(Disudrin) 06 however,
12.5 mg./5mL Syrup label/physical
appearance does not
conform with the
BFAD approved
label/ registered
specifications.
2.Ofloxacin (Inoflox) Unilab 99017407 3- -Registered,
200 mg. tablet. 05 however,
label/physical
appearance does not
conform with the
BFAD approved
label/ registered
specifications.24
On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order25 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to
take possession of "finished or unfinished products of United Laboratories
(UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the
counterfeit nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized
pursuant to the warrant does not, however, include REVICON but other products.
And whether or not these seized products are imitations of UNILAB items is
beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the
proceedings on the application for search warrant relative to the seized products.
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot
be sustained.26
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, where the following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox
200 mg. are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the respondents because they
constitute the "fruit of the poisonous tree" or, CONVERSELY, whether or not the
seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the "plain view"
doctrine and, hence, the same are legally admissible as evidence against the
respondents in any and all actions?27
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the
trial court quashed the search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the
respondents herein in their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that
the trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists
that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to due process. The petitioner
asserts that the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized –
"finished or unfinished products of UNILAB" – is sufficient to include counterfeit
drugs within the premises of the respondents not covered by any license to
operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or
repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals,28 the petitioner asserts that the products
seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The
petitioner posits that the respondents themselves admitted that the seized
articles were in open display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of the
implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should
have been filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are
raised. They also assert that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition
involving the validity and the implementation of the search warrant. They argue
that the petitioner merely assisted the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of
Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the said government agencies as
parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because under the
1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the
government and its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the
Supreme Court. The respondents further assert that the trial court may consider
issues not raised by the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the
just determination of the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed
boxes so fast even before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the
seizure took place at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 as stated in the search
warrant. They assert that the ruling of the Court in People v. Court of Appeals29
is applicable in this case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the
factual basis for the application of the plain view doctrine.30
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-
in-interest to defend the validity of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after
all, it was upon its instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by
the NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No.
8203 from filing a criminal complaint against the respondents and requesting the
NBI to file an application for a search warrant. The petitioner points out that the
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically prohibit a private complainant
from defending the validity of a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a
state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all, the petitioner
insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of a search warrant is
not a criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place sought to be searched
was sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building
on the two parcels of land described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is
located, the place searched by the NBI officers.31 It also asserts that the building
is located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.32
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because
the boxes were found outside the door of the respondents’ laboratory on the
garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding
team – precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos.
The boxes in which the items were contained were themselves so designated to
replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left
hand corner of one side of some of the boxes33 the letters "ABR" under the
words "60 ml," appeared to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as
it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The
petitioner pointed out that "ABR" is the acronym for "amber bottle round"
describing the bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for children) is
contained.
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own "license plates"
which were instituted as among its internal control/countermeasures. The license
plates indicate that the items within are, supposedly, "Disudrin." The NBI officers
had reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data
appearing on their supposedly distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that
although some of the boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo were,
indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the original because these,
too, were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its
pleading pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched showing
respondent Isip;34 the boxes seized by the police officers containing Disudrin
syrup;35 and the boxes containing Inoflox and its contents.36
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the
proper party to file the petition at bench; (2) whether it was proper for the
petitioner to file the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court; and (3) whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and
second floors of the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which,
when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s contention that a search warrant
proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action37 or the commencement of a
prosecution.38 The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings.39 While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal
action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery
employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime.40 It is in the
nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions.41 A
search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search
warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the
Philippines.42
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for
adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights.43 It concerns the
public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights
of private persons.44 It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public
prosecution.45
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or
to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws,
such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search
warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant
issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of
a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the
NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to
quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration
of the court order granting such motion to quash.46
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents’
motion to quash the search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply
and opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr.47 The court
a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it
and its counsel.
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme
Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is
the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court allowed a private
corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and
considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even
held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in
the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v.
Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor
General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a
lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants
therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the
Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case
against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.49
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted
by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.50 In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition,
considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioner’s contention that the issue of
whether the Disudrin and Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised
in the pleadings of the respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents
failed to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant; in their
reply, however, they averred that the seized items were not included in the
subject warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding team.
They also averred that the said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and
shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search.51 In their
Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the
following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether
there is a legal basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized
articles in evidence. Since the articles allegedly seized during the implementation
of the search warrant – Disudrin and Inoflux products – were not included in the
search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team;
they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or
shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain
view or some such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper
examination or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from
respondent’s place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor of
legality.52
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner
that the respondents never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the
seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March
11, 2004 Order of the court a quo on the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the
alleged failure to particularly describe in the search warrant the items to be
seized but upon which NO challenge was then existing and/or NO controversy is
raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that "finished or unfinished
products of UNILAB" cannot stand the test of a particular description for which it
then reasons that the search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully
inadmissible against respondents.53
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it
before finally resolving to deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the
petitioner was denied its right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and
Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things
particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.54
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the
executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a)
the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular
order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c)
it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.55
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement
the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being
present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the
fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating
evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their
eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating
or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to
obtain another warrant.56 Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate
expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the
Constitution.
The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of
discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable
cause of the object’s incriminating evidence.57 In other words, to be immediate,
probable cause must be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory
perception of the object.58 The object is apparent if the executing officer had
probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature
of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the
benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of
seizure.59
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must
not have known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize
it.60 Discovery is not anticipated.61
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the
seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to
associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a
viewed object and criminal activity.62
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending
to prove the guilt of a person.63
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires
that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution
and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more
likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be
seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.64
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued
by the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The
warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize "counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording,
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale,
sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins." The implementing officers failed to
find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes
which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain
Inoflox and Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim
that the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to
prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence
should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential
requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the
respondents’ motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI
and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The
immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception
relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and
the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner
and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or
any of the petitioner’s representative who was present at the time of the
enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the
sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI
agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the
sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent.65 There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the
contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to
prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office
No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division
(PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed
to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked
"Confidential" and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San
Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records
Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in
which documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the
addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:

SO ORDERED.
The Chairwoman
Warrantless searches
Civil Service Commission
Pollo vs. Constantino-David (G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government
employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the
service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the
government employer as evidence of misconduct. Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2
dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A.
Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and
penalized him with dismissal.
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you
personally if it is just alright for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an
accused gov’t employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is
a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the
region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na
division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc. The
justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please
investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is
being tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background
in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in
the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4 After some briefing, the
team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of
the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and
Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal
Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with
Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00
p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who
were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of
computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text messages
received by petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and
LSD per instruction of the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be
better."
"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."
"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about
this.
"We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of
the memo via mms"5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to
Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer. Another text message received
by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from CSC
main office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00
p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all
the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving
all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced
from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson
David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal
Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing
files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters7 in
connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis
of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order8 dated January
11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioner’s personal files,
Chairperson David made the following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are
related to or connected with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as
pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or
other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on
behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative
cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was
knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and
inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government
service. The number of pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such
person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming
regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly
against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had
engaged in this customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of
the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees.
That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo
invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand
in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct
control and disposition.9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the
anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a
lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused
CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and
printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his
comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he
had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave,
citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that
the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives,
friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy
and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership
of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for
personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not
actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In
view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without
his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima
facie case against the petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation
of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five
days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the
charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under
90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the
resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to
Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an
illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people
with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer
were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time
or another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship.
Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who
entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioner’s CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado,
the latter being Atty. Solosa’s client who attested that petitioner had nothing to
do with the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to
Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case should be
deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he
filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner
believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of
the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated
March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat
the said motion as petitioner’s answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11,
2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total
absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an
administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G.
Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo
(CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for
disbarment against Director Buensalida.14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting
the formal investigation of the case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed
in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.15
Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007,
the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of
petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference shall
entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte.16
Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that
the investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution
of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the
pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the
consequences of petitioner and/or his counsel’s non-appearance.17 This
prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents,
including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07113419 denying petitioner’s
motion to set aside the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to
inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing
officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the
prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal
investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the dispositive part
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds
Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic
Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking
future civil service examinations.21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioner’s
computer, the CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual
milieu of this case where the government as employer invades the private files of
an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the
course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee
and without the latter’s consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant
rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of
O’Connor v. Ortega22 as authority for the view that government agencies, in
their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct
search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the "probable
cause" or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the
CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons23 which declared
that the federal agency’s computer use policy foreclosed any inference of
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court
therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the
respondent’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer
was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employee’s office was upheld as
valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search
pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is
reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that
petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer
he was using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use policy which
unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a
computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative
policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioner’s computer
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it
pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related
misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the
Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence having been
resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the
charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave
infractions justified petitioner’s dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above
resolution dismissing him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing
of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed
for the inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC
officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis of the
anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding
investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case
against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in
petitioner’s computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had
encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy
declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users
thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous
in CSC’s act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no
restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought
this appeal arguing that –
I OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS
ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS
EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL
RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE
ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY
VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL
MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND
NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS
INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY
INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007
AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO
10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION
[OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH
PERSONAL HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN
THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE
PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF
RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE
DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER
NEW ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS
ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT
AND INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND
CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE
LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR
TRO.26

Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his
office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and
consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet
of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,27 which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but
only of "unreasonable" searches and seizures.28 But to fully understand this
concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is
essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another
jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti29 :
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the
act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in
an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a
"search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy
right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person
has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
(objective).32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private
employees in the workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee
had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that
he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their guests could enter
the office. The Court thus "recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was
addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr.
Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of
female hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients
under the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal
items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically
declared that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because
they work for the government instead of a private employer."35 A plurality of
four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because
"some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that
no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he operational
realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate
privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances."36
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in
their workplace, O’Connor teaches:
x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate
regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the
context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free
from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees.
Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and
other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-
related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others –
such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public
– may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE
SCALIA that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to
make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer," x x x but some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work
environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.37
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court
declared that Dr. Ortega’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the
conduct of the hospital officials infringed "an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed evidence that
respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other
employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own
office while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were
stored outside his office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had
established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from
storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the
absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it
would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable
expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital
officials was reasonable, the O’Connor plurality decision discussed the following
principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the
"search…was not a reasonable search under the fourth amendment." x x x "[t]o
hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public
employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such
searches…[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search
takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of
reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of
reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing]
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion." x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we
must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer
wished to enter an employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related
purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be
unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon
supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such
procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which
we have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are
hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather,
work-related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would
conflict with the "common-sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers
is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies
provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would
suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an
employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office
correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause,
rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the
purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the
concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by
public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be
given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory
reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an
investigation of work-related employee misconduct. Even when employers
conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from "the
normal need for law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an interest in
ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the
work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence,
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in
many cases, public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and
the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and
the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials,
therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the
agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a
probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the
agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," x x x for
legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of
work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly
burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and
the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first,
one must consider ‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ;
second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place,’" x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its
inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that
the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to
retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the
factual dispute as to the character of the search and neither was there any
finding made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken, the case was
remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search
and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the
search and its scope.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless
searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid
down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the
employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related
to law enforcement.40
O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy
rights in the workplace. One of these cases involved a government employer’s
search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons41 where the
defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child
pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with
anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy
on computer use stating that employees were to use the Internet for official
government business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency will
periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s Internet access as deemed
appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the management of the
agency’s computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity
originating from Simons’ computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and
examination of Simons’ computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed
downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard
drive of Simon’s computer were copied from a remote work station. Days later,
the contractor’s representative finally entered Simon’s office, removed the
original hard drive on Simon’s computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the
original to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants
and searched Simons’ office in the evening when Simons was not around. The
search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer; computer diskettes found
in Simons’ desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive
diskettes; videotapes; and various documents, including personal
correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these evidence, arguing
that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was
found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches
of Simons’ computer and office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and
the first search warrant was valid. It held that the search remains valid under the
O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime
was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection.
Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation
of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and
interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor
because at the inception of the search, the employer had "reasonable grounds for
suspecting" that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the
employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to
download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive
was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not
excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to
the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons
must first prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place
searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation
of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one
that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons
lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the
Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated by FBIS’ retrieval of Simons’ hard drive from his office.
 Simons’ office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer
might engage. x x x42 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record
or fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly
stated that FBIS would "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" employees’ use of the
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board43 which
Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages,
involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory
"as deemed appropriate." x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private.
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
Therefore, regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, have also recognized
transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively
the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x
x x Accordingly, FBIS’ actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer
files Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
xxxx
the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer
in his office. x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not
to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in
share. As noted above, the operational realities of Simons’ workplace may have
a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence in
upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such
an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the
case at bar, we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was
xxxx
the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard
drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?

In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s supervisor entering the
employee’s government office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1)
which the employee had absolutely no expectation of privacy – equipment that
the employee’s relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the
the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in
immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the
the employee’s office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the
employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are
criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here,
relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness
there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employer’s policy and
inquiry, and we consider the two questions together.44 Thus, where the
the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into
employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-
workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
and any search of that space and items located therein must comply with the
Fourth Amendment.45
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the
performance of their respective jobs.

We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given
issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that
time.
he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did
he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that xxxx
being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have
visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he
even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He No Expectation of Privacy
described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown people" and that in
the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is
"personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on 4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall
appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had receive on the computer system.
anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had
such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select
and assign Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the

aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything
expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the
they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any
presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
other computer network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or
automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.

Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly
provides:
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal
property or for the exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt
(MR) has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he
POLICY is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.

1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and xxxx
may be used only for legitimate business purposes.
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their
passwords for access to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be
printed, stored online, or given to others. Users shall be responsible for all
transactions made using their passwords. No User may access the computer
system with another User’s password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the
computer system or to encode particular files or messages does not imply that
Users have an expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on the
computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global passwords that permit
access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a particular User’s password.
Only members of the Commission shall authorize the application of the said
global passwords.
x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-
the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether
an employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the
existence of a workplace privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals
Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the university’s
computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the
university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically
told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university is
responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee
thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university
officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer for work-related
materials.49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted
on petitioner’s computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with
investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-
complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV
where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly
"lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David
stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text
messages from unknown sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service
Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another
government agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all
done during office hours and involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads
and details sufficient to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the
persons and divisions involved in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO
IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening
in CSCRO IV and its effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a
team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the computers of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.51 Thus, in the
2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that
where a government agency’s computer use policy prohibited electronic
messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that
employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the
agency information systems and technology, the government employee had no
legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office
computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the
computer was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the
defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a
computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he
was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail
messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant
had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the
express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken
and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search
warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the
hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless
searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public employer can
investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception
and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first
place.52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was
justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion
on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines
established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is
no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances
exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a
complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No.
IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said regional office
or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the
institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be
so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act
fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus,
on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office.
That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since
these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting
out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer
files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated
drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the
probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless
search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the
regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the
process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly
notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of
files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on
computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality.
It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as
an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by
going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the
evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.53
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must
necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also
untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions
into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons
are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like
child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was
justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein
would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted
by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless
requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against
Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54
involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an
anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and
attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The
OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to
access Atty. Morales’ personal computer and print two documents stored in its
hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another
in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales’
computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered
released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files
stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that
there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one
from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and
positive statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other
court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty.
Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that
while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of
every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his
personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the
claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent
of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case
against the persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the
validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence,
apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal
computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no
choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the
former which involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer
from which the personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-
issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with
the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances
under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC
MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of
petitioner are admissible in the administrative case against him, we now proceed
to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the
charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the
CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise.55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of
drafts of legal pleadings and documents stored in his office computer, as well as
the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the
formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to
be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of
some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission
Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with
the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the
explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his
computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa
whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases
they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We hold that
the CSC’s factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and
misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of
pleadings responding to the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or
directly in opposition to them such as a petition for certiorari or a motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof
knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the
interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the
appearance in one of the retrieved documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado,
Epal kulang ang bayad mo," lends plausibility to an inference that the preparation
or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable
motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the
same for the money – a "legal mercenary" selling or purveying his expertise to
the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of
Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he
had a control of the said computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses,
Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the
pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the respondent. This was
the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of
Appeals. The said circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly
undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe
that the documents were the personal files of some of his friends, including one
Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served as his counsel of record during
the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a
sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent
was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified that during
her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer
assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in
close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she
personally knows, was using the computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa
himself was never presented during the formal investigation to confirm his sworn
statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of
weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits, which
Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent,
it evinces the fact that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the
computer assigned to him for official purpose, not only once but several times
gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the interests
of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable
cooperation…Or at the very least, he should be responsible for serious
misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the
electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant
that the line appearing in one of the documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang
ang bayad mo," was a private joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N.
Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more
sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a
statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the
respondent, unless he had something to do with it?56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained
an anonymous complaint since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC)
requires a verified complaint:

Rule II – Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall
not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the
complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or
merit to the allegation therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in
which case the person complained of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint
is deemed to have been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after
a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in
the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining
authority’s own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a
prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his comment.
As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals57 --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and
Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a
complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the
appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to.
Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the
complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the
same deserves scant consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said
memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the
Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner
Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her
Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflor’s previous memo expressing
his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case.
According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact
exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002
Commission Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr.
and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue
a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use
of the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order.58
Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which
regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be
published prior to its effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in
affirming the CSC’s ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of
R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner
of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to
existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Luz vs. People (G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February
20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
 In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery
on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March
10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG
City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article
the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle
II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down
minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three
the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with
inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket
law.
of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three
(3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to
open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover SO ORDERED.6
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
suspected shabu.3

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October
guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued. January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself
and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE
POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE
REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was
no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation
of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he
had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this
case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-
012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and
riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof.
The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when
he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his
possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending
officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No.
98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating
the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons
alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a
driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or
of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act,
confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor
vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of
issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension
and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the
following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile
Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations.
The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention
on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner
was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as
found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost
in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at
length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure
is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
"freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman’s
signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda
opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda
requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which
the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide
whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently
impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that
he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,"
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside
detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a
policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end
he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is
aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
"Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains
the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the
dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
 Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
xxx xxx xxx
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come
to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam).
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they
subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he
might make could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See
case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
supplied.)

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was
not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic
"inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself,"
citation was being made.
"which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible
to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine,
after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not
be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was
made for such an offense.
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there
would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time—after the
police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their custody.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or
was likewise illegal.
intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule
view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.20
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full
container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-
apparent.16
blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police
officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
alight from the car or doing a patdown:
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to
be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told"
is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
to take out the contents of his pocket.18

We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
and weighty,’" x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation,
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson,
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for
the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp
consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
routine traffic stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, basic principles of government.24
supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may
justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out
of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs
attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the accused.26
driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414;
perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion
that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968);
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the
conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even
City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and
conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460
immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is
(1981).
warranted by some other cause or ground.

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident
SO ORDERED.
to arrest—the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was
stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to People of the Philippines vs. Cogaed (G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III,
passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their
autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged
compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real.
Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic
to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
this scourge of society.
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22

Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a
result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any
as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message. The
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose
accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that
in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There
was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action.
The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly,
and without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent
with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible
admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police
Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian
informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan
ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San
Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San
Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-
Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who
were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9
Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow
bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this
exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet
gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is]
contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and
brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying
their respective bags"16 inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside
Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI
Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II
performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight
of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1
grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A
total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.27
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union,
"waiting for a jeepney to take him"28 to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could
buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger
brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and
Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help
in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed
agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1
Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was
inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then
talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35
Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the
police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-
ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38
The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao
were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No.
9165.40 The information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San
Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y
SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody
and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of
seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search
should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to
such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals
found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout
any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence,
this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic
Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002").41 I

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE
against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or
Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May
21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of
II
the decision states:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos
(Php 1,000,000.00).46

III

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
"Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just
alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY
AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid
search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the
evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there
was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to
the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether
searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted
with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable.
This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must be established
by the judge after asking searching questions and answers.57 Probable cause at
this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the
warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a
particular description of the place and the things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the
"uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk".
"Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require
that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within
the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65
was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the
identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily while
the police officer seeks to obtain more information."66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding
and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no
time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did
not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where
the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on
the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether
an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be
that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about
a place frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the
police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying
manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers.72
These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the]
petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76
This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon
seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79 After
stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade firearm"80 in
his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first."82
This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to
the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner,
based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit
drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal,
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who
signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
 be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this would be an
infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
COURT:

IV
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him
in the passenger jeep?

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to
confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
WITNESS:
Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated: to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
COURT:

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana? a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged."88

WITNESS:
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have
to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine
A No, Your Honor.84 reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by
the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that case,
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The Constitution
from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one
themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.98
identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they
alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107 The bag contained
marijuana leaves.108
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The
person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor
There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.
police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not admissible because
This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
of the illegal search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
without a valid search warrant.

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not
V
the police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here,
exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and
the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as
that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and
accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case
at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turnedout
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
to be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case,
safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure
the police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the police received
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99
information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel
(Emphasis supplied)
so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the
hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was
dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the
box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence
ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.128
also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s
situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no
valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence
to be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of
arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of
the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has
not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in
People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two
elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view
of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was
arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume
that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court
previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.132 (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive
objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the
police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one
which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such
waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be
discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG: A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.133
(Emphasis supplied)

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents
of their bags, is it not? The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s
responses to Judge Florendo’s questions:

WITNESS:
COURT:

A Yes, ma’am.
....

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it
not? Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A Yes, ma’am. A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he
was somewhat frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he was
already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags? he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to carry."134

A None, ma’am. For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a
police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to be
searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the
or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search.
contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from
The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the
them, is it not?
person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be
anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or
her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am. requires no less.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in VIII
opening the bags, is it not?
The Constitution provides:

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This
rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It
ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects
are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the
search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that
there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate
this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to
perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our
society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be
seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando
City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being
heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sydeco vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 202692, November 12,
2014)
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are
the December 28, 2011 Decision1 and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The assailed issuances affirmed the
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case
Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of drunk
driving and resisting arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed against petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in
Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that court. The accusatory portions
of the interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the
first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then the driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor.
Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in
violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136.
Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP
Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz
III, bonafide member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9,
duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual performance of their official
duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and pushing,
the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for
violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under,
thus to be governed by, the Rule on Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in
evidence the oral testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle
Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos Santos,9 plus the documents each identified
while in the witness box, among which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest10 executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The
defense’s witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his wife,
Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be
deduced from, the CA decision now on appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3
Benedict Cruz III and another officer were manning a checkpoint established
along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about
twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with
plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all
inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom the
vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,before he
resumes driving.11 Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor,
denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice,
petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp.
Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp.
Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had seen him
swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner
who put up resistance. Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the
police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital
ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath
per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner
was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition.12 Petitioner, on
the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question, adding in this
regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and
arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit13 and
his Complaint-Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early
morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva,
cook and waitress, respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave.,
Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when signaled to
stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their flashlights
trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked
the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search,
a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead,
he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang."
Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it
turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of
empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about
being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was
ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and
poked a gun at his head, at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo
tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi." The officers then pulled the
petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the police mobile car,
whereupon he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The
policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they
succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey
Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of alcoholic breath, although he refused
to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was conducted. He was
thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the
afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to
undergo actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate
indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath.
Ten days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating,
P/Insp. Aguilar and the other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not to place the erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his
driver’s license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as
charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is
hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-
CN; and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of
two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office
the result of this case, stating further the data required under Section 5815 of
Republic Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the
MeTC erred in: 1) according credit to the medical certificate issued by Dr.
Balucating, although the records custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented
to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician, and 2) upholding the veracity
of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and
PO3 Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court to
testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner, addressing the first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following
wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as
indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would only serve
to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder the
Rules of Court,17 observations of the police officers regarding the petitioner’s
behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state on
the day he was apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the
discretion as to how many witnesses it needs to present before the trial court,
the positive testimony of a single credible witness as to the guilt of the accused
being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established
jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not necessarily with
the greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered."
Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner went
to the CA on a petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
33567. By a Decision dated December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a
Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22,
2010 of the RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties by the police officers; and

II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey
Balucating, in the absence of his testimony before the Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial
court’s findings of fact does hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record
that facts and circumstancesof weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic
that an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for
review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21`
Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and employees are
bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which
careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.22
[intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what
appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made
doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle,
concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle
that petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner went on
with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed the police officers
off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions
as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to
an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically
described this particular event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light
sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang
pintuan ng nasabing sasakyan.

In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya
during the period material appearednot to have performed their duties as
ako at ang aking kasama kong waitress na bumaba.
required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They
spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to
stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the driver’s
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN
license orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required
VIEW LANG" pero iyon ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi
under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:
na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace

x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a
sasakyan habang ang isang pulis ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya,
driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or
nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.
of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license ofthe driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay
fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x tinutukan ng baril. x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng
x (Emphasis added.) Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer one mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng
or two routinary questions out of respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang kanilang baril.24
Court of Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists’ right of "free passage without
Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting
officers themselves who admitted that they originally had no intention to search
the vehicle in question nor subject its occupants to a body search. The officers
wrote in their aforementioned joint affidavit:
xxxx
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA
4136 (Driving under the influence of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the
RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006
along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and converse with us
rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our
job. P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and driving
under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting him to our police
station in which our intention was to make him rest for a moment before he
continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added.)
a willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is required.26 Nothing in the
records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover,
the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the
streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to
life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers
stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required
under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the
petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that
the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the
trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest
the accused (sic) the charged in for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung
sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo.

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the
precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or suspected of having vehicle of the accused swerving, is that correct?
committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood,refers to a movement
wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct
course of action or movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is A: Yes, sir.
a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the
nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?

SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any
highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic,
A: Yes, sir.
grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and
the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property
or the safetyor rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable
damage to the highway. Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of
the accused?

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive

of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and

xxxx
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational
stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was
the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search
juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin
gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may
have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would
make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when
flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a
reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block
established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key
elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the
RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That
the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are
persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal
checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against
unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in
context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in
contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed
differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not
in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use
them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover, there is, to
stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to
order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and
body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of
the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a
"stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why
they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed
a crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest
before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending
officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner
out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and
punched him on the face. None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied
the petitioner’s allegation aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the
Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was
that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both
actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136. They relied
on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner
showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged not
only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but
also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos,
the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest
that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision,
merely stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon
by the doctor who issued it.1âwphi1 Instead, the Records Custodian of the
Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the Prosecution to testify on the said
documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to
affirm the contents of the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to
have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that the observation of herein private
complainants as to the accused’s behavior and condition after the incident was
sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
evidence regarding x x x x
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same."32
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical
certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated
state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the
testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers
were acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized
enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are
differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable
certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136
penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has
of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged
Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence
of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a
motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being
subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as
established jointly by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under
Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross
vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol
concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver
isdriving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586,
petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol
for this obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let
alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold level of
intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art.
22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are
favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f)
of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of
RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving
under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in
2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution35 of
November 21, 2006 found, on the strength of another physical examination from
the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the
same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries
against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that the
police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out, the
purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the
unfortunate incident, lost no time incommencing the appropriate criminal charges
against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whomhe accused of issuing Exh.
"F" even without examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing lends
credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of
disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the
fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been
inspired by improper motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him
and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to
accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a
harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into
account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual
procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence
of alcoholand executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by
the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of
police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the
presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by
contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that
obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the
absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving
coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle
argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving
and resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor
of innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it
should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the
guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its
evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No.
052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Valid Waiver
People vs. Omaweng [213 SCRA 462 (1992)]
Accused Conway B. Omaweng was originally indicted for the violation of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. 1 Upon his failure to
submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so,
the court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and,
finding probable cause against the accused, ordered the elevation of the case to
the proper court. 2
On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province
filed an Information charging the accused with the violation of Section 47 Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The accusatory portion
thereof reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"That on or about September 12, 1988, at Dantay, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously dispatch in transit or transport in a Ford Fiera, owned and driven by
him, 10 1/4 kilos of processed marijuana in powder form contained in al plastic
bags of different sizes which were placed in a travelling bag destained (sic) and
intended for delivery, disposition and sale in Sagada, Mountain Province, with full
knowledge that said processed marijuana is (sic) prohibited drug or from which
(sic) prohibited drug maybe manufactured.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 713.
After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, 4 the
accused entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989.
During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses. The
accused did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory
Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph
Layong and David Fomocod.
On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment 5 convicting the
accused of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4,
Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon the accused herein
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos.
Pursuant to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the aforecited special law, the drugs subject of the
crime are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government.
Accordingly, it is further directed that such drugs so confiscated and forfeited be
destroyed without delay per existing rules and regulations on the
matter.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED." 6
Hence, this appeal.
In the Appellant’s Brief, Accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of
the following errors.
"I
. . . IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JOINT CLARIFICATORY STATEMENT OF THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT THE OWNER
OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
III
. . . IN NOT RULING THAT THE CONTRABAND SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH (sic) AND SEIZURE." 7
The appeal is without merit. The decision appealed from must be upheld.
After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence, We find to have been fully
proven the following facts as summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for
the Appellee. 8
"In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the
Mt. Province PC Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC
soldiers to Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per instruction of their officer, Capt.
Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to
Sagada and the other to Bontoc (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4). They stopped
and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint (TSN, April 5, 1990, p.
12).
At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne
Famocod (sic), saw and flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate
No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5, 8). The vehicle was driven by appellant and
had no passengers (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5).
Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant
acceded to the request. (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5). When they peered
into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered
by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 6, 10, 11).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Layong and his companions asked permission to see the contents of the bag
(TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 6). Appellant consented to the request but told them
that it only contained some clothes (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 6). When Layong
opened the bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of
different sizes containing pulverized substances (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7,
9).
Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod,
who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana (TSN, November 9,
1989, p. 16).
The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and
proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7-8) The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the
evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7-8).
Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, who has conducted more than 2500 professional examinations of
marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry examinations of
the substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found
them to be positive for hashish or marijuana (TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 3, 5-
81)." 9
Anent the first assigned error, the accused contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that he is the owner of the marijuana found inside the travelling bag which
he had in his vehicle, a Ford Fiera Proof of ownership is immaterial. Accused was
prosecuted for the dispatching in transit or transporting of prohibited drugs
pursuant to Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. This section does
not require that for one to be liable for participating in any of the proscribed
transactions enumerated therein, he must be the owner of the prohibited drug. It
simply reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor,
or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed."cralaw virtua1aw library
This section penalizes the pusher, who need not be the owner of the prohibited
drug. The law defines pusher as "any person who sells, administers, delivers, or
gives away to another, on any terms whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in
transit or transports any dangerous drug or who acts as a broker in any of such
transactions, in violation of this Act. 10
In People v. Alfonso, 11 where the accused was charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana under the aforesaid Section 4, this Court ruled that
ownership is not a basic issue.cralawnad
The facts, as proven by the prosecution, establish beyond cavil that the accused
was caught in the act of transporting the prohibited drug or, in other words, in
flagrante delicto. That he knew fully well what he was doing is shown beyond
moral certainty by the following circumstances: (a) the prohibited drug was found
in a travelling bag, (b) he is the owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag
behind a spare tire, (d) he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera in which
he loaded the bag was under his absolute control, pursuant to Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court (on circumstantial evidence), the combination of all
these circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Such circumstances, unrebutted by strong and convincing evidence by the
accused, even gave rise to the presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited
drug. 12
The second assigned error is devoid of merit. The declaration in the joint
clarificatory sworn statement executed by the apprehending officers, that the
marijuana subject of the case was surreptitiously placed by an unknown person
in the bag of the accused, is not supported by evidence. Said sworn statement
cannot be used as a basis for exoneration because the very same officers who
signed the same reiterated on the witness stand their statements in their original
affidavit implicating the accused, both the criminal complaint before the Municipal
Trial Court of Lontoc and the information in this case were based on this original
affidavit. No probative value could be assigned to it not only because it was
procured by the defense under questionable circumstances, but also because the
affiants therein merely expressed their personal opinion. The trial court’s correct
exposition on this point, to which nothing more may be added, deserves to be The third assignment of error hardly deserves any consideration Accused was not
quoted, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 14 If one had
been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the
"From the portions of the ‘Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement- of prosecution citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest
witnesses Layong and Fomocod cited (Exhs. "I" to "I-C" ; p 155, Record), the duties and privileges of the Court." 15 He willingly gave prior consent to the
defense would want this Court to draw the inference that the accused Conway search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling
Omaweng is innocent as confirmed by no less than the persons who apprehended bag. Prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:chanrobles lawlibrary :
the suspect in flagranti (sic). In other words, that the said accused is not the rednad
owner of the contraband confiscated but someone else; that to (sic) mysterious
individual placed the prohibited articles inside the travelling bag of the accused
without the knowledge and consent of the latter; and that the identity of this "PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
shadowy third person is known by the PC/INP investigators. The isolated
declarations, albeit under oath are much too asinine to be true and do not affect
the credibilities of the witnesses — affiants and the truth of their affirmations on Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
the stand. As gleaned from parts of the record of the reinvestigation of this case
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal (Exhs "G" and "D" ; pp. 158 and 161, Record),
it appears that Layong and Fomocod were prevailed upon to affix their signatures
A When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
to (sic) the document styled as ‘Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement’ by
contents.
interested persons in a vain ploy to extricate the accused from the morass he got
himself into. Testifying in open court, the same witnesses maintained the tenor of
their original affidavit supporting the filing of the criminal complaint in the lower
court (Exh. "C" ; p. 2, Record) No additional information was elicited from said Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
witnesses during their examination from which it can reasonably be deduced that
a third person instead of the accused is the culprit and that the suspect is being
framed-up for a crime he did not commit. Nonetheless, granting arguendo that A He said ‘you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).’
the declarations of Layong and Fomocod now the bone of contention, are on the
level, the same are but mere opinions and conclusions without bases. Any which
way, to believe that any person in his right mind owning several kilos of hot Q When he said that, what did you do?
hashish worth tens of thousands of pesos would simply stash it away in the
travelling bag of someone he has no previous agreement with is a mockery of
common sense. And to think further that the PC/INP agents know of such fact yet A We asked him if we could open and see it.
they kept the vital information under ‘confidential Status’ (whatever that means
in police parlance) while an innocent person is being prosecuted and practically in
the shadow of the gallows for the offense would be stretching human credulity to
Q When you said that, what did he tell you?
the snapping point. By and large, the fact remains as the circumstances logically
indicate that the accused Conway Omaweng has knowledge of the existence of
the contraband inside his vehicle and he was caught red-handed transporting the
hot stuff." 13 A He said you can see it.
Q And when he said ‘you can see and open it,’ what did you do?

"A" The bag was not positively identified to be

A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic)
that was contained in the bag.
the same bag allegedly found inside the

Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
vehicle driven by the accused. The

A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents
arresting officers failed to show any
and showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said
it was marijuana." 16

identifying marks; thug, said bag is an

This testimony was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by the accused
for he chose not to testify on his own behalf.
irrelevant evidence not admissible in court;

Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
As this Court stated in People v. Malasugui: 17 "A-1" to "A-40" Objected to also as irrelevant as the 40

". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of bags now being offered are not the same
(sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such bags alleged in the information which is 41
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."cralaw virtua1aw library

bags. The prosecution failed to proved (sic)

Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were
found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for
such seizure. Besides, when said packages were identified by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibit "A-1"
witnesses and later on formally offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any
objection whatsoever. Thus, in the accused’s Comments And/Or Objections To
Offer of Evidence, 18 We merely find the following:chanrobles law library
to "A-40" are the same bags allegedly taken

"EXHIBIT COMMENTS AND/OR OBJECTIONS

from inside Exhibit "A" because what is
supposed to be inside the bag are 41 bags
and not 40 bags."cralaw virtua1aw library
x x x
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial t of Bontoc,
Mountain Province of 21 March 1991 in Criminal Case No. 713 finding the accused
CONWAY B. OMAWENG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Correa [285 SCRA 679 (1998)]
The courts should not hesitate to wield the sword against drug traffickers whose
conscience has been seared by their insatiable greed for instant wealth, thus
propelling them to boldly pursue their abominable trade, utterly unconcerned of
the pernicious effects of their venomous merchandise which have destroyed the
lives and shattered the dreams of hapless victims, especially the vulnerable
youth.
This the trial court did in the present case when it imposed the most severe
penalty of death and a fine of Ten Million Pesos against the three (3) appellants
for delivering and transporting more than 16 kilograms of prohibited dried
marijuana flowering tops.
While the conviction of the appellants of the crime charged is proper, we find,
however, that the penalty of death imposed by the trial court is not in accordance
with the law.
On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 35), docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-137528, indicting appellants
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @ Dodong, and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ Boy Kuba for having violated Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425,1 as amended, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about June 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, not
being authorized by law to possess, sell, deliver, transport, give away to another
or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and jointly deliver or transport eight (8) bundles of dried flowering
tops of MARIJUANA wrapped in pieces of papers and plastic tapes weighing
16.1789 kilograms, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
The Information indicated that the appellants were All Under Arrest and that No
Bail (was) Recommended.3cräläwvirtualibräry
When arraigned, the appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY.
After trial, the lower court found the appellants guilty as charged, the dispositive
portion of the decision dated 03 March 1995 reading thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the three accused ANTONIO
CORREA y CAYTON, @ Boyet, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE @ Dodong, and
LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS @ Boy Kuba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
unlawful delivery and transportation of dried marijuana flowering tops weighing
16.1789 kilograms, penalized under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and further amended by Section 13 in relation to Section 17
About a week prior to June 18, 1994, the Police Operatives from the Drug
of Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing each of the said three accused to
Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) had
DEATH to be executed by the means provided by law, and to pay a fine of P
placed under surveillance the movements and activities of appellant Leonardo
10,000,000.00, plus the costs.
Dulay on account of confidential and intelligence reports received in said Unit
about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police
surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulays illegal drug trade
The eight (8) bundles in brick form of dried marijuana flowering tops (Exhibits B-
(TSN, Nov. 22, 1994, pp. 16-17).
1 to B-8, inclusive), weighing 16.1789 kilograms are ordered confiscated and
forfeited to the Government to be disposed of in accordance with law under the
direction and supervision by the Dangerous Drugs Board. Within ten (10) days
On June 17, 1994, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, the Units Operatives,
following the promulgation of this judgment, the Branch Clerk of this Court, is
DEU-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila was alerted by a police informant that
ordered to turn over the two (2) bundles of dried marijuana flowering tops left
Dulay, coming from Quezon City, would deliver and transport that night, to
with this Court to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian, National Bureau of
Bambang Street, Manila a certain quantity of drugs. Dulay reportedly would pass
Investigation, as appointed by the Dangerous Drugs Board, for appropriate
A. Bonifacio Street on board a semi-stainless owner-type jeep with Plate No.
disposition. The other six (6) bundles of said dried marijuana flowering tops have
FMR-948. Forthwith, a nine-man team headed by SPO3 Jesus Faller was
been left in the custody of the NBI, Forensic Chemistry Division.
organized to pursue and bag the suspect. Thereafter, the operatives, together
with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board three vehicles. They
inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery, boundary of Quezon
The owner-type jeep with plate No. FMR 948 used by the three accused as a
City and Manila, at around 11:00 oclock that same evening, and waited for the
means to commit the offense is also ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of
suspect (Id., pp. 4; 19-20).
the Government, unless it can be shown that it is in the property of a third
person not liable for the offense.

Around 3:00 oclock in the morning of June 18, 1994, the police informant spotted
the approaching vehicle of Dulay and immediately alerted the waiting policemen.
Serve a copy of this Decision on the Executive Director, Dangerous Drugs Board,
The operatives tailed the subject jeepney, taking care that its passengers would
for his information and guidance.
not notice that they were being followed (Id., p. 5).

SO ORDERED.4cräläwvirtualibräry
The verdict of conviction by the trial court rested mainly on the testimony of
prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus Faller, a police officer assigned at Police Station
3, Western Police District, City of Manila.5 He was among the nine-member police
team of the Drug Enforcement Unit - Western Police District Command (DEU-
WPDC) which arrested the three (3) appellants in the early morning of 18 June
1994.6 His account of the arrest, as correctly narrated in the Appellees Brief, is
as follows:
Upon reaching the intersection of Bambang Extension and Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, the subject vehicle stopped and parked at a corner.
Thereupon, the operatives also stopped and parked their vehicles around the
suspects vehicle and accosted the passengers of the owner-type jeepney.
Appellant Antonio Correa was at the drivers seat with appellant Leonardo Dulay
sitting beside him in the front seat and appellant Rito Gunida at the back seat
(Id., p. 21). The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking
Lard (Exhibit B), about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The
can contained eight bundles of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped
in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands
and marked each bundle consecutively with IDR-1 to IDR-8 (Exhibits B-1 to B-8 taken to the headquarters of the WPDC at U.N. Avenue, and there placed in a
inclusive). The three suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU- cell.
WPDC for investigation (Id., pp. 5-9; Exhs. E, F and G).

The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The
tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for marijuana and
weighed 16.1789 kilograms (TSN, Nov. 15, 1994, p. 11; Exhs. D and D-
1).7cräläwvirtualibräry
In addition to their respective declarations, the three accused likewise offered the
testimonies of Marilene de la Rosa, Violeta Almugela, Juanito Balino, Rogelio Altis
and Pascual Gillego to corroborate the claim of the defense.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Assailing the verdict of conviction, the appellants interpose the following
assignment of errors:

The appellants, on the other hand, had a different story on their arrest. The trial
court, in its decision subject for review, has summarized the appellants version THE LOWER COURT ERRED:
thus:

I
The common defense interposed by the three accused is in the nature of alibi.
The core of their contention is that they were arrested without warrant in
Camarin D, Caloocan City. They also denied that they were delivering and
IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE, AS ALL THE ACCUSED WERE
transporting dried marijuana flowering tops when they were apprehended.
APPREHENDED AT THEIR RESPECTIVE RESIDENCES IN CAMARIN, KALOOKAN
CITY, NOT IN MANILA AS THE LAWMEN MADE IT APPEAR WHERE THE THREE (3)
ACCUSED ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE.
Also stripped of incidental details, the version of the defense is to the effect that
on June 17, 1994, at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Leonardo Dulay rushed
to the Metropolitan Hospital his gravely ill and very weak six months old son Jon-
II
Jon. He was accompanied by his co-accused Antonio Correa, who drove the
owner-type jeep which they used, and a neighbor known only as Bulik. At around
11:00 oclock the same evening, Leonardo Dulay, Antonio Correa and Bulik went
back home to get the things of the sick child. However, when they were already IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED FROM THE ACCUSED,
near the house of Leonardo Dulay in Camarin D, Caloocan City, some elements of THE SAME BEING INADMISSIBLE BEING THE FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
the Western Police District Command blocked their (accused) way, and CONDUCTED WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT.
apprehended them for an alleged charge of trafficking on shabu, and were
brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained.
III

x x x according to accused Rito Gunida, he was picked-up by the police in his

house at Camarin II, Area D, Caloocan City, on June 17, 1994, at around 12:00 IN BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS SOLELY ON THE
oclock midnight. The arresting officers rose (sic) him from his sleep. He was also UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF SPO3 JESUS FALLER OF THE WPDC DESPITE
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OTHER EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE OPERATIVES THAT
ALLEGEDLY TOOK PART IN THE ARREST OF THE THREE (3) ACCUSED.
IV
IN CONVICTING THE THREE (3) ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.9cräläwvirtualibräry
The appellants submission is palpably without merit.
The first, third and fourth assigned errors aforequoted are closely interrelated
and, therefore, the same shall be discussed jointly.
The appellants plead in exculpation that their version should be believed because
the defense has indubitably established that they were arrested in their
respective residences in Camarin, Caloocan City by the police team of SPO3 Jesus
Faller of the Western Police District Command, Manila. The appellants claim that -
x x x. Witnesses Juanita Balino, Marlene dela Rosa, Violeta Almojuela and Rogelio
Altis are unanimous in their declaration that the arresting officers were in
Camarin, Kalookan City, when they arrested the three accused. As against the
testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller, the positive declaration of the foregoing
witnesses for the defense should prevail. Since SPO3 Jesus Faller belongs to the
Western Police District Command, he orchestrated his testimony to make it
appear that the arrest of the three accused and the confiscation of the alleged
marijuana took place in Bambang, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which is too far and remote
from the residences of the three accused who are all residents of Camarin,
Kalookan City. The arrest of the three accused in Camarin, Kalookan City, were
illegal and the alleged confiscation of evidence invalid, granting that there really
were evidence confiscated from the three accused. To cure the flaw in the arrest
of the accused and the warrantless confiscation, Faller made it appear that the
accused were transporting marijuana in Bambang, Sta. Cruz, Manila and that
they tailed the accused until Bambang Street, when in truth and in fact, the three
accused were illegally apprehended in Camarin, Kalookan City, and they really
have to pass through A. Bonifacio Street, on their way to Western Police
Headquarters at the U.N. Avenue.
To avoid inconsistencies in their statements and oral declaration in court, the
other eight (8) members of the arresting team x x x were not presented as
witnesses and their testimonies were withheld by the prosecution. We do not find
any reason why not one of them corroborated the testimony of SPO3 Faller.
There is a legal presumption that if an evidence is intentionally withheld when
there is opportunity to offer the same, (the said evidence) is deemed to be
adverse to the party withholding the same. Not a single corroboration came for
the said eight members of the arresting team.10 (Emphasis ours)
That is all the appellants could say in assailing the credibility of prosecution star
witness SPO3 Jesus Faller. Nothing suggestion was mentioned about any
inconsistencies in the testimony of Faller. Neither was there any that Faller
harbored ill-feeling against the appellants.
The appellants allegations that (t)o cure the flaw in (their) arrest, SPO3 Jesus
Faller orchestrated his testimony and made it appear that the accused were
transporting marijuana in Bambang, Sta. Cruz, Manila and were arrested thereat,
and that (t)o avoid inconsistencies in their statements and oral declaration in
court, the other eight (8) members of the arresting team...were not presented as
witnesses, are nothing but mere conjectures and suspicions which have zero
probative value. Conjectures and suspicions are not evidence; ergo, they prove
nothing.
Moreover, the testimonies of the other members of the apprehending team
would, at best, have been merely corroborative of Jesus Fallers testimony. Thus,
the trial court did not err in giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of
Jesus Faller and in rejecting the appellants defense of alibi and denial.
There is no law requiring that a testimony of a witness be corroborated in order
to be believed.11 The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is
sufficient to produce a conviction.12 The failure to present all the eyewitnesses to
an act does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption, especially
when the testimony of the witness sought to be presented is merely
corroborative.13 A corroborative testimony is not necessary where the details of
the crime have clearly been testified to with sufficient
clarity.14cräläwvirtualibräry
The matter of selecting and presenting witnesses for the People is a prerogative
of the public prosecutor.15 Thus, the non-presentation by the prosecution of
certain witnesses is not a valid defense for the accused, neither does it work
against the prosecutions cause.16 Where, as here, the accused believes that the
testimonies of said witnesses are important to his cause, as when he expects
them to make declarations inconsistent with that of the principal prosecution
witness, then he should avail of them even by compulsory judicial process if
necessary.17cräläwvirtualibräry
In any case, the public prosecutors choice of SPO3 Jesus Faller as the only
witness to testify on the appellants arrest was proper. Faller was the one who
received from the informant the confidential information about the illegal drug
trafficking activities of appellant Leonardo Dulay.18 Since the said information
was so confidential, Faller placed appellant Dulay under police surveillance with
only PO3 Ebia and their informant as his (Fallers) companions.19 After a week of
surveillance, the informant again reported to Faller in the evening of 17 June
1994 that the appellants would deliver illegal drugs that night to Bambang on
board a vehicle, and it was Faller who also headed the nine-man police team in
tailing the appellants and arresting them after finding the illegal drugs in their
possession.20 Thus, Faller was the best witness to testify on the circumstances of
the appellants arrest.
We have carefully examined the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller to determine
whether or not his testimony is a product of fabrication and we find his testimony
to be credible. Moreover, being a law enforcer, Faller is presumed to have
regularly performed his duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.21 We fully
agree with the observation of the trial court when it said:
Apart from their inherently weak defense, the three accused have not provided
this Court with any other ground to warrant disbelief of the testimony of SPO3
Jesus Faller. They have not as much as hinted that SPO3 Jesus Faller was ill-
motivated in testifying against them. This witness of the People is a police officer.
As such he is presumed to have carried out and performed regularly his official
duties, especially in the absence of any indication in the record showing
otherwise. It has not been claimed that SPO3 Jesus Faller has a personal stake
and interest in the final outcome of this case, or that he would be benefited or
some personal advantage would inure to him if the three accused were convicted.
Whatever is the result of this case he would continue to receive his usual
remuneration as a police officer. More than these, SPO3 Jesus Faller has been
subjected to a lengthy and searching cross-examination by an able and
determined defense counsel de parte, such that any falsehood in his narration
could have been easily detected and exposed. However, he came out from the
ordeal with his narration unimpaired and maintained.
It is a familiar rule consistently applied by the Supreme Court in a long line of
cases, thereby making further citations academic, that where there appears no
evidence in the record indicating that the principal prosecution witness has been
actuated by improper motive in testifying against the accused, the presumption is
that he has not been so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
belief.
The contentions of the defense that on June 18, 1994, at about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa rushed the gravely ill six months
old son of the former to the Metropolitan Hospital located at Magdalena Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, according to Leonardo Dulay (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, p. 11), or at
the corner of Masangkay and Mayhaligue Streets, according to Antonio Correa
(TSN, Dec. 19, 1994, p. 22), and that at around 11:00 oclock in the evening on
the same date they returned to Camarin in Caloocan City to get the things of the
child, but they were not able to do so because elements of the Western Police
District Command, who were waiting near the house of Leonardo Dulay, arrested
them (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, pp. 12 & 15; Id., Dec. 19, 1994, pp. 23-26), do not
deserve belief by this Court. Aside from the observed discrepancy in their
testimonies about the location of the Metropolitan Hospital, the Booking Sheets
and Arrest Reports (Exhibits E and G) conclusively reveal that as early as 4:00
oclock in the morning on June 18, 1994, they had been in the custody of the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command at U.N. Avenue,
Ermita, Manila, undergoing police investigation. Although objected to by the
defense counsel on the ground that Antonio Correa and Leonardo Dulay signed
Exhibits E and G, respectively, without the assistance of counsel, these
documents, however, were offered by the prosecution and admitted by the Court
only for the purpose of showing that a police investigation was conducted
following the arrest of the two accused. The signatures of the two accused on
these documents are, thus, immaterial and will not alter the fact that they were
in the Office of the DEU-WPDC at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, from 4:00 oclock
in the morning on June 18, 1994, being investigated by the police authorities in
connection with the offense now in question.
prosecution. (People vs. Chavez, et al., 117 SCRA 221, 227; People vs. Campana,
124 SCRA 271, 281.)
The attempt of the defense to corroborate its claim that the three accused were
arrested in Camarin, Caloocan City, and not in Bambang Extension corner of
Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, with the testimonies of Marilene de la Rosa,
Violeta Almugela, Juanita Balino, Rogelio Altisi and Pascual Gillego, did not
provide any improvement to its weak and crippled position.

Marilene de la Rosa is the niece of Leonardo Dulay who finances her studies.
One more thing. The clear implication of the claim of the defense is that the sick (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, p. 4.) In view of her close relationship with her uncle and the
child of Leonardo Dulay was confined in the Metropolitan Hospital, otherwise its financial support he extends to her, it would be unnatural if she does not feel a
contention that Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa went back to Camarin, very strong bias in favor of her uncle and provider.
Caloocan City to get the things of the child would bear no sense. The hospital
records of said child are, therefore, the best evidence which would conclusively
confirm their pretense. Surprisingly, however, and for no stated reason, the
Violeta Almugela contradicted the testimonies of Leonardo Dulay and Antonio
defense failed to offer in the evidence those hospital records of the son of
Correa on a vital aspect of their defense. In the course of her direct examination,
Leonardo Dulay. The significance of this omission is fatal to the cause of the
she declared:
defense. It means that there were no such hospital records because no child of
Leonardo Dulay was hospitalized on or about June 18, 1994, and that this was
merely fabricated by the defense to provide some loopholes through which these
two accused may elude the law. ATTY. MORALES (Defense counsel)

The alibi of Rito Gunida that he was sleeping in his house at Camarin II, Area D, Madam witness, where were you on June 17, 1994, at about midnight?
Caloocan City, on June 17, 1994, when at around midnight he was awakened and
arrested by some policemen cannot outweigh and prevail over the testimony of
SPO3 Jesus Faller that he and his co-police officers arrested this accused, A: I was at the Hospital, sir.
together with Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa, on June 18, 1994, at more or
less, 3:45 oclock in the morning at Bambang Extension corner Jose Abad Santos
Avenue in Tondo, Manila, in the act of delivering and transporting marijuana, Q: What Hospital are you referring to?
using a motorized vehicle. In weighing conflicting statements and declarations of
opposing witnesses, the accepted rule consistently applied by the courts is that
where the testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution regarding the A: Infant Jesus, sir.
commission by the accused of the offense in question is positive, clear and
trustworthy, like in the case at bar, the latters denials and explanation cannot
outweigh and prevail over such positive, clear and trustworthy evidence of the
Q: What time did you arrive at Infant Jesus Hospital?
 A: At Magdalena, Sta. Cruz, Manila, sir.

A: At 5:00, sir.

xxx

Q: Who were with you when you arrived?

Q: When did you bring your son to the Metropolitan Hospital?

A: I was with Boy Dulay and Josephine Dulay and a certain Antonio, sir.

A: On June 18, sir.

xxx

Q: What time?

Q: Where did you proceed?

A: 5:00 oclock, sir. (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, pp. 11-12)

A: We proceeded to Metro Hospital, sir.

There was no mention in the testimony of Leonardo Dulay that his sick son was
first taken to the Infant Jesus Hospital at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on June
Q: Where is that situated?
18, 1994.

A: At Tayuman, Tondo, sir. (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, pp. 12-14.)

Antonio Correa, testifying on the same incident, gave another version. He
declared:

Leonardo Dulay, on the other hand, declared under the direct examination of his
counsel:
Q: Where is Metropolitan Hospital?

Q: Where is that Metropolitan Hospital situated?

A: At Masangkay corner Mayhaligue Street.

A: In Magdalena, sir.
Q: What City?

Q: Magdalena what?
A: Manila, sir.
xxx
Q: Why did you go to Metropolitan Hospital?
A: In order to have the child of Leonardo Dulay medically attended, sir.
xxx
Q: What time did you bring the son of Dulay to the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: From 5:00 oclock in the afternoon up to past 11:00 oclock.
xxx
Q: Now, what time did you leave the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: Past 11:00 oclock, sir. (TSN, Dec. 19, 1994, pp. 22-23)
The discrepancies in the testimonies of defense witness Violeta Almugela,
accused Leonardo Dulay and accused Antonio Correa cannot be lightly ignored as
discrepancies in minor details, because such alleged incident forms a major link
in the defense of the accused, and the main basis of their alibi defense.
The testimony of Juanita Balino deserves but a passing consideration by this
Court. According to her on June 17, 1994, at about midnight she was in her
house in Camarin Petchayan, Caloocan City, when Boy Dulay, Antonio Correa,
Gunida and one Violeta Almugela were taken by armed police officers. But
because after they passed by she got afraid she went back to sleep. (TSN, Jan. 9,
1995, p. 23-24.) Her testimony was so trivial, such that even the Assistant
Prosecutor found her unworthy for further cross-examination.
We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
common knowledge, usual observation, and daily experience. To be worthy of
credence, the testimony of a witness should be so natural, reasonable and
probable in view of the event which it describes or to which it relates, so as to
make it easy for the mind to accept. In this case, despite the startling occurrence
which happened before her eyes, which even scared her, Juanita Balino
nonchalantly went back to sleep, unconcerned with what may happen next. This
is not the usual way a person of her age, 57 years old, and status conducts
himself(sic) in the face of a shocking event.
Rogelio A. Altis, Sr., a barangay kagawad of Barangay 178, Zone 15, of Caloocan
City, had no personal knowledge of the alleged incident which supposedly took
place at about midnight on June 17, 1994. He learned it only on June 20, 1994,
when one Ursula Gunida reported it to him. (TSN, Jan. 11, 1995, p. 3) It has not
been explained why it took Ursula Gunida until June 20, 1994 to report to the
barangay authorities the incident which allegedly happened on June 17, 1994.
The same may be said with respect to the testimony of defense witness Pascual
Gillego. He admitted that he learned of the alleged arrest of the three accused
only from his neighbors. But he took no steps to report the matter to his
superiors in the barangay. x x x. (TSN, Jan. 11, 1995, pp. 6, 9).
The testimonies of Rogelio Altis, Sr. and Pascual Gillego are hearsay, and as such
it has no probative value and should be disregarded whether objected to or not.
If no objection is made, it becomes evidence only by reason of want of such
objection, but its admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of
weight. Its nature and quality remains the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness
and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned. (People vs. Valero, 112
SCRA 661, 675.)22cräläwvirtualibräry
We should accord great weight and respect to the findings of fact of the trial
court which is in a better position to determine questions involving the credibility
of witnesses, it having directly heard them and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying.23 In the absence of any showing that the trial court had
overlooked certain substantial facts which would alter the conviction of the
appellants, we do not find any reason to overturn the trial courts findings as to
facts.
What is of paramount importance in the present case is the positive identification
by prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus Faller of the three (3) appellants, who were
caught in flagrante delicto transporting the subject dried marijuana flowering
tops. This should prevail over the appellants alibi and denials of having
committed the crime with which they were charged in the lower court, since as
between the positive declaration of the prosecution witness and the negative
statements of the appellants, the former deserves more
credence.24cräläwvirtualibräry
In the second, and final assigned error, the appellants assail the admission of the
seized marijuana flowering tops as evidence against them, arguing that the same
was the fruit of an illegal search conducted without any search warrant.
The appellants contention is untenable. However, it would serve no useful
purpose to discuss at length this alleged error, for the following reasons:
(1) The appellants are now precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation during
the search and seizure. The appellants never protested when SPO3 Jesus Faller,
after identifying himself as a police officer, opened the tin can loaded in the
appellants vehicle and found eight (8) bundles.25 And when Faller opened one of
the bundles, it smelled of marijuana.26 The NBI later confirmed the eight (8)
bundles to be positive for marijuana.27 Again, the appellants did not raise any
protest when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were
brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. We
have ruled in a long line of cases28 that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631). The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
(2) The appellants effectively waived their constitutional right against the search
and seizure in question by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by
participating in the trial.29cräläwvirtualibräry
We agree with the trial court that the appellants conspired to commit the offense
which they knew to be unlawful:
The established circumstances of this case, considered collectively, demonstrate
beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy among the three accused to commit the
offense at bar. They were apprehended at the same time; travelling together in a
motorized vehicle from the time they were first spotted by the arresting police
officers at A. Bonifacio Street until their actual arrest at Bambang Extension
corner Jose Abad Santos Avenue in Tondo, Manila; at an unholy hour of the night
(until) around 3:00 to 3:45 oclock in the morning on June 18,1994; with Antonio
Correa at the steering wheel, Leonardo Dulay seated in front beside the driver
and Rito Gunida seated at the back of the motor vehicle; carrying for delivery and
transportation a large quantity of dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in
tightly with plastic tapes and concealed in a big tin can of El Cielo Vegetable
Cooking Oil (Exhibit B). These factors leave the mind of this Court at ease and
free from any doubt that indeed the three accused had conspired and helped one
another in the delivery and transportation of the said contraband. Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 6425 provides:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescibed by this Act for the
commission of the offence shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy
commit the same in the following cases:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous
drugs;
xxx xxx xxx 30cräläwvirtualibräry
It was also duly established that the total weight of the dried marijuana flowering
tops involved in this case is 16.1789 kilograms as testified to by NBI Forensic
Chemist Emilia A. Rosales.31cräläwvirtualibräry
The only error committed by the trial court, as we stated in the beginning, is its
imposition of the death penalty on the appellants. Although this matter is not
assigned as an error by the appellants, however, in a criminal case, an appeal to
this Court throws the whole case open to review and it becomes our duty to
correct an error as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether it is
made the subject of assignment of errors or not.32cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court considered the appellants use of a motor vehicle in the commission
of the offense as an aggravating circumstance, thus raising the penalty from
reclusion perpetua which is the imposable penalty prescribed by law33 to death.
Justifying the penalty of death, the trial court made the following observation:
In view of the volume of dried marijuana flowering tops involved in this case, and
the attendance of the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by
means of a motor vehicle, the Court, with deep regret and sorrow, finds no other
alternative but to impose on each of the three accused the supreme penalty of
death and fine prescribed by law. Undoubtedly the three accused used an owner-
type jeep with plate No. FMR 948 as a means to carry, deliver and transport their
illegal merchandise; to elude detection of their drug trafficking activities by the
police authorities; and to facilitate escape in case their crime is discovered.
(People vs. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400.)34 (Emphasis ours)
True, Section 20, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code considers as aggravating
circumstance a situation when the crime be committed x x x by means of motor
vehicles, airships, or other similar means. However, the use by the appellants of
a motor vehicle in this case should not be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance because the very act of transporting the prohibited drug is what is
being punished under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No.
7659 (the heinous crimes law). The said law provides:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. (Emphasis ours)
The act of transporting a prohibited drug, like the one at bar, is a malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law.35 The use of a
motor vehicle is inherent in the crime of transporting the prohibited drug. It is a
wrongful act because it is prohibited by law.36 Without the law punishing the act,
it cannot be considered a wrong.37 As such, the mere commission of said act is
constitutive of the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an
individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal
intent.38cräläwvirtualibräry
Admittedly, the law does not define how the act of transporting can be
committed. But, how else can one transport something to another place except
by the use of a carrier. Blacks Law Dictionary defines transport as to carry or
convey from one place to another.39 Under Section 4, Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs is by itself an offense. Again, Black defines transportation as the
movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.40 The
operative words in the definition are to carry or convey.41 The fact that there is
actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was
committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached.42cräläwvirtualibräry
(Emphasis ours)

Simply stated, the motor vehicle which was used to transport prohibited drugs
The case of People vs. Espejo cited by the trial court in support of its ruling that
was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime since such act
the use of a motor vehicle in this case is an aggravating circumstance, is one for
of transporting constitutes the crime itself, punishable under Section 4, Article II
robbery with homicide punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which has an
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. That a motor vehicle was used in
entirely different factual setting and, therefore, the ruling therein should not be
committing the crime is merely incidental to the act of transporting prohibited
applied in the case at bench. In any event, the finding of the trial court that the
drugs. The use of a motor vehicle is inherent in the crime of transporting as it
appellants use of the motor vehicle was intended to elude detection of their drug
must of necessity accompany the commission thereof; hence, such use is not an
trafficking activities by the police authorities and to facilitate escape in case their
aggravating circumstance.
crime is discovered is baseless. The prosecution failed to establish this matter.
Such intention cannot simply be presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence as conclusively as the crime itself.
Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 7659, reads:

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance which attended the

commission of the offense in this case, and considering that the quantity of the
Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
subject prohibited drug exceeded 750 grams, the proper penalty that should be
of habitual delinquency. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual
imposed on each of the appellants is reclusion perpetua and a fine of Ten Million
delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or
Pesos.43cräläwvirtualibräry
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, in
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
Criminal Case No. 94-137528 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that the accused-
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
appellants ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE and
prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its
increasing the penalty.
entire duration. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellants.

xxx
SO ORDERED.

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances
inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
xxx
People vs. Ramos (G.R. 85401-02, June 4, 1990)
Appellant Rosalinda Ramos seeks the reversal of the decisions of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 73, Third Judicial Region at Olongapo City, finding her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 5990 for violating Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and in
Criminal Case No. 5991 for violating Section 4 of the same Act and sentencing
her to:
1) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day and a fine of P6,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. 5990; and
2) Life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 5991.
The two informations filed against the appellant respectively alleged:
Criminal Case No. 5990
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1982 in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused without being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his/her/their person, possession and control twenty (20)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
Criminal Case No. 5991
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1982 in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes which is/are prohibited
drug(s). (Rollo, p. 68)
The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the Solicitor-General, is
as follows:
On November 29,1982, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, a civilian informer
came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a
cigarette vendor by the name of 'Mama Rose' was selling marijuana at the comer
of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City (TSN, pp. 4-5, 13, May 4, 1984;
pp. 3-4, 11, April 9, 1986). Captain Castillo instructed the informant to conduct a
test buy. He gave to the informant two (2) five-peso bills, noting first the serial
numbers in his pocket note (TSN, pp. 5,14-15, May 4, 1984; p. 4, April 9, 1986).
The informer left and after thirty (30) minutes came back and gave to Captain
Castillo two (2) sticks of marijuana cigarettes (Exhibit 'C-2') which he bought
from appellant. Captain Castillo again instructed the informer to make another
test buy from the suspect. From his wallet, Captain Castillo extracted another two
(2) five-peso bills and before handing the same to the informer, recorded the
serial numbers in his pocket note (TSN, pp. 19-21, May 4, 1984).
A team composed of Captain Castillo, Sgt. Tahil Ahamad, CIC Danilo Santiago
and Angel Sudiacal left with the informer. The informer proceeded to where
appellant was selling cigarettes to conduct the next test buy while the NARCOM
agents waited at the Black and White Open Bar located at 7th Street, Rizal
Avenue, Olongapo City (TSN, pp. 6-7, April 9, 1986). The bar was about three (3)
blocks away from the place where appellant was selling cigarettes (TSN, pp. 19,
8, Id.). After forty-five (45) minutes more or less, the informer arrived at the
Black and White Bar and again gave to Captain Castillo two (2) sticks of
marijuana (Exhibit 'C-l'; TSN, p. 23, May 4, 1984; p. 6, April 9,1986).
The team then proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes.
After Identifying themselves as NARCOM agents, Capt. Castillo told appellant that
she was being placed under arrest for illegal peddling of marijuana. Appellant was
requested to take out the contents of her wallet (TSN, pp. 6-7, April 9, 1986, The
four marked five- peso bills were found among her possessions and were
confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed by Captain Castillo from his
record (TSN, pp. 23-25, May 4, 1984). The initial of Sgt. Tahil Ahamad was also
found from the confiscated five- peso bills (TSN, p. 9, April 9, 1986). Sgt.
Ahamad searched the stall of appellant and found twenty (20) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where appellant displayed
the wares she was selling (TSN, p. 7, April 9, 1986). Appellant was thereafter
brought to the station (TSN, p. 23, May 4, 1984).
At the station, appellant executed a statement confessing to her crimes which
she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal Domingo Cabali, Jr. (TSN, pp. 5-6. June
20,1984; Exhibit 'G').
The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime
Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis. These were confirmed to be marijuana as
evidenced by the Chemistry Report No. MD-363-82 of Marlene Salangad, a
Forensic Chemist of the PCCL (See Exhibit 'B'; TSN, p. 3, Jan. 13, 1986). (Rollo,
pp. 92-94)
having signed anything because she was nervous, Capt. Castillo investigated her
and thereafter was brought to the Fiscal's Office. She signed a document at the
Fiscal's Office; that she was asked if the contents of the document is (sic) true to
which she answered 'No, sir; that she was not assisted by a counsel while being
investigated. She also testified that she stayed at Narcom for five (5) days; that
Capt. Castillo alone investigated her for four (4) hours and that she likewise was
not assisted by counsel at the Fiscal's Office. She claimed that when she was told
by the Fiscal to just sign the document, Fiscal Cabali did not say anything when
she said that the contents of the document are not true. (Rollo, pp. 72)

Appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

On the other hand, the version of the appellant as summarized by the trial court,
is as follows:
I

... [O]n November 29, 1982, between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the evening she
was at the corner of 3rd St., and Rizal Avenue, West Tapinac, Olongapo City, THE FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE SO UNCLEAR AND DOUBTFUL, MAKING THE
selling cigarettes and fruits; that she does not have any table, all she had was a CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL LEG TO
small wooden 'papag' to show her wares and sell them; that she was sitting on STAND ON.
the small 'papag' when Capt. Castillo came and introduced himself followed by
three or four others who were more or less 6 to 8 meters away. She was
surprised why they were there, and that she was invited by Capt. Castillo to the II
NARCOM office for investigation to which invitation she said 'yes' after which she
was taken to the NARCOM office. Before she was taken thereto, the other men
searched the buri bags where she used to place her fruits (records does (sic) not
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AND THE PERSON ARRESTED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT
show what fruits she was selling) and also her small cigarettes (sic) stand; that
OF A WARRANT OF ARREST AND SEIZURE MAY NOT BE USED AGAINST THE
they did not find anything under the 'papag; that when she was ordered to board
ACCUSED AND ANY CONVICTION FROM SUCH EVIDENCE IS NOT VALID AND A
the car, Castillo told her 'sakay na ho, Mama Rose' (please board now, Mama
GROUND FOR REVERSAL.
Rose'); that she was told to bring along her cigarette stand; that inside her
brown wallet, she has fifty (P 50.00) pesos consisting of five pesos and ten
pesos; that it was Sudiacal who took her wallet and Sudiacal took five (5) peso
bills and told her that four (4) five peso bills are the same money which was used III
to buy marijuana from her; that she told the officer that the money was hers as
she has been saving some for the rentals. She claimed that she affixed her
signatures on the four (4) five peso bills because she was forced by Tahil Ahamad THE TRIAL COURT RELIED HEAVILY ON THE CONFESSION OF THE APPELLANT
by saying 'Mama Rose', you sign this, if you are not going to sign this, something AND THE CONFESSION WAS EXTRACTED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
will happen to you, you will get hurt'; that because she is an old woman, she got CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 'TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL'.
scared so she signed. When Tahil Ahamad told her to sign, Ahamad was tailing to
her in a normal manner and seated in front of her; that she cannot remember
IV SALAYSAY NA KUSANG LOOB NA IBINIBIGAY NI ROSALINDA RAMOS Y DAVID
KAY CAPTAIN ARTURO M. CASTILLO PC SA HARAP NI SGT. TAHIL AHAMAD DITO
SA HIMPILAN NG CANU, OLONGAPO CITY, NGAYON 29 NG BUWAN NG
WHEN NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE ARE PRESENT AND PROVEN, NOBYEMBRE 1982.
CONVICTION IS NOT PROPER.

TAGASIYASAT: Gng. Rosalinda Ramos, ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat

V ukol sa paglabag sa ipinagbabawal na gamot. Bago kita tanungin ay nais kong
malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ating bagong saligang batas at ito ay
ang mga sumusunod:
THE REQUISITES IN ORDER TO CONVICT ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE
NOT PRESENT AND NOT COMPLIED WITH. (Rollo, p. 59)
1 Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag sumagot sa aking mga itatanong sa iyo sa
pagsisiyasat na ito,
At the outset, it may be observed that two informations were filed against the
appellant and the lower court imposed two sentences on appellant, one for sale
and the other for possession of marijuana. This Court must emphasize that, 2. Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng isang abogado upang makatulong sa
assuming arguendo, the findings of guilt for both offenses are correct, the trial iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito at
judge nevertheless erred in imposing a separate sentence for possession because
possession of marijuana is inherent in the crime of selling them. (People v. de
Jesus, 145 SCRA 521 [1986]; People v. Andiza, 164 SCRA 642 [1988]) 3. Ano man ang iyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring gamitin laban
or pabor sa iyo saan mang hukuman dito sa ating bansa.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court holds that appellant's guilt in
Criminal Case No. 5991 (sale of marijuana) has not been proven beyond TANONG: Ngayon alam no na ang iyong mga karapatan sa ating bagong saligang
reasonable doubt. batas ikaw ba ay kusang loob na magbibigay ng isang salaysay na pawang
katotohanan at pawang katotohanan lamang sa pagsisiyasat na ito?;

First, the extrajudicial confession extracted from the accused on November 29,
1982 is inadmissible in evidence for being violative of the Constitutional mandate SAGOT: Opo. (Exhibit G)
that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. (Art. III, Section 12(l), This Court finds that such recital of rights falls short of the requirement on proper
Constitution) apprisal of constitutional rights. We quote the ruling in People v. Nicandro (141
SCRA 289 [1986]):

The preliminary statement read to the appellant when her sworn statement was
executed appears as follows: When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of
his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore,
it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not
only duty- bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he
must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly
understands. In other words, the right of a person under interrogation 'to be
informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right , as it
cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since
the right 'to be informed implies comprehension, the degree of explanation
required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and
other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice
it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is
unlettered.
appellant who denies having sold marijuana cigarettes to anyone. (People v. Ale,
145 SCRA 50 [1986]) Without the testimony of the poseur-buyer, there is no
convincing evidence pointing to the accused as having sold marijuana. (People v.
Fernando, 145 SCRA 151 [1986]) In this case, the alleged informant and the
alleged poseur-buyer are one and the same person. We realize that narcotics
agents often have to keep their Identities and those of their informants
confidential. For a prosecution involving the sale or distribution of drugs to
prosper in this particular case, however, the informant has to testify. The
testimony of the poseur-buyer is rendered compelling by the fact that the police
officers were situated three blocks away from where the alleged sale took place.
They did not see the actual sale of marijuana. Thus, Sit. Sudiacal testified:
Q Before you arrested the accused, where did you position yourselves?
A We were at the Black and White Open Bar, sir.

Although the right to counsel is a right that may be waived, such waiver must be
Q How far is that from the place where the accused was selling cigarettes?
voluntary, knowing and intelligent (People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 [1980]).

A It is about three blocks, sir.

To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution now
requires; that for the right to counsel to be waived, the waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. (Art. III, Section 12(l),
Constitution) There is no such written waiver in this case, much less was any Q You did not actually see the accused selling marijuana?
waiver made in the presence of counsel.

A Yes, Sir ...," (TSN, May 4, 1984, p. 8)

Fiscal Cabali, who administered the oath on the appellant's extrajudicial
confession, and the police officers who took it down should know by now that the
procedure they followed results in incompetent evidence. If the purpose is to get xxx xxx xxx
proof which can stand up in court, they should follow the requirements of the
Constitution.
Q Did you actually see the buying of the marijuana?

Second, the alleged poseur-buyer, who also happens to be the alleged informant,
was never presented during trial. The presence and Identity of the poseur-buyer A No, Mam.
is vital to the case as his very existence is being disputed by the accused-

Q So, you did not see anything?
A Yes, Mam.
Q None of the three of you, Sgt. Sudiacal and Captain Castillo witnessed the
actual buy of the three sticks of marijuana?
A Yes, Mam.
Q Your basis of the alleged buy by the informant is his word that he bought it
from the suspect?
A Yes, Mam. (TSN, April 9, 1986, pp. 125-126)
It is a known fact that drug dealings are hard to prove in court. Precisely because
of this difficulty, buy-bust operations have to be conducted and every effort is
taken such that the suspected pusher is caught in flagrante selling prohibited
drugs. For the culprit to be convicted, the element of sale must be unequivocally
established. In this case, the alleged poseur-buyer who could have categorically
asserted that she bought marijuana from the appellant was not presented by the
prosecution. And Sgts. Ahamad and Sudiacal could not attest to the fact of sale
because they were three blocks away. The sale of marijuana was therefore not
positively proven.
Despite the absence of the testimony of the poseur-buyer, the court a quo,
however, relied on circumstantial evidence in concluding that there was indeed a
sale:
In this case, the accused admitted that she was the only one selling cigarettes at
the corner of 3rd Street; the informant told the NARCOM Officers that their
'suspect' is a cigarette vendor positioned thereat. The two (2) 'test buy' yielded
positive results as the informant was able to buy four (4) handrolled sticks of
marijuana cigarettes from her, two at a time. The accused did not ask the reason
why when she was invited for investigation. This act negates innocence and
against human nature, especially after having introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents. In her control and possession, twenty (20) sticks of similar handrolled
marijuana cigarettes were recovered from a trash can under her small table. Her
counsel on cross-examination asked Sgt. Tahil Ahamad the following (TSN, April
9, 1986, p. 14) 'and in order to search that trash can under the table, you have
to ask or request 'Mama Rose' to get out of the way in order to check the
contents of the waste can?' The question was answered, 'We asked permission
from her to stand up so we can look into the contents of her small table, sir.
When investigated, the accused gave her statement which in fact was a
confession where she admitted having sold marijuana cigarettes. She was taken
before the Fiscal to subscribe the same. While she alleged that she told the Fiscal
(Fiscal Cabali) that the contents of her statement are not true, why then did she
sign it before the said Fiscal? Why did she not insist that her denial be registered
on the document so as to repudiate it? Fear could not be a valid reason as she
has already boldly spoken out when she said the contents were not true. The
'marked money' were recovered from her possession. She did not deny that the
four (4) five peso bills were taken from her wallet. She was addressed as 'Mama
Rose' not once but twice by the apprehending officers. Her counsel during the
cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and direct examination of the
accused called and addressed her as 'Mama Rose', and the informant Identified
her not only as Rosalinda Ramos but also as 'Mama Rose'. (At pp. 73-74, Rollo)
This Court finds that the cited circumstantial evidence do not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that there was a sale of marijuana. Considering the severe
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on those who sell or distribute drugs, we
have to insure that evidence of culpability must pass the test of the strictest
scrutiny. We also have to take into account the oftrepeated defense in violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act that the drugs or the marked money were planted by
police officers. More direct and positive evidence is essential.
The failure of the appellant to ask why she was being invited for investigation by
the NARCOM officers does not ipso facto indicate her guilt. Fear could have,
For not successfully meeting the above requirements, the enumerated
prevented her from propounding inquiries to the officers.
circumstantial evidence cannot be a ground for conviction for the sale of
marijuana.

Nor does the fact that' marked money was found in her possession show
incontrovertibly that she is the seller of marijuana. The appellant is a cigarette
With respect to Criminal Case No., 5990, however, this Court upholds the lower
vendor. By the nature of her job, there is a constant exchange of goods for
court's finding that the appellant is guilty of possession of marijuana.
money. It may be far- fetched but it is possible that she came into possession of
the marked money because she accepted it in the course of legitimate sales of
cigarettes. Again, it is only the poseur-buyer who could testify that she gave
marked money to the appellant in exchange for marijuana sticks. Rule 113 Section 6 (b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The fact that the appellant signed the extrajudicial confession despite her SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant. — when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
insistence that its contents were not true does not necessarily signify guilt. As person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
earlier stated the extra-judicial confession cannot be accepted as evidence. It is
useless for purposes of proof of sale of prohibited drugs.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Lastly, this Court fails to see how, from her being addressed as Mama Rose by
the witnesses and appellant's counsel and the alleged informant poseur-buyer,
the sale of marijuana can be inferred. Meanwhile, Section 12 of Rule 126 states:

Rule 133, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sgts. Sudiacal and Ahamad testified that there was an informant who apprised
them of the presence of a drug pusher at the comer of 3rd Street and Rizal
Avenue, Olongapo City. Acting on such information and in their presence, their
superior, Captain Castillo, gave the informant marked money to buy marijuana.
The informant, now turned poseur-buyer, returned with two sticks of marijuana.
Captain Castillo again gave said informant marked money to purchase
:marijuana. The informant-poseur buyer thereafter returned with another two
sticks of marijuana. The police officers then proceeded to the corner of 3rd Street
and Rizal Avenue and effected the arrest of appellant.

From the above facts, it may be concluded that the arresting police officers had
personal knowledge of facts implicating the appellant with the sale of marijuana
to the informant-poseur buyer. We hold therefore that the arrest was legal and
the consequent search which yielded 20 sticks of marijuana was lawful for being
incident to a valid arrest.
The fact that the prosecution failed to prove the sale of marijuana beyond
reasonable doubt does not undermine the legality of the appellant's arrest.
It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order
to regard the detention as legal. The legality of detention does not depend upon
the actual commission of the crime, but upon the nature of the deed when such
characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to who
in the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of
suspending the liberty of the citizen (People v. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667 [1978]).
The obligation to make an arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof the indubitable existence of a crime
(People v. Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415 [1939]).
The appellant argues that if the twenty sticks of marijuana were in a trash can
and it was not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the said trash can
belongs to the appellant, then she cannot be considered as being in possession of
marijuana.
In disposing of this contention, this Court quotes with approval the following
arguments of the Solicitor-General:
Appellant's defense falls against the categorical testimony of the NARCOM agents
that the trash can was found under the table where her legitimate wares were
being sold. This fact was not denied by appellant. Therefore, she was the only
person who had access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate
physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under
the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession exists
when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party. But this is
not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law, possession
necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances
with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual (Black's Law
Dictionary, Abridge, 5th Edition, pp. 606-607). It is only necessary that the
defendant must have dominion and control over the contraband. These
requirements are present in the situation described, where the prohibited drugs
were found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by appellant. In
fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask
appellant to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under the 'papag'
of the appellant. Hence the trash can was positioned in such a way that it was
difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not
for use by her customers.
Appellant's arguments are inherently weak and improbable and cannot stand
against the clear evidence pointing to her actual possession of the prohibited
drug. The raw facts testified to by the NARCOM agents were corroborated by
appellant and their conclusion-that she had possession of the marijuana sticks
found in the trash can- is consistent with law and reason.
Appellant further contends that it is hard to believe that she would keep the
marijuana sticks in a trash can since it is a precious commodity to pushers and
users thereof.
The above argument is misleading. The value of the marijuana is not the primary
consideration in the concealment of the contraband. The primary consideration is
escaping detection and arrest. Obviously, the modus operandi was to dissimulate
the act of selling and possession of marijuana sticks which carries the capital
penalty (sic). Appellant could not display it among her regular wares of cigarettes
and fruits for sale. She had to hide them from public view, but near enough to
have access to them. The trash can, to her thinking, would be the last place to
look for the precious commodity. Unfortunately, she was found out. The
argument that it was an 'unlikely place' to hide the precious contraband is in fact
the very consideration in choosing it as the hiding place for the contraband. (At
pp. 97-100, Rollo)
 the accused intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well
that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a] prohibited drug.
We rule, therefore, that the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence
and the trial court's finding that the appellant is guilty of possession is correct.

