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An Alternative Reconceptualization of Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge

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Research Commentary

An Alternative Reconceptualization of
Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge

Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

After evaluating a proposal by Jon Star (2005) that mathematics educators recon-
ceptualize the construct of procedural knowledge, we offer an alternative reconcep-
tualization based on an extension and amalgamation of his and other conceptualiza-
tions of procedural knowledge and conceptual knowledge. We then propose some
implications for research suggested by our critique and our alternative perspective.
Key words: Algorithm; Conceptual knowledge; Flexibility; Procedural knowledge

In his November 2005 “Research Commentary” in this journal (“Recon-

ceptualizing Procedural Knowledge”), Jon Star makes a valuable scholarly contri-
bution by challenging mathematics educators to consider explicitly and carefully
the constructs of procedural knowledge and conceptual knowledge. The heart of
his argument, like that of de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler (1996), is that the popular
use of these terms confounds knowledge categories or types (e.g., procedural
knowledge) with knowledge properties or qualities, which can characterize any type
of knowledge (e.g., degree of connectedness).

STAR’S PROPOSAL FOR RECONCEPTUALIZING

PROCEDURAL AND CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

Star (2005) argues that each type of knowledge—procedural or conceptual—

can have either a superficial or a deep quality. He explains the premise for
proposing four distinct knowledge categories as follows (J. Star, personal commu-
nication, December 23, 2005):
In the absence of rich connections, knowledge is referred to as procedural by many
if not most mathematics educators. . . . The adjectives “conceptual” and “procedural”

Preparation of this manuscript was supported, in part, by grants from the Spencer
Foundation (2000400033: “Key Transitions in Preschoolers’ Number and
Arithmetic Development: The Psychological Foundations of Early Childhood
Mathematics Education), the Institute of Education Science (R305K050082:
“Developing an Intervention to Foster Early Number Sense and Skill”), and the
National Institutes of Health (R01-HD051538-01: “Computer-guided Com-
prehensive Mathematics Assessment for Young Children”). The opinions expressed
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position, policy,
or endorsement of the Spencer Foundation, the Institute of Education Science, or
the National Institutes of Health.
2 An Alternative Reconceptualization

are typically used to refer to the [number] of connections (knowledge quality . . .),
with “conceptual” meaning richly connected. The use of these terms to refer to a type
of knowledge . . . is largely lost. In common usage, procedural knowledge does not
mean knowledge of procedures, but instead it refers to knowledge that is not richly
connected.

In his 2005 commentary, Star concluded that equating procedural knowledge with
superficial, sparsely connected, or rote knowledge and conceptual knowledge with
deep, richly connected, and meaningful knowledge “makes it difficult to consider
(or even name) the knowledge that belongs in the deep procedural” or superficial
conceptual categories (p. 408). This confusion also makes it “difficult to speak of
the kind of knowledge that underlies flexible use of procedures” (J. Star, personal
communication, December 23, 2005). Star (2005) noted that flexibility, a key
“indicator of deep procedural knowledge,” is “often overlooked” in mathematics
education research and not “even accounted for in typical definitions of concep-
tual and procedural knowledge” (p. 409).
Like de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler (1996), Star (2005) argued that knowledge
type and quality should be treated as independent dimensions. To disentangle the
two, he proposed defining conceptual knowledge as “knowledge of concepts or
principles”—as knowledge that involves relations or connections (but not neces-
sarily rich ones). He defined procedural knowledge as “knowledge of proce-
dures” and deep procedural knowledge as involving “comprehension, flexibility,
and critical judgment and [as] distinct from (but possibly related to) knowledge
of concepts” (p. 408).

