G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.—The power of eminent
domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to
LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate
private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.” In this case,
Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the
parameters for its exercise.

Same; Same; Essential requisites before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain.—Thus, the
following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1.
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Same; Same; In the case at bar, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance; RA 7160, the present Local Government Code which was already in
force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for the purpose.—
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not
in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which
had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA
7160, the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.

Same; Same; A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.—We are not convinced by petitioner’s
insistence that the terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently—a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.

Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a
mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.—Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule
which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and
cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the
discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article
32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of
the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

Remedial Law; Action; Motion; In a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself.—It is hornbook doctrine that “x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is:
admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint?”

Same; Res Judicata; All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case.—As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of res
judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation
case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over it.

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Same; Same; The principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.—Be that as it may, the Court
holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like
police power, can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use.” “All separate
interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact
idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign
capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest
requires it.” Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous noncompliance with any legal requirement.

Same; Same; In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to
exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property
to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties.—While the principle of res judicata
does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues
decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground
that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the
State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently
exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same token, our ruling that
petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it
from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are
properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle
of “law of the case.” In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to
exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property
to be expropriated has become the law of the

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to
expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not
only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Leo Luis P. Mendoza for petitioner.

     Robiso & Reyes for respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of
private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly
and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the
sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res
judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal
requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

Statement of the Case

These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review on certiorari of the July 22,
1996 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA GR CV No. 48048, which affirmed in toto3 the Regional
Trial Court’s August 9, 1994

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 21-25.

2 Special Sixth Division, composed of J. Antonio M. Martinez (now an associate justice of the Supreme
Court), ponente and chairman; and JJ. Ricardo P. Galvez and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring.

3 See rollo, p. 25.

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

Resolution.4 The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as follows:

“The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such right
may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no
such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Parañaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief
Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action.

Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior judgment. On September 29,
1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice
on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became
final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the present action without violating the principle of [r]es
[j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of
res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The herein
defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the ‘Deed of
Assignment Exchange’ executed on June 13, 1990.

WHEREFORE, defendant’s motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The order dated February 4,
1994 is vacated and set aside.

This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”5

Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993,6 the Municipality of Parañaque
filed on Septem-

_______________

4 Penned by acting Presiding Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

5 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; rollo, p. 70.

6 Rollo, pp. 41-43.

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ber 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over
two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd- 17917), with a combined area of
about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed “for the purpose of alleviating
the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized
housing project.”8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,9 previously made an offer to enter into a
negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept.10

Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134,
issued an Order dated January 10, 1994,11 giving it due course. Acting on petitioner’s motion, said court
issued an Order dated February 4, 1994,12 authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value
based on its current tax declaration.

On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim,13 alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was
filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private
respondent’s mo-

_______________
7 Ibid., pp. 27-32.

8 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 1; rollo, p. 184.

9 Rollo, pp. 37-38.

10 Complaint, p. 3; rollo, p. 29.

11 Rollo, p. 45.

12 Ibid., p. 47.

13 Ibid., pp. 48-51.

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tion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss.14 On March 24, 1994,15 petitioner filed its
opposition, stressing that the trial court’s Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of
RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.

Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order
and dismissing the case. Petitioner’s motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the
trial court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1994.17 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court,
raising the following issues:
“1.Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a
substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.
2.Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action.
3.Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of procedure resulted in
technicality standing in the way of substantial justice.
4.Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case.”18
As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision. Respondent
Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997,19 denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

_______________

14 Private respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 197-198.

15 Rollo, pp. 66-68.

16 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

17 Ibid., pp. 71-72.

18 Ibid., pp. 78-79.

19 Ibid., p. 26.

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

Hence, this appeal.20

The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

“1.A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and
will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2.The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is
primarily involved.”21
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.

First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements of the law”22 because the terms
“ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.”23 Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article
36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: “If
the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU
may expropriate said property through a resolution of the

_______________

20 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 13, 1998, when the Court received private
respondent’s Memorandum.

21 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 187.

22 Ibid., p. 4; rollo, p. 188.

23 Ibid.
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Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.”24 (Italics supplied.)

The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.25 An LGU
may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and
subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.”26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent
domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

“Section 19. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property.” (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:

_______________

24 Paragraph A.
25 Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586, 592, February 20, 1997.

26 Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, 179-180, May 17, 1993, per
Quiason, J.

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

1.An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.
2.The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3.There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4.A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.27
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals28 to show that a
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU.29 This case, however, is
not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337,30 the previous Local Government Code,
which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast,
RA 7160,31 the present Local

_______________

27 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key To National
Development, 1993 ed., p. 110.
28 Supra.

29 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 189.

30 Approved on February 10, 1983 and published in 79 O.G. No. 7. See Moday vs. Court of Appeals,
supra, p. 593. Sec. 9 of BP 337 reads:

“SEC. 9. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings
for public use or purpose.

31 Effective January 1, 1992.

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Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly
required an ordinance for this purpose.

We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution
is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.32 An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently—a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.33

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have
simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that
the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, “[l]egislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.”34 In the instant case,
there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible,
absurd, or unjust.

_______________

32 Mascuñana vs. Provincial Board of Negros Occidental , 79 SCRA 399, 405, October 18, 1977; cited in
private respondent’s Memorandum, p. 5.

33 Article 107, pars. a and c, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160; cited in Pimentel, Jr.,
supra, pp. 163-164.

34 Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, 762, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.; citing
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private
right of the people.35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language—from “resolution”
under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160—demands a strict construction. “No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.”36
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160,
the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.37 It is axiomatic that the
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the
implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of
eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides that “territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.” It merely upholds
the law as worded in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its

_______________

35 City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 366 (1919), and Arriete vs. Director
of Public Works, 58 Phil. 507, 511 (1933). See also Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines; A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 348.

36 Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 59.

37 See Villa vs. Llanes, Jr., 120 SCRA 81, 84, January 21, 1983, and Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655,
676 (1947). See also Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.

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powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority
given and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated
to an LGU is in reality not eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by
the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.38 Indeed, “the national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.”39

Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action

In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an
ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all
the acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation.40

This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an
ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not
raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing.41
In any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner’s Complaint for expropriation
filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that

“x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted by the motion.

_______________

38 Bernas, supra, pp. 348-349.

39 Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 272-273, July 20, 1994, per Cruz, J.

40 Rollo, pp. 81-82.

41 See private respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 201-202.

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Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint?”42

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which
was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of
cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial
court’s Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.

Second Issue:Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals43 and the trial court,44 all the requisites for the application of
res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior
expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.

Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all
cases and proceedings,45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The
very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain
is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of

_______________

42 Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205, 210, July 15, 1991,
per Cruz, J.; citing The Heirs of Juliana Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217, 222, October 28, 1977.

43 Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 25.

44 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; rollo, p. 70.

45 Republic vs. Director of Lands, 99 SCRA 651, 657, September 11, 1980.
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property which the State might need for public use.”46 “All separate interests of individuals in property
are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to
individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government,
or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it.”47 Thus, the State or its authorized
agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance
with any legal requirement.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it
does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an
expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same
issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as
prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.48
By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain
through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of
reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of “law of the case.” In Republic vs. De Knecht,49 the
Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the
mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case
as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate
the same property, once all legal

_______________

46 Bernas, supra, p. 349.

47 Ibid.
48 See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577, March 11, 1996.

49 182 SCRA 142, 147-148, February 12, 1990.

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Re: Cases Left Undecided By Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, RTC, Branch 24, Manila

requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of
eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner’s proper exercise of its
power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Note.—Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government that
may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the
State. (Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 [1996])

——o0o—— Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 678, G.R. No. 127820
July 20, 1998