Contrary to law. 1

The lower court, however, erred in imposing a fixed penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day for possession of marijuana. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of
Law (Republic Act 4103 as amended) provides that in imposing a prison sentence
R.A. No. 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
for an offense punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court
perpetua 2 and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum which
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The penalty
prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act for possession of marijuana is Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years Court to determine —
and a fine ranging from P6,000 to P12,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 5990 is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years and to pay a fine of
six thousand (P 6,000) pesos. The appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 5991 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:
(1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search
of the accused;
(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of
interrogation conducted by four (4) soldiers one after the other under
intimidating circumstances; and

People vs. Barros [231 SCRA 557 (1994)]

Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information which
read as follows:
That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a passenger in a
Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without lawful
authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry with him as
part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which
(3) misappreciation of facts. 3
The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's
decision are as follows:
That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both
members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing
Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-
as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw accused carrying a carton,
board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under
his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-
as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C
[Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao
inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the
passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered.
Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C
Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused
was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C.
officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton
when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon entering the detachment
the carton was opened in the presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros
was asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied [this]. That
when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers
called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of
the carton of marijuana. That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally
admitted ownership of the carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped
packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").
. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan
General Hospital, Bauko, Mountain Province, for physical examination and a
Medico Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that
accused suffered no physical injuries and that accused was probably under the
influence of marijuana. That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio
Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana.
That after accused was medically examined, he was escorted by three members
of the P.C. to the P.C. detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where the
carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was also brought. That at Tadian, a seizure
receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit "C") pointing out to the
fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from accused
Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the accused (Exhibit "C-1")
and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That in
connection with the confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and
the apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros, the P.C. officers who figured in this
case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao have
correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2", "D",
"D-1", "D-2").
. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages
marked Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and placed in four separate
envelopes, following an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by
Police Officer Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory
test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test
on the four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of marijuana
as per his report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"). 4
The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the
ownership or possession of the carton box containing the four (4) kilos of
marijuana. The trial court summarized the story of the accused in the following
manner:
That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco
Pad, Baguio City. That on September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager,
Engineer Arsenio Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records
from one Billy Cuanguey at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon
arriving at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, accused looked for the
residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a house where someone was
tending a store. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the
man answered that he did not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man
if Billy left [in] his room the tapes and records and the man said he did not know.
Thereafter, accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where Billy
was staying as it was the instruction of his manager. That the following day,
September 6, 1987, after taking breakfast, accused, was going back to Baguio.
On that morning of September 6, 1987, accused Bonifacio Barros boarded the
Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for Baguio City.
That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the
bus and checked the baggages. That a soldier fished out a carton under the seat
of [the] accused and shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered.
Thereafter, the soldier went down with the carton and moments later returned to
the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from the bus. That Mr.
Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his baggage
which consisted of a pasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by
the soldiers to a house where his pasiking was taken and his clothes removed
and his wallet taken. Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of
marijuana but he refused.
. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers
escorted accused to the hospital and from the hospital, they proceeded to the
Municipality of Tadian, Mountain Province. That upon reaching Tadian, accused
was brought to the P.C. Camp and there he saw someone typing. Later, the
soldiers allegedly presented to accused some papers which he was asked to sign
but accused refused. That accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the
papers that something will happen to him. That moments later, accused was
threatened [by] a soldier [who] pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the
paper and because of fear, he had to sign the document marked Exhibit "C."
Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and asked him to sign
his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana. Exhibit "X"
for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution. That after staying at Tadian
for one night, accused was brought back to Sabangan and later transferred to the
Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5
Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that
the police authorities had impermissibly extracted confessions from him after two
(2) hours of interrogation, "under intimidating circumstances," by four (4)
soldiers one after the other. The accused complains that he was not informed of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his rights as an
accused person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without
the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession is
inadmissible as evidence against him.
We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of
appellant Barros. For the trial court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not
taken into consideration the statements which had been obtained from the
appellant during the interrogation conducted by the police officers. The trial
court, so far as can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits
"C", "E" and "B-5," the alleged uncounselled confessions. The trial court made
very clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged; those bases did not include the alleged
confessions:
First — M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the
accused carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when he boarded the bus at
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That the bus conductor pointed to
accused at the checkpoint of Sabangan, Mountain Province. That accused is the
owner of the carton (Exhibit "B"). That the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained
four packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4")
was fished out from under the seat of the accused which fact was admitted by
the accused himself.
Second — That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused
Bonifacio Barros and that he suffered no physical injuries that would show that
the accused was in anyway maltreated by the police authorities, and this fact was
also admitted by accused to the effect that he was never harmed by the police
nor the soldiers. Dra. Aleta also found that the accused was under the influence
of drug[s] and that the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked
marijuana. This is clear evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana
but also a user of said prohibited drugs. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN —
Page 24 — Orpecio).
Third — The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by
the court for laboratory test at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet were all
positive of marijuana per Report No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain
Carlos Figueroa, forensical expert.
Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it
lacks the ring of truth. Besides, it is devoid of any corroboration. Our Supreme
Court in this respect said:
The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear,
positive and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People
vs. Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)." 6
We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros —
i.e., that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had
been violated by the police authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are
found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with
a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the above quoted constitutional
provision. 7 The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding. 8
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying
out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain
exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving
vehicles. 9 Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles —
automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to
secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. 10 In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however,
peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really
searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte vs. De
Villa, 11 the Court stated:
[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle,
or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations
omitted)
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense. 12
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had
emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; 13 (2) agents of the
Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had
received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; 14 (3)
Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep
penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country on a
particular airline flight on a given date; 15 (4) Narcom agents had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his
possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused
Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present
his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; 16 and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a
woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana. 17
In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this A: I went to Sabangan, sir.
case any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted
probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by
appellant Barros. The carrying of such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus Q: What transportation did you use?
could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan
either that the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were
instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The
A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.
carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially
those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute the most
economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not
received any information or "tip-off" from an informer; no such a "tip-off" was Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus?
alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. The police officers also did
not contend that they had detected the odor of dried marijuana, or appellant
Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a seat A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.
during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned
the carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The
testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which started for
(M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box Baguio City from Bontoc, Mountain Province, and while it stopped at
in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, was there anything that happened?
the presence of any such probable cause.

xxx xxx xxx

M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:

A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person carrying a

Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok: baggage or carton and boarded the bus then took his seat, seat No. 18.

xxx xxx xxx Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?

Q: On September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty? A: A carton.

A: Yes, sir. Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying?

Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6, 1987? A: In front of seat No. 18 where he sat.
Q: You mean inside the bus? A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect the baggage
of the suspect and when C2C .

A: Yes.
Atty. Sokoken:

Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a
carton and placed it in front of seat No. 18, what happened to the bus We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies [to] not in
afterwards? the narrative way.

A: It proceeded to Sabangan. Fiscal Ayochok:

Q: And at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any? He is answering the question.

A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection. Court:

Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened? Let the witness finish.

Atty. Sokoken: A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it
contained MJ.

He did not say routinary checkpoint. He said routinary inspection.

Q: What do you mean MJ?

Fiscal Ayochok:
A: Marijuana.

We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of

counsel. xxx xxx xxx 18

Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection? For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:
Direct Examination:

Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton
baggage, where did he go?
xxx xxx xxx

A: He sat facing the seat No. 18.

Q: And in the morning of September 6, 1987, do you recall where you were
particularly in the afternoon?

Q: Between seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the
carton, where was the carton exactly located?
A: In the morning of September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate]
No. ABZ-242 going to Sabangan.

A: As far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.

Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?

Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton
luggage you saw reached Sabangan what happened there?
A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.

A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was stopped for
Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, what did
routinary inspection.
you see?

Q: What happened next?

A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton.

A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at
Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on
Chackchakan.
place that carton?

Q: Did he inspect the baggage?

A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. 18.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Inside the bus, Mr. witness?

Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?
A: Inside the bus, sir.
A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir. Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc, going to
Sabangan, there is already marijuana being carried inside that bus?

Q: You mean marijuana?

A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it
when you arrived at Alab? Why have you waited to reach Sabangan to inspect it?
xxx xxx xxx

A: Because it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.

Cross Examination:

Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage
xxx xxx xxx here in Bontoc?

Q: You stated that on September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan, A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.
Mt. Province for purposes of military check-up, is that correct?

Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan?
A: Routinary inspection, sir.

A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.

Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary check-up?

Fiscal Ayochok:
A: We were there riding in the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao to come.

Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper
Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that checkpoint.
person carrying this carton which is marked Exhibit "B"?

Court:
A: No, sir, because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why
I called one of my men, sir.
Sustained.

Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. 18, did you
inspect that carton?
xxx xxx xxx 19

A: I inspected it, sir.

The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but equally
uninformative:

Q: You said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting that carton?

Direct Examination:

A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a stuff of

marijuana, sir.
Q: On September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having reported for
duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province?

xxx xxx xxx 20

A: Yes, sir.

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there
existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the
Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there anything
two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. They asked the
unusual that happened that time?
police officers at the checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried
by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be
carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other
A: Yes, sir. words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of "actually
committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing
on the record that could have reasonably led the two (2) police officers to believe
Q: What was that Mr. witness? that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros
boarded the bus at Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the
box here involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers,
A: When we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate No. ABZ-242. according to the record, had no "personable knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in
brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure
of the carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid. 22 The "fruits" of the
Q: When the bus stopped, what did you do?
invalid search and seizure — i.e., the four (4) kilos of marijuana — should
therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant Barros.

A: While on my way to check the bus, Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called
for me, sir, and they told me that a carton was placed under seat No. 18, sir.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any
irregularities which may have attended his arrest. Presumably, the Solicitor
In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that
General also argues that appellant Barros has waived the non-admissibility of the
appellant Barros had waived his rights by his "stoic deportment" consisting of
carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves
failure to object to the search by the police authorities immediately after the
(Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor General said:
opening of the carton box:

. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of

. . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana
appellant, still the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is
and asked accused-appellant who owned the box, accused-appellant denied
the doctrine laid down in the case of Callanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and
ownership of the box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest
later reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525),
(p. 3, Decision). His demeanor should therefore be construed as implicit
that "posting of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the
acquiescence to the search inasmuch as the objection thereto is vulnerable to
arrest of a person and estops him from questioning its validity." Here, appellant
express or implied waiver (People vs. Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1
had in fact posted the required bail to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his
Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . .
application was subsequently denied (see TSN, Feb. 10, 1988, p. 65). Consistent
. . 25
with jurisprudence, therefore, he should be deemed to have waived any
irregularity attending his arrest, if any there be, and cannot now be heard to
assail the same. 23
It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at
bar; rather it is People vs. Burgos,26 promulgated fifty (50) years after Kaqui
Malasuqui, that is applicable. In Burgos, this Court ruled that the accused is not
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an
to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of
invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by
his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" —
an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified
warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may
be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to
estop as accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention . . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
however, that waiver of the latter (by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish
necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former — an argument the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the
that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non- accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless permission to make a search therein (Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As
search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin
against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of (supra):
our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on
constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of
marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. 24 xxx xxx xxx
We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was
made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to
waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct . . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
before or during during the trial. the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting
an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S.
458).27 (Emphasis supplied) .
Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court
explicitly found that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the
accused and therefore, the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter
was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui, a Chinese merchant was found lying on
the ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one resulted in skull fracture
and proved fatal. He died in the hospital to which he had been immediately
brought by a policeman. Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because when the
victim was found, still alive, and upon being asked who had attacked him,
laconically answered, "Kagui." On the same day, the accused Kagui Malasugui
was arrested and a search of his person was conducted without objection from
the accused. Before the body search of the accused was carried out, the accused
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to
the deceased victim and when asked if he had anything else to surrender, he, in
a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police thereupon conducted a
body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted
in the production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim.
Under these circumstances, the Court ruled that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an
unlawful warrantless search or arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the
accused's counsel during trial, it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of
Court) specifies the proper time when objections to admission of evidence must
be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely objection was made by appellant
Barros. Finally, the accused's silence during the warrantless search should not be
lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained by the
Court in Burgos, 28 and as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."
It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of
transporting the four (4) kilos of marijuana. His guilt must, however, be
established by constitutional means. The non-admissibility of evidence secured
through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution
for disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for it renders inutile
the work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is
a sanction which this Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 687 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial court not being sufficient to
establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Veroy vs. Layague [210 SCRA 97 (1992)]
This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court: certiorari, to review the Order of the respondent Judge
dated October 2, 1990 denying herein petitioner's Motion for Hospital
Confinement; mandamus, to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners'
long pending motion for bail; and prohibition, to enjoin further proceedings on
the ground that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The facts of this case are as follows:
 entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of George Badiang
had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's
Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13
room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and
Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner
conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a
Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the
magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an
Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to
unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of
130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The
RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached as Annexes "H" and "H-1" of the
care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys,
petition) (Rollo, pp. 49-55) were also found in the children's room. A search of
Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the
the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing
premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the
assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve
salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house.
striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A.,
While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the
one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic
kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon
Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope,
to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the
a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in
master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by
the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make
herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter
an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house (Annex "F" of the
the house.
Petition, Rollo, p. 48). Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one of the
caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt. Justalero
turned over the articles to Sgt. Rodolfo Urbano at the police station.
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP,
acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida,
raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information that the said
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant
residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to
Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor
enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since
for Davao City by the Department of Justice through Department Order No. 88
the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma.
dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada
Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero
recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners for Violation
to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions
used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa
in Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 71). Hence, on
Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but
August 8, 1990. an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the
relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto
City Prosecutor of Davao City before the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of
Region, Davao City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and entitled "People
the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero
of the Philippines v. Atty. Leopoldo Veroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K"
to Major Macasaet who answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by
of the Petition, Rollo, p. 70). No bail was recommended by the prosecution.
telephone on the matter and that the permission was given on the condition that
the search be conducted in his presence.

The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal Ponferrada was

received by the petitioners on August 13, 1990. On the same day, the latter filed
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein
a Motion for Bail before herein respondent Judge Layague which was denied on
petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority
August 17, 1990 for being premature since at that time, petitioners had not yet
granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into
been arrested. Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet
the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain
been served on them, herein petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to
Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the
complaint. However, the latter refused to receive them on the ground that his
office has not yet received copies of their warrants of arrest.
In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were admitted to the St.
Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress
and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On August 17, 1990,
Brig. Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be allowed to be confined at
the hospital and placed under guard thereat.
In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt. Benjamin de
los Santos, made its return to the trial court informing the latter of the voluntary
surrender of herein petitioners and the fact that they were under hospital
confinement. Herein Petitioner reiterated their Motion for Bail. In an Order dated
August 24, 1990 (Annex "M" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 74), the hearing for the
Motion for Ball was set for August 31, 1990 to enable the prosecution to present
evidence it opposition to said motion. The prosecution filed its written opposition
(Annex "N" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 75) on August 28, 1990, arguing that the
evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and thereafter presented its evidence.
On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the
bodies of herein petitioners on October 1, 1990 for arraignment (Annex "O" of
the Petition, Rollo, p. 76). Upon their arraignment, herein Petitioners entered a
plea of not guilty and filed an "Urgent Motion for Hospital Confinement" (Annex
"OO" of the Petition Rollo, p. 77) which was denied by the court in its Order dated
October 2, 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 80). It likewise ordered their
commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center, Ma-a, Davao City pending
trial on the merits. Herein petitioners argued orally a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the prosecution. At the conclusion thereof, the court a quo
issued a second order annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83) denying then
motion for reconsideration and as to the alternative prayer to reopen the motion
for hospital confinement, set the continuance thereof to October 17, 1990. It was
further ordered that the petitioners shall remain under the custody of the PC-CIS
pending resolution of the case.
Meanwhile, petitioners were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their
physical condition remained erratic. On or about October 18, 1990, herein
petitioners were informed that Brig. Gen. Dumlao had issued a directive for their
transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the October
2, 1990 Order (Annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 83). Petitioners made
representations that the tenor of the court order warranted maintenance of the
status quo, i.e., they were to continue their hospital confinement. However, Brig,
Gen. Dumlao informed them that unless otherwise restrained by the court, they
would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial court.
Hence, this petition on October 25, 1990 this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering: (a) respondent Hon. William L. Layague to refrain from
further proceeding with petitioners' "Motion for Hospital Confinement" in Criminal
Case No. 20595-90 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Veroy and Ma.
Luisa Veroy"; and (b) respondent Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao to refrain from
transferring petitioners from the St. Luke's Hospital (Rollo, pp. 84-A to 84-C).
On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners'
Motion for Bail (Annex "A" of the Second Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 133).
Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition on November 7, 1990 (Rollo, P. 105) and
a Second Supplemental Petition on November 16, 1990 (Rollo, p. 120) which
sought to review the order of the trial court dated November 2, 1990 denying
their petition for bail.
Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into
consideration several factors such as: a) that the possibility that they will flee or
evade the processes of the court is fairly remote; b) their poor medical condition;
and c) the matters in their Second Supplemental Petition especially since the
prosecution's evidence refers to constructive possession of the disputed firearms
in Davao City through the two (2) caretakers while petitioners lived in Manila
since 1988, this Court, on November 20, 1990, granted petitioners' provisional
liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each (Rollo, p. 141). Petitioners
posted a cash bond in the said amount on November 23, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 143-
145).
The petition was given due course on July 16, 1991 (Rollo, p. 211). Respondents
adopted their Comment dated December 28, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 182-191) as their
Memorandum while, petitioners filed their Memorandum on September 9, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 218-269).
As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the petition for
mandamus to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail,
and the petition for certiorari to review the order of respondent judge initially
denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement, were rendered moot and
academic by the resolutions of this Court dated November 20, 1990 and October
25, 1990, respectively. What remains to be resolved is the petition for prohibition
where petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution;
2. Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 6968;
3. Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were
clearly inadmissible for being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest
in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA
648), where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third
paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis
since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double
jeopardy.
Likewise, petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential
Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction
that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its
meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the
language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding Judge of Cebu, CFI,
Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A perusal of the
aforementioned laws would reveal that the legislature provided for two (2)
distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866; and (2) rebellion, coup d' etat, sedition and disloyalty under Republic Act
6968; evidently involving different subjects which were not clearly shown to have
eliminated the others.
But petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched
in general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess"
are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to
whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the
concept of constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found
in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City
while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being
charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the
house wherein the items were found belongs to them (Memorandum for
Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 242-244).
Otherwise stated, other than their ownership of the house in Skyline Village,
there was no other evidence whatsoever that herein petitioners possessed or had
in their control the items seized (Ibid., pp. 248-250). Neither was it shown that
they had the intention to possess the Firearms or to further rebellion (Ibid., P.
252).
In a similar case, the revolver in question was found in appellant's store and the
question arouse whether he had possession or custody of it within the meaning of
the law.
This Court held that:
The animus possidendi must be proved in opium cases where the prohibited drug
was found on the premises of the accused and the same rule is applicable to the
possession of firearms. The appellant denied all knowledge of the existence of the
revolver, and the Government's principal witness stated that there were a
number of employees in the store. The only testimony which tends to show that
the appellant had the possession or custody of this revolver is the inference
drawn from the fact that it was found in his store, but we think that this inference
is overcome by the positive testimony of the appellant, when considered with the
fact that there were a number of employees in the store, who, of course, could
have placed the revolver in the secret place where it was found without the
knowledge of the appellant. At least there is a very serious doubt whether he
knew of the existence of this revolver. In such case the doubt must be resolved
in favor of the appellant. (U.S. v. Jose and Tan Bo., 34 Phil. 724 [1916])
But more importantly, petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the
articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from
Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the
purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once
inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search,
violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence
against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the
recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a
search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v.
Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching
the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout
and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search
warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized
the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but
rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission
was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain
the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the
police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v. De Villa, supra.; People
v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988 [163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro,
G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151 SCRA 279]), warrantless searches were
declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity
to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized, being products of illegal
searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions subsequently
instituted against the accused-appellants (People v. Cendana, G.R. No. 84715,
October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but
it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is
immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against
the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of
firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that
there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need
of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the
knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against
the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Damaso [212 SCRA 457 (1992)] Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information
proceedings.
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita
The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the
Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites
articles and/or items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and
Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz
marked and submitted in court as evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited
Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such information was later
in favor of the government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine
amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-
Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
appellant from the criminal charge. The amended information reads:

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)

That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Basilio DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody and Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with magazine and Fifty-
Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
for Violation of Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276. REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20) INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
(Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and
offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed
his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its
being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant.
On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any
evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17,
1990, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS
DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED
INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND
THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY
Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION
Decree Number 1866, and considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, pursuant to Section 1,
IN FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME
OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer
connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some
companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay
Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended
Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias
Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After
coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to
the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7
caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina
Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a
visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza,
herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by appellant. When
they reached the house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the
occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie
Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested
him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again required
Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz
Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member
of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she
requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group,
as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan,"
xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were
companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries
Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the
persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened
one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle,
bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines,
Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles
and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought
the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said
persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31,
1989). (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against
lawless elements in our society, We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts
to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case at bar,
not only did We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law
officers in obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the
evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the
sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to
establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of
the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the
owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two witnesses who attested
to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who
mentioned the name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house
and at the same time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that
items. (TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40) house?

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka
"K-2," tell us if it has any connection to the house? Bernie is the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.

A The same house, sir. . . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)

Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified
Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did on matters not on their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however,
you find out the identity? argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible
because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.

A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true
identity of Bernie Mendoza?
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being
admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since
these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In
People vs. Valero, We emphatically declared that:

A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.

The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent
evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such
Q Can you name these officers?
evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. probative value.
54-55)
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)

M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez

It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons
who knew the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way,
the appellant could have exercised his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records
do not show any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the
lessee of the house and the owner of the subversive items. To give probative
value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone
would be to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the
house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the
Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The purpose of the law is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of
the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted (see
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute. There
are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1)
search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986,
143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo
entered the appellant's house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda
Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions, radio set and more subversive items; that technically speaking,
there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles used in
subversion; that besides, a search may be validly conducted without search
warrant with the consent of the person searched in this case, appellant's helper
and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant's
house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the
same may be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person
whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records
show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31,
1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados
was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that
the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The
prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority.
Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling
cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a
consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have
been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have
prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is
silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the appellant at
nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go inside his
house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact
not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to
get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have
surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into
the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. (G.R. No.
69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-
appellant is in the identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally
possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described
as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore
a different serial number thus:
 FISCAL:

FISCAL

Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of
that firearm to the firearm which according to you you found inside the room
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house?
allegedly occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?

Lt. Quijardo:
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house.
(TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied).

A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we
immediately saw different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical
subversive orientation and the M-14 rifle.
error.

Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its
correction or lack of it could spell the difference between freedom and
incarceration of the accused-appellant.
A In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.

In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same? burden to prove the existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed
or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Since the
gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in the amended
A Yes, sir. information, the corpus delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime
has actually been committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance
coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the
Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for gun was found) have totally emasculated the prosecution's case.
purposes of identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked
as Exhibit "D."
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the
argument raised by the defense that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of
COURT: illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with
the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a
separate charge of subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should
have peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge. In People
Mark it.
of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the
futility of such argument. We quote:
 Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled
that if an accused is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are
subversion, the doctrine of absorption of common crimes as applied in rebellion
the very essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In
would have found application therein. The respondents relied on the opinion of
People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court
this Court when it said:
categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:

. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called,
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS
is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is
NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH
committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY
of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-
CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public
application in this case.
uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion,
mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of
arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of
circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.
the charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined
(Emphasis supplied)
that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering
that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal
possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109
qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The
289 (1981]), this Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against
practical result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused
national security, while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly
in instances similar to those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of
and taking arms against the Government is the very element of the crime on
the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws is something that
rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist
the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992).
Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar associations and its successors
because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave
danger to national security.
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of
the charge of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in
connection with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no option,
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized
but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also
by deceit, subversion, and other illegal means. This is a recognition that
subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary to the
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the
arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One
appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.
may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials, where
force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable.

SO ORDERED.
Lopez vs. Comm. of Customs [68 SCRA 320 (1975)]
This Court, understandably and appropriately in the decision of cases coming
before it, is called upon to act with due care to avoid putting obstacles to the
governmental policy "to minimize, if not to do away entirely, with the evil and
corruption that smuggling brings in its wake ..."1 Nonetheless, the steps taken by
administrative authorities to implement such a laudable objective must not be
repugnant to nor in conflict with constitutional rights. To be more specific, when
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is invoked, there is a
need to scrutinize the facts rigorously to preclude any infringement thereof. In
this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which arose from
the seizures made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of 1,480 sacks of copra
and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema, our decision of
November 29, 1974 in Nasiad v. Court of Tax Appeals2 made clear that there was
no failure to comply with the requirements of the law in effecting the same. The
seizure was therefore declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its
decision was affirmed by us.3 The only question left then is whether the search
conducted by a party headed by respondent Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of
Davao,4 without the search warrant for the hotel room of petitioner Tomas
Velasco, who entered into a contract with the other petitioner, Jose G. Lopez, the
awardee of such Philippine Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and
use ostensibly for fishing,5 is violative of such constitutional provision.6 The
defense interposed by respondents is that there was consent. A careful scrutiny
of the pleadings reveals that such indeed was the case. We find for respondents
and dismiss the action.
The relevant facts as found in the aforesaid Nasiad decision read as follows: "As
noted in the appealed decision, the issue submitted "for resolution is the legality
of the seizure made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of the 1,408 sacks of
copra and 86 sacks of coffee allegedly owned by the petitioners." Then came this
portion: "Petitioners claim that the 1,408 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee in
question were purchased in Kiamba, Lumatin, and Lumasal, all in the province of
Cotabato, from a certain Osmeña Juanday. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as
the said goods were not imported and of foreign origin, they are not legally
subject to seizure and forfeiture. They likewise contend that the forfeiture made
by the Collector of Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture was
based on documents and papers which were illegally seized by agents of the
Government through violence and intimidation. Respondent denies petitioners'
claim. He contends that the evidence is sufficient to hold that the goods in
question came from Indonesia and subsequently brought to the Philippines in
violation of our laws and, therefore, subject to forfeiture; and that the Indonesian
documents and papers allegedly secured illegally by the combined team of NBI,
PC and RASAC agents stationed in Davao, were in fact lawfully and validly
secured by them. Consequently, said documents and papers are admissible in
evidence in the forfeiture proceedings instituted administratively by the Collector
of Customs of Davao." It was then set forth: "The voluminous [evidence] of
record clearly show that M/V [Jolo Lema] had been under strict surveillance by
the combined team of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao
prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City; that the
said M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and
chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco; during the period from the latter part of August
to September 18, 1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded
copra and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta and Mangenito, all of Indonesia ... ;
that in its trip to Indonesia it brought various merchandise from the Philippines
which were exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee beans and
subsequently taken to Davao City ...; and that said vessel passed Marore,
Indonesia on September 18, 1966 on its way to Tahuna, Indonesia ... before
proceeding to Davao City where it was apprehended on September 19, 1966."
Then came the reference to the evidence and the testimonies of the witnesses of
both parties, being appraised by respondent Court, which did not find any ground
to discredit the finding of respondent Collector of Customs. As therein pointed
out: "The evidence does not show any plausible motive for respondent's
witnesses to falsify the truth because they represent different agencies of the
government. From all appearances, they have no personal interest whatsoever
over the goods subject of the forfeiture proceedings. Besides, petitioners have
not adduced any evidence showing that they were enemies of the witnesses for
the government. In short, no iota of evidence was ever presented by the
petitioners to destroy the integrity of the government witnesses and to cast a
cloud of doubt on their testimonies." Also: "The decision of the Collector of
Customs of Davao shows that a petitioner herein and at the same time one of the
claimants of the confiscated copra and coffee beans, Mr. Ernesto Lozada, is the
Officer-in-Charge of the vessel M/V Jolo Lema. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the members of his crew repudiated their sworn statements given to government
agents." Then, lastly: "Moreover, petitioners failed to explain satisfactorily, much
less refute the vital testimony of Fiscal Mariano Umali of the Department of
Justice, Manila that the various Indonesian documents ... duly authenticated by
the Indonesian Consulate in Manila, show in clear detail that the vessel M/V Jolo
Lema was in Indonesia during the period from the latter part of August to
September 18, 1966, and that it loaded copra and coffee beans therein before
the said vessel returned to Davao City on September 19, 1966. Petitioners'
failure to successfully dispute or destroy said testimony by competent and
reliable evidence strongly indicates that the copra and coffee beans in question 1. There has been marked receptivity on the part of this Court to claims based on
were imported from Indonesia." "7 the protection of the search and seizure clause of the Constitution, whenever
properly invoked. So it was made clear from the leading case of Alvarez v. Court
of First
On the question of the search of the hotel room, the petition alleged that at about
Instance. 11 It has been thus since then. 12 Such was the case likewise under
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 19, 1966, when the vessel was
previous organic acts. 13 There is this succinct restatement of what is embraced
searched, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center
in the guarantee in the latest case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 14 with Justice Martin
operatives headed by NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being
as ponente: "There can be no question that without the proper search warrant,
rented by petitioner Tomas Velasco without any search warrant and in the
no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his
absence at the time of such petitioner Tomas Velasco or the presence of any
consent for the purpose of search and seizure." 15 It does not admit of doubt
other person, except one Teofila Ibañez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by
therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as unreasonable and
occupation and "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several
thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. Such a view is implicit in
documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away the
People v. Malasugui. 16 For this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a
same."8 There was this refutation of such allegation in the answer presented by
personal right which may be waived either expressly or impliedly. 17
respondents, represented by the then Solicitor General, 9 now Associate Justice,
Antonio P. Barredo: "(a) After Captain Pantinople informed the team that
petitioner Tomas Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents
The crucial question then is whether in this instance there was consent on the
showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee,
part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then rented by
some members of the team proceeded to the room of petitioner Velasco at the
petitioner Velasco. It cannot be contended that such premises would be outside
Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said documents; (b) Although petitioner
the constitutional protection of a guarantee intended to protect one's privacy. It
Velasco was not inside the hotel room, respondent Reynolds, after identifying
stands to reason that in such a place, the insistence on being free from any
himself as a police officer and after explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter
unwelcome intrusion is likely to be more marked. 18 Was there, however,
the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco who subsequently volunteered to open the
consent sufficient in law to dispense with the warrant? Respondents, as
suitcases and baggages of petitioner Velasco and delivered the documents and
previously noted, contend that there was such consent. They so alleged in their
things contained therein to respondent Reynolds; ... (c) The said police team did
answer. Their memorandum would stress it further in these words: "Here the wife
not search the room; neither did the members thereof forcibly open the luggages
of petitioner Tomas Velasco, upon being informed of the purpose of the search by
and boxes nor seized and confiscated the documents and things contained
the officers, invited them to enter and search the hotel room and even voluntarily
therein, since that was not necessary because ... Mrs. Tomas Velasco voluntarily
gave the documents and things requested by said officers. This fact could be
opened the baggages and suitcases and gave their contents of documents and
gleaned from the following records of the two seizure cases involving the vessel
things to respondent Reynolds. Such fact is also established by the joint affidavit
M/V Jolo Lema and its cargo of Indonesian copra and coffee: (a) On September
of PC Lt. Romeo Arceño, Angel Huertas, Gregorio Esperancilla, Wilfredo G.
19, 1966, Teofila Ibañez, wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, issued a written
Agcaoili, Patricio Barnes and Lucero Cordero, a joint sworn statement of Antonio
statement which states that — "... I have voluntarily and freely allowed my
Bonotan, Vicente Dubria, Alberto Morgady and Virgilio Humol; and another
husband's and my personal belongings to be searched and freely gave the
affidavit of Pio Raganit and Winifredo Calamba, ... " 10
following items." ... (b) On the same date, she issued another certification which
reads in part, viz.: "... That I have voluntarily turned over for safekeeping and
verification the following."... (c) Also on the same date, she issued still another
Thus, as noted at the outset, petitioners are not entitled to the remedies prayed
certification which reads partially, thus:"... that I have freely and voluntarily
for.
allowed the search of my and my husband's personal belongings and turn-over to
the NBI of the following items."... (d) On October 13, 1966 the Davao City Police
Department issued a certification to the effect that the petitioner Tomas Velasco
never filed any "report for robbery or other offenses ... against any member of
the NBI or the PC during the period from September 19, 1966 to the present,"...
2. It was set forth at the outset that the state policy of minimizing, if not doing
." 19 Their memorandum likewise included as an annex an affidavit from
away entirely with the festering sore of smuggling must be carried out with due
Benjamin Doronal Y. Yañez, the assistant manager of the Skyroom Hotel. It was
respect for constitutional rights. It is a truism in law that a desirable end cannot
worded thus: "That on September 19, 1966 at around 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the
be attained by illegal means. Whenever there is a showing therefore that the
afternoon, a joint NBI, PC and Davao City Police Commando Team conducted a
safeguards of the fundamental law are disregarded, more specifically the
search on Room 220 of the Skyroom Hotel occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Tomas
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, then judicial redress is
Velasco; That before said search was conducted, [Teofila Ibañez], the actual
appropriate. To repeat, such is not the case here. Moreover, it may likewise be
occupant of the room at the time, voluntarily consented to the request of Atty.
added that as previously mentioned in Nasiad v. Court of Tax Appeals, 24
[Earl Reynolds] and Lt.[Romeo Arceño], to search their room (Rm. 220) after the
involving the very same occurrence, the only difference being that the petitioners
latter introduced themselves by showing their respective identifications cards;
there were the importers of the smuggled goods, this Court had affirmed the
That during said search, upon the request of Atty. [Reynolds] and Lt.[Arceño],
validity of the seizure proceeding. No injustice can therefore be claimed by
[Teofila Ibañez] voluntarily opened her handbag which was found to contain a .45
petitioners.
caliber pistol and likewise voluntarily opened the maletas which were found to
contain several papers and documents; That receipts were duly issued to [Teofila
Ibañez] which accounted for everything taken from their room (Rm. No. 220)
during the search, including said .45 caliber pistol, papers and documents and WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is dismissed.
that nothing was lost; That [Teofila Ibañez] signed the receipts and received Costs against petitioners.
copies thereof; That [Teofila Ibañez] and I were present when the said search
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 136292, January 5, 2002]
was being conducted; That said search was conducted in a peaceful and orderly
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals
manner ... ." 20
dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy
Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the
There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the force of the resolution 2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner’s motion for
above recital by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, 21 who stated that she is reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
the legal wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, and another by such petitioner himself
22 reiterating such a fact and that the person who was present at his hotel room
was one Teofila Ibañez, "a manicurist by occupation ." 23 Their effort
In an Information 3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the
appurtenant thereto is doomed to failure. If such indeed were the case, then it is
crime of theft committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who could be
aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time,
would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the
circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and "That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan,
even petitioner Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this
officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the
person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER
common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at
concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a P27,450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National
search warrant. The petition cannot, therefore, prevail. Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the
merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" [At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what
was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700
kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came
from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately
8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with
the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo
Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver
and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988
although his identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June
28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one
Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his jeepney conductor wires
which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last
trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos,
that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed
with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and
intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had
his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant’s
jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5)
masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge,
the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and
Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that
the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his
explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters where he was
interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him up in
jail for a week." 4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 the dispositive portion of
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Theft of property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as
maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power Corporation in the
amount of P55,244.45, and to pay the costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted
the award for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered
and modified the penalty imposed, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal in theft, defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1,
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby
meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven
(11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity
and no costs." 6
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the
police officers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a
search warrant and when samples of the wires and references to them were
admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner’s defense that
he was engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and
conjecture in rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional
right of petitioner to presumption of innocence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility
of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the
search and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that
effect. The Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho
[Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that ‘considering that
before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched
must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of
practicability.’ The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte v. de
Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration,
September 29, 1989), it was ruled that ‘automobiles because of their mobility
may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search
of a resident or office. . . . To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested
and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would
be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances’ (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People v. Ortiz, 191
SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without a
warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the
police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the
accused even without a warrant." 7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who
were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled
goods," does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted
by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the
search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in
their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
defined under Section 2, Article III thereof, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 9
(3) search of moving vehicles; 10 (4) consented warrantless search; 11 (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); 12 and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances. 13
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional
events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when
the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched
and the character of the articles procured. 14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers
in the case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is
whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes
a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity. 15 Thus, the rules governing search and seizure
have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the
object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before
a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must
be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified
on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought. 16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like checkpoints near the
boundary lines of the State. 17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made
within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. 18 Still
and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched. 19 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the
facts of each case. 20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal
per se, 21 for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order 22 and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 23 A checkpoint may either be a
mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is
limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; 24 (2)
simply looks into a vehicle; 25 (3) flashes a light therein without opening the
car’s doors; 26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search; 27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or
visual inspection; 28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
area. 29
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein
petitioner’s vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves
and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot
be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States v. Pierre, 30 the Court held that the physical
intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area
protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver’s side window. The agent thus
effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle . . . [W]e are aware of no case
holding that an officer did not conduct a search when he physically intruded part
of his body into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. [The] Agent[s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see and to smell
things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle . . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from
outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and
into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had
stuck his head inside the open window of a home:"
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had
emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the
Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had
received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3)
Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that
a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana; 32 (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports
that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where
the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one
who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the
accused belonged — that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country. 33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that
the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to
them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ATTY. SANTOS

Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you
were performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting
patrol in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the
jeepney and searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these
conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what
did you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." 34
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir." 35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People v. Chua Ho San, 36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by
the accused was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of
the accused when he attempted to flee from the police authorities do not
sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are
suggestive of probable cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of
firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA’s watercraft differing in appearance
from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
CHUA’s illegal entry into the Philippines . . ., CHUA’s suspicious behavior, i.e., he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by
which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of
the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana
or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by
informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious
bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner
would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent.
The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetrating an offense. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential
report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his
vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is
replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. 37 Unfortunately, none exists in the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by
this case. petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied
acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
II. Plain view doctrine

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and

It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner’s vehicle were in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words,
if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
38
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. 41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. 42 The question whether a consent to a
search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. 43 Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively
looked on; 44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; 45 (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 46 It is the State which has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 47

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to
sight because they were placed in sacks 39 and covered with leaves. The articles
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the
were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They
search was conducted in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a
matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such
a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. 40 "WITNESS

III. Consented search Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
the vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner
consented to the search. He claims that there is no specific statement as to how
x x x Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual

incident on said date and time?
Q What was the answer of Caballes?

A Yes, sir.
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I
told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.

Q What is that incident?

Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what
did you do?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy
Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.

A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
the Cavinti area, sir." 48
x x x

This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented

Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir.
warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers’ request
to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such
language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was
requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such
request. 49

In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 50 the apprehending officers sought the

Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle
and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner
therein himself freely gave his consent to said search. In People v. Lacerna, 51
the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who
asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In
upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant
himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he
was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done
nothing wrong. In People v. Cuizon, 52 the accused admitted that they signed a
written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their
luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People v.
Montilla, 53 it was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative
acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to
do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In
People v. Omaweng, 54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the
contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those
are only clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and see it, and
accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a valid consented
search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the
two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner’s vehicle was
flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to
believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting
for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all
intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner
that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented
search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain
terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein
petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent;
they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is
doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when
Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the
vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the
vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a
clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de
Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they
stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle.
He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.
56
Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People v. Barros, 57 appellant Barros,
who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding.
The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who
owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the
search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held
that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search
conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of
People v. Burgos, 58 to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an
officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can only be established
without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de
oficio.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Asis, et. al. (G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002)

Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00
conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the
possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty.
Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused one (1) wristwatch
deserves acquittal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

one (1) gold necklace

The Case

and undetermined items

For automatic review before this Court is the March 8, 2000 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54) in Criminal Case No. 98-163090,
finding Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert 2 Formento y Saricon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide aggravated by abuse of confidence,
superior strength and treachery. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING
GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency,
and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death." 6

"WHEREFORE, the two (2) accused are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstances
of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery; and each is sentenced to
death under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code; they are also ordered
to jointly and severally pay P100,000.00 as damages to the heirs of the victim." 3
When arraigned on July 9, 1998, both appellants pleaded not guilty. 7 Found to
be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, 8 but also by
an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. After due trial, appellants were
found guilty and sentenced to death.

The Facts
Appellants were charged in an Information 4 dated February 18, 1998, worded as
follows: 5

Version of the Prosecution

"That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by
means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one In its Brief, 9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) detailed the facts in the
YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
"The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. Although none of them had
actually seen the crime committed, strong and substantial circumstantial
evidence abound linking beyond reasonable doubt both appellants to the crime.
"As culled from the records, hereunder are the pertinent facts of the
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"George Huang, the nephew of the victim Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching, always
passes by the store of the victim at 1042 Benavidez Street, Binondo, Manila to
bring food stuff, ice and other things to his uncle and mother, Diana Yu, who
work[s] in the office of said store.
"On February 9, 1998, at around 6:30 o’clock in the morning, Huang arrived at
the victim’s store and discovered that the steel door of the store was locked from
the outside. When he opened the steel door, he found everything to be normal
except for the inner door which had always been left open but which was closed
at that time with only a chair blocking it.
"When he removed the blocking chair, he discovered the body of his uncle, Yu
Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching (victim), lying prostrate on the ground with a knife
embedded on his nape. He closed the door and proceeded to Luneta, where [his]
mother exercises, to inform her of what he saw. After informing [his] mother,
Huang first went to the Chinatown Police Station and reported the incident;
thereafter, he went to another station located in Soler corner Reina Regente to
report the incident again.
"Diana Yu, the sister of the victim, testified that on February 9, 1998, before 8:30
o’clock in the evening, she was in the office of her brother where she was
working at 1042 Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. She saw the two appellants,
namely: Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento, and her brother (the victim), who are
all deaf-mutes, talking in sign language. She testified that Danilo Asis frequented
the office of the victim, while Gilbert Formento came only on the night of
February 9, 1998. At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening, she left the office,
leaving both appellants and the victim behind. The following morning, at around
7:30 o’clock in the morning, her son, George Huang, informed her of her
brother’s (victim’s) death. Upon learning of said incident, she went to the office
where she saw her brother’s body. She discovered that the sales proceeds of the
preceding day were missing and the necklace of her brother (victim) which he
always wore was also missing.
"On re-direct examination, Diana testified that she suspected both appellants,
especially Gilbert Formento, to have perpetrated the crime because of the fact
that she saw the pair of shorts of the victim in the bag of appellant Gilbert
Formento.
"Jimmy Pagaduan testified that he was a helper in the Yu Hing Guan Auto Supply
for five years already. He saw the two appellants everyday in the store of the
victim. Furthermore, he testified that as far as he knows, Danilo Asis owed the
victim PhP3,000.00 and that he saw a list thereof which the victim showed him.
On February 9, 1998, he left the store at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening and
he saw both appellants conversing with the victim.
"SPO2 Pablo Ileto of WPD Homicide Section testified that on February 11, 1998,
he was at Barangay Sto. Ni[ñ]o, Hagunoy, Bulacan together with Sgt. Napoleon
Timbol, PO3 Luis Chico, and witness, Diana Yu. The three (3) of them were trying
to locate the whereabouts of appellant Gilbert Formento in connection with the
death of Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching. They coordinated with the Hagunoy
Bulacan police and searched the area. Diana Yu saw Gilbert Formento in a
delivery truck and she pointed him to them. Thereafter, they invited Gilbert
Formento to their office at the WPD Homicide Section. But before going to the
WPD station, they first brought Gilbert Formento to his house. Upon reaching the
house, Diana Yu asked from the wife of the suspect for the stolen money.
However, they could not understand each other, so the wife gave Diana Yu the
bag of Gilbert Formento where Diana Yu noticed the pair of shorts which
belonged to the victim. PO2 Ileto noticed what appears to be blood stains on the
pair of shorts.
"SPO1 Benito Cabatbat testified that he, together with SPO1 Alfredo Opriasa,
SPO1 Raul Olavario, the photographer SPO2 Tabio, and fingerprint technician
Domingo Daclan of the District Crime Laboratory Division went to the crime scene
to conduct the investigation on February 10, 1998. Upon arriving at the scene,
they saw the victim lying prostrate on the ground, barefooted, and clad only in
brief.
"After photographing the victim, the team went upstairs where traces of blood
were seen on the second and third floors.
"During the course of investigation, SPO1 Cabatbat received a phone call from a
relative informing him that one of the suspects, appellant Danilo Asis, went back
to the scene of the crime. Afterwards, they brought Danilo Asis to the police
station for investigation, who expectedly denied having anything to do with the
killing of the victim.
"During investigation (February 10, 1998), SPO1 Balatbat noticed that there was
a bloodstain in Asis’ T-shirt.
"During the presentation of prosecution witness Dr. Olga Bausa, they stipulated
that the bloodstains found in the white t-shirt with a lettering of `Collorrific’ and
in the short pants were human blood." 10 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellants’ version of the facts is as follows: 11
"GILBERT FORMENTO is a deaf-mute who is one of the accused in this case. He
testified through sign interpreter, Mrs. Nelda Bahena. On February 9, 1998 at
about 11 am., he was in the house of Roy Ching[.] They talked about things and
events. When he left the house of Ching he proceeded to Bulacan while Asis went
to Luneta. He denied having in possession of the clothes of Ching found with him
in Bulacan. A policeman met him in his house in Sto. Nino, Hagunoy, Bulacan.
They handcuffed him immediately. He was whipped for the first time in his life.
He was brought to Manila at Funeraria Paz. The relatives of Roy Ching were
pointing to him while he was being whipped by the two policemen.
"NESTOR PAGLINAWAN is a friend of Danilo Asis. He is a vendor who vends at the
PICC area. He testified that accused-appellant Danilo Asis occasionally help[s]
him in vending by guarding his selling items and preparing coffee. He
communicated with accused-appellant Asis through sign language. He had known
Asis for five years. On February 9, 1998, at about 10:00 p.m., Danilo Asis was
with him at the PICC. Accused-appellant Asis stayed with him until 7:00 am of
the following day.
"DANILO ASIS is a deaf-mute and one of the accused in this case. He testified
through sign interpreters, Ms. Theta Figuerres and Mrs. Nelda Bahena. Roy Ching
was his friend since 1995. On February 9, 1998, he went to the store of Roy
Ching because he was called by Ching to help him in his store. When he arrived
at Ching’s store, Gilbert Formento was there already. The three of them drank
beer. He left the store at 9:00 p.m., ahead of Gilbert Formento. He proceeded to
PICC to help his friend Nestor, a cigarette vendor.
"He denied killing Ching. When he went back to Roy Ching’s store at 10 a.m. the
following day, he felt depressed upon knowing that Roy Ching was dead. He was
arrested and incarcerated on that same day." 12 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under
Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code." 13 It ruled that "although no
witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial
evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused
definitely proved that the two (2) . . . committed the crime." 14 Finally, the RTC
also appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior
strength and treachery and thus sentenced both appellants to the supreme
penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review before us. 15
Issues
In their Brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following assignment of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide notwithstanding the
insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
"II
The trial court gravely erred in concluding that evident premeditation, treachery
and conspiracy attended the killing of Roy Ching.
"III
The trial court gravely erred in not considering the physical infirmities of the two
accused-appellants who are deaf-mutes." 16
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution’s evidence does not prove the guilt of
appellants beyond reasonable doubt; hence, their constitutional right to be
presumed innocent remains and must be upheld.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
In the present appeal, two things stand out: first, there were no eyewitnesses to
the robbery or to the homicide; and second, none of the items allegedly stolen
were recovered or presented in evidence.
Appellants argue that, the pieces of circumstantial evidence submitted by the
prosecution are insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution counters that these pieces of evidence, taken together, necessarily
lead to their conviction.
Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that the accused may be convicted of
the crime charged. 17 Circumstantial evidence is resorted to when direct
testimony would result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community. 18 The former is not a "weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis the latter."
19 The accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one
fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person. 20 "Circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry; it should
be made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven." 21 This pattern
should be reasonably consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
and at the same time totally inconsistent with the proposition that he or she is
innocent. 22
The Rules on Evidence 23 allow conviction by means of circumstantial evidence
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt."cralaw virtua1aw library
Bloodstained Trousers
The prosecution argues that the strongest piece of evidence damning appellants
is the victim’s bloodstained pair of short pants recovered from the bag of Gilbert
Formento. It argues that since the trousers were recovered from one of the
appellants, then Rule 131 (j) of the Revised Rules of Court should apply. The said
provision is worded, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.
The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x brushed aside, considering the guarantee so sacredly enshrined in our
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;" 24
We disagree. It escapes this Court how the recovery of a bloodstained pair of
shorts allegedly owned by the victim should give rise to the presumption that one
of the appellants was the "taker and doer of the whole act" 25 of robbery with
homicide. By itself, the retrieval of the pair of shorts does not prove that
appellants, or even just one of them, robbed the trouser owner of cash and
jewelry and also killed him, as charged in the Information. Neither does it show
that appellants, or one of them, perpetrated the aggression leading to the
victim’s death.
Furthermore, the ownership of the pair of shorts was not definitively determined.
And even granting for the sake of argument that it indeed belonged to the victim,
still, there is no evidence to prove that it was taken from him on the night of the
homicide. Neither can it be ruled out that he might have lent it or gave it to
either one of the two. It was neither extraordinary nor impossible for him to have
allowed Appellant Formento to use it, considering that they were friends, and that
they shared a commonality as deaf-mutes.
The OSG harps on the bloodstains found on the shorts. But as testified to by the
pathologist 26 who examined them, although the origin was human blood, the
blood grouping could not be determined. 27 Thus, its mere presence on the pair
of shorts did not in any way support the prosecution’s theory linking appellants to
the crime.
Evidence Is Inadmissible
In any event, appellants’ argument of illegal search and seizure cannot simply be
Constitution.
There is no question that appellants were collared without any arrest warrant.
Neither was there any valid search warrant obtained against them. However, they
The OSG’s argument loses even more cogency when evaluated against the well-
never questioned the legality of their arrest through a motion to quash the
settled principles on searches and seizures without warrants.
Information. Instead, they entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the
trial. Settled is the rule that any objection involving the arrest or the trial court’s
procedure of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before the arraignment; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 28 To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second,
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
33 How could Appellant Formento have consented to a warrantless search when,
Indeed, appellants do not now question the legality of their arrest. What they
in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment?
object to is the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered
The prosecution witnesses themselves testified that there was no interpreter to
from the bag of Appellant Formento. They argue that the search was illegally
assist him — a deaf-mute — during the arrest, search and seizure. Naturally, it
done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as
would seem that he indeed consented to the warrantless search, as the
inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was the wife of
prosecution would want this Court to believe.
appellant who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained
trousers of the victim. 29 Her act, it claims, constituted a valid consent to the
search without a warrant. 30
As early as 1938, Justice Jose P. Laurel pointed out in Pasion vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
We clarify. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person
whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her "As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
behalf. 31 In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Appellant officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other the law." 34
person.

The OSG cites Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 32 which validated a waiver of
a warrantless search, when a woman thought to be the wife of the accused — but
who later turned out to be a manicurist — surrendered to the police the papers
belonging to the appellant. The instant appeal, however, presents a different
situation, because here the accused himself was present when the search was
made. Hence, consent should have been obtained from or given by him. In
Lopez, the accused was not present when the search was made; hence, the
consent given by the occupant of the hotel room was deemed the consent of the
accused who was then renting the space.
This point becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which
appellant is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what
was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may
be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance.
Verily, "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and . . . we do not presume acquiescence [to]
the loss of fundamental rights." 35
Neither can the OSG claim that appellant’s wife voluntarily surrendered the bag
that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim. 36 As admitted by
This testimony clearly forecloses the assertion that it was not the police
Prosecution Witness PO2 Pablo Ileto, the victim’s sister and appellant’s wife
authorities who conducted the search. This testimony in fact belies that of PO2
"cannot understand each other." 37 Eventually, appellant’s wife gave the
Pablo Ileto 40 that it was the prosecution witness who was talking to appellant’s
belongings of Gilbert Formento where the bloodstained shorts of the victim were
wife, and who conducted the search that yielded the bloodstained shortpants.
recovered. 38 How can the surrender of appellant’s belongings in this case be
voluntary, when the person surrendering them did not even understand the
person she was communicating with?
All told, the bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the
occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. 41 In the language
To be sure, the OSG cannot even use the argument that the search was made by
of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
a private individual, the victim’s sister, and thereby skirt the issue of
any proceeding. 42
constitutional protection against unlawful searches by the State.

Bloodstained Shirt
The victim’s sister herself testified against this argument as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The prosecution then contends that when the other appellant, Danilo Asis, was
brought to the police station for investigation the following day, the police found
"ATTY. FONTANILLA
bloodstain on his shirt.

Q So Gilbert Formento was not wearing the alleged trouser[s]?

Again, this fact cannot be taken as an indication of guilt on the part of Appellant
Asis. It does not point to the conclusion that he was involved in the crime
charged against him. We cannot agree that since there was bloodstain on his
A The bag was given by his mother or his wife, sir.
clothing, ergo, he committed the robbery and the attendant killing. At most, this
piece of circumstantial evidence, taken with the other one, may lead to suspicion.
But courts do not rely on circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicion
Q To whom? or conjecture. 43 For circumstantial evidence to lead to conviction, it must do
more than just raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt. 44 It must
engender moral certainty.
A To the policemen, sir.

Motive for the Crime

Q And they searched this, is that right?

The prosecution then attempts to ascribe motive to appellants by arguing that

A Yes sir." 39 one of them, Appellant Asis, allegedly owed the victim P6,070. 45
 Neither is the mere presence of appellants at the locus criminis sufficient to
implicate them. Their being at the store of the victim was not unusual, as
Indeed, motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or
testified to by the witnesses. In fact, it was established that he and appellants
inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or
had known one another well, and that they had regularly met at his store.
whether the accused has committed it. 46 But the prosecution’s contention again
Moreover, there was paucity of evidence indicating that, other than appellants,
fails, as the fact of indebtedness was never conclusively established. According to
no other person had or could have had access to the store where he was robbed
the sister of the victim, Asis still owed her brother the amount of P6,070. Yet,
and killed.
during the testimony of the said appellant, it was shown that it was actually the
victim who had been indebted to the former. The prosecution, in fact, uses this
testimony of Asis to bolster its claim that he became "madder and madder" at the
As they themselves correctly observe, their complicity in the crime becomes even
victim. Coming from the prosecution itself, this argument casts doubts on
more doubtful because, as testified to by his sister, the neighbors heard shouts;
whether it was appellant who owed the victim or the other way around.
these could not have come from deaf-mutes. Furthermore, appellants question
the non-presentation of the results of the tests conducted on the fingerprints
lifted from the crime scene.
The Public Attorney’s Office, the defense counsel, correctly points out that the
victim himself had made the entries in his logbook which served as bases for the
prosecution’s averment that appellant owed him some amount. The sister, who
Appellants Pointed
was explaining the entries, admitted that she had no personal knowledge thereof.
More important, their veracity was never established. Neither were the erasures
or scratches thereon sufficiently explained.
to Each Other?

To show that there was sufficient motive to commit the crime charged, the
prosecution uses the testimony of Asis that he got "madder and madder" at the
victim. This statement is too speculative to deserve serious consideration.
The Last Persons Seen
Finally, we do not find any evidence that appellants indeed pointed to one
another as the author of the crime charged. In fact, even during their cross-
examination, neither of them specifically shifted the blame to the other. When
questioned by the public prosecutor, they even denied having done so.

All told, to sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide,
which is primarily an offense against property, it is essential that the robbery be
Talking with the Victim
proved beyond reasonable doubt. 48 Proof of the homicide alone is not sufficient
to support a conviction for the aforesaid complex crime. 49

It is also argued that appellants were the last persons seen with the victim; ergo,
the suspicion that they were the authors of the crime. Admittedly, this
Essential to robbery is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property
circumstance may raise a speculation, but it is insufficient to establish their guilt.
belonging to another by means of violence or intimidation against another person
As this Court has consistently stressed, mere suspicions and speculations can
by the use of force upon things. There is robbery with homicide when, by reason
never be the bases of conviction in a criminal case. 47
or on the occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons, homicide is also committed. 50
 on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense.
58 Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately established,
Accordingly, in robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution needs to prove
much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction. 59 Suspicion alone is
these elements: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable
violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to
doubt. 60 Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks
another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
upon it is without rudder or compass." 61
(d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide —
here used in its generic sense — is committed. 51

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding

consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but
Robbery Completely
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. 62 Where there is no
moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their
innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent
Unsubstantiated until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 63

The prosecution tried its best to prove the crime of homicide, even if In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender
unsuccessfully, but in the process, it left the crime of robbery totally doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of appellants.
unsubstantiated.

In view of the above findings, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other
More glaring is the fact that the Information charged appellants "as conspiring issues raised by appellants.
and confederating together and mutually helping each other." 52 Yet, the RTC
Decision found them both guilty of the crime charged without any pronouncement
as to the presence of conspiracy. To serve effectively as a basis for conviction,
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. 53
Manila (Branch 54) in Criminal Case No. 98-163090 is SET ASIDE. Danilo Asis
and Gilbert Formento are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held for some other
Had the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime been established, then the lawful cause.
precise modality of each individual conspirator becomes secondary. The
applicable rule in conspiracy is that the act of one shall be deemed to be the act
of all. 54 The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision
immaterial. 55 However, since there was neither proof nor finding of conspiracy,
forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of
then the extent of the individual participation of each appellant should have been
the date appellants were actually released from confinement. Costs de officio.
clearly delineated.

SO ORDERED.
In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt
of the accused. 56 Ei incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts — not he People vs. Tudtud, et. al. (G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003)
who denies — must prove. 57 The burden must be discharged by the prosecution
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not
itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime,
I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and
I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts
and pays and announces that it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for
my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.
So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S.1 On this occasion,
this Court is made to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or
letting the government play an ignoble part.
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a
certain Noel Tudtud.2 Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining
about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in
their area.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan,4 all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril
Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril,
Davao City.5 For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud
was involved in illegal drugs.6 According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in
selling marijuana.7cräläwvirtualibräry
On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.8 Solier
described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat.9 At around
4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1
Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival.10 All wore civilian
clothes.11cräläwvirtualibräry
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each
other carry a carton12 marked King Flakes.13 Standing some five feet away from
the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds
description.14 The same man also toted a plastic bag.15cräläwvirtualibräry
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers.16 PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had
received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night.17
The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any
drugs.18 PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box.19
Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright.20 Tudtud opened the box himself as his
companion looked on.21cräläwvirtualibräry
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one
wrapped in a striped plastic bag22 and another in newspapers.23 PO1 Desierto
asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.24 They contained what seemed to the
police officers as marijuana leaves.25cräläwvirtualibräry
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights
and brought them to the police station.26 The two did not
resist.27cräläwvirtualibräry
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for examination.28 Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief
Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region
XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers
suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the
newspapers contained another 890 grams.29 Police Chief Inspector Austero
reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated
2 August 1999.30cräläwvirtualibräry
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged31
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.32 Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty.33 The
defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and
the seizure of the evidence against them.34
Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto
and PO1 Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police
Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of
the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of
facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North
Cotabato to sell pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline.35 At about 5:00 in
the afternoon, he returned to Davao City by bus.36 Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud,
along with less than ten passengers, got down the
bus.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him,
pointing a .38 caliber revolver.38 The man told him not to run.39 Tudtud raised
his arms and asked, Sir, what is this about?40 The man answered that he would
like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open
the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levis pants.41cräläwvirtualibräry
The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away.42
According to Tudtud, the box was already there when he disembarked the bus.43
Tudtud told the man the box was not his, but proceeded to open it out of fear
after the man again pointed his revolver at him.44 Tudtud discovered pieces of
dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in
cellophane.45cräläwvirtualibräry
What is that? the man asked.46 Tudtud replied that he did not know.47 Without
even unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly
handcuffed Tudtud.48cräläwvirtualibräry
Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other
side of the street, some eight meters from Tudtud.49cräläwvirtualibräry
Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a
cousins wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted.50 After
alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street.51 Someone then approached him
and pointed a gun at him.52 The man ordered him not to move and handcuffed
him.53 Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the man just told him to go
with them.54cräläwvirtualibräry
The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim,
they met each other for the first time.55cräläwvirtualibräry
Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the
testimonies of Felicia Julaton,56 Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia,57
Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita Abunda,58 Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of
the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified and presented court
documents showing that one Bobo or Bobong Ramirez was charged in their
respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious
physical injuries and robbery. The defense asserted that the Bobo or Bobong
Ramirez accused in these cases is the same person as the informant Bobong
Solier.59cräläwvirtualibräry
Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.60cräläwvirtualibräry
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the
admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in
violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable
within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any
evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.61 Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable
searches and seizures. The following instances are not deemed unreasonable
even in the absence of a warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62cräläwvirtualibräry
The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first
exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this
Courts rulings in People v. Claudio,63 People v. Tangliben,64 People v.
Montilla,65 and People v. Valdez.66 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the cases of People
v. Maspil, Jr.,67 People v. Malmstedt,68 and People v.
Bagista.69cräläwvirtualibräry
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to
its revision in 2000, Section 12,70 Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot
be reversed.71 Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest
at the outset of the search.72 The question, therefore, is whether the police in
this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been
defined as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.73cräläwvirtualibräry
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of
consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
In the leading case of People v. Burgos,74 this Court held that the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view.75 In Burgos, the authorities
obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok
as member of the New Peoples Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon
finding the accused, the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun
as well as purportedly subversive documents. This Court, in declaring then
Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellants wife.
At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could
be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the
arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The
statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is
strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when
securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by
the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so
would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated
and so deserving of full protection.76
Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in
violation of the accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest
seizures.
because of suspicious circumstances: People v. Tangliben88 (accused was acting
suspiciously), People v. Malmstedt89 (a bulge on the accuseds waist), and People
v. de Guzman90 (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing
In People v. Aminnudin,77 this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and
tight-fitting clothes).
subsequent search of appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:

There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of cases belong People v.
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
Maspil, Jr.,91 People v. Bagista,92 People v. Balingan,93 People v. Lising,94
outward indication that he called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
People v. Montilla,95 People v. Valdez,96 and People v. Gonzales.97 In these
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
but there were no overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive
the accused has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the
the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come under some other
probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized
exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both,
him.78cräläwvirtualibräry
and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.

Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which,
that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side
in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the
while holding ones abdomen,79 or of standing on a corner with ones eyes moving
phrase in his presence therein, connoting personal knowledge on the part of the
very fast, looking at every person who came near,80 does not justify a
arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting something in
searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being
ones pocket,81 handing over ones baggage,82 riding a motorcycle,83 nor does
a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to
holding a bag on board a trisikad84sanction State intrusion. The same rule
the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot
applies to crossing the street per se.85cräläwvirtualibräry
be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.98cräläwvirtualibräry

Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.86 Recently,
The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In
in People v. Binad Sy Chua,87 this Court declared invalid the arrest of the
Claudio,99 the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting
accused, who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus arousing the latters suspicion. In
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two
Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted suspiciously.
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not
without its critics. There, majority of the Court held:
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag
and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any
crime since that is normal. But precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that
drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and
concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely
on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed
them, that the drugs were in appellants luggage. It would obviously have been
irresponsible, if now downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the
constable to adopt a wait and see attitude at the risk of eventually losing the
quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the
point prior to the search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which
by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded
and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The
search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting
prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings
without the requisite warrant were both justified.100cräläwvirtualibräry
While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the
discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr.
Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate
Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented to
the inspection of his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that
jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the officers making the
in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant did not exhibit any overt act
or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he
was embarking on some felonious enterprise.
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and
searches without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the
former, the arresting person must have actually witnessed the crime being
committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated
the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines
personally from testimonies of witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime was committed by the accused.
To say that reliable tips constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or
search is in my opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the
doctrines laid down in many decisions made by this Court, in its effort to
zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-
called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese occupation.
Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law
could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power
upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under oath their
accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify
warrantless arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an
oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants, for they can always claim
that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon
before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly
effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majoritys
ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures.101cräläwvirtualibräry
Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring opinion in
People v. Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:
Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his
direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his
(PO3 Manlangits) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he
not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of appellant
person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily Tudtud:
lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or
without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Dorias word, the Narcom Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to
agents had no showing that the person who affected the warantless arrest had, in Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana?
his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.102 [Italics
in the original.]
A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person
whou [sic] would point to him because he had been giving trouble to the
neighborhood because according to them there are [sic] proliferation of
Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice Panganiban said marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors.
that Doria rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless
arrests and searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in
People v. Ruben Montilla.103cräläwvirtualibräry
Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting
him particularly?

Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions

searches incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any rate,
A His friends were the once who told me about it.
Montilla was a consented search. As will be demonstrated later, the same could
not be said of this case.

Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in
proliferation of marijuana?
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an
on-the-spot information. The urgency of the circumstances, an element not
present in this case, prevented the arresting officer therein from obtaining a
warrant. A About a month.

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a
suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was
about to be, committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be believed,
appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Although appellant
Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring,104 pale105 and trembling,106 this was
only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.
.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana
which led to his apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according
to the report [which] is based on your report my question is, how did you know
that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana stocks on August 1, 1999?

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant
Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned .

A Because of the information of his neighbor.107cräläwvirtualibräry
In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on
how his neighbors or Tudtuds friends acquired their information that Tudtud was
responsible for the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood.
Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their
informant. He testified on cross-examination:
Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?
A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?
A (witness did not answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.108cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any
explanation from PO1 Floreta for his telling silence.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to
conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal
trade, but of a mere gather[ing] of information from the assets there.109 The
police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets
were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also
hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow
them to do away with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack of
time110 notwithstanding. Records show that the police had ample opportunity to
apply for a warrant, having received Soliers information at around 9:00 in the
morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening
of the same day.111 In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was
sufficient time to procure a warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in
the afternoon an intelligence report that the accused, who was supposedly
carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00 a.m.:
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992
at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V
Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day.
Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search warrants even after
office hours:
3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for
search warrant may be filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place
to be searched is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the
urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays
and legal holidays; . . ..
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19,
series of 1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for
search warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed
in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas:
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on
applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other
serious crimes affecting peace and order. There is a need for prompt action on
such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these amended guidelines in
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from
the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
Cotabato to get that (sic) stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant
on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion

Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as
A No.
amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall
immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under Q Why?
whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.

A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.

2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take
cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive
Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the application may be taken cognizance of and Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real
acted upon by any judge of the Court where application is filed. basis to search Tudtud and Bulong at that time?

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, A Yes, sir.
shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court
having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant
shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that .
its issuance is urgent.

Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay
personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent
the possible leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures, safeguards,
A Yes, sir.
and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in this Courts
Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.112 [Italics in the
original.]
Q And this was 9:00 a.m.?

Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floretas
testimony that the real reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked A Yes, sir.
sufficient basis to obtain the same assumes greater significance. This was PO1
Floretas familiar refrain:
Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?

A Yes, sir.
Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the
search warrant or the prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
A They help.
Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.113cräläwvirtualibräry
It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer
concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which
must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of
probable cause and that a court may also find probable cause in spite of an
officers judgment that none exists.114 However, the fact that the arresting
officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite
their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious questions whether such
surveillance actually yielded any pertinent information and even whether they
actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to
personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.115cräläwvirtualibräry
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records
disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and
requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist
and opened the box himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these
circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed.116 The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.
. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an A He said do not run.
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.117 [Underscoring supplied.]
Q What did you do?

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag118 or the
chairs119 containing marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about?
no valid consent to the search.

Q Why did you call him Sir?

On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving
that the search was unconsented.120cräläwvirtualibräry A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.

In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished
by the allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a
gun at them before asking them to open the subject box. Appellant Tudtud
testified as follows:
Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a
gun is a policeman.

Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.]
[What] was that something? Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?

A A 38 cal. Revolver. A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]

Q How did he point it at you? Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?

A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding A I told him that is not mine.
something towards somebody).

Q What did this man say?


A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q What did you do?
A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.121cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is,
thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.122 Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure.123cräläwvirtualibräry
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions
to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are
inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay
testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and
government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained
as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power.124cräläwvirtualibräry
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the
hierarchy of rights,125 next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life,
liberty and property, which is protected by the due process clause.126 This is as
it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates,127 the
right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation
of the right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist,
and the right to enjoyment of life while existing. Emphasizing such right, this
Court declared in People v. Aruta:
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for
the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if
the law violated is the Constitution itself.128
Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the
government play an ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and
ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED.
Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to
cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are
being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance
herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 126, Section 13, Rules of Court
Chimel vs. California [395 U.S. 752 (1964)]
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Syllabus
Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search warrant, were
admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where they awaited petitioner's arrival.
When he entered, he was served with the warrant. Although he denied the
officers' request to "look around," they conducted a search of the entire house
"on the basis of the lawful arrest." At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items
taken from his home were admitted over objection that they had been
unconstitutionally seized. His conviction was affirmed by the California appellate
courts, which held, despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the
arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the
warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had sufficient
information to constitute probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was lawful. The
courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a valid arrest.
Held: Assuming the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of petitioner's house
cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest. Pp. 395 U. S. 755-
768.
(a) An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and remove
weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and
may search the area "within the immediate control" of the person arrested,
meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. Pp. 395 U. S. 762-763.
(b) For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs, or
for searching desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself,
absent well recognized exceptions, a search warrant is required. P. 395 U. S.
763.
(c) While the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest depends upon "the
facts and circumstances -- the total atmosphere of the case," those facts and
circumstances must be viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment
principles, and the only reasoned distinction is one between (1) a search of the
person arrested and the area within his reach, and (2) more extensive searches.
Pp. 395 U. S. 765-766.
Page 395 U. S. 753
(d) United Ste v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, and Harris v. United States, 331 U. S.
145, on their facts, and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent
with this decision, are no longer to be followed. P. 395 U. S. 768.
(e) The scope of the search here was unreasonable under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as it went beyond petitioner's person and the area from
within which he might have obtained a weapon or something that could have
been used as evidence against him, and there was no constitutional justification,
in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. P.
395 U. S. 768.
68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, reversed.
People vs. de la Cruz (G.R. 83988, April 18, 1990)
Accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and his co-accused Reynaldo
Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case No. 87-54417 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21,
Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, in an information which reads:
That on or about May 4, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any
prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell,
deliver or give away to and other the following:
1. One (1) cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana;
2. Two (2) cigarette foil wrapper (sic) containing marijuana which are prohibited
drugs.
Contrary to law.1
The accused, who were assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on May 26, 1987. On August 18, 1987, trial on the merits started, with
the prosecution thereafter presenting as its witnesses P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy,
P/Capt. Luena Layador, T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, and S/Sgt.
Armando Isidro. On its part, the defense presented both accused, Lolita Mendoza
and Maribeth Manapat as its witnesses.
The court a quo, in a comparative evaluation of evidence, painstakingly
summarized the clashing factual versions of the prosecution and defense, as
follows:
. . . On its part, the prosecution alleged that after receiving a confidential report
from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th
Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as
Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez,
P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St.,
Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 4, 1987 to catch the
pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his
companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz
and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first
negotiated (with) on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was
buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give
one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and
delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was
really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by
scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the
vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and
effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill (Exhibit C-
1) used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with
two aluminum foils and containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3").
Traversing this version is that of the defense which, in brief, consists of a denial
to (sic) the prosecution's theory and the claim that accused Juan de la Cruz, who
was then suffering from loose bowel movement, was all the time in bed at their
place at 3034 Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila; that he never left their place
throughout that day of May 4, 1987; that he never had a visitor on that day and
that he was never engaged in the sale of marijuana. The NARCOM agents raided
his place without search warrant or without first securing his previous permission.
One searched thoroughly his place, the second acted as a guard posted at the
door of De la Cruz' place and the third agent was a mere observer. His place was
ransacked and he was even bodily searched. As regards accused Reynaldo
Beltran, he was arrested by the same group (prior to the arrest of Juan de la
Cruz) while he was playing "pool" at Aling Ely's place along Maliclic St. that
afternoon and that without much ado, he was taken because he was fingered by
one Arnel to be engaged in selling marijuana. Both accused were brought to a
parked vehicle of the raiding team, From there, they were taken to NARCOM
headquarters for investigation where for the first time they came to know that
they were being charged of selling marijuana. 2
Finding the version of the prosecution more worthy of credit, the court a quo
rendered its decision3 on March 15, 1988, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the
accused, JUAN DE LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation
to Section 21, Article IV, both of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by Presidential Decree No.
1675 and as charged in the Information, and, accordingly, hereby sentences each
of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law; to pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
each to pay one-half of the costs.
The three (3) aluminum foils containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" to "B-4")
placed in an empty Marlboro pack (Exhibit "B-1") are hereby ordered confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the government and once this Decision shall become final
and executory, the same shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
through the Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, for proper
disposition while the P10.00 bill (Exhibit "C-1") bearing Serial No. F-215962 shall
be returned to T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas.
Furnish copy of this Decision to the Honorable Supreme Court through the
Honorable Court Administrator. 4
From this decision, accused Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and co-accused Reynaldo
Beltran y Aniban interposed the instant appeal.
In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated March 3, 1989, 5 the Court was
informed of the death of accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales on
February 21, 1989. Counsel de oficio having thereafter submitted a certified true
copy of the death certificate of the accused 6 as directed by the Court, the
criminal case against said accused-appellant was dismissed in our resolution of
September 25, 1989. 7
The present appellate proceeding is, therefore, limited only to appellant Reynaldo
Beltran y Aniban who now faults the trial court with the following assignment of
errors:
1. The Buy-Bust Operation being done to enforce Republic Act 6425 is
unconstitutional and any evidence acquired under such method should not be
admissible in court.
2. The Buy-Bust Operation should be declared illegal for it breeds corruption of
police and military officers through planting of evidence for purposes of extortion.
3. The Court erred in giving probative value to the confiscated marijuana sticks
despite the fact that no civilian or other neutral person signed as a witness to its
taking. If it were true, there must be at least one civic-minded citizen who could
easily be convinced by the police to witness it.
4. The Court erred in considering the evidence, Exhibits "B-2," "B-3" and "B-4",
as the very ones confiscated.
If they were the very ones taken from the accused, the original receipt prepared
at the scene of the crime would not have been thrown away by the very agent
who acted as the buyer. Exhibit "E" should have been given no probative value
for having been executed by someone who did not actually confiscate the
marijuana.
5. The Court erred in giving probative value to the Buy-Bust Operation when
even the alleged marked money utilized in the operation could not be identified
by the leader, T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas.
6. The Court erred in not giving value to the testimony of the two disinterested
witnesses for the defense, namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, whose
testimony corroborated substantially that of the accused.
7. The Court erred in concluding that there was no motive for the military to
manufacture evidence.1âwphi1 It is common knowledge that apprehensions of
this kind are made to fill up a quota of arrest in cases handled to comply with
standard operating procedure and efficiency reports. 8
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Appellant assails, unconstitutional, the manner in which the so-called buy-bust
operation is conducted in order to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act. He
stigmatizes it as no different from seizure of evidence from one's person or abode
without a search warrant. He argues that this procedure is pregnant with
opportunities, and gives rise to situations, for corrupting our law enforcers.
 Appellant castigates the prosecution for not having presented any civilian or other
neutral person who could attest that the foils of marijuana were indeed
We are not unmindful of the fact that the common modus operandi of narcotic
confiscated from him. The absence of any civilian witness should not undermine
agents in utilizing poseur-buyers does not always commend itself as the most
the case for the prosecution. The natural reaction of a civilian to inhibit himself
reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it is susceptible
from being a witness to a crime is understandable. A criminal proceeding entails
of mistakes as well as harassment, extortion and abuse. 9 By the very nature of
a lot of unavoidable inconveniences, aside from the time involved in attendance
this anti-narcotics operation, the possibility of abuse is great. 10
as a witness in investigations and hearings. Adding to this the inherent fear of
reprisal, we have the natural reticence and abhorrence of most people to get
involved in a criminal case.
We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of narcotics agents whose
task, as it is, is already formidable and attended with great risk, lest their
dedicated efforts for the apprehension and successful prosecution of prohibited
At any rate, the testimony of other witnesses in this case would only be
drug violators be unduly hampered. The proliferation of drug addiction and
cumulative or corroborative as they would only be repeating the facts already
trafficking has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of
amply testified to by the government witnesses. Credence should be accorded to
incorrigible, cunning and dangerous operations. Our experience has proven
the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
entrapment to be an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers as
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in
exemplified by this case.
the absence of proof to the contrary. 16

The Solicitor General explains that a buy-bust operation is the method employed
Appellant maintains that the court below should have rejected Exhibit E, which
by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is
evidences the receipt of marijuana from appellant and which was prepared by
essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor
Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, in the absence of the original receipt prepared at the scene
induces the accused to commit a crime. 11 Entrapment is the employment of
of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy who was the poseur-buyer.
such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from
whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way
of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense.12
We agree with the Solicitor General, since this is borne out by the records, that
Exhibit E is actually based on, as it is merely a clearer copy of, the receipt
prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy. Since the draft receipt had to
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence
be prepared hurriedly at the scene in order that the accused could be brought to
from one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is
the Narcotics Command, such draft receipt was not clearly written, so Sgt.
not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. 13 A peace officer
Vicente Jimenez mechanically transferred the written entries of P/Pfc. Arcoy into
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
a more legible copy. 17 Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Sgt. Jimenez, a
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
member of the team, had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in both
offense. 14 It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of
receipts, being an eyewitness to the events that had transpired.
the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably
caught red-handed. 15 There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in
The testimony of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, the team leader who gave P/Pfc. Arcoy
evidence.
the money to pay for the marijuana, is challenged in that he failed to identify the
marked money utilized in the operation. Appellant insists that the marked money
must be recorded, if not photographed in order to be admissible as evidence. This
is clutching at evidentiary and argumental straws.
As found by the trial court, the money was in the possession of P/Pfc. Arcoy who
had been assigned as the poseur-buyer.1âwphi1 In the ensuing transaction, the
foil of marijuana was handed to Arcoy by appellant and then Arcoy gave the
money to accused Juan dela Cruz. 18
Suffice it to say that even if the money given to De la Cruz was not presented in
court, the same would not militate against the People's case. 19 In fact, there
was even no need to prove that the marked money was handed to the appellants
in payment of the goods. The crime could have been consummated by the mere
delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not only the act of
selling but also, albeit not limited to, the act of delivering. In the latter case, the
act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise,
and by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. 20
On the trial court's rejection of the testimony of the alleged two disinterested
witnesses for the defense, namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, we find
no reason to disturb its ruling. We reiterate the time-honored principle that on
the issue of which version to accept, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are given great weight and the highest degree of respect
by the appellate court. Subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present
case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question, having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. 21
Appellant imputes insidious motives on the part of the military to manufacture
evidence, theorizing that a buy-bust operation is for the purpose either of
extorting money or, in line with alleged internal policies, complying with a quota
of arrests. 22 These are bare unsupported allegations. From the evidence of
record, we find no reason why the prosecution witness should fabricate their
testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime. The defense has not
established any cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge the accused
with peddling marijuana. As found by the trial court, there is not even a breath,
much less an accusation by the defense, that the military and police personnel
involved were indeed engaged in such nefarious activities. 23
Finally, appellant reproaches the prosecution for not presenting the civilian
informer as a witness. 24 It is settled that the non-presentation of a certain
witness by the prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible defense. If the accused
believes that the testimony of said witness is important to his cause, he should
avail thereof, even by compulsory judicial process if necessary. Furthermore, the
non-presentation of some prosecution witnesses does not detract from the
prosecution's case, since the number of such witnesses who should be called to
testify is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers. 25
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case
No. 87-54417, insofar as accused-appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban is
concerned, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Kalubiran [196 SCRA 645 (1991)]
The accused-appellant is questioning his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He
contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution, in violating his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and in not according him the presumption of innocence.
Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on July 12, 1985, at about nine o'clock in the
evening, at Real Street in Dumaguete City, by elements of the Narcotics
Command stationed in that city. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust"
operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team
members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo
approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of the
Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying
marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two sticks of marijuana, for which
Quindo paid him a previously marked P 5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and
Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accused-
appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of
marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt.
Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they
boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station.
The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC Crime
Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results, as reported and
later testified on by Forensic Chemist Myrna Arreola. The above-named Narcotics
agents all testified and corroborated each other in narrating the "buy-bust"
operation.
As might be expected, the defense had a different version of the accused-
appellant's arrest. Kalubiran said he and his friends were in front of the Gamo
Memorial Clinic that evening of July 12, 1985, when a jeep stopped in front of
them and several persons alighted. One of them—whom he subsequently
identified as Quindo—approached and frisked him. Finding nothing on him,
Quindo went back to the jeep, and he for his part left for his house. However, he
was called back by another person he later came to know as Villamor. He was
told at gunpoint to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the
police station. He was released the following day with the help of a lawyer his girl
friend, Norma Diez, had contacted. He denied having sold marijuana and insisted
that the 19 sticks of marijuana and the marked bill never came from him.
Norma Diez corroborated Kalubiran. So did the other defense witness, Bob Reloj,
except that he testified he was also frisked and likewise taken to PC headquarters
and later to the police station, where he and Kalubiran were detained for three
days.
After examining and evaluating the evidence of the parties, Judge Enrique C.
Garrovillo found in favor of the prosecution, declared Kalubiran guilty as charged,
and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P 20,000.00 fine and the costs. It
is from this judgment that Kalubiran has filed this appeal.
This Court places much reliance upon the factual findings of the trial judge who
has the advantages of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to gauge
by their demeanor whether they are being true to their oath or lying in their
teeth. Such an opportunity is not available to the appellate judge, who must
depend on the inanimate record that cannot reveal the tell-tale signs by which
the truth may be discerned and the falsehood exposed. Lacking any showing of
arbitrariness—and there is none in the case at bar—such findings of the trial
court cannot be faulted by this Court.
There are indeed some inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses but we do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential
veracity of their narration of Kalubiran's arrest as it actually happened. We have
said often enough that such imperfections may in fact bolster rather than
emasculate a person's credibility as one cannot be expected to remember a
particular incident with unerring accuracy in every minute detail.
It is the defense evidence that in fact suffers from the defects it would impute to
the prosecution. While it has not been shown that the Narcotics agents were
acting with ulterior motives rather than merely pursuing their duties, Norma
Diez's testimony is reasonably suspect as she is the girl friend of Kalubiran and
can be expected to be loyal to him, to the point of even lying for him. As for
Reloj, his inconsistency with Kalubiran's testimony is not merely insignificant but
loudly proclaims its own falsity. It is noted that Reloj said he was also arrested
with the accused-appellant and the two of them were detained at the police
station for three days. The accused- appellant said he was the only one arrested
and that he was released the following morning.
The defense argues that Kalubiran would not have sold marijuana at a public
place and in plain view of the people as this would be contrary to human nature
and caution. We are not impressed. The people he was with at the time were his
own group, friends who were probably aware of his unlawful trade and did not
care much what he did. Moreover, it is to be expected that he did not sell the
marijuana openly or with reckless fanfare but with appropriate furtiveness, as
befitted him shameful trade.
At any rate, we have already observed in People vs. Paco,1 that:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy
is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a
few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of
other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as
these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has
sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard
hall (People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986,142 SCRA 329; People vs.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store
(People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People vs. Toledo, G.R. No.
67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People vs.
Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
The defense posture that Kalubiran's arrest and search violated the Bill of Rights
demonstrates an unfamiliarity with the applicable rules and jurisprudence. The
accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment
and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a
warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The search was
made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of
Rule 116. In addition to the aforecited Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence
justifying warrantless searches and seizures under the conditions established in
this case.2
The argument that the marijuana and the marked money were not sufficiently
identified must also be rejected.1âwphi1 The exhibits were placed in a steel
cabinet by Villamor for safekeeping before he personally took the marijuana to
the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. It was also Villamor who had also
earlier initiated the P5.00 bill and later identified it at the trial as the money paid
to the accused-appellant in exchange for the two sticks of marijuana.
The Court notes that Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of
marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have
been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the
time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the
second offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate information for
violation of Section 8 of the said law.
It is futile for Kalubiran to invoke the constitutional presumption of innocence
because it has been overcome with overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt.
His defense is not only weak; what is worse for him is that the prosecution is
clearly strong and has proved his offense beyond the whisper of a doubt.
Persons like the accused-appellant deserve the severe sanctions of the law for
the misery they spread among our people, especially the youth, many of whom
have forfeited their future because of the evil influence of drugs. The strong arm
of the law must never weaken against the onslaughts of this terrible affliction.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Malmstedt [198 SCRA 401 (1991)]
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt
(hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-
0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in
1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival
thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed
in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City.
From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
Plate number AVC 902.1
luggage carrier.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy
Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that
stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at
there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in
passport.
the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa,
drugs.2 La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal
effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay
chemical analysis.
Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock
in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they
were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The
two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the
rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense,
the rear thereof. he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that
the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the
two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him
by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
Dangwa Station.
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the
wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his
of marijuana. passport and other Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his
pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his
passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it
to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came
back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to
get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his
neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers,
was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When
accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the
Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer
about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as
having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4,
Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4,
Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional
Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the
crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.5
However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need
to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a
peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their
Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of
herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information
supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and
pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein,
and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present
his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities,
to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In
other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his
pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag
(which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags
containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted
by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport,
and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of
the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the
trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Espano vs. Court of Appeals [288 SCRA 558 (1998)]
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convincing petitioner Rodolfo Espano for
violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing
crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo
Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police
officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of
the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him.
The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags
of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted
bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory
Section, testified that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding
the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for
marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in
his house and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He
alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when
they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for
investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna
corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere afterthought" and found
the version of the prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting
petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the
accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8,
Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a
fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned
over to the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
however, affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.

Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on
the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible;
(b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the
doctrine of presumption of regularity, (c) he was denied the constitutional right of
confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on
evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no
compelling reason sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of
witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the
issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during appeal in
the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were
more credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that
Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his
duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a
serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the
buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous
activities who were motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact
personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her.
And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to
falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . . , must prevail
over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been
framed. 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any
consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time
of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he
was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was
physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up',
like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged
informant in court cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is
again without merit, since failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in
court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to
establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this
case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner, testified
on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as the one they caught
in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants.
There is no compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that
the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution, was
straightforward spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if
credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient
to convict. 10

Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to
prove that petitioner indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the
finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be
ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in
flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area
of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner
handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched
him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence,
however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and
seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In
this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after
his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial
court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially
the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made
inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not
armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made
incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that
point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish
him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar,
appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can
hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine
of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his
house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became
unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the
time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on
December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of
drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20, and
as interpreted in People v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of
marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges from
prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that
petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to
him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty
imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional,
which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Tangliben [184 SCRA 220 (1990)]
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third
Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel
Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the
costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San
Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO,
knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1) bag
of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to
transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so. (At
p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was based is narrated by the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late
evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of
the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario
Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the
surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors
at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of
dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers; that it was around
9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag
(Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person
was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag
but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped
in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was
asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his
name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to
Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the
police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and
that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's
Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or
on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto
Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had special training on
narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to
have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the
marijuana leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the
remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at
Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A
and A-1) and when examined, the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit
C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial
court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot
a child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of
his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in the business
of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to conduct his
business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his
business and whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena
Ballon and dispose the same in Manila; that he never left his residence at
Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to
collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that
he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in
Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's
son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but
he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it
was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy, he did not notice
that the bus was only bound for San Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at
the Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to
wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a man whom he
came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has
any residence certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the
wallet and took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat.
Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as
he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman,
identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when
he arrived that Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out
everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get the
same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took
the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never
returned to him; that he was thereafter placed under detention and somebody
told him that he is being charged with possession of marijuana and if he would
like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that when he was
visited by his wife, he told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all
his money but he told his wife not to complain anymore as it would be useless.
(Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone
assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND
DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower
court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio
Atty. Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio,
Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the
Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter
complied and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE
OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED
WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a
product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in
evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of
his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless
search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted
with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not
need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco
V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the
1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163
SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an
informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening,
approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The
Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was
seized illegally. The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not
sing in the case before us, which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid.
As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at react two days within which they
could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's
decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that
there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To
require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods,
robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the
crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves
supposedly seized from him was never authenticated and therefore should not
have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana
package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for
examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule,
however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana
package together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist
Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana together
with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused,
then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently
complied with. The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was
satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was
not properly authenticated, still, we cannot discount the separate field test
conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive results for
marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was
insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer
should have been presented before the lower court. We discard this argument as
a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several
cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be
merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People
v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262,
March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia,
147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial
court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to
great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court.
Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial
judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and
behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of
their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v.
Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo
Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show the commission by the
accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution witnesses have no
motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the
accused. The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired
by them in the official performance of their duties and then, (sic) being no
showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies deserve
full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the
possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the
examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL, with
station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo, p.
11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat.
Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory
Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged"
why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for
interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his
identity to the accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony
to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never
returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any money from the
accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the
two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling
red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which contained the marijuana in
question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the
prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge acquired by the
prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there
is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have
any prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of these
prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony
of the accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could
have availed himself through compulsory court processes of several witnesses to
buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was presented nor was any
justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and
uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive
testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly
observed by the lower court, is an added circumstance tending to establish his
guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one
(1) kilo, more or less. The intent to transport the same is clear from the
testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that when
he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused) is
bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the
quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused and the
place he was arrested which is at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place where the
accused is not residing, it can be said that the intent to transport the marijuana
leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he
categorically denied in court, that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to
Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true, the
extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the
records that the accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People
v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the
prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he
was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because
there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his
confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v.
Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of
official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the
Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his
constitutionally protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and
from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It
may be pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to
be approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana
leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a
considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to
transport the marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact
that the accused was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not
his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe penalty must be
based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in
this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport
the marijuana leaves but his actual session.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section
8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED
but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six
Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Che Chun Ting [328 SCRA 592 (2000)]
CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," a Hong Kong national, was found guilty by the trial
court on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit
999.43 grams of shabu; 1 and, having in his custody, possession and control
5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. 2 He was meted two (2) death
sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of Sec. 16, both
of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended). 3 He
was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first case, and
P12,000,000.00 in the second. 4 He is now before us on automatic review.
The antecedent facts: Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements of
the Special Operation Unit, Narcotics Command, apprehended a suspected drug
courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a transparent plastic bag
containing a white crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM
agents. When questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government
agents and revealed the name of accused Che Chun Ting as the source of the
drugs.
On 27 June 1996 the Narcotics Command Deployed a team of agents for the
entrapment and arrest of Che Chun Ting. The team was composed of Major
Marcelo Garbo, a certain Captain Campos, 5 P/Insp. Raymond Santiago, SPO3
Renato Campanilla, and a civilian interpreter. The member of the NARCOM team
were in two (2) vehicles: a Nissan Sentra Super Saloon driven by Mabel with
P/Insp. Santiago, SPO3 Campanilla as passengers; and the other vehicle, with
Major Garbo, Captain Campos and the civilian interpreter on board. At around 7
o'clock in the morning they proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden in Pasay
City where Che Chun Ting was and had the place under surveillance. Later, they
moved to the McDonald's parking lot where the civilian interpreter transferred to
the Nissan car. Mabel then called Che Chun Ting through her cellular phone and
spoke to him in Chinese. According to the interpreter, who translated to the
NARCOM agents the conversation between Mabel and Che Chun Ting, Mabel
ordered one (1) kilo of shabu.
At around 10:30 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Mabel received a call
from the accused that he was ready to deliver the stuff. She immediately relayed
the message to the NARCOM agents. After receiving the go-signal from Major
Garbo, P/Insp. Santiago, SPO3 Campanilla and Mabel proceeded to the Roxas
Seafront Garden. The other vehicle followed but trailed behind within reasonable
distance to serve as a blocking force.
Upon arriving at the Roxas Seafront Garden, Mabel honked twice and went to
Unit 122. The two (2) NARCOM agents, who waited inside the car parked two (2)
meters away, saw the door of the unit open as a man went out to hand Mabel a
transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM
agents immediately alighted and arrested the surprised man who was positively
identified by Mabel as Che Chun Ting. Then the agents radioed their superiors in
the other car and coordinated with the security guard on duty at the Roxas
Seafront Garden to make a search of Unit 122. During the search SPO3
Campanilla seized a black bag with several plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the second floor. The bag was
examined in the presence of Major Garbo, the accused himself, and his girlfriend
Nimfa Ortiz. The accused together with the evidence was then brought to Camp
Crame where Forensic Chemist P/Sr. Inspector Julita T. de Villa after conducting
laboratory tests found the white crystalline substance to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 6
 in assuming that the entire white crystalline substance seized is positive
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
The defense has a different version. Nimfa Ortiz narrated that she sent her
brother Noli Ortiz to meet Mabel Cheung Mei Po in front of the Allied Bank at the
EDSA Extension to help the latter find a lawyer and at the same time get the
We resolve. The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can
laser disc she lent to Mabel. Noli testified that when he go inside the car of Mabel
be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Thus —
a policeman sitting at the back of the car suddenly hit him on the head. The car
then proceeded to McDonald's at Roxas Boulevard near the Roxas Seafront
Garden where he was moved to another car, a green Nissan Sentra, with Major
Garbo, Captain Lukban, and a certain Palma (perceived to be the civilian The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
interpreter) on board. Mabel stayed behind at Mcdonald's until she was brought against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
back to Camp Crame. purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
Noli Ortiz, Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and Palma went to the Roxas Seafront
persons or things to be seized. 9
Garden where they parked the car five (5) to seven (7) meters away from Unit
122. Noli rang the doorbell of the unit. When Nimfa opened the door, two (2)
NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched the premises.
Noli denied having seen any black bag seized by SPO3 Campanilla; instead, what It further mandates that any evidence obtained in violation thereof shall be
he saw was his sister's video camera being carted away by the NARCOM agents. inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 10
He further testified that when his sister was made to sign a certification on the
conduct of the search on Unit 122 she was frightened and crying. He claimed that
accused Che Chun Ting was then asleep at the second floor of the unit. The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. For
instance, a person lawfully arrested searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense, without a search
The defense presented documents showing that the owner of the Unit 122 was warrant. 11 The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
Nimfa Ortiz and not the accused Che Chun Ting who lived at 1001 Domingo include the permissible area or surroundings within his immediate control. 12
Poblete St., BF Homes Paranaque. 7 This information, according to the defense,
was vital for purposes of ascertaining the legality of the search on Unit 122 as
well as the seizure therein of a black bag containing several plastic bags of The issue is whether this case falls within the exception.
shabu. Finally, the defense assailed the lower court for relying on the testimony
of Mabel who turned hostile witness in the course of the trial. 8
The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to Mabel
Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives.
Accused Che Chun Ting now contends that the trial court erred: (a) in convicting Moreover, it is borne by the records that Unit 122 was not even his residence but
him on the basis of the shabu seized inside Unit 122, which was constitutionally that of his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein.
inadmissible as evidence since it was seized without a search warrant; (b) in Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of the house constituted a
failing to recognize that the testimony of Mabel Cheung Mei Po, who turned permissible area within his reach or immediate control,13 to justify a warrantless
hostile witness in the course of the trial, has discredited the prosecution case and search therein.
cast doubt on the testimonies of P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla; and, (c)
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless
search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by
the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is
sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be
seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or ''anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense." With respect to the time and
place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful
arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at
about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place
where the suspect was arrested, 14 or the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the
arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might
be armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person arrested from
destroying the evidence within his reach. 15 The exception therefore should not
be strained beyond what is needed in order to serve its purposes, as what the
Solicitor General would want us to do.
We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some
5,578.68 grams of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for
being violative of one's basic constitutional right and guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof
are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as
having been obtained from a polluted source, the "fruit of a poisonous tree."
However, objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law
cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure.
Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives which cannot legally be
possessed by the accused under the law, can and must be retained by the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the 5,578.68 grams of shabu in evidence
does not totally exonerate the accused. The illegal search in Unit 122 was
preceded by a valid arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a
result of an entrapment conducted by NARCOM operatives on the basis of the
information provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po regarding the accused's illegal
trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla saw him handing
over a bag of white crystalline substance to Mabel Cheung Mei Po. His arrest was
lawful and the seized bag of shabu weighing 999.43 grams was admissible in
evidence, being the fruit of the crime.
The second assigned error hinges on the credibility of witnesses. As we have
consistently stressed in the majority of appeals in criminal cases, appellate courts
give weight, and at times even finality, to the findings of the trial judge who is in
a better position to determine the credibility of witnesses, as he can observe
firsthand their demeanor and deportment while testifying. Appellate courts have
none of the judge's advantageous position; they rely merely on the cold records
of the case and on the judge's discretion.
As mentioned earlier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness in the course
of the trial. The defense capitalized on such fact and hammered the prosecution
on this point, arguing that Mabel's testimony during her cross-examination
virtually belied the prosecution's factual theory of the case and the cast doubt on
the testimony of the NARCOM agents.
But we are not persuaded. Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness
understandably because of her adverse interest in the case. She was separately
charged for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, 16 although she was
subsequently acquitted by the trial court on reasonable doubt. 17 It is therefore
to be expected that she would be extremely cautious in giving her testimony as it
might incriminate her. At any rate, the testimony of the police informant in an
illegal drug case is not essential for the conviction of the accused since that
testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative. 18 Hence, even if we
concede that Mabel Cheung Mei Po's testimony was discredited on account of the
dismissal of the criminal case against her, the prosecution could still rely on the
testimonies of the arresting officers and secure a conviction on the basis thereof.
Further, the attempt of the accused to downgrade the testimonies of the
NARCOM agents is bereft of substantial basis since it has not been shown that
they had an improper motive for testifying as they did. It would not be amiss to
point out that NARCOM agents are not just ordinary witnesses but are law
enforcers. As compared to the baseless disclaimers of the witnesses for the
defense, the narration of the incident of the police officers is far more worthy of
belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. 19 From the
evidence at hand, we find no reason to denigrate their declarations.
Indeed, there is no doubt from the records that the accused was caught in
flagrante delicto, i.e., in the act of delivering shabu. The evidence for the
prosecution is both substantial and convincing. at its core is the testimony of
P/Ins. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla who categorically pointed to the accused as
the person who handed to Mabel a plastic bag of white crystalline substance
which, upon forensic examination, was found positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. As can be gleaned from the assailed decision of the trial
court, the narration of events by the police officers is positive, credible and
entirely in accord with human experience. It bears all the earmarks of truth that
it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to give credence to it. They
testified in a clear, precise and straightforward manner, and even the rigid cross-
examination by the defense could not dent the essence of their testimonies.
As regards the third assigned error, the accused questions the accuracy of the
laboratory tests conducted by the forensic chemist on the seized articles. He
contends that the PNP Crime Laboratory should have subjected the entire 999.43
grams and 5,578.66 grams of white crystalline substance taken from him, to
laboratory examination and not merely representative samples thereof in
milligrams.
The argument is untenable. Primarily, there is no law or rule of evidence
requiring the forensic chemist to test the entire quantity of seized drugs to
determine whether the whole lot is really prohibited or regulated drugs as
suspected. On the contrary, it has always been the standard procedure in the PNP
Crime Laboratory to test only samples of the drugs submitted for laboratory
examination. A sample taken from a package may be logically presumed to be
representative of the whole contents of the package. 20
Moreover, we held in one case that chemical analysis is not an indispensable
prerequisite to establish whether a certain substance offered in evidence is a
prohibited drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be acquired without any
knowledge of chemistry to such an extent that the testimony of a witness on the
point may be entitled to great weight. Such technical knowledge is not required,
and the degree of familiarity of a witness with such drugs only affects the weight
and not the competency of his testimony. 21 1âwphi1
At any rate, it was up to the defense to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the findings of the forensic chemist were erroneous. In the absence of such
evidence, the positive results of the tests conducted by the chemist should be
accepted as conclusive. After all, she has in her favor the presumption that she
regularly performed her official duty, which was to carry out those tests in
accordance with the accepted standard procedure. 22
All told, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 96-8932. Accordingly, he
must suffer for his serious crime of poisoning the health and future of this nation.
However, we refrain from imposing the capital punishment. As amended by RA
7659, Sec. 20, Art. IV of The Dangerous Drugs Act now provides in part that the
penalty in Sec. 15, Art. III, shall be applied if the dangerous drug involved is, in
the case of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride 200 grams or more and
the delivery united efforts to stem the surging tide of drug-trafficking in this
country, the police force is not only expected to be well-trained and well-
equipped in the detection and apprehension of drug pushers, but more
importantly, it must also be aware that arrest, searches and seizures should at all
times and in all instances be done within the context of the Constitution. While
we encourage an active and vigorous law enforcement, we nevertheless deter to
and uphold the sacredness of constitutional rights. In the instant case, while the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by this Court on the accused may be
sufficient to put him away for good, it is nonetheless lamentable that he will walk
away unpunished in the other case of possession of more than 5,000 grams of
illegal narcotics on account of a blunder which could have easily been avoided
had the NARCOM officers faithfully adhered to the requirements of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 96-8932 convicting
accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, of RA 6425
(The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended) is AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that the penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The accused is ordered to pay a fine in the increased amount of
P2,000,000.00, and the cost.
In Crim. Case No. 96-8933, accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" is ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt the
evidence against him being inadmissible.
The 999.43 grams and 5,578.68 grams of shabu, subject of Crim. Case Nos. 96-
8932 and 96-8933 are FORFEITED in favor of the government to be turned over
immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board and the National Bureau of
Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Estrella (G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003)
The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug
was searched for and found in a hut that has not been proven to be owned,
controlled, or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose. Hence, he
cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein.
The Case
Antonio C. Estella appeals the August 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69) in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I. The
trial court found him guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I, accused
Antonio C. Estella is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
"The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana is ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The Sheriff is directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition.
"In Criminal Case No. RTC 2144-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and
the Information dated 07 January 1997 filed against him for violation of P.D.
1866 is dismissed with costs de officio.
"The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live ammunitions,
subject of the offense, are ordered delivered to any authorized representative of
the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame,
Quezon City." 2
The Information dated January 7, 1997, charged appellant thus:
"That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996 at about 11:15 o'clock in the
morning, at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, in the Municipality of Masinloc,
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control, [o]ne (1) tin can labeled 'CLASSIC'
containing twenty (20) small bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of 589.270 grams each wrapped with a piece of reading material; [o]ne
(1) tin can labeled 'CLASSIC' containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
41.126 grams; [t]wo (2) white sando plastic bag each containing one (1) [brick]
of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.710 kilograms each
wrapped with a piece of newspaper, [o]ne (1) white sando plastic bag containing
two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.820
kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper, all in the total of 8.320
kilograms of dried marijuana, without any authority to possess the same." 3

After the Information had been read to him in Filipino, a language he fully
understood, 4 appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, 5 pleaded not guilty
when arraigned on March 11, 1997. After due trial, the RTC convicted appellant
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana), but acquitted him of illegal
possession of firearms. On November 4, 1998, his counsel filed a Notice of
Appeal. 6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's
version of the facts as follows:
"Prior to November 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure
in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc,
Zambales.
"In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio
Bulor[o]n, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose
Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based
in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated
with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought
the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the
enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea accompanied
the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place
mentioned in the search warrant.
"On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking
chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella,
brother of appellant, and being rented by appellant's live-in partner, named Eva.
They approached appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They
showed appellant the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1
Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if
so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty.
"While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing
dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting
tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and his live-in
partner. They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained
four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four
live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and
ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items.
Barangay Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police
Station also signed the receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions
arrested appellant and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales.
"At their office in San Marcelino, Zambales, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca placed
their markings on the seized items for purposes of identification. SPO1 Arca kept
the seized items under his custody. The next day, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca
brought the seized items to San Antonio, Zambales, where Police Senior
Inspector Florencio Sahagun examined the suspected marijuana dried leaves.
Inspector Sahagun prepared a certification of field test.
"On November 29, 1996, the suspected marijuana dried leaves were delivered to
the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas for further examination. Senior
Inspector Daisy Babor, a forensic chemist, examined the suspected marijuana
dried leaves and issued Chemistry Report No. D-768-96 stating that the
specimens are positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Specimen A weighed
1.710 kilograms, while Specimen D weighed 1.820 kilograms." 8 (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
For his version of the facts, appellant merely reproduced the narration in the
assailed RTC Decision as follows:
 In finding appellant guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, the court a quo
relied heavily on the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Intelligence
"Accused Antonio C. Estella [i]s married to Gloria Atrero Estella. They have three
and Investigation Officer SPO1 Antonio Buloron. He was among the members of
(3) children, namely: Carmen Estella (8 years old), Antonio Estella, Jr. (5 years
the police team that searched appellant's alleged house. Since the defense failed
old) and Roen Estella (3 years old). Since 1982, Antonio Estella has been [a]
to present proof of any intent on the part of SPO1 Buloron to falsely impute to
resident of Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.
appellant such a serious crime, the trial court accorded full faith and credence to
the police officer's testimony.

"On 20 November 1996 between 10:30 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the morning,
while accused was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a
Moreover, the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of the place
vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and about 70 meters away
named in the search warrant led the police to the house. Thus, appellant could
from his house, a group of men approached them. The group introduced
not deny that he owned it.
themselves as policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella
because they have a search warrant issued against him. Accused identified
himself to them. The policemen inquired from the accused as to where his house
As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, the lower court ruled that the
is located and accused told them that his house is located across the road. The
search warrant did not cover the seized firearm, making it inadmissible against
police did not believe him and insisted that accused's house (according to their
appellant. He was thus acquitted of the charge.
asset) is that house located about 5–8 meters away from them. Accused told the
policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house
is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the
Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside the Hence, this recourse. 10
house nearby and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of plastic and
had it shown to the accused. They photographed the accused and brought him to
their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Accused Antonio Estella was investigated The Issues
a[t] San Marcelino, Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact
that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely
Bakdangan. In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

"Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing "A. The trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the conjectural and
marijuana and likewise having any firearm. conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;

"Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years, "B. The trial court gravely failed to consider the serious contradictions in the facts
identified the house depicted on a photograph as that house belonging to the and evidences adduced by the prosecution;
accused." 9 (Citations omitted)

"C. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant
Ruling of the Trial Court for the crime charged has been prove[n] beyond reasonable doubt, instead of
judgment of acquittal demanded by the constitutional presumption of
innocence[.]"11
Though not clearly articulated by appellant, the pivotal issue here is the legality
of the police search undertaken in the hut where the subject marijuana was
seized.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Legality of the Search Undertaken
Once again, this Court is confronted with a situation that involves a well-
enshrined dogma in our Constitution: the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 12 The exclusionary rule prescribed by Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution, bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of this right. 13
The conviction or the acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity of the
police officers' search and seizure, as well as the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by virtue thereof. Without that evidence, the prosecution would not be
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ownership of the Subject House
Appellant claims that the hut, 14 which was searched by the police and where the
subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another
house 15 as his real residence. To support his claim, he presents a document 16
that shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by
one Odilon Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that just because
"appellant has another house in a place away from the hut that was searched
does not necessarily mean that the hut is not occupied by him or under his full
control." 17 The prosecution cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay
captain of that place, to show that the hut in question belongs to appellant.
The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it
was bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. "Narding" Estella. 18 We cannot
sustain the OSG's supposition that since it was being rented by the alleged live-in
partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control
of it. In the first place, other than SPO1 Buloron's uncorroborated testimony, no
other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the person renting
the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant — if he indeed had any.
Moreover, the testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the
position of the prosecution. We quote from his testimony:
"Q Do you know who is the owner of that house?
A What I know is that Narding Estella bought that house, sir.
Q Who is that Narding Estella?
A The brother of Tony Estella, sir.
Q And you know that that has been rent[ed] to people?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, so far how many people [rented] that place or that house?

A I do not have any information about that[,] sir.
Q Why did you know that that place was rented?
A Because when I asked Eva she replied that they [were] only renting that
house, sir.
Q How long has Eva been renting that house?
A I do not have any information about that[,] sir.
Q Do you know who was living with Eva?
A No, sir.
Q So, what you know is that Eva lives alone in that house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you do not know anybody who is renting that house?
A I have no information, sir.
Q And you do not know if the accused was renting [it] or not?
A I don't have any information, sir." 19
At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella
and rented by someone named Eva. The attempt to make it appear that appellant
occupied it, or that it was under his full control, is merely conjectural and
speculative. We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses
mere suspicion or conjecture. 20 To lead to conviction, evidence must do more
than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt. 21 It must engender
moral certainty.
Neither do we find merit in the OSG's argument that appellant cannot deny
ownership or control of the hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting on a
rocking chair and drinking coffee. 22 Indeed, to uphold this proposition would be
to stretch our imagination to the extreme.
The OSG maintains that when appellant was "shown the search warrant and
asked about the existence of prohibited drug in his possession, appellant went
inside the hut, took his stock of marijuana and turned it [over] to the police
officers." 23 This, according to the prosecution, clearly showed that he was not
only occupying the hut, but was in fact using it to store the prohibited drug. 24
It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from assessing the probative
value of witnesses' testimonies on the basis of the transcript of stenographic
notes (TSNs). 25
In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court erred in adopting the
prosecution's dubious story. It failed to see patent inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies about the search undertaken.
A review of the TSNs shows that SPO1 Buloron, the prosecutions principal
witness, testified that appellant had allegedly gone inside the hut; and that the
latter had done so to get his stock of illegal drugs, which he turned over to the
police. Ironically, Captain Barnachea, who was purposely presented by the A Nothing, sir. The NARCOM g[o]t inside the house, sir.
prosecution to corroborate SPO1 Buloron's story, belied it when he testified thus:

Q And where did Antonio Estella go when the police entered the house?
"PROS. QUINTILLAN:

A He was just outside the house, sir.

Q When the police officer showed that search warrant what did Antonio
Estella said, if any, if you hear[d]?
Q And how far is that house from Antonio Estella?

A What I saw is that Tony Estella is sitting in the rocking chair outside the
house drinking coffee, sir. INTERPRETER:

Q And you saw him and then the search warrant was presented, isn't it? Witness estimating the distance of about five (5) meters.

A Yes, sir. COURT:

Q And when it was presented what did Tony Estella do? Do the prosecution and defense agree to 5 meters?

A What they did they show to Tony the search warrant and I also read the BOTH COUNSEL:
contents of the search warrant, sir.

Yes, Your Honor.

Q And when Tony was shown that search warrant what did he do
immediately after being shown that search warrant?
PROS. QUINTILLAN:

A He just [sat] and then he stood up, sir.

Q And when the police entered the house did not Tony go with them?

Q And when he stood up what else did he do?

A I did not notice, sir." 26
 earlier adverted to, there is no convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the
prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of
It is undisputed that even before arriving at the hut, the police officers were
Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecution's
already being assisted by Barangay Captain Barnachea. Thus, it was highly
story.
improbable for him not to see personally appellant's alleged voluntary surrender
of the prohibited drug to the authorities. And yet, his testimony completely
contradicted the policemen's version of the events. He testified that appellant,
Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was
after being served the search warrant, remained outside the hut and did nothing.
incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and
In fact, the former categorically stated that when the police officers had gone
can only be invoked through Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
inside the hut to conduct the search, appellant remained seated on a rocking
Procedure, which we quote:
chair outside. 27 Barnachea's statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1
Buloron's claim that, after being apprised of the contents of the search warrant,
appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the police. 28
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Apart from the testimony of Barnachea — which contradicted rather than
validated the story of SPO1 Buloron — no other evidence was presented to
corroborate the latter's narration of the events. Without any independent or "(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
corroborative proof, it has little or no probative value at all. committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

In a criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, "(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
verifiable, and in harmony with the usual course of human experience — not by believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
mere conjecture or speculation. 29 While the guilty should not escape, the be arrested has committed it; and
innocent should not suffer. 30

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
The OSG argues that "[e]ven assuming that appellant was not the occupant of
the hut, the fact remains that he voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the
police officers. After appellant had surrendered the prohibited stuff, the police
had a right to arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the
immediate vicinity of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful objects as an
incident to the lawful arrest." 31
"(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
"In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112."

Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in
The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore,
appellant had voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. As that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually
committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that
knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was
lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of
the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section
12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant."
However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the
person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can
destroy. 32 The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the
arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter's person — that
which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or
which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or
escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case. 33
In the leading case Chimel v. California, 34 the Supreme Court of the United
States of America laid down this rule:
"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification,
therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his
immediate control' — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
"There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room
other than that in which an arrest occurs — or, for that matter, for searching
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself." 35
The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed
by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and
to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception,
therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. 36
In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have
been within appellant's immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds
of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest.
The Presence of the Accused or the Witnesses During the Search
Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's ownership, control of
or residence in the subject hut, we hold that the presence of appellant or of
witnesses during the search now becomes moot and academic.
Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search, if he was
neither the owner nor the lawful occupant of the premises in question. Besides,
as we have noted, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding these
crucial circumstances were contradictory. They erode SPO1 Buloron's credibility
as a prosecution witness and raise serious doubts concerning the prosecution's
evidence. This Court is thus constrained to view his testimony with caution and
care.
With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search
undertaken — during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered —
we hold that the search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence
obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible.
Objections to the Legality of the Search
Finally, the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
object to the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence seized
through that search because, during the trial, he did not raise these issues.
On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality of
the search. In fact, when SPO1 Buloron was presented as a prosecution witness,
the former's counsel objected to the offer of the latter's testimony on items
allegedly confiscated during the search. Appellant's counsel argued that these
items, which consisted of the marijuana and the firearm, had been seized illegally
and were therefore inadmissible. 37
Further, in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits, 38 appellant
once again questioned the legality of the search conducted by the police, a
search that had yielded the evidence being used against him.
Finally, on October 21, 1997, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence 39 reiterating his
objection to the search and to the eventual use against him of the evidence
procured therefrom.
All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty. 40 Not only did its evidence fall
short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it has also failed to
present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental
rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 41
To overcome such presumption, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails
to do so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the
constitutional duty of the court to set them free. 42 This principle leaves this
Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. Estella for insufficiency of
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being
held for some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision
forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of
the date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Libnao, et. al. (G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003)
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao
and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 For their
conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of two million pesos.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following
Information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 o’clock dawn, in the
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping with one another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell
marijuana leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately eight
(8) kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996,
intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac,
Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the
area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and
a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big
bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector
Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which
his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be
making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1
Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to
man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and
PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated
inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-
accused Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the
black bag and the two’s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and
content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the same
barangay. They brought with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to
witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the
bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon
as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the
appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight
bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves
were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the
two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn,
disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt
without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to
have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of
theirs were present.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San
Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu
conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles
were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. 4
For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga
testified that in the evening of October 19, 1996, she went to buy medicine for
her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was
suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house,
she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the
way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint
in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the
Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag
allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the
bag and knowing its contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the
passenger’s seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male
passenger behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her
lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one
Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac.
The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2
Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their
Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the company’s logbook. Gannod,
however, was not presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his
affidavit was the Appellant.

After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they
are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED." 5
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief,
she assigned the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the
defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and
search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the
right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the
peace officers who apprehended and investigated the accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses which inconsistencies cast doubt
and make incredible the contention and version of the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and
considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally
offered amounting to ignorance of the law." 6
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be
dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a
warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by
the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a
tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as
illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when
warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is
inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly
issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." 7
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police
must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue
or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. 8
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior
to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain
familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles.
9 Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of
the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may
be sought. 10 Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. 11 When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e.,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. 12
In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following
instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic
bag carried by the accused; 13 (b) where an informer positively identified the
accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; 14 (c) where the accused
who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity
of marijuana; 15 (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport
and other identification papers when requested to do so; 16 (f) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and
clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who participated in
the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong — that
said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 17 (g) where the
arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose
identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation,
would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; 18
(h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was
carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a
bag to Manila; 19 and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of
the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. 20
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The
Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a
month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks.
At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted
three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag,
which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it
and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the
warrantless search and seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a
criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one
of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is
when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
x x x." 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when
police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of
her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence,
she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be
considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any
confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the
appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We
quote the relevant portion of its decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel
Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation
receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is inadmissible because they were
not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the
postulate to rest on good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted
from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss
any answer given by both accused as a result of the police interrogation while in
their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be resolved by
the court is whether or not, based on the prosecution’s evidence, both accused
can be convicted." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the
object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to
formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be
deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by
the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.
23 All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified,
presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. 24
Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the
case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies
are recorded. 25 Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits. 26
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1
Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag
containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag
was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on
the police officers’ failure to remember the family name of the driver of the
tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary to
human experience.
Again, appellant’s arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she
mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the
basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the
credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant
and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need
only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the
principal occurrence. 27 The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly
immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the
testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some
aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the same
incident. 28
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note
and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was
unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in complicity
with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify
falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. 29 In
this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on
the part of the police enforcers in arresting the Appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s
defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. 31 The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to
support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even
affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing
her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million
pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Plain view doctrine
People vs. Musa [217 SCRA 597 (1993)]
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision,
dated August 31, 1990,1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City,
Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers
containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty.3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt.
Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City,
who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the appellant;
(2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City,
who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena
Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime
Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution
was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at
Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and
test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded
to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari
Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian
informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was
able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt.
Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped
marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to
him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned.
Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was
given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt
(Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his
right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory
teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was
composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.
and Sgt. Biong.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while
the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90
to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on
between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari
Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he
wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After
receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave
Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the
two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were
marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand.
The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani.
Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,
examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All
submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of
marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her
Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2",
"J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper
wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each
specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also
identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on
December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also
identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)

T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana

At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside
through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989,
his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and
2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of
Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the
the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14,
NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known
1989, and his signature thereon (Exh.
as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa
but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked "L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed
where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and
his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").4
dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed
under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned
over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant
bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the
version of the defense, thus:

In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on,
Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his
two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one
house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known
newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag
as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named
containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen
Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one
of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory
hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep.
Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said
in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.5
NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced
that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house
and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following
were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, disposition:
Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged
to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in
another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable
when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he
is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter
imposed without subsidiary imprisonment.6
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at
Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was
investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into writing.
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond
The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document
reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to
sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to
him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of
counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not
by counsel. credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the
other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and
(2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana
by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right
hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents
boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated,
he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus
(on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought
brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter.7 He reported the successful
marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day.8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga
Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day.9
had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be
maltreated in the fiscal's office.
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles
headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound,
marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose
given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked
against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic
places.11 Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked
Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt.
Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and
brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt.
Ani.13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the
house.14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the
pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand.15 The NARCOM agents,
accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents
searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him
where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife.16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani
regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension,
prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and
forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points,
it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani
because they do not know each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a
wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt.
Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more
marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover,
the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be
strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of
the marijuana.17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it
was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and
manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling
prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial18 and the presence of other
people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the
consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco,19
these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the
instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are
known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that these people
will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility
of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that
he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have
possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a
policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by
the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly
did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of
Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified
that he and his companion were certain that the appellant therein handed
marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the
cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana
cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are
different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done
on those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale
of more or less 10 to 15 meters.21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw
the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was
an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt.
Belarga's testimony reads:22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari
Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong
were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he
was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa who was at the time
wearing short pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him,
thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back later
and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt.
Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the
appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that
what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance,
his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court
earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material
points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-
buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13,
1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported
a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of
marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a
team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City;26 (5) T/Sgt.
Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-
bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville,
Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some
agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic
places;28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place.29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence
given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police
officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the
appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be
fatal to the prosecution's case30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or
circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to
prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag
containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen.
It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM
agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They
searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being
questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife.31
Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what
T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the
corner of the kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing
to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial,
the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it
contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in
evidence.33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2,
the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in
Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation
of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure
may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v.
Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity
for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest."37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless
search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person
arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an
arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
cause . . . "38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher,
the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search
warrants.39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after
arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire
house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.41
In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but
having information that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his
apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants'
apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living
room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers,
after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a
small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package
containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package
of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the
Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the
officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant
wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not
constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in
full view.43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the
marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the
admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
 the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
intention of fishing for more evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search
made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.45
what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was
application of the doctrine:
visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another
immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
— and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
observer.48
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view"
incriminating at last emerges.46
doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was
seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the
"plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way,
object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that
the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of
otherwise subject to seizure.
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of
Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the
appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the
of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the
NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the
kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move
Court AFFIRMED.
from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.
Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the
doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana,
SO ORDERED.
Padilla vs. CA [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in
the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1)
short magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions;
and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under P.D. 18662 thru the following Information:3
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle,
SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions,
one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and
possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,5 but granted his application
for bail. 6 During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was
entered for petitioner after he refused, 7 upon advice of counsel, 8 to make any
plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of
the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April
25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an
"indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". 11 Petitioner filed
his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the respondent
Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a
motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was
incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining
petitioner's conviction 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by
accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No.
JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles
City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter
his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National
Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be
immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a
report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9,
1995 he filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)"
17 but the same was denied by respondent court in its September 20, 1995
Resolution 18 copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995.
The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari with application for bail 19 followed by two "supplemental petitions"
filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental petition" 21 and an urgent
motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-
General 22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed
in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted the
Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and
thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. 24 However, after his vigorous
resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court
and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief
in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout
by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal.
25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record
and given credence by respondent court, is as follows: 26
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and
his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in
Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp.
5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp
5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang
noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting
him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the
inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: "Ka bilis na,
mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p. 7, ibid). True enough,
immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle
running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle
hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened,
remarked "oy ta na" signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation
(pp. 8-9, ibid).
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp.
9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and
the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and
called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles
City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had
started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north
(p. 11, ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had
hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode
on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was
able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN,
February 15, 1193). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid)
reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved
in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of
SP02 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all
units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid).
One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol
Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February
23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately
borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the
south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to the
north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance
between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from
SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then
conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On
board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO
Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway
to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the
hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur
Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not
catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw
that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan
bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When
he reached the Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben
Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993).
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8,
He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p.
1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the
10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about the
matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run
incident, Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When
incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number
Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured
of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12,
in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant
ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played
(p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of
with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja
the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid)
with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko" (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because
towards the Abacan bridge.
appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite
rifle tucked in appellant 's back right, pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this
and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No.
vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid).
3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12)
Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he
meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car,
had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his
switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to
vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a
intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it
baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat.
to stop (p. 11, ibid).
It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-
21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant
answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of
23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional
instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as
Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with
him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang
The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid).
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third
SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was
firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit "L") with a single round in its chamber
wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he
and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets.
alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit "C") tucked on the left side of
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long
his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p.
magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After
15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the
appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was
former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid).
transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the
SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers,
City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over
it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant,
to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the
SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by
investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used
appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19,
them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or
ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets
memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25,
inside (p. 20, ibid).
1994).
On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives
Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the three
firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a
.357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-
A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second
Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the
three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p.
10, ibid).
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential
agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes
excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that
petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the
Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no
dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did
not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii)
in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements
concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit
and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point
that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense,
but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once
to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the
incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using
his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report
to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he
found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned
near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.
32 We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen
(who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting
petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It
was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better
trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein
petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which
an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life.
Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through
this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a
additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein,

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of
cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want
property is valid, 44 are as follows:
of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take
action. 33 The exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, a
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime — all created a
situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,
mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has
been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto
with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M- 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47
16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37 (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be

justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and be where they are;
run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at
the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for
themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in
the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon (d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 48
verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. 40

3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the
information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed
him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for
bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects. 43
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting
to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the
authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying
into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within
"plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to
the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,
the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the,
corpus delicti. 53
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view
are subject to seizure even without a warrant. 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of
petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure
56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect. 57
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected,
the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment
and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an
incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible
evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search
of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless
search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have
been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of
violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a
Mission Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence
during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued
under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's
incisive observation. Thus:
Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized
and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so.
The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on
October 26, 1992.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his
authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary
investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any proper
document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum
Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those documents easily, if
not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary investigation. But
neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is
authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt
and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant
could have produced these documents to belie the charged against him.
Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his
possession of the subject firearms.
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested
contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing
appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.
At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one
James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was
not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by
the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found
Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January
13, 1994. 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his
apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were
intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential
Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at
home, further compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an
accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest
opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question
and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from
proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the
Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement
units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of
AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid
embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential
instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an
actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered
inoperative in respect to such violation. 68
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt,
moreover, were ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt.
Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order
and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
"Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the
authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines
on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who
issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit
Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having
emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the
Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas outside Supt.
Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval "by next higher
Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also
unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of
the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:
 That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces
of evidence is accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the
No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without
Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP
corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of
declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in
the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in that
the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:
units property book, and that report of such action has been reported to higher
AFP authority.

Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find,
if any?
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he
cannot present the corresponding certification as well.

A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9

mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the
firearms being asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records,
Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-
the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the
Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which
same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in the
could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's
name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
counsel. 74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief
and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:

Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla
is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to
carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla
of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
A. Yes, sir.
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the
civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence
project proposal or special project which specifically required the use of
firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names
the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of of the accused in this case?
the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of command. 75 Circular No. 1, dated
January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
A. Yes, sir. 77

If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service),
they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government xxx xxx xxx
agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for
the service they are rendering.
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE

This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
Camp Crame, Quezon City

FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

PNFEO5 28 November 1992

(Sgd.)
CERTIFICATION

JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Sr. Inspector, PNP

Chief, Records Branch 78

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial
number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office
(FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such certification is
sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing
discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess
was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be
dispensed with in the light of the evidences 81 that an M-16 rifle and any short
firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot
be licensed to a civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore,
entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no
plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart from the factual findings of
both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the
Court with respect and finality. 83

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866
in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that
respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal
possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866
no longer exists. 84 He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21
years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in
contravention of the Constitution. 85
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's
commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law as it stands. 87 And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted
for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by
petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it
should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty
does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for
a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24
C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive",
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense
of the community" 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so
much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is,
or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant
which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of
the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. 91 Just
recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . . " 92
Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be
addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality
of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only
function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent
court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the
fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en banc provided that the
indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following
explanation by the Court:
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged
or proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in
People v. Simon, 94 although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the
penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said
Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be
applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the
rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law,
shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum
thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium
period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000)
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No.
6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as
follows:"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill,
Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which
dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and
prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were
planted, cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the
government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the
police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m.
of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the
presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan,
Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.3 The prohibited plants were allegedly planted
close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to
verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel
V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I.
Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay
road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The
police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around
the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from
appellant's hut.5 PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.6 The police uprooted
the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.7 The police took
photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.8 Appellant was then
arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.9
Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified
that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.10 She next
conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial
impressions. She found as follows:

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana
plant placed inside a white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen
gave POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on
which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland
Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya.12 This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of
Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around
10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in
Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He
was asked to go with the latter to "see something."14 This unknown person then
brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found,
approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.15 Five armed policemen were
present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked
if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants.16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted
owning the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana
plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them
to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of
uprooted marijuana plants.18 The police team then brought him to the police
station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer
of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge
against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging
activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be
put in a bad situation."19 At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he
knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses
around the vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.21
The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay
peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants
were found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's.22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was
offered to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in
the lot he was cultivating.23 Tipay presented a sketch he made,24 which showed
the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of
appellant, as well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot
was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant
from the hut of Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no
surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements.26 He further
stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the
seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and the
proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.27
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged
for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating
marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs
against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."28
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7)
MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION
OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC
LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT
MARIJUANA.29
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case
lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that
the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second,
that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove
appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392
US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection
against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records
clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place.
The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an
unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from
afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they
reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the
police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless
lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the
police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to
the plantation site merely to make a verification. When they found the said
plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of
the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and
forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a
valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search
warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by
the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep
trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search
warrant was required."30
The Constitution31 lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable
search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree and should be excluded.32 Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding.33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the
police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain
a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to
them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From
the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse
that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not
underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants.34 The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the
"plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be
present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.36 Hence,
there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in
"plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.37
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note
the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look
around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.38 Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or
"open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection
afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's
person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.39 The
guarantee refers to "the right of personal security"40 of the individual. As
appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's
unlawful intrusion are persons, not places.41 To conclude otherwise would not
only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic
that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he
must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of
Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the
sanctuary of his bedroom.
 regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the
presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were
purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it
evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue,
override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the
prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search
and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the
appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the
court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as
police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
evidence to convict appellant.
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s
failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him
indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the
by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized
marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now
address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the
suffices to convict appellant?
commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the
the presence of counsel.43 An investigation begins when it is no longer a general
police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana
inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect
in connection with an alleged offense.44 The moment the police try to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel,
the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.45
competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification;
under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence
and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel."42
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly
meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the
question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general
relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation inquiry.46
conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit
information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that
since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the
counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him
cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to
inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..."47 In
trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating
appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation
and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial
investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."48 As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated appellant.
Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen.49 All had been dispatched to arrest him.50 From these
circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his
freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that
even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos
in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing.51 The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It
was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during
the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and
even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of
the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.52 Even if
the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.53
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof.54
The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test
of reason,55 it must likewise be credible and competent.56 Competent evidence
is "generally admissible" evidence.57 Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of
such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to
be introduced at trial."58
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to
convict appellant of the offense charged.1âwphi1 These were the seized
marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership
of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no
other evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these
proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him.
For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted
without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence
clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There
was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the
immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running
afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant
allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also
violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made without the
assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter.
Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul
of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must
have the services of competent and independent counsel during such
investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's
voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove
appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."59 To justify the conviction of
the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must
stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the accused.60 Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana plants
linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional
infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."62 Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled
investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him."63 Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the
prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of
evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of
innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as
driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's
evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the
basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow
in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105,
finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death
penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement
unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Arizona vs. Hicks [480 U.S. 321 (1987)]
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA
Syllabus
A bullet fired through the floor of respondent's apartment injured a man on the
floor below. Police entered the apartment to search for the shooter, for other
victims, and for weapons, and there seized three weapons and discovered a
stocking-cap mask. While there, one of the policemen noticed two sets of
expensive stereo components and, suspecting that they were stolen, read and
recorded their serial numbers -- moving some of them, including a turntable, to
do so -- and phoned in the numbers to headquarters. Upon learning that the
turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately.
Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery, but the state trial court
granted his motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized, and the
Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying upon a statement in Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed
by the exigencies which justify its initiation," the Court of Appeals held that the
policeman's obtaining the serial numbers violated the Fourth Amendment
because it was unrelated to the shooting, the exigent circumstance that justified
the initial entry and search. Both state courts rejected the contention that the
policeman's actions were justified under the "plain view" doctrine.
Held:
1. The policeman's actions come within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
The mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a "seizure," since it
did not meaningfully interfere with respondent's possessory interest in either the
numbers or the stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a
"search" separate and apart from the search that was the lawful objective of
entering the apartment. The fact that the search uncovered nothing of great
personal value to respondent is irrelevant. Pp. 480 U. S. 324-325.
2. The "plain view" doctrine does not render the search "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S. 325-329.
(a) The policeman's action directed to the stereo equipment was not ipso facto
unreasonable simply because it was unrelated to the justification for entering the
apartment. That lack of relationship always exists when the "plain view" doctrine
applies. In saying that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation," Mincey was simply addressing the
scope of the primary
Page 480 U. S. 322
search itself, and was not overruling the "plain view" doctrine by implication. Pp.
480 U. S. 325-326.
(b) However, the search was invalid because, as the State concedes, the
policeman had only a "reasonable suspicion" -- i.e., less than probable cause to
believe -- that the stereo equipment was stolen. Probable cause is required to
invoke the "plain view" doctrine as it applies to seizures. It would be illogical to
hold that an object is seizable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated search and
seizure, than would have been needed to obtain a warrant for it if it had been
known to be on the premises. Probable cause to believe the equipment was
stolen was also necessary to support the search here, whether legal authority to
move the equipment could be found only as the inevitable concomitant of the
authority to seize it or also as a consequence of some independent power to
search objects in plain view. Pp. 480 U. S. 326-328.
3. The policeman's action cannot be upheld on the ground that it was not a "full-
blown search," but was only a "cursory inspection" that could be justified by
reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause. A truly cursory inspection -- one
that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without
disturbing it -- is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore
does not even require reasonable suspicion. This Court is unwilling to create a
subcategory of "cursory" searches under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S.
328-329.
146 Ariz. 533, 707 P.2d 331, affirmed.
People vs. Compacion (G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001)
Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425
(known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in
an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses ARMANDO COMPACION y Surposa, Barangay Captain of
Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, of the crime of
VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659 committed as follows:
"That on or about 1:30 oclock A.M., July 13, 1995, at Barangay Bagonbon, San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or culture two
(2) full grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, more or
less eleven (11) feet tall, in gross violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659."
CONTRARY TO LAW.1cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
On January 2, 1996, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged.
The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the Court finds the accused ARMANDO COMPACION Y SURPOSA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Violation of Section 9, R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 whereof he is charged in the information in the instant case and
sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of half a million
(P500,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The portion of the backyard of his
residence in the poblacion proper of Brgy. Bagonbon this City and Province, in
which the two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, subject-matter of this case, were
planted, cultivated and cultured, is hereby ordered confiscated and escheated in
favor of the State, pursuant to the aforequoted Sec. 13 R.A. 7659.
It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the instant case for
having planted, cultivated and cultured just two (2) marijuana plants is extremely
harsh. But there is nothing in the law which allows the Court to impose a lesser
penalty in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular case.
Hence, dura lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law.
The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a nonchalant or
cavalier attitude towards dangerous prohibited drugs. They should not dabble in
it as if they were a flippant thing. These dangerous and prohibited drugs are a
terrible menace to the minds and morality of our people for their distortive and
pervertive effects on them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the
government wants this evil exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the
accused instead of helping the government in this drive, in his capacity as
barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting, cultivating
and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants himself.
A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of reflection forced
upon him by the result of his own act in violating the law. It is time for him to
humbly submit to the compassion of God and of his only begotten Son, whose
birth on earth to become the Saviour of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to
change and transform his own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that
with a changed life, God might be gracious enough to move the heart of His
Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him walk out of
prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read Gods Word daily while in
prison for his guidance, comfort and hope.
Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the information in the
instant case.
SO ORDERED.2cräläwvirtualibräry
The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks the
Court to reverse the same on the following grounds, viz:
The lower court erred:
1. In holding that Exhibit F of the prosecution, consisting of two marijuana plants
wrapped in plastic, is admissible in evidence against the accused as the corpus
delicti in the instant case, inspite of the fact that the prosecution failed to prove
that the specimens of marijuana (Exhibit F) examined by the forensic chemist
were the ones purportedly planted and cultivated by the accused, and of the fact
that the prosecution failed to establish the evidences chain of custody; and
2. In holding that the warrantless search of the residence of the accused at 1:30
oclock in the morning of July 13, 1995 at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, and seizure of two eleven feet tall, more or less, full grown
suspected Indian Hemp, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, leading to the
subsequent arrest of the accused, were valid on the ground that the accused has
committed the crime of cultivating the said marijuana plants in violation of Sec.
9, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by RA 7659 in open
view, inspite of the fact that they had to enter the dwelling of the accused to get
to the place where the suspected marijuana plants were planted, and in admitting
in evidence the said plants, later marked as Exhibit F, against the accused,
inspite of the fact that the said plants were the fruits of the poisonous
tree.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The relevant facts are as follows:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant
was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2
Basilio Sarong of the 6 th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay
Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said
surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant
which they suspected to be marijuana plants. 4cräläwvirtualibräry
SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4
Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed
a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division Provincial
Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force.
Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio,
were also included in the composite team.
On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of
Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada
informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 5 The
team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around six-
thirty in the evening, then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S.
Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so because it was
nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge to
go back in the morning. 6cräläwvirtualibräry
Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the
residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4
Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What
happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends
that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He
was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants
and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife
who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be
charged for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and informed him of his
constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana
plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the
Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result.
7cräläwvirtualibräry
On July 15, 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to Senior
Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed
and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the
other was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations
were conducted, namely: the microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin
layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the early
morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard
somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a
flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were
members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was
dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit
only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room.
Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of
them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises.
9cräläwvirtualibräry
After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the men called him outside and
brought him to the backyard. One of the military men said: Captain, you have a
(sic) marijuana here at your backyard to which accused-appellant replied: I do
not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they are
medicinal plants for my wife who was suffering from migraine.
10cräläwvirtualibräry
After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men
took pictures of him and themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside the house
where he and the military men spent the night. 11cräläwvirtualibräry
At around ten oclock that same morning, they brought him with them to the city
hall. Accused-appellant saw that one of the two (2) service vehicles they brought
was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men that said
plants were marijuana. 12 Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met with the
mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him together
with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as back drop. Soon
thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF Headquarters.
13cräläwvirtualibräry
A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 was filed against accused-appellant.
Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, we now consider his
allegation that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
had been violated by the police authorities.
The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and
unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v.
Querubin, 14 underscored their importance:
It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily ones home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be
guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In
that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him.
There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under
the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and
to respect the privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home
and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards.15cräläwvirtualibräry
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the
meaning of the constitutional provision. 16 Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the
fruits of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding. 17cräläwvirtualibräry
The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial
authority prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute.
There are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when
the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; 18 when
the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; 19 when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; 20 when it is made on vessels and aircraft
for violation of customs laws; 21 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose
of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 22 when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; 23 when it involves a stop and frisk situation; 24
when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; 25 or in cases
of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations. 26 In these instances, a search may be validly made
even without a warrant.
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in
the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does
not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above mentioned cases.
Consequently, accused-appellants right against unreasonable search and seizure
was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the
warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either
expressly or impliedly, 27 such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in
allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent
silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and
seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly
numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure. 28 The case of People v. Burgos, 29 is instructive. In Burgos, the Court
ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search
simply because he failed to object. There, we held:
xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right (Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As
pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin
(supra);
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting
an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.30cräläwvirtualibräry
Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of
accused-appellants premises by invoking the necessity and urgency of the
situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team that the
residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance following
a tip from a confidential informant. The surveillance was conducted on July 9,
1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4) days later or on July
13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have first secured a
search warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellants premises. In fact,
they earlier had approached then Executive Judge Ponferrada of Bacolod City who
declined to issue one on the ground that the matter was outside his territorial
jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in
the evening of July 12, 1995 who asked them to come back in the morning as it
was already nighttime and outside of office hours. However, in their haste to
apprehend the accused-appellant on the pretext that information of his
impending arrest may be leaked to him, the team proceeded to go to his
residence to arrest him and seize the alleged marijuana plants. The teams
apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded. It is far-fetched that one could have
gone to accused-appellants place before the following morning to warn him of his
impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is an isolated and difficult to reach
mountain barangay. The road leading to it was rough, hilly and eroded by rain
and flood. 31 A few hours delay to await the issuance of a warrant in the morning
would not have compromised the teams operation.
In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on July 13,
1995, the trial court ruled that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants which was
easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused. 32 Thus, the trial
court concluded that:
xxx (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, were the very corpus delicti of
the crime the accused has been committing since the time he planted them in the
backyard of his residence for whatever reason a corpus delicti which the NARCOM
agents saw with their very own eyes as the same were in plain view when they
made a surveillance in the accuseds place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti has
remained on the spots in accuseds backyard where they had been growing since
the time they were planted there and, therefore, any peace officer or even
private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said plants and recognized them as
marijuana, was by law empowered and authorized to arrest the accused even
without any warrant of arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying marijuana,
hence, committing a crime, at the time of his arrest. The warrantless search
which was conducted following a lawful arrest, was valid.
- People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993)
226 SCRA 299, at p. 300
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating and culturing
said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, in the backyard of his residence, which the
NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the time they arrested and apprehended
him. Under said circumstances, a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest were
not legally needed before the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest of the
accused.33cräläwvirtualibräry
As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. 34 It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 35
Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be
applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain
view justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
36cräläwvirtualibräry
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-
appellants premises without the latters consent. It is undisputed that the
NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant
on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana
when they allegedly came in plain view of the marijuana plants. When the agents
entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence
against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could
not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not
come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a
surveillance and barged into accused-appellants residence.
In People v. Musa, 37 the Court held:
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made
solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown,
460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]
It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the
plants involved herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were
uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using a
Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana
plants. 38 Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to
conduct three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants were indeed
marijuana. 39cräläwvirtualibräry
Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 40 In People v. Aruta, 41 we held
that:
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-
exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be
held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most
jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is he only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on
the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for
the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if
the law violated is the Constitution itself.42cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch
58 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S.
Compacion is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of reasonable
doubt. He is ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for some
other legal grounds. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Huang Zhen Hua (G.R. 139301, September 9, 2004)
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Metro Manila, Branch 259, convicting the appellants of violation
of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The Case for the Prosecution
Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC)
under the Department of Interior and Local Government received word from their
confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao,2 and appellants Jogy Lee
and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also
learned that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the
proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan.3 PO3 Belliardo
Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations and
were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband
and wife. They once spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants and two others, in a
seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila, late in the evening. On
another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the appellants, at the
Celicious Restaurant along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m.
They were spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m. to
8:00 p.m.4 The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at Room
Nos. 1245 and 1247, Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and
in a two-storey condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa,
Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila.5
On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search
Warrant No. 96-801 for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal
possession of firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-802, for
violation of Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from
Judge William M. Bayhon, Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila.6 Senior Police
Inspector Lucio Margallo supervised the enforcement of Search Warrant No. 96-
801 at the Cityland Condominium at about 11:00 p.m. on October 29, 1996. With
him were PO3 Anciro, Jr., PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3 Roger Ferias and seven
other policemen of the PARAC, who were all in uniform, as well as a Cantonese
interpreter by the name of Chuang. While no persons were found inside, the
policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known
as shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently
used for the production of fake credit cards.7
Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would
be delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the corner of
Dasmariñas and Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen rushed to the area on
board their vehicles. It was 2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The policemen saw
Chan and Lao on board the latter's Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one
of the men approached them and introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired
shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the members of the raiding team and
the two suspects. Chan and Lao were shot to death during the encounter. The
policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Lao's car.
The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to
enforce Search Warrant No. 96-802. When the policemen arrived at the place,
they coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the
building.8 The men found that the Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao
under the name Henry Kao Tsung. The policemen, Pangan and two security
guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr.
knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise,
knocked on the door.9 Appellant Lee peeped through the window beside the front
door.10 The men introduced themselves as policemen,11 but the appellant could
not understand them as she could not speak English.12 The policemen allowed
Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their
uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the
door and allowed the policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the
condominium unit.13 The policemen brought appellant Lee to the second floor
where there were three bedrooms - a master's bedroom and two other rooms.
When asked where she and Lao slept, appellant Lee pointed to the master's
bedroom.14 Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched the
master's bedroom, while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom where
appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping.15 Ferias awakened appellant Zhen Hua and
identified himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised.16
Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the master's bedroom about six feet high.
He stood on a chair, opened the cabinet and found two transparent plastic bags
each containing one kilo of shabu,17 a feeding bottle, a plastic canister18 and
assorted paraphernalia.19 Inside the drawer of the bed's headboard, Anciro, Jr.
also found assorted documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied
Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards of Lao and
Lee.20 Anciro, Jr. asked appellant Lee who was the owner of the crystalline
substance, but the latter did not respond because she did not know English.21
Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for instructions on what to do with the things he had
found, and the latter told him to keep the same for future reference,22 and as
evidence against any other suspect for illegal drug transactions.23 Anciro, Jr.,
Pangan and Margallo later showed the seized articles to the other members of the
team.24
Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were
bringing her to the PARAC headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told and
took some clothes from the cabinet in the master's bedroom where Anciro, Jr.
had earlier found the shabu.25
The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following Exh. "A" - One (1) "must de Cartier Paris" carton containing the following:
articles were found and confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit:

Exh. "A-1" - One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40
A. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) Kilo each of grams of white crystalline substance.
white crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
Shabu, a regulated drug;
Exh. "A-2" - One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.10
grams of white crystalline substance.
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an undetermined
quantity of suspected Shabu;
Exh. "A-3" - One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink
cover containing 18.52 grams of white crystalline substance.
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined amount of
suspected Shabu '.
Exh. "A-4" - One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing
3.28 grams of white crystalline substance.
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used
for sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils,
etc.;26 NOTE: The above-stated specimen were allegedly taken from the residence of the
above-named subjects. xxx

Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box.27 The
appellants were then brought to the PARAC headquarters where they were PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
detained. Pangan signed a Certification28 that the search conducted by the
policemen had been orderly and peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the
transparent plastic bags and their contents, the transparent baby feeding bottle
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
and the plastic cannister and their contents. On October 26, 1996, he and
Ferias29 brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination30 along with the letter-request31 thereon.
FINDINGS:

On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cariño signed Chemistry
Report No. D-1243-96 which contained his findings on the laboratory examination Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens, Exhs. "A-1"
of the items which were marked as Exhibits "A" to "A-4," viz: through "A-4" gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx32

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest.33 Pangan and the two security
guards signed a certification stating that nothing was destroyed in the
condominium unit and that the search was orderly and peaceful.34 The
policemen also accomplished an inventory of the articles seized during the
search.35
The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, in an Information filed in the RTC of Parañaque, Metro Manila, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to possess
or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in their
possession and under their control and custody, the following to wit:
A. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of
white crystalline substance;
B. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.1 grams of white
crystalline substance;
C. One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover
containing 18.52 grams of white crystalline substance;
D. One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams
of white crystalline substance
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.36
Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29, 1992,
and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Appellants
Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of
Kwantong, China, a college graduate who could not speak nor understand
English. She was once employed in a real estate firm. One of her co-employees
was Huang Zhen Hua.37 She met Henry Lao in China sometime in 1995,38 and
he brought her to Belgium that same year. Lao also helped her procure a Belguim
passport, for he explained that if she only had a Chinese passport, it would be
difficult to secure visas from countries she wanted to go to and visit; whereas
many countries did not require a Belgian passport holder to secure visas before
allowing entry therein. In the process, he and Lao fell in love and became lovers.
Upon Lao's invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the first
time in April 1996. Lao met her at the airport, and she was, thereafter, brought
to a hotel in Manila where she stayed for less than a month.39 She returned to
the Philippines a second time and was again billeted in a hotel in Manila. All her
expenses were shouldered by Lao, who was engaged in the garlic business.40 As
far as she knew, Lao was not engaged in any other business.41 In June 1996,
she invited her friend, appellant Huang Zhen Hua to visit the Philippines to enjoy
the tourist spots.42 They were then in China.
In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines on a
tourist visa. She was fetched by Lao, and she was brought to his condominium
unit at No. 19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Niño, Parañaque. She had
been residing there since then. She and Lao used to go to the shopping malls43
and she even saw Chan once when he cleaned his Nissan car in Lao's garage.
On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and
was met by Lao at the airport. He tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but Lee
told him that he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen Hua was brought to
the Villa where he had been staying since then. The appellants had made plans to
visit Cebu.
At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the
master's bedroom at the condominium unit. She had closed all the windows
because she had turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen Hua was sleeping in
the other bedroom in the second floor beside the master's bedroom. Lao's Honda
Civic car and Chan's Nissan car were in the garage beside the condominium unit.
Momentarily, Lee heard someone knocking on the bedroom door. When she
opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the bedroom and at the room where
appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was not among the men. Lee did not
hear the policemen knock at the main door before they entered.44 The policemen
were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who told her that the
policemen were going to search the house.45 Appellant Lee saw a policeman
holding two papers, but no search warrant was shown to her.46 She was so
frightened.
The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the
master's bedroom. Appellant Lee went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and
when she returned to the master's bedroom, she saw shabu on the bed.47 The
policemen took her ring, watch and the P600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier
been placed in the cabinet, her papers and documents, and those of Lao's as
well. She had never seen any shabu in the room before the incident. Thereafter,
she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC headquarters where they
were detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter, informed her that shabu had
been found in the condominium unit and that the policemen were demanding
P5,000,000 for her release. She was also told that if she did not pay the amount,
she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that the leader of the group who
arrested her would be promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no
money. Since she could not pay the amount, she was boarded on a PARAC
owner-type jeep and returned to the condominium unit where the policemen took
all the household appliances, such as the television, compact discs, washing
machine, including laundry detergent. Only the sofa and the bed were not taken.
About ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the services of counsel.
Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the
condominium unit but that no one responded. He shouted, "Sir Henry," referring
to Lao, but there was no response from inside the condominium. After about
three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they entered
the house. They went to the second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.
Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen.
He learned that shabu had been found and taken from the condominium unit only
when he saw someone holding up the substance on television during the daily
news program TV Patrol.48
Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of
appellant Lee that upon her invitation, he arrived in the Philippines on a tourist
visa on October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see Anciro, Jr. in the
condominium unit when policemen arrived and searched the house. He testified
that aside from the PARAC policemen, he was also investigated by policemen
from Taiwan.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both
appellants of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen
Hua GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425,
as amended by RA 7659, and considering the absence of any aggravating
circumstances, this Court hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The properties seized
in accordance with the search warrants issued relative to this case are hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court of this
Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, the drugs and
paraphernalia subject hereof for proper disposition.
The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate
transfer of both accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua from the Parañaque City
Jail to the Bureau of Correccions (sic) in Muntinlupa City.

SO ORDERED.49
The Present Appeal
On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:
First. The evidence for the prosecution, as a whole, is so far as self-contradictory,
inherently improbable and palpably false to be accepted as a faithful reflection of
the true facts of the case;
Second. Appellant Huang Zhen Hua's conviction was based merely on the trial
court's conclusion that he "is not an epitome of first class tourist and that he
appeared nonchalant throughout the proceedings;"
Third. In convicting said appellant, the court below completely disregarded the
glaring facts and admissions of the prosecution's principal witnesses that no
regulated drug was ever found in his possession;
Fourth. The trial court, likewise, ignored the fact that the appellant's arrest was
illegal and in violation of his constitutional and basic rights against arrest without
probable cause as determined by a Judge and that his arraignment did not
constitute a waiver of such right;
Fifth. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the presumption of regularity
of performance of the police officers who took part in the search had been
overcome by prosecution's own evidence, thereby wrongly giving such
presumption substance over and above the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the appellant.50
For her part, appellant Lee contends that:
1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE ROOMS
IN THE TOWNHOUSE RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY PLANTED BY PARAC
OPERATIVES;
1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY
IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT DID
NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE ROOM TO BE SEARCHED,
NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER TO ASSIST AND GUIDE JOGY LEE, WHO
NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, DURING THE
SEARCH AND EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE UPON
THE GROUND THAT HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.51
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant Zhen
Hua should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the
conviction of appellant Lee should be affirmed.
The Court's Ruling
We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang Zhen
Hua and Jogy Lee sequentially.
On Appellant Zhen Hua
The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove appellant Zhen Hua's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime charged, thus:
 We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People v.
Tira,53 ruminated and expostulated on the juridical concept of "possession"
Huang Zhen Hua denies having anything to do with the bags of "shabu" found in
under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and the evidence
the townhouse unit of Henry Lau. He claims that he arrived in the Philippines as a
necessary to prove the said crime, thus:
tourist on October 22, 1996, upon the invitation of Jogy Lee. Allegedly, at the
time of his arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely four days. He claims
that he was just temporarily billeted as a guest at the townhouse where Jogy Lee
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the
was staying. And that he had no control whatsoever over said townhouse. He
following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the
puts emphasis on the fact that the search of his room turned out to be "negative"
person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the
and that the raiding team failed to seize or confiscate any prohibited or regulated
accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala
drug in his person or possession. He, therefore, prays for his acquittal.
prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidende) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
The People submits that Huang Zhen Hua is entitled to acquittal. The
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
prosecution's evidence fails to meet the quantum of evidence required to
drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; thus, regardless of the
other hand, constructive possession exits when the drug is under the dominion
supposed weakness of his defense, and his innocence may be doubted, he is
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
nonetheless entitled to an acquittal (Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
(1980), cited in People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000). The
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of
and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with
primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the
another.
weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a

In the instant case, as pointed out by appellant Huang Zhen Hua, the trial court
showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact
erred when it did not give much weight to the admission made by the prosecution
of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
witnesses that no regulated drug was found in his person. No regulated drug was
reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that
also found inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc. Thus,
the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the
he had no actual or constructive possession of the confiscated "shabu."
place under his control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since
knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the
place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may
Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over
for barely four (4) days at the time when he was arrested. The prosecution was which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the
unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua committed acts absence of any satisfactory explanation.54
which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lau and
Peter Chan. It was not even shown that he was together with Henry Lau and
Peter Chan on any occasion. As for Huang Zhen Hua, therefore, there is no direct
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had
evidence of any culpability. Nor is there any circumstantial evidence from which
actual or constructive possession of the regulated drug found in the master's
any culpability may be inferred.52
bedroom where appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the appellant had accessed
the said room at any given time; or that he had knowledge of the existence of
shabu in appellant Lee's bedroom. Appellant Zhen Hua had arrived in the
Philippines upon the invitation of appellant Lee only on October 22, 1996 or
barely four (4) days before the arrival of the policemen and the search conducted
in the condominium unit leased by Henry Lao. He was a mere visitor of appellant
Lee. There is no evidence that appellant Zhen Hua was aware of the alleged
illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry Lao, Peter Chan and appellant
Lee. The policemen did not find any regulated drug in the room where appellant
Zhen Hua was sleeping when they made their search.
The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove conspiracy between him, appellant Lee
and Chan or Lao.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and
decide to commit it.55 Conspiracy cannot be presumed.56 Conspiracy must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the conspiracy.57
Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the
accused, before, during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative
of a common design.58
The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant Zhen
Hua from China, and before the search conducted in Lao's condominium unit,
appellant Zhen Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and appellant Lee. Having
dinner or lunch at a restaurant does not constitute sufficient proof that he had
conspired with them or with any of them to possess the subject-regulated drug.
Mere association with the principals by direct participation or mere knowledge of
conspiracy, without more, does not suffice.59 Anciro, Jr. even admitted that
during his surveillance, he could have mistaken appellant Zhen Hua for another
group of Chinese persons who were also being watched.60 Appellant Zhen Hua
should, thus, be acquitted.
On Appellant Lee
Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and
implementation of Search Warrant No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the policemen who
implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show to her the said
warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their presence in the
condominium unit; (b) the policemen gained entry into the condominium unit by
force while she was sleeping; and (c) articles and personal effects owned by her
and Lao were taken and confiscated by the policemen, although not specified in
the search warrant.
The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the
occasion of the search of the condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because
the policemen planted the regulated drug on her bed even before they searched
the bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua to find out if he was
already awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her
bed. She avers that the sole testimony of Anciro, Jr., that he found the regulated
drug in the master's bedroom, is incredible because he was not with the
policemen who barged into the bedroom. She notes that even Pangan, the
caretaker of the Villa, testified that he did not see any illegal drug confiscated by
the policemen.
According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime
charged, considering that Lao and Chan were the suspects identified in the search
warrants, not her. She avers that she had no knowledge of the alleged illegal
drug transactions of her lover Lao. She contends that there was no probable
cause for her arrest as her mere presence in the condominium unit does not
render her liable for the shabu found in the master's bedroom of the
condominium unit leased by Lao. She further avers that the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution are inconsistent; hence, barren of probative weight.
The appellant also asserts that she was deprived of her right to due process when
the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese interpreter to assist her.
The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have
performed their duties. Based on the testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee was
shown the search warrant, through the window, and the policemen identified
themselves through their uniforms. The security guards of the condominium also
explained the search warrant to the appellant. Although she was, at first,
reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later voluntarily opened the door and
allowed them entry into the unit. There was no evidence of forcible entry into the
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their
unit and no breakage of any door. The OSG further avers that the appellant had
authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open
been in the country for quite sometime already and could not have gotten around
any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if,
without understanding English. In fact, the OSG argues that when Anciro, Jr. told
after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of
the appellant to get some of her clothes since she would be brought to the police
directed search. This is known as the "knock and announce" principle which is
headquarters in Quezon City, she did as she was told and took her clothes from
embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of an officer into a
the cabinet where the shabu were found by the policemen.
dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important
considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is
constitutionally reasonable.63 In Gouled v. The United States,64 it was held that
The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the subdivision
a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search
who was a witness for appellant Lee, even testified that the search was orderly.
would violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by
The OSG contends that there was probable cause for the appellant's arrest
force, by illegal threat or mere show of force.
because an informant had tipped off the arresting officers that the appellant was
a member of a syndicate dealing with illegal drugs, and that she handled the
accounts of Lao and Chan. The appellant was not a victim of frame-up because
The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing
she was present when the policemen searched the master's bedroom where she
that "if a person takes the beasts of another and causes them to be driven into a
was sleeping and where she kept her clothes, and witnessed the discovery of the
castle or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the deliverance of the
regulated drugs and paraphernalia.
beasts, and if the person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the
king shall cause the said castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery."
Common law courts appended an important qualification:
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional proscription
against unreasonable search and seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to
aliens temporarily residing in the country. The rule against unreasonable search
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make
and seizure forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all those
request to open doors ', for the law without a default in the owner abhors the
suspected or known to be offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as
destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of
important and imperative as the guarantee of the other fundamental rights of the
man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when
citizens.61 All owes the duty for its effective enforcement lest there shall be an
no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he
impairment of the right for the purpose for which it was adopted.62
had noticed, it is to be presumed that he would obey it' 65

Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking open
doors if the possession be not quietly delivered.66 The principle was woven
quickly into the fabric of early American law and in the Fourth Amendment in the
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused
United States Federal Constitution. It is an element of the reasonableness inquiry
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
under the Fourth Amendment as held in Wilson v. Arkansas.67
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or
any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, constitutionally defective, if the police officers' entry was without prior
identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish the reasonableness
possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant of an unannounced entry.72 Indeed, there is no formula for the determination of
to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.73
dialect known to and understood by them. The requirement is not a mere In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the existence of
procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial provision which probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had reason
safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of words is required. It is to believe and the time of the entry.74 In Richards v. Wisconsin,75 it was held
sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the that:
purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It must be emphasized that
the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the
person to be searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being of the [1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable
officers serving and implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified of the circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.
he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful This standard as opposed to a probable-cause requirement'strikes the
aggression on his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in
process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interest affected by
for which he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility no-knock entries.76
that the police serving and implementing the search warrant may be misinformed
as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations.
Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment
As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida,77 what constitutes breaking
attendant upon an unannounced intrusion.69 Indeed, a lawful entry is the
includes the lifting of a latch, turning a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp,
indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the
removing a prop to or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house, even
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry
a closed screen door.78 However, entry obtained through the use of deception,
were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show of force or
accomplished without force is not a "breaking" requiring officers to first announce
obtained by stealth, or coercion.70
their authority and purpose because the reasons behind the rule are satisfied -
there was no real likelihood of violence, no unwarranted intrusion or privacy and
no damage to the residence of the accused.79
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose
premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open
it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the
As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before
officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in
breaking open any door cannot be distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each
the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when
case has to be decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an examination of all the
those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for
circumstances.80 The proper trigger point in determining, under the "knock and
example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which
announce" rule, whether the police waited long enough before entering the
justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
residence to execute a warrant, is when those inside should have been alerted
being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or
that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant.81
dispose of evidence.71 However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or
conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of
the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced
intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be
In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium unit.
A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key and also
Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police officers were
knock and introduce ourselves, knock on the said condominium.
accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his
companions were police officers and had a search warrant for the premises, and
also explained to her that the officers were going to search the condominium
unit.82 The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of the policemen, Q Did they do that, the request?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose. Moreover,
Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with her as she
was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being A Yes, Sir.
interpreted to the appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some
clothes from the cabinet atop the headboard.83
Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand
Villa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door
before entering the condominium unit, and after a while, the appellant opened
the door and allowed the policemen and Pangan to enter. Anciro, Jr. testified, A Yes, Sir.
thus:

Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to implement said
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards who helped search warrants, what happened next, if any? What did you do after
you or assisted you in implementing said search warrants at Grand Villa that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Subdivision?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody there
A The OIC of the Home Owners' Association, Antonio Pangan, and the OIC of the because the Home Owners' Association doesn't have any key for the door. We
Security Agency and two (2) other security guards. asked them to knock also because they are the ones who have access with the
tenants.

Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr.

Witness?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q And after knocking, what happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A I can hardly recall their names. A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By that
time, we thought they were still asleep.

Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers and the
OIC of the Home Owners' Association, what did you do Q And then after that what did you do, if any?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another security did so only after knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5) minutes and after
guard to try to knock on the kitchen which is on the back door. he had called Lao in a loud voice and received no response from the appellants:

Q And then after that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being required
according to your security guards?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic) the window
of the kitchen and asked who we are in a sign language. A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as police
operatives.

Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window - I withdraw. Were
you able to have a good look on that female person who showed herself thru the Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police
window?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary authorities?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir. A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19, that is
what they told me.

Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct the
search?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.84

A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I don't know
The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain what time was that.
entry into the condominium unit. She could have asked the court for an ocular
inspection to show the door which was allegedly broken into by the policemen, or
at least adduce in evidence pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant Q When they conducted the search, were you there?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
failed to do so. The testimony of the appellant is even belied by Pangan, who was
a witness for the appellant, who certified, along with three other security guards,
that nothing was destroyed and that the search was conducted in a peaceful and A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is not present.
orderly manner.85

Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of that unit
We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked the occupied by Henry Kau Chung?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
outer door to gain entry into the condominium unit, which testimony is seemingly
in derogation of his certification. However, Pangan admitted that the policemen
A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they pushed the door Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no one who
and the door was opened. responded to your knocking at the door?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened A Nobody was answering, Sir.
it?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door

A Kaya naman po ginawa 'yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker, wala forcibly?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
naman pong masamang mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po ang namamahala.

A Yes, Sir.86
Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time that the
police operatives forcibly break open the door, how many minutes had
elapsed?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary COURT:

A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, "Mr. Henry, pakibuksan n
yo ang pinto, would you mind to open the door, kasi merong mga police officers
na gustong ma-search itong unit mo. Then, when nobody was answering, they
forcibly opened the door.
From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed before the
police officer broke open the door?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Matagal din po.

Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that unit at that
time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q For how long?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion whom I do
A Maybe for about three to five minutes.
not know.

Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the

Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door, there was
door?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
no one who responded, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Your Honor.

A Pardon, Sir?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

COURT:
 A They were outside, Sir.

Continue.87

Q During the search made on the master's bedroom?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her contention
that Anciro, Jr. placed the shabu on her bed before he continued his search in the
A Yes, Sir.
bedroom, and that she was a victim of frame-up by the policemen. She relied on
her testimony and those of Pangan and Ferias that they did not see Anciro, Jr.
discover and take custody of the shabu in the cabinet.
Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by Huang Zhen
Hua, were you present then?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The appellant's defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard
line of defense in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
While such defense cannot and should not always be considered as contrived, A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.
nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult
to prove. Police officers are, after all, presumed to have acted regularly in the
performance of their official functions, in the absence of clear and convincing Q How about the other guards?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-will.88

A They were also outside.89

It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr.
discover and take custody of the shabu subject of this case. However, as
explained by Pangan, he remained in the ground floor of the condominium unit For his part, Ferias declared:
while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant Lee
and her lover Lao, and Ferias proceeded to the room occupied by appellant Zhen
Hua where he conducted his search. Thus, Pangan testified:
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest
room?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q When the master's bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then, according
to you, sleeping, did you accompany the PARAC
A No, Sir.
members?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then
A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.
sleeping?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q What about the members of the security force?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police
officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He was surprised.90
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest
room?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then
sleeping?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police
officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He was surprised.91
Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the
second floor of the condominium unit, he did not see them bring in anything:
Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the unit, you did
not see them bringing anything with them, they were all empty-
handed?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I did not see, Sir.92
No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the
security guards of the subdivision, who accompanied the policemen in
implementing the search warrants, certified that, what was found inside the
condominium unit and confiscated by the policemen were two plastic bags which
contained white crystalline powder substances suspected to be shabu.93
The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the policemen
were there. She claimed that the policemen placed the plastic bag on the bed
before they started the search and that she noticed the shabu only after he
returned from the room of appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was already awake is
hard to believe.
First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the appellant's
bed, in her full view, for which the latter could be prosecuted for planting
evidence and, if convicted, sentenced to death under Section 19 of Rep. Act
7659:
SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and
Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence.' The
maximum penalties provided for [in] Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and
13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be
imposed, if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government
officials, employees or officers, including members of police agencies and the
armed forces.
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing undetermined
quantity of suspected Shabu;
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Canister also containing undetermined amount of
suspected Shabu'

Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person
or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall
suffer the same penalty as therein provided.
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used
for sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils,
etc.;

A. TWO (2) Kettles/Pots containing more or less 1 - kilos of Raw Shabu or

Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;
evidence by the policemen; if she had done so, for sure, the said counsel would
have prepared her affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court for the
suppression of the things/articles seized by the policemen.
b. Two (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing more or less Two (2) Kilos of
Shabu;

Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence
before or after she was charged of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
c. Three (3) Plastic Basins, small, medium, large, used for containers of
finished/cooked Shabu;

Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or
policemen who allegedly planted the evidence.
c. Several pieces of Plastic Strainers used for draining out liquids from finished
Shabu;

The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr. and
Ferias, the articles and substances found and confiscated from the condominium
e. One (1) Plastic Container with liquid chemical of undetermined element;
unit of Lao and appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at the Cityland condominium
unit of Lao and Chan were itemized as follows:

f. Several pieces of Spoons and ladles with traces of raw Shabu used in stirring
mixtures
A. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) kilo each of
white crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
Shabu, a regulated drug;
g. One (1) Electric Cooking Stove w/one coil burner;
h. One (1) Unit Card Making Machine;
i. One (1) Unit Card Stamping Machine;
j. Several pieces of Credit Cards and Telephone Cards;94
Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline
powder which were found and confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the company
of Ferias, delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, per
the request of Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman, the chief of the
PARAC.
We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in the
search warrants. However, such fact did not proscribe the policemen from
arresting her and charging her of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
There was, in fine, probable cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that
found by Judge William Bayhon when he issued the search warrants against Lao
and Chan for search of the condominium units at Atlantic Drive and Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the
premises being searched when the facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are
sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an
offense has been or is being committed.95 It has been held that:
Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present at the
time the officers entered the apartment to arrest her husband, was nevertheless
present at the time of her arrest. Upon their entry and announcement of their
identity, the officers were met not only by George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who
was emerging from the kitchen. Officer Berman immediately walked to the
doorway from which she emerged and, without entering, observed the brick-
shaped package of marijuana in plain view. Even assuming that her presence in a
small room with the contraband in a prominent position on the kitchen sink would
not alone establish a reasonable ground for the officers' belief that she was in
joint possession with her husband, that fact was accompanied by the officers'
information that Ker had been using his apartment as a base of operations for his
narcotics activities. Therefore, we cannot say that at the time of her arrest there
were no sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as well as her
husband, were committing the offense of possession of marijuana in the presence
of the officers.96
In Draper v. United States,97 it was held that informations from a reliable
informant, corroborated by the police officer's observations as to the accuracy of
the description of the accused, and of his presence at a particular place, is
sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, the police officers received
reliable information and verified, after surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao
were living together as husband and wife in the condominium unit and that
appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and proceeds of the illegal
drug trafficking activities of Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that the appellant
occupied the bedroom and slept in the same bed used by Lao. The appellant took
her clothes from the same cabinet where the subject shabu and paraphernalia
were found by Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same condominium
unit with Lao since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996. Along
with Lao, the appellant thus had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as
well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts
and circumstances are sufficient on which to base a reasonable belief that the
appellant had joint possession of the regulated drugs found in the bedroom along
with Lao, her live-in partner, in line with our ruling in People v. Tira.98 For the
purpose of prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, possession can
be constructive and need not be exclusive, but may be joint.99
Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the
appellant and Lao which were not described in the search warrants. However, the
seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not render the seizure of
the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in
evidence such articles which were described in the warrant and seized pursuant
thereto. Moreover, it bears stressing that Anciro, Jr. saw the unlisted articles
when he and the other policemen implemented the search warrants. Such articles
were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was
authorized to seize the said articles because of their close connection to the crime
charged. As held in Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire:100
 joint possession of the shabu which the policemen found and confiscated from
her bedroom.
An example of the applicability of the 'plain view' doctrine is the situation in
which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and
in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is
character.'
GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, convicting
him of the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The said appellant is
ACQUITTED of said charge. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby
Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an
directed to release the said appellant from detention unless he is detained for
article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to
another cause or charge, and to submit to the Court, within five (5) days from
the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus, the police may
notice hereof, a report of his compliance with the directive of the Court.
inadvertently come across evidence while in 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect. -
And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is
appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a
The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10,
warrant.' Finally, the 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police officer
1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, convicting her of violation of
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
comes across an incriminating object. '101

SO ORDERED.
It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and
papers seen by the policemen have an intimate nexus with the crime charged or, Enforcement of fishing, customs and immigration laws
at the very least, incriminating. The passport of the appellant would show when
and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank Roldan vs. Arca [65 SCRA 320 (1975)]
book would indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
how she acquired or earned the same. The pictures and those of the other
respondent Judge from enforcing his order dated October 18, 1965, and the writ
persons shown therein are relevant to show her relationship to Lao and Chan.102
of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed to
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of
provide an interpreter when she testified. The records show that a Cantonese
Manila a civil case docketed as No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries
interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The Rules of Court
Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex
does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter
VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and impounded
throughout the trial. An interpreter is required only if the witness on the stand
by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
testifies in a language other than in English or is a deaf - mute. The appellant
may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense.