AN EVALUATION OF STAR’S PROPOSAL

Mathematics Education Researchers’ Views

If Hiebert and Lefevre’s (1986) initial definition of conceptual knowledge and
aspects of their characterization of procedural knowledge are considered in isola-
tion, then Star (2005) is correct in saying that they confound knowledge type and
quality. Hiebert and Lefevre defined the former “as knowledge that is rich in rela-
tionships” and that cannot exist as “an isolated piece of information” (pp. 3–4; see
also Gray & Tall, 1994; Hiebert & Wearne, 1986). In contrast to conceptual knowl-
edge, which is saturated with relationships of many kinds, Hiebert and Lefevre char-
acterized procedural knowledge as involving primarily sequential relations.
Subsequently, some mathematics educators, including the first author of this
commentary, have indeed been guilty of oversimplifying their claims and loosely
or inadvertently equating “knowledge memorized by rote . . . with computational
skill or procedural knowledge” (Baroody, 2003, p. 4).
Mathematics education researchers (MERs) usually define procedural knowl-
edge, however, in terms of knowledge type—as sequential or “step-by-step
[prescriptions for] how to complete tasks” (Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986, p. 6; see also
Haapasalo, 2003), as algorithms for implementing a process such as addition
Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson 3

(Davis, 1983; Gray & Tall, 1994; Hiebert & Lefevre; Nesher, 1986), as knowl-
edge-how (Skemp, 1987), or as knowing how along with knowing why (Baroody,
1998, 2003; Mason & Spence, 1999). More important, most MERs probably
attempt to distinguish between knowledge type and quality by viewing both
procedural and conceptual knowledge as a continuum from sparsely to richly
connected knowledge (Baroody, 2003; Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992; Hiebert &
Wearne, 1986; Moursund, 2002; Resnick & Ford, 1981). Hiebert and Lefevre, for
instance, do not limit procedural knowledge to knowledge without relations but
note, for example, that procedures are often embedded in (interconnected with)
other procedures (J. Hiebert, personal communication, August 24, 2006). MERs,
then, do not typically equate weakly connected knowledge with procedural
knowledge (personal communications: T. Carpenter, July 11, 2006; K. Fuson, July
24, 2006; J. Hiebert, July 12, 2006; L. Verschaffel, July 17, 2006). “There is
nothing inherent in procedural knowledge that would mean it [must] be ‘sparsely
connected . . . ,’ and most certainly there is much sparsely connected conceptual
knowledge that is NOT procedural” (D. Clements, personal communication,
July 12, 2006).
MERs have attempted to define and study both deep procedural knowledge and
superficial conceptual knowledge. They have long contrasted unconnected, disem-
bodied, meaningless, context-bound, or mechanical procedures (what could be called
a “weak scheme”) with well-connected, contextualized, integrated, meaningful,
general, or strategic procedural knowledge (what could be called a “strong scheme”;
see row A of Table 1). Analogously, well-connected conceptual knowledge has been
contrasted with sparsely connected conceptual knowledge (see row B of Table 1).
For instance, strong schemas—which involve generalizations broad in scope, high
standards of internal (logical) consistency, principle-driven comprehension, and
principled bases for a priori reasoning (i.e., predictions are derived logically)—have
been proposed to underlie deep conceptual knowledge. Weak schemas—which
entail generalizations local in scope, low standards of internal (logical) consistency,
precedent-driven comprehension, and no logical basis for a priori reasoning (i.e.,
predictions are looked up)—have been posited to underlie superficial conceptual
knowledge and to explain why younger children’s concepts may be less deep and
sophisticated (e.g., less general, logical, interconnected, or flexible) than older chil-
dren’s or adults’ (see row B of Table 1).
MERs have further offered constructs that apply to both procedural and concep-
tual knowledge and suggest that both superficial and deep forms of each share many
characteristics (see row C of Table 1). For example, both superficial conceptual and
procedural knowledge have been described as routine expertise (knowledge that
can be applied effectively to familiar, but not new, tasks), and both deep concep-
tual and procedural knowledge have been characterized as adaptive expertise
(meaningful knowledge that can be applied creatively, flexibly, and appropriately
to new, as well as familiar, tasks).
Consider children who memorize the names of different classes of two-dimen-
sional shapes (e.g., triangle, square, rectangle and circle) by rote. MERs who
4 An Alternative Reconceptualization