On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction with respondent court, but said prayer was, however,
Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof beyond
denied.
reasonable doubt of her guilt of the crime charged. She and Lao, her lover, had
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April
10, 1964 and granted respondent company's motion for reconsideration praying
for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took Possession
of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the abovesaid writ.
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case
No. 56701 for failure of therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to
prosecute as well as for failure of therein defendants (petitioners herein)to
appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie
however, remained in the possession of respondent company.
On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine
Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called
Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal
fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were
then found aboard the two vessels.
On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan
Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing
vessels.
On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the court of First Instance of Palawan
a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and
another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI — both for violations of Act
No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for
illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex
parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence
of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the
vessels (p. 56, rec.).
On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the
Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody.
On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a complaint with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila against herein petitioners. Among others, it was
alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same
were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by
virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent
company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous
violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were
settled.
On October 9, 1965, petitioners, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed
the above-mentioned complaint, alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of
the writ would disrupt the status quo of the parties and would render nugatory
any decision of the respondent court favorable to the defendant; (2) that the
vessels, being instruments of a crime in criminal cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed
with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, the release of the vessels sans the
corresponding order from the above-mentioned court would deprive the same of
its authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the Provincial
Fiscal would not be able to utilize said vessels as evidence in the prosecution of
said cases; (3) that as petitioners herein were in possession of one of the vessels
in point, they cannot now be deprived of the legal custody thereof by reason of
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 56701; (4) that petitioner Fisheries Commissioner
has the power to seize and detain the vessels pursuant to Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 3215 in relation to Sections 903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and
Customs Code; (5) that respondents herein have not exhausted administrative
remedies before coming to court; (6) that the compromise agreement approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and indorsed to the
Fisheries Commissioner is never a bar to the prosecution of the crime perpetrated
by the crew members of the vessels belonging to respondent company.
And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed their memorandum
praying for the denial of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On
the same day, October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed an urgent motion to
submit additional documentary evidence.
On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in said Civil Case No.
62799, filed their answer to the complaint with affirmative defenses, reiterating
the grounds in their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and adding that herein private respondent admitted committing the
last violation when it offered in its letter dated September 21, 1965 to the Acting
Commissioner of Fisheries, to compromise said last violation (Exh. 12, pp. 60-61,
rec.).
On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order
granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued
the preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00
for the release of the two vessels(pp. 95-102, rec.).
On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order issuing the preliminary writ on October 18, 1965 on the ground, among
others, that on October 18, 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan
Court of First Instance two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the
Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said
vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the
bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case
the two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of
the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the crime (pp.
103-109, rec.).1äwphï1.ñët
On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the said motion for
reconsideration (p. 110, rec.).
WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October
18, 1965 the order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same.
I 525; Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib vs. Insular
When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels
were already under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by
virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal
(pp. 54, 55, rec.), directing the Philippine Navy to detain (pp. 108, 109, rec.) said
vessels, which are subject to forfeiture as instruments of the crime, to be utilized
as evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing pending in
said court (pp. 54-55, rec.). The said vessels were seized while engaging in
prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Palawan (pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.)
and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in
obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal offense was committed not
only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction"(Lopez vs. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616, 619). The
jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan Court of First Instance
cannot be interfered with by another Court of First Instance. The orders of
October 2 and 4, 1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the
Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two vessels and that "same should not be
released without prior order or authority from this Court" (pp. 108, 109, rec.).
Only the Palawan court can order the release of the two vessels. Not even the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner
can direct that the fishing boats be turned over to private respondent without
risking contempt of court.
The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge was
heightened by the fact that he did not reconsider his order of October 18, 1965
after he was informed by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration filed on
October 19, 1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance had already issued the
two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 directing the Philippine Navy to hold in
custody the fishing boats until further orders.
It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or decrees
of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to
grant the relief sought by injunction; because if coordinate courts were allowed to
interfere with each other's judgments, decrees or injunctions, the same would
obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of
justice (Ongsinco, etc. vs. Tan, et al., 97 Phil. 330; PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil.
Drug Company, 64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Auto Bus Company,
et al., G.R. No. L-17907, May 30, 1963, 8 SCRA, 103, 107-109; NPC vs. Hon.
Jesus de Vera, G.R. No. L-15763, Dec. 22, 1961, 3 SCRA, 646, 648; Cabigao vs.
del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Araneta & Uy vs. Commonwealth Insurance Company,
55 OG 431; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1970 ed., p. 64).
As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were already in custodia legis
under the sole control of the Palawan Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of
First Instance cannot interfere with and change that possession (Hacbang vs.
Leyte Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, supra).
It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine Navy basin in Manila;
for the same in no way impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan
court, which has custody thereof through the Philippine Navy. This is analogous
to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L-27124, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA
186, 188-9), wherein We ruled "where the illegal possession of firearms was
committed in the town where the Court sits, the fact that the firearms were
confiscated from the accused in another town does not affect the jurisdiction of
the Court" (pp. 186, 189).
It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the
herein petitioners of the seizure of the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy,
because such previous notice is not required by law.
II
The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil Case No. 56701 by the
Court of First Instance of Manila had the necessary effect of automatically
dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued therein on April 28,
1964, directing the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (pp. 156-157, rec.). Such
a preliminary writ, like any other interlocutory order, cannot survive the main
case of which it was but an incident; because "an ancillary writ of preliminary
injunction loses its force and effect after the dismissal of the main petition"
(National Sugar Workers' Union, etc., vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, et al., L-
23569, May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA 104, 109; Lazaro vs. Mariano, 59 Phil. 6Z7, 631;
Saavedra vs. Ibañez, 56 Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji vs. Phil. Sugar Estate and
Development Company, 50 Phil. 592, 594).1äwphï1.ñët
Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 28, 1964 in Civil Case
No. 56701 was directed against the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for
violations committed prior to August 5, 1965, and therefore cannot and does not
extend to the seizure and detention of said vessel for violations on August 5 or 6,
1965, which violations were not and could not possibly be the subject-matter of
said Civil Case No. 56701 which was filed on April 3, 1964 (p. 12, rec.).
III
Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of
private respondent for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the
requisite licenses.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the
Fisheries Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as
amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make
searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives
in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as ... dynamites and
the like ...; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things
that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively
implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."
Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to
and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and
duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and
Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters ..."
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 4003, as
amended, prohibits fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized
by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than
P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6)
months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of
all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in
fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same
Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with
its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or
finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall
constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and
explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and
that the possession or discovery in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the
use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew
have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives." (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or
corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding license
prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or
regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense
by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one
year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That in case of an
association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible
for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with
his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is
concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of a known owner of the
vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be responsible
for any violation of this Act: and Provided, finally, That in case of a second
offense, the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be
forfeited to the Government" (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of December 23, 1950, reorganizing
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among
others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws
and regulations pertaining to ... fishing ..." (46 OG 5905, 5911).
Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34 of
October 27, 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority
under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as
well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person
on board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws.
When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner,
apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex
VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels
were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of
the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license
required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47,
rec.).1äwphï1.ñët
The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended pursuant to the
order dated January 28, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending
the final determination of the case against it for illegal fishing with explosives on
January 21, 1964 (p. 34, rec.) and remained suspended until its apprehension on
August 5 or 6, 1965 (p. 46, rec.).
For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23, 1963, the renewal of the fishing
boat license of Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from the time said boat
was moored at Pier 14 at North Harbor, Manila, without prejudice to the
institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator, pursuant to the
order dated May 19, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 35-36,
rec.), the motion for reconsideration of which order was denied by the
Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August 17, 1964 (pp. 41-42, rec.).
For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28, 1963, the operation of Tony Lex VI
was suspended by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1, 1963
(p. 62, rec.).
For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25, 1963, the fishing boat Tony
Lex VI together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and all other apparatus used in
fishing was ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and a
fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on its owners-operators, without
prejudice to the filing of the necessary criminal action, pursuant to the order of
June 2, 1964 of the Commissioner of Fisheries(pp. 37-38, rec.).
Again, for comitting the same violation on June 19, 1963, a fine in the amount of
P5,000.00 was imposed on the owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI
pursuant to the order of June 4, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries
(pp. 39-40, rec.)..
It appears, therefore, that since January 28, 1964, the fishing boat Tony Lex III
was suspended from operating and was ordered moored at Pier 14, North Harbor,
Manila (pp. 34, 46-47, rec.); and that the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI was
suspended for one year from May 24, 1964 and was actually ordered forfeited to
the Government pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 for repeated violations of
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act (pp. 37- 38. rec.).1äwphï1.ñët As a matter of fact,
when apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965, both vessels were found to be
without any license or permit for coastwise trade or for fishing and unlawfully
fishing with explosives, for which reason their owners and crew were accordingly
indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license (pp. 48-53, rec.).
As heretofore intimated, the two fishing boats were apprehended on numerous
occasions for fishing with dynamite from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964,
which violations private respondent, as owner-operator, sought to compromise by
offering to pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all said prior violations.
Such previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Act committed
by the two fishing boats, Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, from March 28, 1963
until August 5 or 6, 1965, rendered the said vessels subject to forfeiture under
Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations
of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before
such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected (Papa vs.
Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770, 774; Caroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice Fernando, The Bill
of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p.
300).
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our
fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to
elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a
valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest
(Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p.
224). Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may,
without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing
or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed
to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a
prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or
from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being
transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of
Court). In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were
caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite
license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a
crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and
dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on September 13, 1965 (pp. 63-64, 158-159, rec.) cannot be invoked
by the respondents because the said compromise referred to about thirty
violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March
28, 1963 to March 11, 1964. The violations by the two vessels of private
respondent by reason of which these vessels were apprehended and detained by
the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were
committed on August 5 or 6, 1965.
 of its complaint in Civil Case No. 62799 (p. 18, rec.), as well as in its various
communications to the Fisheries Commissioner (pp. 60-61, 65, 82,
Moreover, the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal
rec.).1äwphï1.ñët The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI likewise
prosecution is instituted; otherwise the Department Secretary or any of his sub-
fall under the term vessel used in Sections 17, 76 and 78, as well as the term
alterns can render criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries law a mere
boats utilized in the second paragraph of Section 76 of the Fisheries Act. They
mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to sustain the
can also fall under the term fishing equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic
viewpoint that the Department Secretary can compromise criminal cases
Act No. 3512; because a fishing equipment is never complete and cannot be
involving public, not private, offenses after the indictment had been instituted in
effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the fishing boat or fishing
court. The fishing vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites
vessel itself. And these two vessels of private respondent certainly come under
found therein are not only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject
the term fishing vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same
to forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments of the crime (Art. 45,
Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries Commission.
Revised Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003, as amended). Section 80(j) of Act
No. 4003, as amended, precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries
Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in accordance with
Hence, no useful purpose can be served in trying to distinguish between boat and
Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries law.
vessel with reference to Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. As a matter of fact, the
Furthermore, any compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the Fisheries
accepted definition of vessel includes "every description of water craft, large or
Commission (Section 80[i], Act No. 4003), which did not recommend such a
small, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water"
compromise for the violation on August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section 12 in relation to
(Cope versus Vallete, etc., 199 U.S. 625; U.S. vs. Holmes, 104 Fed. 884; Charles
Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended. On the contrary, the Fisheries
Barnes Co. vs. One Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895; and Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil.
Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp.
780).
43-45, rec.) and the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 on September 30, 1965 against
the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels (pp. 48-53, rec.).
The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft (Monongahela River
Construction, etc. vs. Hardsaw, 77 NE 363, 365). The fishing boats Tony Lex III
and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel used
It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated September 13, 1965 of the
in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of
P21,000.00 for the various violations committed previous to August 5 or 6, 1965
(pp. 34-42, 47, 58-64, 149-155, 158-159, rec.), the Department Secretary
"believes that the offer made by the company was an implied admission of WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF
violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law and regulations, ..." (pp. 63, RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
158, rec.). The said approval was granted after the private respondent filed a MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND THE ORDER DATED
motion for reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5, 1965 of the NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID, WITH COSTS
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources disapproving the offer by private AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise.
People vs. Gatward [267 SCRA 785 (1997)]

There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat (employed in the second
paragraph of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III
and Tony Lex VI. Even private respondent refers to said fishing boats as fishing
vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing" in paragraph IV
The accession into our statute books on December 31, 1993 of Republic Act No.
7659,1 which authorized the re-imposition of the death penalty and amended
certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, raised the level of expectations in the drive against criminality. As was to
be expected, however, some innovations therein needed the intervention of this
Court for a judicial interpretation of amendments introduced to the dangerous
drugs law.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The same spin-off of novelty, this time by the new provision fixing the duration of
reclusion perpetua which theretofore had not been spelled out with specificity in
the Revised Penal Code, produced some conflicting constructions, more
specifically on whether such penalty is divisible or indivisible in nature. That is
actually the major issue in these cases, the factual scenario and the culpability of
both accused having been.
The antecedents being undisputed, and with a careful review and assessment of
the records of this case having sustained the same, we reproduce hereunder the
pertinent parts of the decision of the trial court jointly deciding the criminal cases
separately filed against each of the accused. Although only one of them, Nigel
Richard Gatward, has appealed his conviction to us, for reasons hereinafter
explained we shall likewise include the disposition by the court a quo of the case
against U Aung Win.
1. The lower court stated the cases against the accused, the proceedings therein
and its findings thereon, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 94-6268, the accused is charged with violating Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, allegedly in this
manner:
That on or about the 31st (sic) day of August 1994, in the vicinity of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, x x x, the above-named accused not
being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport heroin (2605.70 grams and 2632.0 grams) contained in separate carton
envelopes with a total weight of 5237.70 grams which is legally considered as a
prohibited drug. (Information dated Sept. 14, 1994)
In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, the accused is indicted for transgressing Section 3
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, purportedly in this way:
That on or about the 30th day of August 1994, at the arrival area of Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Pasay City, x x x, the above-named accused not being
authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously import
and bring into the Philippines 5579.80 grams of heroin which is legally considered
as a prohibited drug. (Information also dated Sept. 14, 1994)
Accused Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 pleaded not guilty
of the charge when arraigned.
On the other hand, accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, assisted
by Atty. Willy Chan of the Public Attorneys Office of the Department of Justice,
entered a plea of guilty of the crime charged upon his arraignment. Since it is a
capital offense, the Court asked searching questions to determine the
voluntariness and the full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of
his plea. The accused manifested that he was entering a plea of guilty voluntarily
without having been forced or intimidated into doing it. The nature of the charge
was explained to him, with emphasis that the offense carries with it the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and his pleading guilty of it might subject him to
the penalty of death. The accused answered that he understood fully the charge
against him and the consequences of his entering a plea of guilty. The defense
counsel likewise made an assurance in open court that he had explained to U
Aung Win the nature of the charge and the consequences of his pleading guilty of
it.
Having been thus apprised, the accused still maintained his plea of guilty of the
offense charged against him. Since the offense admitted by him is punishable by
death, the case was still set for trial for the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution to prove the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused and
that of the defense to establish mitigating circumstances.
Upon motion of the prosecution without any objection from the defense, these
two cases were consolidated and tried jointly, since the offenses charged arose
from a series of related incidents and the prosecution would be presenting
common evidence in both.
At about 3:30 in the afternoon of August 30, 1994, accused U Aung Win, a
passenger of TG Flight No. 620 of the Thai Airways which had just arrived from
Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a travelling bag about 20 inches in
length, 14 inches in width and 10 inches in thickness, for examination to Customs
Examiner Busran Tawano, who was assigned at the Arrival Area of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City. The accused also handed to
Tawano his Customs Declaration No. 128417 stating that he had no articles to
declare. When Tawano was about to inspect his luggage, the accused suddenly
left, proceeding towards the direction of Carousel No. 1, the conveyor for the
pieces of luggage of the passengers of Flight No. 620, as if to retrieve another
baggage from it.
After having inspected the luggages of the other incoming passengers, Tawano
became alarmed by the failure of U Aung Win to return and suspected that the
bag of the accused contained illegal articles. The Customs Examiner reported the
matter to his superiors. Upon their instructions, the bag was turned over to the
office of the Customs Police in the NAIA for x-ray examination where it was
detected that it contained some powdery substance. When opened, the bag
revealed two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its
partitions. Representative samples of the substance were examined by Elizabeth
Ayonon, a chemist of the Crime Laboratory Service of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned at the Arrival Area of the NAIA, and by Tita Advincula,
another chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, and found
to be positive for heroin. The two chemists concluded that the entire substance,
with a total weight of 5,579.80 grams, contained in the two packages found in
the bag of U Aung Win, is heroin.
A manhunt was conducted to locate U Aung Win. The personnel of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation in the NAIA were asked to place the accused in the
hold order list. The offices of the different airlines in the airport were also alerted
to inform the Enforcement and Security Service and the Customs Police Division
of the NAIA of any departing passenger by the name of U Aung Win who would
check in at their departure counters. A team was likewise sent to the Park Hotel
in Belen St., Paco, Manila, which accused U Aung Win had indicated in his
Customs Declaration as his address in the Philippines. But the accused was not
found in that hotel.
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same date of August 30, 1994, Rey Espinosa, an
employee of the Lufthansa Airlines, notified the commander of the NAIA Customs
Police District Command that a certain Burmese national by the name of U Aung
Win appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as a departing passenger.
Immediately, a team of law enforcers proceeded to the Departure Area and
apprehended the accused after he had been identified through his signatures in
his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Arrival
Card. Customs Examiner Tawano also positively identified the accused as the
person who left his bag with him at the Arrival Area of the NAIA.
During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs Police and the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information that the accused had a
contact in Bangkok and that there were other drug couriers in the Philippines.
Following the lead, a team of lawmen, together with U Aung Win, was dispatched
to the City Garden Hotel in Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, to enable U Aung Win to
communicate with his contact in Bangkok for further instructions. While the police
officers were standing by, they noticed two persons, a Caucasian and an oriental,
alight from a car and enter the hotel. U Aung Win whispered to Customs Police
Special Agent Edgar Quiones that he recognized the two as drug couriers whom
he saw talking with his contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau. The members of the
team were able to establish the identity of the two persons as accused Nigel
Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing, a Thailander, from the driver of the
hotel service car used by the two when they arrived in the hotel. It was gathered
by the law enforcers that Gatward and Zaw Win Naing were scheduled to leave
for Bangkok on board a KLM flight.
On August 31, 1994, operatives of the NAIA Customs Police mounted a
surveillance operation at the Departure Area for Gatward and Zaw Win Naing who
might be leaving the country. At about 7:45 p.m. of the same date, Special Agent
Gino Minguillan of the Customs Police made a verification on the passenger
manifest of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Flight No. 806, bound for Amsterdam via
Bangkok, which was scheduled to depart at about 7:55 that evening. He found
the name GATWARD/NRMR listed therein as a passenger for Amsterdam and
accordingly informed his teammates who responded immediately. Customs Police
Captain Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM airline at
the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward disembark from the aircraft and to have his
checked-in luggage, if any, unloaded. The manager acceded to the request to off-
load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as the plane was about
to depart and to do so would unduly delay the flight. However, Erece made an
assurance that the bag would be returned immediately to the Philippines on the
first available flight from Bangkok. Upon his disembarkment, Gatward was invited
by the police officers for investigation.
At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of September 1, 1994, Gatwards luggage,
a travelling bag almost of the same size as that of U Aung Win, was brought back
to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai Airways, pursuant to the request of
Erece which was telexed in the evening of August 31, 1994, to the KLM airline
manager in Bangkok. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-
ray examinations in the presence of accused Gatward and some Customs
officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance. Inside the bag
were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each containing the powdery
substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the
bag, one at the side in between a double-wall, the other inside a partition in the
middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and Advincula pursuant to the
request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery
substance contained in the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of
5,237.70 grams, was found to be heroin.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court below made short shrift of the defense raised by herein appellant.
Apart from the well-known rule on the respect accorded to the factual findings of
trial courts because of the vantage position they occupy in that regard, we accept
its discussion thereon by reason of its clear concordance with the tenets of law
and logic. Again we quote:
Accused Gatward denied that the bag containing the heroin was his luggage.
However, that the said bag belongs to him is convincingly shown by the fact that
the serial number of the luggage tag, which is KL 206835, corresponds to the
serial number of the luggage claim tag attached to the plane ticket of the
accused. Moreover, as testified to by Manager Erece of the KLM airline, the
luggage of Gatward located in Container No. 1020 of KLM Flight No. 806 was the
same luggage which was returned to the NAIA on September 1, 1994, on board
Thai Airways TG Flight No. 620, pursuant to the request made by him to the KLM
manager in Bangkok. The testimony of Erece should be given weight in
accordance with the presumption that the ordinary course of business has been
followed. (Sec. 3(q), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). No circumstance was
shown by the defense which would create a doubt as to the identity of the bag as
the luggage of Gatward which he checked in for KLM Flight No. 806 for
Amsterdam with stopover in Bangkok.
Accused Gatward was present during the opening of his bag and the examination
of its contents. He was also interviewed by some press reporters in connection
with the prohibited drug found in the bag. Gatward did not then disclaim
ownership of the bag and its heroin contents. His protestations now that the bag
does not belong to him should be deemed as an afterthought which deserves no
credence.
Gatward posited that he checked in a different bag when he boarded KLM Flight
No. 806, explaining that upon his apprehension by the agents of the NAIA
Customs Police, he threw away the claim tag for the said luggage. He alleged that
the said bag contained, among other things, not only important documents and
papers pertaining to his cellular phone business in the pursuit of which he came
to the Philippines, but also money amounting to L 1,500.00. Gatward stressed
that the bag did not have any illegal articles in it. If this were so, it was unusual
for him, and certainly not in accordance with the common habit of man, to have
thrown away the claim tag, thereby in effect abandoning the bag with its valuable
contents. Not having been corroborated by any other evidence, and being
rendered unbelievable by the circumstances accompanying it as advanced by
him, the stand of accused Gatward that his luggage was different from that which
contained the 5,237.70 grams of heroin in question commands outright
rejection.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The trial court was also correct in rejecting the challenge to the admissibility in
evidence of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. While no search
warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when appellant checked in his bag
as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight No. 806 he thereby agreed
to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an
international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a
warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin
in his bag, or in flagrante delicto.
The conviction of accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269 is likewise
unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also
upon the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by
the lower court despite said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly
proved his having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage
which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the international
airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was authorized by law to
import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so.
2. It is, however, the penalties imposed by the trial court on the two accused
which this Court cannot fully accept. This is the presentation made, and the
rationalization thereof, by the court below:
According to Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the penalties for the offenses under Sections 3 and 4 of
the said Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved, with reference to
heroin, is 40 grams or more. Since the heroin subject of each of these two cases
exceeds 40 grams, it follows that the penalty which may be imposed on each
accused shall range from reclusion perpetua to death.
To fix the proper penalty, it becomes necessary to determine whether any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance had attended the commission of the
offenses charged against the accused. With respect to Gatward, no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance was shown which might affect his criminal liability.
Relative to U Aung Win, no aggravating circumstance was likewise established by
the prosecution. However, the voluntary plea of guilty of the said accused, which
was made upon his arraignment and therefore before the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution, should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the rules for the
application of indivisible penalties, in all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied,
if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission
of the crime, or if the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance. However, this rule may no longer be followed in
these cases, although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua to
death, since reclusion perpetua, which was an indivisible penalty before, is now a
divisible penalty with a duration from 20 years and one (1) day to 40 years, in
accordance with Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.
Consequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death should at present be
deemed to fall within the purview of the penalty prescribed which does not have
one of the forms specially provided for in the Revised Penal Code, the periods of
which shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules, in line with
Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to this principle, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall have the following periods: Death, as the
maximum; thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, as the medium;
and twenty (20) years and one (1) day to thirty (30) years, as the minimum.
As there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance shown to have attended
the commission of the offense charged against Gatward, the penalty to be
imposed on him shall be within the range of the medium period. On the other
hand, since U Aung Win is favored by one mitigating circumstance without any
aggravating circumstance to be taken against him, the penalty which may be
imposed on him shall be within the range of the minimum period. (Art. 64(1) &
(2), Revised Penal Code)
The accused in these cases may not enjoy the benefit of Act No. 4103, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, for under Section 2 of the said Act, its provisions
shall not apply to those convicted of offenses punished with life imprisonment,
which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as similar to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as far as the non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is concerned. (People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29,
1994)5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On those considerations, the trial court handed down its verdict on March 3, 1995
finding both accused guilty as charged, thus:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-6268, accused Nigel Richard Gatward is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority
therefor, 5,237.70 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance shown to have attended the commission of the crime, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for thirty-five (35) years of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, accused U Aung Win is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of importing or bringing into the Philippines 5,579.80 grams of
heroin, a prohibited drug, without being authorized by law to do so, contrary to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and in view of the presence of one (1)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for twenty-five (25) years of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
The heroin involved in these cases is declared forfeited in favor of the
government and ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposal.
With costs de oficio.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is apropos to mention at this juncture that during the pendency of this appeal,
and while awaiting the filing of appellants brief on an extended period granted to
his counsel de parte, the Court received on September 5, 1995 a mimeographed
form of a so-called Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. It bears the signature of
appellant but without the assistance or signature of his counsel indicated thereon.
No reason whatsoever was given for the desired withdrawal and considering the
ambient circumstances, the Court resolved on September 27, 1995 to deny the
same for lack of merit.7
On June 10, 1996, a letter was received from one H.M. Consul M.B. Evans of the
British Embassy, Consular Section, Manila, seeking an explanation for the
aforesaid resolution and with the representation that a convicted person who did
not, on reflection, wish to continue with an appeal would not need to prove merit
but could simply notify the courts of his wish to withdraw and that would be the
end of the matter. To be sure, this is not the first time that members of foreign
embassies and consulates feel that they have a right to intrude into our judicial
affairs and processes, to the extent of imposing their views on our judiciary,
seemingly oblivious or arrogantly disdainful of the fact that our courts are entitled
to as much respect as those in their own countries.
Such faux pas notwithstanding, a reply was sent to Mr. Evans informing him that,
while there is no arrangement whereby a foreign consular officer may intervene
in a judicial proceeding in this Court but out of courtesy as enjoined in Republic
Act No. 6713, the unauthorized pleading of appellant was made under
unacceptable circumstances as explained in said reply; that it is not mandatory
on this Court to dismiss an appeal on mere motion of an appellant; that the Court
does not discuss or transmit notices of judicial action except to counsel of the
parties; and that, should he so desire, he could coordinate with appellants
counsel whose address was furnished therein.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a resolution dated June 19, 1996, appellants counsel was ordered to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held for contempt for his
failure to file appellants brief. On July 24, 1996, said counsel and the Solicitor
General were required to comment on the aforestated motion of appellant to
withdraw his appeal, no brief for him having yet been filed. Under date of
September 6, 1996, the Solicitor General filed his comment surprisingly to the
effect that the People interposed no objection to the motion to withdraw appeal.
Appellants counsel, on the other hand, manifested on November 4, 1996 that he
was willing to file the brief but he could not do so since appellant asked for time
to consult his pastor who would later inform said counsel, but neither that pastor
nor appellant has done so up to the present.
It would then be worthwhile to restate for future referential purposes the rules in
criminal cases on the withdrawal of an appeal pending in the appellate courts.
The basic rule is that, in appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the same may be withdrawn and allowed
to be retracted by the trial court before the records of the case are forwarded to
the appellate court.9 Once the records are brought to the appellate court, only
the latter may act on the motion for withdrawal of appeal.10 In the Supreme
Court, the discontinuance of appeals before the filing of the appellees brief is
generally permitted.11 Where the death penalty is imposed, the review shall
proceed notwithstanding withdrawal of the appeal as the review is automatic and
this the Court can do without the benefit of briefs or arguments filed by the
appellant.12
In the case at bar, however, the denial of the motion to withdraw his appeal by
herein appellant is not only justified but is necessary since the trial court had
imposed a penalty based on an erroneous interpretation of the governing law
thereon. Thus, in People vs. Roque,13 the Court denied the motion of the
accused to withdraw his appeal, to enable it to correct the wrongful imposition by
the trial court of the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for the
crime of simple rape, in clear derogation of the provisions of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Similarly, in another
case,14 the motion to withdraw his appeal by the accused, whose guilt for the
crime of murder was undeniable and for which he should suffer the medium
period of the imposable penalty which is reclusion perpetua, was not allowed;
otherwise, to permit him to recall the appeal would enable him to suffer a lesser
indeterminate sentence erroneously decreed by the trial court which imposed the
minimum of the penalty for murder, that is, reclusion temporal in its maximum
period.
In the cases at bar, the same legal obstacle constrained the Court to deny
appellants motion to withdraw his appeal. The trial court had, by considering
reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, imposed an unauthorized penalty on
both accused which would remain uncorrected if the appeal had been allowed to
be withdrawn. In fact, it would stamp a nihil obstantium on a penalty that in law
does not exist and which error, initially committed by this Court in another case
on which the trial court relied, had already been set aright by this Court.
3. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the respective penalties imposable
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, in relation to Section 20
thereof, would range from reclusion perpetua to death and a fine of P500,000.00
to P10,000,000.00 if the quantity of the illegal drug involved, which is heroin in
this case, should be 40 grams or more. In the same amendatory law, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is now accorded a defined duration ranging from twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, through the amendment
introduced by it to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code.
This led the trial court to conclude that said penalty is now divisible in nature,
and that (c)onsequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death should at
present be deemed to fall within the purview of the penalty prescribed which
does not have one of the forms specially provided for in the Revised Penal Code,
and the periods of which shall be distributed by an analogous application of the
rules in Article 77 of the Code. Pursuant to its hypothesis, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall have the following periods: death, as the maximum;
thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, as the medium; and twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to thirty (30) years, as the
minimum.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We cannot altogether blame the lower court for this impass'e since this Court
itself inceptively made an identical misinterpretation concerning the question on
the indivisibility of reclusion perpetua as a penalty. In People vs. Lucas,16 the
Court was originally of the view that by reason of the amendment of Article 27 of
the Code by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7569, there was conferred upon said
penalty a defined duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years; but that since there
was no express intent to convert said penalty into a divisible one, there having
been no corresponding amendment to Article 76, the provisions of Article 65
could be applied by analogy. The Court then declared that reclusion perpetua
could be divided into three equal portions, each portion composing a period. In
effect, reclusion perpetua was then to be considered as a divisible penalty.
In a subsequent re-examination of and a resolution in said case on January 9,
1995, occasioned by a motion for clarification thereof,17 the Court en banc
realized the misconception, reversed its earlier pronouncement, and has since
reiterated its amended ruling in three succeeding appellate litigations.18 The
Court, this time, held that in spite of the amendment putting the duration of
reclusion perpetua at 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, it should remain as an
indivisible penalty since there was never any intent on the part of Congress to
reclassify it into a divisible penalty. This is evident from the undisputed fact that
neither Article 63 nor Article 76 of the Code had been correspondingly altered, to
wit:
Verily, if reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. To
illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A. No. 6425
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous
drugs involved are of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the
Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a
divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when
either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there
would be no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug
cases, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63
assumes serious proportions since it does not involve only drug cases, as
aforesaid. Under the amendatory sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason by a Filipino (Section 2),
qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder (Section 6), kidnapping
and serious illegal detention (Section 8), robbery with homicide (Section 9),
destructive arson (Section 10), rape committed under certain circumstances
(Section 11), and plunder (Section 12).
In the same resolution, the Court adverted to its holding in People vs. Reyes, 19
that while the original Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code provided for the
minimum and the maximum ranges of all the penalties therein, from arresto
menor to reclusion temporal but with the exceptions of bond to keep the peace,
there was no parallel specification of either the minimum or the maximum range
of reclusion perpetua. Said article had only provided that a person sentenced to
suffer any of the perpetual penalties shall, as a general rule, be extended pardon
after service thereof for 30 years. Likewise, in laying down the procedure on
successive service of sentence and the application of the three-fold rule, the
duration of perpetual penalties is computed at 30 years under Article 70 of the
Code.
Furthermore, since in the scales of penalties provided in the Code, specifically
those in Articles 25, 70 and 71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately
higher than reclusion temporal, then its minimum range should by necessary
implication start at 20 years and 1 day while the maximum thereunder could be
co-extensive with the rest of the natural life of the offender. However, Article 70
provides that the maximum period in regard to service of the sentence shall not
exceed 40 years.
Thus, the maximum duration of reclusion perpetua is not and has never been 30
years which is merely the number of years which the convict must serve in order
to be eligible for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule. Under these
accepted propositions, the Court ruled in the motion for clarification in the Lucas
case that Republic Act No. 7659 had simply restated existing jurisprudence when
it specified the duration of reclusion perpetua at 20 years and 1 day to 40 years.
The error of the trial court was in imposing the penalties in these cases based on
the original doctrine in Lucas which was not yet final and executory, hence open
to reconsideration and reversal. The same having been timeously rectified,
appellant should necessarily suffer the entire extent of 40 years of reclusion
perpetua, in line with that reconsidered dictum subsequently handed down by
this Court. In passing, it may be worth asking whether or not appellant
subsequently learned of the amendatory resolution of the Court under which he
stood to serve up to 40 years, and that was what prompted him to move
posthaste for the withdrawal of his appeal from a sentence of 35 years.
4. The case of U Aung Win ostensibly presents a more ticklish legal poser, but
that is not actually so. It will be recalled that this accused was found guilty and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua supposedly in its minimum
period, consisting of imprisonment for 25 years, and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00. He did not appeal, and it may be contended that what has been
said about the corrected duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua which we
hold should be imposed on appellant Gatward, since reclusion perpetua is after all
an indivisible penalty, should not apply to this accused.
Along that theory, it may be asserted that the judgment against accused U Aung
Win has already become final. It may also be argued that since Section 11(a) of
Rule 122 provides that an appeal taken by one accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter, our present disposition of the correct duration of the
penalty imposable on appellant Gatward should not affect accused U Aung Win
since it would not be favorable to the latter. To use a trite and tired legal phrase,
those objections are more apparent than real.
At bottom, all those postulations assume that the penalties decreed in the
judgment of the trial court are valid, specifically in the sense that the same
actually exist in law and are authorized to be meted out as punishments. In the
case of U Aung Win, and the same holds true with respect to Gatward, the
penalty inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity because it was never authorized
by law as a valid punishment. The penalties which consisted of aliquot one-third
portions of an indivisible penalty are self-contradictory in terms and unknown in
penal law. Without intending to sound sardonic or facetious, it was akin to
imposing the indivisible penalties of public censure, or perpetual absolute or
special disqualification, or death in their minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting a
penalty higher or lower than the one imposable under the law but with both
penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid punishments. An
erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment.20 But a judgment
which ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or
which is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful penalties is
necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of the penalty and
does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof. Corollarily, such a
judgment can never become final and executory.
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case was
reopened in order that a higher penalty may be imposed on him. There is here no
reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is being affirmed but with a
correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it conformable to law,
pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The penalty has not been
changed since what was decreed by the trial court and is now being likewise
affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion perpetua which,
unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court in an elemental form which is
non-existent in and not authorized by law. Just as the penalty has not been
reduced in order to be favorable to the accused, neither has it been increased so
as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the
imposition upon him of the corrected duration, inherent in the essence and
concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with an
illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial legislation and
unequal protection of the law. He would thus be the victim of an inadvertence
which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment and the penalty
meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have served. Far from
violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the remedial and corrective
measures interposed by this opinion protect him against the risk of another trial
and review aimed at determining the correct period of imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo, specifically with regard to the
penalty imposed on accused-appellant Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case
No. 94-6268 and that of accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, is
hereby MODIFIED in the sense that both accused are sentenced to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and full extent. In all other
respects, said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, but with costs to be assessed
against both accused in all instances of these cases.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Johnson (G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000)
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyes
guilty of violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of;2500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The information against accused-appellant alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each bag
weighing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding license or
prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon being arraigned, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, 3 whereupon trial
was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George
de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina
Bernal. The defense presented accused appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years
old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former
Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had
since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and
those with Alzheimer’s disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. 4
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s family in
Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On
July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the
way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30
p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998. 5
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at
Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband goods, and explosives. 6
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound
for the United Sates via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on
the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to
wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an
ectopic pregnancy. 7
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior,
SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po
iyon." ("Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.") She was directed to take
accused-appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection. Ramirez took
accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal.
Embile stayed outside. 8
Inside the women’s room, Accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what
the hard object on her stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same
answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing
under her girdle." Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which
Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women’s room. 9
 RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment. in
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of
case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." 10

The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2

grams (Exhibits "G", "C-2" and "C-3") are hereby confiscated in favor of the
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation
government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to cause the
and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-
transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in
appellant’s passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were
accordance with law.
taken and her personal belongings were itemized. 11

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail
In her defense, Accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last
of Pasay City during the pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing
boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She
to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the women’s room. There, she was
asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that
nothing was fount on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes,
SO ORDERED.
garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some
change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two
hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo. 12
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) "despite failure
of the prosecution in proving the negative allegation in the information;" (2)
"despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards carne in
hydrochloride;" (3) "despite violation of her constitutional rights;" and (4) "when
and threw two white packages on the table. They told her to admit that the
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt." 16
packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the packages.
She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she
was taken before a fiscal for inquest. 13 She claimed that throughout the period
of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross
to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the "shabu" confiscated
relatives in the Philippines. 14 from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature
on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the
assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional
rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu,"
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
should have been excluded from the evidence. 17
which reads: 15

The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y
appellant during her detention and used in evidence against her. There is,
REYES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16
therefore, no basis for accused-appellant’s invocation of Art. III, §12(1) and (3).
of Republic Act 6425 as amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of
On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto
pursuant to a valid search made on her person.
The trial court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace. officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed. and person to be arrested
has committed it; and (Emphasis supplied)
x x x protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as
"the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.
This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that
the investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has
been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. 18
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at
the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 19 Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. 20
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the
accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise
without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and
C-3 herein) had been obtained while she was in the custody of the airport
authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly
points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was
required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile
SECTION 20 Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds
and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were presented
or Instrument Of The Crime — The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8
by the prosecution in proving its case.
and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act, shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellant’s
passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken
during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
signature thereon. Rule 126, §2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

(a) Subject of the offense; 4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and 5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. 6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned 7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, or
to her.

8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond

Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain therapeutic requirements as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings conducted for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. purpose.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by RA. No. 7659, states:chanrob1es Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
virtual 1aw library penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
Under this provision, Accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of WITNESS
reclusion perpetua to death for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.

In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a or the same as the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample
qualitative examination of the substance contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3.
She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist was a
qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to x x x
establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate and
unproved.

This contention is likewise without merit. PROS. VELASCO

The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have
indicated the presence of impurities if there were any. He testified examined, in chemical examination, what color it will register, if any?

PROS. VELASCO WITNESS

By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the
be discovered by just mixing it? reagent, therefore it will not dissolve. In my examination, all the specimens
reacted on the re-agents, sir.

WITNESS
PROS. VELASCO

If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer

chromatographic examination. And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in layman’s term.?

PROS. VELASCO WITNESS

Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness? It is only a tawas.
x x x That is qualitative examination.

WITNESS

COURT

And also positive for aluminum sulfate. 21

In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the
specimen.?
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a
quantitative analysis requires the determination of the percentage combination of
the components of a mixture. Hence, a qualitative identification of a powder may
WITNESS
reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative
analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine.
22
None, your Honor.

De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents

x x x of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. Chromatography is a means of separating and
ATTY. AGOOT
I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
is mixed with 200 grams of tawas, you will submit that to qualitative
examination, what will be your findings, negative or positive, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. It is particularly useful for
analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime
lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically
any material that is at the disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of
the product that is made available to prospective customers. Hence, the task of
identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the aid of
chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its components. 23
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but
also that the scientifically correct method of obtaining an accurate representative
sample had been obtained. 24 At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed
out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results, it would have been a
simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by
another chemist. This she did not do.

ATTY. AGOOT
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative
allegation in the information that she did not have a license to possess or use
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."cralaw virtua1aw library
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," a regulated drug, is not unlawful unless the possessor
or user does not have the required license or prescription. She points out that
since the prosecution failed to present any certification that she is not authorized
to possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof
needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan
Toco. 25 The accused in that case was charged with smoking opium without
being duly registered. He demurred to the information on the ground that it failed
to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly
licensed and practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize
generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. But the legislator desired to
withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of smokers who
smoked under the advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing
physician . . . Hence where one is charged with a violation of the general
provisions of the Opium Law, it is more logical as well as more practical and
convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he
should set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be
called upon to prove that every smoker, charged with a violation of the law, does
so without such advice or prescription. Indeed, when it is considered tit under the
law any person may, in case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a
physician to use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of things
no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to be kept, it is
manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the
prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium
does so without the advice of a physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
in a particular case, that one using opium does so without the advice or
prescription of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility
without the aid of the defendant himself, while a defendant charged with the
illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that he used
it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so. 26
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he
does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for
him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it
is an easy thing for him to do, he has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in
R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the
prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has no license or
permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime
per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a
license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, Accused appellant contends that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding that she is guilty of the crime
charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected. with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to
P50,000.00. Costs against Appellant.

Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,

who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet
against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of
the police enforcers in arresting Accused-Appellant. This Court accords great
respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the SO ORDERED.
witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings. 27
People vs. Suzuki (G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003)

It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other
witness was presented in her behalf. Her denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 28 As has been held, denial as a rule is
a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. 29
For automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45,
Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi Suzuki, appellant,
of illegal possession of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 8, Article
II of R.A. No. 6525, as amended, 2 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00.
The Information 3 against appellant reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 12th day of April, 1994, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines,
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being
may be validly charged with and convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous
lawfully authorized to possess, prepare, administer or otherwise use any
drug in violation of RA. No. 6425, as amended, have been complied with by the
prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be
possession and under his custody and control 1.9 kilos or 1,900 grams, more or
upheld.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
less, of marijuana which is a prohibited drug, in violation of the aforementioned
laws.

As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it is been held that courts may fix
any amount within the limits established by law. 30 Considering that five hundred
"Acts contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
eighty point two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated from accused-
appellant, the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced to
P50,000.00.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
followed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110,
finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED The prosecution presented P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic
chemist of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo
Casugod, Sr. of the Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM), PO3 Rhodelio
Poyugao, also of the PASCOM, and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM), all of Bacolod City. Their testimonies, woven together, established
the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sometime in November, 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to
all Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals
within their respective areas of responsibility, following reports that drug
trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to coordinate with local airport
authorities and the PASCOM.
In the morning of April 12, 1994, while the prosecution witnesses were in their
respective stations, appellant and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals,
entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Appellant was
bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a
small traveling bag and a box marked "Bongbong’s piaya." 4 At the pre-departure
area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM,
appellant proceeded to the "walk-through metal detector," a machine which
produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic
substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm
sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in
the box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Poyugao to frisk him bodily. Finding
no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and
passed it through the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao
then ordered appellant to go to the hand-carried luggage inspection counter
where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were present. SPO1 Casugod
requested appellant to open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant and
started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented, saying
in faltering English, "open, open." SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found
therein eighteen (18) small packs, seventeen (17) of which were wrapped in
aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops
which looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this, appellant ran outside the pre-
departure area but he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Linda and Donato
Barnezo of the PASCOM.
They apprehended appellant near the entrance of the terminal and brought him
to the PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes
Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with appellant in drug
trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he
arrived, the police apprised appellant of his constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the
same. The total weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9
kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a "confiscation receipt" which
appellant, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to acknowledge. SPO1
Casugod turned over appellant to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and his companions were brought to the prosecutor’s
office for inquest and placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara
at the NARCOM office. The box with its contents was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Inspector Villavicencio conducted three tests on the specimen
samples which proved positive for marijuana.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness whose testimony is as
follows: On April 9, 1994, he and Takeshi Koketsu arrived in Manila from Osaka,
Japan. The purpose of his trip was to collect from Takeshi Y2.5 million or
P500,000.00 which the latter owed him. Waiting for them at the airport was
Takeshi’s wife, Lourdes. On the same day, the three flew to Bacolod City.
Appellant stayed at the house of Takeshi.
Two days later, appellant asked Takeshi to pay. When Takeshi admitted he had
no money, appellant got angry and went to the Casino Filipino where he stayed
until 10:30 in the evening. Upon leaving the casino, he met Pinky who enticed
him to have sex with her. They then proceeded to the Moonlight Motel. Moments
later, Pinky left, while appellant stayed there for the night. He told her he was
leaving the following morning.
The following day or on April 12, 1994, appellant went to the airport. Pinky, who
was there waiting, gave him a box of "Bongbong’s piaya" as "pasalubong" from
Bacolod City. He did not ascertain the contents of the box since he trusted Pinky
although he just met her the previous night.
 Five days later, appellant, escorted by the police, went to Takeshi’s house to
retrieve his money (Y120,000 equivalent to P30,000.00), but Takeshi told him
Appellant found and joined Takeshi and Lourdes at the coffee shop. Takeshi
that it was already spent for the food and drinks of the NARCOM agents and the
apologized for his failure to pay his debt, assuring him that he would settle his
airport policemen.
obligation next month.

On December 7, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision the dispositive portion
When it was time to leave, appellant, accompanied by Takeshi, proceeded to the
of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
pre-departure area. When he passed through the metal detector, a policeman
frisked him, got the box and placed it inside the metal detector. The machine
produced a red light, hence, the policeman brought the box to the inspection
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused HEDISHI SUZUKI guilty beyond reasonable
table, with appellant following him. Thereafter, the policeman, whom he later
doubt of the offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum
knew as SPO1 Arturo Casugod, pointed to the box uttering something appellant
penalty of death, to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), and to pay
did not understand. Appellant said, "wait a minute," (in Japanese) and went
the costs.
outside to ask Takeshi and Lourdes to interpret for him, but they did not respond.
When PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao called him back to the pre-departure area he found
Takeshi near the table and the box containing something wrapped in aluminum
foil already opened. Takeshi told him that he was carrying marijuana. He replied "Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
it was given to him by a woman that morning. Then he and SPO1 Casugod went Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7659, let the 1,547.07 grams of dried marijuana
to the PASCOM office where the latter weighed the contents of the box. He did fruiting tops, subject matter of this case, be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
not sign the "Confiscation Receipt" presented to him. They then proceeded to the the government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian,
NARCOM office with C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, SPO1 Linda, PO3 Poyugao, NBI, to be disposed according to law.
and three other officers. From the NARCOM office, appellant was brought to the
Bacolod Police Station.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Shortly thereafter, they went to the Nagoya Restaurant owned by Takeshi where
appellant saw C/Inspector Alcantara and Lourdes talking. When he inquired from Hence the instant mandatory review.
Takeshi what was going on, he was told they needed money in dealing with the
police. Appellant was then brought to the prosecutor’s office. There Takeshi told
him to keep silent as he would make a deal with the prosecutor. Then they went In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:chanrob1es
to Takeshi’s house where appellant stayed for two days. virtual 1aw library

On April 14, 1994, C/Inspector Alcantara and SPO1 Linda brought appellant to "I
the Bacolod City Jail. Takeshi visited him twice, advising him to ask someone
from Japan to send him money and be discreet, otherwise he would be killed;
and to admit he has in his possession less than 750 grams of marijuana so he
could post bail. However, he refused.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT
AGENTS HAD THE LEGAL AUTHORITY WHEN THEY OPENED AND SEARCHED THE
SMALL CARTON IN QUESTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE OPENING AND SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AND
IN DECLARING LEGAL AND VALID THE SEIZURE OF SAID CARTON AND THE
SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
MARIJUANA CONTENTS OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE
CARTON IN QUESTION WAS INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE
SUBJECT CARTON WAS MADE UNDER THE EXCEPTION OF SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE
IN PLAIN VIEW.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE
APPELLANT WAS VALID AS HE WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
UNQUALIFIED, VOLUNTARY AND AUTHORITATIVE CONSENT GIVEN BY THE
APPELLANT TO THE OPENING OF THE CARTON.
VIII
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
CAUGHT IN POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE NEGATIVE
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
IX
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE CARTON IN QUESTION (CONTAINING
MARIJUANA), THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT
INTENDED TO POSSESS SAID PACKS OF MARIJUANA.
X
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT’S PETITION TO
BE RELEASED ON BAIL CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF ANY IRREGULARITY
ATTENDING HIS ARREST AND ESTOPS HIM FROM QUESTIONING ITS VALIDITY.
XI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT,
CONSIDERATION AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AND IN
DECLARING THE SAME SELF-SERVING AND NOT AMPLY PROVEN.
XII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION WHICH CREATE
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT.
XIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION CONVICTING
APPELLANT.
XIV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE
MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH AND IMPOSING A FINE OF TEN MILLION PESOS.
XV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering that the above assigned errors are interrelated, they will be
discussed jointly.
Appellant invokes his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure, contending that: (1) the authority to open and investigate suspicious
packages and cargoes under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 5 does not apply
to PASCOM and NARCOM agents but is limited only to aircraft companies or
operators of aircraft for hire; (2) he did not consent to be searched by the
authorities; (3) the prohibited substances confiscated by the authorities were not
actually in their plain view; and (4) the search they conducted was not incidental
to a lawful arrest.
Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of 2. Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;
aircraft which are for hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious
packages and cargoes in the presence of the owner or shipper, or his authorized
representatives if present, in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of 3. Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in
the provisions of this Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his airport security operations;
representative refuses to have the same opened and inspected, the airline or air
carrier is authorized to refuse the loading thereof." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
4. Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and
provide other pertinent public safety services within the airports;

In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court correctly upheld the PASCOM’s
authority to open packages and cargoes, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x

"This Court does not subscribe to the contention of the accused. The Police
Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National
Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 399, dated April 28, 1976.
‘One of its guidelines before the passenger can enter the sanitized area (pre-
departure area) is to check the hand-carried luggage and personal effects of
passengers (PAFM 3-9, page 2–3).

"On February 18, 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of

National Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and ‘Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag or attaché case with the following
Communication, the Secretary of Justice, the Director General, National limitation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of Finance was signed. The
purpose was to establish a working arrangement among cognizant agencies, set
up guidelines and procedures for the security of the airport complex throughout a. . . .
the Philippines particularly handling, coordination and disposition of hijacking and
other criminal incidents that may occur thereat (PAFM 3-9, page 1-3).
b. . . .

‘Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM (now

PASCOM) shall have the following functions and responsibilities:chanrob1es
c. It can be readily opened for inspection (PAFM 3-9, page 2–4).
virtual 1aw library

‘Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399,

1. Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil
in relation to R.A. 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod
aviation;
Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or hand-carried bags.
 This is not the first time we recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine
airport security procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless
‘Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts
searches. In People v. Canton, 6 and People v. Johnson, 7 we validated the
of Unlawful Interference, particularly paragraph 3.6.4 ‘when x-ray inspection is
search conducted on the departing passengers and the consequent seizure of the
not possible or when the x-ray image of a bag gives rise to suspicion, . . ., a
shabu found in their persons, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
manual search must be carried out’ (Memorandum of the Prosecution, pp. 15–16;
Emphasis supplied).’

"Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
"The prosecution correctly argued that the PASCOM established a system of
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
checkpoint at the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport to quickly inspect or
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
screen persons or hand-carried baggages for illegal items pursuant to said
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
Memorandum of Agreement, which in turn derived its life from LOI 399. In short,
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
the setting up of checkpoint at the Bacolod Airport on April 12, 1994 does not
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
have only jurisprudential basis (Valmonte v. De Villa, Et Al., G.R. No. 83288,
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 211, more popularly known as the ‘checkpoints
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
cases’) but also statutory basis.
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
"Moreover, to sustain the stand of the accused exclusively limiting the authority Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs
to open and search ‘suspicious’ luggages would result to absurdity. It would and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
deprive law enforcers of their authority to perform their duty of maintaining prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
order, preserving peace, protecting life and property and other police works such These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
as crime detection, while within the airport premises. The construction given by protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
the accused conveniently omitted the phrase found in Section 8 of Republic Act airport procedures." (Emphasis ours)
No. 6235 which reads ‘in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act.’ The word ‘authorities’ evidently refers to police officers and
other law enforcers such as the PASCOM officers. It follows that in allowing or
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of
authorizing aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of
prohibited materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying
aircraft which are for hire, to open and investigate suspicious packages and
suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area, as claimed by appellant,
seizures, the authors of the law does not disallow or prohibit law enforcement
is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning
agencies of the government from assisting or conducting the opening and
impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society. 8
investigation of suspicious packages and cargoes. Otherwise, they will be remiss
in their sworn duty of protecting the public in general and more particularly those
in the aviation industry. . . .. It becomes crystal-clear that the PASCOM officers
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable
and personnel had the legal authority when they opened and investigated the box
search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
in the presence of the accused and his counsel."cralaw virtua1aw library
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or
seizure. 9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the Q When you say open the luggage you are referring to the box?
PASCOM agents. The testimony of SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. is quite revealing,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A Referring to the small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.

"Q And when the said carton box was passed for the second time thru the walk-
through machine it indicated this metallic element by flashing a red light, is that Q What happened then?
correct?

A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki tried to get outside of the pre-departure area instead of
A Yes, sir. opening the box.

Q And because of that, what did you do? Q Where did Mr. Suzuki go if he went away?

A Rhodelin Poyugao put the box on top of the inspection table. A Before he could get out of the door of the pre-departure area I called his
attention to come back.

Q What happened then?

Q Did he come back?

A And then our non-uniformed personnel, Mr. Donato Barnezo, asked the
passenger Mr. Hedishi Suzuki, saying, ‘kindly open your box for inspection’.
Q What happened after he asked the accused to open the box?
A He came back and I explained to him again, sir, that we are very sorry but we
need to open your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya. I told him, ‘I am very
sorry, sir, but we need to open your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya’.

Q And what did Mr. Suzuki do?

A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki refused to open, sir. He signaled ‘no, no’.

A Mr. Suzuki answered me, ‘open’.

Q What happened then?cralaw : red

Q What did you do?

A At that juncture, sir. I advised the said passenger, Mr. Hedishi Suzuki: ‘I am
very sorry, sir, we need to open your luggage because it indicated a red light’.
A I said ‘kindly open your carton’ and he repeated, ‘open’.

Q For the second time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do then because he said ‘open’?
A I explained to him, sir, and I asked him again, ‘sir, I am going to open this’ and
he told me ‘you open’.
Q Then, what did you do?
A I got hold of the carton and opened it by means of cutting the masking tape
that bound both ends of the carton.
Q And what did you find inside the said box?
A When I opened the box, sir, I found out that it contained suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops wrapped in an aluminum foil, sir, and transparent
cellophane.
x x x" 10
That appellant gave his consent when PO1 Casugod asked him to open the box
was confirmed by SPO1 Linda and PO3 Poyugao. 11 As succinctly found by the
trial court, appellant cannot deny that he consented by feigning ignorance of the
English language, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Accused through counsel would want this Court to believe that the opening of
the carton containing marijuana fruiting tops was without the consent of the
accused. The defense relied on the alleged inability of the accused to understand
nor speak the English language because he is a Japanese national. It made
capital on the presence of Japanese interpreters, Tsuyushi Tsuchida and Hideo
Agarie, who assisted during the trial.
"The Court has no doubt in the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and their categorical declaration that accused Hedishi Suzuki gave his consent
not only nodding his head but also by saying ‘Open. Open. Open.’ There was
even a ‘third-party consent’ given by his Japanese companion Takeshi Koketsu.
"The allegation of the accused that he does not understand English is indeed
incredible to believe. As aptly observed by Assistant City Prosecutor Rafael
Guanco, the trial prosecutor, ‘the accused might not be able to speak straight
English yet he might understand English’ (Memorandum of the Prosecution, page
21). The prosecution witnesses categorically declared that accused Hedishi Suzuki
was speaking English during the airport encounter with the PASCOM and
NARCOM operatives and while being investigated at the PASCOM Office. While it
may be true that Lourdes Linsangan participated on some occasions, her
participation merely facilitated the conversation.
"The Court cannot believe accused’s protestation of ignorance of the English
language. There are several indications that accused understand the English
language. It may be noted that in filing a motion to terminate the legal services
of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa, it appeared that accused caused its preparation or filing
without the assistance of a lawyer (Motion To Terminate Services of Counsel,
page 53, expedient. The accused testified that his wife is proficient in English.
Accused was able to play games in the casino, the night before the airport
incident. He was able to give direction to the driver from the motel to the airport.
He has traveled to the Philippines about ten (10) times. He claims to be an owner
and manager of a company where some clients or customers are non-Japanese
such as Germans and Americans. During the trial accused appeared to be an
intelligent witness and this Court has keenly observed that accused had shown
eagerness and readiness to answer the questions propounded in the English
language even before the Japanese translation. Above all, Accused answered in
the affirmative when queried by the Court whether he was able to attend English
classes while in college. In short, the Court was literally taken for a ride when
initially made to believe that the accused could not read, speak and understand
the English language."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 12 Given the
circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the airport
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 13 The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such
valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant. 14
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on the plain view doctrine
misplaced. Such doctrine finds application only when the incriminating nature of
the object is in the "plain view of the police officer. 15 Here, it is beyond cavil
that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box of piaya,
wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport
authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet
arrested at the time of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be a lawful arrest before the
search can be made. 16
At this point, it bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance
is a crime per se and the burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a
license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug. 17 Here,
appellant failed to prove that he has a license to possess the marijuana. In
People v. Bongcarawan, 18 we held that such possession constitutes prima facie
evidence of animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of
any satisfactory explanation.
Appellant vigorously contends that the trial court should have sustained his
unrebutted testimony that he was a victim of frame-up contrived by Takeshi in
connivance with the arresting officers, especially C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara,
Accused in several criminal charges.
It is noteworthy that aside from appellant’s testimony, not a shred of evidence
was presented by the defense to prove his claim that he was framed-up. Not
even Pinky who allegedly gave him the box of piaya containing marijuana was
presented as a witness to confirm his story. We have ruled that clear and
convincing evidence is required to prove the defense of "frame-up" because in
the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty stands. 19 Also, allegations of frame-up are easily
fabricated, making it the common and standard line of defense in prosecutions
involving the Dangerous Drugs Law. 20
We are not swayed by appellant’s reference to C/Inspector Alcantara’s criminal
records. Suffice it to state that he is neither an accused in this case or a
prosecution witness.
We have carefully reviewed the records and found no cogent reason to overthrow
the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court. That this is a matter
exclusively within its competence, since it had the unique opportunity of
observing the witnesses and their manner of testifying during trial, had long been
established. Hence, its findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, except when there is a clear showing that facts of weight and substance
which would affect the outcome of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied. 21 This exception is not present here.
However, the trial court imposed the wrong penalty.
Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana or Indian hemp
shall be 750 grams or more. 22 Section 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
lesser penalty shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance. 23
In the case at bar, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
appellant’s possession of 1,547.70 grams 24 of marijuana does not merit the
supreme penalty of death but only reclusion perpetua.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
While the imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of
illegal drugs, 25 we, however, reduce the fine imposed by the trial court to
P1,000,000.00, considering that courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. 26
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 94-16100 finding appellant Hedishi Suzuki guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that he is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and fined One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
“Stop and frisk”
Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1 (1968)]
Syllabus
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been
patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man,
Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth
along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they
did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a
third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a
stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple
of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified
himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something,"
whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing,
and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer
ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a
revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He
patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have
been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the
guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were
charged with carrying
Page 392 U. S. 2
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the
trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a
search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to
believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, had the
right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that
they might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop"
and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-
blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an
intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was
involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people,
not places," and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as
at home or elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but
the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and
seizure. P. 392 U. S. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's
approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the
exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective
sanction. Pp. 392 U.S. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those
followed here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt
to find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a
given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may
make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be
armed and dangerous
Page 392 U. S. 3
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or
the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Pp. 392 U. S. 20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a
search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based
upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. P. 392 U. S.
20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in
light of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of
reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was
appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S. 21-22.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating
suspicious conduct when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions.
P. 392 U. S. 22.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior
he is investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of
physical harm, take necessary measures to determine whether that person is
carrying a weapon. P. 392 U. S. 24.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25-26.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable
apprehension of danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest.
Pp. 392 U. S. 26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the
limited search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as
conducted. Pp. 392 U. S. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P.
392 U. S. 28.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to
determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for
the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to
ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29-30.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence
against him, since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 30-31.
Affirmed.
People vs. Solayao [262 SCRA 255 (1996)]
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition 1 defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr.
and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They
were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence
officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran. 2
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Niño proceeded to
Barangay Onion where they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao
numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed that the
latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage
uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the
government agents, fled. 3
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself
as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was
carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know
as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry
said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence
group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same.
Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm. 4
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun
but averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions,
Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed
that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut
leaves since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed
that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been used up. 5
Accused-appellant's claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed
received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun
wrapped in coconut leaves. 6
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal
possession of firearm under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but
one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to
suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
by law. 7 It found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Niño
confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess
the same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's submission that he was in
possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching Barangay
Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio
Sevillano, Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not
know his companions. 8
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following
errors:
I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
in the imposition of the maximum penalty against the accused-appellant. 9
This court, in the case of People v. Lualhati10 ruled that in crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess the same.
In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in
admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful
warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his person violated
his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the search made without a
warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides,
inter alia:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous
tree." 11 As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-
appellant acquitted.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et
al. 12 where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the
law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the
search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a
search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by
the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to
law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's
arguments are hardy tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations
aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself
was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit 13 and that upon espying the
peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers
were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons
were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. 14
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court
of Appeals 15 where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspended that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case
brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a
"stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even
before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the
former identified himself as a government agents. 16 The peace officers did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal
possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed
men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could
not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-
appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and
seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable
cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions filed upon
seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it
admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the
second element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject
firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed
out that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the
necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm. 17
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such
burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm,
and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 18
In People v. Tiozon, 19 this Court said:
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758
could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged
with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to
possess the firearm, but we are of the considered opinion that under the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in
criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if
"it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged," the burden of proof was
with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in
committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient
of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against
appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681)
specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber
pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty
not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by
similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged
with "having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of
the qualifications required to be a voter. It was there held that the negative fact
of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the crime
charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs.
Quebral. 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of
medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases
suffered by certain patients from whom he received monetary compensation,
without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the
Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative
Code, this Court held that if the subject of the negative averment like, for
instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law is an
essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative
allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima
facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both
appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie
case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm.
Former Chief Justice Moral upholds this view as follows:
The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof
of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the
burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be
assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have
alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an
act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How
could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge
of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such
license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless,
encumber upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation.
Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly
within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on
the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him." (6 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8).
Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present
governing case law on this question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in
People v. Macagaling: 20
We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of
the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the
accused in an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative
element provided by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite
recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the
elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of
evidence all the elements it has thus alleged.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial
evidence that accused-appellant admitted before Police Officer Niño at the time
that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the
subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. 21 In other words, the
prosecution relied on accused-appellant's admission to prove the second element.
Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element
of illegal possession of firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the
corresponding license? Corollary to the above question is whether an admission
by the accused-appellant can take the place of any evidentiary means
establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the
pleading and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an
"admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which
guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of
itself to establish his guilt." 22 In other words, it is a "statement by defendant of
fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or
circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize
conviction." 23 From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission
in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission
of the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall
under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case does not require proof.
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case
for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a
license.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by
the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to
present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not
conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In
other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish
the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing
evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned." 24
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's
case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving
the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is
upon the party averring the negative." 25
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine
National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind
or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned
error.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds
for his continued detention, with cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997)
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city
streets where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search
warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-
frisk" — which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they
possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat
cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search
and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA
G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was
charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of
Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a
prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge.3 With the agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released
after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered
on May 19, 1989 a decision5 convicting appellant of illegal possession of
marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN
MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,
Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana
residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the
defense, filed a Notice of Appeal8 dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993,
Respondent Court9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal and
affirming the trial court:10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against appellant.
Respondent Court11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated
January 20, 1994, disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby
DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:12
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance
along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The
policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named
Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the
Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who
appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and
to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his
hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person
if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the
wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took
the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue
inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated
wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu,
Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he
wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of paper was
marked as Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of
folded paper. (Exhibit "E-4").
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana
residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the
referral slip (Exhibit "D") to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including
the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat.
Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and
the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as
shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical
examinations of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit
"E")13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana
leaves" in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F").14 These crushed
marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In
this examination, she also found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave
positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
examinations (Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white
letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on
this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl.
Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City.
(Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was
walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as
follows:16
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN
MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City
Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver
of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were
under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the
tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point,
the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen
replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found
on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle
driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at
Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled
the latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan
City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to remove
his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen
turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for
marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This
prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to
release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the
accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought
outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the
policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The policemen who led
the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his
parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his
parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought
in the office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no
marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say
anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he
and the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April
11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on his person
or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at
the Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police
searched the accused who was made to take off his pants at the police
headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
 I

Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented

several pictures showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
Caloocan Cemetery.17

II
The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue
ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
largely on the strength of the arresting officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and
Lumabas were "neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what
transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted
that the appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was later III
identified as crushed marijuana residue.

The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not
"trumped up," because the appellant neither took any legal action against the minor.
allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of
Kalookan City.
IV

On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court
was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was
discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled framed for the purpose of extorting money.
that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of
the narration. It further found petitioner's contention — that he could not be
convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue — to be without merit, V
because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana
leaves.
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence
presented is consistent with both innocence and guilt.
Issues

VI
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are
inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the
evidence against him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the
rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3)
the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession,
contending that they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in
his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for
respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived
because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he
object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo
that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a
stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was
defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search
is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest
of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a
person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to
make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer
McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his
companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner
for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in
the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It
would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have
failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US
Supreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more
immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.20 Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the
exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna
enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and
seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure."22 In
People vs. Encinada,23 the Court further explained that "[i]n these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential
requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a
search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court
held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-
and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao
stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They
found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live
ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In
upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police
officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might
prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a
situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular
hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of
drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to
stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession:25
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery,
Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were
roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan
City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas Q How did you introduce yourselves?
and one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?

A In a polite manner, sir.

A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery
then when we called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to
approach him and introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner. Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?

xxx xxx xxx A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was
upon him? holding in his hands?

A That person seems like he is high on drug. A He tried to resist, sir.

Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
was high on drug?

A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands.
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.

Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?

Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?

A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.

A He was roaming around, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?

Q What was he holding?

A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite
manner, sir.
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic)
crushed residue.
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them
substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner
vs. Avila, it was held that — "As long as the witnesses concur on the material
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he
points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on
failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a
the essential veracity of their statements.
right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search,
requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be
waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive,
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the
thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.26
performance of duty, the bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is
Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory
of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to
testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit29 signed by both
exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is
arresting policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside
deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the
petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner
trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of
did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in
criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally
evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This
limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be
shows that such contradiction is minor and does not destroy Espiritu's
pleaded for the first time on appeal.27
credibility.30

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in
"polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained" contradictions which did not support
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b)
petitioner's conviction.
such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.31

We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic
Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it
Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of
had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified
authority to possess these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was
before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the
misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the
policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was
result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule.28
holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding
marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.

We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:

Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of
sufficient grounds to believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or present any
evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was
lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the
be on bail as early as April 26, 1988.32 Since then, he could have made the following penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:
charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His
defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is
easy to concoct and fabricate.33
Sec. 8. . . . .

The Proper Penalty

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years
and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law hemp.
(Act No. 4103, as amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six
years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand
pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years.34
Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6)
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) SO ORDERED.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [283 SCRA 159 (1997)]

Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy
Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, 2 as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess
and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license
and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A,"
"A-1," and "A-2," 4 while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities
were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they
arrested petitioner.5
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as
its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the
investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on
27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast."6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one
group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase,
Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu
found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then
brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a
report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the
vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25
August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt
to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch
any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely
standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August
1990. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly
acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue
any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.9
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990,
petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for
investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects,
informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent
and independent counsel. Despite Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan
manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a
lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there
being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the
grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of
petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence
and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit for
examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession
knowing it was inadmissible in evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties
included, among other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that
on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo
Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then
affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and
time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of the
grenade, he "[f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and
fuse assembly [were] all present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was
and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a certification stating his incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted
findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13 such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug
Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on
22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30
in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994,
fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:
in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and
detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer.
The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at [T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND
petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then inserted the muzzle of ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY
his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me." (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in
Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was
him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
appealing to this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the
Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice
to file briefs. 21
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was
akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
that:
information." 15 Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a
crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation,
hence to require probable cause would have been "premature." 16 The RTC
emphasized that Yu and his companions were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, 1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner and his HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and "reported
cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different
directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for 2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-
an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A
discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
without fear of violence." 18

In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence
of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the
hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the
trial court and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court
a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the
factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's
possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the
admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized from petitioner.
Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful
on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was
"attempting to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live
grenade and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed
firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been
enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting
to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically
notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political
upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an
offense, Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports
of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days
prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his
companions acted suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than
sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be
committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence
and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would]
first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while
maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but
moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in
agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a
situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the
practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind,
and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26
which petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to
wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that
someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited
article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a
check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving
intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically
notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to
observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police
officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had]
personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days
before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and
assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE WARRANTIES ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the
validity of the warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of
the Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the
evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner
of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and
"looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner
points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote
to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the
challenged decision..
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To
repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall
unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the
maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have
been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation to Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution 29
and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term "life
imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948,
and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view
of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's
decision to this Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of
Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered
without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to
us, with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the
comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the
Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the
prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was
found in and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in
court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his
commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander
was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade
presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the
latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not
immediately after petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19
March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu
never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former
confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the
grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he
examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement
authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in
cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he
was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his
fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his
three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police
officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner
simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed
petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in
order to discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during
his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was
inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his
arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to
assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner
consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to
counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in
the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest
and search of petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b)
has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34 and
(6) a "stop and frisk."35
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop
and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate
incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of
these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
 may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
validly effected and in their allowable scope.
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . 39
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
conduct a "stop and frisk," 40 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.37
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of
At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of
the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
committing violence. 38
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly,
the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk"
as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in
Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of
the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is
neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other
police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's
credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine
reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the
credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest
(Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police
officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving
very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the
corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared
on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create
any commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner
was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and
from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not
yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see
any bulging object in [sic] his person. 43
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights
solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part
of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February
1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and
petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED
immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for
any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Florida vs. J.L. (98-1993, March 28, 2000)
Syllabus
FLORIDA v. J. L.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA No. 98-1993. Argued
February 29, 2000-Decided March 28, 2000
After an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black
male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a
gun, officers went to the bus stop and saw three black males, one of whom,
respondent J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no
reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a
firearm or observe any unusual movements. One of the officers frisked J. L. and
seized a gun from his pocket. J. L., who was then almost 16, was charged under
state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a
firearm while under the age of 18. The trial court granted his motion to suppress
the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search. The intermediate appellate court
reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and held the
search invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
Held: An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more,
sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. An officer, for
the protection of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for
weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual conduct where,
inter alia, the officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons in question may be armed and
presently dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30. Here, the officers' suspicion
that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from their own observations but solely
from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The tip lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make a Terry
stop: It provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without
means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. See Alabama v. White,
496 U. S. 325, 327. The contentions of Florida and the United States as amicus
that the tip was reliable because it accurately described J. L.'s visible attributes
misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The
reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. This Court also
declines to adopt the argument that the standard Terry analysis should be
modified to license a "firearm exception," under which a tip alleging an illegal gun
would justify a stop and frisk even if
267
the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. The facts of this
case do not require the Court to speculate about the circumstances under which
the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great--e. g., a report of a
person carrying a bomb-as to justify a search even without a showing of
reliability. Pp.269-274.
727 So. 2d 204, affirmed.
Search of moving vehicles
Papa vs. Mago [22 SCRA 857 (1968)]
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary
injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile,
Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against
Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued
by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of
certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the
enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further
proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the
determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing
the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the
Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on
November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from
the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of
November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the
trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the
two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership
of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in
the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two
trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order
or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among
others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said
place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods
were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant
issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the
request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the
goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner
Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because
the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner
of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and,
undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and
Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person
without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet
been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner
of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained
their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer
irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the
issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and
customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the
goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as
well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an
order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now
petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in
question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was
received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the
examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila
Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein
respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended
petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of
Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila
Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24,
1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the
goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and
affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the
case, the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios
Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and
Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the
goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the
members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure;
that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section
2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests
in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in
the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios
Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the
goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs
Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and
that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury.
Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining order,
for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the
dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity
of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of
court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the
Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a
"Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex
parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods
seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be
released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate
bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the
release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the
case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared
and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by
herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure
proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of
property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby
be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed
a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the
goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent
Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for
the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the
goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the
corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods
under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been
directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods
pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration,
and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition
petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without
jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed
goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent
Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies
before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by
the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes;
and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was
grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for
prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their answer, respondents alleged,
among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided
by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was
instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine
bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that
petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding
duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises
and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that
respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question
so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings;
(4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila Police
Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention;
(5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the
Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a
judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in
question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that
petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed
before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the
release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said
goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was
sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent
Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing
the goods in question.
 to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture. 8
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among
others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and
all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been
customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the
brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over
customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question
the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle
were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under
Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been
directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had
customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties,
regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and
taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of
Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according
to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the
disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus,
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore,
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the
could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the
had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in
full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed,
as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry"
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin,
and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination
et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely
and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the
Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of
statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of
assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and
ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance")
entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila
states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies'
on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the
sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of
them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be
men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band
different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
(gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the
color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in
release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods;
Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120
that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to
dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and
examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October
another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in
26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and
petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held
that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject
Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the
goods.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually
seized on October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The
purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the
Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December
Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not
23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have
imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes because
been released regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods
the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the
imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject
hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods
to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that
the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of
Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to
goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
collect revenues from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress
Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view
(Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance
held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the
merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a
preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu.
a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Should they be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in
Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which
resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act
however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and 1937.
mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional
bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on
January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up
injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held: defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of
the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as
provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported
jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities
and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one
mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods? of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia,
supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax
Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that
Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs
the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the
warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau
jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
 It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of
the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by
the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In
the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on
November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the
Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after
the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the
issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent
Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of
jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the
Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order
of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the
Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search
warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police
Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine
any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such
article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G.
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the
goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter
has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and
seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the
Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the
interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The
Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The
Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or
any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered
view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39
A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to
Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find
in the first Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a
difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject
to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods
in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they
could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231,
232, chap. 94), it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and
search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect
there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into
the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in
charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had
been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and
the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April
27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of
February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13
Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of
the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter
embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat.
Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever
been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and
treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215,
219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the
two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the
court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there
was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without
any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police
Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no
search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379,
190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R.,
686), the question raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile
truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant or other
process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for
violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the
negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search
and seizure without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable"
search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the
language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in
determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances
under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development,
which has multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our
highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily
noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they
furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public
places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called
"bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed
for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on
private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and
seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized
to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality,
chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from
It is so ordered.
an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view People vs. CFI of Rizal [101 SCRA 86 (1980)]
of all the circumstances under which it is made.
This original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Order dated August 20,
1975 issued by District Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento in Criminal Case No. Q-3781
which stalled the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Jessie C. Hope and Monina
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
Medina for the alleged violation of section 3601 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that
The order declared as inadmissible in evidence the allegedly smuggled articles
seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
obtained by apprehending agents in the course of a warrantless search and
purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the
seizure. Dispositively, the order decreed:
Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and
decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the
purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in
their pleadings. WHEREFORE, in accordance with Article IV, Sec. 4, paragraph 2 of the present
Constitution, the boxes and the watches and bracelets contained therein seized
from the car of the accused Sgt. Jessie C. Hope, are hereby declared inadmissible
in evidence in this case; likewise, the pictures taken of said items attempted to
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
be presented as evidence in the instant case is hereby declared in admissible as
evidence against the accused.

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

SO ORDERED.

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the
order of respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil
The records disclose that one week before February 9, 1974, the Regional Anti-
Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that
a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles
City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
and Macario Sabado, on the aforesaid date and upon order of the Chief of
March 31, 1967 restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or
Intelligence and Operations Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr.,
implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road at
First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
Balintawak, Quezon City.

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila; and1äwphï1.ñët
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
At about 6:45 A.M. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate No. 21-87-
73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina
approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards
Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent
Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of
heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could not go
through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents
succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado
who were in civilian clothes showed their Identification cards to respondents and
introduced themselves as RASAC agents.
The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as
to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Further,
respondents were asked where they were bringing the boxes, to which
respondent Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical
Hut at Epifanio de los Santos. Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with
respondents while Agent Manuel took their own car and both cars drove towards
Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up
Col. Abad by telephone.
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined
them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina was supposed to
receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called off the mission"
and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about
9:00 A.M. (Respondents' Memorandum, records, pp. 180-183).
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed
boxes, four (4) on the rear seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment
which was opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the same order of the intelligence
officer, the boxes were opened before the presence of respondents Hope and
Medina, representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs,
P.C., COSAC and photographers of the Department of National Defense. The
contents of the boxes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist watches of
assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands" (based
on a later inventory), supposedly untaxed.
As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the
Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the
articles including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same on
February 12, 1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending
agents arrested respondents and brought them together with the seized articles
to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed with a warrant
of arrest and seizure.
In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector
of Customs, seizure proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure
Identification No. 14281 against the wrist watches and watch bracelets pursuant
to Section 2530 (m) — 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure
Identification No. 14281-A against the Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of
the same Code.2
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases, respondents disclaimed ownership of
the seized articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario
who intervened in the proceedings. The claimant-intervenor testified that he
bought the watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales
invoice certified to be authentic by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No. 6 of
Quezon City, which transaction was entered in the book of accounts of aforesaid
claimant; that the same articles were brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but
when the sale failed to materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina
Medina to transport back the boxes to Manila for a consideration of P1,000.00
without disclosing the contents thereof which claimant simply represented as PX
goods; that when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he presumed that the
corresponding duties have already been paid, only to be surprised later on when
he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the time of
apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and granting
that he had such knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed commodities
that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car
upon request of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not
present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their
contents on the way. On the part of respondent Monina Medina, she testified that
what she did was only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to
transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut
who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal
the contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes were
opened at Camp Aguinaldo. As there was not enough evidence to controvert the
testimonies of respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the
Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on April 1, 1975
declaring that the seized articles including the car are not subject of forfeiture.
The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it is
hereby ordered and decreed that the subject motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge,
Model 1965, Motor No. 33859, Serial No. W357348361, File No. 2B-1884, with
Plate No. EH 21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it is
hereby declared released to its registered owner, Jessie C. Hope, upon proper
Identification. Relative to Seizure Identification No. 14281, it is further ordered
and decreed that the subject matter thereof to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted brands
of wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets and 100 pcs.
of tools be, as they are hereby likewise declared released to the rightful owner
thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon payment of the levitable duties, taxes and
other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes
thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the assessable
duties, taxes and other charges owing from the aforestated articles within 30
days from the time this decision becomes final and unappealable, the same shall
be deemed abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner provided for by law.
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1974, after the requisite preliminary investigation, the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the existence of a prima facie case against
respondents Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case No. Q-3781 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on April 23, 1974,
respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on January 28, 1975 and while
the prosecution through its first witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as
evidence the pictures of the eleven (11) boxes containing the assorted watches
and watch bracelets, counsel for respondents objected to the presentation of the
pictures and the subject articles on the ground that they were seized without the
benefit of warrant, and therefore inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2),
Article IV of the New Constitution. After the parties have argued their grounds in
their respective memoranda, respondent trial court issued the questioned order
of August 20, 1975 as cited earlier. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration
was denied on September 30, 1975. Hence, this petition which was treated as a
special civil action in Our Resolution of May 5, 1976.
The substantive issue as urged in the petition is whether or not the seizure of the
merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized agents commissioned to enforce
customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such merchandise are
inadmissible in evidence. Corollary to the issue is, has the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in finding the affirmative?
The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing search and seizure
had been liberalized when a moving vehicle is the object of the search and the
necessity of a prior warrant has been relaxed on the ground of practicality,
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge
— a requirement which borders on impossibility in the case of smuggling effected
by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. Petitioner vigorously contends that contraband may be
seized without necessity of a search warrant since the Constitution does not
guaranty immunity to smugglers and that a warrantless seizure of contraband in
a moving vehicle is justified by the traditional exception attached to the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and such exception must be adopted in
interpreting the relevant provision in the new Philippine Constitution.
As counter argument, respondents maintain that the decision of the Collector of
Customs in their seizure cases which has now become final and unappealable has
made no pronouncement that the subject articles are smuggled items. More so,
the decision has entirely cleared respondents of any liability or responsibility in
the alleged smuggling activity and as a consequence, the decision has the direct
effect of deciding finally that the watches and bracelets are not smuggled and
that respondents have not violated the customs and tariff laws as charged in the
criminal complaint. Respondents argue further that the interception of accused
Jessie Hope's car by RASAC Agents while in the course of a normal trip without
any order of the court and without having shown that the interception was
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, is an
impairment of the liberty of travel under section 5, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. Finally, they claim that the agents had one week's time before the
date of apprehension to secure the necessary warrant but since they failed to get
this court order, the search of Hope's car and the spontaneous seizure of the
boxes loaded therein and the contents thereof is a violation of the constitutional
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and
for any purpose" under section 3, Article IV of the fundamental law.
We find for petitioner. The opposing counsel's attempt to draw an Identity
between the seizure cases and the present criminal action to the ultimate end
that the decision in the former should be made decisive of the issue of criminal
liability must be overruled. It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs
made no findings that the articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector
stated was that the prosecution failed to present the quantum of evidence
sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles (Pages 128 and 130 of
Annex "E", Records, p. 109). In a general sense, this does not necessarily
exclude the possibility of smuggling. But if the aim of a confirmation that the
goods are indeed smuggled, is to draw an inference to tie up respondents'
criminal liability, the Collector is not duty bound, nor is there any need for him to
arrive at such a conclusion. It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they
do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty
provided for in section 3601 of the Code 3 . As can be gleaned from Section 2533
of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely
civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the
administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their
deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from
the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or
possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. 4
In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure
proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe
on contraband or illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated the
revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being
assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and
the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the form of fines or of forfeiture in
favor of the government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The
importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative
penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the
same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not
held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles are
not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were
transported in respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the
law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff
and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a
separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws,
criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence
but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law, the authority of
persons duly commissioned to enforce tariff and customs laws is quite
exceptional when it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of goods
suspected to have been introduced in the country in violation of the customs
laws. This Court had occasion to recognize this power granted to persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Code, who in order to discharge their
official duties more effecttively —
... may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or inclosure of any
warehouse, store or other building not being a dwelling house. (Section 2208,
emphasis supplied)
... (to) go aboard any vessel or aircraft within the limits of any collection district,
and to inspect, search and examine said vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope on board, and search any person on board the said
vessel or aircraft and to this end to hail and stop such vessel or aircraft if under
way. to use all necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall appear that
any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws of the Philippines has been
committed, whereby or in consequence of which such vessels or aircrafts, or the
article, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel or aircrafts, is
hable to forfeiture to make seizure of the same or any part thereof.
The power of search herein above given shall extend to the removal of any false
bottom, partition, bulkhead or other obstruction, so far as may be necessary to
enable the officer to discover whether any dutiable or forfeitable articles may be
concealed. (Section 2210)
or,

... (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever
found when he has reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable
or prohibited article or articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, and
likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably
suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid (Section 2211,
emphasis supplied)
As enunciated in the leading case of Papa v. Mago 5, in the exercise of the
specific functions aforecited, the Code does not mention the need of a search
warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a "dwelling house may
be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the
peace), upon swom application showing probable cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and person or thing to be seized." Aware of
this delineation, the Court in that case expressed the considered view that
"except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in
Carroll v. United States 6 wherein an imprimatur against constitutional infirmity
was stamped in favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such nature as in the
case at bar. On this stable foundation We refute the constitutional charge of
respondents that the warrantless seizure violated Article IV, Section 3 of the
1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth Amendment of the American
Constitution 7
The Carroll doctrine arose from the indictment and conviction of George Carroll
and partner for transporting in an automobile intoxicating liquor in violation of
the National Prohibition Act. They assailed the conviction on the ground that the
trial court admitted in evidence two of the sixty-eight bottles found by searching
the automobile and eventual seizure of the same allegedly in violation of the 4th
Amendment, and therefore that the use of the liquor as evidence was improper. 8
To paraphrase the significant views of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, the legislative
history of the Act clearly established the intent of Congress to make a distinction
between the necessity for a search warrant in the search of private dwellings and
that of automobiles and other road vehicles in the enforcement of the Act. This
distinction is consistent with the 4th Amendment since the latter does not
denounce an searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable. Searches
and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon probable cause, that is, upon
a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction. 9 Similarly, other statutes of the Union such as the Act of 1789,
Act of August 4, 1790, and Act of March 3, 1815, among others, construed in the
light of the 4th Amendment had recognized the distinctive feature of a
warrantless search of a ship motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. 10 In such a situation, what appears to the measure of legality of the
seizure was formulated in this sense: "that the seizing officer shall have
reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops
and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. "
Therein the guarantee of the 4th Amendment was fulfilled. Where seizure is
impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his
peril unless he can show the court probable cause. 11
The counsel for the State is candid enough to admit that the Anti-Smuggling
Action Center tries its best to follow-up the more promising tips and information
from informers, but ever often, the information proves false or the smugglers are
forewarned. 12 It is quite true the ASAC received one such information several
days or a week before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed to obtain
a warrant in spite of the time allowance is not a sign that they have been remiss
in their duty. The records hardly reveal anything certain and confirmatory of the
report during the said period except the general knowledge that some highly
dutiable goods would be transported from Angeles City to Manila in a blue Dodge
automobile. Not even the trial court has made any findings that ASAC has
established with exactitude the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized. Lacking this essential determination, the agents could not have
possibly secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its compelling
necessity. For one thing, the information could have been just another false
alarm. Providentially, however, things turned out differently when in the morning
of February 9, 1974, the undisclosed Informer himself went along with the agents
to the rendezvous point where at the appointed time he positively Identified an
approaching car as the one described by him a week earlier to be the suspected
carrier of untaxed merchandise. Clearly therefore, the agents acted not on the
basis of a mere hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy of belief and
probable cause enough for them to adopt measures to freeze the fleeting event.
We need not argue that the subjective phase of the police action taken by the
ASAC Agents to effect the apprehension of the suspected violators can be
anything less than the ensuing interception and stoppage of respondents' vehicle
after a short chase. Neither can We sustain the argument that in doing so, the
agents violated respondents' constitutional "liberty of travel". To recall again Mr.
Chief Justice Taft: "(B)ut those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the
public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search
unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise." 13 What followed next in the scene was a simple inquiry as to the
contents of the boxes seen inside the car. Respondents' baffled denial of
knowledge thereof could not but only heighten the suspicion of a reasonable and
inquisitive mind. Thus, the probable cause has not been any less mitigated.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when
attempted. 14 The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of
home or of persons and correspondence. 15 The constitutional inviolability of this
great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is more closer to a man's soul than the serenity of
his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable
can only be for the best of causes and reasons. We draw from the context of the
Constitution that an intended search or seizure attains a high degree of propriety
only when a probable cause duly determined is branded on a warrant duly issued
by a judge or other responsible person as may be authorized by law. Not
invariably, however, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the interference
is not wholly defendent on the presence of a warrant or the lack of it. In the
ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus, in
the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence
of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. 16
The ultimate question then, if any, that should confront the actuations of the
ASAC Agents in this case is whether the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by them is lawful or not. We have already seen that what they did was
a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code
directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of
having been possessed, issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which
the government has a direct interest. The official capacity of the agents has never
been questioned by respondents. Neither did respondents raise an issue on the
constitutionality of the law giving the agents the power to act as mandated.
There 'is no question that the Agents have not exceeded their authority nor have
they acted so licentiously to bear upon respondents moral embarrassment or
substantial prejudice beyond what is necessary. The purpose of the search and
seizure is more than clear to Us, hence, We rule out the suspicion that the
intention is only to elicit evidence to be used against respondents.
We do not see strong justification for the trial court's failure to recognize the
circumstances at bar as among the "rare cases" which it admittedly conceded to
be exempted from the requirement of a warrant. 17 The lapse lies on the dismal
gap in the trial court's developmental treat- ment of the law on arrest, search
and seizure. It missed the vital distinction emphatically laid down in Boyd v.
United States 18 which was cited in Carroll with "particular significance and
applicability." Thus, We quote Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd:
... The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties
and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a
search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against
him, The two things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the government is
entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not. The seizure of
stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited
for a breach of the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on
them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past;
and the like seizure have been authorized by our revenue acts from the
commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to
regulate the collection of duties, the Act of July 31, 1789. 1 State at L. 29, 43,
chap. 5, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same
Congress which proposed for adoption the original Amendments to the
Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches
and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable' and they are not embraced within the
prohibition of the Amendment. So also the supervision authorized to be exercised
by officers of the revenue over the manufacture of custody of excisable articles,
and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection,
are necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable searches and
seizures. So also the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles and
things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose
of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of
gambling, etc. are not within this category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met 329.
Many other things of this character might be enumerated. (Emphasis supplied).
Recently, in Viduya v. Berdiago 19 " this Court reiterated the controlling force of
the Papa v. Mago ruling hereinbefore cited and the persuasive authority of the
leading decision in Carroll v. U.S., supra, and in explaining the rationale of the
doctrine significantly said that "(i)t is not for this Court to do less than it can to
implement and enforce the mandates of the customs and revenue laws. The evils
associated with tax evasion must be stamped out — without any disregard, it is
to be affirmed, of any constitutional right ...
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the
privileged area where search and seizure may lawfully be effected without the
need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to the applicability of the
classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision
must be upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional
guarantee has not been violated and the respondent court gravely erred in
issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as inadmissible evidence the items
or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any search
warrant, as well as the pictures of said items attempted to be presented as
evidence against the accused.
Notwithstanding the reversal and setting aside of the order of respondent judge
assailed herein, thereby allowing the introduction and admission of the subject
prohibited articles in the trial of the accused Jessie C. Hope and Monina Medina
for alleged smuggling, in the interest of speedy justice, the prosecution is
directed forthwith to re-assess and re-evaluate the evidence at its disposal,
considering the lapse of time since the trial commenced on June 28, 1975 and
was thus delayed due to the filing of the instant certiorari petition and that on
April 1, 1975, after seizure proceedings initiated by the Collector of Customs, the
said articles were ordered released upon payment of the leviable duties, taxes
and other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and
taxes thereof. After such re-assessment and re-evaluation, the prosecution must
promptly take the necessary action on the premises for the protection of the
rights and interests of all parties concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is
ordered remanded for further trial and reception of evidence without excluding
the articles subject of the seizure or for such action as the prosecution may take
after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove
directed.
This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Salvador vs. People (G.R. No. 146706, July 15, 2005)
At bar is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by Tomas Salvador assailing
the Decision2 dated August 9, 2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186.
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner
Tomas Salvador, then aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and Manila
Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF) for possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled
watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
117, Pasay City with violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity,
Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and
unlawful importation of the following items:
198 pieces of means watches P187,110.00
76 pieces of men's diving watches' 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches 11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry '. 322,000.00
with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND THREEE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency,
without authority or permit from proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW."3
When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution established the following facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations
Squadron, headed by Major Gerardo B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts.
Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio M. Sindac and Edwin B. Ople,
conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check
on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain
PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep close watch on
the second airplane parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is
an Airbus 300 with tail number RPC-3001. It arrived at the NAIA at 10:25 in the
evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight No. PR-311. After its
passengers disembarked and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground
crew and parked at the ramp area of the Domestic Airport terminal.
At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three
(3) persons had boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued
its surveillance.
At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3)
persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their
abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights
off.
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the
aircraft tow truck. At the Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked
and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified himself and asked
the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as Tomas
Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the
driver of the tow truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandin's uniform was
partly open, showing a girdle. While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a
package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the package
contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, "Positive!" 16 pcs. Seiko Divers Watch Mens - Black 800.00
Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused dial with rubberized bracelet (-1)
who surrendered without a fight. The team searched their bodies and found that x $50
the three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets 4 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with 100.00
wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and yellow dial with gold metal
Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the packets and brought all the bracelet (1) x $25
accused to the PAFSECOM Office. 4 pcs. Citizen L-watches with white dial 80.00
(4) x $20
62 pcs. Seiko 5 Men's watches with 1,550.00
At around 8:00 o'clock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of yellow dial with gold metal
the Bureau of Customs, arrived at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the bracelet (1) x $25
packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, she proceeded to weigh 34 pcs. Seiko 5 Men's watches with black 850.00
the thirteen (13) packets seized from the accused. She then prepared an dial with gold metal bracelet (1) x
$25
inventory of the items seized and listed the weight of the packets.4 Thereafter,
she brought the seized packets to the In-Board Section, Bureau of Customs, ____ pcs. $6,580.00
Airport Office where their contents were identified and appraised. The Bureau of
Customs found 248 pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold 248
jewelries valued as follows: The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter
recommended that petitioner and his co-accused be charged with violating
QTY. UNIT DESCRIPTION APPRAISED VALUE Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Accordingly, the Information,
10 pcs. Half-bangles with Charms 122.8 gms. mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC.
Tricolors
6 pcs. Bracelet with Charms Tricolors 52.4 gms.
8 pcs. Bracelet (Tricolor) 64.2 gms. After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to
5 pcs. Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor 155.3 gms. Evidence.
Baby's Bangles with charm 18.2 gms.
L-Bangles with charm 68.5 gms.
L-Bangles 112.3 gms. In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and
L-Creolla Earrings 901.56 gms. directed the accused to present their evidence.
TOTAL GRAMS +P 299,052.00

1,495 x P200.00/gm. All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were
Assorted Watches framed-up by the military.
204 pcs. Citizen M watches with black dial $2,600.00
with gold metal bracelet (-1) x
$25 Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the
24 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with blue 600.00 Airbus 300 with tail No. RPC-3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then
dial with white metal bracelet (- working on said aircraft. He was conducting a visual check of the plane when a
1) x $25 tow truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield. He told one of the junior
mechanics that he would take a break and be back in an hour. He then boarded
the tow truck. When it was near the Lima Gate, a jeep with four (4) men in subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The court
civilian attire aboard approached him. The four pointed their firearms at him and, also orders the forfeiture of the confiscated articles in favor of the Government.
after searching him for drugs, he was frisked but nothing was found. He was
nonetheless brought by the men to the PAFSECOM Office, then to Villamor
Airbase Hospital for a medical examination and alcohol test. Thereafter, he was SO ORDERED."5
brought back to the PAFSECOM Office. There, another military man arrived and
brought out a box containing packets. Then he and his companions were told to
put on their mechanic's uniforms and to wear girdles. The packets were placed on
All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
their bodies, after which they were photographed. He further testified that he was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20186.
asked to sign a certain paper but was not allowed to read it thoroughly. During
the investigation, he was not apprised of his rights nor assisted by a counsel.

On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the
trial court's Decision, thus:
Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items
seized from him. He testified that during the incident in question, he only
boarded the tow truck to take a break at the PAL canteen. He saw a box on the
tow truck but was not aware of its contents. After his arrest, he was made to sign "We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.
a document under duress.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that
after his arrest, he was made to sign a document by the PAF personnel, the
contents of which he was not able to read. He signed it because he was struck SO ORDERED."6
with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the military men and threatened him with
summary execution if he would not do so. He was not informed of his rights nor
given the services of counsel during the investigation. They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated
January 9, 2001.7

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of
the offense charged, thus: Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari . He submits for our consideration the following
assignments of error:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio
Mandin y Liston, Danilo Santos y Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs "I
Code of the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences
each of the accused to an indeterminate term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE
DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES
maximum, and to pay a fine of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without
AND CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE
PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE
APPELLATE COURT OF THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS
WELL AS ALL ITS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME
WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL.
IV
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE
COURT OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS."8
The above assignments of error boil down to these issues: (1) whether the seized
items are admissible in evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved
the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the PAF operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,9 he maintains
that at the time he and his co-accused were stopped by the PAF law enforces,
they were unaware that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law
enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his
Constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the seized items
should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual
circumstances of the case at bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF
surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions. They
boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other
PAL personnel working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and
surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then stopped and looked around
and made apparent signals. All these acts were sufficient to engender a
reasonable suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to something
illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was conducted in connection with the
enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a
motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate
of the Manila Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the airport perimeter, has
a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions agreed to the search
after one of them was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these
circumstances, the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are
admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a person's
body, personal effects or residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure mandated by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution provide:
"SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
x x x."
The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but
only such as are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas
where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant.
These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in
plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-
and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.10
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission
of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of
drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the
airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his
co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly
effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law.11
In Papa v. Mago12 involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who
are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or
other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said
items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and
customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or
person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent
schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The
Government's policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot be
reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which
the duty has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as
an individual's private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply
this State policy which we have continued to affirm.13
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused
were on board a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a
moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A search
warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling
house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the
warrant must be sought.14 Verily, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in holding that the articles involved in the instant controversy
were validly seized by the authorities even without a search warrant, hence,
admissible in evidence against petitioner and his co-accused.
Onthe second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining
the trial court's finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were credible,
notwithstanding that their testimonies contain glaring inconsistencies which tend
to detract from their veracity. Petitioner submits that these inconsistencies create
serious doubt which should have been resolved in his favor.
We are not persuaded.
After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by
petitioner, we find that they do not relate with the elements of the offense
charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and insignificant matters as for
instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how the
girdles (garters) were removed; and what time the aircraft in question arrived.

It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all
members of the special PAF team who conducted the search positively identified
the petitioner and his co-accused as the same persons who boarded the PAL
plane; stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a manner
which stirred suspicion from the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode
an aircraft tow truck towards Lima Gate where they were caught in flagrante
delicto.
As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and
insignificant details do not destroy their credibility.15 Moreover, minor
inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution's case as
they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby
negating any misgivings that the same were perjured.16
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:
"SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. - Any person who shall fraudulently import or
bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or
shall receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner facilitate the importation,
concealment or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling'
xxx
When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have had
possession of the article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant shall explain the
possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided, however, That payment of
the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any
prosecution under this section."
Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or
brings into the Philippines or assists in importing or bringing into the Philippines
any article, contrary to law, or (2) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after
importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.17
Importation commences when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the
jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload and is deemed terminated
upon payment of the duties, taxes and other charges due upon the articles and
the legal permit for withdrawal has been issued, or where the articles are duty-
free, once the articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs.18
In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and
convincing evidence that petitioner and his co-accused were caught red-handed
by a team from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, while in the possession of
highly dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The contraband items
were taken by petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from
Hong Kong on the night of June 3, 1994. Petitioner and his colleagues then
attempted to bring out these items in the cover of darkness by concealing them
inside their uniforms. When confronted by the PAF team, they were unable to
satisfactorily explain why the questioned articles were in their possession. They
could not present any document to prove lawful importation. Thus, their
conviction must necessarily be upheld. Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision convicting petitioner and
his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Whren vs. United States [(95-5841) 517 US 806, January 10, 1996]
Syllabus
WHREN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
 Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis. Pp. 809-813.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

(b) Although framed as an empirical question-whether the officer's conduct

deviated materially from standard police practices-petitioners' proposed test is
No. 95-5841. Argued April 17, 1996-Decided June 10, 1996
plainly designed to combat the perceived danger of pretextual stops. It is thus
inconsistent with this Court's cases, which

Plainclothes policemen patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked vehicle

observed a truck driven by petitioner Brown waiting at a stop sign at an
807
intersection for an unusually long time; the truck then turned suddenly, without
signaling, and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed. The officers stopped the
vehicle, assertedly to warn the driver about traffic violations, and upon
make clear that the Fourth Amendment's concern with "reasonableness" allows
approaching the truck observed plastic bags of crack cocaine in petitioner
certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
Whren's hands. Petitioners were arrested. Prior to trial on federal drug charges,
intent. See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 236. Nor can the Fourth Amendment's
they moved for suppression of the evidence, arguing that the stop had not been
protections be thought to vary from place to place and from time to time, which
justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe petitioners
would be the consequence of assessing the reasonableness of police conduct in
were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers' traffic-
light of local law enforcement practices. Pp. 813-816.
violation ground for approaching the truck was pretextual. The motion to
suppress was denied, petitioners were convicted, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
(c) Also rejected is petitioners' argument that the balancing of interests inherent
in Fourth Amendment inquiries does not support enforcement of minor traffic
laws by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles, since that practice only
Held: The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that
minimally advances the government's interest in traffic safety while subjecting
he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's
motorists to inconvenience, confusion, and anxiety. Where probable cause exists,
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not
this Court has found it necessary to engage in balancing only in cases involving
have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. Pp.
searches or seizures conducted in a manner unusually harmful to the individual.
809-819.
See, e. g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1. The making of a traffic stop out of
uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice. pp. 816-819.

(a) Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe

that a traffic violation has occurred. See, e. g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S.
53 F.3d 371, affirmed.
648, 659. Petitioners claim that, because the police may be tempted to use
commonly occurring traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other Emergency circumstances
laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a reasonable
officer would have stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing the traffic People vs. De Gracia [233 SCRA 716 (1994)]
violation at issue. However, this Court's cases foreclose the argument that
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat
ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct justified on the basis of probable
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the
cause. See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 221, n. 1,236.
Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their
"tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine
Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout
Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations
Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of
the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations
for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion,
and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-
90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several
John Does whose true names and identities have not as yet been ascertained,
were charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and
control, the following to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same
from the proper authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and
explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and
prompted by common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the
crime of rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking
arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its
activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts
thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto
Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged with attempted homicide
allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon the person of
Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However,
he admitted that he is not authorized to possess any firearms, ammunition
and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion
during the period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren
Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was
on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office
located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team
composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino,
one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on
the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant
to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was
being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to
fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt.
Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on
foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw
the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and
leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters away, the
latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack
resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car
and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-
fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team
composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion,
Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one
Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-
shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the
building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw
appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present
inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As
a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made
to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding
team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office,
aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able
to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and
that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims
that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of
Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1,
1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar
Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut
which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the
office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He
denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding
team barged in and that he had explosives in his possession. He testified that
when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and
made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were
janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know anything about the
explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives
were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew
Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987 coup d'
etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job.
Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the
marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office,
appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against
him because "bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col.
Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant
Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, it made a recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia
appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit
contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that
Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of
five (5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
 Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the
Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession
commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.
of firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or constructive
possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is
neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential
explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand
element of the offense punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so,
boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he
whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and
did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to
ammunition.
possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of

firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or
the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. 6 This has to be so
if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the
a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in
law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms,
part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a
to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess
to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
special law, 8 in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not
penalty of death shall be imposed.
valid defenses. 9

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection

with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall
be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally
affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts have
resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable
resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country
during the first few years of the transitional government under then President
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the
crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and
intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and
that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to
commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to separation from the service for going on absence without leave
convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is
there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.
familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and
11 Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or
various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense
about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person
feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty
explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were
of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or
found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily
license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if
but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily
such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this
nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has
nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control
ammunition.
of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that
animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his
person.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant
De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms,
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid
explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.
search and seizure in this case. While the matter has not been squarely put in
Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first
issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence thereto by the parties,
one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the
to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding
same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several
team, considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to
explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant denied
be convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.
any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his
act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not
constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to
possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office
Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually
not and cannot inspire credence. precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance
conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group
of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case
the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for
basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and
them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The
the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory
disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is
or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably
or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at
that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the
office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that
matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding
team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the
raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was
amply explained in People vs. Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their
Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of
herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information
supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and
pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein,
and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present
his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the
suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities,
to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In
other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his
pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag
(which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with
hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his
identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by
the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of
society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other
acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from
November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion.
Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms,
explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose
and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
which states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing
the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the
Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the
act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the
latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used
by the court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant
and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is
charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the
crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete
penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder,
homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that
might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree
No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal
possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained that said provision of the
law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized under
two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly
advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that,
subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to
separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on
rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an
offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the
Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated
provision of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a
special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive
clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of
five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive
prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against
any tenuous importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition
confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in
furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In the words of
the court a quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items — 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons
of M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports
received by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the
rebels was not without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's personal
defense. They are for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per
instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo
to stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in
that office is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the
birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-
soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the
company of his boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with
soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989
was a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with
caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly
trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, De
Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of the AFP
intelligence agents. 25
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion.
At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the
governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve
the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial
court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but
its recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis
thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Checkpoints
Gen. De Villa vs. Valmonte (G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990)
In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and
their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for
reconsideration of said decision. Before submission of the incident for resolution,
the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to which petitioners
filed a reply.
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did
this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances.
What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on
the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this
proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed,
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain.
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First,
the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these
highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of,
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for
the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second
checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
coup d’etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only last 1 December
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints
1989. Another attempt at a coup d’etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA,
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location
of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug
of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all-time high. Whether or
limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely
not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a
to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a
security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a
class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint,
dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals them there was in
the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present stop judicial review." 2
government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social
and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the
basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its
The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless
program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those
search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution. 3
objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select
the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is
evidently one of such means it has selected.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after
a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on
of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
motorist’s right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the
held by the U.S. Supreme Court —
vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
"Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v.
search.
United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302(1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543, 45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so
holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As
have ‘reasonable or probable cause’ to believe that they will find the
held by the U.S. Supreme Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin
their warrantless search. . . ." 4
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite
similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the
commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter. In People v. Kagui Malasuqui,
it was held —
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to
a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances." 5
By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers,
at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not
constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and
necessity.
Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor
condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court’s
decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing the
military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is
acknowledged, the Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of
its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball
game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become
aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and
extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices of
foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other
urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning
them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling traders. This, of
course, is a national tragedy.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men
in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the men in
uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the
checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a
military "concoction." It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their
men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed
unless the men behind it are honest, noble and dedicated.
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is
not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts
exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man
checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority
and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts. 7 This tenet
should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher military
authorities.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Aniag vs. Comelec [237 SCRA 424 (1994)]
PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition) the following resolutions of the Commission on Elections: Resolution
No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being unconstitutional, and Resolution No.
92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for
want of legal and factual bases.
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local
elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the
"Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period.1 Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special
strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad,
Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2)
firearms3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of
the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his
driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle
Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its
entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged
down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched
the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a
bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He
explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house
and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor
for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with
an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release
of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious.4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the
circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only
appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also
wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when
apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard.5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which,
among other matters, recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed
and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed.6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information
against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No.
7166;7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in
relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881.8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance
the administrative proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court.9
On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.10
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
the rules and regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits
defined by law; that the Omnibus Election Code provides for the disqualification
of any person/candidate from running for or holding a public office, i.e., any
person who has either been declared by competent authority as insane or
incompetent or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude;
that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of
the Code; that the resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction
before the commission of certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption
of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the
criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case, and
(c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to the requisite
quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office
under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a
result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the fundamental law
thus rendering it fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for
a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to
discuss the implications of the charge against him on his qualification to run for
public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether
he can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-
at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the
search. According to him, without a warrant and without informing the driver of
his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The firearms were not
tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly
packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car.
Thus, the search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was
clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in
the preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included
in the charge sheet. Consequently, making him a respondent in the criminal
information would violate his constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which
prohibits any candidate for public office during the election period from employing
or availing himself or engaging the services of security personnel or bodyguards
since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a civilian
employee assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically,
petitioner further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he
did, the firearms in compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms
pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the
petition13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the
position of COMELEC and prayed instead to be excused from filing the required
comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in
relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals,
accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be
criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that it was upon petitioner's
instruction that Arellano brought the firearms in question outside petitioner's
residence, submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was
invited by the City Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's
possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation about
the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is
immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional
infirmity of Resolution No. 2327 since this petition may be resolved without
passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by
an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of
moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view,17 as well as the search
conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per
se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution
for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed
within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside
a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The
records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the
PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any
report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano
when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying
on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as
well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers
conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle
to be searched.19 The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless
search is determined by the facts of each case.20 Thus, we upheld the validity of
the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from
a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police
officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably
corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a confidential report that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the
search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto
transporting drugs at the time of their arrest; 22 where apart from the
intelligence information, there were reports by an undercover "deep penetration"
agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where
the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs
was strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his
suspicious failure to produce his passport and other identification papers;24
where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the description given in the
confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana;25 where the
accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous
when queried about its contents;26 or where the identity of the drug courier was
already established by police authorities who received confidential information
about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the vessels arriving in
Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters
from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do
so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that
certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike
forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or
behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of
petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the
policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the
firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search
cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search
constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness
of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however
stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil
and political rights results from the implementation of this authority," and that
"the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in
consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created
under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323."28 The facts show that PNP installed the
checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search
was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that news of
impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason
for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did
the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the
purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have
any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. With the
authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not
have any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to
turnabout albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for
the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his
vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was
stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know
the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen
conducting the operation,29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of
petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest
against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that
petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary
investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of
due process which requires that the procedure established by law should be
obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he
was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading
to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of
explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due
process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense.31 Due process
guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals,33 we held
that —
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional
in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened
criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of
Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to
believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written
explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not
petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was
fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City
Prosecutor.
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for
reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a
separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion itself expresses
petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as
soon as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even after
COMELEC's denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so
since the prohibition against carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without probation and
with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right to
suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a
preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted
by the Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the
firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as evidence in any
proceeding against petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829
dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Usana [323 SCRA 754 (2000)]
Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D.
Escaño, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64,
in Criminal Case No. 95-936 with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425,1 as amended. Escaño and Usana were also charged in Criminal Case
No. 95-937 and No. 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-936 reads as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping
and aiding one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport 3.3143 kilograms
of "HASHISH", a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law.2
The charge against accused Julian D. Escaño in Criminal Case No. 95-937 reads
as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, direct custody and control one (1) pc. of cal. .45 pistol, government
model with Serial No. 990255, with magazine containing 7 live ammos and two
(2) more magazines for cal. .45 pistol containing 7 live ammos each, without first
securing the necessary license or permit from the proper government authorities
and which firearm and ammunitions he carried outside of his residence.3
The accusatory portion of the information against Virgilio Usana in Criminal Case
No. 95-938 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, direct custody and control One (1) pc. of rifle carbine with Serial No.
7176644 with a banana type magazine loaded with 28 live ammunitions without
first securing the necessary license or permit from the proper government
authorities and which firearms and ammunitions he carried outside of his
residence.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
In its Decision of 30 May 1997,5 which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the
trial court convicted Escaño and herein appellants in Criminal Case No. 95-936,
Escaño in Criminal Case No. 95-937, and appellant Usana in Criminal Case No.
95-938.
Escaño filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a
Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal,6 which was granted by the trial court in
its Order of 1 7 July 1997.7
Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997,8 manifesting therein
that they were appealing to this Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering
the penalties imposed, the decision in Criminal Case No. 95-936 was appealed to
this Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from
Criminal Case No. 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997,9 the trial court gave due
course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case
No. 95-936 to this Court and the record of Criminal Case No. 95-938 to the Court
of Appeals.
Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-936
that is now before this Court.
Due to the differing versions of the parties, there is a need to narrate each of the
testimonies of the key players in this case.
The prosecution has this version of the events: On the 5th of April 1995 and
during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely,
PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and
Inspector Ernesto Guico,10 were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator
Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).11 They were checking
the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing
merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia
Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493.12 PO3 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of
the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio
Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Escaño, to open the door. PO3 Suba
seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, upon
order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were
search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they
seized from Escaño.13
The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the
Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato.14 Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned
over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the
vehicle, he requested Escaño to open the trunk.15 Escaño readily agreed and
opened the trunk himself using his key.16 They noticed a blue bag inside it,17
which they asked Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape,18
which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist
Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms.19
A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office of the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) to the effect that Escaño was not a
licensed/registered firearms holder of any kind and caliber. Usana, however,
according to the same certification is a licensed/registered holder of a pistol Colt
.45 caliber with license issued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996.
Usana also has an application for a pistol Uzi Cal. 9mm. Neither of the two guns
seized were licensed/registered with the NAPOLCOM.20
For his part, Escaño (or Jovy) testified that on the 4th of April 1995, between
11:00 and 11:30 in the morning, he was at the lobby of Legend Hotel, at Pioneer
St., Mandaluyong City, to meet with his business partners, including Usana and
Lopez. He saw his friend and erstwhile co-employee at Philippine Airlines, Ramon
Cabrera, who had borrowed his wife's car. Since it was his wife's birthday the
following day, he asked Cabrera if he could get back the car. Cabrera readily
gave him the keys of the car.21
He left the hotel at around 11:45 in the evening with Usana and Lopez. Using his
wife's car, they cruised southward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA)
and turned right at Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. They stopped before crossing SLEX
because the traffic light turned red. From the other side of SLEX, he could see a
group of policemen. Upon crossing SLEX, they were flagged down by one of the
policemen, so he slowed down and stopped. PO3 Nonato asked him to roll down
the window and demanded to see his license. He asked if he had committed any
violation, but PO3 Nonato accused him of being drunk, which he denied. The
policemen persisted in asking for his license, but he did not budge and instead
reiterated that there was no reason for him to surrender his license for he had
not committed any violation. A verbal tussle ensued resulting in the drawing of
firearms by the policemen which prompted Usana to suggest that they go to the
police station because the policemen were carrying guns and they have not done
anything wrong.22
He stated further that he was the one who drove to the police station along Dian
St. with his companions. He parked the car then they were brought to the office
of the Deputy Station Commander, Lieutenant Eco.23 The policemen asked if
they could search his car. He then inquired if he was not entitled to a lawyer and
why they needed to conduct a search when they had not even told him what he
had violated. Apparently, he thought they were there only for verification
purposes. Lt. Eco explained that that was the reason why they were going to
search his car, to see if he had done anything illegal. Although the police were
insistent in asking for the keys to his car, he continuously refused. Lt. Eco asked
his men to usher the trio into the detention cell.24
 Upon reaching the police station, Escaño was immediately brought to the office of
Lt. Eco while he and Usana were asked to sit on the bench. After a few minutes,
After two hours, he was brought back to Lt. Eco's office. Lt. Eco pointed to a bag,
PO3 de los Santos came out of the office of Lt. Eco to talk to him. He told him
a rifle, a pistol and a package wrapped in masking tape or packing tape on his
that all he knew about Escaño is that he was a wealthy flight attendant with
desk, and said these items constituted evidence of illegal possession of firearms
military connections. After returning to Lt. Eco's office, PO3 de los Santos went
and transporting of drugs. He was surprised that they found those items from his
out of the police station with Lt. Eco and Escaño. The three came back with a
car because his key had been with him all the time. He was handcuffed, brought
blue bag which he had never seen before. The bag was opened before the three
to his car, and again was surprised to see its trunk open.25
suspects. Escaño reiterated that his two companions had nothing to do with the
bag.33

On the other hand, Lopez had a different story. He claimed he was the mechanic
of Usana and they lived in the same subdivision.26 On 4 April 1995, he was
He and Usana stayed overnight in their cell and only saw Escaño in the morning
working on Usana's pick-up truck at the latter's house when Escaño dropped by
of April 5. At around 4:00 p.m., they were transferred to the CID and stayed in
at around 4:30 in the afternoon looking for Usana who was then working in
the office of a certain Inspector Sipin. Escaño admitted he owned the
Forbes Park.27 At around 5:30 p.m., they left Usana's house in Escaño's metallic
bag/case.34
gray Kia Pride. Inside the car, he saw a .45 caliber pistol and two spare
magazines tucked in the right side and left side of Escaño's waist. He also saw a
carbine under the right passenger seat. When he inquired about the guns, Escaño
For his part, Usana testified that he was a duly licensed architect who was
replied that such did not pose any problem since they were licensed. Before going
gainfully employed by Rolando de Asis and Taytay Management Corporation.35
to Usana, they went to Pasay City to see a certain jerry.28 They met Usana at
He admitted owning a licensed .45 caliber pistol.36 In March 1995, he hired as
the Sen. Gil Puyat Station of the LRT at around 9:00 p.m. He gave his seat to
mechanic Lopez, who lives in Bernabe Subdivision Phase II where he also lives.
Usana but was unaware if the latter noticed the rifle beneath the seat.29
Escaño on the other hand, was introduced to him by a certain Roberto
Samparado, a neighbor of Lopez. Escaño, an international flight attendant of
Philippine Airlines and a businessman who owns Verge Enterprises, also supplied
They went home via Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue but were stopped at a checkpoint
materials to the Philippine Army and planned to engage in a construction
after crossing SLEX. The policemen directed their flashlights at them and one
business.37
opened the front passenger door.30 The latter saw the rifle under Usana's seat.
Usana and Escaño were ordered to get out of the car. PO3 Nonato immediately
saw the gun tucked in Escaño's waist and asked if he was a policeman. Escaño
On 4 April 1995, at around 7:30 p.m., he paged Escaño to talk about the
replied that everything would be explained at the police station. He was also
materials for the five prototype gunship helicopters they were supposed to
asked to step out. No firearm was, however, found in his possession.31
supply. They talked on the phone, agreeing to meet between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m.
at the Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Station of the Light Rail Transit,38 and met at around
a quarter past nine. Escaño was on board a metallic Kia Pride with Lopez on the
When confronted about the guns, Escaño tried to intercede for his two
passenger seat. Lopez vacated the seat for him. They went to Magallanes Village
companions and said that ". . . these two don't know anything about it, I just
to meet a certain Norman Garcia and talk about the documents39 relating to the
took them for a drive." They subsequently went to police station Block 5. A
helicopter gunship of the Air Force. They arrived there at 11:30 p.m. While they
certain Toto, a policeman, drove the Kia Pride to Block 5.32
were talking with Garcia, he noticed a gun and magazines tucked in Escaño's
waist. Upon inquiry, Escaño said it was not a problem and only for his
protection.40 On their way to Roxas Boulevard, they were stopped at a
checkpoint along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Policemen knocked on the car windows so
he and Escaño rolled down their windows. A person in civilian clothes suddenly sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay a fine of
opened the right door, took something from the side of his seat and shouted, P500,000.00.
"There's a gun." He was surprised because he did not carry anything when he
bearded the car; neither did he see anything inside the car because it was dark
and he was not wearing his eyeglasses.41 The person who took the gun asked if The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
he was a policeman, and he said he was an architect. He was then asked to alight the 3.314 kilograms of Hashish (marijuana) for its appropriate disposition in
from the car, then frisked. Escaño was also asked to alight from a car. They saw accordance with law; and
a gun tucked in his waist, so they asked if he was a policeman, and Escaño
answered in the negative. Lopez was then ordered to get out of the car by the
person in civilian clothes and was also searched. They rode the Anfra service
2. In criminal Cases Nos. 95-937 and 95-938, accused JULIAN ESCAÑO y DEEN
vehicle of the police. One of the policemen asked Lopez to handcuff him and
and VIRGILIO USANA y TOME are GUILTY as charged in the two separate
Escaño. The policeman who asked Escaño to get out of the car drove the Anfra
informations respectively filed against them and are sentenced to suffer the
van to Block 5 where they arrived at 1:30 in the morning of 5 April.42
indeterminate prison term from TEN (10) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR maximum,
as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL maximum as maximum.44
He and Lopez waited outside the office of Lt. Eco while Escaño was inside with the
arresting officers. Lt. Eco came out of his office and urged Lopez to tell the truth.
He heard Lopez say that they were both just with Escaño and that they knew
The firearms and ammunitions subject matter of these cases which are still with
nothing about the guns; neither do they own any. SPO4 de los Santos entered
the City Prosecutor's Office are forfeited in favor of the Government are directed
the office of Lt. Eco and came out five minutes later with Escaño, Lt. Eco, and the
to be turned over to the Firearms and Explosive Unit, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon
other arresting officers, Nonato, Suba and Erwin Eco, the person in civilian
City for its appropriate disposition.
clothes. All six went out to the parking area and returned after about five
minutes. Lt. Eco was carrying a bag which he placed on top his desk. Lopez and
Escaño were asked about the contents of the bag. The two replied it was the first
time they saw that bag. Lt. Eco opened the bag before them. They all saw SO ORDERED.45
something in brown paper. He and Lopez simultaneously exclaimed that they
knew nothing about the contents of the bag, and they implored Escaño to tell the
police that they had nothing to do with it.43 Accused-appellants Usana and Lopez anchor their appeal on the following
arguments:

The trial court found the prosecution's version more credible than that of any one
of the accused, and ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to convict the accused as charged. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the hashish seized without search
warrant when the police officers already had the opportunity to secure a search
warrant before searching the bag found at the baggage compartment at the back
of the car;

2. Assuming that the hashish is admissible in evidence, the trial court erred in
1. In Criminal Case No. 95-936, accused JULIAN ESCAÑO y DEEN, VIRGILIO finding appellants to have conspired with Escaño in transporting the hashish
USANA y TOME and JERRY LOPEZ y CASABAAN are GUILTY as charged and are
when the evidence clearly shows that the hashish was owned and possessed
solely by Escaño;
3. The trial court erred in convicting appellants of illegal possession of hashish
despite the fact that they were neither in actual nor constructive possession of
the illegal drug; and
4. The trial court erred in not considering the exculpatory testimony of Julian
Escaño in favor of appellants.
Before going any further, some words are in order regarding the establishment of
checkpoints.
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was
conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati
Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been
conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution46 imposing a
gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to
Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The
national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of
the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the
election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed.47 For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks,
when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.48
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by
the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its
deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also
defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring
a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to
easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that
they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose
windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying
guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would
stop, without opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a body
search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation
demands.
We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked.
Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to
violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred
from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are
operated.49
Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in
convicting the three accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as
aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police of the trunk of the car.
Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant
requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs searches; (5) consented warrantless
search;50 and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.51
Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot unless their further detention is justified for any lawful ground. The Director of
invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of
on the car of Escaño was consented to by him. Both Lopez and Usana testified said accused-appellants within five (5) days from notice of this decision.
that Escaño was with the police officers when they searched the car.52 There was
no apparent objection made by Escaño as he seemed to have freely accompanied
the police officers to the car. PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escaño SO ORDERED.
readily agreed to open the trunk," upon request of SPO4 de los Santos.53 But
according to Escaño, he refused the request of the police officers to search his People vs. Vinecario (G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004)
car.54 We must give credence to the testimony of PO3 Suba. Not only is it
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999,
buttressed by the testimony of Usana and Lopez that Escaño freely accompanied
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor
the police officers to the car, it is also deemed admitted by Escaño in failing to
Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
appeal the decision. The findings of fact of the trial court are thus deemed final as
violation of Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
against him.
amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, they lodged the present appeal.

Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and
Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate
The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:
against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of
the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were
searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place
where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION
with the permission of Escaño, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) 4, ARTICLE II IN RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425,
after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the car's trunk, the car committed as follows:
was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced
to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having
been with Escaño in the latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring,
desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting confederating and helping one another, without being authorized by law, willfully,
the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of unlawfully and feloniously transported, delivered and possessed 1.7 kilos dried
the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before marijuana leaves which are prohibited drugs.
it was seized.1âwphi1.nêt

CONTRARY TO LAW.1
IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is
concerned with regard to accused-appellants VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRY C. Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel,
LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby
rendered ACQUITTING them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and
ORDERING their immediate release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
 On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants
along with two bundles of marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police
battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao City and were turned over to one PO2
officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC
Cabalon, an investigator of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to said
Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX
battalion office, however, the incident was blottered9 by PO3 Edward Morado at
motorcycle with three men on board sped past them.2 One of the police officers
the Buhangin Police Station.10
blew his whistle3 and ordered them to return to the checkpoint.

On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1
Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1
Pual Padasay brought the confiscated suspected marijuana to the camp’s crime
Haydenburge Goc-ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th
laboratory for examination11 which determined it to weigh 1,700 grams12 and to
Company thereupon asked them why they sped away to which appellant Victor
be indeed positive therefor.13
Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and
in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is
a member of the army.4 When asked by the law enforcers to produce an
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
identification card, he could not, however, offer any. At this point, the police
officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of
Vinecario who was observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting
suspiciously.5 SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry
backpack were. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and Division of the Philippine army stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan,14 approached
proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however, motorcycle driver Wates at a terminal in Andile, Mawab and requested him to
returned it to Vinecario.6 bring him to his elder brother at Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which
he paid.15 The two thus proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up
Roble to alternate with Wates as driver, and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for
Parang.16
Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his
men to disperse, following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario
did as ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed something wrapped in paper, he
told Vinecario to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his
that it was only a mat. brother Teofanis to shoulder the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30
p.m., after partaking of snacks at Teofanis’ residence, appellants left for Davao
City.
SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario
grabbed it,7 resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of
marijuana wafted in the air. Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecario’s former co-employee at
Emerson Plywood where he previously worked, blocked the motorcycle.17
Vinecario thus alighted from the motorcycle and shook hands with Datolarta18
who asked where they were headed for and requested that he ride with them.
Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong "let us talk about this,"8 but the latter
Vinecario turned Datolarta down as there was no longer any room in the
ignored Vinecario and instead called his Commanding Officer and reported to him
motorcycle. Datolarta then asked if he (Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes
that marijuana was found in Vinecario’s possession.
and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas, Tagum. Without examining its
contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolarta’s bag and left with his co-
appellants.19
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there
was a checkpoint,20 sped past it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away
from the checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting Wates to tap Vinecario,
telling him that the whistle came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble
to go back to the checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed
them to alight from the motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he
was, and Vinecario identified himself as a member of the Philippine National
Police.21 The officer asked for identification and when Vinecario could not
produce any, the former got the backpack slung on Vinecario’s shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as
Vinecario acquiesced, two officers opened the bag upon which they shouted that
it contained marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the backpack to confirm if there
was indeed marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and
brought him, together with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station,
and later to Camp Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the
assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents
which they were not allowed to read.22
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to
prove the guilt of all three accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged, accused PFC Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, pursuant
to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep.
Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme
penalty of death by lethal injection, under Rep Act 8177 in the manner and
procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659, amending
Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16
Davao City, is ordered to elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of
Court, Supreme Court Manila, for the automatic review of this Decision, after its
promulgation.
SO ORDERED.23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20,
1999 and disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the
imposition of the penalty against all accused, even if invoked only be accused
Venecaio (sic) through his counsel de officio, will apply to all accused since there
exists conspiracy of all in the commission of the offense charged.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and
reconsidered, only insofar as the imposition of the supreme penalty of death
through lethal injection under Republic Act No. 8177, is concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead
sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. IV,
Sec. 21, in relation to Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, as decided by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Peope (sic)
vs. Ruben Montilla G.R. No. 123872 dated January 30, 1998.
However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the
offense charged, is (sic) sustained. The corresponding motion (sic) for
reconsideration of all accused through their counsel for their acquittal of (sic) the
offense charged, is denied, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)
The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 dated September 14,
1995 of the above-mentioned Order of the trial court, it arguing that the
commission of the offense charged against appellants was attended by an
aggravating circumstance in that it was committed by an organized or syndicated
crime group, thus warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal26 on September
15, 1999. Vinecario followed suit and filed his Notice of Appeal.27
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecution’s
Motion.
In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT’S OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE
CONSPIRED WITH VICTOR VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA FROM
PARANG, MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE BY THE EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD
AND SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING
FACTS IF NOT A COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH
DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL.
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD EVIDENTIARY
WEIGHT TO THE RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-
ONG AND VICENTE CARVAJAL THAT BOTH APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE
WERE NOT NERVOUS AND APPREHENSIVE AT THE TME (sic) OF THE OPENING OF
THE MILITARY PACK CONTAINING MARIJUANA NEAR THE CHECKPOINT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE MERELY
HIRED BY VICTOR VINECARIO TO BRING HIM TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO FOR A
FEE OF P500.00 WITH FREE FOOD AND GASOLINE.
4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF P500.00
WHICH VINECARIO PAID TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE] AS
INADEQUATE BY TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE BUS FARE OF P268.00 FROM
MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO SUN WAY CROSSING, MAGUINDANAO DOWN TO
PARANG, MAGUINDANAO.28
Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted
with unity of purpose and in the execution of any unlawful objective with
Vinecario.29 They assert that they had no prior knowledge of Vinecario’s plan to
meet with a man who would give the backpack containing marijuana; that
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal’s declaration that they
(appellants Wates and Roble) were not nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when
the backpack was opened buttresses their claim that they did not conspire with
Vinecario; and that the prosecution’s theory of conspiracy was merely based on
the testimony of PO1 Carvajal that they acted nervously when the backpack was
ordered opened for inspection; that there was a "great variance" in the
testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in the direct examination and
their testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that transpired on April 10, 1995,
thus casting serious doubts on the trial court’s findings of guilt.
On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,30
stating that he is "practically satisfied with the decision of the trial court"; that
"he would not waste anymore the effort of the honorable Supreme Court Justices
in further reviewing his case"; and that as he was "driven by the sincerest desire
in renewing his life," he "irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal." On
even date, Roble and Wates likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal,31 stating that they admit the commission of the offense for which they
were convicted; that they are satisfied with the decision of the trial court; and
that they are already serving the penalty for their offense and "realize the overt
admittance of guilt as the only vehicle in [their] gradual renewal."
By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants
and directed Vinecario to file his brief within forty-five days from notice of the
resolution.
In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the
trial court:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON
THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS (sic) VALID.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN GIVING THE POLICEMEN
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE
THE APPARENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE MANNER OF ARRESTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.32
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by
the police officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been
deemed to have consented to the search as any such consent was given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed no probable cause
to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence, it being a product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to
inform him of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel of his choice, thereby violating Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution.33
The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be
conducted without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution so ordains:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence
obtained in violation of the right of the people under Section 2 shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits
of certain exceptions, however. Search and/or seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.34
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by
the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.35 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search.36
x x x [Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances,
as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the
lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and
installed by the government.
xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present
government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social
and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the
basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its
program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those
objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select
the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is
evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. x x x
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As
held by the U.S. Supreme Court:
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First,
the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these
highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of,
the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location
of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by official
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely
to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a
class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint,
there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in
the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-
stop judicial review."37
Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735
imposing a gun ban during an election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) of
the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).38 The national and local
elections in 1995 having been held on May 8, the present incident, which
occurred on April 10, 1995, was well within the election period.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as
pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine
inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or
have been instruments of some offense.39
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not detemined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.40 (Emphasis supplied).
That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers
at the checkpoint is gathered from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:
Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you
point to him?
A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing
yellow t-shirt who stood up and when asked about his name answered that he is
Victor Venecario).

xxx
Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when
these three persons approached?
Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification
papers to show that he is really a member of the army?
A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded
away.
A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.

Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away?
Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?

A: One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic).
A: Venecario.

xxx
xxx

Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened?

Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you
tell us why did you (sic) ask him?
A: When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away?

A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if

Q: What did they answer? they were afraid and different reactions (sic).

A: One of them said that he is a member of the army. Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A: Yes.

A: Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will
be bombed.
Q: That is what you have observed from their faces?

Q: Prior to that was there any incident?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx
Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that
backpack?

A: In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4.

A: He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion.

Q: If you recall when was that?

Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to
whom did he pass it on?
A: April 4 of the same year.

A: He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble.

Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter,
what happened next?

Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him?

A: I ordered Venecario to open the backpack.

A: Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario.

Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open?

Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one
person to another?
A: They opened the backpack..41

A: My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter.

SPO1 Goc-ong’s testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal:

Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident
Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any
prior to that checkpoint?
unusual incident while you were conducting that checkpoint?
A: Yes, sir. A: I was behind him because I backed him up.

Q: What was that incident all about? Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID?

A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle A: He answered that he has no ID.
passing and flagged them to stop and there were three (3) persons and one was
manning and they briefly stopped but speeded away.
Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that
he was an army man?
xxx

A: Our other companion moved closer as security.

Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened?

Q: Why?
A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.

A: We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in
xxx uniform.

Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing?
himself as an army man, what did you do?

A: He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic).

A: I asked for an ID.

xxx
Q: Who among you asked for an ID?

Q: After that what happened?

A: Sgt. Goc-ong.

A: We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag.

Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?
Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the xxx
contents of the bag?

Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he
A: He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes. got hold of that backpack what happened?

Q: Before that what did Venecario do? A: He opened the backpack.

A: He placed it in (sic) his shoulder. Q: Who told him to open the backpack?

Q: What did he do with the backpack? A: Sgt. Goc-ong.42

A: When asked he passed it to his other companions.
Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion?
A: Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his
other companion.
In light then of appellants’ speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even
after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous
gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to
one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-
appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the
Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders
of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some
offense.

Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he
do?
A: He returned back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario?
As to Vinecario’s allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the
custodial investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an
accused becomes the basis of his conviction.43 In the case at bar, the trial court
convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.

Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: A former soldier?

Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident
that took place?
A: No, sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said your former companion, am I correct?

Q: What was that?

A: Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood.

A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us.
Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion?

Q: Where?
A: Yes.

A: Parang Highway.
Q: You are familiar with him?

Q: Coming here to Davao?

A: I know him very well.

A: Yes.
Q: He was your close friend?

Q: What happened after Crossing Parang?

A: Yes.

A: There was a person who blocked us.

Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you?

Q: A former companion of yours?

A: Abdul Karim Datolarta.

A: Yes.
Q: He was alone when he stopped you?
A: Yes, sir. A: He told me if he can also ride with us.

Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you? Q: What did you tell him?

A: When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and A: I told him we were already three.
shook hands with him.

Q: What happened next?

Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to
stop?
A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the
name of that cousin of his in Tagum.
A: My friend.

Q: He mentioned the name?

Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours?

A: Yes, Merly.
A: Not yet.

Q: What is the family name?

Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting?

A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum.

A: He asked me where I was heading.

Q: Where in Tagum?
Q: What was your answer?

A: Roxas, Tagum.
A: I told him that I am going back to Davao.

Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum?
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents?
Q: What did he answer you?
A: He answered clothes.
Q: What did you do?
A: Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder.
Q: You did not become suspicious?
A: No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic)
that time.44
Vinecario’s account - that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-
appellants were cruising along the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize
but who turned out to be an acquaintance, Abdul Karim Datolarta, flagged
down45 the motorcycle, and as requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to
bring a backpack to Datolarta’s cousin without checking its contents - is
incredible, contrary to human experience, and taxes credulity. Datolarta was not
even apprehended nor presented at the trial, thus further eliciting serious doubts
on Vinecario’s tale.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act.46
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill
motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the
unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants,
the same fails.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.47 Where the acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.48 To exempt himself
from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the crime.49
In People v. Concepcion,50 this Court held:
x x x Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to
show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which
an illegal objective is to be carried out. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in
unlawfully transporting the subject marijuana. Roble, who was driving the
motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away upon seeing the
checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by the police officers. When
asked as to the contents of the backpack by SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed
the same to one another, indicating that they knew its contents. These
circumstances manifest appellants’ concerted efforts and cooperation towards the
attainment of their criminal objective.
 Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and
stopped you said you noticed one of them was nervous, did I get you right?
Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and
PO1 Carvajal, they contending that these witnesses contradicted their
testimonies-in-chief when they subsequently testified on rebuttal that appellants
A: Yes, sir.
were not nervous or apprehensive at all when they were being inspected by the
policemen.

Q: Only one was nervous?

It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-
ong and PO1 Carvajal referred to by Roble and Wates on their deportment
pertain to different stages of the checkpoint inspection as a scrutiny of the A: All of them.
records reveals. Thus, in his direct examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as
follows:
Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were
trembling?
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you
tell us why did you (sic) ask him?
A: Yes, sir.

A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if

they were afraid and different reactions (sic). Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct?

Q: They were acting suspiciously? A: Yes.

A: Yes. Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00
o’clock in the evening?

Q: That is what you observed in their faces?

A: There was light.

A: Yes, sir.51
Q: The place was well-lighted?

PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ong’s observations on

appellants’ deportment upon returning to the checkpoint: A: Yes, sir.52
On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or
apprehensive when he flagged them down as they crossed the checkpoint.53
PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervous
as Vinecario’s backpack was being opened.54
As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the
following arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General, which are quoted with
approval, should dispose of the same:
It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other
vehicles passed through the checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter
could not have sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1 Goc-ong did not give any
testimony that other vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the
appellants arrived. On the contrary, he testified there was no other vehicle ahead
of the appellants at the checkpoint when the latter arrived on their motorcycle
(TSN, June 17, 1999, p.7).
It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the
checkpoint just because SPO1 Goc-ong made no mention of using reflectorized
objects at the checkpoint. As described earlier in his Brief, this witness explained
that the checkpoint was visible because it had a sign board at the middle of the
road that read, "COMELEC GUN BAN" (TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is
no way for appellants not to have noticed the checkpoint.55
In fine, appellants’ defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or
transporting marijuana.
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of
delivering or transporting illegal drugs. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous
Drugs Act is defined to mean: "to carry or convey from one place to another."
When accused-appellant used his vehicle to convey the package containing
marijuana to an unknown destination, his act was part of the process of
transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in the crime of transporting
the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of transporting a
prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The mere commission of the act
constitutes the offense and is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual
committing the act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was caught
transporting marijuana, the crime being mala prohibita, accused-appellant’s
intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof need not be shown.56 (Underscoring
supplied)
A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall transport any prohibited drug. Section 20, Article
IV of the same act provides that the penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied
if the dangerous drug is, with respect to marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the
case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed 1,700 grams. Since the law
prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code57 is necessary. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
that attended the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed by the trial court. A fine of P500,000.00 should,
however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidum in accordance with
the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in
Criminal Case No. 35233-95 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and
Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting marijuana
under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and solidarity pay a fine of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Inspection of building
Camara vs. Municipal Court [387 U.S. 523 (1967)]
Syllabus
 (d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds that
they make minimal demands on occupants;
Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for
refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to
allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and
Page 387 U. S. 524
residential use of which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy
permit. Claiming the inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a
warrant for inspections, appellant while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior
Court for a writ of prohibition, which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could
Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and similar cases, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, not function under reasonable search warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S. 531-
holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State 533.
Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing.

Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to
permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence.
Frank v. Maryland, supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 528-534.
2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code
enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a
particular dwelling violates the code, but on the reasonableness of the
enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The
standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will
necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S. 534-
539.

3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should

(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the
normally be sought only after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.
States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches
and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. P. 387 U. S. 528.
4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 387 U. S. 540.
(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search
of private property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.
237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded.

Rebellion as Continuing Offense

(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment
interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire, health, and housing Umil vs. Ramos (G.R. 81567, July 9, 1990)
inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have
physical conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs,
been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the
moreover, are enforceable by criminal process, as is refusal to allow an
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to
inspection. Pp. 387 U. S. 529-531.
produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should
not be set at liberty without further delay.
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been
confinement to another.
legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court
against them.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted,
so that the informations filed against them are null and void.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective
is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an
pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested
offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal
nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The
circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas
rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the
corpus.
case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to
effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
amended, which provides:
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf
these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without
a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
valid informations filed against them in court.

A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8)
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal petitions is in order.
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988,
the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-
CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow
Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that
the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for
the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in
Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM,
for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando
Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top
of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias
Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was
amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents
filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were
heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly
released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the
writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who
has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act
of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested
just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the
said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated
by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes
of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest
of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of
society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other
acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural
and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below
and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the
writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case
of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To
this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of
guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been
released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against
the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such
irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and
Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the
house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia
Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in
possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no
permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio
Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military
authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He
identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the
Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in
charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon;
"Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato
Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by
Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house
was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the
Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following
articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;

e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment.
Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When
questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he
was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking
member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo
Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound.
When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular
member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka
Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On
further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he
was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him
were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August
11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August
11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but
jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka
Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the
whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the
next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in
the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted
a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain
of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP.
They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer
diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL
Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live
ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia
Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque
admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and
that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the
said other occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for
inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
 their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns.
Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case
were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession
is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
were the following articles:

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on
a) Voluminous subversive documents
behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case,
however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas corpus
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for
filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque
Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
remains for resolution.

c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1)
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers
magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was
not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be
deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest,
without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon
Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously
she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without surrendered to the military.
license to possess them.

On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary

III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are
admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing
subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they
had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening
of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the
house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under
surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on
evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who
conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases
Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo
and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations
filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing
and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of
habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the
parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested
because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7,
shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that
based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an
information, without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had
reads:
been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have
been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.

Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is

lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
IV
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky
Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition
when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988,
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command,
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search,
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky
Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC
Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera,
right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
on the other hand, was released from custody.

The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was
In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made identical
illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary
certifications, as follows:
investigation.

It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so
that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was
conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule
112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia
Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to
have been found in their possession when they were arrested, did not belong to
them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the
arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to
accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in
these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as
counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing
in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP
Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the
other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is
not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the
petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence,
was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a
result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by
former members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid
produced positive results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that the
residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment,
firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that
other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a
"stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left
behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's
arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in
his person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading
would show. Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was
there to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and
Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come
to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the
military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable
Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to
visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect
her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with
Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the
necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper
taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not
offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably,
under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially
considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e,
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their
possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from
which one can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot, involving
utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for
Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of
the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines,
organized for their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988,
while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila,
he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of
persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men,
headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-
type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to
accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped
away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at
Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00
o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim and,
there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was
thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of
the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he
was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in
view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with
violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a
judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just
committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a
press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators
to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to
give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water
and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-
isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced
the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to
investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about
5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was
heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi
tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating
pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na
si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was
invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an
Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is
detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he may
not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting
bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail
(P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in
the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is
unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in
the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was
arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to
Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye
II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso
Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously,
the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with
the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion
was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the
motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted
by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of
habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January
1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition
for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody
of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno
(presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the
same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without
warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively
implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs.
Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime,
does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of
a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
VIII
 We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based
upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the
been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice
issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ
whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of
of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as
commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or
amended is quite explicit in providing that:
not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but
rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for
habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus.
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with a convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727
(Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and,
thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the
SO ORDERED.
person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by
the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the Committed in the Presence of Police Officers
said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce
People vs. Sucro [195 SCRA 388 (1991)]
and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic
dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II
the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest of the Dangerous Drugs Act, under an Information which reads:
and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and,
most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court
that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be
That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion,
able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within
assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting as a
permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away
to another and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law have in his possession and
control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of
dried marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities
of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves
to a customer. (Rollo, p. 9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
"not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction
was rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the
sale of prohibited drug under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay
a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his
sentence with the period for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to
the date of promulgation of this judgment. All the items of marijuana confiscated
in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State. (Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this
appeal, assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo,
to wit:
I activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS
DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE
REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT
IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY
OF THE SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE
IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P 20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as
follows:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo,
Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information
gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself
under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the
house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat.
Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out
later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel,
and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie
Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out
with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It
was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the
developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to
report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting
with appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the
police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt.
Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught
up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the
Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the
ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19,
1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same
from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989)
The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,
The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at
Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18",
Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4,
1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the
arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not
the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his
rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses
that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and
arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of
the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his
arrest.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances
where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(Emphasis supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil.
472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo
Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious
activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to
them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time
that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction
to P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the
police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily
admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that
Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just
committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge,
being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August
27, 1990) that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission
of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
Thus, it stated:
When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would
take place and while positioned at a street comer, they saw appellant Regalado
Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters
away from them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to
Bati, who, thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the
object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part,
placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their
testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that
took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing
distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed
tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the
appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law
enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties
in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v.
Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the
former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three
days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their
childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the
accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that
because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and
merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable
information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday, he was
constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems
from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient
to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is
paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case of
People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial
court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would
attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was
based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the
suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from
this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the
accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them
to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is
effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at
checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in
the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances
(monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting
officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the
contraband.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
(People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant,
it follows that the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its
compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits
obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante
whose reason for testifying could be merely to escape prosecution.
We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:
The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have
been the reason of (sic) his willingness to testify in court against the accused. But
this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As
explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers
are usually their customers, especially if as in this case, there is no other direct
evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. We accept this
observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are, and
should be employed by law enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against
pushers who are the real felons in our society. We have observed the demeanor
of the witness in court, and found him to be straightforward, unhesitating, and
spontaneous in his declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention and
disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)
Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the
trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being
acknowledged. that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during
the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, et
al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745
[1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA
400 [1970]).
Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by
public officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled
by any motive than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the
execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their
duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec.
3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller, supra citing People v.
Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).
The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic
Chemist that the items seized were all positive for marijuana.
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's
defense is alibi which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by
Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.
Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his
uncle and cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact,
however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was present in
the vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the
occasion to meet Macabante on the street.
It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive
identification of the appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People
v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])
Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had
indeed committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Luisito Go (G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001)
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro
Piamonte and SPO3 Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up
Unit of the Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride,
or shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent Ronnie
Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw accused-appellant Luisito
Go, also known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo Disco House with two women.
Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-appellants waist.
Together, the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located
about a hundred meters away from the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that
they were conducting an Operation Bakal, whereby they search for illegally
possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany
them. They went up to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the
lights, and the police officers saw accused-appellant and his lady companions
seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked accused-appellant to
stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist.
SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but accused-appellant was
unable to produce any. Instead, accused-appellant brought out the drivers license
of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the gun, which was
later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, Serial Number 006784, with a magazine
containing ten (10) rounds of live ammunition. Accused-appellant was invited to
the police precinct for questioning.
On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car,
which was parked outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to
his car, a Honda Civic with license plate number TCM-789. Through the
windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National Police identification card
hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant if he was a
member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked accused-appellant
for his drivers license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was
unable to produce them. When accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido
took the ID card and found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong.
The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and
floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he had these items, but he
did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk the
matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they
should talk at the police headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an attach case
from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Accused-
appellant opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in
cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.
The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. When they
arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attach case together with the two
black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane
bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When
the attach case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three
glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.
1cräläwvirtualibräry
Consequently, two Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C, charged accused-appellant with
violation of Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992 at Brgy. I, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba,
province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized/permitted by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
750 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a regulated
drug, in violation of the above-stated law.2cräläwvirtualibräry
The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, charged
accused-appellant with violation of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992, at Flamingo Beerhouse, Crossing,
Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named not being licensed or authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) caliber .9mm marked WALTHER with serial number
006784 with one (1) magazine loaded with ten (10) live ammunitions of same
The two cases were consolidated. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
caliber, in violation of the aforementioned law.3cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused-appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment convicting accused-
for the two crimes. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the
appellant in the two criminal cases, to wit:
arrest and subsequent seizure were legal. A review of the records at bar shows
no reason to depart therefrom.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused in Criminal Case

No. 3308-92-C, to be GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having in his
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any
possession of 750.39 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, 8 is not a hard-and-fast rule.
drug. He is hereby sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00)
may be effected without a warrant. 9 Among these are when, in the presence of
PESOS; and in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, the accused is also found GUILTY
a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm, and is
or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Considering that the accused appears to be detained at the Makati Police Station,
jailer, Makati Police Station is hereby ordered to commit the accused to the New
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he
Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The bond posted
stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was
by the accused in Criminal Cases No. 3308-92-C & 3309-92-C, are hereby
necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for the firearm, whether
ordered cancelled.4cräläwvirtualibräry
at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime
in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such
a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C
directly to this Court, considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua, which appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 116001.
As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126,
On the other hand, accused-appellant brought his appeal of the judgment in
Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. 10 The
Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C before the Court of Appeals. 5 In an Amended
subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline
Decision dated February 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed accused-
substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from
appellants conviction but modified the penalty imposed by the trial court by
where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have
sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
been made during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within
twelve (12) years, to pay a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), citing Section
the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in violation of
8 of R.A. 6425, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 6 Hence, this
the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any
petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 123943.
proceeding. 11 Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the
objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the
drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it has
been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in
evidence. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime is the accuseds lack of license or
permit to carry or possess firearm, ammunition, or explosive. Possession by itself
is not prohibited by law. 13 In prosecutions for illegal possession of firearm, the
element of absence of license to possess the firearm may be established through
the testimony of or a certification from a representative of the Firearms and
Explosives Bureau 14of the Philippine National Police (FEB-PNP), attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm. 15 In this case, a representative of the
FEB-PNP testified that accused-appellant was not a holder of any gun license. 16
Moreover, a certification 17to that effect was presented to corroborate his
testimony. These pieces of evidence suffice to establish the second element of
the offense of possession of unlicensed firearms. 18 However, in a vain attempt
to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presented for the first time an alleged
firearm license, which was described as Annex 2 of his petition. Accused-
appellants counsel admitted that said document was not presented below for
some reason. 19 Whatever those reasons are, he did not specify. The document,
however, is dubious. It is too late in the day for accused-appellant to proffer this
very vital piece of evidence which might exculpate him. First, the reception of
evidence is best addressed to the trial court because it entails questions of fact.
It should be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. 20 Second, the
document marked as Annex 2 of the petition in G.R. No. 123943 is not the
license referred to, but an order of the trial court resetting the date of
arraignment. 21 Third, there is attached to the petition a firearm license 22 which
is a mere photocopy and, as such, cannot be appreciated by this Court. Indeed,
considering that this was the one piece of evidence which could spell accused-
appellants acquittal of the unlicensed firearm charge, and assuming that, as
shown in the face of the license, it was issued on October 7, 1992, there should
be no reason for its non-production during the trial. Fourth, and most
importantly, the genuineness of the purported license becomes all the more
suspect in view of the Certification issued by the FEO-PNP that accused-appellant
was not a licensed firearm holder.
Anent the certification issued by the FEO-PNP to the effect that Luisito Go y Ko
was not a licensed gun holder, accused-appellant claims that he was not the
person alluded to therein because the correct spelling of his middle name is not
Ko but Co. Whatever the correct spelling of his name is, the fact remains that he
had no license on the day the gun was found in his possession. All that he could
present then was a photocopy of his application for gun license, 23 which is not
the equivalent of a license. Appellant testified that he presented a firearm license
to the police, 24 but he could not produce that alleged license in court. If
appellant was indeed a licensed gun holder and if that license existed on October
22, 1992, he could have easily presented it to the police when he was asked for
his papers inside the disco, or if the alleged license was in his car, he could have
easily shown it to them when they went to his car. Otherwise, he could have
easily asked his lawyer or relative to bring the license to the police precinct when
he was being investigated. Despite several opportunities to produce a license, he
failed to do so. In fact, during trial, he never presented any such license. And on
appeal, he could only submit for the first time and for unknown reasons an
alleged photocopy of a purported license. The only plausible conclusion that can
be drawn is that there was no such license in the first place. Hence, his guilt of
illegal possession of firearm was duly established.
Accused-appellants guilt for illegal possession of shabu has likewise been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The white crystalline substance found in his
possession, upon laboratory examination, were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
25cräläwvirtualibräry
The bulk of accused-appellants defense revolves around the factual findings of
the trial court. It should be recalled that factual findings of the trial court, if
supported by evidence on record, and particularly when affirmed by the appellate
court, are binding on this Court. 26 As discussed above, the records substantiate
the trial courts and the appellate courts findings as to accused-appellants
culpability. There is no reason to depart from these findings as no significant
facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded
which, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the case. 27 Moreover,
questions as to credibility of witness are matters best left to the appreciation of
the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive
and incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the reviewing tribunal.
28cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the trial court found:
The narration of the incident by the police is far more worthy of belief coming as
it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their
duties and were not demonstrated to have been unduly biased against the
accused.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that:
(T)he findings of fact of the trial court are generally respected by the appellate
court, unless they are found to be clearly biased or arbitrary. We do not find any
in these cases.30cräläwvirtualibräry
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, committed in 1992, regardless of
whether the firearm is low powered or high powered, was punished with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as provided in P.D. 1866. However, under
R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1997, 31 the penalty was lowered to
prision correcional in its maximum period and a fine of P30,000.00, if the firearm
32 is classified as low powered. In this case, the unlicensed firearm found in
appellants possession was a 9mm Walther pistol, which under the amendatory
law, is considered as low powered. Inasmuch as the new law imposes a reduced
penalty and is, thus, more favorable to accused-appellant, the same may be
given retroactive effect. 33 Therefore, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00.
On the other hand, the crime of illegal possession of regulated drug, under the
law in force at the time of the commission of the offense in this case, was
punished by imprisonment of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and a fine ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, 34 regardless of the
amount of drugs involved. Hence, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00. The decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 750.39
grams of shabu and drug paraphernalia, is likewise AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of P12,000.00. The shabu and subject drug paraphernalia seized from
appellant shall be destroyed as provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
Personal Knowledge of the Offense
People vs. Gerente [219 SCRA 756 (1993)]
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section
8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty
of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel
Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty
years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no
aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive
imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II
of R.A. 6425, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops
wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are
considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at
large, was charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an
information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and
against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic)
block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B.
Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3,
Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant
Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started
drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is
about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in
her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention
to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel,
papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's
suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed:
"Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace
at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first
blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who
hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren
dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged
Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela
Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling
incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival.
The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy
object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima
and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow
block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping.
They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as
policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his
pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves
were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic
Chemist found them to be marijuana.

Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other
suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A.
6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial
court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425
and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in
evidence by the prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes
charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana
leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to
illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in
the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . .
.'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to
death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant
was effected one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The
arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs.
Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to
a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was
made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is
first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A.
Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual
being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against
the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting
him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill
Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back
of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped
the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That
circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the
murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-
testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their
victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When
there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was
moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587,
588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes'
testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his
innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award
of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased
to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the
civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby
increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Sinoc [275 SCRA 357 (1997)]
In a decision handed down on October 7, 1993, by Branch 30 of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Danilo Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in two cases jointly tried: 1 one, of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 2 and 48 3
of the Revised Penal Code) — in Criminal Case No. 3564; and the other, of the
complex crime of kidnapping with frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6 4
and 48 of the same Code) — in Criminal Case No. 3565. In each case, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on him. 5
The amended informations under which Sinoc was tried and convicted, both
dated January 23, 1992, included five (5) other accused, namely: Vicente Salon
@ "Dodong," Benjamin Espinosa @ "Benji," Jaime Jornales @ "James," Victorino
Delegencia @ Jun-Gren," and one Roger Doe @ "Ram" (at large). 6 However,
only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned, on July 14, 1992, the other accused
being then at large, as they still appear to be to this day. Assisted by their
respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and were
thereafter jointly tried. The joint trial resulted in Salon’s acquittal in both cases.
The Court agreed with him that "none of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution remotely implicate . . . (him in) the crimes charged," and that"
(i)ndeed, the only piece of evidence pointing to . . . (him [Salon]) as the
mastermind is contained in the affidavit of confession of accused Danilo Sinoc;"
hence, conspiracy not having been proved, the case against Salon "has to be
dismissed." Only Sinoc, therefore, is concerned in the appeal at bar.
Respecting the essential facts constituting the corpus delicti, there appears to be
no serious dispute. It appears that on September 20, 1991, at about 6 o’clock in
the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was
motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte)
to Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (with
Plate No. DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were
approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were stopped by several armed
men. The latter, identifying themselves as members of the New People’s Army
(NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached
Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to
alight, led them, their hands bound behind their back to a coconut grove some
six meters from the road, and after making them lie face down on the ground,
shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon,
was not as lucky; he died on the spot.
These facts are set forth in, among others, a sworn statement given to the police
by Sinoc, infra and an affidavit executed and sworn to by Viacrusis on October
17, 1991, about a month later. 7 In that affidavit, Viacrusis described the armed
men who had kidnapped and shot him and Guijapon. The only malefactor he was
able to identify by name, however, was Danilo Sinoc who, he said, had "curly
hair, (was) known as ‘Colot’ (Danilo Sinoc), (and was known to) driver Tarcing . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library
Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of the
consolidated cases: Marlyn Legaspi, a resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao
del Sur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, also of Barangay San Vicente.
Marlyn testified that she was startled by the sound of gunshots that morning of
September 20, 1991. She ran towards the direction of the gunfire and as she
neared the place, heard the moaning of a man. She moved quickly to the
highway and saw a blue "Pajero" parked at the barangay road, its engine idling;
and moments later, she saw the same vehicle running fast towards San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. She lost no time in reporting the incident to Barangay
Councilor Terencio Jamero.
Jamero testified that on receiving Marlyn’s report, he and another Councilor,
Alberto Saliling, at once proceeded to the place indicated. There they came upon
the slain driver, and Isidoro Viacrusis, lying on the ground, sorely wounded,
crying out for help. With the assistance of policemen of Barobo, they brought
Viacrusis to the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay. Timely medical
attention enabled Viacrusis to recover from his grievous wounds.
The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of the
following day, September 21, 1991, at about 7 o’clock, a secret informant
(known as a "civilian asset") named Boyet reported to the police Station at
Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen ("carnapped") "Pajero" was parked
behind the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at
Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station Commander, a police team 8
went to the place. They saw the "Pajero" and, their initial inquiries having yielded
the information that the man who had brought it there would return that
morning, posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. Some three
hours later, at about 10:30 o’clock, they saw a man approach the "Pajero" who,
on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the
man, identified as Danilo Sinoc of Surigao del Norte, 9 had the key of the
"Pajero," and was acting under instructions of certain companions who were
waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the
recovered "Pajero," the police officers brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only to
discover that his companions were no longer there. They later turned over Sinoc
to the 459(th) Mobile Force, together with the "Pajero."cralaw virtua1aw library
Four months afterwards, in the afternoon of January 21, 1993, SPO1 Roger A.
Basadre and two other officers (of the CIS) brought Danilo Sinoc to the Public
Attorney’s Office at Curato Street, Butuan City. They asked one of the attorneys
there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinoc’s statement in writing in
his office. Sinoc asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an
"affidavit of confession."cralaw virtua1aw library
Atty. Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and to
remain silent. Sinoc said he wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and be
assisted by Jalad in doing so. The latter then had Sinoc narrate the occurrence in
question in "Cebuano/Visayan," a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar. That
done, Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him anything for the affidavit he
would execute. Sinoc said no. Only then did the CIS officers commence to take
Sinoc’s statement, typing their questions and Sinoc’s answers — as well as the
initial appraisal of his constitutional rights — on a typewriter in Atty. Jalad’s
Office.cralawnad
In his sworn statement, 10 Sinoc declared that he knew the victims, Isidoro
Viacrusis and Tarcisio Guijapon because he was "formerly working at Taganito
Mining Company" (TAMICO); that in June, 1991, he learned that Benjamin
Espinosa (@ Benji), Jaime Jornales (@ James), Victorino Delegencia (@ Jun-
Gren), and a certain "Ram" had been monitoring the activities of TAMICO
Manager Viacrusis whom they planned to kidnap and rob of his "Pajero," and
make it appear to be an act of the NPA; that the criminal undertaking was
planned by a certain Vicente Salon (@ Dodong), who made available the needed
funds and two (2) hand guns; that in September, 1991, at a meeting of the
group at the boarding house of "Jun-Gren" to which he (Sinoc) was invited was
offered P20,000.00 to join in the "kidnapping and carnapping" operation; that he
agreed "because of poverty;" that in the morning of September 20, 1991, at
about 6:30 o’clock, he, "Ram" and Benjamin Espinosa stopped the "Pajero"
driven by Tarcisio Guijapon in which Viacrusis was riding, brandishing two .38
caliber revolvers, and a piece of wood shaped like a rifle; that they boarded the
vehicle, identifying themselves as NPA (soldiers of the New People’s Army) and
had the driver proceed towards Surigao City; that at the bridge of Tres de Mayor,
they had the "Pajero" stop to pick up two other companions, "James" (Jaime
Jornales) and Jun-gren" (Victor Delegencia); that "Ram" took over the wheel and
drove towards Butuan City; that at San Vicente, Barobo, "Ram" turned into a
feeder road and stopped about seven (7) meters from the highway; that there,
Viacrusis and Guijapon, whose hands had been tied behind their back, were made
to get down; that "James" Jornales shot Viacrusis four times after which "Jun-
gren" Delegencia, Jr. fired at Guijapon four times, too; that when Sinoc
remonstrated at the shootings, he was told it was on Dodong Salon’s orders; that
the malefactors then proceeded to the "Bliss" Housing Project at Monkayo where
they left the "Pajero," this being the place where the mastermind, Vicente Salon,
was supposed to get the vehicle and pay Sinoc the promised sum of P20,000.00;
that they then all went to Tagum; that on the following day, Sinoc was instructed
by Jun-gren and James to return to Monkayo with the key of the "Pajero" and
deliver it to "Ram," and that when he arrived at the place at about 9 o’clock in
the morning, he was apprehended by soldiers and brought to the "459(th) PNP
Mobile Company."cralaw virtua1aw library
During the entire period of Sinoc’s interrogation, which commenced at about 3:00
P.M., Atty. Jalad remained seated beside him; and at its conclusion, Jalad read to
Sinoc the contents of his statement from beginning to end. The statement was
thereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described as "witness to
signature." 11
Sinoc was next brought to the home of Butuan City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy
so that he might take oath on his statement. This was at about 7:00 P.M. After
going over the statement, City Fiscal Brocoy told Sinoc that is was "very
damaging," briefly discussing the contents thereof in Cebuano. The latter stood
by his answers, however, averring that they had been voluntarily given. Evidently
satisfied of the authenticity and voluntariness of the statement, Brocoy
administered the oath to Sinoc, and signed the certification typed at the left hand
margin of page 4 thereof, reading: "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
21st day of January 1992, at Butuan City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I
personally examined the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that he voluntarily
executed and understood his statement." He also initialed every page of the
statement. 12
While under detention at the Provincial Jail, awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two (2)
letters to the Trial Judge dated June and July, 1992, in both of which he asked
that he be transferred to the City Jail because he had heard that Vicente Salon,
who had been arrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had made plans
to kill him. He sent the Judge a third letter — dated August 11, 1993, consisting
of four (4) pages — which is described by His Honor as "substantially a repetition
of the contents of his affidavit of confession." All the letters were handwritten in
block letters in the Cebuano dialect. 13

Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi. His claim, as summarized by his counsel, was
that "on September 19, 1991, he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur together with
his wife and prepared on that early morning to sell tableya (native chocolate) in
Tagum, Davao del Norte. On the same day they reached Tagum and they sold
tableya and on the same day there were not able to sell the tableya; on
September 20, 1991 they were again selling tableya in Tagum, Davao del Norte.
It was while in Tagum that . . . (they met) a certain Darves, they did not know
exactly the name, he offered to them the money to accompany the said driver of
Darves who is name(d) Ram. He was offered . . . money to accompany this Ram
in prior (sic) to allegedly get the Pajero vehicle from Moncayo together with Ram,
and while in Moncayo he was first apprehended by the police and detained at
Moncayo, first . . . (by) the 459 Mobile Force of . . . Monkayo and on January 14,
1992 to January 24, 1992 he was detained by the CIS authorities in Butuan
City."cralaw virtua1aw library
Elaborating, Sinoc testified that he saw Darves with three companions at "a
certain restaurant in Tagum;" that Darves introduced himself, and offered to give
him P1,000.00 if he would accompany his driver to get a vehicle at Moncayo; that
he agreed, and at 6 o’clock in the morning of September 21, 1991 he went to the
Star Lodge where Darves was staying; that there, he was introduced to the
latter’s driver, Ram, given P1,000.00, and told to go with Ram; and that he went
out of the Star Lodge, gave his wife P800.00, and then went with Ram to
Moncayo on board a bus.
In Moncayo, they went to where the Pajero was parked. Sinoc went towards the
vehicle. Ram lagged behind, having paused to buy some cigarettes. When Sinoc
reached the Pajero, five persons suddenly pointed guns at him, searched him,
and found on him the key to the "Pajero" which Darves had given to him. The
five persons, who were led by Sgt. Michael Aringgo of the PNP, brought him to
the Moncayo police station where they investigated him without informing him of
his constitutional rights.
In the afternoon of that day, September 21, 1991, he was surrendered to the
459th Mobile Force Company which detained him until January 14, 1992. On this
date he was taken by CIS personnel and brought to the CIS Compound at Butuan
City, at which place he was confined up to January 24, 1992, and subjected to
the interrogation without being informed that he had a right to remain silent. He
was told, however, that he had the right to counsel, but although he told the
investigators that his lawyer was Atty. Gavino Samontina, they never called the
latter.
The investigators wished him to sign an affidavit. When he refused, they
maltreated him by repeatedly submerging his head in a toilet bowl full of
excrement, as well as by trying him on a bed, raising the bed on one end so that
his feet were up and his head down, and keeping him in the position for hours.
On January 20, 1992, his wife and Efren Dak-ang came to see him at the CIS
Compound. He talked to them and revealed what was being done to him while
under investigation.
On January 21, 1992, after having been interrogated the whole night, he finally
agreed to sign the affidavit because the CIS officers told him," (W)e will kill you
or salvage you." In fact, the night before, police officers had brought him to an
uninhabited place near the bridge and with guns pointed at his head, commanded
him to run. He refused, of course. So, in the afternoon of that day, at around 4
o’clock, he was brought to the office of Public Attorney Jalad, where the police
investigators" hurriedly typed" his affidavit and made him sign it. He denied that
Atty. Jalad informed him of his constitutional rights. He asserted that when he
told Jalad he had his own lawyer, Jalad merely remarked, "Never mind, all
attorneys are just the same as long as it is attorney." He was next brought to
Fiscal Brocoy who, without talking to him, "right away signed that document" (his
confession).
Sinoc also explained how he had come to write the letter of August 11, 1992 to
the Judge some seven months after his confession. That letter — it will be
recalled and as is evident from a comparison of both documents — was described
by the latter as "substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavit of
confession," supra. 14 He said:" (T)here were persons who visited me while at
the Provincial Jail and told me to accept the crime . . . because if I will not accept
the crime, my wife and children (and) my parents, they will liquidate all of them..
. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Sinoc’s wife, Jovita, testified for the defense, and sought to corroborate his
testimony. She affirmed that she had seen her husband at the CIS on September
20, 1992, at about 8:30 in the evening and he had told her then to "keep . . .
silent not to tell anybody that he will be accompan(ied) by the CIS." Efren Dak-
ang also gave corroborating testimony.
For some undisclosed reason, the surviving victim, Isidoro Viacrusis, did not
testify; this, despite the fiscal’s assurances to the Trial Judge that he was "very
interested" in giving evidence. Obviously because of Viacrusis’ failure to testify,
his affidavit of October 17, 1991 was not formally offered, being obviously
hearsay, although it is attached to the record.
Be this as it may, the Trial Court was satisfied that the evidence actually
presented by the Government sufficed to establish Sinoc’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the two felonies with which he stood charged.
Sinoc has taken an appeal to this Court and ascribes to the Trial Court the
following errors: (1) convicting him of the offenses charged although conspiracy
had not been independently proven to exist among him and other persons named
in the indictment; (2) not rejecting the evidence obtained after he had been
"arrested without any warrant of arrest," and (3) not rejecting his confession
after he had been illegally arrested and had thereafter been "under custodial
investigation . . . without a counsel of choice" from September 21, 1991 to
January 20, 1992, first by the Moncayo 459th Mobile Force, and later by the
C.I.S., Butuan City.
As regards Sinoc’s claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that an arrest without
warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer, inter alia. "When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." 15
There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an
offense had just been committed; i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a "Pajero"
belonging to a private company had been stolen ("carnapped") and its driver and
passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of
death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer ("asset") had reported that the
stolen "Pajero" was at the Bliss Housing Project at Monkayo. It was precisely to
recover the "Pajero" that a team composed of SPO1 Michael Aringo and "joint
elements of 459 PNP MFC and Moncayo Police Stn led by Insptr Eden T. Ugale,"
went to that place and, on taking custody of the "Pajero," forthwith dispatched a
radio message to "Higher Headquarters" advising of that fact. 16
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached
the place where the "Pajero" was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner
of the apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that the man who had
brought the "Pajero" would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus
described did in fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately
identified by Overa as "the one who rode on that car ‘Pajero;’" 17 just as there is
no question that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the
stolen "Pajero" and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take
possession of it (after having arrived by bus from Tagum together with another
suspect, "Ram"). Sinoc’s link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the kidnapping
and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest
Sinoc and take possession of the "Pajero." His arrest without warrant was
justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers’ clear duty to apprehend him;
their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
Sinoc’s assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantless
arrest, because conducted without advice to him of his constitutional rights, is
pointless. It is true that, as candidly admitted by the arresting officers, their
initial interrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told of his
corresponding rights. This is inconsequential for the prosecution never attempted
to prove what he might have said on that occasion.
The confession made by him some time afterwards at the Public Attorneys’ Office
at Butuan City is altogether a different matter, however. The record adequately
shows it to have been executed voluntarily and under applicable safeguards,
apart from being confirmed by, consistent with, other evidence.
Sinoc does not dispute that he was taken to the Public Attorney’s Office; that he
spoke to Atty. Alfredo Jalad and it was in the latter’s office that his confession
was prepared by the CIS investigator. Nor does he deny that he was then
brought to the home of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy who certified that the
confession had been subscribed and sworn to before him and that he was
satisfied that Sinoc had voluntarily executed and understood his statement. Sinoc
nonetheless claims that he was under intimidation at that time and never advised
of his constitutional rights.
After carefully considering the evidence, this Court is convinced that the Trial
Judge was correct in accepting the account of the execution of Sinoc’s confession
(Exhs. K, K-1 to K-5) narrated by Public Atty. Alfredo Jalad and City Prosecutor
Ernesto Brocoy, to the effect that the confession was voluntarily given after he
had been duly informed of his constitutional rights. No reason whatever is
discernible in the record for these Government officials to give false evidence
against Sinoc, or testify otherwise than to the truth.
Sinoc’s confession of January 21, 1992 is confirmed by the letter he admittedly
wrote to the Trial Judge more than a year later, on August 11, 1993, 18 the
contents of which are, as observed by the Trial Judge, substantially identical with
those of the confession. In said letter, in which he narrates in no little detail the
same story contained in his confession, he apologizes for "bothering you again at
this time" (obviously referring to his prior letters to the Judge of June and July
1992), and gives his reasons for writing the latest letter; to ask for the Judge’s
assistance and take account of his allegation that his agreement with his co-
accused was only to stop the "Pajero," that it was poverty that impelled him to
join the plotters (Vicente Salon, Et. Al.); to see that Tarcisio Guijapon and
Viacrusis be given justice; and to plead that the Judge take pity on him, and not
give him too heavy a penalty.
The confession is also consistent with Sinoc’s testimony at his trial in which he
admitted that he had indeed traveled from Tagum to Moncayo where he was
arrested; and that he has made the trip, together with his co-accused, "Ram,"
precisely to get the stolen "Pajero" the key of which he had on his person at the
time. It contains details (e.g., the use of two (2) hand guns and a wooden rifle,
the bringing of the Pajero from the scene of the killing to Monkayo, the identities
of the individual malefactors who shot the victims) which it is improbable to think
were conjured out of thin air by the police investigators or deduced from other
evidence. The confession is consistent too, with the other proofs, particularly the
testimony of Marlyn Legaspi and Barangay Councilor Jamero as regards the time
and place of the shooting of the hapless victims.chanrobles
In any event, the Trial Judge appears to have carefully assessed the demeanor of
the witnesses for the prosecution and those for the defense, in relation to the
documents on record, and on this basis and from his vantage point, found that
the prosecution’s proofs were more credible than the defense, and that their
combined weight established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s culpable
participation in the crimes charged.
It must additionally be pointed out that apart from Sinoc’s protestations that his
extrajudicial confession was the result of torture and threats, no competent
evidence exists on record to substantiate that claim. He made no such claim to
either Public Attorney Alfredo Jalad or City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy although
there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate any cause for him to distrust
either government officer, much less believe they were in conspiracy with the
police officers to concoct a case against him. In fact, although he professes to
have disclosed his supposed maltreatment to his wife when she visited him at the
place of his detention, the latter made no mention of it in her testimony, nor did
she ever attempt to have him medically examined to confirm such a revelation, if
it had been made. Moreover, the counsel he said, who wanted to represent him
during his interrogation at Public Attorney Jalad’s office, Atty. Gavino Samontina,
was never presented to confirm his statement.
While the evidence does show that Sinoc became embroiled in a criminal
conspiracy 19 — he agreed (out of poverty, he says) to join in an crime being
planned by certain men named by him and decided to commit it with them — the
agreement, as far as he was concerned, was to waylay Viacrusis, the Manager of
the Tagum Mining Company, and rob him of his "Pajero," for which his share
would be P20,000.00; but it did not include the shooting of Viacrusis or any one
else. In fact, he raised a protest when Viacrusis and Guijapon were shot. In other
words, as far as Sinoc understood it, and as far as may in fact be deduced from
the evidence, the plan was not much to capture Viacrusis and deprive him of
liberty, even less to assassinate him, but to steal his "Pajero" by violent means.
The "kidnapping" was not the principal objective; it was merely incidental to the
forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by reason or on the occasion of the
seizure of the "Pajero" — and (as far as the proofs demonstrate) without fore-
knowledge on Sinoc’s part — its driver was killed, and the lone passenger
seriously injured.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code — the essential object of which is to "kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty." The idea of
"kidnapping" in this case appears to have been the result of the continuous but
uninformed use of that term by the peace officers involved in the investigation,
carelessly carried over into the indictments and the record of the trial, and even
accepted by His Honor. 20
The offense actually committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 — where the killing of
Tarcesio Guijapon accompanied the taking of the "Pajero" — is that defined and
penalized by Article 294 of the Criminal Code, 21 viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties.
— Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall
suffer:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
x x x
It is germane to observe that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as
important or primordial an objective as the asportation of the "Pajero," the
kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with homicide; 22 and that the
term, "homicide," is used in the quoted article in the generic sense — i.e., as also
including murder, the nature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous
character, or the number, of the killings in connection with the robbery. 23
On the other hand, the wrongful acts actually proven to have been committed by
the defendants in Criminal Case No. 3565 are: (1) robbery, of course, as above
described, and (2) frustrated murder on the occasion thereof — gunshot wounds
having been inflicted on Isidoro Viacrusis, while bound and prostrate on the
ground, utterly unable to put up any defense, the wounds being of such a nature
as would have resulted in his death were it not for timely medical intervention.
Obviously, these acts do not fall within the ambit of Article 294, which treats of
the special complex crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons, but NOT robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide (or murder),
although the law does not punish the crime of attempted and frustrated robbery
with homicide. 24
Neither do the crimes come within the operation of Article 48 of the Criminal
Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that when "a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." In this
case, the two crimes of "carnapping" and frustrated murder did not result from "a
single act." Nor was either offense a "necessary means for committing the other."
The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the "carnapping;" indeed
at the time the victim was shot, the "carnapping" had already been
consummated. And, of course, the "carnapping" which, according to the
evidence, was the conspirators’ principal objective, was not necessary to
perpetrate the shooting.
It follows then that the malefactors’ felonious acts in Criminal Case No. 3565
cannot be regarded as juridically fused into a "complex crime" under Article 48.
They should be considered separate offenses, separately punishable.
Now Sinoc admittedly entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused; but he
insists that as far as he was concerned, the conspiracy was to "carnap" the
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3564, appellant Danilo Sinoc, being guilty
"Pajero," and did not include any killing or assault against persons. His theory is
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of robbery with homicide defined and
that the slaying of the driver and passenger might conceivably have been
punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to reclusion
contemplated from the outset by one or some or all his co-conspirators; but
perpetua. Criminal Case No. 3565 is DISMISSED as to him.
Sinoc himself never had that intention. Indeed, he says he had no inkling that the
shooting would take place; had no opportunity to prevent it, and could only
remonstrate about it after it was done; and he invokes the doctrine that
conspirators may only be held accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal SO ORDERED.
agreement; and as regards felonious acts not included, only the author thereof
People vs. Baula (G.R. No. 132671, November 15, 2000)
would be liable.25cralaw:red
In an Information, dated 07 August 1996, Accused-appellants were charged with
murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The
Sinoc’s disclaimers notwithstanding, it is this Court’s view that the crime that accusatory portions of the Information against the indictees read:chanrob1es
may properly be ascribed to him in Case No. 3564 is robbery with homicide under virtua1 1aw library
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. For unfortunately for him, there is no
avoiding the fact that a homicide — although not agreed to or expected by him —
was committed on the occasion of the robbery of the "Pajero," and he could not "That on or about the 13th day of December 1995, in the evening, in barangay
but have realized or anticipated the possibility of serious harm, even death, being Sioasio West, Municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within
inflicted on the person or persons in the "Pajero" targeted for robbery, since two the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
of his companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to repeat, his confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a bolo (tabas), with
agreement did not include killing. 26 The most that can be conceded is to credit abuse of superior strength, treachery and evident premeditation and intent to kill,
him with the mitigating circumstance of having "no intention to commit so grave did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
a wrong as that committed." 27 Patrocenia Caburao, inflicting upon her the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Sinoc may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of "1. Hacking wound — 3 inches in length; 2 inches deep Rt. Occipital region (nape
frustrated murder as regards Viacrusis, for the reasons already mentioned; in this area) exposing brain tissue;
particular case, the evidence shows that he agreed only to the plan to "carnap"
the "Pajero," but not to any assault or killing. 28 Nor it is logical to convict him
twice of robbery of the same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he "2. Hacking wound — 4 inches in length; 2 inches deep at mid occipital area
may not be pronounced responsible for the separate offense of robbery of the exposing damage brain tissue;
same "Pajero," in addition to being declared guilty of robbery (of that same
"Pajero") with homicide under Article 294.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"3. Hacking wound — 4 inches in length; 1/2 inch deep facial area running across
the Rt. Cheek and left cheek including the nasal area;
The penalty imposable on Sinoc is that provided in Article 294 of the Penal Code,
which is reclusion perpetua to death. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that done, the
"4. Hacking wound — 2 inches in height; 1 inch deep at the vertex (top of the
penalty that should be applied to him is reclusion perpetua.
head);
"5. Abrasion; confluent at the back area.
"Cause of death — Brain tissue injury secondary to mortal wounds above which
injuries directly caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said Patrocenia Caburao.
"Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code." 1
When arraigned, the accused all entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. Trial shortly thereafter ensued.
The relevant facts and events that transpired, according to the prosecution, were
briefly narrated in the People’s Brief.
On 13 December 1995, at around eight o’clock in the evening, Jupiter Caburao,
decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house
at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her due obligations at a
store, about one-and-a-half kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida
Tumamang. While traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter noticed a
commotion near the creek about ten meters away from him. He focused his
flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and saw accused-
appellants Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who
was lying on the ground, while accused-appellants Robert Baula and Ruben Baula
stood as lookouts. The assault lasted for about four minutes. Accused-appellants
fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge
the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who
turned out to be his own mother. Her head and face sustained four hacking
wounds, two of which damaged her brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and
brought his niece and nephew to the house of a neighbor for their safety. For fear
of reprisal from accused-appellants and believing that the police would be able to
solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the damage to either his
relatives or the police.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
About two o’clock in the morning of 14 December 1995, the police authorities, led
by SPO4 Fermin Mirande, went to the locus criminis, and took pictures of the
body of the victim. 2 The investigation revealed that before the victim was killed,
she had been to Brigida Tumamang’s store; that accused-appellants were also at
the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between seven
o’clock and eight o’clock in the evening, and that, fifteen minutes later, Accused-
appellants also left.
SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the respective houses of
Accused-Appellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the
clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula gave his bloodstained
pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt.
The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group
found hanging on the wall a bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short
pants, polo shirt and bolo, together with the victim’s dried blood samples, 3 were
sent on the same day to the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City
Branch Office, 4 for forensic examination. The results of the examination 5
disclosed that the bloodstains 6 found in the bolo, 7 the bloodstains 8 on the polo
shirt 9 and the bloodstains 10 on the pair of short pants 11 had the same type
"O" blood as that of the victim.
The defense had another version of the incident.
Wilson Radovan, the barangay captain of Siwasiw, Sual, Pangasinan, testified
that on 13 December 1995, at around eight o’clock in the evening, while he and
the other barangay officials were at their outpost, they heard the cry of a woman
asking for help. Rushing out, they saw Teofila Uson, a barangay mate, who told
them that she and Patrocinia Caburao were being pelted with stones. Teofila Uson
said that it was too dark to be able to identify the person who had attacked them.
When the group proceeded to the place of the incident, they saw the lifeless body
of Patrocinia Caburao, beside the road, near the creek. Radovan testified that he
did not notice any other person in the place where the incident occurred. He
requested Gene Macatiao, the son-in-law of the victim and one of those who first
arrived in the scene, to inform their relatives and the police.
Ruben Baula testified that in the morning of 13 December 1995, he, together
with his co-accused and other companions, namely, Pepito Ramos, Amber
Pagudpod, Francis Amistad and Reny, were harvesting palay, at Sitio Binabalian,
Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, on the land being tenanted by Crisanto Baula.
He recounted that they were there until 4:55 in the afternoon at about which
time Crisanto Baula invited the group to eat "merienda" in the nearby canteen of
Brigida Tumamang. He noticed that when they arrived at the store, there were
three other persons partaking of drinks. At about twilight, they left the store of
Brigida Tumamang and proceeded to their respective residences, leaving behind
the three persons who continued with their drinking spree. At about three o’clock
in the morning of 14 December 1995, while he was asleep, four policemen and
several barangay officials arrived and asked him if he knew who had killed
Patrocinia Caburao. Although he denied any knowledge about the killing, the
policemen, nevertheless, invited him to accompany them to the house of Robert
Baula. Arriving thereat, the policemen likewise questioned the latter about the
killing of Patrocinia Caburao. Robert Baula, like his co-accused Ruben Baula,
denied any knowledge of the killing. After the interrogation, the police authorities
allowed them to go. Ruben and Robert Baula both vehemently denied that the
police ever took any clothing from them.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accused-appellants, Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos, corroborated the
testimony of their co-accused, Ruben and Robert Baula, in its material points,
claiming that in the morning of 13 December 1995, they went to Sitio Binabalian
to harvest palay; that in the afternoon, they took their merienda at the store of
Brigida Tumamang; and that, thereafter, they went home leaving behind the
three persons still indulging in drinks at the store of Brigida Tumamang.
The trial over, the court a quo rendered its judgment on 17 November 1997,
convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged; thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula, Ruben Baula and Robert
Baula, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
"Pursuant thereto and in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2 of the same
code, all the aforenamed accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Patrocinia
Caburao the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. P50,000.00 for the death of Patrocinia Caburao;
"b. P15,000.00 for funeral expenses;
"c. moral damages of P75,000.00;
"d. to pay proportionally the costs.
"SO ORDERED." 12
Accused-appellants contend in the instant appeal that the trial court has erred (1)
in giving full credence to the belated eyewitness account of Jupiter Caburao
ascribing to herein accused-appellants authorship of the crime, and (2) in
admitting in evidence the bolo, polo shirt, and short pants taken by the
policemen from accused-appellants in violation of their constitutional rights.
In convicting accused-appellants, the trial court found the explanation of Jupiter
for his delay in reporting what he knew of the gruesome killing not to be without
valid reasons. After all, the court said, he was threatened and he felt that the
authorities could solve the crime even without revealing what he
knew.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
True, the rule has generally been that where the culpability or innocence of an
accused hinges on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their
testimony, the assessment made by the trial court thereover is entitled to a great
degree of respect and, absent strong justifications to the contrary, it will not be
disturbed on appeal. 13 The reason is simple. A trial court gets an opportunity,
not equally open to an appellate court, to observe the expression of witnesses at
Verily, it is not uncommon for a witness to show some reluctance about being
the stand, including their demeanor under questioning, that makes up a most
immersed in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to "get
significant factor in the proper evaluation of testimonial evidence. Obviously,
involved" is, in fact, of judicial notice. 19 Thus, it is recognized that the delay or
however, this rule will not apply where one judge hears the testimony of the
vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the
witnesses and another judge pens the decision for, in such a case, the thesis for
credibility of witnesses for, more often than not, such a delay can be satisfactorily
the rule is not in the least extant. 14
explained. 20

In the case under review, such as in People v. Capilitan 15 and People v.