Table 1
Efforts to Define Types and Qualities (Continua) of Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge
Knowledge Knowledge quality
type Superficial Deep Reference
A. Procedural Surface-level rules Deeper-level rules Matz, 1980
only (superficial (serve to create or
step-by-step modify surface-
knowledge) level rules)
Task-performing Procedural “operations Davis, 1983
procedures that involve stepping
outside of the system”
(take place in a
planning space that
involves conceptual
knowledge)
Weak scheme Strong scheme Baroody, 2003;
(disembodied (integrated procedural Baroody & Ginsburg,
procedural knowledge) 1986; Brownell,
knowledge) 1935; Moursund,
2002; Paden, n.d.
B. Conceptual Weak schema Strong schema Baroody, Cibulsksis,
only Lai,& Li, 2004; Baroody
& Ginsburg, 1986;
Baroody, Wilkins, &
Tiilikainen, 2003;
Lunkenbein, 1985
Primary-level Reflective-level Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986
concept (less ab- concept (more
stract)—tied to a abstract)—tied
specific context to multiple contexts
C. Both proce- Drill theory Meaning theory Brownell, 1935
dural and Instrumental Relational Skemp, 1987
conceptual understanding understanding
(rules without
reason)
Procedural or Proceptual Gray & Tall, 1994
conceptual
Knowing about— Knowing to— Mason & Spence
includes knowing “active, practical (1999);
how, that, and knowledge that cf. Skemp, 1979
why nables people to
act creatively”
Routine expertise Adaptive expertise Hatano, 1988, 2003

narrowly interpret Hiebert and Lefevre (1986) might define such unconnected
knowledge as procedural (as knowledge of the surface features of mathematical
representations). Probably most, though, would define it as unconnected or sparsely
connected concepts—as van Hiele’s (1986) Level 1 (visualization). Consistent with
a weak schema, Level 1 thinkers use appearances and prototypical examples (a
precedent) to mechanically recognize, classify, and name shapes (Clements,
Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson 5

Swaminathan, Hannibal, & Sarama, 1999). For example, a o is a square and not a
rectangle “because it looks like a square, not like a rectangle.” In contrast, Level 2
understanding (informal deduction) entails the use of well-connected knowledge
(e.g., how the attributes of concepts are interrelated) to recognize that a square is
a special kind of rectangle.
In brief, although some MERs may exclusively equate sparsely connected knowl-
edge with procedural knowledge and richly connected knowledge with conceptual
knowledge, probably most do not. Nevertheless, Star’s (2005) point that mathe-
matics educators do not have an entirely uniform and clear-cut definition of proce-
dural and conceptual knowledge is valid.

Definitions of Conceptual and Procedural Knowledge

Star (2005) does not clearly disentangle knowledge type and quality. He cites
as an example of deep procedural knowledge vanLehn’s (1990) construct of “tele-
ological understanding of a procedure” (e.g., comprehension of a procedure’s
design or justification for its use). Knowledge about procedures, however, can be
either superficial (e.g., permit a recitation of the steps in order) or deep (e.g.,
empower a cogent explanation of how the steps are interrelated to achieve a goal).
Although conceptual knowledge is not necessary for the former, it is unclear how
substantially deep comprehension of a procedure can exist without understanding
its rationale (e.g., the conceptual basis for each of its steps). Mathematical proce-
dures are not developed in a vacuum. They are created to solve a problem, and their
steps are worked out according to mathematical principles and logic. Likewise,
deep conceptual knowledge depends on knowing the tools for applying and
extending mathematical ideas (Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001). Thus,
although an effort to separate quality and type of knowledge makes sense in
theory, psychologically speaking, deep procedural and conceptual knowledge
cannot be separated.
Star (2005) suggests defining concept as psychologists do, as an equivalence
class (Piaget, 1965; but cf. Davis, 1983). For example, learning the concept of
dog entails inducing the attributes common to all members of that class (Mix,
Sandhofer, & Baroody, 2005). As Star allows, however, such a definition implies
connected knowledge, although not necessarily rich connections. Although his
characterization of conceptual knowledge differs from that given initially by
Hiebert and Lefevre (1986), it does not differ from that of MERs who view
conceptual knowledge in terms of a continuum of connectedness—including
Hiebert himself (see, e.g., Baroody, 1992; Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992;
Lunkenbein, 1985; Resnick & Ford, 1981). Hiebert and Lefevre clearly imply that
conceptual knowledge grows as additional connections are made via assimilation
and integration. Hiebert and Wearne (1986) illustrate this point by noting that “the
conceptual network of place value grows as . . . related bits of knowledge . . . are
related to earlier ideas” (p. 200). Because knowledge quality is defined by the
number (and quality) of connections, completely disentangling knowledge quality
6 An Alternative Reconceptualization

and type would require defining conceptual knowledge in a way that excludes
implying connections.