In this instance, however, the Court cannot help but doubt as being highly
Villapana, 16 the decision was rendered by the judge who did not conduct the
suspect, the belated revelation of Jupiter on the identity of the assailants. His
trial and hear the evidence. The Court in acquitting Capilitan of rape, quoted with
claim that he did not immediately report the matter to the police relying on a
approval its previous pronouncement in Villapana similarly acquitting the accused
supposition that the crime could anyway be solved even without his own
therein, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
disclosure appears to be a bit flimsy. Unlike previous cases where we have ruled
otherwise, Jupiter is not just an innocent bystander but the son of the victim. The
raging passion and anger of a son who has just lost a mother in such a brutal
"Additionally, we have to take note that in this case, the judge who heard the
manner would have impelled him to immediately report the crime to the
evidence for the prosecution is not the same judge who decided the case. It was
authorities even with an alleged threat upon his life.
Judge Serafin Salvador who heard the testimonies of complainant and her
witness before his retirement. Whereas, it was Judge Romulo Quimbo who
decided the case relying solely on the transcripts of stenographic notes in
It can be accepted that there is yet no real test or a hard and fast rule in
appreciating Macaranas’ and her witness’ testimonies. Even as this Court has
ascertaining the truth of the testimony of a witness to an accurate degree.
consistently been guided by the precept that findings of trial courts on credibility
Nevertheless, testimony that conforms to human knowledge, observation, and
of witnesses are accorded .great weight and must not be disturbed as it was the
experience is often deemed reliable and that which is repugnant to such
trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
standards belongs to the miraculous and outside of judicial cognizance. 21 The
while they were testifying, this case should be an exception in view of the fact
Court finds that Jupiter’s response to the events is far from the natural reaction
that the Judge who decided the case is NOT the same judge who heard the
of a son who has just witnessed the grisly murder of his own mother. What he
evidence (see People v. Escalante, Et Al., G.R. No. L-371457, August 22, 1984,
has said to have done is simply not in accord with human nature. With all the
131 SCRA 237). Thus, the Court should all the more exercise utmost care in
bitterness and indignation expected of a person similarly situated, it is quite odd
evaluating the evidence presented in the instant case so as to render justice not
that he would keep the matter to himself and fail to disclose his knowledge of the
only to the accused, but also to the complainant and the State as well. 17
crime to the police authorities, or even to any of his relatives, despite his
presence during their investigation of the case. His belated declaration of the
identity of his mother’s assailants, some two months after the killing, can but
Here, it was Judge Antonio M. Belen who heard the testimony given at the trial,
accentuate the difficulty that the Court would have to face if it were to rely
but it was Judge Emilio V. Angeles who wrote the decision, dated 17 November
almost completely on his testimony.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
1997, solely on the basis of the records of the case. Having neither personally
heard the testimony of the witnesses nor observed their deportment and manner
of testifying, his assessment on the credibility of witnesses would have to be
A careful reading of the records of this case additionally would reveal significant
received with caution on appeal. 18
flaws in the testimony of Jupiter.

Jupiter testified that he was able to recognize all the accused being
barangaymates but failed to recognize the victim because he was quite distant
from the place where the assault took place. He remembered well the number of
times the accused Crisanto and Danilo had allegedly hacked the victim, yet, on
further questioning by the trial court, he could not tell which part of the body of
the victim was struck. On direct examination, Jupiter would insist that he
approached the victim after the accused had fled. When asked by the court
whether he went close to the "place of the incident," he answered in the
negative, stating that he was shocked and frightened. Jupiter testified that the
incident had lasted for four minutes and that he focused his flashlight on the
commotion four times, at intervals of five seconds each, but, again, when queried
by the court why he had waited for four minutes before focusing his flashlight,
Jupiter kept silent and did not answer the question.
It would seem unlikely that after Jupiter focused his flashlight on them, Accused-
appellants would continue hacking the victim and for the two lookouts, who were
supposed to precisely warn their co-accused of the presence of witnesses, to
simply do nothing about it. The most common response of persons committing a
crime would be to flee upon being discovered. Indeed, there should be greater
reason for them to do so when that witness happened to be the son of their
victim.
Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself which, by common experience and
observation, could lead to the inference of at least its probability under the
circumstances. 22 In a criminal prosecution the accused is confronted with the
full might of state authority. The evidence of the prosecution must thus be strong
to pierce the shield of presumptive innocence. 23
Accused-appellants also take exception to the admissibility of the evidence
consisting of the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants arguing that, even
on the assumption that these articles did belong to accused-appellants, their
seizure without a valid warrant has violated their constitutional rights.
Admittedly, the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were taken, sans
any search warrant, from accused-appellants Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and
Ruben Baula, respectively, at a time when the police started to question them
about the killing of Patrocinia Caburao.
Section 2, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above constitutional mandate is complemented by Article III, Section 3(2), of
the Constitution providing that —
"SECTION 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" —
a rule pronounced by the Court in Stonehill v. Diokno. 24 The plain import of the
fundamental law is thus to say that between the State and the people stands the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest. 25 The protection means that the State
cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into houses, or conduct search and seizure
thereat or on the person of an individual, and it puts up an almost impenetrable
shield to protect privacy and accord sanctity against this unlawful form of
restraint. 26
The above proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not
absolute, of course, and the Court has had occasions to rule that a warrantless
search and seizure of property is valid under certain circumstances. There can,
for instance, be a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rules 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
"Q. Dead already?
jurisprudence; or seizure of evidence in "plain view," its elements being extant;
27 or search of a moving vehicle; 28 or consented search; or customs search. 29
The situation here in question, however, can hardly come within the purview of
any of the established exceptions.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary "Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself must have to "A. Yes, sir, due to multiple hack wounds.
be effected under the circumstances enumerated by law. One such case is when
an offense has in fact just been committed, and the peace officer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. 30 "Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles "Q. What have you and your companions done there?
were allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police
officers conducting the investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The
investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the "Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless
arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless
search and seizure.
"A. Since at the time we arrived at the place, we did not immediately gather such
evidence to pin point any suspect. We tried our very best to conduct further
investigation as to the place where this victim came from and we were able to
SPO4 Fermin Mirande testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph establish that she came at the place where at the place of one store, sir.

"Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. What have you found in the scene of the incident? "Q. Store of?

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. We were able to see the bloodied body of Patrocinia Caburao, sir. "A. I could no longer . . . .

"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Q. In Siwasiw?

 "Q. Have you ascertain the identities of the persons who were drinking at the
store?
"A. Yes, sir. From that place, according to the information given by the owner of
the store, nobody had seen what is really happened to the victim, sir.

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

x x x

"A. The four (4) suspects were the four (4) accused now, Crisanto Baula, Danilo
Dacocos, Ruben Baula and Robert Baula and they were the one engaged in this
drinking spree at the said place, sir.
"Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. After you proceeded to the store and you have gathered that information,
what transpired next in that store?
"Q. All the accused?

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. Since there is an information that there were persons who were drinking at
the said store, sir.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary "A. And some other unidentified persons, sir.

"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. Drinking wine you mean? "Q. After you ascertain the four (4) accused and some other which were not
identified were the one have drunk at the said store, what transpired next in your
investigation?
"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Yes, sir. We exerted our efforts to look for these people, sir.

"A. We tried to look for these persons, identified persons, sir.

"Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. I have not bring with me the record, sir.

"Q. What happened? "Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Q. Can you identify that suspect, if you can see him again?

"A. And we were able to locate them at their respective houses, sir. "Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. One of the Baulas, sir.

"Q. Now, what transpired when you located the four (4) accused at their "Q. How many Baulas?
respective houses?

"A. Three (3), sir.

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. Can you identify by his face?

"A. We examined their persons if they are really drank at that time but the same
no sign that they were drank but we made on suspicion that one of the accused
to where we requested to present his clothes during the night that he wore "Atty. Palma:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
during their engagement at the drinking spree in the store, sir.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Already testified, he cannot.

"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. Who is this accused?

"Q. You look at the accused?

"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
 "Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A. So far, as of now, I could not exactly identify him, sir, but the moment I could
see on my records, I have to consult my record.
"A. I could no longer remember, sir.

"Q. What record?

"Q. Now, what else have you done after you had requested this one of the
accused Baula to present his clothes wore at the night of the drinking spree?

"A. The one presented our transmittal to the NBI, sir.

"A. One of the persons who were engaged in the drinking spree was Danilo
Dacocos, sir. We tried to look for him and we were able to see him at his hut
"Q. NBI, Dagupan City?
almost one (1) kilometer away from the store, sir, and we were able to see one
(1) bolo which was hang on the wall of the hut.

"A. Yes, sir.

"Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. Regarding what?

"Q. Was the bolo has bloodstained?

"A. To determine as to whether the suspected bloodstains of the clothing that is

of the victim, sir.
"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

x x x
"A. There is again a suspected bloodstain, sir, and that cause us to turn over for
examination to the NBI, sir.

"Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Q. And this is one of the specimen you sent?

"Q. Now, you said the clothing which you have requested from one of the "A. Yes, sir.
accused Baula to give to you which he wore that evening when there was
drinking spree in the store, now, what part of the clothing was stained with
blood? x x x
"Fiscal:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Now, tell us if there was occupants of this hut of Danilo Dacocos when you
saw this bloodstain on that bolo?
"Witness:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. At the time we discovered the bolo there is no occupant but he was the one
living at the said hut, sir.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Q. Why do you know that it was Danilo Dacocos was the one living in that hut?
"A. During the interview he admitted that he is living there, sir.
"Q. Now, what transpired next after going to this hut of Danilo Dacocos?
"A. We took the bolo and sent to the NBI, sir." 31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the police officers acted on a mere suspicion that accused-appellants
could be responsible for the commission of the crime and only because of their
being at the store where the victim was last seen.
Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he can be charged. 32 An illegal search cannot be
undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded
by that search. 33
The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo
shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a
warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty. 34 This presumption by itself, cannot
prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in
the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors. 35chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and all the
accused-appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered to
be immediately released from custody unless detained for some other lawful
reason. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Cubcubin (G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001)
This case is here on automatic review of the decision, 1 dated October 5, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel
Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of death.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, armed with an unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber
.38 revolver, with no serial number, with intent to kill, acting with treachery and
evident premeditation and taking advantage of the darkness of [the] night, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot
with the aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain HENRY PECHO PIAMONTE, hitting
and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the head which caused the
latters instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon trial on the merits
ensued.
Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M.
Malinao, Jr., Enrico A. Rosal, Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr., and Virgilio L. Pilapil, all of
whom belong to the Cavite City Police Department; National Bureau of
Investigation ballistician Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr.; NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet
Gelacio-Mahilum; Dr. Regalado D. Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-
Legal Officer of the Department of Health (DOH) in Cavite City; and Danet D.
Garcellano, a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio, Cavite City. The
testimony of Police Chief Inspector Edwin G. Nemenzo, Chief of the Records,
Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, was dispensed with in view of his certification, dated
October 7, 1997 (Exh. N), 3 that accused-appellant is not a licensed/registered
holder of firearm of any kind and caliber.
The prosecution evidence is to the following effect:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the
Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot
near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For
this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy,
Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P.
Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road. Police
photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene (Exhs. A, A-1, A-2,
and A-3) 4 showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. 5 PO3 Rosal
testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that
accused-appellant and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting
Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a
kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food
server/waitress in Sting Cafe. 6 The other policemen at the police station called
up City Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Garcellano told
the police investigators that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe
at about 12:00 midnight and drink beer; that at about 2:30 a.m., the victim
arrived and joined accused-appellant; that the two stayed in the cafe until 3:30
a.m.; and that she did not know if they left together as she was serving other
customers. Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, dark-complexioned,
and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants.
7cräläwvirtualibräry
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that
Garcellanos description fitted a person known as alias Jun Dulce. Armando Plata,
who knew where accused-appellant lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and
Prosecutor Lu to accused-appellants house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The
policemen knocked on the door for about three minutes before it was opened by
a man who answered the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned
out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives identified themselves and
informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the
cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house.
8cräläwvirtualibräry
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt,
bearing the brand name Hanes (Exh. H) 9 and the name Dhenvher written in the
inner portion of the shirts hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon
close examination, he said that he found it to be bloodied." When he picked up
the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with
accused-appellant while he conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and
the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked accused-appellant to go with
them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was
positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victims companion. The police
investigators asked accused-appellant where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
said accused-appellant refused to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought his
(accused-appellants) permission to go back to his house to conduct a further
search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy,
Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. 10 Inside the
house, they saw accused-appellants 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr.
found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a
homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial
number (Exh. F). He found the gun loaded with five live bullets (Exhs. M, M-1, M-
2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials RDE (for
Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object.
While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal
stayed with accused-appellant in the sala. 11 The .38 caliber gun (Exhs. B, B-1),
12 the white Hanes t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), 13 and the two spent .38
caliber shells (Exhs. B-2, B-2-B) 14 were all photographed. Accused-appellant
was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed (Exh. B-3) 15
along with the things seized from him.
the angle of the right mandible and the lead slug is embedded at the right lateral
portion of the first (1st) cervical vertebrae hence extracted.
= Gunshot wound, 1 cm. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders located at
the left frontal region 5 cms. above the temporal end of the left eyebrow. It is
directed inwards and downwards fracturing the bone (frontal) underneath into
[the] intracranial cavity.

SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division,

testified that on August 26, 1997, the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Piamonte was forwarded to him by PO3 Rosal together with the evidence
consisting of a bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt, a .38 revolver with five live
ammunitions, and two deformed slugs. After an evaluation of the evidence, he
= Presence of circular complete fracture, 0.8 cm. in d[iameter] at the left frontal
formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant. He took
region.
blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory
examination. 16cräläwvirtualibräry

= The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is enveloped
with liquid and clotted blood.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the
Department of Health in Cavite City, conducted a postmortem examination of the
cadaver and prepared an autopsy report (Exh. O) 17 which showed the following
findings: = The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.

AUTOPSY REPORT = The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the area
is severely hematomatous and explored until a lead slug [was] found at the 1st
cervical vertebrae at the right side.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

= Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell.

A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric state
with gunshot wounds . . . described as follows:
= Other internal organs are significantly normal.

= Gunshot wound, 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., oval in shape with powder burns more on
top of the wound to 2.5 cms. elevation/height located at the angle of the right Slugs extracted:
jaw and/or 5 cms. below the inferior level of the right ear. The wound has
irregular and inverted borders. It is directed inwards fracturing the lower edge of
1. 0.6 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed. The length
of the slug is 1.6 cms.
Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug.
2. A 0.7 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug . . . roundly/ovally deformed [on] one end.
The length of the slug is 1.8 cm.
Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug.
Dr. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. R), 18 the
first one located on the right jaw below the ear while the second wound located
at the left temporal side above the left eyebrow. The slug from the first gunshot
wound remained at the base of the neck, near the spinal column. There were
powder burns, called tatooing, surrounding the first wound which showed that the
victim was shot point-blank. The second slug was also embedded at the front
lobe of the brain. 19 Dr. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death (Exh. Q) that
the victim died of shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to
multiple gunshot wounds. 20cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon written request (Exh. C) 21 of Prosecutor Lu, the NBI conducted a ballistics
examination to determine whether the two slugs taken from the body of the
victim were fired from the firearm recovered from accused-appellant.
Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., an NBI ballistician, conducted on September 10, 1997 a
comparative examination of the two evidence bullets, marked as HPP-1 (Exh. E)
and HPP-2 (Exh. E-1), which had been recovered from the victims head and the
three test bullets (Exhs. G, G-1, G-2) fired from the seized .38 caliber firearm.
The tests showed that the evidence bullets were fired from the subject firearm.
22 The empty shells from the three test bullets fired were duly marked (Exhs. G-
3, G-4, G-5). No photographs were taken. Silvestres findings were confirmed by
four other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar, Supervising
Ballistician Ernie Magtibay, Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded, and, Flor Landicho,
another ballistician. The two .38 caliber empty shells recovered from accused-
appellant were no longer examined. 23cräläwvirtualibräry
Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. J) 24 for a laboratory
examination of the bloodstains on the white Hanes t-shirt of accused-appellant to
determine whether such were identical to the blood of the victim.
Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, NBI Forensic Chemist II, testified that on September 26,
1997, she conducted three kinds of laboratory examinations, namely, (a)
benzidine test, to determine the presence of blood; (b) precipitin test, to
determine if the bloodstains came from human or animal blood; and (c) ABO
grouping test, to determine the blood group. When tested and matched together,
the bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim yielded
positive results for human blood belonging to blood type O (Exh. K).
25cräläwvirtualibräry
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself, his son Jhumar,
and his sister Yolanda Cubcubin Padua.
Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. testified that he enlisted in the
Philippine Constabulary as a soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being
AWOL. He said he left for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a driver and came
back in 1979. He was later employed as a driver by a friend, who owned a junk
shop in Cavite City. He admitted knowing the victim whom he addressed as Kuya.
Accused-appellant testified that from 10:00 in the evening to 12:00 midnight of
August 25, 1997, he and some friends played a card game called tong-its on
Molina Street, Cavite City. Afterwards, he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he
had some drinks while waiting for food to be served. Henry Piamonte, a tricycle
driver, arrived and had drinks with him. After a while, the victim left as a
passenger was waiting to be given a ride. The victim came back to the restaurant
before 1:00 a.m. and had another bottle of beer with accused-appellant. At about
1:30 a.m., the victim again left to transport another passenger. After that, the
victim did not come back anymore. 26cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a.m. and took a tricycle
home to 1151 Garcia Extension, San Antonio, Cavite City. He was sleeping on the
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, accused-appellants sister, testified that at about 5:30 in
sofa in his bedroom when he was awakened by the arrival of three policemen,
the morning of August 26, 1997, she was told by her nephew, Jhumar, that
two of them he recognized as SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Estoy, Jr., who pointed
accused-appellant had been apprehended by some policemen. She and Jhumar
their guns at him and told him to lie face down. He said he was handcuffed while
then went to the police patrol car where she saw her brother in handcuffs. She
the policemen searched his room, turning the sala set upside down and opening
said she protested to the policemen that there was no evidence that accused-
the cabinets. His son, Jhumar, stood beside him. Before leaving, the policemen
appellant had killed the victim. Yolanda said she saw the confiscated white Hanes
took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son Denver. Accused-
t-shirt, but she claimed the same did not have any bloodstain on it. She went
appellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he
back to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Trias, Cavite to let her know what
was afraid they would maltreat him. He denied the claim of the policemen that
had happened. She then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar, who
the white t-shirt had blood stains. He claimed that the policemen did not have
told her that some policemen were searching accused-appellants house and
any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when they took him into custody. Nor
found a gun. 29cräläwvirtualibräry
did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted
by counsel. He also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol car for
almost two hours before he was brought inside the police station. He denied
owning the .38 caliber revolver presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 On October 5, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-
Pilapil or that the same had been recovered from his house. He also denied the appellant guilty of murder. It based its finding on circumstantial evidence, to wit:
prosecutions claim that he was taken to the Sting Cafe where he was allegedly (1) That Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the Sting Cafe, saw accused-appellant
identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen with the victim before the arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997 and drink beer, while the
latter was killed. 27cräläwvirtualibräry victim arrived at about 2:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997 and joined accused-
appellant in drinking beer at the bar. She said that she served them beer and
they stayed for about an hour, that the two later had an argument as accused-
appellant wanted to have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for, and
Jhumar Cubcubin, son of accused-appellant, testified that at about 4:00 in the
that at about 3:30 a.m., the victim and accused-appellant left and boarded the
morning of August 26, 1997, he was sleeping on the second floor of the house
victims tricycle; (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that they saw
when he was roused from his sleep by loud knocks on the door. When he opened
the lifeless body of the victim, with bullet wounds on his head, slumped on the
the door, he saw three policemen who were looking for his father. He told them
handle of his tricycle, that the crime scene was about 50 meters away from the
that his father was not around, but he was shoved away. They proceeded
house of accused-appellant, and that when they were told by an unidentified
upstairs to the room of his father where they took from the clothes stand a white
tricycle driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving the Sting
Hanes t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. They put his father in a police
Cafe together, they went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who
patrol car waiting outside. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt, Yolanda
described the appearance of the victims companion. Armando Plata, another
Cubcubin Padua, and reported to her what had happened. He went back to the
tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as the person being described by
house and saw some policemen still conducting a search. As the policemen were
Garcellano, accompanied the policemen to the house of accused-appellant; (3)
about to leave, a van with some other policemen on board arrived. They asked
That after SPO1 Malinao, Jr. was allowed to enter the house, he found a white
him where the water container was located. They went inside the house and,
Hanes t-shirt with bloodstains on it and also recovered two spent .38 caliber
when they came out, one of them announced that he had found a gun, which was
shells; (4) That when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting Cafe, he was
then photographed. Jhumar said that while his father was inside the police patrol
positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victims companion moments prior
car, his aunt was arguing with the policemen. At that instance, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
to his death; (5) That when the investigators returned to the house of accused-
spread the t-shirt and told Jhumars aunt Eto, puro dugo damit niya, although the
appellant, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found a .38 caliber revolver placed on top of a plastic
t-shirt had no bloodstains. He said that he and his father never gave permission
water container located outside the bathroom; (6) That laboratory examination
to the policemen to search their house. 28cräläwvirtualibräry
conducted by the forensic chemist, Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, showed that the
bloodstains on the white Hanes t-shirt were human blood, type O, which matched
the blood type of the victim; and (7) That per ballistic examination of NBI
ballistician, Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., the two slugs recovered from the head of the
victim were fired from the .38 caliber revolver seized from accused-appellants
house.
The trial court rejected accused-appellants alibi, giving full credence to the
testimonies of Danet Garcellano and the police investigators whom it found to
have no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant. It admitted the
prosecution evidence consisting of the white Hanes t-shirt, two spent shells, and
the .38 caliber revolver, on the ground that these items had been seized as
incident to a lawful arrest. It ruled that since Dr. Sosa testified that the victim
was shot point-blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the
assailant, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present, not to mention
that the victim was unarmed and thus totally defenseless. The trial court
theorized that while the victim was on his tricycle, the assailant went around and
shot him on the left temple. It held that the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing
the victim constituted an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty of murder and accordingly imposed on him the penalty
of death. Hence, this appeal.
On April 18, 2000, the Court received a letter, dated April 5, 2000, 30 from
Victoria Abrenica Dulce, mother of accused-appellant, with an attached affidavit
of desistance entitled Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Uurong , dated November
14, 1997, 31 executed by Marilou B. Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that
accused-appellant had been mistakenly identified as the assailant, and, by reason
thereof, sought the dismissal of the criminal case against him. In her letter, Dulce
said that the affidavit of desistance was supposed to be submitted to the trial
court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, but, for
unknown reasons, the same was not done by accused-appellants counsel. This
affidavit of desistance, however, not being formally offered before the trial court,
has no probative value.
We now consider accused-appellants assignment of errors.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26, 1997
without a warrant, was illegal. On this point, Rule 113, 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first,
the offender has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal knowledge
of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. 32cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim
was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was probable cause for PO3
Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-
appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. The two did not
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had
committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they
allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely
on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP
station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26,
1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of
[T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after
the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim
the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which
coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe,
might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they
who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-
had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which
complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants;
is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical
description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias Jun Dulce and who
said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-
appellants house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on Indeed, at the time [the victim] was killed, these [NBI] agents were nowhere
information given to them by others. near the scene of the crime. When [the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the
students], the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything
that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the
contrary, [they], under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a
In an analogous case, 33 the police was informed that the accused was involved
peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
in subversive activities. On the basis of this information, the police arrested the
accused and, in the course of the arrest, allegedly recovered an unlicensed
firearm and some subversive materials from the latter. This Court held that the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their information came Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe
entirely from an informant. It was pointed out that at the time of his arrest, the accused-appellant to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a
accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive activities. bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber revolver, and two spent .38 caliber shells in his
His arrest without a warrant could not be justified under 5(b). house. At the time accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing anything
overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came after his arrest.
Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized from
accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
In another case, 34 the accused, in a case of robbery with rape, were arrested
solely on the basis of the identification given by one of the victims. This Court
held the arrest to be illegal for lack of personal knowledge of the arresting
officers. More recently, in Posadas v. Ombudsman , 35 this Court, in declaring Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his
the arrest without warrant of two University of the Philippines students to be arrest without a warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the
illegal, held: charge when arraigned on November 11, 1997. It is true that on August 28,
1997, he filed a petition for reinvestigation in which he alleged that he had been
illegally detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. In its order, dated
September 9, 1997, the trial court granted his motion and ordered the City
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c).
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit his findings within
The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed.
thirty (30) days thereof. 36 On October 7, 1997, City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu
Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped
moved for the resetting of accused-appellants arraignment from October 8, 1997
from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a
to the first week of November, 1997 on the ground that the findings on the
crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of
laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been received from the NBI. 37
facts indicating that [the students] were probably guilty.
Accused-appellant did not object to the arraignment. The City Prosecutors
request was, therefore, granted and the arraignment was reset to November 11,
1997. 38 Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on the ground
....
that his arrest was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over
his person. Instead, on November 11, 1997, at the scheduled arraignment,
accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. 39 On the same day, the trial court issued an order stating that, as a
result of accused-appellants arraignment, his motion for preliminary investigation
had become moot and academic and, accordingly, set the case for trial. 40
Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest.
41cräläwvirtualibräry
Second. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission
to the arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the Hanes t-
shirt, the two spent slugs, and the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his
house are inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution, on the other hand, insists
that accused-appellant consented to the search of his house.
To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication
cannot be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right. A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a
search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For as Justice Laurel
explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia v. Locsin, 42 As the constitutional guaranty is
not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission
to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law.
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was
unconsented. It is noteworthy that the testimonies of the two prosecution
witnesses, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the search show laborious effort
to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to search his house.
At every turn, even when they were not being asked, they said the search was
made with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, the lady
doth protest too much, methinks. Indeed, not only does accused-appellant
stoutly deny that he ever consented to the search of his dwelling but the
prosecution has not shown any good reason why accused-appellant might have
agreed to the search.
The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest.
Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be
considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence
or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area
of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent
the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon
against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be
justified on this ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of
accused-appellants immediate control. In fact, according to the rosecution, the
police found the gun only after going back to the house of accused-appellant.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the plain view
doctrine. As this Court held in People v. Musa: 43cräläwvirtualibräry
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made
solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]
Q Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other?

Here, the search of accused-appellants house was illegal and, consequently, the
A When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer, they
things obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white Hanes t-shirt, two
talked and afterwards, I already left them and I served the other customers.
spent shells, and the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It
cannot be said that the .38 caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence.
After bringing accused-appellant to the Sting Cafe where he was positively
identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victims companion, the Q Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe?
arresting officers allegedly asked accused-appellant where he hid the gun used in
killing the victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when accused-appellant refused
to answer, he sought accused-appellants permission to go back to his house and A They were about to leave already at that time because they were already
there found the .38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic water container outside bringing with them the two bottles of beer, Sir.
the bathroom. Thus, the gun was purposely sought by the police officers and they
did not merely stumble upon it.
Q But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe?

Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white Hanes t-shirt placed on
top of the divider in plain view as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in A When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe, Henry boarded a tricycle, Sir.
nature which would lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute
evidence of a crime. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not
bloodied which could have directed his attention to take a closer look at it. From
Q How about Cubcubin, how did he leave the Sting Cafe?
the photograph of the t-shirt (Exh. B-2), it is not visible that there were
bloodstains. The actual t-shirt (Exh. H) merely had some small specks of blood at
its lower portion.
A He followed Henry, Sir.

Third. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. Danet

Garcellano said that accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25,
1997; that the victim joined him at about 2:30 a.m.; and that although both left
the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a.m., she really did not know if they left together.
Thus, Danet testified:
Q How did he follow Henry, on foot, on board a vehicle or what?
A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served the other customers
inside.44cräläwvirtualibräry

PROSECUTOR LU:
....

....
On cross-examination, Danet said:
ATTY. BAYBAY: A Yes, Sir.

Q When he left, he left alone? Q And, what was the basis of your estimation?

A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served inside. A Because at that time there were only few customers in that place, Sir.

Q Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left? Q So, you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left?

A No, Sir, what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two A Yes, Sir.
bottles of beer which were paid by Piamonte inside, Sir.

Q You also did not see him leave?

....

A No, Sir.45cräläwvirtualibräry
ATTY. BAYBAY:

In People v. Gallarde, 46 it was explained that positive identification refers

Q The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30? essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to
the very act of commission of the crime. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime. This constitutes direct
A Yes, Sir. evidence. Or, he may not have actually seen the crime committed, but is
nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of the
crime, as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
Q Now, how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people at
second type of positive identification, which, when taken together with other
that time?
pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all
others.
A That is only my estimation, Sir.

This rule, however, cannot be applied in the present case because Danet
Q You only estimated? Garcellano did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting
Cafe together. There is thus serious doubt as to whether accused-appellant was
really the last person seen with the victim. Her testimony is insufficient to place
accused-appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form part of the chain of
circumstantial evidence to show that accused-appellant committed the crime.
Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant testified that he could not have killed the victim
because the latter was his friend whom he considered his kuya or elder brother.
48 There is no showing that the killing of the victim was by reason of a supposed
altercation they had as to who would pay for the two bottles of beer ordered
while they were at the Sting Cafe. The beer was later paid for by the victim.
Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may express the
motive or from which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred.
49cräläwvirtualibräry
does not necessarily mean that the bloodstains came from the victim who also
had a type O blood; (5) Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to
determine if he was positive for gunpowder nitrates; (8) The .38 caliber gun
allegedly found in his house was not examined for the possible presence of
accused-appellants fingerprints; and (9) The allegation that the gun was placed
on top of a water container in accused-appellants house is unbelievable as it is
improbable that accused-appellant could be so careless as to leave the fatal
weapon there when he could have hidden it or thrown it away.
Nor can we rest easy on the prosecutions claim as to where the two empty shells
and the t-shirt were allegedly found. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that these were
placed beside the white Hanes t-shirt and fell when he took the shirt. On direct
examination, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said:
PROSECUTOR LU:

Q What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time?

Rule 133, 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the
following in order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
A We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
house, then after entering the same, while we were in the sala near the kitchen
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
we saw the white Hanes t-shirt there, Sir, that was near the kitchen.

In the case at bar, there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was
Q Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the
committed by accused-appellant in view of the following: (1) As already stated,
same?
Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the Sting Cafe, did not actually see accused-
appellant and the victim leaving the cafe together at about 3:30 a.m. of August
26, 1997; (2) PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that when they arrived at
the scene of the crime, they were informed by a tricycle driver that the victim A Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that house
and the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together, but the and there is a table there and that t-shirt was placed on the table.
tricycle driver was not presented to confirm this fact; (3) SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
testified that the white Hanes t-shirt was bloodied, but the evidence shows that it
had some bloodstains only on its lower portion (Exh. H), while the photograph of Q Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house?
the t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), supposedly taken at the time of the search,
shows that it had no bloodstains and this discrepancy was not explained by SPO1
Malinao, Jr.; (4) The fact that the t-shirt was tested positive for type O blood A Yes, Sir.
 However, on cross-examination, he said he found the empty shells on top of a
cabinet (tokador) in the bedroom on the second floor of the house. Thus, he
Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
testified:

A Before I got the t-shirt, I even asked his permission for me to be able to get
ATTY. BAYBAY:
the t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after
getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt
was with blood stains.
Q Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it?

Q This white t-shirt, can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt?
A In the kitchen area, Sir.

A Hanes, Sir.
Q Where in the kitchen area, on the floor or on the wall?

Q How about the blood spot or blood stains, can you tell us how many, if you can
A It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider
remember?
anymore, Sir.

A We were in a hurry, I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were
Q And that t-shirt was immediately near the door, on the floor?
blood stains on the t-shirt, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.
Q How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt, can you
describe to us these 2 empty shells?

Q What did you do after that, when you saw the t-shirt there?
A Empty shells of .38 cal. bullets, Sir.

A I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt, Sir.
Q What did you do with the empty shells?

Q And you said, you looked at it?

A I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him,
Sir.50cräläwvirtualibräry
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you said, you looked at it, how did you look at it?

A Yes, Sir, there is a bedroom upstairs.

A I spread it out in front of him, Sir.

Q You found it when you went up?

Q And when you spread it out in front of him, did you ask him whose t-shirt is it?

A I first asked his permission to look around inside the house, Sir, because I was
asking him also about the whereabouts of the firearm he had.
A I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him, Sir.

Q And he allowed you?

Q What did he say?

A He allowed me, sir.

A According to him, the t-shirt does not belong to him, Sir.

Q And when you went upstairs, you found the two empty shells?
Q You also testified that you found two empty shells?

A Yes, Sir, they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a curtain.
A Yes, Sir.

Q In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN, you stated
Q Where did you find these two empty shells?
that you got the t-shirt and when you lifted the t-shirt, two empty shells fell off?

A From the bedroom upstairs, Sir.

A After finding the two empty shells for a .38 caliber, Sir, I placed them together
with the t-shirt.

Q Bedroom upstairs?
Q What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs, you found two empty
shells and you put them together with the t-shirt, that is what you are telling us
A Yes, Sir. now?

Q You mean, it is a two-storey house? A After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt, I put it on the original place where
it was, Sir, and after finding the two empty shells, it so happened that the
investigator was behind me so after that, I showed to him the t-shirt as well as
the empty shells.51
....
Q Also in your previous testimony, you got the t-shirt and you asked the
permission to get the t-shirt, after getting the t-shirt, there were 2 empty shells
which fell. The question is, do you remember that this happened?
A These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs, sir, I placed them on top of
the t-shirt.
Q You said, when you got the t-shirt, something fell, in your direct testimony?
A While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me, Sir, I got the t-shirt, I spread it out
and nothing fell yet at that time, then I asked him about the firearm that he
used.
....
Q Do you remember having been asked this particular question:
Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
A Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the
t-shirt, Sir, and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting
the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was
with blood stains.
A Yes, Sir, I remember it.
Q I am just referring to two empty shells that fell, which you said, is that true?
A Yes, Sir, there were empty shells that fell, but I first placed them on top of the
t-shirt because I was planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt.
Q You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front
door of the house, is that true?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were referring to the time that you entered the house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you got
it?
A What I said before was that, I got the t-shirt, I lifted it, after that, I placed it on
its original place, Sir, and I asked him about the firearm but he was not
commenting anything on that, so I asked permission from him to go upstairs to
look around.
Q When you said you placed that from the place where you found it, how did you
put it on the place where you found it?
A I placed it there the way I saw it before, the way it was previously placed
there, Sir, because I was planning to bring the t-shirt.52cräläwvirtualibräry
 reasons stated in his Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief) filed
with the Court. We have reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary
Thus, caught in his own contradiction, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. prevaricated but in the
evidence in this case and we find said recommendation to be well taken.
process committed more contradictions. He said he found the empty shells on top
of the tokador on the second floor of the house, brought them downstairs, and
then placed them on the t-shirt. When he got the t-shirt, the empty shells fell on
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-
the floor. But how could he have gotten the shells from the second floor if,
accused, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, with allegedly having in their
according to him, he found them by accident when they fell from the t-shirt which
custody and possession 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-
he found immediately after entering accused-appellants house and before going
bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of
up to the second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao,
P200.00. 2
Jr. said he found the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen, he later said he
found it on the floor.

During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against
them. At the trial, the prosecution and the defense presented several witnesses
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
after which the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and
finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of
Antonio Lonceras but convicting and penalizing herein appellant as hereinbefore
murder, is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
stated.
of reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to
implement this Decision and to report to the Court the action taken hereon within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Time of Arrest
People vs. Rodrigueza [205 SCRA 791 (1992)]
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
Branch 10, finding accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs.1
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the
prosecution of criminal cases, recommends the acquittal of appellant for the
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was
in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong
Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B.
Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a
confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team
to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was given P200.00 in different
denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder
at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the
money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a
certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone
and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where be
could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and
when be returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to
him as Don, herein appellant. 3
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a
passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated
Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a
and was repeatedly asked regarding the whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was
plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor.
manhandled by the NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the camp. He
Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding
was then made to hold a P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he
his said purchase of marijuana. 4
was taken to the PCCL and examined he was found positive of the ultraviolet
powder. He was also made to sign some papers but he did not know what they
were all about. 9
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation
to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and
S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of
appellant, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not,
his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave
however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three
the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him that their
accused. The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for investigation. 5
father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Appellant went to
Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of
July 2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about the
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the
marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like Segovia,
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant. Taduran did not go with them.
he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for
During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was
syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any search
detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his
warrant. 6
complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. 10

The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but
appellant was detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken from and executed by him,
was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no
counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation.
The arrestees were also examined by personnel of the PCCL and were found
positive for ultraviolet powder. 7
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in (1) admitting in evidence the sworn statement of appellant which was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the
crime charged despite the fact that the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves
allegedly bought from him were not properly identified; (3) convicting appellant
of the crime charged despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution is
weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of selling or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of
marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11

Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987
listening to the radio. Later, he ate his merienda and then went out to buy We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In
cigarettes from the store. While he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him. disposing of this case, however, we feel that the issues raised by appellant should
Several armed men alighted therefrom and ordered him to get inside the jeep. properly be discussed seriatim.
He refused but he was forced to board the vehicle. He was even hit by the butt of
a gun. 8
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the
term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught
redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person
acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents
failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution,
after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC
Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and
taking him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural
course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust
operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having
been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of
duty by an agent of the law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was
squarely placed in issue and, as correctly pointed out by the defense, said sworn
statement is inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during custodial
examination. He was also asked if he was waiving his right to be assisted by
counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person
under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel. 13 In the present case, the waiver made by appellant
being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient to
invalidate said sworn statement. 14
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting
in evidence against appellant the articles allegedly confiscated during the raid
conducted in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority.
15 True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to
conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the
owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; 16 when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 when it is made on vessels and aircraft
for violation of customs laws; 18 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose
of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; 20 or in cases of inspection of buildings and
other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a
search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does
not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases.
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite
some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented
as evidence against appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him
100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and
no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to
and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the
appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained
inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds
contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a
piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected
dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe. 22
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-
called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered
question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the
basis of appellant's conviction. 23 In People vs. Rubio, 24 this Court had the
occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof
must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal
to the cause of the prosecution.
5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a
witness will not affect his credibility. It even enhances such credibility because it
only shows that he has not been rehearsed. 25 However, when the
inconsistencies pertain to material and crucial points, the same detract from his
overall credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are tainted with serious flaws and material inconsistencies rendering the same
incredible. 26
CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting
surveillance of the place where the buy-bust operation was to take place. It
turned out, however, that he did not even know the exact place and the identity
of the person from whom he was to buy marijuana leaves. Thus:
FISCAL TOLOSA
Q What place in Tagas were you able to go (to)?
WITNESS
A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in Tagas, although we occasionally
passed there.
Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do that afternoon?
A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have already been conducted
(sic) surveylance (sic) in the vicinity.
Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the suspect?
A By the road, sir.
Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you arrived at Tagas?
A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.
Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?
A According to him, we could get some. 27
The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct
examination, he declared that they arrested the three accused all at the same
time on the fateful night of July 1, 1987. But, in his cross-examination and as
corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 28 submitted by him and Molinawe, it
appeared that Lonceras and Segovia were arrested on different times and that
appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were arrested. Instead, it
was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a much later time.
With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more
credibility to the testimony of appellant Rodrigueza. While it is true that
appellant's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a
criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing
to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his
testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night of July 1,
1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza was not
with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents.
Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused
was also revealed during the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo,
sister of appellant, and Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia, testified that
Sgt. Molinawe, who has since been reportedly dismissed from the service, asked
for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange for the liberty of the accused. 29
This allegation was never refuted by the prosecution. Hence, the rule laid down
by this Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses are entitled to full
faith and credit 30 has no application in the case at bar.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly shown by the evidence, the
prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant
should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations
against him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. It is hereby ordered that he be immediately released from
custody unless he is otherwise detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Go vs. Court of Appeals [206 SCRA 586 (1992)]
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1
on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan,
Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St.,
where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong"
direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and
Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked
over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's
car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for
a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that
the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out
where the suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined
at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of
the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of
petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the
police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station
to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa
Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he
could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot
wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial
Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the
Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with
the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the
last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in
order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was
raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the
cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact
released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
leave to conduct preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of
P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of
petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991
until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10
embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was
recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender
himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to
conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's
omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11
July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order,
contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due
process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was,
however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the
arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain
his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the
Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal
Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of
his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The
Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26
September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court
of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in
the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a
month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas
corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the
petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying
petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion
had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the
prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14
dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was
arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been
established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station,
there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San
Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending
his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it
properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991
Order because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its
processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid
commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the
authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial
Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the
trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the
trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14
October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold
in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this
Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first,
whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively
waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of
the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's
identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been
sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days
later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v.
Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos,
et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid
although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which
Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the
provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and
because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information
for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the
police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in
the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six
vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners
made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses,
upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those
offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New
People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was
arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed
at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal
shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section
5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest"
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when
[the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section
5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did
not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section
7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of
the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
(Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked
into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was
"surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting
that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When
the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter
should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine
whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing
of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the
erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required
petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error,
for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had
not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning
demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out,
on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial
Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that
omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the
Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his
right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's
statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim
basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not
by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's
omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the
Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware
of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor.
In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused., or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
. . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary
investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-
investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the
5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised
of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial
court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-
day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part
of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of
expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save,
perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to
due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a
preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already
arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had
vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the
Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a
preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v.
Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked
for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before
respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor
filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he
clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation
was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to
accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate
and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner
was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the
Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong.
Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge
recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself
within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that
no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order
issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in
the instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor
having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's
right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released
on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation
conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled
to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that
petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the
merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in
abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is
true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time
have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand
does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional
point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of
procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and
literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary
haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a
manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23
August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before
arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection
to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation.
28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and
objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw
or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial,
before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once
again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation:
petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had
promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the
lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of
his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the
prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented
by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held
to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the
judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner
remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence
already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the
Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of
petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and
objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for
cancellation of bail.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a
preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to
complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from
commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the
Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a
cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall
be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion
of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a People vs. Calimlim (G.R. No. 123980, August 30, 2001)
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
Before us on automatic review is the joint decision1 of the Regional Trial Court,
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of
First Judicial Region, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant
due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or
Manuel Calimlim guilty of four (4) counts of rape based on similarly-worded
culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons
informations in the following criminal cases:
well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could
turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not
compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, Criminal Case No. U-8525:
it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people
and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights
and liberties. That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality
of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE complainant, a minor, against her will.
and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September
1991 hereby REVERSED.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. U-8638:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality
of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. U-8639:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality
of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. U-8640:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality
of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits
followed.
The prosecution's case was mainly based on the testimony of private
complainant, LANIE S. LIMIN. According to her, she was fourteen (14) years old
and had been living with the family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia
Ferrer (Ferrers) for the past three years. The night of April 2, 1995, she was left
alone in one of the two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions, the
sons of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the night. The Ferrers were in the
other house about 15 meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened
when she heard somebody, later identified as appellant, enter her room.
Appellant immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said
"Accompany me because I killed my wife."6 She was then dragged to the pig
pen, about 8-9 meters away from the place where she slept. Afterwards, she was
again forcibly taken back to her room, then to her cousin's room and to the
kitchen. In each of these places, appellant forcibly had sexual intercourse with
her while he poked a knife against her neck. According to her, she first
recognized appellant while they were in the kitchen when she was able to remove
the cloth covering his face. She stated that she knew appellant because she had
seen him always following her whenever she went to school. After the fourth
intercourse, appellant threatened that he would kill her if she reported the
incidents. Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer,7 who then
reported the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived nearby.8 On cross-
examination, complainant stated that she did not struggle nor shout nor resist
because she was afraid that appellant might kill her.9
The second witness was CRESENCIA FERRER, who testified that the victim was
her niece. Lanie's grandmother was the sister of her mother. Cresencia testified
that Lanie was born in Sexmoan, Pampanga, on June 13, 1981, and became her
ward starting October 25, 1993. On the evening of April 2, 1995, Cresencia said
she was in her shop in front of their house. Lanie was left alone in the other
house because her usual companions, the children of the Ferrers, all went to a
disco. The other children, Christian and Manicris, were inside their shop with her
and her husband. Cresencia recalled that she was still awake at 11:30 P.M.
working on some clothing materials. She did not see or notice anything unusual
that night. The following morning, she tried to get Lanie to rise but the latter did
not want to. Lanie was crying so she decided to leave Lanie alone. At around
8:00 A.M., Cresencia's daughter Manicris called her from outside the shop to
inform her that Dr. Quinto was there to talk to her. Dr. Quinto and Manicris told
Cresencia that Lanie had been raped. Cresencia said that when she confronted
Lanie about it, Lanie narrated her ordeal and pointed to appellant as her rapist.
The women brought Lanie to the Community Hospital in Baritao where she was
medically examined. Then they reported the matter to the police.10
On cross-examination, Cresencia recalled that around 3:00 A.M., April 3, 1995,
the wee hours after the alleged rape, she heard their gate opening because of the
arrival of her three sons from the disco.11
SPO1 MARIO SURATOS testified that he was the duty officer when the rapes were
reported to their station by Kagawad Ferrer.12 It was not the victim herself who
reported the rapes.13
DR. RICARDO FERRER, who conducted the physical examination on Lanie,
testified that there was minimal vaginal bleeding and there were lacerations in
the hymen, the positions of which were at 9:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 3:00
o'clock, all fresh, indicating that there were insertions within the past 24 hours.
There was also a whitish vaginal discharge which was found positive for
spermatozoa.14
During cross-examination, Dr. Ferrer stated that the lacerations found inside the
complainant's vagina could have been caused by hard objects other than a penis.
He said the lacerations could have also been caused by fingers or a thumb, but
would unlikely be the victim's since she would have stopped once she felt the
pain. The doctor also stated that it was possible that the spermatozoa was
artificially placed inside the vagina, but that it was not possible to determine the
identity of the person who emitted it.15
Appellant MANUEL CALIMLIM denied the accusations. He claimed that he was in
his house on the evening of April 2, 1995, and that he went to sleep at 10:00
P.M. He recalled that he even had sex with his wife in the early morning of April
3, 1995. He averred that he was just being used as a scapegoat by the Ferrers
who hated him since he did not vote for Ferrer who was a candidate during the
last elections. He also surmised that the Ferrers could have been irked when
appellant allowed the construction of a waiting shed in front of his house. He
asserted that as a hollow blocks maker, a physically draining job, he was often
tired and weak and had little strength to engage in sex for more than once a
month.16
ERLINDA PIMENTEL CALIMLIM, wife of accused, testified that on the night of April
2, 1995, she was with the accused, who slept from 10:00 P.M. until 5:00 A.M.
the following morning.17
MARLENE P. CALIMLIM, daughter of appellant, testified that her father was with
them on the evening of April 2, 1995 until the following morning. She
remembered that her parents slept at 10:00 P.M. that night and she sensed they
even engaged in sexual intercourse at around 2:00 A.M. of April 3, 1995. She
added that it was possible the Ferrers were angry at her father because her
father did not vote for Ferrer during the last elections and also because of their
disagreement about the waiting shed.18
On November 17, 1995, the trial court rendered its joint decision finding
appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant was sentenced to death for each count
of rape. The similarly-worded dispositive portions of said decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused MANUEL CALIMLIM y Muyano:
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8525:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized
under Republic Act No. 7659, the offense having been committed with the
attendant circumstance of "with the use of a deadly weapon" and with the
generic aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and disguise, hereby sentences
him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the complainant LANIE S.
LIMIN the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs.
IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8638: SO ORDERED.19

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
under Republic Act No. 7659, the offense having been committed with the court:
attendant circumstance of "with the use of a deadly weapon" and with the
generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and disguise, hereby
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the offended party I
LANIE S. LIMIN the amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs.

THAT THE SAID HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
WITH REGARDS TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8639: FINDING THE ACCUSED NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized II
under Republic Act No. 7659, the offense having been committed with the
attendant circumstance of "with the use of a deadly weapon" and with the
generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and disguise, hereby
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT MISCONVICTED SAID
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to pay the victim the sum
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE CONTRARY TO THE
of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs.
FINDINGS OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN WHO PHYSICALLY EXAMINED THE
ALLEGED VICTIM THAT IF EVER THERE WAS A CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED IT
COULD ONLY BE ONCE
AS TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8640:

III
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized
under Republic Act No. 7659, the offense having been committed with the
attendant circumstance of "with the use of a deadly weapon" and with the
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WAS GROSSLY MISTAKEN IN
generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and disguise, hereby
NOT APPRECIATING THE MAIN DEFENSE OF SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the complainant
THE NARRATION OF FACTS AS ORCHESTRATED AND TESTIFIED TO BY ALLEGED
the amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs.
VICTIM DEFIES IMAGINATION

"The law is harsh, but that is the law."

IV

"Dura lex, sed lex, it is said."

AND THE FOREMOST, THE HONORABLE COURT OVERLOOKED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, SUCH AS THE
REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A CHANCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO FILE
COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS AND THAT OF HIS WITNESSES; HIS BEING IMMEDIATELY
ARRESTED WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF ARREST; AND WHEN
The OSG recommends, however, that the imposable penalty should be reclusion
ARRESTED, WAS NOT ACCORDED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN BROUGHT TO
perpetua, and not death, because the informations charging appellant of rape did
THE PNP INVESTIGATIVE BODY20
not allege the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon". The OSG also
recommends an increase in the damages to be awarded to the complainant.22

In sum, the issues here involve the credibility of witnesses, the denial of
appellant's constitutional rights, the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction,
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has three guiding principles: (1) an
and the propriety of the death sentence imposed on him.
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
Appellant raises the defense of denial and alibi while he challenges complainant's
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
credibility. He insists that he was at home during the time the alleged crimes
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
were perpetrated. He also argues that complainant's story is unlikely because a
merit, and the prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
man like him would not be able to consummate four (4) rapes in just one night
weakness of the evidence for the defense.23
and within a short time. He asserts that he is just being made a fall guy by
complainant's guardians who hold a grudge against him. Appellant also points out
that the testimony of complainant shows that she did not exert any tenacious
Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that in rape cases, the accused may be
resistance, implying that if there was intercourse, she had consented to it.
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is
Appellant also claims he was denied his right against warrantless arrests, his
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
right to remain silent, and his right to due process. For example, he was not
course of things.24 In evaluating the credibility of witnesses, much weight and
allowed to submit any counter-affidavit during the investigation of his case.21
great respect is given to the findings made by the trial court25 since it has the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses first-hand under
grilling cross-examination. Hence, findings of the trial court on the credibility of
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, stresses that the testimony of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
complainant deserves full faith and credit. There is no showing that she was
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to
impelled by any improper motive in filing her complaint. A young barrio lass
materially affect the disposition of the case.26
would not fabricate a charge of sexual abuse and subject herself to the
humiliation of a public trial unless she was motivated by a strong desire to bring
her abuser to justice. The victim did not show tenacious resistance since, being a
In this case, we find that complainant has no reason to falsely accuse appellant.
young girl, she was easily awed and overpowered by appellant. Her lack of
Appellant avers that complainant was influenced by the Ferrers to falsely accuse
resistance could also be attributed to paralyzing fear she felt at the time of her
him. He also insinuates that complainant was protecting the real offenders, the
rape. Contrary to appellant's claim, there was no impossibility nor improbability
children of the Ferrers, out of blind loyalty to them. However, both averment and
about complainant's story. The findings and evaluation of the trial court regarding
insinuation are not sufficiently backed up by persuasive proof. They are mere
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be given great respect since
darts in the dark, pathetic ploys that remain preposterous propositions offered up
the trial court was in the best position to observe the demeanor, attitude and
by the defense. It is rather unseemly as well as unnatural for complainant to
manner of the witnesses. Finally, said the OSG, the defense of denial and alibi
subject herself to public ridicule, exonerate her real ravishers, and vent her fury
presented by the appellant cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
only against appellant. It would have been easier for her to endure her shame in
the complainant that appellant was the rapist.
silence rather than invent a sordid story if it were not true. As we have
consistently held, a young girl would not concoct a rape charge, allow the
examination of her private parts, then publicly disclose that she has been
sexually abused, if her motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to
justice the person who defiled her.27 That she was prevailed upon by the Ferrers
to fabricate the rape charge, just to get even with appellant because he did not
vote for Ferrer, is too inane a tale to inspire belief. Complainant's testimony on
record is too candid and straightforward to be mere fabrication. She bared details
which could not be concocted easily even by an ingenious or imaginative
narrator. She cried for several minutes,28 while she testified, enhancing her
testimony's credibility.29 Absent any ill-motive to falsely accuse appellant, we
hold that complainant's testimony deserves full faith and credence.30
The defense capitalizes on the fact that complainant did not tenaciously resist the
assault on her. Physical resistance, however, need not be established in rape
when the victim is intimidated, threatened by a knife.31 Intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape and not by any hard and fast rule.32 In this
case, the victim was a minor while her attacker was an armed man boasting he
had just killed his wife. Indeed a rape victim need not show that she would fight
unto death,33 resisting a brutal crime. What is essential in this prosecution of her
ravisher, is evidence showing that she did not consent to the sexual act, while he
had used force and intimidation in achieving his evil desire.34
Further, the defense wants to make us believe that it was not possible for
appellant to consummate four (4) acts of rape in just one night. This proposition
deserves scant consideration. Rape is an act of depravity and lust. There is no
rhyme not reason for beastly acts. But negative testimony on mere possibilities
cannot outweigh positive testimony of complainant on the number of sexual
violations she endured.
Now we come to the defense of alibi which appellant offers coupled with outright
denial. Corroborated mainly by his close relatives, this defense is less than
persuasive and piteously dubious.35 It is not credible because it is tainted with
bias, especially in this case where the witnesses are the wife and the daughter of
appellant.36 Worse, the testimonies of said witnesses were not even consistent
with one another. Note that the wife, Erlinda, testified that the appellant slept
from 10:00 P.M. of April 2, 1995 until 5:00 A.M. the following morning.37 But the
daughter, Marlene, testified that her parents were awake and perhaps made love
at around 2:00 A.M. of April 3, 1995.38 Erlinda said she did not know if her
husband woke up during the night, after she mentioned she has a light sleep and
would have noticed if he did.39 Inconsistency in the statements of the defense
witnesses, while not necessarily an indication that they were lying, suggests that
both mother and daughter could not recall with precision what happened during
the crucial hours of the night of April 2 to early morning of April 3, 1995, but
merely included the events that normally happen at around those hours in their
household. Ranged against complainant's positive identification of her rapist and
her candid, straightforward and convincing testimony, the defense of alibi raised
by appellant must surely fall for lack of merit.
More substantially, appellant avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule
113,40 since his arrest was made one day after the crime was committed, but
without any judicial warrant, although the police had ample time to get one. This
he claims is also in violation of Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.41 But here
it will be noted that appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the
informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had effectively waived his right to
question any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the
unlawful restraint of his liberty.42 This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:43
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure
of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g) and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (Italics supplied)
Given the circumstances of his case now, the exceptions do not apply here and
we are constrained to rule that appellant is estopped from raising the issue of the
legality of his arrest.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error.44 The defense's claim of warrantless arrest which is illegal cannot render
void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the
appellant, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts on record point to his culpability.45
However, we find one point in appellant's favor. As recommended by the Office of
the Solicitor General, the penalty imposable on the appellant for the rapes
committed should not be capital punishment. The qualifying circumstance,
concerning "use of deadly weapon," was not alleged in the four informations
against the appellant. Even if proved during trial, still that circumstance could not
be used to aggravate appellant's crime, not having been included in the
informations. To do so would violate appellant's right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. See People vs. Motos, 317 SCRA 96,
119 (1999), which held that where neither the complaint nor the evidence
introduced show any qualifying circumstance that would make the offense fall
within the category of rape punishable by death, the only penalty that can be
properly decreed is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, in People vs. Pailanco, 322 SCRA 790, 804 (2000), we also held that:
. . . neither can we impose the death penalty for the second incident of rape
when complainant was threatened with a bolo by accused-appellant. Although
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposable when the rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon, however, in the case at bar, the use of a deadly
weapon during the second incident of rape was not alleged in the information . . .
[A] qualifying circumstance may only be taken into account as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance when it is not alleged in the information (citing People
vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162). The next lower penalty to death being the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, only the same may be imposed
regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances.
Conformably to law and jurisprudence, appellant herein can only be convicted of
simple rapes committed by using force and intimidation, punishable by reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape.
Finally, in line with current jurisprudence and considering the need to deter
commission of a bestial offense against a minor, aside from the civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 for each rape, appellant should be made to pay the additional
amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for every count of rape.46
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the appellant Manuel Calimlim
y Muyano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, in Criminal
Case Nos. U-8525, U-8638, U-8639, and U-8640 is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon the appellant is only reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape. Further, he is ORDERED to pay private
complainant Lanie S. Limin the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
Marked Money
People vs. Enrile [222 SCRA 586 (1993)]
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Antonio Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for convicting him.1 His co-accused, Rogelio Abugatal, was killed in an
attempted jailbreak and this appeal is dismissed as to him.2 We deal here only
with Enrile.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the
evening of October 25, 1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and
Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched
to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco Del Monte,
Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines,
a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer.3
In their separate testimonies,4 both policemen said that on the occasion they
saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for
the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned ten minutes
later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then
approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating
the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be
marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams.5
The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to
a house at 20 De Vera Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City,
where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate.
Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the
policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front
pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with
Serial No. PJ966425.6
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the
above narration.7 Enrile refused to make any statement pending consultation
with a lawyer.
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by
the police officers, who he said simply barged into his house without a warrant
and arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of the marijuana. He claimed
that at the time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as a dental technician,
to a patient whom he was fitting for dentures.8 The supposed patient, Alicia
Tiempo, corroborated him.9
Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that
he had a pending application for probation. He suggested that this could be the
reason the policemen sought to implicate him in the new charge and thus weaken
his application.10
Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that
he had not sold any marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was
that two male teenagers approached him that evening and told him to buy
marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did not have any
marijuana and did not know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's
house and to give him the marked money. He did so because they had a knife.
Enrile handed him a plastic bag which was later found to contain dried marijuana
fruiting tops.11
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of
Abugatal, considering that it was made without compliance with the requisites of
a custodial investigation, including the right to the assistance of counsel. The
confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not follow the ruling of this Court in
Morales v. Enrile,12 promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated in People v.
Galit,13 promulgated on March 20, 1985, where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion
laid down the correct procedure, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986,
long after the above-cited decisions had become effective.
Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without
the assistance of counsel could have been sustained. It was not enough then to
inform the suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had to ascertain for
itself that the accused clearly understood the import and consequences of his
confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do so.14 There is no
showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision
that Abugatal had been informed of his rights and had validly waived the
assistance of counsel.
If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was
it admissible against Enrile.
The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's
house and buy marijuana from him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial
confession. With that confession outlawed and the testimony disowned by the
prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against Enrile to tie him with
Abugatal.
It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he
sold the marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment
at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile's house where he
pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true,
that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private
person may make a warrantless arrest only under any of the following
circumstances :
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point
because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal
knowledge that he was the source of marijuana.
According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked
Abugatal who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this
reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately arrested him.15
What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis
of the information supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority,
proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no
right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently
disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if
he had been caught in flagrante delicto.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the
act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it
were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and
seizure.
The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that
a man's house is his castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces,
may violate. There were measures available under the law to enable the
authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was found in
possession of prohibited articles. The police did not employ these measures.
What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the
slightest heed to the injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were
using the tactics of the police state, where the minions of the government place
little value on human rights and individual liberties and are obssessed only with
the maintenance of peace and punishment of crime.
These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be
pursued at the cost of dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of
the individual from overzealous law-enforcers who mistakenly believe that
suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the
Constitution. Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to
apprehend and punish law-breakers. Such a practice only leads to further
defiance of the law by those who have been denied its protection.
In the light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced
that there is enough evidence to establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of
doubt. The paucity of such evidence only strengthens the suspicion that the
marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police officers who were
probably worried that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction as a drug
pusher would be thwarted by his application for probation.
Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating
Enrile is inadmissible against Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found
on him as a result of the illegal search. The only remaining evidence against the
appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this has been questioned and discredited
by the prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left without a leg to stand
on and must therefore be dismissed.
Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the
discharge of their duties is not enough to build a case against a person charged
with a crime. They should build it with painstaking care, stone by stone of
provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the accused, before they
can hope to secure a conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the challenged decision is hereby
SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be
released immediately. It is so ordered.
Lack of Urgency
People vs. Pasudag (G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001)
The case is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan,
Branch 46, Urdaneta finding accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana2 and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary penalty
and accessories of the law.
On December 17, 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
Emiliano M. Matro filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta an
Information3 charging accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang with violation of R.A.
No. 6425, Sec. 9, reading as follows:
"That on or about September 26, 1995 and prior dates thereto at barangay
Artacho, municipality of Sison, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate, and culture seven (7) hills of
marijuana in the land tilled by him and situated beside the house of the accused,
without authority or permit to do so.
"Contrary to Sec. 9 of R.A. 6425 as amended."
On February 10, 1997, the trial court arraigned the accused. He pleaded not
guilty.4 Trial ensued.
On September 26, 1995, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip of
the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng
operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About
five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were
marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a
storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner
told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it.5
SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C.
Astrero. The latter dispatched team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito,
SPO3 Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 in
that same afternoon, the team arrived at Brgy; Artacho and went straight to the
house of accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked
him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters
away.6
Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who
took pictures of accused Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants.7
They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag
and the marijuana plants to the police station.8
At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police
Astrero, that he owned the marijuana plants.9 SPO3 Fajarito prepared a
confiscation report10 which accused Pasudag signed.11 He kept the six
marijuana plants inside the cabinet in the office of the Chief of Police and brought
the tallest plant12 to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 13
Major Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime
Laboratory, receive the specimen14 on October 11, 1995. She testified that she
took some leaves from the marijuana plant because the leaves had the most
concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol. As per her Chemistry Report No. D-O87-
95,15 the examination was positive for marijuana (tetrahydrocannabinol).16
On March 18, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
as charged and, taking into consideration his educational attainment (he reached
only grade IV), imposed the minimum of the imposable penalty, thus:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered CONVICTING ALBERTO PASUDAG of the
crime charged in the information and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary
penalty and other accessories of the law.
"The 7 fully grown marijuana plants are confiscated in favor of the government.
"The Warden of Urdaneta, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, is hereby
ordered to commit the body of Alberto Pasudag to the National Bilibid Prison
immediately upon receipt hereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"Done this 17th day of March, 1997, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
(Sgd. ) MODESTO C. JU ANSON
Judge"17
Hence, this appeal.18
In his brief, accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding that
the marijuana plant submitted for laboratory examination was one of the seven
(7) marijuana plants confiscated from his garden; that the trial court erred in
concluding that the confiscation report was not an extrajudicial admission which
required the intervention of his counsel; and in convicting him on the basis of
inference that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7) plants, owned
the same or that he permitted others to cultivate the same.19
The Solicitor General contended that accused-appellant admitted before the lower
court that tile specimen20 was one of the plants confiscated in his backyard; that
appellant was not under custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation
report; and that the inferences deduced by the lower court strengthened the
conviction of accused-appellant..21
We find the appeal meritorious. handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praise worthiness of their
intentions."32

As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law

enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized
individual.22 The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.33
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x."23 Any
evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible.24 The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The
testimony of SPO3 Jovencio Fajarito34 reveals that appellant was not duly
informed of his constitutional rights, thus: "
In tile case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from
the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the
house.25 He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized "ATTY: ESTRADA:
that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants.26 Time
was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three
months old27 and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be
Q: In fact, you went to the house of Alberto Pasudag?
uprooteds on that same day.

A: Yes sir.
In People vs. Valdez28 the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without
the requisite judicial warrant is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's
evidence clearly established that the police conducted a search of accused's
backyard garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search Q: And in fact you invited him to the place where marijuana plants were planted?
warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity
for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants.
A: Yes sir.

"Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to
enforce."29 Q: Then and there, you started asking question from him?

"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in A: Yes sir.
suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of
crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the
Bill of Rights."30 We need not underscore that the protection against illegal Q: In fact you started asking questions to elucidate from him information of
search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances admission regarding the ownership of the plants in question?
are searches allowed without warrants."31 "The mantle of protection extended by
the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high
A: I only asked who really planted and cultivated the plants sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q: Before you propounded questions to Alberto Pasudag, as according to you, Q: According to you, you brought Alberto Pasudag to the Office of the Chief of
you were already informed that he was the cultivator by some per sons whose Police of Sison, Pangasinan?
name until now you do not know?

A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir.

Q: In fact the Chief of Police was there?

Q: Did you not inform Alberto , Pasudag his constitutional rights?

A: Yes sir.
A: I did not inform him because only when I will took (sic) his statement in the
presence of his counsel and to be reduced in writing, sir.
Q: Romeo Ast.rero was the Senior Inspector? ,

Q: What you want to impress, you will inform only a person of his constitutional
rights if you take his statement in writing? A: Yes sir. Q: In other words, SPO2 Calip, Alcantara, Romeo Rasca and Alberto
Pasudag were inside the office of the Chief of Police?

A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir.

Q: Is that your method?

Q: And according to you, Alberto Pasudag was interrogated by the Chief of Police
?
A: I informed the accused if l have to place it is statement into writing, sir.

A: Yes sir:
Q: According to you, you invited Alberto Pasudag to the alleged place where the
marijuana were planted, then and there, you asked him who planted the same,
and according to you, he said he planted the same? Q: In fact the Chief of Police was asking Alberto Pasudag in your presence? who
planted the marijuana plants and according to you, Alberto Pasudag admitted in
your presence that he planted the alleged marijuana plants?
A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir.
Q: Before Chief Inspector Romeo Astrero interrogated Alberto Pasudag, he did
not also inform Alberto Pasudag his constitutional rights, particularly the rights of
a person under custodial interrogation?
A: What I know, he just asked Alberto Pasudag the veracity whether or not he
planted the said plants.
Q: In other words, your answer is, your Chief of Police did not inform Alberto
Pasudag his constitutional rights?
A: No sir." (emphasis supplied)
After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report,35 which
was part of the investigation.36 Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation
report.37 In both the interrogation and the signing of the confiscation receipt, no
counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the only civilian present in the Office
of the Chief of Police.38
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant was not under
custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held
repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's
participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.39 Obviously, accused-
appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and
ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.
"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more that mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee."40 Even if the confession or admission were "gospel
truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of
such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence.41
In light of the foregoing, we uphold the constitutional right of accused-appellant
to a presumption of innocence. The prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of the crime
charged for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of Corrections is
hereby directed to forthwith release accused-appellant unless he is held for
another case, and to inform the Court of the action taken hereon within ten (10)
days from notice.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Aminnudin [163 SCRA 402 (1988)]
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was
nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from
the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was
filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one
of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on
this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him
as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to
contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in
his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.
11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His
bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even
know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to
have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused
that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two
watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00
for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept
the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged
not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even
know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing
that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was
the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and
had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or
voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which
may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact
amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that
the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain
about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or
realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that
time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free
since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for
his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is
Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making
the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against
him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his
part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the
arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of
the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as
incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized
the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier
received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as
to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest,
20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter,
we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano
Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
COURT:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25,
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin

A Yes, sir.
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

Q What were those activities?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
Q From whom did you get that information?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,
that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the
maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
A Marijuana, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with Q Are you sure of that?
marijuana was received by you many days before you received the intelligence
report in writing?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before? Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir. A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the
coming? subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but A No, more.
on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was
coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was
already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff. Q Why not?

COURT: A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance? Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not
need a search warrant anymore?

A Yes, sir.
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere
lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement.
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of
This is still a government of laws and not of men.
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were
caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations
of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of
persons or things to be seized.
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.
It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules
years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will,
of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of
detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves
the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held
to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its
that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of
guarantees.
the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of
own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they
he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be
could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
enough to convict him.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes'
felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those
who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every
individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers
with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss
of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence
against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is
innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Effect of Entry of Plea
People vs. Plana (G.R. No. 128285, November 27, 2001)
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15
of Roxas City in Criminal Case No. 4659 finding accused-appellants Antonio
Plana, Edgardo Perayra, Rene Saldevea and Richard Banday guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and imposing upon them
the supreme penalty of Death.
The Information filed against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of September 23, 1994, at Brgy.
Cubi, Dumarao, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused did, then and there, wilfully and feloniously, and by conspiring and
helping one another, gang-up and have carnal knowledge of HELEN PIROTE
[should read Helen Perote] against her will, and, thereafter, by means of cruelty
which augmented her suffering, did, then and there, strike, mangle and stab said
HELEN PIROTE several times with both blunt and sharp-edged weapons thereby
inflicting upon her serious multiple wounds causing massive hemorrhage which
resulted to [sic] her death.1
At their arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the
prosecution presented as its witnesses Dr. Ricardo Betita, Jr., Felix Lagud, Rene
Bustamante, Antonio Mendoza, Amalia Rafael, Linda Perote and Romeo de la
Torre Diaz. Their testimonies, taken together, establish that:
On September 26, 1994, the victim, Helen Perote, was found dead by her brother
and the police in Brgy. Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The body was in prone position
and was already in an advance state of decomposition. Per the post mortem
examination conducted by Dr. Ricardo Betita, Rural Health Officer of Cuartero,
Capiz, the victim sustained the following injuries:
1. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left anterior chest.
2. Avulsion with irregular edges wound 8x12 cm middle chest area.
3. Avulsion of the nose and upper lip portion/area.
4. Clean edges wound or stab wound 2x5 cm epigastric area.
5. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left hypogastric area.
6. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm hypogastric area.
7. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left posterior upper back.
8. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm mid upper portion of the back.
9. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left posterior back level of 8th ribs.
10. Clean edges stab wound 2x5 cm left back level of left lumbar area.
11. Clean edges wound 2x5 cm middle low back area.
12. Clean edges wound 2x5 cm right low back area at level of lumbar area.
13. Clean edges wound 2x5 cm left gluteal area near the anus.
14. Vagina: Introitus can easily insert 2 fingers/Hymen with laceration 3 and 9
o'clock (old laceration) and on the state of decomposition.
The most probable cause of death was massive hemorrhage or blood loss
secondary to multiple stab wound[s].2
When he took the witness stand, Dr. Betita described the fourteen (14) wounds
inflicted on the victim as follows: Wound No. 1 was located just above the left
breast of the victim. It was seven (7) to nine (9) centimeters deep. It was a fatal
wound as it hit the heart of the victim. Wound No. 2 was located in the middle
chest area of the victim. Wound No. 3 was an avulsion on the nose and upper lip.
There was also a missing tooth. The wound could have been caused by a hard
object or that the victim fell with her face hitting the ground. Wound No. 4 was a
stab wound located at the upper part of the abdomen. It was seven (7)
centimeters deep and was probably caused by a knife or a bladed instrument.
Wound No. 5 was a stab wound located at the left side above the pubis area.
Wound No. 6 was a stab wound located above the pubis area also. It was seven
(7) to ten (10) centimeters deep. The urinary bladder and the uterus could have
been hit by this wound. Wound No. 7 was a stab wound and located at the right
scapular area of the body. With a depth of seven (7) centimeters, the wound hit
the lungs of the victim. Wound No. 8 was a stab wound and located at the upper
back portion. It could have affected the spinal cord causing paralysis. Wound No.
9 was a fatal stab would located at the left posterior back level of the 8th rib. The
wound could have affected the spinal cord, the lungs and the abdominal "aorta."
Wound No. 10 was located at the left lumbar area which could have hit the
kidney of the victim. Wound No. 11 was located at the middle low back area.
Wound No. 12 was located at the middle portion of the back just above the right
lumbar area. Wound No. 13 was located near the anus. The wound was inflicted
with the victim facing downward or the assailant was at the back of the victim.
Finally, Entry No. 14 was the laceration on the hymen of the victim's sexual
organ.3
According to Dr. Betita, the victim died more than seventy-two (72) hours
already before the police authorities found her body.4
On September 23, 1994, or three (3) days before the victim's body was found, at
around 10:30 in the morning, Felix Lagud was walking at the feeder road in
Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. He just came from his farm in Alipasyawan,
Dumarao and was on his way home to Poblacion Ilawod. A movement at about
fifty meters to his left side caught his attention. He saw three persons who
seemed to be wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to see them more
clearly. From about a distance of twenty (20) meters, he saw the three men
holding a girl while another man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and
she was later stabbed. Frightened that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran
away. He intended to go straight home but when he passed by the house of
Porferio Haguisan, the latter invited him for a "milagrosa." Lagud obliged and
stayed at the house of his "kumpare" until 2:00 in the morning.5
On September 26, 1994, while he was in Ungon Ilaya, Lagud heard that a girl
was found dead in Barangay Cobe. It was the same place where, three days
earlier, he saw the four men gang up on the girl. He wanted to go to the place
but he was told that the foul smell coming from the decomposed body already
permeated the place. He later learned that the deceased was Helen Perote.6
In his affidavit,7 as well as in his testimony in court, Lagud identified accused-
appellants Plana, Perayra and Saldevea as the three men who were holding the
girl while their fourth companion was raping her. At the time of the incident, he
did not yet recognize the fourth man who was on top of the girl. However, when
he saw accused-appellants at the municipal hall where they were brought when
they were arrested on September 26, 1994, he identified the fourth man to be
accused-appellant Banday.8
Rene Bustamante corroborated in part the testimony of Lagud. Between 10:30 to
11:00 in the morning of September 23, 1994, Bustamante was looking for his
carabao. He found it near the fishpond owned by accused-appellant Saldevea in
Barangay Cobe. Bustamante was tugging the carabao when he heard the sound
of men laughing. When he looked back, he saw accused-appellant Saldevea, who
was then shirtless, pull up his pants. Accused-appellant Saldevea were with three
other men. They were washing their hands on the fishpond. Bustamante
recognized one of them to be accused-appellant Perayra. Bustamante proceeded
to his home in Barangay Ungon, Ilaya, Dumarao, Capiz.9
On September 25, 1994, Bustamante was in their house with his wife and
children. His mother-in-law, Linda Perote, arrived looking for her daughter Helen.
The wife of Bustamante is the older sister of Helen. They learned that Helen had
been missing since September 23, 1994. She was supposed to go to the house of
her other sister, Susan, but she (Helen) never reached the latter's place. They
began to search for her. On September 26, 1994, they found her lifeless body
with no clothes on but her panty. There were already maggots infesting her body.
Bustamante confirmed in open court that accused-appellants were the men that
he saw on September 23, 1994 near the place where the body of Helen was
found.10
Antonio Mendoza, barangay captain of Barangay Hambad, Dumarao, Capiz and
storeowner, narrated during the hearing that on September 23, 1994, at past
8:00 in the morning, accused-appellants arrived at his store. They bought two
bottles of ESQ whisky and proceeded to drink the liquor. Accused-appellants were
drinking in Mendoza's store until almost 10:00 in the morning. Thereafter, they
left bringing with them the one-half full bottle of whisky that they did not
consume.11
Two days after that incident, on September 25, 1994, Porferio Haguisan and
members of the Regional Security of the Armed Forces (RSAF) came to see
Mendoza to ask him if he saw accused-appellants. Mendoza told them that
accused-appellants were in his store in the morning of September 23, 1994.
Haguisan and the police left. The following day, Mendoza heard that Helen's body
was found dead near the fishpond owned by the brother of accused-appellant
Saldevea. The place is approximately 500 meters away from Mendoza's store.12
The last person who talked with the victim was her older sister Amalia Rafael. In
the morning of September 23, 1994, Helen went to see Amalia to tell her that
they were going to have a "milagrosa" in the house of their other sister, Susan.
Amalia instructed Helen to go ahead. Helen then left to proceed to Susan's house.
Going there, Helen would usually pass by the railway track and the feeder road.
After Helen left, Amalia followed her to their sister's house. Amalia took the same
route passing by the railway track and feeder road. On her way, Amalia met
accused-appellants on the feeder road near the fishpond. At the time, she only
knew accused-appellants Plana and Perayra. She noticed that the four men were
not wearing any shirts but only their denim pants. They were obviously drunk as
their faces were red and they walked in a zigzag manner. Amalia saw that
accused-appellant Plana had a knife tucked in his waist.13
There were already many people when Amalia arrived at Susan's house.
However, Helen was nowhere to be found. Amalia did not stay long there as she
only got food. On September 25, 1994, while she was working in the ricefield,
their mother, Linda, came. She told Amalia that Helen had not come home. They
then went to see Helen's classmates to ask them if they knew where she went.
All they knew is that she went to a "milagrosa." On September 26, 1994, they
found the body of Helen near the fishpond of accused-appellant Saldevea in
Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. Helen was then only eighteen years old.14
The Chief of Police of Dumarao Police Station, Romeo dela Torre Diaz, received
report of Helen's disappearance in the afternoon of September 25, 1994. Later in
the evening, he granted clearance to the 601st Mobile Force Company to conduct
the search. The following day, upon hearing that the body of Helen was already
found, Diaz went to the station of the 601st Mobile Force Company. Accused-
appellants, who were already there, were turned over to him for investigation.
Thereafter, Diaz went to the place where Helen's body was found in Barangay
Cobe.15
Linda Perote, the victim's mother, described on the witness stand the shock, grief
and anguish that she felt upon learning of her daughter's death. She averred that
the family spent almost fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for Helen's wake and
burial.16
Upon the other hand, accused-appellants interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. Their account of their activities on that fateful day of September 23, 1994 is
as follows:
At around 7:30 in the morning, accused-appellants had "lomi" in the eatery
owned by Eddie Pendon. After eating, they accompanied accused-appellant
Saldevea to the public market to buy fish. From the public market, they all
boarded a tricycle to go to Barangay Bugnay. When they alighted the tricycle,
they may barangay captain Tony Mendoza. Mendoza boarded the tricycle while
accused-appellants proceeded to Mendoza's store. Accused-appellants bought
two bottles of whisky from the store. They drank the liquor at said store until
past 10:00 in the morning.17
Thereafter, accused-appellants Plana and Banday had to leave behind accused-
appellants Saldevea and Perayra to go to the house of Plana's aunt and uncle,
Vicente and Felomina Docutan. They reached the house of the Docutans at
around 10:30 in the morning. It only took them a couple of minutes to get there
by foot. Accused-appellants Plana and Banday were tasked to cook the chicken
for the celebration that night. Also at the house of the Docutan couple was Nolan
Obena. Accused-appellants Plana and Banday stayed there until 9:00 in the
evening. Accused-appellant Banday slept over at the house of accused-appellant
Plana since he (accused-appellant Banday) lived quite far.18
For their part, after accused-appellants Plana and Banday left the store, accused-
appellants Perayra and Saldevea proceeded to the house of the latter's sister-in-
law, Monina Saldevea. Accused-appellant Saldevea cooked the fish that they
earlier bought in the public market. They then had lunch and after eating, they
slept. Accused-appellant Perayra slept until 4:00 in the afternoon. Accused-
appellant Saldevea woke up earlier and was soon outside the house plowing the
field. Accused-appellant Perayra went home at 4:30 in the afternoon.19
To buttress their defense of denial and alibi, accused-appellants further
accounted for their activities on the days subsequent to September 23, 1994.
Accused-appellant Plana claimed that he spent the day gathering wood on
September 24, 1994. The following day, he just stayed at their house but in the
afternoon, he played basketball with accused-appellant Perayra and their friends.
Later in the evening, at about 11:00, certain members of the RSAF came to the
house of accused-appellant Plana. Accused-appellant Perayra was still there
because he slept over at said house. The RSAF questioned them if they saw a girl
named Helen Perote. They answered no. Accused-appellants Plana and Perayra
then accompanied the law enforcers to see a certain "Lando." The authorities
inquired from Lando if there was a woman who boarded his "bering"
transportation. Lando answered in the negative. Accused-appellants Plana and
Perayra were then instructed by the police to go to the police detachment. Since
it was already late, accused-appellants Plana and Perayra asked if they could just
go there in the morning of the following day.20
Accused-appellant Perayra averred that he stayed at his house the whole day of
September 24, 1994. The following day, he went to the house of accused-
appellant Plana in the afternoon. They agreed to meet later in the evening at the
wake in the house of the Igaras family. They left the wake at 10:00 in the
evening. Accused-appellant Perayra decided to spend the night at the house of
accuse-appellant Plana. At 11:00 in the evening, they were awakened by the
brother of accused-appellant Plana. They were informed that members of the
RSAF were outside the house looking for them. Accused-appellant Perayra was
brought in front of the house while accused-appellant Plana was brought at the
back. Accused-appellant Perayra was asked of his whereabouts on September 23,
1994.21
Accused-appellant Banday recounted that he left the house of accused-appellant
Plana early morning of September 24, 1994. He slept there the night before after
they had dinner at the house of the Docutans. He never left his house on
September 24 and 25, 1994. On September 26, 1994, he received word that the
police chief wanted to ask him questions. He thus went to the police detachment
as instructed. He did not see the other accused-appellants when he arrived at the
detachment. The authorities began interrogating him. They wanted him to
confess to the killing and raping of Helen. When he refused, they punched him.
Later in the afternoon, the four accused-appellants were brought to the municipal
hall in Dumarao, Capiz. They were placed under detention there.22
Aside from accused-appellants, the defense presented other witnesses, namely,
Julia Barrientos, Nolan Obena, Igleserio Farinas, Rolando Naelgas and Monina
Saldevea. Barrientos tried to refute the allegation of prosecution witness Felix
Lagud that he saw accused-appellants rape and stab Helen in Barangay Cobe.
Barrientos testified that on September 23, 1994, at 10:00 in the morning, on her
way to the public market, she saw Lagud sitting on the bench outside his house.
Lagud was then selling "amakan," hence, he could not have seen what he
claimed he saw.23
Obena corroborated the alibi of accused-appellants Plana and Banday that from
10:30 in the morning to 8:00 in the evening of September 23, 1994, they were
at the house of the Docutan couple.24 Farinas, a basket vendor, said during his
testimony that he saw accused-appellant Plana and his two companions at
around 10:30 in the morning of that fateful day. They passed by the house of
Ronie Saldevea, brother of accused-appellant Saldevea, where Farinas was
buying baskets. He (Farinas) even had a short conversation with accused-
appellant Plana. Farinas saw accused-appellant Plana and his companions head
towards Barangay Cobe.25 Naelgas corroborated the testimony of Obena.
Naelgas saw Obena when the latter bought baskets from Ronie. He (Naelgas)
affirmed that accused-appellants Plana and Banday passed by the house of
Ronie. They came from the direction of the nearby high school and went down
the hill going to Barangay Cobe.26
Monina Saldevea, sister-in-law of accused-appellant Saldevea, corroborated the
alibi of accused-appellants Saldevea and Perayra. She attested that on
September 23, 1994, accused-appellants Saldevea and Perayra arrived at her
house at 10:30 in the morning. They had their lunch there. Accused-appellant
Saldevea helped prepare the same. Accused-appellant Perayra stayed at the
house of Monina until 4:30 in the afternoon when he went home. On the other
hand, accused-appellant Saldevea did not leave the house until September 25,
1994. The following day, he went to the detachment after he was informed by
accused-appellant Perayra that the authorities wanted to investigate them for the
death of Helen Perote.27 Edith Perayra, mother of accused-appellant Perayra,
averred that in the morning of September 23, 1994, her son asked permission
from her to go to the public market. He told her that he was going there with
accused-appellant Saldevea. When he got home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he told
his mother that he ate lunch at the house of Monina Saldevea with accused-
appellant Saldevea. Accused-appellant Perayra did not leave their house except
to buy cigarettes in the afternoon of September 25, 1994. The following day, at
6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant Perayra reported to the police
detachment after he learned that the authorities wanted to ask him questions. At
the detachment, he was surprised to learn that he was one of the suspects in the
rape-slaying of Helen. Accused-appellants were all brought to the municipal hall
in Dumarao, Capiz where they were detained.28
Lagud was called again to the witness stand by the prosecution to rebut the
testimony of Julia Barrientos, witness for the defense. Lagud admitted that he
knows Barrientos but denied seeing her on September 23, 1994. According to
Lagud, Barrientos' claim that she saw him selling "amakan" on that date is not
true because he had already stopped said business in 1992.29
On November 23, 1996, after due trial, a judgment was rendered by the trial
court finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide. The trial court imposed upon them the supreme penalty of
death. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ANTONIO PLANA, EDGARDO PERAYRA, RENE
SALDEVEA and RICHARD BANDAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and punished under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and, likewise,
ordering them to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim, Helen Perote,
twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as actual damages and fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as civil liability.
SO ORDERED.30
In their appeal brief, accused-appellants assail their conviction alleging that the
trial court committed the following errors:
a. The trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of alibi/denial put up by
the appellants they had nothing to do with the commission of the crime as their
testimonies and their witnesses, individually and collectively taken together,
showed with clarity and beyond doubt they were not at the scene of the crime
and did not commit the offenses charged.
b. The trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police authorities in
detaining appellants without benefit of Court filed information nor judicial order of
detention as well as violation of their constitutional rights during their so-called
custodial invitation and interrogation.
c. The trial court erred in not appreciating the inconsistencies and inherent
weaknesses/improbabilities of the testimonies of prosecution's witness which
showed tons of doubt of appellant's guilt entitling them to acquittal.31
Accused-appellants vigorously deny that they committed the rape and killing of
Helen. They maintain that their testimonies, taken together with that of the other
defense witnesses, show that they were not at the scene of the crime. In other
words, they fault the trial court for not giving credence to their defense of alibi.
Corollarily, they point out the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. Accused-appellants likewise
denounce as violative of their constitutional rights their detention without, at the
time, a judicial order or an information filed in court.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court is constrained to
affirm the judgment of conviction of accused-appellants.
The first and last issues raised by accused-appellants shall be addressed jointly
as they both involve the assessment of the witnesses' credibility. It is well-
entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight
and substance which would have affected the result of the case. The trial court is
in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying.32
In this case, the trial court correctly gave credence to the positive identification of
accused-appellants as the assailants of Helen by Felix Lagud. His testimony was
straightforward, direct and consistent:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q Mr. Lagud, where were you at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning on
September 23, 1994?
A I was walking at the feeder road of barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz.
Q Where were you headed to?
A Going home to Poblacion Ilawod. A On my left side.

Q And this Poblacion Ilawod is also of Dumarao, Capiz? Q Now, how far were you from the very spot where you saw there seems to
be wrestling persons?

A Yes, sir.
A 50 meters. About 50 meters.

Q Where have you been?

Q Now, when you saw this what did you do?

A I came from Alipasyawan, Dumarao, Capiz, visiting my farm.

A I came near so that I could see it clearly.

Q This Alipasyawan is also of Dumarao, Capiz?

Q How near did you approached that spot, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.
A About twenty (20) meters.

Q While walking in barangay road of Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz, was

there anything unusual that attracted or called your attention? Q Now, upon reaching that distance from the spot where you said you saw
persons who seems to be wrestling what did you see?

A Yes, ma'm.
A I saw three (3) persons holding the one who is being raped and one
person was on the top of the girl.
Q What was the unusual incident that called your attention?

Q Now, did you recognized these three (3) persons whom you saw were
A I saw that as if there were wrestling. holding the victim?

Q On which part of the barangay road where you were walking that you saw A Yes, sir.
there seems to be wrestling persons?

Q Who were these three (3) persons holding still the victim?
A Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra and Rene Saldevea.
Q Now, before that incident that you saw have you already known these
three (3) persons you have identified who have been holding the girl, one of
them was actually raping —
ATTY. BARRERA:
I object to the term actual raping. There is still no proof that there was any rape,
was holding the girl only. He has not yet given testimony involving rape.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A These three (3) persons I have already known them because we have
gone together in a drinking session and I also passed by Cobe.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q Now, if these (3) persons are inside the courtroom, will you please go
down from the witness stand and tap the should of these three (3)?
ATTY. BARRERA:
I request as he taps each of them he should mention the name.
A (Witness came down from the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of
Antonio Plana, next as Rene Saldevea and another persons he named as Edgardo
Perayra.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR CONTINUING:
Q Now, what else did you see?
A The first, at first I saw the three persons holding the victim and the other
one is on top of the victim. Later, I saw that the one who is on top of the girl
raised his hand and stabbed the victim.
Q Now, what happened after you saw that the one on top of the victim
stabbed the victim?
A Because I was afraid, I ran away because they might also see me.
Q Now, where did you proceed after you got frightened of what you saw?
A Going home to Poblacion Ilawod, Dumarao, Capiz.
Q Were you able to immediately go home?
A I was not able to go home because when I passed by the house of
Porferio Haguisan, he saw me and he invited me because it was their Milagrosa.
Q How long did you stay in the house of your Compare Porferio?
A I stayed there long. I went home already 2:00 o'clock. Q Now, who was the dead person that was found in that spot?

xxx xxx xxx A Helen Perote.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: Q When this victim was still alive, have you any occasion to know her?

Q Now, what did you do when you heard that a person was found there a A Yes, I know her.
dead person was found in that very place where you saw the accused on
September 23, 1994, holding and raping?
Q Now, how about the fourth man who was on top of the girl and whom you
saw also stabbed the girl on the morning of September 23, 1994, did you
A I went to the Municipal Hall because I also heard that the accused were recognize him?
apprehended and I went there and I saw and recognized them.

A On that incident I do not know him but when I saw him at the Municipal
COURT: Hall I know him because they were also together.

Q You mean to tell us Mr. Witness that on September 26, 1994, when the Q And did you know who this fourth man was when you went to the
dead body was found in the feeder road of Cobe, you went to the Municipal Hall Municipal Hall?
because the accused was arrested, is that what you mean?

A Yes, sir, Richard Banday.

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is inside the courtroom will you please go down from the witness
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: stand and tap the shoulder of Richard Banday?

Q What time have you gone to the Municipal Hall? A (Witness went down from the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of a
person who, when asked answered his name as Richard Banday).33

A Noon time.
Lagud remained unwavering and consistent even when he was under the grueling actually 12 meters. The question is, why did you approach the place where you
cross-examination by accused-appellants' counsel: saw persons wrestling?

ATTY. BARRERA: A I went near so that it would be clear to me and I can recognize and
confirm as to what they are doing.

Q At that distance of 50 meters as you said from the place where you saw
persons as if wrestling there was no obstruction to your view? Q You want to tell the Court that it was out of curiosity that you approached
the area where you saw persons appearing to be wrestling?

A There were grasses and trees not so tall.

A Yes, that is what I plan.

Q Now, would you agree with me that the place, I withdraw that. The place
where you were and the area where you saw persons as if wrestling which is the Q You were not afraid instead you were curious isn't it?
elevated portion?

A I was afraid that is why when I went near I also crouched.

A On the place where I was.

Q So, your portion being elevated you would agree with me that you can
see the place where there are persons appearing to be wrestling because it was
at the lower portion am I correct?
Q Just answer my question. Were you afraid or you were curious that is why
you approached the place where persons appeared to be wrestling.
COURT:

A Not so clear because there were grasses and that is why I went near.
Compañero, if you have any correction just make a manifestation, just make it
formal.
Q How were you able to identify the three (3) persons, namely, Plana,
Saldevea and Perayra?
ATTY. BARRERA:

A When I came near that is the time that I recognized them.

I am sorry, your honor.

Q Now, you said that you came nearer to the place where persons were
wrestling and you said you were 20 meters from them but when measured it was
COURT: Q As a matter of fact the only vegetation you can find in the premises from
where you were meters away from the area where you saw what you are telling
this Court as green grass?
Proceed.

A Yes, sir. Short grasses.

A Just for curiosity sake.

Q And you identified only three persons holding not the one lying, you said
ATTY. BARRERA: it was Plana, Perayra and Saldevea, and you do not know the person on top of
the person lying, who was covered on top by a man, was he a man or a woman?

Q Now, at a distance of 12 meters you recognized three (3) persons holding

the arms and leg of the one lying and another person on top of the woman lying A I think it was a girl because I heard voices like that of a woman.
is that it?

Q You think it was a girl. At a distance of 12 meters and you said it was
A Yes, sir. clear to your view can you not identify the person lying and covered by one on
top of as a woman?

Q And at that distance of 12 meters you identified the three persons as the
herein accused, Plana, Perayra, and Saldevea whom you met according to you for A It is not clear because it was covered by a person on top.
three times at the store of Antonio Mendoza, is that correct?

Q Definitely, you told the Court you do not know who was the person on top
A Yes, sir. of the one lying, am I correct at that very moment?

Q Now, 12 meters distance from the place where you were sitting up to the A Yes, sir.,
place where you pointed at is the area where you identified the accused holding
and another one on top of the person lying, there was no obstruction from the
area from the place where you were to the area where you saw? PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

A It was clear because it was near. Your honor, the translation is I did not yet know him.

ATTY. BARRERA:
 Q What was that he wanted to have it penetrated?

Q What part of his body that person who was on top you saw?

A His organ.

A From his head to his back.

Q Did the Court get you right that you said you saw — you set properly.
Make it of record that witness has been uneasy when being cross-examined.
Q You did not see his face?
Don't make any undesirable — you sit properly. Now, did the Court get you right
that the man whom you saw at the top of the person lying was turning his back
towards you?
A No, sir.

A I saw his head and back and he was not on the back view but side view.
Q What was he actually doing when you saw him for the first time?

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
A He was on top of the girl.

May I interpret. And his back was not actually against me but he was somewhat
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: side view position upon me.

There is a continuation, your honor, he said "naga". COURT:

A He was on top of the girl and he was — Q Did he have his clothes on when he was on top of the person lying?

COURT: A No, sir.

He was what? You say it? Q You mean to tell us that he was naked throughout?

A He is forcing that his will penetrate. A His pants was lowered down.
Q Was he naked up? Q And the woman at the time you said the man was trying to force his
organ penetrate that of a person lying was that person lying struggling or what
was that person lying doing?
A Yes, sir.

A She was struggling and she was held by three persons.

Q At that distance can you see his organ?

Q Alright, tell us, you identified Antonio Plana what was he holding at that
A I cannot see but as if he is trying to force because his back was also moment you said you saw?
moving.

A The right foot of the girl.

Q So actually you did not see his organ that he was trying to have it
penetrated?
Q How about Perayra?

A No, sir.
A On the left foot.

Q Did you see the organ of that woman lying down?

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

A No, sir.
I think not, foot, it is the leg (witness indicating a little above the ankle).

ATTY. BARRERA:
A Left lower part of the leg.

Q Now, so, did the man on top of that woman — person lying whom you
said was a girl had her pants you said lowered up to where? ATTY. BARRERA:

A Up to about his knees. Q And Rene Saldevea, what part was he holding, if any according to you?

A Two (2) hands (witness raising his two hands above his head closed
together).
 ATTY. BARRERA:

Q And at that position as you described none of the four (4) persons
including the three you identified covered the mouth of the person lying?
I am trying to clarify what — was it moaning, crying or saying something vocal.

A I cannot tell because I cannot see.

A Crying.

Q You mean at a distance of 12 meters you cannot see if the mouth of the
Q You did not hear any word being uttered?
person lying was covered or not?

A The words was (sic) not clear.

A I cannot see because she was covered by the person lying on top of her.

Q Now, the person lying (who is) whose pleading you heard was she moving
Q You have not heard any sound or voice emanating from the person lying?
or was she moving her body or any part of her body?

A I heard voices but it was not clear.

A She was moving but she was held by three persons.

Q Now, that voices you heard what were the nature of those voices?
Q Now, you said that the person on top of that woman lying has his pants
lowered up to his knee, on the other hand, the person lying did you see if she
was totally naked or she had something on or you have not seen it?
A As if pleading.

A On his top was naked but her pants was lowered on the left leg. The
Q You wanted to tell us that the voice you heard was the crying or moaning
pants was already taken on the right leg, the pants was not taken off.
or —

Q So that the person lying was not totally naked at the time you saw it?
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

A As to her body she was naked but only the pants on the right side was
Your honor, the witness has already described the nature of the voices as if
not taken off.
pleading.
Q So at the moment because the upper part of the body had no clothes A No, sir.
except portion of the right leg that still retains the pants you would know that it
was a woman lying on the ground is that it?
Q You did not hear if they were shouting at one another?

A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.

Q And at that point of time while the three accused, Plana, Perayra, and
Saldevea were holding the hands of the girl and the other one on to of her, can Q You did not hear any of them saying go ahead, we follow also?
you tell this Court if these four (4) persons while doing those things as you
described were conversing or uttered any word?
A No, sir.

A I heard voices but it was not clear.

Q Now, and later you said you saw a person on top of that girl pulled a knife
and stabbed that person lying whom you said was a girl is that it?
Q You mean you heard voices being made by persons you saw?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q Considering that that person on top of that victim had dress over and had
Q And you would like to tell the Court that at a distance of 12 meters from his pants on top of his knee how did he stabbed that victim whom you said was a
where you were you never heard audibly the words coming from their voices? woman?

A I cannot understand because their voices were low. A I noticed that but I do not know where he get (sic) the knife but I noticed
that he just raised his hand.

Q Were they laughing?

Q Not one of the three (3) whom you identified gave him the knife except
that you only saw that person on top of that woman all of a sudden having a
A I have not noticed. knife and stabbing is that it?

Q So, you did not notice if they were laughing? A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is that person on top of the woman stabbing that woman did you Q And so, you did not notice him how many times that person stabbed the
hear any or uttered by that man stabbing that woman? woman?

A I did not notice the words he uttered. A No, sir.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: Q At the time she was stabbed did you hear any voice being uttered.

Your honor, there is a continuation on the answer, I did not notice if he uttered A I heard as if there was a sound like a moan then I ran away.34
any word because immediately I ran away.

The testimony of Lagud positively identifying accused-appellants as the

ATTY. BARRERA: perpetrators of the dastardly crime was corroborated in its material points by the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses. The prosecution had sufficiently
established that accused-appellants were together and were drinking liquor at the
Anyway, let it stay in the record. early morning of September 23, 1994; Lagud saw them along the feeder road in
Barangay Cobe raping a girl and later one of them stabbed her; Bustamante saw
them boisterously laughing near the fishpond where the body of Helen was
found; Rafael confirmed that Helen took that route on the way to their sister's
COURT:
house for the "milagrosa;" Rafael met accused-appellants, who were all drunk,
along the feeder road while she was on her way to her sister's house and; when
it was found on September 26, 1994, Helen's body had already been lifeless for
Proceed. more than seventy-two hours.

ATTY. BARRERA: In light of the positive identification and the other strong corroborative evidence,
the trial court properly gave scant consideration to accused-appellants' defense of
denial and alibi. Alibi is concededly one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases.
Q By the way, how many times (did) you saw that man on top of the It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, positive identification by
woman stabbed that woman? credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the crime.35

A That was the first time when he raised his hand and stabbed her then I
ran away.
Aside from accused-appellants who expectedly gave self-serving testimonies, the
defense presented other witnesses, mainly relatives of accused-appellants, to
establish that they were not at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Unfortunately, alibi becomes less plausible when it is corroborated
by friends and relatives who may then not be impartial witnesses.36 On the other
hand, the defense failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to testify falsely against accused-appellants.
Moreover, accused-appellants' defense of alibi cannot be given credence
considering that they themselves admit their proximity to the scene of the crime
at the time that it occurred. Accused-appellants Plana and Banday claimed that
they were at the time at the house of accused-appellant Plana's relatives in
Barangay Cobe. Accused-appellants Saldevea and Perayra insisted that they were
then in the house of Monina Saldevea in Barangay Cobe. It must be noted that
the rape and killing of Helen was committed in the feeder road also in Barangay
Cobe.
For alibi to prosper, the following must be established: (a) the presence of
accused-appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense
and; (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.37
Accused-appellants miserably failed to satisfy these requisites. Considering that
they admit that they were all in Barangay Cobe, where Helen was raped and
subsequently killed, it cannot be said that it was physically impossible for them to
have committed the crime.
Accused-appellants tried to discredit Lagud by making much of the fact that he
did not immediately disclose what he witnessed to the authorities. This
contention hardly destroys the testimony of Lagud and his credibility as a
witness. As Lagud explained on cross-examination, he was afraid that accused-
appellants would harm him had they known that he saw them commit the
crime.38 Besides, as consistently held by this Court, there is no standard form of
the human behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience and delay in
bringing up the matter to the authorities do not destroy the veracity and
credibility of the testimony offered. The Court takes judicial notice of some
people's reluctance to be involved in criminal trials. Failure to volunteer what one
knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a witness'
credibility.39
In obvious attempt to evade the capital penalty of death, accused-appellants
opine that granting arguendo that they are guilty of any crime, the crime is only
murder because the rape of Helen allegedly had not been sufficiently established.
This argument is untenable. The evidence on record indubitably establish that,
while the other accused-appellants forcibly held Helen, accused-appellant Banday
had carnal knowledge of her. Thereafter, they killed her. Lagud categorically
testified on this fact.40 The findings of the medico-legal corroborate Lagud's
testimony, thus:
Q In entry No. 14, vagina, introitus can easily insert 2 fingers/Hymen with
lacerations 3 and 9 o'clock (old laceration) and on the state of decomposition. In
that state of decomposition of the victim how were you able to determine the
laceration of the hymen of the said victim?
A Actually, what I did I asked help from the owner of the Funeral Homes to
spread the thigh of the victim so that I can easily see the inside of the vagina.
Upon opening, I can easily insert my two fingers because of that I tried to spread
the vaginal canal I saw three (3) lacerations, I have also seen blood clotting in
that area but one reason that I can easily insert may two (2) fingers is because
the victim was already in the state of decomposition.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Doctor, you said it could have been caused by the laceration that you
found which is 6x9, in what or what could have caused the vaginal laceration?
A In the vagina, the laceration in the hymen is caused only by sexual
intercourse. If the female is a virgin, it could have been caused by sexual
intercourse.41
In fine, accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of rape with homicide had been
proved beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Further, the trial court rightly
appreciated the existence of conspiracy among the accused-appellants. Their
individual acts, taken as a whole, revealed that they shared a common design to
rape and kill Helen. They acted in unison and cooperation to achieve the same
unlawful objective.42 The principle that the act of one is the act of all is
applicable to accused-appellants in this case.
With respect to the second issue raised by accused-appellants, i.e., they were
detained without judicial order and prior to the filing of the information, suffice it
to say, that they already waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in
their arrest.43 Accused-appellants respectively entered a plea of "not guilty" at
their arraignment.44 By so pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.45
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
reads:
Art. 335 When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force and intimidation;
2. . . .;
3. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Whey by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellants' guilt for the crime of rape with homicide having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, the imposition of the penalty of death upon
them is warranted. Four members of the Court maintain their position that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority
vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be accordingly
imposed.
However, there is need to modify the damages awarded to the heirs of Helen by
the trial court. In addition to the sum of P25,000.00 as actual damages, the trial
court awarded to the heirs of Helen the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
This amount should be increased in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence 46
fixing the civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide at P100,000.00. The
Court, likewise, finds it proper to award the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of moral damages may be made to the heirs of the victim in
a criminal proceeding without need of proof. The fact that they suffered the
trauma of mental or physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the
basis for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require
recital thereof at trial.47
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Roxas City
finding accused-appellants Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra, Rene Saldevea and
Richard Banday, guilty of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic act No. 7659, and imposing upon them the
supreme penalty of Death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said
accused-appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of
Helen Perote the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as actual damages.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President upon
finality of this decision for possible exercise of executive clemency in accordance
with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED.
Validity of Conviction
People vs. Conde (G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001)
On appeal is the decision 1 dated December 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City finding accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis and
Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of
P50,000.00.
Accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis and Alejandro Perez, Jr., were arraigned in an
Information which reads:
That, on or about the 25th day of May, 1992 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by
means of threats and intimidation upon the persons of SUKHDEV SINGH Y
DHALNAL and BIANT SINGH Y SIDHU, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away cash of unestimated amount and assorted
merchandise such as umbrellas and beach towels, that on the occasion of the
said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away
the aforementioned articles, the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill,
attack and stab with bladed weapons upon the persons of SUKHDEV SINGH Y
DHALNAL and BIANT SINGH Y SIDHU on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon said victims serious physical injuries which caused their death on
the above-specified date.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The accused entered pleas of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Apollo Romero, PO3
Rodencio Sevillano, and Dr. Gario Gajardo as witnesses.
Apollo Romero, a resident of Santolan Street, Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
testified that on May 25, 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., he was home sitting by the
window and drinking coffee when he saw four men in Santolan Street block the
path of two Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. One of the men, later
identified as Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three
companions approached and stabbed the Indians. He later identified the other
two assailants as Alejandro Perez, Jr., and Allan Atis. He also saw Allan Atis take
the goods 3 which were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After the
stabbing, the four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street. The
fourth assailant remained unidentified. Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away
from the place where the crime was committed. 4
PO3 Rodencio Sevillano, testified that he was assigned with the Intelligence and
Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City. On May 25, 1992, he was
told to investigate the abovecited incident. On May 30, 1992, the police arrested
the three accused. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when
Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to the
accused. These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine
inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of
arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant
when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house of a
certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. 5
Dario Gajardo, a doctor employed in the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Station
4, Central Police District, Quezon City performed the post-mortem examination
on the bodies of Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh. He testified that the cause of
death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to
stab wounds. Biant Singh sustained stab wounds on his lower stomach while
Sukhdev Singh sustained stab wounds at the back and right portion of the ribs. 6
The defense presented five witnesses: Alejandro Perez, Jr., Oscar Conde, Allan
Atis, Danilo Acutin and Anita Santos.
 Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the 3 accused shall be credited with the period of their preventive
Alejandro Perez, Jr. testified that Oscar Conde and Allan Atis were his townmates
detention.
from Catbalogan, Samar. According to Perez, on May 25, 1992, at about 7:00
A.M., he went to the Madrigal Compound at Las Piñas, Metro Manila to visit his
cousin Danilo and apologize for not attending his uncle's 40th death anniversary
By way of compensatory damages, the accused shall jointly and severally
and their fiesta. Upon his arrival they went to the Pulang Lupa Cemetery and
indemnify the heirs, if any, of deceased SUKHDEV SINGH and BIANT SINGH in
visited the graves of his uncle and their grandfather. From the cemetery, they
the sum of P50,000.00 for each, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
went home where they drank some beer until late afternoon. Together with Oscar
insolvency.
Conde and Allan Atis, he was arrested in Tandang Sora, Quezon City on May 30,
1992. 7

SO ORDERED. 12
Danilo Acutin corroborated Alejandro's testimony. 8

The three accused appealed. However, the counsel de parte for accused
Alejandro Perez, Jr., Atty. Jose M. Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez,
Oscar Conde testified that on May 25, 1992, he was in Barangay Polo Street,
prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal. The decision of the trial court became
Parañaque mending his fishing net. He was with his wife, Felicidad Macabare; and
final and executory with respect to accused Alejandro Perez, Jr. 13 Hence the
his uncle, Tancio Loto. He said the police arrested Alejandro Perez, Jr., Allan Atis,
present appeal concerns only appellants Atis and Conde, who filed their separate
Felicidad Macabare and him in Tandang Sora, Quezon City on May 30, 1992. 9
briefs.
(Later reports indicated, however, that Felicidad was not among those arrested.
10 )

Atis avers that the trial court erred:

Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a construction worker
for a certain Romy Ramos on May 25, 1992. He denied having anything to do
with the death of the two Indian nationals. 11 I

On December 15, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Oscar Conde y
Lutoc, Allan Atis y Abet and Alejandro Perez, Jr. y Carsillar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to the Solis ruling. Accordingly, the 3 accused shall each serve the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties under the law.
. . . IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE CLAIM OF THE
DEFENSE.
II
. . . IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALLAN ATIS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE HOMICIDE
DESPITE [OF] THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. 14

Atis argues that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. He alleges that Apollo Romero only saw him in court.
Atis likewise claims that he was arrested without any warrant of arrest several
days after the crime. 15
Oscar Conde avers that the trial court erred in:
I
. . . NOT HOLDING THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED ILLEGAL
II
. . . ACCORDING THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES APOLLO
ROMERO AND PO3 RODENCIO SEVILLANO FULL CREDENCE.
III
. . . HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE (sic) HOMICIDE. 16
Oscar Conde claims that he was illegally arrested by the authorities. He adds that
the Indian Embassy was pressuring the police to solve the murder. He avers that
the testimony of Romero is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He cites the
delay of Romero in reporting what he saw, hence Romero's testimony is
unbelievable. Lastly, Conde wants this Court to disregard as evidence the stolen
items and weapons illegally seized by the police. 17
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, filed its appellee's brief only in
regard to Oscar Conde's appeal. According to the OSG, the testimony of Apollo
Romero deserves full faith and credence since the appellants failed to show any
improper motive on his part. The same is true for the testimony of PO3 Sevillano
who also enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties. In conclusion, the Solicitor General prays that the conviction of the
appellants be affirmed. Citing People vs. Escandor, 265 SCRA 444, 445 (1996),
the OSG stresses that the findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of witnesses, are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, because
the trial court is in the best position to make an honest determination of the
witnesses' behavior and deportment during trial. 18
In substance, the issues raised by both appellants are (1) Whether or not the
identification made by Apollo Romero deserves credence; (2) Whether or not the
arrests of the appellants were illegal; (3) Whether or not the alleged stolen
objects, i.e., the beach towel and umbrella, can be presented in evidence.
Anent the first issue, we are in agreement with the submission by the Office of
the Solicitor General. First, factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon
this Court and its evaluation regarding the credibility of witnesses are given great
weight and respect unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case. 19 Being in a better position to
observe the witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defense, the trial court's
appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty and candor deserves the
highest respect. 20
Allan Atis insists that it was impossible for Romero to have identified him since
Romero only saw him inside the court room and that Romero had not seen him
before. However, there is nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a
condition sine qua non for the positive identification by a prosecution witness of a
felon, that witness must first know the latter personally. 21 The fact that Romero
never saw Atis before the crime was committed does not detract from the
credibility and reliability of Romero's testimony.
Oscar Conde insists that the delay of Romero in reporting the incident makes his
testimony unworthy of credence. It is however well settled in jurisprudence that
delay in divulging the names of perpetrators of a crime, if sufficiently explained,
does not impair the credibility of the witness and his testimony. 22 Likewise,
credibility is not affected by the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information. 23 It is not uncommon for witnesses to a crime to show some
reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case as, in fact, the natural
reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial notice. 24
Romero categorically identified both Oscar Conde and Allan Atis as two of the
perpetrators of the crime. Appellants failed to adduce any improper motive on his
part which would motivate him to implicate them in the said crime. Absent such
motive, the testimony of Romero should be accorded full faith and credence as
the testimony of a disinterested party who only wants to see justice upheld. 25
The two appellants interposed the negative defenses of alibi and denial. But as
held in several cases, these defenses cannot overcome the straightforward
testimony and the positive identification made by a prosecution witness. 26
We now turn to the appellants' vehement assertion that they have been illegally
arrested. The records of the case will show that the arrests of the appellants
came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the
crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any
warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without
warrant, namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in this case. Appellants were merely
walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither
can it be said that the crime had just been committed. Five days had already
passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that
the arresting officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge. PO3
Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and
certain unnamed informants. The third circumstance is patently not present. The
lapse of five days gave the police more than enough time to conduct surveillance
of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, appellants' rights
provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated.
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional rights prior to their
arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. 29 When the appellants entered their pleas
on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which
might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. 30 Any objection, defect, or
irregularity attending their arrests should had been made before they entered
their pleas. 31 It is much too late for appellants to raise the question of their
warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute
clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty. 32
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from
error. 33 The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-
accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts on record point to their culpability. 34
As for the stolen objects presented in evidence, their seizure is assailed by Q: Can you still recall with what instrument did Allan Atis used (sic) in
appellants. We agree that the warrantless search in the house of a certain Jimmy, stabbing the Indian National at the back.
based on the confession of accused Alejandro Perez, Jr., 35 is definitely
questionable. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano categorically stated that they were able to
recover the stolen items, i.e., the beach towel and the umbrella, because of the A: I cannot recall anymore, ma'm.
confession of Alejandro Perez, Jr. who was not assisted by counsel when he
confessed and eventually led the police to the whereabouts of the said items. 36
The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or
Q: What about Alejandro Perez, what did he do?
admission without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is
proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution. 37

A: Allan Atis was the one who took the goods being sold by the Indian
Nationals in installment.
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree",
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence
because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
38 Simply put, the objects confiscated at said house are inadmissible as Q: Who took the goods? Will you please identify the person who took the
evidence. goods from the Indian Nationals?

Without the stolen objects as evidence, we are left with only the testimony of A: The one wearing the white t-shirt.
Apollo Romero that he saw Allan Atis take the beach towel and the umbrella. 39
A reading of the said testimony will indicate that such was not categorical and
straightforward, to wit: Atty. Yson

Q: And can you tell us, Mr. Witness, more or less what did Allan Atis did Witness pointed to a person wearing a white t-shirt who when asked answered by
(sic)? the name of Allan Atis. 40

A: Yes, ma'm. The identification of Allan Atis by Apollo Romero as the one who took the items
was more of an afterthought and was not even responsive to the question made
by the prosecutor. Aside from this, the ownership of the towel and the umbrella
Q: What? was not even established. In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself, otherwise,
the crime would only be homicide or murder, as the case may be. 41 In this case,
only the facts and causes of deaths were established with moral certainty. Hence,
A: He stabbed one of the Indian Nationals at the back.
there can be no robbery with homicide. The appellants are only liable for two
counts of homicide.
On the other hand, we find in order the search of the bag of Felicidad Macabare,
at the time she was visiting her husband who was a detainee. PO3 Sevillano
testified, this search is part of police standard operating procedure, 42 and is
recognized as part of precautionary measures by the police to safeguard the
safety of the detainees as well as the over-all security of the jail premises.
However, the weapons 43 confiscated from Felicidad Macabare, were not formally
offered as evidence by the prosecution, 44 hence probatively valueless. 45
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 129, finding the appellants Oscar Conde and Allan Atis guilty of robbery
with homicide is hereby MODIFIED. They are declared guilty only of two counts of
homicide and each is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal for each count of homicide. They
are likewise ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the
victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
XII. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Custodial Investigation
People vs. Lugod (G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001)
This is an automatic review of the Judgment 1 dated October 8, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28 in Criminal Case No.
SC-6670 finding the accused, Clemente John Lugod alias HONASAN, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
On October 10, 1997, an Information 2 for rape with homicide was filed against
the accused as follows:
That on or about September 16, 1997 in the municipality of Cavinti, province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means force and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
NAIRUBE J. RAMOS, an eight-year old girl, against her will and by reason or on
the same occasion and in order to hide the crime he just committed, dump the
victim in the grassy coconut plantation area, which resulted in her death due to
shock secondary to vulvar laceration committed on her by the herein accused, to
the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim.
Upon arraignment, the accused with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of
not guilty. 3 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses in support of its charge
against the accused:
EDILBERTO CASTILLO, the medico-legal officer who examined the cadaver of
Nairube on September 19, 1997, testified that during the course of his
examination of the cadaver, he discovered an 8 cm. wound penetration in her
vagina which was probably caused by the insertion of a penis; that the cadaver
was in an advanced state of decomposition; that more or less, the approximate
time of death of the victim was three (3) days prior to his examination; and that
the cause of death of the victim was hypovolenic shock secondary to the
laceration. 4cräläwvirtualibräry
RICARDO VIDA, the Task Force Chief of Cavinti, testified that on September 18,
1997, at around 4:35 p.m., the accused pointed out where the body of the victim
was; that the accused pointed to a place inside Villa Anastacia which was two
hundred (250) meters from the road; that at the time the accused pointed to the
place, he was handcuffed to the accused; that the accused used his left hand in
pointing towards the direction; and that the father of the victim cried upon
identifying the victim. 5cräläwvirtualibräry
VIOLETA CABUHAT testified that on September 15, 1997, at around 10:00 p.m.,
she was weaving hats at her house. At that time, she was together with her three
children, Joey, Jessica and Jovelin and Loreto Veloria. The accused suddenly
entered her house and asked her if he could sleep there but she declined. After
she declined, he suddenly forced her to move to one side of the place where she
was seated by forcing his body against hers and held her chin. She noticed that
he was drunk at that time because she smelt liquor on his breath. After he held
her chin, she went upstairs and slept. She claims that the accused left her house
at 10:20 p.m. since she looked at her watch when she went upstairs. She does
not remember what happened next. In court, she identified that accused as the
person who entered her house that night. 6cräläwvirtualibräry
LORETO VELORIA testified that on September 15, 1997, at around 10:10 p.m.,
he was at the house of Violeta Cabuhat. While he was there, the accused, whom
he identified in court, suddenly arrived. He noticed that the accused was wearing
a pair of muddy rubber slippers the bottom of which was color red while the top
was color yellow. Since the slippers of the accused were muddy, he asked him to
remove them but the accused did not comply with his request. Veloria also
noticed that the accused was wearing a black collared T-shirt. In court, he
identified a pair of slippers (Exhibit D) as the one he saw the accused wearing
that night and on several other occasions. He also identified a black collared T-
shirt in court (Exhibit E) as the one he saw the accused wearing that night and on
two other occasions. Veloria stated that the accused sat beside Violeta and tried
to catch her chin; that he conversed with Violeta but did not hear the accuseds
request if he could stay overnight. After the accused left, he also left the house of
Violeta. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
PEDRO DELA TORRE testified that on September 15, 1997, at 10:30 p.m., the
accused arrived at his house and joined the drinking session of his son. He
noticed that the accused was wearing a black T-shirt and appeared to be drunk.
Dela Torre claims that the accused left at around 11:45 p.m. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
ROMUALDO RAMOS testified that at around 8:30 on the morning of September
16, 1997, he was driving his tricycle towards the poblacion of Cavinti. While
driving towards the poblacion, he noticed the accused coming out of the gate of
Villa Anastacia. Upon seeing the accused, he stopped his tricycle thinking that the
accused would board the same but the accused did not mind him. He noticed that
the accused was wearing only a pair of white short pants with a red waistline and
was not wearing a T-shirt or any slippers. The accused also appeared to be
drunk. Thereafter, he proceeded to the poblacion terminal where he discovered
that Nairube was missing. He also learned that the accused was the suspect
behind her disappearance. Upon learning this, he told Ricardo Vida, the Chief of
the barangay tanod who was searching for the victim, to look for her at Villa
Anastacia because it was the place where he saw the accused come out from.
Ramos further testified that the house of the victim is about five hundred (500)
meters away from the place where he saw the accused but if one passes through
the coconut plantation, it is only two hundred (200) meters away.
9cräläwvirtualibräry
ALMA DIAZ testified that around 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. of September 16, 1997, she
went with the search party to look for Nairube. The search party was composed
of around ten (10) persons including Violeta and Helen Ramos, the mother of the
victim. They first searched the back portion of the victims house. During the
course of their search, she found a panty around three hundred (300) meters
away from the house of the victim. Helen identified the panty as belonging to her
daughter and cried upon seeing the same. The panty was laid behind a barb wire
fence (the boundary of Villa Anastacia) and had a spot of blood and some mud on
it. In court, she identified Exhibit F as the panty she saw but stated that it was
already clean. Thereafter, they continued the search and found a black collared
T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a
guava twig. The T-shirt appeared clean at the time. She picked up the T-shirt and
brought it along with her to the house of the victim. Upon reaching the house,
the T-shirt fell in mud and got dirty. Diaz further stated that the panty was found
less than a hundred (100) meters away while the black T-shirt was fifty (50)
meters away from the place where the body of the victim was found inside Villa
Anastacia and that the panty and T-shirt were around thirty (30) meters away
from each other. Diaz also claims that eight days after the death of the child, the
mother of the accused, Irene Lugod, came to her house to ask her for help in
seeking an amicable settlement of the case with the Ramos spouses. On cross-
examination Diaz stated that she found the panty closer than the black T-shirt to
the body of the victim. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
HELEN RAMOS, the mother of the victim, testified that on September 15, 1997 at
around 7:00 p.m., she was asleep in her house together with her husband and
children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her on the
upper part of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because
he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house. She noticed that
Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that
Nairube merely answered the call of nature. After three minutes of waiting for
Nariubes return, she stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no
answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their
house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if Nairube was
there but she was not. Helen also testified that Nairubes blanket was also no
longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still there. She further
stated that she found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside
of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a
combination of yellow and white. She assured the court that the slippers did not
belong to any member of her family. In court, she identified Exhibit D as the
slippers she found that night. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma
Diaz to ask her for help. Then, in the morning of September 16, 1997, she went
to the police station to report the loss of her child. She also reported the
discovery of the pair of slippers. She then went home while the police began their
search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with
the searching team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she
recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was
thereafter ordered to go home while the others continued the search. On
September 18, 1997, they found the dead body of her daughter in Villa
Anastacia. Helen also testified on the amounts she spent in connection with the
funeral of her daughter and produced a list which totaled P37,200.00. During
cross-examination, Helen stated that the pair of slippers she found on top of the
bench was muddy. 11cräläwvirtualibräry
SPO2 QUIRINO GALLARDO testified that on September 16, 1997 at around 7:30
in the a.m., Helen Ramos reported that her daughter, Nairube, was missing. He
thereafter proceeded to the house of the victim together with members of the
Crime Investigation Group, the PNP and some townspeople to conduct an ocular
inspection. Helen Ramos gave him a pair of slippers and pointed to him the
location where she found the same. Alma Diaz also gave him a black T-shirt
which she found. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two items were worn by
the accused when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m.,
he apprehended the accused on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-
shirt. He then brought the accused to the police station where he was temporarily
incarcerated. At first, the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but
after he told him what happened to the girl. Gallardo claims that the accused told
him that after the drinking spree on September 15, 1997, the accused wanted to
have sexual intercourse with a woman. So after the drinking spree, the accused
went to the house of Gemma Lingatong, the neighbor of Helen Ramos. Upon his
arrival at the house of Gemma, he bumped pots which awakened the occupants
of the house. Considering the commotion he caused, he left and went to the
house of Nairube Ramos. After removing his slippers, he entered the house of
Nairube and slowly went upstairs. He saw that Helen Ramos was sleeping beside
her husband so he took Nairube instead. In court, Gallardo demonstrated how
the accused claimed to have lifted the child by raising two of his hands as if he
was lifting something off the ground. After taking Nairube, he brought her to the
farm where according to the accused; he raped her three times. After
successfully raping Nairube, the accused slept. When he woke up, he saw the
lifeless body of Nairube which he wrapped in a blanket and hid in a grassy place.
Then, he took a bath in the river. He then returned to Villa Anastacia and went
out through its gate. Although he admitted to having raped and killed Nairube,
the accused refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been
informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with
other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the
search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when
they brought the accused to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the
cadaver that they found the body of Nairube. Gallardo stated that the accused
pointed to the location by using his lips. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
PO2 ANTONIO DECENAs testimony corroborates the testimony of Ricardo Vida
although he claims that the accused pointed to the location of the body of the
victim by using his lips. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
DANILO RAMOS, the father of Nairube, testified that on September 15, 1997 at
around 7:00 in the evening, he was asleep in his house together with his wife,
Helen and five children, Nimrod, Neres, Nairube, Nixon and Nerdami. At around
12:30 a.m., he felt someone going down the stairs of their house. He woke his
wife up and checked if his children were all there. He noticed that Nairube was
not there so his wife went downstairs and checked if she was downstairs. After
three minutes, his wife returned and told him that Nairube was not downstairs.
So, he went down to double check. Upon his return, his wife gave him a pair of
red rubber slippers. He described the slipper as having a red sole but that he did
not notice the color of the strap since the light was dim. In court, he identified
Exhibit D as the pair of slippers he saw that night. In the early morning of
September 16, 1997, they continued searching for Nairube. On September 18,
1997, a member of the bantay bayan went to their house informing them that
the accused would be pointing out where the body of Nairube was. At around
4:00 p.m., the accused pointed out the location of the body of Nairube inside
Villa Anastacia by using his lips. 14cräläwvirtualibräry
FLORO ESGUERRA, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, testified that on September 19,
1997 at around 3:30 p.m., he attended the funeral of Nairube. After the funeral,
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT CONFESSED HIS GUILT
he visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation with the
BEFORE THE VICE-MAYOR, WHICH CONFESSION IS ADMISSIBLE AS IT WAS NOT
accused, the accused confessed to the commission of the offense.
MADE IN RESPONSE TO ANY INTERROGATION.17cräläwvirtualibräry
15cräläwvirtualibräry

In support of his appeal, accused-appellant submits that the evidence presented

On October 8, 1998 the RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
by the prosecution fails to establish that he raped and killed Nairube Ramos
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, the dispositive
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not present any direct evidence to
portion of the decision reads:
inculpate him in the commission of the crime. Neither did the prosecution present
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, accused-appellant claims that the alleged confession he made to the
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this
vice-mayor was not a confession. He prays that the judgment of conviction of the
Court finds the accused CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
RTC be reversed and that he be acquitted of the crime charged.
DOUBT of the special complex crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE under Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, amending
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the
After a careful review of the case, we agree with the submission of accused-
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
appellant and find that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
the victim, NAIRUBE RAMOS the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her
doubt.
death and P37,200.00 as actual damages.

In rendering its decision, the trial court disregarded accused-appellants defense

The accused is further ordered to pay the cost of the instant suit.
of denial and alibi and relied on the following pieces of circumstantial evidence
culled from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to justify its judgment of
conviction:
SO ORDERED.16cräläwvirtualibräry

(1) In the evening of September 15, 1997, Accused CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD
In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case is now before this Court
wearing a pair of slippers and black T-shirt, had a drinking spree with the son of
on automatic review.
Pedro dela Torre outside their house at Udia, Cavinti, Laguna;

In his brief, the accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the
(2) On the same evening, accused wearing the same pair of slippers and black T-
RTC:
shirt and under the influence of liquor, entered the house of VIOLETA CABUHAT
without her consent;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS

OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH DID NOT PROVE WITH MORAL
(3) On the same evening, LORETO VELORIA saw accused wearing the same pair
CERTAINTY THAT HE WAS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
of slippers and black T-shirt;

(4) At about 12:30 in the early morning of September 16, 1997, father of the
victim noticed somebody going downstairs of their house;
(5) The pair of slippers were found near the door of the victims house;
(6) The panty of the victim was found inside the premises of VILLA ANASTACIA at
Cavinti, Laguna;
(7) In the early morning of September 16, 1997, Romualdo Ramos saw accused
coming out of from VILLA ANASTACIA barefoot and half-naked;
(8) Accused pointed to RICARDO VIDA and SPO2 ANTONIO DECENA the place
where the cadaver of the victim could be found;
(9) Accused confessed to the Mayor and the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna, that
he committed the offense imputed against him; and
(10) Almost all eyewitnesses for the Prosecution positively identified the accused
in open court as CLEMENTE JOHN LUGOD.18cräläwvirtualibräry
There is no question that at the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant was
already placed under arrest and was suspected of having something to do with
the disappearance of Nairube. In fact, the lower court declared that accused-
appellants warrantless arrest was valid based on Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. 19 However, at the time of his arrest, the apprehending officers
did not inform the accused-appellant and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton
disregard of his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section
as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.
Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice,
he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he
intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in
order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo
that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used
against him for having transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of
Rights. 20 This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded
or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein,
the accused-appellants act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was
also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to remain silent. The
same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a
fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, in People vs. De La Cruz, 21 we ruled that:
Equally indmissible, for being integral parts of the uncouselled admission or fruits
of the poisonous tree are the photographs of subsequent acts which the accused
was made to do in order to obtain proof to support such admission or confession,
such as (a) his digging in the place where Virginia Trangia was allegedly buried, A: Between 3:30 and 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.
(b) his retrieving of the bones discovered therein (c) his posing before a
photographer while executing such acts.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: Do you have any companion at the time you visited Clemente John Lugod?

Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under

interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was A: Nobody, sir.
brought to the police station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made
considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession
Q: Tell us how you were able to visit him in the said cell?
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told
the truth. Furthermore, when accused-appellant allegedly pointed out the body of
the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly one hundred
(100) of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that A: My first intention in visiting him was just to know him, sir.
the townspeople were antagonistic towards accused-appellant and wanted to hurt
him. 23 The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant was apprehended and
taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out Q: Did anybody introduce to you Clemente John Lugod?
the location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not
conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere,
accused-appellants claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police A: A police officer called Clemente John Lugod, who was then lying inside the cell,
officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged sir.
confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited accused-appellant
in the jail cell, he noticed that the accused-appellant had bruises on his face,
corroborated accused-appellants assertion that he was maltreated. Q: What did the police officer say to Clemente John Lugod?
24cräläwvirtualibräry

A: The police officer said: Lugod, the vice mayor wants to talk to you.
In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the
accused-appellant to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the
Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused-
appellant is not conclusive. The Vice-Mayors testimony reads as follows:

Q: What did Lugod do if any when he was called by the police officer?
TRIAL PROSECUTOR;

A: He arose and he greeted me good afternoon, sir.

Q: More or less what time did you visit Clemente John Lugod in his cell?

Q: What happened after he greeted you good afternoon?

A: I pitied him during that time, I asked him why he did that thing. TRIAL PROSECUTOR:

COURT: Q: What place are you referring to?

Q: Did you specify to him what you mean by why he did such a thing? A: That house. I did not ask the specific place, what I was referring then was that
house.

A: No, Your Honor, I merely asked him why was he able to do that.
Q: What was the response of Clemente John Lugod?

Q: Do you know if Lugod understood what you mean?

A: He answered he thought of his two children, sir.

A: I think he understood my question then, Your Honor.

Q: What about if he thought of his two children?

TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
A: According to him he planned to go back to Brgy. Layog where he left his
children.
Q: What was the response of Clemente John Lugod when you asked him that
question?
Q: Did you ask him what he do (sic) in that place?

A: He told me he was so drunk, he did not know what happened next. Hindi niya
namalayan na ganoon ang nangyari. A: I did not ask, sir.

Q: Did you ask him what he has done? Q: What else did he tell you?

WITNESS: A: I asked another question, sir.

A: I asked him why he went to that place, sir. Q: What is that other question?
 TRIAL PROSECUTOR: That will be all, Your Honor.

A: I asked him if it was the mother whom he liked then, sir.

COURT: Cross

Q: What was the answer?

ATTY. DE RAMOS: With the permission of the Honorable Court?

A: Allegedly not the mother, sir.

COURT: Proceed.

TRIAL PROSECUTOR:

ATTY. DERAMOS:

Q: Did you ask him what did he do (sic) in that place?

Q: Vice mayor, when you visited John Lugod on September 19, 1997 at around
3:30 to 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, you stated that he was lying in his cell, is
A: No more, sir.
that correct?

Q: What else did he tell you aside from what you have testified?
A: Yes, sir.

A: No more, sir, I bid him goodbye.

ATTY. DE RAMOS:

Q: Is Clemente John Lugod present in court?

Q: And the reason why the police officer called John Lugod is because you
approached that police, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.

Q Please point at him.

Q: And you asked him where is John Lugod?

A: (Witness going down of the witness stand and pointed to a person who when
asked of his name answered Clemente John Lugod, the accused in this case).
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Because you do not know John Lugod personally? A: I cannot remember anymore, sir.

A: Yes, sir. ATTY. DE RAMOS:

Q: When you were about to talk to John Lugod, was he still inside the cell or Q: But you can still remember his physical appearance at that time?
outside the cell?

A: Yes, sir.
A: He was still inside the cell, sir.

Q: What was the physical appearance of Clemente John Lugod at that time?
Q: So you are outside the cell?

A: As far as I can recall it seemed that he had some bruises on his face (witness
A: Yes, sir. pointing to his lower jaw)

Q: How about the police officer who called John Lugod? COURT

A: He was outside the cell, sir. Q: Did you not ask him what happened to his face?

Q: So the police officer who called John Lugod was present while you were A: No, sir.
conversing with John Lugod?

Q: Did it not occur to you to think in that appearance that there was something
A: No, sir, he was no longer present because after calling John Lugod he left. that happened?

Q: What was John Lugod wearing at that time? A: No, Your Honor, because my first intention was just to know him.

WITNESS: Q: Did not the accused Clemente John Lugod inform you of any maltreatment
done to him by the police officers?
A: He did not say anything about that, Your Honor.
Q: Did you not ask John Lugod whether somebody laid force on him?
WITNESS:
A: I was not able to ask that, Your Honor.
ATTY. DE RAMOS:
Q: Aside from bruises on his face did you notice any other bruises or wound on
other parts of his body?
A: No more, sir.
Q: You stated earlier that you asked John Lugod why did you do that, tell the
Court what was his response to your question?
A: He said he was so drunk then, sir.
Q: He did not tell you that he raped the victim and killed her?
A: He did not say that, sir.
Q: He did not directly answer your question because your question did not ask
direct to something?
A: Yes, sir.25cräläwvirtualibräry
As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely
responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him.
He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube.
In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that
he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, we note the contradiction between the
testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to the
accused-appellant and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present
when accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Considering that the confession of accused-appellant cannot be used against him,
the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact
that several persons testified having seen accused-appellant the night before the
murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers
and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively
as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that
he saw accused-appellant in the early morning of September 16, 1997 leaving
Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence
are circumstantial in nature. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference. 26 Under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
27cräläwvirtualibräry
In the present case, much emphasis was placed by the trial court on the
discovery of the pair of rubber slippers at the victims house and the black T-shirt
hanging on a guava twig near the cadaver of Nairube which were allegedly worn
by accused-appellant the day before Nariubes disappearance. The trial court also
relied on the fact that there was an eyewitness who saw accused-appellant
leaving Villa Anastacia, the place where the body of the victim was found, in the
morning after the disappearance of the victim. However, the combination of the
above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion
that accused-appellant raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these
circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses,
merely establish the accused-appellants whereabouts on that fateful evening and
places accused-appellant at the scene of the crime and nothing more. The
evidence of the prosecution does not provide a link which would enable this Court
to conclude that he in fact killed and raped Nairube. It must be stressed that
although not decisive for the determination of the guilt of the accused-appellant,
the prosecution did not present any evidence to establish that he was at any time
seen with the victim at or about the time of the incident. Neither was there any
other evidence which could single him out to the exclusion of any other as being
responsible for the crime.
It may be argued that his presence at the scene of the crime was unexplained
and gives rise to the suspicion that the accused-appellant was the author thereof
but this circumstance alone is insufficient to establish his guilt. It is well settled
that mere suspicions and speculations can never be the bases of conviction in a
criminal case. 28cräläwvirtualibräry
More important, it appears that the rubber slippers, which were found at the
house of the victim on the night Nairube disappeared, are an ordinary pair of
rubber slippers without any distinguishing marks to differentiate the same from
any other. In People vs. De Joya, 29 this Court ruled that:
Rubber or beach walk slippers are made in such quantities by multiple
manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of
the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellants wife.
And even if conclusive identification of the slippers had been offered, and it is
assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those slippers on that
fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and
directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that
assumption, the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed
that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and there mislaid the
slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he
did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia
Diamse had been perpetrated, and there found many persons in the house
viewing the body.30cräläwvirtualibräry
Likewise, in People vs. Mijares, 31 this Court ruled that the fact that the accused
was the last person seen with the victim and that his slippers were found at the
crime scene do not necessarily prove that he killed the victim. This Court stated
that:
That the appellant was the last person seen with the victim on the night she
disappeared does not necessarily prove that he killed her. It was not established
that appellant and the victim were together until the crime was committed. It
was not even shown that the appellant proceeded to the crime scene, either by
himself or together with the victim.
Likewise, the fact that the slippers which appellant borrowed from Elizabeth Oglos
were found near the victims dead body does not necessarily prove that he was
the perpetrator of the crime. Even if we were to conjecture that appellant went to
the locus criminis and inadvertently left them there, such supposition does not
necessarily imply that he had committed the crime. Indeed, it was not
established whether appellant went to the place before, during or after the
commission of the crime, if at all. Moreover, the prosecution has not ruled out the
possibility that the slippers may have been brought by another person to the
crime scene, precisely to implicate him and thus exonerate the real culprit.
Clearly, several antithetical propositions may be inferred from the presence of the
slippers at the crime scene, and appellants guilt is only one of
them.32cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment dated October 8,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28 in Criminal
Case No. SC-6670 finding the accused, Clemente John Lugod alias HONASAN,
guilty of the crime of rape with homicide is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless
held for some other legal cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Del Rosario (G.R. 127755, April 14, 1999)
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of the victim Virginia
Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.1
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy
Santos and John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof
shot and killed her.2
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,3 Virgilio Boy Santos and
John Doe alias Dodong remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a
police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of
tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in
the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nitas Drugstore, General
Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance
of about one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by
accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman
grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two
men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman,
while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon
after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he
shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of
accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man
then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the
tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of
the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest
police headquarters and reported the incident.4
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30
in the afternoon he was hired for P120.005 by a certain Boy Santos,6 his co-
accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive him to cockpit at the
Blas Edward Coliseum.7 However, despite their earlier arrangement boy Santos
directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch Jun Marquez and Dodong
Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded.8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the
parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.9 Subsequently, he was
asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where
Bisaya alighted on the pretest of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the
victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun
Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help Dodong Bisaya.10 Accused del Rosario
tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle
prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before
boarding the tricycle Jun Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while
she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded
the sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered
him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del
Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at
Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses.11 Upon arriving at Dicarma, the
three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.12
Del Rosario then went home.13 Because of the threat, however, he did not report
the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the
police.14
 As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with
weapons, even those less powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as
will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do,
charged and sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review
nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with
that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and
a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a
irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio Boy Santos,
stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with
Ernesto Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he
his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he
was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez
only saw for the first time that day.19
and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not
considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not
considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of
Corollary with defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it
Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.15
said that it was Boy Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the
victim and then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing her.20 A careful and
meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the case, particularly the
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from
testimonies of the witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was Jun
criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the
Marquez who ran after the victims helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo
compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and
testified on direct examination -
unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused
from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing,
and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.16
Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?

But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote,
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir x x x x
hence, could not be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did
not constitute irresistible force because it fell short of the test required by law
and jurisprudence.17
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men?

We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom.
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is
not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious A: He was the one holding the gun, sir x x x x
bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.18
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two
men who grappled the same from her?
 Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit
in the tricycle?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the
other man was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir.

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the
other man entered the sidecar, sir.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: What happened to the lady who to the ground?

On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the

A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman
crime scene conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated
who was then lying on the ground, sir x x x x

Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
then holding the gun fired at the victim?

A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.

A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion
holding the gun chased the helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue,
sir.
Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the tricycle
which was at a distance of about one and a half meter?
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?

A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir x x x x

A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in
this spot the man holding the gun shot the victim, sir.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the
possession of the bag?
On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified

A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?

Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?
A: Yes, sir.

A: They went away, sir x x x x

Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?
 xxxx

xxxx

Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by
the assailants?
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.

A: Yes, sir.
xxxx

Q: Then what did you do?

A: Yes, sir.

A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.

Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the
gun?

Q: When you said they to whom are you referring?

A: Yes, sir.23cräläwvirtualibräry

A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.

On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination
that
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?

Q: x x x x On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as
A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.
testified to by Eduardo Nalagon?

Q: And what about Jun Marquez?

A: Yes, sir.

A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the
victim .
Nitas Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?

Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?

A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag. A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the
possession of Boy Santos x x x x

Q: And after that what happened?

Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?

A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.

A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.

Court: Did you not see any shooting?

Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when
you tried to escape that was the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will
A: There was, sir. escape something will happen to your family?

Q: Who was shot? A: Yes, sir.

A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir x x x x Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or
Dodong Visaya?

Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was
transpiring was wrong and illegal? A: Dodong Visaya, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your
back?

Q: But you did not try to leave?

A: Yes, sir.24cräläwvirtualibräry

A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
On cross-examination, accused further stated

Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?
Q: After shopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong
Bisaya was grabbing the bag of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down x x x x
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private
persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting
the old woman?
A: No, sir x x x x.
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling
for the possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir x x x x25cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area
where the incident occurred is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos
and he was telling you that you should not do anything against their will, they will
kill you and your family will be killed also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was
loaded by your other three co-accused in this case, all of them alighted and that
Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim going towards the public market along
Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir.26cräläwvirtualibräry
Del Rosario maintains that Boy Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter
pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also
asserted that it was Jun Marquez who shot the victim and sat behind him in the
tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag
of the victim was grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun;
that the gunwielder returned and shot the victim and then sat behind the driver
of the tricycle; and, the bag was given to a person who was inside the tricycle.
Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del
Rosario, it can be deduced that Jun Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was
referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased by the other
man and that this other man could not be Boy Santos who stayed inside the
tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to
the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos never left the tricycle, and to his
allegation that Boy Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists
with violence and prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
plausible reason for Boy Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a
a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform
conspirator; that Boy Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the
an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for
commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with
concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose or for common and joint
Dodong Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that Boy Santos
purpose and design. Its manifestation could be shown by united and concerted
opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del
action.31
Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.27

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its

Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1) in
nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct
front of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen
evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is
and was not privy to events that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the
involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances
pointing of the gun by Boy Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing
which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
the back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent.28
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun
of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among
directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile
them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.32
and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment of automaton
Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party
a mere instrument acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore exempt
to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction
from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy
against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.
must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosarios conviction on his reasonable doubt.33
participation in the orchestrated acts of Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong
Bisaya. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other
malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between accused and his
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as
passengers was evident because while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of
he was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of
the helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas
guilt against him by asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of
were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the
his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was
engine of the motor was running;29 that the accused did not deny that the
merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was
tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused
prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered
in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the
to help them escape.
authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the
crime.30
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused
came to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to
commit the same."34 Therefore, in order to convict the accused, the presence of
an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime
was committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not
establish conspiracy.35 The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is
that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for
his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution.
As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made
by his co-accused that he would, be killed should he shout for help. No complicity
can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly
participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the
persons who robbed and killed the victim.36
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the
authorities, to his employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his
credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case
is of judicial notice.37 It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle
driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario
understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his
silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent,
right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,
and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights.38 As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who
was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident,
during his cross-examination -
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod
Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was
summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for
interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name
his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused
informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-
uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt.
Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of
15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they
found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were
happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they
went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the
accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while,
he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements
were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention.
His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge
Talavera.39cräläwvirtualibräry
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy.
Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had
already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he
might attempt to escape.40
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.41 This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by
RA 743842 to include "the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed."
Section 2 of the same Act further provides that -
x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot
afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the
house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial
investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the
investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and
the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia
Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his
right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even
before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed
the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant
therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:43
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the
police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In
People vs Sucro44 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec.
5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or
within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused
be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of
the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the
aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of
the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just
been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there
must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was
committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of
time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that
the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts
indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime.45
Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since,
as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime
and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the
jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is
waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection,
as in this case.46
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost
her life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held
accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him.
Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by
other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's
defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was
not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del
Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide
and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of
Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Bolanos [211 SCRA 262 (1992)]
This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 14, under Criminal Case No. 1831-M-90, for "Murder", wherein the
accused-appellant, Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the Crime of Murder and the Court hereby imposed upon the accused
Ramon Bolanos the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay
the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 With Costs.
SO ORDERED. (Judgment, p. 6)
The antecedent facts and circumstances, follow:
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Patrolmen
Marcelo J. Fidelino and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP),
Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal
Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and documentary exhibits. The testimonial evidence
were after the fact narration of events based on the report regarding the death of
the victim, Oscar Pagdalian which was communicated to the Police Station where
the two (2) policemen who responded to the incident are assigned and
subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2)
Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they proceeded
to the scene of the crime of the Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon
arrival they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of
blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances of the
incident and were informed that the deceased was with two (2) companions, on
the previous night, one of whom was the accused who had a drinking spree with
the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the
following morning, June 23, 1990. (Ibid., p. 3)
The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco Dayao, further indicated that
when they apprehend the accused-appellant, they found the firearm of the
deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated; that they
boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought
them to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon
Bolanos accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian
because he was abusive." (Ibid., p. 4)
During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the
appellant was given without the assistance of counsel as it was made while on
board the police vehicle on their way to the police station. The specific portion of
the decision of the court a quo reads as follows:
. . . the police boarded the two, the accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio
Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded to the police station of Balagtas, Bulacan to
be investigated, on the way the accused told the police, after he was asked by
the police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim because the victim was
abusive; this statement of the accused was considered admissible in evidence
against him by the Court because it was given freely and before the investigation.
The foregoing circumstances clearly lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that
the accused Ramon Bolanos is guilty of having killed the victim Oscar Pagdalian.
(Judgment, p. 6)
A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor General's
Office, dated April 2, 1992, with the position that the lower court erred in
admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while on board the
police patrol jeep. Said office even postulated that: "(A)ssuming that it was
given, it was done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right to be informed,
to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice, while already under police
custody." (Manifestation, p. 4)
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep
on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been
conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section
as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices and their families. (Emphasis supplied).
Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the
manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact
that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the
only reason for the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject
judgment under review.
WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of the accused-appellant have
been violated, the appellant is ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Rhode Island vs. Innis [446 U.S. 291 (1980)]
Syllabus
Shortly after a taxicab driver, who had been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-
off shotgun, identified a picture of respondent as that of his assailant, a
Providence, R.I., patrolman spotted respondent, who was unarmed, on the
street, arrested him, and advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436. When other police officers arrived at the arrest scene, respondent was
twice again advised of his Miranda rights, and he stated that he understood his
rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer. Respondent was then placed in a police
car to be driven to the central station in the company of three officers, who were
instructed not to question respondent or intimidate him in any way. While en
route to the station, two of the officers engaged in a conversation between
themselves concerning the missing shotgun. One of the officers stated that there
were "a lot of handicapped children running around in this area" because a school
for such children was located nearby, and "God forbid one of them might find a
weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." Respondent interrupted the
conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could
show them where the gun was located. Upon returning to the scene of the arrest
where a search for the shotgun was in progress, respondent was again advised of
his Miranda rights, replied that he understood those rights, but that he "wanted
to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the school," and
then led the police to the shotgun. Before trial on charges of kidnaping, robbery,
and murder of another taxicab driver, the trial court denied respondent's motion
to suppress the shotgun and the statement he had made to the police regarding
its discovery, ruling that respondent had waived his Miranda rights, and
respondent was subsequently convicted. The Rhode Island Supreme Court set
aside the conviction and held that respondent was entitled to a new trial,
concluding that respondent had invoked his Miranda right to counsel and that,
contrary to Miranda's mandate that, in the absence of counsel, all custodial
interrogation then cease, the police officers in the vehicle had "interrogated"
120 R.I. ___, 391 A.2d 1158, vacated and remanded.
respondent without a valid waiver of his right to counsel.
People vs. Mahinay [302 SCRA 455 (1999)]

Held: Respondent was not "interrogated" in violation of his right under Miranda to
remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer. Pp. 446 U. S. 297-303.
Page 446 U. S. 292
(a) The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to
say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter
portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than the intent of the police. Pp. 446 U. S. 298-302.
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and
unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that
destroys not only her future but of the youth population as well, who in the
teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once
again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity,
committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12
years, has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely
death as a result of the "intrinsically evil act" of non-consensual sex called rape.
Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an ignominious crime for
which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to lust.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the
horrible experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the
bloody hands of appellant, as such facts are ably supported by evidence on
record:1 *

(b) Here, there was no express questioning of respondent; the conversation

between the two officers was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue
"Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on
between them to which no response from respondent was invited. Moreover,
November 20, 1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under
respondent was not subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning, since
construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No.
it cannot be said that the officers should have known that their conversation was
4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela , Metro Manila. But he stayed and
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from respondent. There is
slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware that respondent was
unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of
handicapped children, or that the police knew that respondent was unusually
disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. Nor does the record indicate that, in
"The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street.
the context of a brief conversation, the officers should have known that
She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the
respondent would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response.
compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While they
While it may be said that respondent was subjected to "subtle compulsion," it
were playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside the
must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product
compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September
of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were
6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-22).
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, which was not established
here. Pp. 446 U. S. 302-303.
"On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-
drinking spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already 17).
drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his
friends (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).
"That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma.
Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the
"Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
the compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching
birds inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The
unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's store (TSN, September "With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
18, 1995, pp.9-11). retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following
findings:
"On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his
in-law's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on
the trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian
Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria
standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995,
Contusions, supra pubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
pp. 3-7; 14-17).

Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.

"Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store
to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it.
She notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair
was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked
why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to
the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
"Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing.
She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow
hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue
rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm, angle of the left eye, lateral
aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right,
2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular
area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm.
subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left,
posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and
left 6.0 x 5.0 cm. forearms, left, posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand,
left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd,
12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-
lower 3rd , 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cm. lateral
mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.

"Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the
following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant
alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural
petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,
Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots.
(TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126)
"Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing.
According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the
apartment since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the
same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-
11-27).
"SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of
appellant was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City.
They proceeded to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that
appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his present
whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed them that
appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN,
August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
"The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the
house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty
white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by
Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside
another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Appellant.
Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellant's belongings. These items were brought to the
police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8;
August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
"A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to
the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano
retrieved the victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp.
3-8; 14-17).
"After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay
Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to Valenzuela Police Station. On
July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed
the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and
aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim.
He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp.
13-21)."
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an
Information which reads:2cräläwvirtualibräry
"That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN
y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of
said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
"Contrary to law."3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision states:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of
P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
"Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
"SO ORDERED."4
Upon automatic review by the court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended,5 appellant insists that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony summarized by the trial court,
appellant offered his version of what transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellants employer.
After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to
clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 oclock noon. Then he
had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with
his friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5).
At 2 oclock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted
to rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed
one case of red horse beer. Around 6 oclock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched
him at Gregorio Riveras house. They went to Zaldys house and bought a bottle of
gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 oclock p.m. After consuming the bottle of
gin, they went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was
already 9 oclock in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy
met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Riveras store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and
proceeded to Isips apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to
sleep at the second floor of Isips unfinished house. Around 10 oclock p.m., Zaldy
and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room
where appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a
knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they
would kill him. He, However, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and
Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped
dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that
should they ever see him again, they would kill him. At 4 oclock the following
morning, he left the compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later to
Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan,
Batangas. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in
Manila. There, appellant heard the police officers plan to salvage him if he would
not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he
executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty.
Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection
in the review thereof since there can be no stake higher and no penalty more
severe x x x than the termination of a human life.7 For life, once taken is like
virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In order therefore, that
appellants guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the
records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellants proffered
excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not
necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence8
and pursuant to settled jurisprudence,9 conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.10 Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass
even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.11cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove
appellants guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial
evidence are as follows:
FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of
the unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where
the body of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is
located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25,
1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the
compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is
situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accuseds hair was
disarranged, drunk and walking in sigsaging manner. That the accused appeared
uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That the accused did not reply to her
queries why he looked worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically, testified that on
June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws
house, he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-laws
residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of
the unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same
evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where
victims body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry
Mahinay is her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June
25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That
after finishing some work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it
is customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same
day or sometimes in the next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not
return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver
plying the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Diam St., Gen. T.
de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one
of the passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00
early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is
a clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic)
fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused.
The absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the
witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado,
58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having
been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes of the Public Attorneys Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting
the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given
with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and
voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any
maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984; 150
SCRA 311). He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to
the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was
promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details know
only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty.
Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained
to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving
of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer
from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice
any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of
the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia
by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate.
Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and the
latters head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya,
tapos tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape
ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement.
There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim
that he was mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as
a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of
reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to
concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held
to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249;
People v. Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol
35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to
enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he
proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while
sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and dumped
it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex
with the dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist them in
dumping the dead body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp8-9
October 16, 1995). This is unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is
staying in the apartment and not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the
said unfinished house only that night of June 25, 1995 because the apartment
where he was staying was already closed. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy
and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished
house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the
room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay
was sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to
be disposed/dumped later in the septic tank located in the ground floor. Boyet
and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by
themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room 3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot
where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
with the dead body of the child.

the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
knowledge observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
to the miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)

When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have
apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who
interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An 1.) By using force or intimidation;
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of
crime as a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against
prejudicing himself. A persons silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5
July 21, 1978).

3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his

consciousness of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the
incident and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.12 The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
wit:13cräläwvirtualibräry two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; the penalty shall be death.

2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
caution; and
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a
crime against chastity,15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No.
8353), rape has since been re-classified as a crime against persons under Articles
266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by
the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with
a woman by force and without consent.16 (Under the new law, rape may be
committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a man.)17 If the
woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes
immaterial18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,19 but
the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is be proven. But if the
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this case,
not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other
element that the perpetrators evil acts with the offended party was done through
force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are
present in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was
adequately proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who
conducted post mortem examination on the childs body:
Q: And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 oclock and 8:00
oclock position and that the edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of
an organ.
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.

Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?

18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?

A: Adult male organ, sir.

S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.

Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?

19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang
babae?

A: I am very sure of that.20

S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself

admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?

15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?

S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung
anong petsa, basta araw ng Linggo.

S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na

ginagawa, tapos dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya
sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.

S: Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.

16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?

22. T: Alam mo na ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?

S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this
investigators table. Subject evidence were part of evidences recovered at the
crime scene). S: Hindi ko po alam.

17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae? 23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na
iyong ni rape at pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?
S: Oho. S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.

24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba? 30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?

S: Naka-isa po. S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.

25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng NAKARAOS, 31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
maaari bang ipaliwanag mo ito?

S: Natatakot po ako.
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.

32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?

26. T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong
ari?
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.

S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.

33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?

27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod
mong ginawa? S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.

S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace. 34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?

28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace? S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.

S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra. 35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay
pa ba siya o patay na?

29. T: Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?

S: Buhay pa po. A We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta
and we were told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to
confess of the crime of, I think, rape with homicide.
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?

Q And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.21 other person present?

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victims
vagina; rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex
organ is enough to consummate the sexual intercourse.22 The mere touching by
the males organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the
womans private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside
the investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
Q- And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the
accused already there?

From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was
indeed employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants own A The accused was already there.
account, he pushed the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and
fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his
salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her Q Was he alone?
penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the
sexual act.
A he was alone, sir.

Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession,

Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP
which he, however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to
Officers, what did they tell you, if any?
counsel. But his contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of
the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally
guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting
lawyer: A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to
confess of the crime charged, sir.

Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?

A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorneys Office.

 Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay,
do you recall whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced
Q Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the
in writing?
accused?

A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer
A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
Alabastro.

Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?

Q I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing,
will you be able to recognize the same?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period
start?
Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same
document you mentioned?

A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.

A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.

Q And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing
that you did as assisting lawyer to the accused?
ATTY. PRINCIPE:

A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A
proper.

Q What are those right?

Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused
whether you asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his
own choice and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and
that he has the right to refuse to answer any question that would incriminate
A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
him.

Q But you were present?

A I was then present when he signed. Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment?

Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before A It was the Police Officer who asked him.
and after there are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2)
signatures?
Q In your presence?

A These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.

A In my presence, sir.

Q The signature of whom?

Q And when he said or when he replied Opo so the question started?

A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. PRINCIPE:
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present
also when he signed this waiver?
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my
compaero be encircled and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
A Yes, sir, I was also present.

Q After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right
explaining to him in Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
accused?

A I had also explained to him, sir.

A- Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.

Q In Filipino?
Q What was the reply?

A In Tagalog, sir.
A He said Opo.
Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten
name Larry Mahinay, Nagsasalaysay, whose signature is that?
A This is also signed in my presence.
Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A He signed in my presence, sir.
Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry
Mahinay subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this
signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have
personally examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary
executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature, sir.23 (emphasis supplied).
Appellants defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the
victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of
Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey,24cräläwvirtualibräry
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of
having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses
department on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.25 In this case, the trial courts findings, conclusions and
evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest
respect,26 the same being supported by substantial evidence on record. There
was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded relevant facts
and circumstances which when considered would have affected the outcome of
this case27 or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court
below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no
such motive exists.28 Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police
officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659
when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death. This special complex crime is treated by law in the same degree
as qualified rape -- that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) attendant circumstances
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is
death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged,
the penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC
which will affect the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63
of the RPC. However, if any of those circumstances proven but not alleged cannot
be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the
same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Articles 63 of the RPC
in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14
and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the
information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is
not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, in which
case the only penalty is death subject to the usual proof of such circumstance in
either case.
 concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to
warrant per se the award of moral damages.36 Thus, it was held that a
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for
conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim
the crime of rape with homicide, the court has no option but to apply the same
without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.37cräläwvirtualibräry
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended
the commission of the crime29 in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as
amended.30 This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of death
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was
which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC,
attended by one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of
as amended, which provides:
the Civil Code38 after proof that the offended party is entitled to moral,
temperate and compensatory damages.39 Under the circumstances of this case,
appellant is liable to the victims heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years
of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the
Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death
evidence against and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as
penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. (emphasis
guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and
supplied).
duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his
companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at
and during the time of the custodial interrogation40 in accordance with the
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty,
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438:41 It is high-time to
appellant tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a
educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
few months old at the time he committed the rape and thus, covered by the
indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which
proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty person is below eighteen (18)
the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
years at the time of the commission of the crime.31 Again, the record rebuffs
appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than
20 years of age when he did the heinous act.
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood
indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is
by said person;
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil indemnity for the
victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).32 In
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement
addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to
he makes may be used as evidence against him;
Article 2219 of the Civil Code33 in such amount as the court deems just, without
the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.34 Civil Indemnity is
different from the award of moral and exemplary damages.35 The requirement of
proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have
dispensed with because it is recognized that the victims injury is inherently the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;
 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by
answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;

Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling
communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or
of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death
messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
penalty should accordingly be imposed.
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with
duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00,
PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.