Flexibility as an Indicator of Deep Procedural Knowledge

Star’s (2005) examples suggest that he equates flexibility with effective strategy
choice—strategically choosing the most efficient method from among several
procedures. But flexibility can also refer to creativity or transfer—adopting an extant
procedure to meet new task demands. Influenced by developmental psychologists
(e.g., Ilg & Ames, 1951; Siegler & Shrager, 1984; Svenson & Sjöberg, 1983), Gestalt
psychologists (e.g., Wertheimer, 1945/1959), and William Brownell (1935), MERs
have long been concerned about procedural flexibility in both forms and about their
developmental prerequisites (e.g., see reviews in Clements & Sarama, 2004; Davis,
1983; Fuson, 1992; Ginsburg, Klein, & Starkey, 1998; Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992;
Hiebert et al., 1997; Kilpatrick et al., 2001; Resnick & Ford, 1981). Citing Fuson,
Richards, and Briars (1982) and Steffe, von Glasersfeld, Richards, and Cobb
(1983), Gray and Tall (1994) observed, “Flexibility in arithmetic is a regular
feature in the literature” (p. 25). Their observation is no less true today (see, e.g.,
Ambrose, Baek, & Carpenter, 2003; Baroody, 1995, 1999; Blöte, Klein, &
Beishuizen, 2000; Blöte, Van der Burg, & Klein, 2001; Carpenter, Franke, Jacobs,
Fennema, & Empson, 1998; Fuson & Burghardt, 2003; Gray & Tall, 1994; Kornilaki
& Nunes, 2005; Peled & Segalis, 2005; Torbeyns, Verschaffel, & Ghesquiere,
2005). For example, the terms flexibility, strategy choice, multiple strategies, adap-
tive expertise, and transfer appear on pages 52, 19, 36, 60, and 17, respectively, of
Baroody and Dowker (2003).
MERs widely agree that “flexibility of approach is the major cognitive require-
ment for solving nonroutine problems” (Kilpatrick et al., 2001, p. 127), that proce-
dural fluency should entail flexible (as well as efficient and appropriate) applica-
tion of procedures, and that each of these critical components of mathematical
proficiency both benefits from and benefits conceptual understanding (see also, e.g.,
Carpenter et al., 1999; Davis, 1983; Gray & Tall, 1994; Ma, 1999; Romberg,
Carpenter, & Kwako, 2005). MERs have characterized the integration of procedural
and conceptual knowledge in various ways (see row C under the Deep column in
Table 1). The construct of adaptive expertise, for one, unites the notions of deep
conceptual knowledge, deep procedural knowledge, and flexibility (Baroody, 2003;
Fuson, 2004). As Hatano (2003) noted, quoting page 15 of an article he wrote in
1982:
I began by considering the following two questions: What kind of knowledge do flex-
ible and inventive experts construct? And how do they construct it? In other words, I
speculated about both the product of adaptive expertise and its acquisition process.
Regarding the former, my attention focused on the conceptual knowledge underlying
procedures. “Flexibility and adaptability seem to be possible only when there is some
corresponding conceptual knowledge to give meaning to each step of the skill and
provide criteria for selection among alternative possibilities for each step within the
procedures.” (p. xi)
Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson 7

Parenthetically, MERs have also considered what role other factors, such as beliefs,
play in flexible problem solving (see, e.g., McLeod, 1992; Schoenfeld, 1985,
1992). As an indicator of meaningful or deep procedural knowledge, MERs have,
for some time, considered adaptive expertise or the flexible application of proce-
dures to be critical in assessment (see, e.g., Baroody, 2003; Carpenter, 1986;
Haapasalo, 2003; Hatano, 1988, 2003; Kilpatrick et al., 2001).
Star (personal communication, December 23, 2005), however, does not consider
existing efforts to define deep procedural knowledge to be adequate:
Saying that flexible use of procedures [results from or is the byproduct of] the integration
of conceptual and procedural knowledge (e.g., adaptive expertise) has bypassed a core issue
about what procedural knowledge is, how it develops, and its role in the development of math-
ematical understanding. Procedural knowledge (or skill) is valuable in and of itself, not solely
because of its connections with and integration to conceptual knowledge.

As Figure 1 illustrates, Star (2005) proposes a model in which procedural and

conceptual knowledge are orthogonal, and in which deep, flexible procedural
knowledge can be achieved with or without conceptual knowledge. That is, it can
be achieved either with adaptive expertise (represented by cells A and, to some
extent, B1 and B2 in Figure 1) or without it (i.e., largely through connections with
nonconceptual knowledge, represented by cells B3 and B4 in Figure 1).
Existing evidence appears to support the conventional wisdom that, like proce-
dural comprehension, substantial procedural flexibility and critical judgment
require the integration of procedural knowledge with conceptual knowledge, not
merely numerous connections with other aspects of nonconceptual knowledge
(Carpenter, 1986; Carpenter, Levi, Franke, & Zeringue, 2005; Davis, 1983;
Hatano, 2003). Wertheimer’s (1945/1959) observations of children who could not
flexibly apply mechanically learned algorithms to even modestly novel problems
have been cited by MERs to illustrate the need for connecting procedural knowl-
edge with conceptual knowledge (Baroody, 2003; Resnick & Ford, 1981;
Schoenfeld, 1986; Steffe, 1992).
Consider the case of Felicia (Baroody, 1984). This 5-year-old typically solved
single-digit addend (basic) addition items by counting-all starting with the larger
addend (CAL; e.g., 3 + 5: “1, 2, 3, 4, 5; 6 [is one more], 7 [is two more], 8 [is three
more].” When presented with more difficult items, she flexibly switched to a new
and more economical counting-on from the larger addend (COL) strategy (e.g., 3
+ 25: “25; 26 [+1], 27 [+2], 28 [+3]) or COL-like procedure (e.g., 3 + 25: 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25; 26 [+1], 27 [+2], 28 [+3]). Yet her understanding and flexibility
appeared limited. Given basic items again, she switched back to the less advanced
and less efficient CAL procedure. Moreover, when asked to evaluate COL, she—
like children who have not yet invented that relatively abstract and advanced proce-
dure—claimed that it was incorrect (Baroody, Tiilikainen, & Tai, 2006). Months
apart, these results were replicated twice. Thus, it is possible for nonconceptual
factors, such as an effort to save cognitive labor, to play a role in flexibly inventing,
choosing, and using new procedures. As Carpenter (1986) suggested, however, such
factors probably play only a limited role.
8 An Alternative Reconceptualization

Richly
Connected A

Well
Connected B1
Conceptual Knowledge

Somewhat
Connected B2

Sparsely
Connected X B3

Not
Connected Z Y B4

Not Sparsely Somewhat Well Richly

Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected
Procedural Knowledge

= Procedural Knowledge = Conceptual Knowledge = Integration

A = Deep (interconnected Y = Procedural

or integrated) knowledge sparsely
procedural and interconnected with
conceptual knowledge other procedural
knowledge
B = Deep procedural
knowledge only Z = Isolated procedural
or conceptual
X = Procedural and knowledge
conceptual
knowledge sparsely
interconnected

Figure 1. The orthogonal relation between procedural and conceptual knowledge proposed
in Star’s (2005) reconceptualized framework

It makes sense to question the conventional wisdom that integration with concep-
tual understanding is the sole source of procedural flexibility. Hatano (2003), for
instance, may be overstating the case for integrated knowledge by claiming that
some corresponding conceptual knowledge of each step of an algorithm is neces-
sary for procedural adaptability. It is not accurate, however, to conclude that
mathematics educators have overlooked flexibility or its basis in their theorizing
or research.
Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson 9

AN ALTERNATIVE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF
PROCEDURAL AND CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