7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided
it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of
the same;
the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case
be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
SO ORDERED.
waiver and chooses to speak;
Administrative Investigations

People vs. Judge Ayson [175 SCRA 216 (1989)]

9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not
interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must
ceased if it has already begun;
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent
Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of
any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same
provision. The relevant facts are not disputed.

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to
light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed
by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained.2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000
(APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR
BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager
in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio
Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta
Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in
writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made
disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame,"
that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x
to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place,
"Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees
ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties
at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during
the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during
that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) —
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ...
defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner,
to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare
tickets of passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of
P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale,
account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and
instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and
there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum
of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and refused to make
good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and
trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of
PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence dated June 21, 1988,6 which included "the (above mentioned)
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
"handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to,
which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence."7
Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said
document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused
being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons
interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits
"as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith
and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His
Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the
statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City
Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it
does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave
his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared
inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J.
Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the
exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by
counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by
Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent
Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121
SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and
People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial
investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the
present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the
investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense
of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and
therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and
the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was
administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit
of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the
petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private
prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated
October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment
on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . .
. ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial and/or
hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the
issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any
matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required
the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson,
Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General
has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given
due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent
Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the
prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety
might have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the
People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal
action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue — of whether or
not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the
People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the
People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which is
a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is
similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12
and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in
separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section
12 of the same Article III.13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes
an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the
right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the
right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn
and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him,
the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not
impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against
self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the
law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of
things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the
character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the
protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or
better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police
authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in
the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal,
or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an
offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an
"earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid
down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as
the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers
are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without
full warnings of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or
"in-custody interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already
stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and
"cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary
to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar
surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the
truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered
and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an
atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks
to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is
within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial
interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the
statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police
precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he
was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a
statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1)
that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply
to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a
crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation
is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there
had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal
case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a
defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial
interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer
under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation
before the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the
right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific
incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter
of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of
protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as
witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness
shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness
against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce
evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused.
He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of
the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for
a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words — unlike an ordinary
witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by
subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory
question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can refuse
to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer
any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be
a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his
right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other
witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct
examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or
the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the
crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked
a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is
charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he
may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming
that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may
not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he
might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any
particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense,
say, estafa.

In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his
testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of
these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has
misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the
same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly
erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he
took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the
actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to
make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally
unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby,
annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in
ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of
a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him
on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed
that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been
marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as
Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he
sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation,
offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and
even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that
the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the
violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the
investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies, or
complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in
their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects,
whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral
coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to
the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions
may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must
be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel,
or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any
statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so,
in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his
statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to
his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel
and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether
called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that
they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the
judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation,
undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under
investigation — or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another
whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or
confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in
evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a
violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the
general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may
not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be
accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the
Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9,
1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence
Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and
thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary
restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now
declared of no further force and effect.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumiling [271 SCRA 316 (1997)]
With reluctance, the Court once again has to wield its power of imposing
disciplinary measures on members of the Bench and employees of the judiciary
for failure to live up to the obligations incident to their status as officers of the
Court.
Respondents Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva
Mercado, court employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna
(hereinafter referred to as the lower court), were charged in a memorandum
report by the Office of Court Administrator dated August 16, 1994,1 for
misappropriating funds deposited by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858, entitled
Spouses Entero Villarica and Felicidad Domingo v. Teodorico Dizon. On October 5,
1994, this Court issued a resolution treating the aforesaid memorandum report
as an administrative complaint which was docketed as Administrative Matter No.
MTJ-94-989.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In addition, a second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing judicial
records outside the court premises.3 This Court decided to include this matter in
the original complaint earlier docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-94-989 in a resolution
dated March 6, 1995.4 The antecedent facts follow:
This case arose as an aftermath of an on-the-spot audit examination of the
official cashbook and other documents of the lower court. It appears from the
evidence that court interpreter Malla who was the officer-in-charge from July 1,
1992 to November 15, 1992, took a maternity leave for one (1) month
(November 16, 1992 to December 15, 1992) and reassumed her position on
December 16, 1992, until her resignation on August 31, 1993.
On September 1, 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of officer in
charge. It was during her tenure on August 8, 1994, that an on-the-spot audit
examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of Court
Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous transactions
were discovered. One involved a managers check deposited in the name of
Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica,
on August 7, 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of
P240,000.00 to said respondent instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court
pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When asked to explain where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she
deposited it at the Sta Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank but
she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that the
defendant, Dizon, would demand the delivery of the money upon the termination
of the case. Upon further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla
admitted that she lent the amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Lagmay,
P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of
Judge Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and
the remaining balance for personal purposes.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado
borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she used
P100,000.00 for her personal needs.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon learning that they were being implicated in the anomalous transaction,
Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the amount of P55,000.00 was from
the personal account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount deposited
before the court and such loan has already been paid.8 Mercado, on the other
hand, claims that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before
the audit took place, when Malla was no longer employed with the court.9 Mrs.
Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of the transactions.10
After carefully studying the records of this case, the Court is convinced that
respondents did commit acts prejudicial to the service for which they should be
held accountable.
The evidence against Judge Sumilang adequately proves his gross negligence in
this matter. In his proffered explanation, he averred that his wife did not borrow
any money from Malla and that he had no knowledge of the irregularities
involving members of his own staff.11 It bears emphasizing that this is not the
first time that respondent judge has been charged with an administrative case. In
Arviso v. Sumilang,12 this Court found him guilty of gross negligence and
ordered him to pay a fine of P3,000.00 for his failure to act on a motion to
dismiss in an expeditious manner.
A judge must always remember that as the administrator of his court, he is
responsible for the conduct and management thereof. He has the duty to
supervise his court personnel to ensure prompt and efficient dispatch of business
in his court.13 The ignorance of respondent Judge as to the irregularities
occurring in his own backyard constitutes serious breach of judicial
ethics.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Judge Sumilangs excuse, that upon learning of the irregularities being committed
by his court personnel, he immediately acted with haste and instructed Malla to
turn over the money,15 is specious and unconvincing. His admission that he had
no knowledge regarding the anomalies going on in his court underscores his
inefficiency and incompetence. It clearly demonstrates a lack of control expected
of a judge exercising proper office management.
The evidence against Malla is equally incriminating. It has been clearly
established, and this is not denied by Malla,16 that she misappropriated for her
own use the amount of P240,000.00 which she received from Villarica, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858, instead of directing him to deposit said amount
with the Municipal Treasurer. A court interpreter should not receive payments
made by litigants in relation to their cases in his personal
charge.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her defense, Malla testified that her uncle Entero Villarica allowed her to use
the money on the condition that she should be ready to produce it when
necessary.18 Malla, however, never presented Villarica as her witness to bolster
her claim which,therefore, has no evidentiary value for being self-serving.
Besides, there is a disputable presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced during trial.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Malla further claims that her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution20 were violated when she was pressured to sign an affidavit
dated September 14, 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where
she admitted her misdeed.21 Thus, she concludes that the affidavit is
inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Loveria,22 however, we ruled that the aforementioned constitutional
provision may be invoked only during custodial investigation or as in custody
investigation which has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.23 The investigation is defined as an
investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation
conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other
police agencies in our government.24 Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator
can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in the
constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her testimony that
Respondents Lagmay and Mercado, on the other hand, vehemently deny knowing
she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of P240,000.00
that the money they borrowed was money held in trust by Malla.29 This assertion
payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal
contradicts the latters testimony as to the source of the money lent to the
Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang.
former.
Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture that
she used the money for personal purposes.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Worth stressing is the well-entrenched principle that in administrative

proceedings, such as the instant case, the quantum of proof necessary for a
During the investigation, Malla repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit
finding of guilt is only substantial evidence.30 Substantial evidence has been
i.e., that she used a substantial amount of the P240,00.00 for her personal
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claims was
adequate to support a conclusion.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
employed against her. By repeating her confession in open court, Malla thereby
converted it into a judicial confession.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The only evidence presented before this Court are the affidavits of Malla, Lagmay
and Mercado. Firmly established is the rule that testimonial evidence carries more
During the investigation, Malla was charged with a second offense for keeping in
weight than affidavits.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
her custody missing court records containing the technical description of a
cadastral survey.

On this point, the investigating Justice,33 reported:

Malla never denied this charge,27 but claimed that they were returned five hours
after they were removed. We are not impressed with the remonstration of Malla.
It should be stressed that court employees are not allowed to take any court
records, papers or documents outside the court
premises.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
All these acts call for Mallas dismissal, but this penalty cannot be enforced
because she is no longer connected with the MTC of Pila, Laguna. Hence, the
appropriate penalty that may be meted against her is the forfeiture of her
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This disciplinary action should serve as a reminder to all court
personnel who yield to the temptation of using for their own personal interest
funds entrusted to the court, that there is no place in the judiciary for those who
cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. The fact
that Malla returned the whole amount is of no moment because such act will not
mitigate her liability.
In the instant case, both Mercado and Lagmay are residents of Pila, Laguna, like
Malla. All of them were employed with the Municipal Trial Court of Pila, Laguna,
Mercado and Lagmay as stenographic reporters and Malla as court interpreter
and, for a time, as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court. Moreover,
being stenographic reporters in the same court where Malla was the court
interpreter, the deposit by Villarica of the amount of P240,000.00 could not have
been unknown to Mercado and Lagmay. It is not every day that such a huge
amount is deposited with a mere Municipal Trial Court of a town in the province.
Indeed, Lagmay even admitted, when she testified during the investigation, that
she was aware of the deposit of the said amount with the Court as ordered by it.
Lagmay admitted when she testified that Malla was receiving only a monthly
salary of P5,000.00. The three (3) failed to adduce competent evidence sufficient
to prove any other sources of income of Malla except her salary as an employee
of the government. Although Malla, Mercado and Lagmay claimed that Mallas
husband was an agricultural tenant of a five-hectare parcel of land and a real
estate broker and that Malla was the owner of a restaurant managed by her
sister, however, they relied solely on their testimonies to buttress their claim.
Malla failed to adduce in evidence any business or Mayors permit to prove that
she was the owner and operator of a restaurant and any documentary evidence
to prove that her husband was engaged in real estate or that her husband was an
agricultural tenant and his income from said business or occupation. On the other
hand, when she testified during the investigation, Malla admitted that she used
P200,000.00 from the P240,000.00 deposit (T.S.N., Malla, Page 96, April 21,
1995) for the expansion of her restaurant. In fine, Malla was in dire need of
money. If Malla had other sources of income other than her salary as a
government employee, it would not have been necessary for her to use part of
the deposit with the RCBC. Neither Lagmay nor Malla adduced any evidence to
prove that Malla was granted a loan by the Luzon Development Bank, in March,
1994, in the gargantuan amount of P600,000.00.
In situations such as the one at hand, the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the investigating body because,
unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in light of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.34 This rule, however, must be
relaxed when certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the matter.35 Unfortunately for
respondents, no such omission is present here.
We need not belabor jurisprudence that those involved in the administration of
justice must live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity in the public
service. Their conduct must at all times, not only be characterized with propriety
and decorum but above all must be above suspicion.36 For the image of a court
of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
By the very nature of the amount involved and considering that Malla was only
receiving a salary of P5,000.00 a month with no other source of income, the
conduct of the employees involved cast suspicion and tended to diminish the faith
of the people in the judiciary.
In resolving this case, this Court emphasizes the Constitutional tenet that (p)ublic
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with outmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Augusto Sumilang is hereby found guilty of gross
negligence in the management of his court and ordered to pay a FINE of
P20,000.00.
Respondent Felicidad Malla is found guilty of misappropriating funds deposited to
the court by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 858 and infidelity in the custody of
court records. The Court, therefore, imposes the penalty of FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, considering that
dismissal is no longer feasible in view of her separation from the service.
Respondents Edelita Lagmay and Nieva Mercado are likewise found guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and are hereby ordered to
pay a FINE of P3,000.00 each, with a stern warning that commission of the same
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Uy (G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005)
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,1 Jaime Ochoa and Raul
Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of
Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and
penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, in an amended Information,2 docketed as Criminal Case No. 19558,
which alleges –
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of
NPC;
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both
public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange
Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively, also of NAPOCOR,
and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara 2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information
Añonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange trader, said public was (sic) the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division
officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave abuse of authority (LOMAFED);
and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with their private co-accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s 3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the
application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC time mentioned in the information;
Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY
FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the 4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;
purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by
inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in truth
and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment Instructions (PI) when
5. That accused Ochoa’s position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to
signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul
take custody or control of public funds;
Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial
documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE 6. That the application forms for cashier’s check or Manager’s check are not
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS accountable forms of the NAPOCOR.3
(P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation,
which they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
Corporation in the aforementioned sum. rendered its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while
Gutierrez has remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of
Commercial Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25)
solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa shall also suffer the
penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against the accused.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby
ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial
Document. However, because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY
LIABLE for the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily
with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against the accused
embodied in this Court’s Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is recalled.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas,
alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo with last known address at 1348 A.
Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in
–
1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;
2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;
3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.6
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not
disputed by the parties:
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC") became embroiled in a
controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which
were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch ("PNB")
but were subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers’/cashier’s checks (the
first check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00 while the second was for
P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian
Development Bank ("ADB"). As NPC’s debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was
obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from
a local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw
Branch), which local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore
bank. This off-shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then
supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this
case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the
account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in
three [3] "Payment Instructions") included a "value date" (which was July 13,
1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned procedure,
culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign currency
agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted
Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise,
per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted
on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however,
despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2) manager’s/cashier’s
checks ("Manager’s check" for brevity) for such purpose, did not make the agreed
remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the
funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the
accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to
remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both
explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.7
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two
PNB Manager’s checks by falsifying a commercial document called an "Application
for Cashier’s Check" (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04)
of a private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It
claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment
Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Manager’s check to
be charged to NPC’s savings account did not contain any account number.
Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds
from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @
George Añonuevo @ Mara Añonuevo, who is still at large.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed
any of the acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the
ACC; that he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he received the
proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He claims that
his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of
stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel
and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains
that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center
and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted
by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the
affidavit.
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following
essential elements:
a.] The offender is a public officer;
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of,
such funds or property.8
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the
information without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be
informed of the accusation against him. He points out that the information alleges
willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the judgment
found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.
Appellant’s contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either
through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively
through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation.9 To
sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence10 and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of
evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful
malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the
offense.11 Explicitly stated –
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a
case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first
mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only
a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction
thereof is proper.12
The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the
crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is
neither novel nor of first impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,13 we
ruled that an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can validly be
convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we
held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, … but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging
the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant
was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which
turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the
cases decided by this Tribunal. The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a "custodial"
investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody15 and
the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the suspect.16 More specifically –
....

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the
freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at
evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to
once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be
crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken
incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence
into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question
for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
which tend to elicit incriminating statements.17

In People v. Consigna, et al.,14 we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also

Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when
applies to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to the present case,
begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.18 Such a situation
can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through negligence
contemplated has been more precisely described thus where –
where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation

Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based
arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army
on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn
camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only
statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He
by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale.
contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in
He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he
violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
Constitution.
seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience
and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of
the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that –
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence....19
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked
by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the
picture.20 Thus we held in one case21 that admissions made during the course of
an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the
purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also
does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual,22 or
to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation,23 or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not
in his official capacity.24
Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is
not covered by the provision although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take
extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because we recognized
the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense
on television.25
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having
committed the crime,26 nor to a person undergoing an audit examination
because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.27
Thus, the flaw in appellant’s argument in this regard becomes immediately
apparent vis-à-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement
was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team28 and
before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry
into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was
confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to
NPC personnel, not to police authorities.29 Appellant can hardly claim that, under
the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of compulsion may
have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where
impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and
incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been
persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way
as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional
provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the
time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his
predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from
coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by
NPC personnel for the NPC’s administrative investigation. Any investigation
conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the
NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran30 in insisting that the constitutional
safeguard should have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested
or under detention at the time. He also invites our attention to the
pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas31 that "the right to counsel is available
if a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in custody
but he is a suspect."
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional
protection covers not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the
ruling with the statement that what is being eschewed is the evil of "extorting" a
confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As defined,
"extortion" is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a person by
illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats or any undue exercise of power.32
In the context of obtaining an admission, "extorting" means "compelling or
coercing a confession or information by any means serving to overcome his
power of resistance, or making the confession or admission involuntary."33 In
this case, we find nothing on record to support appellant’s claim that his
statements were extorted from him.
 Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days and, who, when
queried whether "ischemic heart disease" had any emotional or psychological
Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on
effect, gave the inconclusive reply that it "may or may not." Moreover, as aptly
what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to
observed by the Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as
the conclusion that the rights are available when the person is already in custody
he was by the alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is
as a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any
supposedly astute in business matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign
significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas34 qualified this statement by saying that
Trader Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another
"[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently held,
affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be
following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must
when the person is already in custody."35
be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.43

Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were
admissible in evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a
Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the
conviction. He contends that although his statement was supposedly gathered
transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-
from the transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him and
judicially. The record, however, shows that the prosecution presented the team
Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared the sworn
leader of the NBI investigators who conducted the investigation, although his
statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.
testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due
execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of its
contents. If at all, the admission of the report’s existence is an acknowledgment
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.
witness Atty. Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show
him the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of its contents.36
Atty. Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go over the document before
All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant
affixing his signature thereto.37 He also inquired whether or not appellant was
to prop up his cause, his appeal must fall.
coerced or intimidated by anybody when the statement was taken.38 Appellant
denied that he was coerced or intimidated,39 affirmed the contents of the
document as a true reflection of his statements,40 and signed the same.41 It
WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby
need not be overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized
AFFIRMED in all respects.
document which has in its favor the presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be
contradicted only by clear and convincing evidence. Without that sort of evidence,
the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the SO ORDERED.
authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.42
Police Lineup

Gamboa vs. Cruz [162 SCRA 642 (1988)]

In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining
the time he signed the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore
order, to annul and set aside the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of
not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled
pretext however collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales, Accused,"
and to restrain the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the
aforementioned case.
Petitioner alleges that:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter,
petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy
and then detained therein together with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including
petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one
is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back
to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was
being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in
front of her.
On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On
2 April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its
case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,
manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to
Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the
ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of,
his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in
the petition at bar) denying the Motion to Acquit:
For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that the
constitutional rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process, have
been violated. After considering the allegations and arguments in support of the
said motion in relation to the evidence presented, the Court finds the said motion
to be without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the
accused is hereby set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Hence, the instant petition.
On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of
this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the court".1
Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said
order, in denying his Motion To Acquit, is null and void for being violative of his
rights to counsel and to due process. 2
We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.
To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge
in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980.
It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. 3 To
warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of
jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as
when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law. 4 This is not the situation in the case
at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as well as the
prosecution's evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.
The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or
1987 Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every person is entitled to
the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution, reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the
1987 Constitution. Section 12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by
counsel. The above-cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no
room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently
held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or
by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall
not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. 5
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least,
in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:
When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had
not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part
of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was
held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused
may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United
States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course
of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not
have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation
between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He
was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far
from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be
BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his
used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being
agreement that the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were
investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant
formally made against an accused.
while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to
counsel had not accrued. 6

Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States,
petitioner would have no cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel
and due process. In Kirby vs. Illinois, 7 the facts of the case and the votes of the
Justices therein are summarized as fellows:
After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police
station, police officers learned that certain items found in their possession had
been stolen in a recent robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police
station and immediately Identified the petitioner and his companion as the
robbers. No attorney was present when the Identification was made, and neither
the petitioner nor his companion had asked for legal assistance or had been
advised of any right to the presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the
petitioner and his companion were indicted for the robbery. At trial in an Illinois
state court, the robbery victim testified that he had seen the petitioner and his
companion at the police station, and he pointed them out in the courtroom and
Identified them as the robbers. The petitioner and his companion were convicted,
and the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the petitioner's conviction,
holding that the constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence derived
from out-of-court Identification procedures conducted in the absence of counsel
did not apply to pre-indictment Identifications (121 III App 2d 323, 257 NEE 2d
589).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an
opinion, affirmed. In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of the
court and expressing the view of four members of the court, it was held that the
constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal proceedings
were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court
Identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply to Identification testimony
based upon a police station show-up which took place before the accused had
been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.
POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule
should not be extended.
BRENNAN J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the grounds
that although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary rule
happened to involve post-indictment Identifications, the rationale behind the rule
was equally applicable to the present case.
WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing
the exclusionary rule governed the present case. 8
Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the
Court, said:
In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's
landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55, 84
ALR 527, it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. See Powell v. Alabama,
supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019, 146 ALR
357; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7 L Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct 157; Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 93 ALR 2d 733; White v.
Maryland, 373 US 59, 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050; Messiah v. United States,
377 US 201, 12 L Ed 246, 84 S Ct 1199; United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 18
L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926; Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263, 18 L Ed 2d 1178,
87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90 S Ct. 1999.
This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
counsel only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches
In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an
at the time of arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists also at
order denying a Motion To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
the time of a preliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. But the point is
provides that, upon arraignment, the defendant shall immediately either move to
that, while members of the court have differed as to existence of the right to
quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the
counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have
defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or
involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
overruled, he should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If,
proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant (in the
information, or arraignment. (Emphasis supplied). 10
motion to quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or
objections (earlier raised in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to
review by the appellate court.
As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and
beyond the guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is
counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings
interlocutory and not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it
have been initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and 1987
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be
Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation
reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after
against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings
trial. As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe,12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco,13 the
against the accused have begun.
accused, after the denial of his motion to quash, should have proceeded with the
trial of the case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him,
he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal, present the questions which he
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to
sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.
extend to those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may
be better than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no
real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the
In Acharon vs. Purisima, 14 the procedure was well defined, thus:
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions
or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous
at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases
presence of counsel. filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy
was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice on his
part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if, after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way,
manner authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as
deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented
authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a writ
by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is unwarranted
present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and
it being contrary to the usual course of law. 15
instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The
case at bar is far from this situation.
Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his
rights to counsel and to due process is a question which he could raise, as a
defense or objection, upon the trial on the merits, and, if that defense or
objection should fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or
information before he pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the complaint or
information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the
same. 16
Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented
its evidence and rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not
applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived objections which are grounds for
a motion to quash.
Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not
among the grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for
quashing a complaint or information. Consequently, the lower court did not err in
denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued
on 3 March 1981 is LIFTED. The instant case is remanded to the respondent court
for further proceedings to afford the petitioner-accused the opportunity to
present evidence on his behalf.
This decision is immediately executory. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
United States v. Wade [388 U.A. 218 (1967)]
Syllabus
Several weeks after respondent's indictment for robbery of a federally insured
bank and for conspiracy, respondent, without notice to his appointed counsel,
was placed in a lineup in which each person wore strips of tape on his face, as
the robber allegedly had done, and, on direction, repeated words like those the
robber allegedly had used. Two bank employees identified respondent as the
robber. At the trial, when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, they
identified respondent. The prior lineup identifications were elicited on cross-
examination. Urging that the conduct of the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
respondent filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the
courtroom identifications. The trial court denied the motions, and respondent was
convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, though there was no Fifth
Amendment deprivation, the absence of counsel at the lineup denied respondent
his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and required the grant of a new
trial at which the in-court identifications of those who had made lineup
identifications would be excluded.
Held:
1. Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his
person for observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a
testimonial nature against himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. Pp.
388 U. S. 221-223.
2. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at
his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings
where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel
might derogate from his right to a fair trial. Pp. 388 U. S. 223-227.
3. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing
fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which
respondent was entitled to the aid of counsel. Pp. 388 U. S. 227-239.
Page 388 U. S. 219
(a) There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point, (1)
because of the manner in which confrontations for identification are frequently
conducted, (2) because of dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and
suggestibility' inherent in the context of the confrontations, and (3) because of
the likelihood that the accused will often be precluded from reconstructing what
occurred, and thereby obtaining a full hearing on the identification issue at trial.
Pp. 388 U. S. 229-235.
(b) This case illustrates the potential for improper influence on witnesses through
the lineup procedure, since the bank employees were allowed to see respondent
in the custody of FBI agents before the lineup began. Pp. 388 U. S. 233-234.
(c) The presence of counsel at the lineup will significantly promote fairness at the
confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification. Pp. 388 U.
S. 236-238.
4. In-court identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before
trial in the absence of counsel must be excluded unless it can be established that
such evidence had an independent origin or that error in its admission was
harmless. Since it is not clear that the Court of Appeals applied the prescribed
rule of exclusion, and since the nature of the in-court identifications here was not
an issue in the trial and cannot be determined on the record, the case must be
remanded to the District Court for resolution of these issues. Pp. 388 U. S. 239-
243.
358 F.2d 557, vacated and remanded.
People vs. Escordial, G.R. 138934, January 16, 2002
These cases are before this Court for review from the decision, 1 dated February
26, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-
appellant Anthony Escordial guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to
death and to pay private complainant Michelle Darunday the amounts of
P3,650.00 representing the amount taken by him, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 97-18117, the information against accused-appellant
charged him with the crime of rape committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused
armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against the latter’s
will.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense
was committed in the dwelling of the said party during nighttime while [she] was
asleep inside her room.
Act contrary to law. 2
In Criminal Case No. 97-18118, the information charged accused-appellant with
robbery with rape as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by means of
violence and intimidation on the person, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00,
belonging to said offended party and [on] the occasion thereof have carnal
knowledge with the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and
inside her room wherein she was temporarily residing as a boarder.
All contrary to law and with aggravating circumstance that the said offense was
committed inside the dwelling of the offended party and during nighttime the
latter not having given provocation for the offense.
Act contrary to law. 3
When arraigned on February 25, 1997, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega, Mark
Esmeralda, Erma Blanca, 4 Dr. Joy Ann Jocson, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, Leo Asan,
Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and Michelle Darunday. Their testimonies are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda testified that at around 8 o’clock in the
evening of December 27, 1996, they and Mark Lucena were playing inside a
jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon 5 at No. 17
Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As
one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man
sitting inside the jeepney to go home lest they would meet an accident. The man
was later identified by Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda as Accused-Appellant.
6
Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle
Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. They stayed in a bedroom on
the ground floor. That same night, December 27, 1996, Teresa went to sleep at
around 9:30 p.m., while Michelle and Erma watched television for a while before
going to bed. They slept beside each other on two beds placed side by side, with
Teresa nearest the wall, Michelle in the middle, and Erma on the other side.
While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The
man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a
knife about four inches long. He warned Erma not to shout or he would kill her.
He then asked Erma where her money was, and the latter pointed to the wall
where she had hung the bag which contained her money. Michelle, who by then
was already awake, told Erma to give the man her money so he would leave.
Erma gave the man P300.00, but the latter said to give him all her money. He
told Erma that he would look for more money and, if he found more, he would kill
her. For this reason, Erma gave the rest of her money. Afterwards, she was told
to lie on her side facing the wall. The man then turned to Michelle and Teresa.
Michelle gave him her money, but Teresa said her money was in the other room.
However, she was not allowed to leave the bedroom. The man was able to get
P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle.
After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and
another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then
began touching her in different parts of her body. He ordered her to take off her
t-shirt, threatening to kill her if she did not do as he commanded. He then went
on top of Michelle and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he had difficulty
doing so, he instead inserted his two fingers. He tried once more to insert his
penis, but again failed. The man then rose from the bed and took some soapy
water, which he proceeded to insert into Michelle’s vagina. He finally succeeded
in inserting his penis into Michelle’s vagina. Michelle felt great pain and pleaded
with the man to stop, but the man paid no heed, and only stopped after
satisfying his lust.
Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel
that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his
chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she
felt that it was also rough.
On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and
that she saw the man’s face because of the light coming from the lamp post
outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window had panes through which the
light filtered in.
After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the
three women. He told Michelle that he used to make catcalls at her and called her
a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his place but Michelle had ignored him.
He told them that he was from Hinigaran, but later took back his statement when
Teresa told him that she was from Binalbagan, which was near Hinigaran.
Michelle then told him that she worked at the City Engineer’s Office and
graduated from the Central Mindanao University. The man cussed when he
learned that Michelle was from Mindanao. As he spoke to Michelle, he leaned over
the bed and mashed the breasts of Erma and Teresa.
After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again.
Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and
said it would be worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her.
He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then inserted his penis into her
anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and
returned to her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but
not before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill
them. 7
Mark Esmeralda testified that he was in his bedroom on the second floor of their
house, toying with a flashlight, when he saw from his bedroom window a man
wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding house. It was around 12:30 in
the morning then. The man was nibbling something. Mark saw the man jump
over the fence. After 30 minutes, Mark went down from his room and told his
parents what he had seen. His parents then went out to check what had
happened. Mark identified accused-appellant as the man he saw that night. 8
Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for
help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo
Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called up
Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported
the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to
describe the assailant, but she told them that she could only identify his voice
and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man
around the Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa
were taken to the police station at Bac-Up 6 for investigation. But, at Michelle’s
request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by
their attacker.
Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt
and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police
headquarters, where she was referred to the Women’s Desk to report the rape.
They were able to go home to the house of Michelle’s aunt at around 5 to 6
o’clock in the evening. 9
PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly
after the commission of the crime, also testified for the prosecution. He said that
the assailant was described to him as wearing long hair and having a rough
projection on the back of his neck, small eyes, a slim body, and a brown
complexion. Later on, Michelle Darunday, accompanied by Allan Aguillon,
returned to the police station to report the rape committed against her. Tancinco
entered her complaint in the police blotter and referred Michelle to the Women’s
Desk.
In the morning of December 28, 1996, Tancinco returned to the boarding house.
He found that the intruder was able to gain entry to the house through the
window of the bathroom. He noticed that the room beside those of the three
women had been ransacked, with the cabinets opened and the clothes in
disarray.
The following day, on December 29, 1996, Tancinco went around Margarita
Extension and learned about the children playing on the street around the time
the intruder entered the boarding house. He was told by Mark Esmeralda and
Jason Joniega that they saw a man inside the jeepney where they were playing at
the time of the incident. Tancinco was likewise informed by Esmeralda that the
person he saw inside the jeepney was the same person he saw coming out of the
boarding house later that night. According to Tancinco, the children said that they
could identify the man if he was shown to them. At around 8 o’clock that evening,
Tancinco questioned a certain Tiyo Anong and Ramie about the identity of the
suspect. Ramie said that the description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a
café called Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from the boarding
house.
Thus, on January 2, 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the
Coffee Break Corner and interviewed the security guard, who told them that a
certain Fidel Hinolan owned the café. When interviewed by Tancinco and his
companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that accused-appellant was his helper and
that the latter had gone home on December 27, 1996 to Barangay Miranda,
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
Based on the information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police
officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to Barangay
Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10 o’clock in the morning of
January 3, 1997 and asked the assistance of the police there to locate Accused-
Appellant. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the Pontevedra
police to accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found accused-appellant
at the basketball court and "invited" him to go to the police station for
questioning. 10
Michelle Darunday remained at the Pontevedra police station. When accused-
appellant was brought there, he saw Michelle and blushed. Michelle looked at him
and recognized him as the man who had robbed and raped her on December 27,
1996. Accused-appellant was asked to take off his t-shirt. Michelle said that she
just kept quiet while accused-appellant tried to talk to her. However, according to
Tancinco, Michelle confirmed to him that accused-appellant was the man who had
attacked her, identifying him through a rough projection, or a keloid, on the back
of his neck and his voice. At the time of his arrest, Accused-appellant had a short
haircut. He was transferred to the Bacolod police station for further investigation.
11 Allan Aguillon took a picture of accused-appellant (Exh. F) at the Pontevedra
police station. 12
At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega,
and Mark Esmeralda were asked whether accused-appellant was the same person
they saw on the night of the incident. They were taken one by one to the jail cell
and asked to point to the person that they had seen that night. They picked
accused-appellant out of four people who were inside the jail cell. 13
Michelle Darunday executed an affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, identifying
accused-appellant as the person who had robbed and raped her. 14 She testified
that she and her friends had gone to the Coffee Break Corner sometime in
September or October 1996. On the way home, she was approached by Accused-
Appellant. He asked Michelle what her name was, and she gave it to him, albeit
reluctantly. She usually passed by the said café when going home and accused-
appellant would often whistle at her and call her a beautiful girl. Michelle had
simply ignored him and gone on her way. 15
Dr. Joy Ann C. Jocson, Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Department,
examined Michelle Darunday and made the following findings and
remarks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Abrasions noted on the right and left Labia Minora and on the posterior
fourchette.
2. New Lacerations noted on the hymenal ring on the following location 1 o’clock
position, 3 o’clock position, and 9 o’clock position.
3. Vaginal introitus admits 2 fingers but with pain.
4. Presently, patient with menstruation.
In my opinion, the patient would need a urinalysis (since she complains of pain
upon urination) and possible Medical treatment if necessary, for about 7 to 10
days. And if necessary, psychiatric evaluation & management is also
recommended. 16
Testifying in court, Dr. Jocson said there was penetration of the victim’s vagina as
shown by the fact that the hymenal rim had lacerations at the 1, 3, and 9 o’clock
positions. Since the edges of the lacerations were sharp, she concluded that
these lacerations were less than a week old at the time of the examination.
According to Dr. Jocson, these were caused by abrasions due to force or pressure
applied on the vaginal area. When asked during cross-examination whether the
victim had abrasions or contusions on her body at the time of her examination,
Dr. Jocson said that she could not remember. She could not remember either
whether there was sperm in the victim’s vagina when she examined the latter.
She said that no sperm specimen had been taken from the victim. She testified
that it could not be determined how many times the victim had previously
engaged in sexual intercourse because this would depend on the elasticity of the
victim’s hymen. She opined, however, that it would be less than 10 times in the
case of the victim. Dr. Jocson stated it was possible the victim agreed to have
sexual intercourse voluntarily based on the lack of marks of violence on the
latter, although it was also possible that she was merely forced to have sex
because she was threatened. On re-direct examination, she stated it was possible
that seminal fluid was not found on the victim’s private parts because the victim
was having her monthly period. She said the lacerations on the victim’s vagina
would result whether the sexual intercourse was voluntary or involuntary on the
part of the victim. 17
Leo Asan, an employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod, testified that the
medical certificate presented by the prosecution, which was undated, was a
faithful reproduction of what was written by Dr. Joy Ann Jocson on January 3,
1997 in the logbook. 18
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo
Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, Accused-appellant Anthony Escordial,
Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave a different account of
the events that led to the arrest of Accused-Appellant. Their version is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accused-appellant testified that he was employed by Fidel Hinolan on January 21,
1996. He said he started on August 6, 1996 as a dishwasher and was later made
cashier. Accused-appellant said that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental on December 24, 1996, arriving there at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.
Hinolan paid him P500.00, which he gave to his mother as his Christmas gift. He
dropped by the house of Aaron Lavilla. At 5:30 p.m., he returned to Coffee Break
Corner in Bacolod City.
In the evening of December 26, 1996, Accused-appellant asked permission from
Hinolan to go home to Pontevedra to stay there until January 1997 as the
restaurant would be closed anyway during this period. Hinolan gave accused-
appellant his permission and paid the latter his salary of P600.00 as well as a
P200.00 bonus. Hence, at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of December 27, 1996,
Accused-appellant took the bus home, arriving in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental an hour later. He went straight home to his mother and gave
her P600.00, telling her to use P400.00 for New Year’s Day. 19
Accused-appellant also saw Elias 20 Sombito, who told him to look for Aaron
Lavilla because a cockfight derby was being held that day in their barangay.
Accused-appellant, therefore, looked for Aaron Lavilla and found him at the
basketball court. Aaron’s mother asked accused-appellant to help her bring to the
cockpit some cases of beer which she planned to sell there. Accused-appellant
obliged.
At the cockpit, Elias Sombito asked him to take care of his cocks. Accused-
appellant asked Aaron Lavilla to go with him to the cockpit, but the latter
continued playing basketball and only proceeded to the cockpit after the game
was finished. The derby ended at around 9 o’clock in the evening.
At about 10 o’clock that night, Accused-appellant and Aaron Lavilla went to the
latter’s house and slept there. The following day, December 28, 1996, Accused-
appellant helped Aaron Lavilla’s mother with the household chores, cutting the
grass and feeding the cocks. He stayed in Barangay Miranda until January 3,
1997. 21 Accused-appellant’s testimony as to his whereabouts from December
27, 1996 to January 3, 1997 was corroborated by Elias Sombito 22 and Aaron
Lavilla. 23
As to the circumstances of accused-appellant’s arrest, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino and
Ricardo Villaspen testified that at around 11 o’clock in the morning of January 3,
1997, three members of the Bacolod police, led by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, went to
the headquarters of the Pontevedra police to ask for help in locating a person
named Anthony Escordial, said to be a resident of Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental, who was wanted in connection with a case for robbery with
rape. Although Tancinco and his companions showed their mission order to
Gemarino, they did not show a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest.
Nonetheless, Gemarino told PO2 Gella of the Pontevedra police and Ricardo
Villaspen, the tanod commander of Barangay Miranda, to help the Bacolod
policemen look for Accused-Appellant. The group left the police station, although
Tancinco’s other companions, Michelle Darunday and Pacita Aguillon, stayed in
the headquarters. 24
The arresting party, composed of Tancinco, PO2 Gella, and Villaspen, proceeded
to the house of accused-appellant in Barangay Miranda, but the latter was not
there. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court watching a game.
After informing him that he was a suspect in a robbery case, the group invited
accused-appellant to go with them to the police headquarters.
Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of Barangay Miranda, was at the police
station. He testified that when accused-appellant, together with Tancinco and his
companions, arrived at the police station, he (Nestor Dojillo) followed them to the
investigating room. Inside the room were Michelle Darunday, three members of
the Bacolod police, Villaspen, and Gemarino. Gemarino asked Michelle if she
could identify accused-appellant as her attacker, but the latter said that she could
do so only if she could see a lump on his back. Gemarino told accused-appellant
to take off his t-shirt. When accused-appellant did as Gemarino ordered, Michelle
looked at his back for identifying marks, while Allan Aguillon took his photograph.
Gemarino then asked Michelle whether accused-appellant was her attacker, but
she replied that she was not sure because the attacker was wearing a mask when
she was raped. The Bacolod policemen requested Gemarino to allow them to
bring accused-appellant to Bacolod City as they still had some witnesses who
could identify the suspect there. Accused-appellant was allowed to go with them
after Dojillo and Gemarino asked the Bacolod policemen not to harm him. 25
Dojillo’s testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of PO2 Rodolfo
Gemarino, 26 Ricardo Villaspen, 27 and Accused-Appellant. 28
Accused-appellant further testified that on the way to Bacolod City, PO3 Tancinco
began beating him and hitting him with the butt of a shotgun to force him to
admit liability for the crime. Because accused-appellant refused to do so, he was
taken by Tancinco and his companions to a lodging house where he was
subjected to torture. Accused-appellant was told to take off his clothes and to lie
down. PO3 Tancinco and his companions then proceeded to hit him with a belt.
Afterwards, they covered his mouth and took him to the bathroom. Tancinco put
a knife to his neck, telling him that he would be killed if he refused to admit that
he was the culprit. As he continued to deny liability for the crime, Accused-
appellant was subjected to further torture. Later on, the driver entered the room
and brought with him a child, whose head was covered, who was instructed to
identify Accused-Appellant. The child, however, did not react upon seeing
accused-appellant, who was thus brought back to the headquarters where he was
again maltreated. Accused-appellant said that he was left alone in his cell and
tied to a chair. He also said that at around 8 o’clock that evening, two of the
complainants arrived and the police told them to identify accused-appellant as
their attacker. But these two complainants just kept looking at accused-appellant
and even asked the policemen if he was the suspect.
After the two women had left, PO3 Tancinco took accused-appellant to a house so
that he could be identified by another complainant. But this complainant likewise
said that he was not the assailant, as the latter had a heavier build and longer
hair. Accused-appellant was returned to the police headquarters.
At the headquarters, PO3 Tancinco talked to accused-appellant and told him that
he would help him if accused-appellant confessed to the crime. But accused-
appellant again refused because he said he had not done anything wrong. The
police then began beating him up again. PO3 Tancinco burnt accused-appellant’s
lips and tongue with a lighted cigarette. 29
At around 12:00 noon of January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen,
together with accused-appellant’s grandfather, a certain Inspector Tamayo, and
reporters from Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod police station to visit Accused-
Appellant. They found him tied to a chair. When they entered the cell, Accused-
appellant, thinking that they were members of the Bacolod police, held up his
hands and asked for pity. The visitors assured accused-appellant that they would
not hurt him. Accused-appellant had a limp because his feet were injured. For
this reason, Dojillo and his companions asked the Bacolod police to let them take
accused-appellant to the hospital for treatment. Accused-appellant was thus
brought to the provincial hospital in Bacolod for x-ray and medical treatment. He
was taken back to the police station thereafter. 30
Lucita Jocame, Records Officer of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial
Regional Hospital (CLMMH), identified in court 31 the medical certificate (Exh. 12)
issued by the said hospital, showing the injuries sustained by accused-appellant,
to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
# 5 CM LINEAR ABRASION WITH CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 1 CM LINEAR ABRASION RIGHT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 4 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT LATERAL CHEST LEVEL OF T12.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT LEG ANTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 4 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT KNEE LATERAL ASPECT.
# 3 x 3 CM SWELLING AND TENDER LEFT ANKLE.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA D/3 RIGHT LEG POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT THIGH POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT PERI AURICULAR AREA.
X-RAY # 280 dated January 6, 1997: SKULL APL: CHEST BUCKY RIGHT THIGH:
APL: RIGHT AND LEFT FOOT APO.
"No Radiographic evidence of fracture in this examination." 32
The last witness presented by the defense was Jerome 33 Jayme, General
Manager of Royal Express Transport, Inc., who testified that the last bus trip from
Kabankalan to Bacolod on December 27, 1996 left at 6 o’clock in the evening.
The trip from Kabankalan to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental
would take one hour. On cross-examination, Jayme stated that the said bus
would reach Bacolod City by 7:40 to 8:00 p.m. if it left Kabankalan at 6:00 p.m.
His company’s buses were not allowed to pick up passengers along the way to
Bacolod City because of the incidence of highway robbery. Jayme identified in
court a certification (Exh. 12-a) he issued which stated that the last bus trip of
their company on December 27, 1996 was at 6:00 p.m. 34
On February 26, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, it is the well-considered view of this court, after a thorough,
painstaking and exhaustive review and examination of the evidence adduced in
this case, that the accused ANTHONY ESCORDIAL y GALES, is GUILTY, beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, punished under Art. 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The commission of the
crime was attended by three aggravating circumstances of nighttime, that the
crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and that craft, fraud
and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under
paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
mitigating circumstance. Applying Article 63, paragraph 1, the accused is hereby
sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH.
He is also condemned to pay private complainant the sum of P3,650.00,
representing the money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED. 35
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
 6. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED
THE ASSAILANT BY FACE THAT VERY EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996 AMIDST
TO THE EFFECT THAT ANTHONY ESCORDIAL CAN NEVER BE THE ROBBER-RAPIST
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DOING THE SAME, GIVEN THE DISTANCE, THE
WHO RAVISHED MICHELLE DARUNDAY ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT OF DECEMBER
INTENSITY OF LIGHT, AND THE TERRIFYING SITUATION, WHICH ALL OBSCURE,
27, 1996, AS THE FORMER (ESCORDIAL) DID NOT HAVE THE QUALITIES,
IF NOT DESTROY, THE CLARITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND PERCEPTION.
CHARACTER AND EXPERTISE OF THE LATTER (ROBBER-RAPIST).

7. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENSE FAILED TO

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE
SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED TO GO TO BACOLOD THAT EVENING OF
ASSAILANT AS DESCRIBED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES FIT
DECEMBER 27, 1996, DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, BY
WITH THAT OF HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THERE
SIMPLY RELYING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED TAKING A CARGO
WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT EVER MADE BY ANYBODY PRIOR TO
TRUCK FROM PONTEVEDRA TO BACOLOD.
THE "WARRANTLESS ARREST" OF THE ACCUSED. THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES WERE IN FACT DRAFTED, EXECUTED AND
SIGNED ONLY SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE ACCUSED WAS BROUGHT INTO THE
8. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ANTHONY
CUSTODY OF THE BACOLOD POLICE.
ESCORDIAL HAD MOTIVE TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON A
WRONG PREMISE THAT THE DEFENSE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT REFUTE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO BE
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF
ACQUAINTED WITH THE COMPLAINANT AND WHISTLED AT THE LATTER SEVERAL
WITNESSES PO2 RODOLFO GEMARINO (DEP. CHIEF OF POLICE OF
TIMES. 36
PONTEVEDRA), BRGY. CAPT. NESTOR DOJILLO (BRGY. CAPT. OF MIRANDA AND
THEN MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PONTEVEDRA), AND RICARDO
VILLASPEN (THEN COMMANDER OF BARANGAY TANOD IN PONTEVEDRA) TO THE
The issues raised by accused-appellant concern (1) the alleged violations of his
EFFECT THAT MICHELLE DARUNDAY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED DURING
constitutional rights and the consequent admissibility of the evidence against him
THEIR ENCOUNTER IN PONTEVEDRA POLICE STATION.
and (2) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

4. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCES, TESTIMONIAL

I. Alleged Violations of Accused-Appellant’s Constitutional Rights
AND DOCUMENTARY, OBTAINED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE LATTER’S SUBJECTION TO
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT LETTING HIM KNOW OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE. A. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant.
Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had arrested
accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a judge. 37 Art. III, §2 of the
Constitution states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES
WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED IN A POLICE LINE UP
DESPITE THE FACT THAT OF THE PERSONS BEING LINED UP ONLY THE ACCUSED
WAS HANDCUFFED. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
To implement this provision, Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule.
At the time of his arrest, Accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball
court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. He was not
committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the police
on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even
without a warrant.
The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them
to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase
"personal knowledge" in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means "an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officer making the arrest. 38
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, Accused-
appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of
the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was
committed, they could not have "personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances of the commission of the crime" so as to be justified in the belief
that accused-appellant was guilty of the crime. The arresting officers had no
reason for not securing a warrant.
However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged against him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997 without
questioning his warrantless arrest. 39 He thus waived objection to the legality of
his arrest. 40 As this Court has held in another case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
[The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest,
considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when
they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the
arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render
subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused. 41
B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides
that" [a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He contends that he
was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to
remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he
contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him
during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant’s rights under this
provision.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the
police obtained any statement from him — whether inculpatory or exculpatory —
which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had
given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement.
In fact, Accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to
physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was
charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-
appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him.
C. Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by
counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the
time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued
detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accused-appellant made no
statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the
admissibility of the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant by the
prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa
Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-
up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. 42
However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having
been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a
certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under
custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by
the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from
a group of persons gathered for that purpose. 43 During custodial investigation,
these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of
the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well
settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." 44 We
have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. 45
Here, Accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunday in a show-up on
January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been
made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-
of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently,
the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have
been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup ‘come at by
exploitation of [the primary] illegality." ‘ 46
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these
witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions
regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the
Rules on Evidence, Accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right
to object to the admissibility of these testimonies. 47
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not
render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the
"fruits of the poisonous tree." 48 This in-court identification was what formed the
basis of the trial court’s conviction of Accused-Appellant. As it was not derived or
drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof,
49 it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such
prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt
is another matter altogether.
II. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellant contends that: (1) he does not possess the character,
qualities, and expertise of the assailant who robbed and raped Michelle
Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver; (2) the records are bereft of
any description of the assailant made by these prosecution witnesses prior to his
arrest as the affidavits of Darunday, Blanca, Joniega, and Esmeralda were
executed only after his arrest; (3) the testimonies of the defense witnesses,
namely, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Barangay Captain Nestor Dojillo, and Ricardo
Villaspen, show that Michelle Darunday failed to identify accused-appellant when
the latter was presented to her at the Pontevedra police station; (4) Tancinco’s
testimony that Michelle Darunday properly identified accused-appellant at the
Pontevedra police station could not be believed as the said witness had motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant; (4) the identification of accused-
appellant at the Bacolod police station was tainted because only accused-
appellant was handcuffed among the persons presented to the prosecution
witnesses; and (5) it was highly improbable for the prosecution witnesses to
identify the assailant by face considering the distance, the intensity of light, and
the circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime.
A. Jason Joniega 50 and Mark Esmeralda 51 pointed to accused-appellant as the
man they saw on the night of December 27, 1996 and the person they identified
inside a jail cell at the Bacolod police station. Erma Blanca, on the other hand,
testified that she saw through her blindfold accused-appellant raping Michelle
Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in court as their assailant and as the
man whom she saw inside the jail cell at the Bacolod police station. 52 Ma.
Teresa Gellaver 53 and Michelle Darunday 54 identified accused-appellant as the
suspect brought before them at the Bacolod police station and the Pontevedra
police station, respectively.
The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon
observations of the suspect other than the line-up identification. 55 As held in
United States v. Wade: 56
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that
quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 488, 9 L ed 2d 441, 455, 83 S
Ct 407," ‘[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.’ Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)." See also Hoffa v. United
States, 385 US 293, 309, 17 L ed 2d 374, 386, 87 S Ct 408. Application of this
test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for example,
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any
pre-line-up description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification
prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant
prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also
relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are
disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet the
test as laid down in that case.
1. Michelle Darunday testified that her assailant’s face was covered with cloth
when he entered the room and that she was blindfolded when she was raped. 57
She could thus only see the assailant’s eyes, which Michelle described as chinito
(chinky), 58 although she testified that she could also identify his voice. 59
Otherwise, Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she
immediately recognized accused-appellant as the assailant when she saw him at
the Pontevedra police station. Michelle stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We waited for a while because they will find the suspect and I was there in the
room of the police sitting.
Madam Witness, a few days thereafter, can you recall any development of your
case?

x x x

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That was in January 3, when somebody told us to identify a suspect in the City PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Hall of Pontevedra.

So, you stayed behind and the policemen pick up the suspect?
PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Who was with you when you went to Pontevedra?

I and my aunt waited in the police of the policemen, and then later the suspect
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library arrived.

My aunt and my uncle and the police investigators. PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x When that suspect arrived inside the room where you were, can you tell us what
was the reaction of the suspect?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When the suspect arrived, at first, he was not able to see me because I was
Upon arrival at Pontevedra, what happened?
behind the desk after the door, and then he was so fresh saying that he was a
good man, but when he saw me he blushed and moving his head asking, "Ano
ang sala ko sa imo? (What did I do to you?), I did not do anything." But when I
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library looked at his eyes and heard his voice, I was sure that he was the man.
PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When that person said, what did I do to you, I did not do anything, what was
[your] reaction?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I just looked at him and he was so fresh that he has not done anything, but the
policeman said that his case is rape. Then, he was asked to take off his t-shirt
and I just looked at him and then later, the policeman asked to borrow the man
for investigation and while the policeman was recording, that suspect approached
me and told me that, "You do not know me.", and asked, "Do you know me?"
PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What was your reaction?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I just [kept] quiet but my aunt reacted by saying, "You think you cannot be
identified because you covered yourself?"
PROS. CARDINAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
And then what did he answer?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
He just stand outside while we went ahead to go back to our home. 60
A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of
accused-appellant by Michelle Darunday, has been held to be an underhanded
mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generat[ing) confidence
where there was none, activat[ing] visual imagination, and, all told, subvert[ing]
their reliability as [an eyewitness]." 61 In these cases, Michelle knew that she
was going to identify a suspect when she went to Pontevedra. Upon seeing
accused-appellant escorted by Tancinco and his colleagues in the Bacolod police,
she knew that he was the suspect she was supposed to identify. When accused-
appellant was thus shown to her, there could be no doubt as to what was
expected of her. Further aggravating the situation were the reply of the
policeman to accused-appellant’s protestations of innocence that he was being
held for rape and Michelle’s aunt’s obvious assumption of his guilt. Michelle’s
immediate conclusion, therefore, that accused-appellant was her attacker was
understandable. As has been explained:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Social psychological influences. Various social psychological factors also increase
the danger of suggestibility in a lineup confrontation. Witnesses, like other
people, are motivated by a desire to be correct and to avoid looking foolish. By
arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that they have caught
the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot
identify anyone and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty.
Moreover, the need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim
of a crime to find a likely target for feelings of hostility.
Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around them. This
desire to conform produces an increased need to identify someone in order to
show the police that they, too, feel that the criminal is in the lineup, and makes
the witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or other
witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime . . . 62
Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the apparent
suggestiveness of the show-up places in doubt her credibility concerning the
identity of Accused-Appellant. The possibility that her identification of accused-
appellant was merely planted in her mind both by the circumstances surrounding
the show-up and her concomitant determination to seek justice cannot be
disregarded by this Court.
Michelle’s identification of accused-appellant is further rendered dubious by the
disparity between her description of her attacker and the appearance of Accused-
Appellant. In her affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, Michelle described her attacker
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
P Sadtong tinion nga ginahimoslan ikaw sining suspetsado nakita mo bala ang iya
hitsura? (At the time that you were abused by the suspect, did you see what he
looked like?)
S Wala, kay tungod nga may tabon ang akon mata, apang matandaan ko guid
ang iya tingog, mata, ang iya malaka nga biguti, ang structure sang iya lawas,
ang supat sang iya kamot, ang iya bibig, ang madamo nga "kelloid" sa iya lawas
kag ang iya baho. (No, because I was blindfolded but I can remember his voice,
his eyes, his thin mustache, his body structure, the smoothness of his hands, his
mouth, and the numerous keloids on his body, and his smell.) 63
Michelle’s affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on the back of her
assailant when the latter was raping her. But, when she testified in court,
Michelle admitted that she did not see keloids on accused-appellant although she
said that his skin was rough. 64 This is corroborated by the testimony of PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino who said that he did not see any lump on the back of accused-
appellant when he tried to look for it. 65 In fact, it would appear that accused-
appellant had no such markings on his back but had only small patches which
could not even be readily seen. 66
In dismissing the disparity between accused-appellant’s appearance and
Michelle’s description of her attacker, the trial court dwelt on the apparent
roughness of accused-appellant’s skin and the probability that Michelle might
have felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her assailant. 67 However, mere
speculations and probabilities cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable
doubt required by law to be established by the prosecution. 68 Michelle Darunday
was a civil engineer in the City Engineer’s Office in Bacolod City. Considering her
educational attainment and professional status, it is improbable that she was
mistaken as to what she felt on her attacker’s back at the time she was raped. A
mere protrusion on the back of the neck of the assailant could not possibly have
been mistaken for keloids.
Another circumstance casting doubt on the credibility of Michelle’s identification is
her lack of reaction upon seeing accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police
headquarters. Defense witnesses PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, 69 Ricardo Villaspen, 70
and Nestor Dojillo 71 testified that Michelle failed to see any identifying marks on
accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in pinpointing the latter as the
culprit. With Gemarino being a policeman, Villaspen a barangay tanod, and Dojillo
a barangay captain, these witnesses were all, in one form or another, connected
with law enforcement. The prosecution having failed to ascribe any ill motive on
the part of these defense witnesses, who are without doubt respectable members
of the community, their testimonies that Michelle showed no reaction in seeing
accused-appellant at the show-up in Pontevedra police station deserve greater
credence than the testimony of Tancinco that Michelle confirmed to him that
accused-appellant was her attacker. The defense evidence established that
Tancinco was an abusive policeman who had made up his mind as to accused-
appellant’s guilt and who had no compunction in doing whatever means
necessary, legal or illegal, to ensure his conviction. We note further that the
testimonies of these defense witnesses coincide with Michelle’s testimony that
she kept quiet when she saw accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station
on January 3, 1997. This being so, her reaction to the show-up at the Pontevedra
police station upon seeing accused-appellant, the man who supposedly raped her
twice in an ignominious manner, is contrary to human nature. 72 It may be that
she was filled with rage so that upon seeing accused-appellant she was unable to
show any emotion. But it is equally possible that, as defense witnesses Gemarino,
Villaspen, and Dojillo testified, Michelle did not immediately recognize accused-
appellant as her attacker and only pointed to him as her assailant upon
promptings by the police and her companions." [W]here the circumstances shown
to exist yield two (2) or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence, while the other or others may be compatible with the
finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction." 73
For the foregoing reasons, we find both the out-of-court and in-court
identification of Michelle Darunday to be insufficient to establish accused-
Third, the affidavit of Erma Blanca 77 was prepared on January 4, 1997, a day
appellant as the person who robbed and raped her and her companions on the
after the arrest of Accused-Appellant. This delay belies Erma’s claim that she saw
night of December 27, 1996.
the assailant through her blindfold on the night of the incident. For the normal
reaction of one who actually witnessed a crime and recognized the offender is to
reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity. 78 In these cases, the
2. Erma Blanca testified that she saw through her blindfold the assailant when he
crime took place on December 27, 1996, but Erma Blanca executed her affidavit
was raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in open court as
only on January 4, 1997, more than a week after the occurrence of the crime.
the person whom she saw that night. 74 Certain circumstances in these cases
Delay in reporting the crime or identifying the perpetrator thereof will not affect
lead us to believe, however, that Erma Blanca did not really see the assailant and
the credibility of the witness if it is sufficiently explained. 79 But here, no
that her testimony otherwise was a mere afterthought. These are:chanrob1es
explanation was given by the prosecution why Erma Blanca executed her affidavit
virtual 1aw library
one week after the crime took place and one day after accused-appellant’s arrest.
The most likely explanation for such lapse is that Erma Blanca was used merely
to corroborate what would otherwise have been a weak claim on the part of
First, the police blotter, dated December 28, 1996, 75 prepared by PO3 Nicolas Michelle Darunday. The same may be said of the testimonies of Jason Joniega
Tancinco, referred to an "unknown suspect" who allegedly entered the boarding and Mark Esmeralda.
house of Pacita Aguillon and robbed Ma. Teresa Gellaver and Michelle Darunday.
This casts doubt on Erma’s credibility because she testified that she had known
accused-appellant for a long time prior to December 27, 1996. During her
B. Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the cockpit in Barangay Miranda,
testimony, Erma claimed that accused-appellant approached her and Michelle
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 27, 1996 is corroborated by Aaron
sometime in September or October 1996 to ask for the name of the latter. In
Lavilla, 80 Elias Sombito, 81 and Nestor Dojillo. 82 Considering the
addition, Erma said she had seen accused-appellant whenever he passed by their
improbabilities and uncertainties surrounding the testimonies of the prosecution
boarding house or stayed in her Tiyo Anong’s store nearby. 76 It would thus
witnesses, the defense of alibi by accused-appellant deserves credence. 83
seem that Erma was familiar with Accused-Appellant. But, if she had actually
seen him on that night of the robbery, why did she not report this to the police
immediately? Being a victim herself, Erma had every motive to reveal the identity
To summarize, we find that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof
of the robber that same night the crime was committed. But she did not do so.
beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. The acquittal of accused-
We are therefore left with the conclusion that the police blotter referred to an
appellant is thus in order.
unknown suspect because the identity of the assailant had not been determined
at the time the crime was reported to the police.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City,
finding accused-appellant guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to
Second, Erma was not the one who accompanied the Bacolod police when the
death, is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on the ground
latter sought accused-appellant in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. PO3 Tancinco
of reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released unless
testified that he took Michelle Darunday along with his other companions when
there are other legal grounds for his continued detention.
they went to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental so that she could identify if the
suspect was the person who had raped her. But Michelle admitted that she did
not see the face of the assailant. Erma Blanca, who claimed she recognized
accused-appellant, was not taken along by the police to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. Why not? Why did they bring instead Michelle Darunday?
The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the
Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Piedad, et al. (G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002)
Accused Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma y
Ider were charged with Murder in an information, which reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping with another
person whose true identity and other personal circumstances of which has not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified with treachery and
evident premeditation and with grave abuse of superior strength, assault, attack
and employ personal violence upon the person of MATEO LACTAWAN Y
DAGUINOD by then and there hitting him with an empty bottle on the head,
ganging him up and mauling him, hitting him with a big stone on the head and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon hitting him on the right back portion of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said MATEO LACTAWAN Y DAGUINOD.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued
thereafter.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Luz Lactawan, widow of the victim Mateo Lactawan, testified that on April 10,
1996, at around 11 o’clock in the evening, she left her house at No. 2 Scout
Bayoran, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo, who had earlier
gone. As she was walking by the gate of the company compound where they
reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help because Mateo was being
mauled by a group of men. She rushed out of the compound and saw her
husband being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and five
others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced
Mateo in an effort to protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large stone,
measuring about a foot and a half, and struck Mateo’s head with it. Then, Lito
approached Mateo’s side and stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in
the face.
Fidel Piquero, who resides in the same company compound as the Laktawans,
corroborated Luz’s testimony. While eating at Aling Digna’s eatery, he saw Mateo
and Andrew Gaerlan come out of the compound and buy two bottles of beer at a
nearby store. They consumed their beer and were about to leave when Niel, for
no apparent reason, struck Mateo with a Tanduay Rhum bottle on the head.
Andrew hurled a plastic chair towards Niel, which caused the latter to scamper
away.
Shortly thereafter, Fidel saw Niel returning to the store with several companions.
Upon seeing the approaching group, Mateo and Andrew ran towards the
compound. Fidel also ran towards the company compound to ask for help. Later,
Fidel emerged from the compound followed by Luz. They saw Mateo leaning by
the compound gates and being beaten up by Niel’s group. Luz quickly came to
the succor of her husband and embraced him. Niel hit Mateo on the head with a
large stone. Fidel also saw Richard, Lito and Rodel Albuena at the scene of the
crime. Lito stabbed Mateo with a balisong. Richard, on the other hand, chased
and mauled Andrew.
Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because
of the injuries he sustained.
Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, chief of the Biological Science Branch of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory Service in Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, who
conducted the post-mortem examination of the body of Mateo, testified that the
stab wound inflicted on the deceased was 15 centimeters deep and that the
pressure applied on his head by means of a blunt object was enough to bring
about hemorrhage inside the skull. 2 The doctor further revealed that both
wounds were fatal. 3 Abrasions on the right ear and right shoulder were also
found. 4 No defense wounds were present. 5 Dr. Freyra concluded that the cause
Richard essentially corroborated Niel’s testimony. Richard left Niel to ask for help
of death was traumatic injury in the head and a stab wound at the back. 6
from the barangay hall. When Richard returned to the scene, he saw Niel
engaged in a fistfight with Fidel. Richard’s friends were also present. Lito broke
up the fight between Niel and Fidel.
SPO4 Lovino Acharon, SPO2 Diosdado Lagajino and two other members of the
mobile patrol division responded to the phone call from the East Avenue Medical
Center regarding the stabbing and mauling incident. They repaired to the crime
At the same time, a melee occurred on another street. After the fistfight, Richard
scene and apprehended Lito and a certain Luis Rodel. Richard and Niel,
and his friends left for home. Like the other accused in this case, Richard denied
meanwhile, were surrendered to the police station by their parents and the
any involvement in Mateo’s death.
barangay chairman of South Triangle.

Lito Garcia, on the other hand, averred that he went out to buy cigarettes and on
During the trial, PO3 Antonio Torrente identified a blood-stained concrete slab
his way home, he noticed several people running. A brawl was taking place along
which he had found at the scene of the crime, allegedly the one used to hit
Mother Ignacia Street. Lito saw Niel and Fidel exchange blows. Lito insisted that
Mateo’s head. On cross examination, however, Torrente admitted that the alleged
he does not know Mateo, nor the latter’s wife, Luz. He also denied any
blood stains were not submitted for forensic examination to confirm whether the
involvement in Mateo’s death.
stains were indeed human blood or not.

Wilson Palma and Bernard Rasol, by and large, corroborated Niel’s and Richard’s
Accused-appellants denied the charges against them and gave a different version
version of the incident. Rasol added that Luz was not present during the brawl.
of the incident.

The trial court rendered a decision 7 the dispositive portion of which

Niel Piedad averred that in the evening of April 10, 1996, he and Richard Palma
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
went to Mang Aga’s store to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rhum. They saw Mateo and
Andrew drinking at another store nearby. Niel and Richard were about to buy
their liquor from the store counter when Mateo cut their path and got ahead to
the counter to buy beer for himself. When Niel finally got the bottle of Tanduay WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Niel Piedad and Lito Garcia guilty beyond
Rhum that he bought, Mateo grabbed it from him. Niel took the bottle back and reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying circumstances
pushed Mateo. Apparently provoked, Mateo got hold of his bottle of beer and was present, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
about to hit Niel with it, but the latter hit Mateo on the head first with the bottle perpetua pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused Niel Piedad
of Tanduay Rhum. Andrew saw what happened and retaliated by picking up a and Lito Garcia are likewise held solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the
plastic chair and hitting Niel at the back. Niel and Richard dispersed and ran victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00.
towards their houses. Mateo and Andrew followed and threw bottles of beer at
Niel and Richard. A throwing exchange of bottles ensued. During this sequence of
events, a group of people suddenly appeared and joined in the fray. Niel was Accused Richard Palma is hereby acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
about to approach the group of people, when Fidel suddenly blocked his way. A
fistfight between the two followed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Hence, the instant appeal by Niel Piedad and Lito Garcia.
 ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT PIEDAD PARTICIPATED IN THE MELEE,
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
In his Brief, Accused-appellant Niel Piedad raised the following errors:chanrob1es
HIM GUILTY OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
virtual 1aw library
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TREACHERY OR OTHER QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES.

I.
For his part, Accused-appellant Lito Garcia raised the following errors:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library I.

A. ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANT PIEDAD DURING THE TRIAL WHEN IT WAS TAINTED BY A POINTEDLY
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
SUGGESTIVE AND FATALLY FLAWED PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION.
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

B. FAILING TO SUBJECT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED WITNESSES TO

II.
RIGID SCRUTINY AS MANDATED BY THE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN CASES WHERE THE WITNESSES HAVE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO THE
VICTIM.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
C. ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE AND RELYING ON THE ALLEGED MURDER PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED MATEO
WEAPON WHEN IT WAS NOT DULY AUTHENTICATED AND IN ANY EVENT HAS LACTAWAN.
LITTLE PROBATIVE VALUE; AND IN

III.
D. PLAINLY OVERLOOKING MATERIAL FACTS CRUCIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THE
CASE.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
II.
ESTABLISH, BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT MATEO LACTAWAN
WAS TREACHEROUSLY STABBED.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The appeals are devoid of merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Accused-appellants raise basically similar assignment of errors, which shall be
discussed jointly.
Accused-appellant Niel Piedad argues that the way that he was identified by
prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally flawed. Niel claims that he
should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a
"confrontation" with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the
police as suspects. He further claims that he was denied his right of counsel
during the most crucial stage of the police investigation — that is, his
identification as one of the assailants by eyewitnesses.
We do not agree.
The claim by the defense that Niel’s pre-trial identification was suggestive due to
the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed
out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. 8 Fidel, on the
other hand, knew Niel because they played basketball together. 9 Hence, the
witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where
arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused
were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether
they were the ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not
incriminate the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the
police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the
crime. 10
Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be
identified as the culprit of a crime. 11 What is important is that the prosecution
witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. 12 In this
regard, this Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Luz’s and Fidel’s
testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel positively, categorically and
unhesitatingly identified Niel as the one who struck Mateo on the head with a
stone, and Lito as the one who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting
traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateo’s death.
Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually
strive to remember the faces of the assailants, 13 this Court sees no reason how
a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her husband and who eventually
died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Luz
was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head,
hence, Luz could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the
attack. She was only a foot away from Niel before the latter hit Mateo on the
head. 14
Lito on the other hand was identified by both Luz 15 and Fidel 16 as the one who
was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from a bulb five (5)
meters away from the scene of the crime. 17 Experience dictates that precisely
because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes,
eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of the
criminals at any given time. 18 Hence, the proximity and attention afforded the
witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters
the credibility of identification of the Accused-Appellants.
Neither is the lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process of the
accused-appellants fatal.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would
then propound questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. 19 The
presence of counsel during such investigation is intended to prevent the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. 20 What is thus
sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence
with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. 21 In the case at bar,
however, Accused-appellants did not make any extrajudicial confession or
admission with regard to the crime charged. 22 While Niel and Lito may have
been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities,
much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Accused-
appellants were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Niel averred during
cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the
police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.
23
Likewise, Lito testified that he did not talk to any of the police officers nor sign
any written statement at the police station when he was invited. 24 Moreover,
the rights accorded an accused under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined, as was done in this case — presented to the
witnesses to be identified. Accused-appellants were not thus denied their right to
counsel.
On the issue of relationship, it has been held time and again that the close
relationship of a witness to the victim will not affect the former’s testimony. It is
basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not
necessarily mean that the former is biased. 25 On the contrary, it is more in
accord with human nature for a friend, not to mention the wife of a victim, to
have more interest in telling the truth, for they would naturally want the real
culprits brought to justice and meted their punishment, rather than prevaricate
and send an innocent man to rot in jail. Their relationship to the victim would
even lend credence to their testimonies as their natural interest in securing the
conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the
culprits; otherwise, the conviction of the innocent would thereby grant immunity
to the guilty. 26
The alleged inconsistencies by the prosecution witnesses do not impair the
credence given to their testimonies and do not change the fact that accused-
appellants were positively identified as the attackers of the deceased. It is
perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to
give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice
while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns
against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean
that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed. 27 As the Solicitor
General correctly observed: 28
To be sure, the testimonies may not be described as flawless, but the triviality of
such "inconsistencies" hardly affect either the substance or veracity and weight of
testimony which, just to the contrary, can serve to reinforce, rather than weaken
credibility. In any case, there is no valid reason shown to deny the trial court the
respect due it in the determination of credibility of witnesses. The fact remains
that the injuries that caused the death of Mateo were inflicted by appellant and
Lito Garcia. (Emphasis provided).
Niel Piedad likewise assails the admissibility of the alleged murder weapon for
lack of proper authentication. Lito Garcia for his part impugns the non-
presentation of the knife used in stabbing the deceased. 29
It must be conceded that the handling by the police of the concrete stone used
by Niel in hitting Mateo on the head leaves much to be desired. As aptly pointed
out by the defense counsel, no tags, no signature, or any kind of identification
containing the date and place where such evidence was found, was ever made on
the specimen retrieved as the murder weapon. 30 And while PO4 Antonio
Torrente did claim to have made a marking 31 on the stone, there is no evidence
on record which suggests that the stone presented in court bore the same
markings made by Torrente. Furthermore, while it is the prosecution’s contention
that the concrete stone was stained with blood, 32 the blood stain was never
brought for forensic examination to confirm whether or not the stain was of
human blood. In fine, an important piece of evidence like the concrete stone
herein should have been handled more properly by the authorities so as to
obviate any doubt as to its authenticity when it is finally presented as object
evidence in court.
Be that as it may, even on the assumption that the concrete slab proffered by the
prosecution was inadmissible and the knife allegedly used to stab the deceased
was never presented, it would not alter the finding of guilt of the accused-
appellants for the simple reason that the presentation of the instruments used in
the killing of the deceased is not indispensable in the prosecution of the accused.
33 The weapon used in the killing, after all, is not an element of the either the
crimes of homicide or murder. Verily, the non-presentation by the prosecution of
the items which the accused-appellants used in stoning and stabbing the victim is
not fatal considering that the accused has been positively identified. 34 The case
of People v. Bagcal 35 is in point:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough that the
prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and
that the accused committed it. Production of the weapon used in committing the
crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of that burden. It is not
vital to the cause of the prosecution, especially where other evidence is available
to support sufficiently the charges. . . .
Finally on the issue of treachery, Accused-appellant Niel Piedad claims that the
attack on the victim was made upon an impulse of the moment and was not the
product of deliberate intent; while Lito Garcia contends that treachery cannot be
appreciated inasmuch as the attack was preceded by a quarrel and heated
discussion.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
We are not persuaded.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make. 36 For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove: a) that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and b) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. 37
The essence of treachery is thus a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. 38
While it is true that the victim herein may have been warned of a possible danger
to his person, since the victim and his companion headed towards their residence
when they saw the group of accused-appellants coming back for them after an
earlier quarrel just minutes before, in treachery, what is decisive is that the
attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to
retaliate. 39
In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any chance of defending himself from the
accused-appellant’s concerted assault, even if he was forewarned of the attack.
Mateo was obviously overpowered and helpless when accused-appellants’ group
numbering around eight, ganged up and mauled him. Luz came to Mateo’s succor
by embracing him and pacifying his aggressors, but accused-appellants were
unrelenting. More importantly, Mateo could not have actually anticipated the
sudden landing of a large concrete stone on his head. The stone was thus
treacherously struck.
Neither could the victim have been aware that Lito came up beside him to stab
his back as persons were beating him from every direction. Lito’s act of stabbing
the victim with a knife, inflicting a 15-centimeter-deep wound shows deliberate
intent of using a particular means of attack. Considering the location of the
injuries sustained by the victim and the absence of defense wounds, Mateo
clearly had no chance to defend himself. In view of the foregoing, treachery was
correctly appreciated by the trial court.
In summation, the allegation of the defense that there were two mauling
incidents which happened on the night in question deserve little probative value
inasmuch as the same was unconvincing and self-serving. The denials of the
accused-appellants cannot overcome their positive identification by the principal
witnesses. It is well settled that between the positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused-appellants, the
former undisputedly deserve more credence and is, therefore, entitled to greater
evidentiary weight. 40
In any case, this Court sees no reason to depart from the well-entrenched
doctrine that findings of facts of the lower court are accorded due respect and
weight unless it has overlooked material and relevant points that would have led
it to rule otherwise. The time-honored rule is that the matter of assigning values
to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in
light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby
placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.
Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the
trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the
latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances
of significance in the case. 41 Accused-appellants failed to show that the trial
court overlooked or disregarded facts and circumstances deemed significant by
them in their assignment of errors.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellants of the
crime of murder.
The penalty for murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 42 The
lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending the crime.
In line with current jurisprudence 43 however, we further grant P50,000.00 as
moral damages to the heirs of the victim aside from the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity granted by the trial court. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. For this reason, moral
damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs’ emotional suffering. 44
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102,
finding accused-appellants Niel Piedad y Consolacion and Lito Garcia y Francisco,
guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
accused-appellants are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Mateo Lactawan y
Daguinod the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity
and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Magtoto vs. Manguera [63 SCRA 4 (1975)]
The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution, which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence,
and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession
obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense who
has not been informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel.1
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should
be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession
obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense,
who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible
in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in
evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and
even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date.
Accordingly, We hereby sustain the orders of the respondent Judges in G.R. No.
L-37201-022 and G.R. No. L-374243 declaring admissible the confessions of the
accused in said cases, and We hereby set aside the order of the respondent
Judge challenged in G.R. No. L-389294 which declared inadmissible the
confessions of the accused in said case, although they have not been informed of
their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions,
because they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution.
 personal opinion because if Congress had wanted Republic Act No. 1083 to grant
a detained person a right to counsel and to be informed of such right, it should
The reasons for these rulings are as follows:
have been so worded. Congress did not do so.

Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a
As originally worded, Senate Bill No. 50, which became Republic Act No. 1083,
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel
provided: "In every case the person detained shall be allowed, upon his request,
and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect,
to have the services of an attorney or counsel. In the period of amendment, the
means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible
phrase "have the services of" was changed to the present wording "communicate
in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed
and confer anytime with his." As the Solicitor General points out in his able
and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in
memorandum, apparently the purpose was to bring the provision in harmony
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the
with the provision of a complementary measure, Republic Act No. 857 (effective
New Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been
July 16, 1953), which provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not
informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of
such right," because, We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
SECTION 1. Any public officer who shall obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise prevent
an attorney entitled to practice in the courts of the Philippines from visiting and
conferring privately with a person arrested, at any hour of the day or, in urgent
The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
cases, of the night, said visit and conference being requested by the person
Code, which was added by Republic Act No. 1083 enacted in l954, which reads as
arrested or by another acting in his behalf, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform the detained
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
person of his "right" to counsel. They only allow him to request to be given
and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time
counsel. It is not for this Court to add a requirement and carry on where both
with his attorney or counsel.
Congress and the President stopped.

impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of

The history behind the new right granted to a detained person by Section 20,
such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained
Article IV of the New constitution to counsel and to be informed of said right
person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a
under pain of a confession taken in violation thereof being rendered inadmissible
request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with
in evidence, clearly shows the intention to give this constitutional guaranty not a
counsel at any time.
retroactive, but a prospective, effect so as to cover only confessions taken after
the effectivity of the New Constitution.

The remark of Senator Cuenco, when Republic Act No. 1083 was being discussed
in the Senate, that the bill which became Republic Act No. 1083 provides that the
To begin with, Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
detained person should be informed of his right to counsel, was only the personal
opinion of Senator Cuenco. We grant that he was, as We personally knew him to
be, a learned lawyer and senator. But his statement could reflect only his
Confession.—The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:
Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—An extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are universally
recognized as admissible in evidence against him, based on the presumption that
no one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were
true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an evidence of a
high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358).
followed in People vs. Nishishima. "Involuntary confessions are uniformly held
inadmissible as evidence — by some courts on the ground that a confession so
obtained is unreliable, and by some on the ground of humanitarian principles
which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness towards the accused in criminal
proceedings. ... ." (57 Phil. 26, 48, 51; 1932).4 * In the concurring opinion of
Justice Butte, he said: "Apart, from the fact that involuntary confessions will be
declared incompetent and are therefore utterly futile, it is high time to put a stop
to these (third degree) practices which are a blot on our Philippine civilization."
This rule was, however, changed by this court in 1953 in the case of People vs.
Delos Santos, et al., G.R. No. L-4880, citing the rule in Moncado vs. People's
Court, et al., 80 Phil 1, and followed in the case of People vs. Villanueva, et al.
(G.R. No. L-7472, January 31, 1956), to the effect that "a confession to be
repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by force or violence
or intimidation, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects the
confession when by force or violence, the accused is compelled against this will to
tell a falsehood, not when by such force and violence is compelled to tell the
truth." This ruling was followed in a number of cases.5

But the ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court et al., 80 Phil 1, which was the basis
The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible, must be voluntary.
of the leading case of People vs. Delos Santos, supra, was overruled in the case
And the first rule in this connection was that before the confession could be
of Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383, June 19, 1963), holding that evidence
admitted in evidence, the prosecution must first show to the satisfaction of the
illegally obtained is not admissible in evidence. So, We reverted to the original
Court that the same was freely and voluntarily made, as provided for in Section 4
rule. As stated by this Court, speaking thru Justice Teehankee in People vs. Urro
of Act 619 of the Philippine Commission (U.S. vs. Pascual, August 29, 1903, 2
(44 SCRA 473, April 27, 1972), "involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
Phil. 458). But with the repeal of said provision of law by the Administrative Code
force or intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by law which proscribes
in 1916, the burden of proof was changed. Now, a confession is admissible in
the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure a confession." "A coerced
evidence without previous proof of its voluntariness on the theory that it is
confession stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never
presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved (5 Moran, Comments on
existed." The defense need not prove that its contents are false. Thus, We turned
the Rules of Court, p. 264; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53, 57, citing U.S. vs.
full circle and returned to the rule originally established in the case of U.S. vs.
Zara, 42 Phil. 308; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People v. Singh, 45 Phil. 676;
Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 323 and People vs. Nishishima, 42 Phil. 26. (See also
People v. Pereto, 21 SCRA 1469).
People vs. Imperio, 44 SCRA 75).

And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial confession was
It must be noted that all these Philippine cases refer to coerced confessions,
made involuntarily, it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing
whether the coercion was physical, mental and/or emotional.
which never existed. It is incompetent as evidence and must be rejected. The
defense need not prove that its contents are false (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil.
329, 358; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 325, November, 1921). The same rule was
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided the following cases:
Massiah vs. United States (377 U.S. 201, 1964), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S.
478, 1964); and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966). In Miranda vs.
Arizona, it was held:têñ.£îhqwâ£
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected
to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural
safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege *[384 U.S. 479]* and
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored,
the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warning have been
given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make
statement. But unless and until such warning and waiver are demonstrated by
the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him. (Miranda vs. Arizona, supra, p. 478)[Emphasis Ours]
When invoked in this jurisdiction, however, the Miranda rule was rejected by this
Court. In the cases of People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450, February 6, 1971) and
People vs. Paras 56 SCRA 248, March 29, 1974), We rejected the rule that an
extrajudicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in
evidence. This Court in the Jose case(as in the Paras case), held:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The inadmissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by
Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Massiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (37 U.S. 478) and
Miranda vs .Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ... ." While
the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in
this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court in
U.S. vs. Beechman, 23 Phil 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in
the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), to
mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the
judgment. Implementing the said Constitutional provision, We have provided in
Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by
attorney at every state of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled
to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of
preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest(Rule 113,
Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered
to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached
hereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there
the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of
unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in
all the three above-cited cases. (People vs. Jose, supra, at page 472).
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on Section 20, Article IV
of the New Constitution was aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had
been rejected in the case of Jose. That is the reason why the Miranda-Escobedo
rule was expressly included as a new right granted to a detained person in the
present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution.
When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of this Section 20, Article IV
to the October 26, 1972 meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering
Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record that "we are adopting
here the rulings of US Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We
cannot agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro that
the Delegates did not know of the existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125
of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution, in Our considered opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted
therein to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under
pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be
given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist before its
incorporation in our New Constitution, as We held in the Jose and Paras cases,
supra.
The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the historical fact that the
constitutional and legal guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure
that the confession be voluntary, underwent a slow and tedious development.
The constitutional guarantee in question might indeed have come late in the
progress of the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had come under
Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. That is all that our duty and
power ordain Us to proclaim; We cannot properly do more.
Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to
counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in
this country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause
injustice to the People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where
confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution and in
accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel.
The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers
when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is
acquitted.
Even in the United States, the trend is now towards prospectivity. As noted in the
memorandum of the Solicitor General:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... That survey indicates that in the early decisions rejecting retroactivity, the
United States Supreme Court did not require "pure prospectivity;" the new
constitutional requirements there were applied to all cases still pending on direct
review at the time they were announced. (See Linkletter vs. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965) (on admissibility of illegally-seized evidence); Tehan vs. Shott, 382
U.S. 406 (1966) (on the self-incrimination rule of Griffin vs. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). But the Court began a new course with Johnson vs. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966). It departed from Linkletter and Tehan and came closer to "pure
prospectivity" by refusing to permit cases still pending on direct review to benefit
from the new in-custody interrogation requirements of Miranda vs. Arizona. As
Chief Justice Warren observed in Jenkins vs. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969),
"With Johnson we began increasing emphasis upon the point at which law
enforcement officials relied upon practices not yet prescribed." "More recently,"
he continued, "we have selected the point of initial reliance." That development
began with Stovall vs. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (on the line-up requirements
of United States vs. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert vs. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967). These new rulings were held applicable only in the immediate
cases "and all future cases which involve confrontation for identification purposes
conducted in the absence of counsel after the dates of Wade and Gilbert." The
fact that Wade and Gilbert were thus the only beneficiaries of the new rules was
described as an "unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional
adjudications not stand as mere dictum." In Jenkins vs. Delaware itself, the Court
held that the Miranda requirement did not apply to a re-trial after June 13, 1966
— the cut-off point set for the Miranda requirement by Johnson vs. New Jersey —
because Jenkins original trial had begun before the cut-off point.
Thus, the remarkable thing about this development in judge-made law is not that
it is given limited retroactive effort. That is to be expected in the case of judicial
decision as distinguished from legislation. The notable thing is that the limited
retroactivity given to judge-made law in the beginning by Linkletter vs. Walker
has been abandoned as the Supreme Court in Johnson vs. New Jersey and in
Jenkins vs. Delaware moved toward "pure prospectivity" (pp. 26-28)
(Respondents' memorandum, Feb. 16, 1974).
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:têñ.£îhqwâ£
Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same,
is not applicable to the present cases: First, because of the inclusion We have
arrived at that the constitutional provision in question has a prospective and not
a retrospective effect, based on the reasons We have given; second, because the
"penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to
substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically a
procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of
confessions and therefore cannot be included in the term "penal laws;"6 and
third, because constitutional provisions as a rule should be given a prospective
effect.7

Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel
and to be informed of such right under pain of any confession given by him in
violation thereof declared inadmissible in evidence, to be prospective, and that
confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible
in evidence against the accused, his fundamental right to prove that his
confession was involuntary still stands. Our present ruling does not in any way
diminish any of his rights before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions for writs of certiorari in G.R. Nos.
L-37201-02 and G.R. No. L-37424 are denied and that in G.R. No. L-38929 is
granted. As a consequence, all the confessions involved in said cases are hereby
declared admissible in evidence. No costs.