To stimulate further research on the relations among procedural knowledge,

conceptual knowledge, and flexibility, we offer an alternative to Star’s (2005)
reconceptualization effort (see Figure 2). Consistent with his recommendation to
define knowledge type independently of the degree of connectedness, we tenta-
tively propose a modification of de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler’s (1996) defini-
tions, defining procedural knowledge as mental “actions or manipulations” (p.
107), including rules, strategies, and algorithms, for completing a task, and
defining conceptual knowledge as “knowledge about facts, [generalizations],
and principles” (p. 107). Like Star’s model, but unlike de Jong and Ferguson-
Hessler’s, we—for the sake of simplicity—distinguish between only two types
of knowledge. What de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler call situational knowledge
(knowledge about problem situations or features that can provide a basis for repre-
senting a problem or seeking additional information) can be considered part of
the other knowledge needed for a relatively complete and accurate grasp of
procedural or conceptual knowledge (the horizontal axis in Figure 2). What they
call strategic knowledge (general problem-solving strategies) can be viewed as
procedural knowledge, if merely memorized by rote, or as the union of procedural
and conceptual knowledge about problem solving, if meaningful.

Interdependence of Deep Procedural and Deep Conceptual Knowledge

A major difference between our perspective and Star’s (2005) or de Jong and
Ferguson-Hessler’s (1996) proposal (as represented by cells B3 and B4 in Figure
1) is that, although (relatively) superficial procedural and conceptual knowledge
may exist (relatively) independently, (relatively) deep procedural knowledge cannot
not exist without (relatively) deep conceptual knowledge or vice versa (Baroody,
2003). The degree of connectedness or mutual dependence between conceptual and
procedural knowledge is represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 2.

Quality of Deep Procedural and Deep Conceptual Knowledge

Whereas Star (2005) seems to equate deep knowledge with richly connected
knowledge only, de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler (1996) propose that knowledge
quality can also include the level of structure (the degree of organization), abstract-
ness (the generality or breadth of application), and accuracy. The vertical axis in
Figure 2 depicts these other aspects of knowledge quality and other aspects of knowl-
edge completeness, including connections within a knowledge type or to everyday
situations and applications.
In our view, depth of understanding entails both the degree to which procedural
and conceptual knowledge are interconnected and the extent to which that knowl-
edge is otherwise complete, well structured, abstract, and accurate. In Figure 2,
the diagonal from Point α (no knowledge) to Point β (maximum knowledge of a
 10

Type of knowledge
p
Relatively complete = Procedural knowledge
(including rich
connections within c = Conceptual knowledge
knowledge type and β
A
with real world Diagonal αβ = depth of knowledge
situation/applications), α = No knowledge
well structured, abstract p c b = (Momentary) maximum deep
(general), and accurate knowledge
knowledge B
A = Extensive adaptive expertise—deep
C procedural and conceptual knowledge
(fully integrated strong schema and
p schemes)
B = Less extensive adaptive
expertise—relatively deep procedural
Other c
Aspects of
and conceptual knowledge (somewhat
D integrated, relatively strong schema
Knowledge
Quality p and schemes)
E C = Transition between relatively shallow
F and relatively deep procedural and
c conceptual knowledge
p
D = More routine than adaptive
c
expertise—relatively shallow
c procedural and conceptual knowledge
α p (relatively weak scheme and schemas)
No E = Routine expertise of (shallow)
Knowledge Not Sparsely Somewhat Well Richly conceptual knowledge (weak schema)
Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected
F = Routine expertise of (shallow)
Connectedness of Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge procedural knowledge (weak scheme)
An Alternative Reconceptualization

Figure 2. The mutually dependent relation between procedural and conceptual knowledge suggested by a model of adaptive expertise.
Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson 11

field until it expands) represents depth of understanding. Cell F represents super-

ficial procedural knowledge (an isolated weak scheme); Cell E, superficial
conceptual knowledge (an isolated weak schema)—a concept that is not under-
stood. Cell A represents deep knowledge (an integrated strong schema and
schemes). Cells D, C, and B represent progressively greater integration of proce-
dural and conceptual knowledge with one another and with other aspects of
knowledge (increasing adaptive expertise) and an increasingly well-structured,
abstract, and accurate web of knowledge.

Big Ideas and Understanding Concepts and Procedures

Big ideas, which are overarching concepts that connect multiple concepts,
procedures, or problems within or even across domains or topics (Baroody,
Cibulsksis, Lai, & Li, 2004), are integral to achieving a deep understanding of
both concepts and procedures. Big ideas serve a number of functions.
Provide a basis for understanding many concepts. For instance, the big idea of
equal partitioning, or its informal analogy of fair sharing, is at the heart of
comprehending the following concepts:
1. Unit principle. Unlike irrational numbers, any natural number can be expressed
as the sum of units (e.g., 5 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1), and any rational number can be
expressed as the sum of unit fractions (e.g., 3/5 = 1/5 + 1/5 + 1/5).
2. Even number. An even number of items can be shared fairly by exactly two
people.
3. Division. For example, an amount shared fairly among a certain number of people
yields a share of what size for each person?
4. Fraction. For example, 3/4 can be viewed as follows: Sharing three candy bars
among four people, what is the size of each person’s share?
5. Measurement. A continuous quantity such as length or area can be subdivided
into equal size parts (units), which can then be counted.
6. Mean. To find what a typical share size (score) would be if everyone had the
same size share, combine all shares (scores), and then divvy up the total fairly
among the number of people (number of scores).
Supply a rationale for various procedures. Big ideas can help children reinvent
and comprehend standard algorithms or invent their own relatively efficient
procedures. For instance, understanding division in terms of fair sharing can
enable children to reinvent the long division algorithm or to invent other relatively
efficient procedures to solve multidigit division problems (e.g., Ambrose et al.,
2003). Such adaptive expertise can provide the basis for creative transfer—to
everyday situations and to comprehending, discovering, or inventing more
advanced concepts or procedures (Ambrose et al.; Baroody, 2003).
Relate diverse concepts (and connected procedures) within and among domains,
and provide a basis for structuring or restructuring knowledge. The examples of
12 An Alternative Reconceptualization

equal partitioning previously discussed provide a connection among such diverse

topics as number theory, operations on whole numbers, rational numbers, measure-
ment, and statistics. Big ideas invite children to view mathematical knowledge as
cohesive or structured rather than as a series of isolated procedures, definitions, and
so forth. In particular, they invite students to look beyond surface features of proce-
dures and concepts and see diverse aspects of knowledge as having the same
underlying structure. In brief, big ideas seem integral to constructing well-connected,
well-structured, abstract, and accurate knowledge—deep understanding of concep-
tual and procedural knowledge.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Whether Star’s (2005) perspective illustrated in Figure 1 or our alternative

reconceptualization illustrated in Figure 2 is more accurate is an empirical ques-
tion. A logical implication of his perspective is that flexible use of procedures can
develop independently of conceptual knowledge, which would entail demon-
strating that appreciable strategy choice or transfer knowledge can be fostered
without, for example, understanding the rationale for the steps of procedures.
A logical implication of our alternative proposal is that at least a degree of
conceptual knowledge is a necessary condition for (relatively) deep proce-
dural knowledge (strategy choice or adaptive expertise with procedures in a
domain) and vice versa. A corollary is the following revision of Hatano’s
conjecture (2003): Increasing integration with corresponding conceptual knowl-
edge increases the accuracy, versatility, duration, and generality of strategy
choice and adaptability. Put differently, procedural knowledge connected exclu-
sively or largely with other nonconceptual knowledge (cells B3 and B4 in
Figure 1) tends to yield more error-prone, rigid, short-term, or isolated exten-
sions than would more conceptually connected procedural knowledge (Baroody,
2003; Carpenter, 1986).
A second implication is that building connections within a type of knowledge
or even between types may be insufficient to maximize deep understanding; other
qualities, such as well-structured knowledge that permits constructing a useful
representation of the problem, need to be considered (Davis, 1983; Gray & Tall,
1994; Greeno, Riley, & Gelman, 1984; Haapasalo, 2003; Hähkiöniemi, 2006; Ma,
1999; Rittle-Johnson, Siegler, & Alibali, 2001). For example, Peled and Segalis
(2005) found that abstracting procedural similarities and mapping similarities
among domains was more effective than the former alone. Recent work on early
algebra has begun to explore what kinds of connections while learning arithmetic
provide a basis for learning algebra, as well as for generalizing arithmetic proce-
dures and using them flexibly (Carpenter et al., 1999; Romberg et al., 2005). A
key finding is that connections that can be explicitly recognized and justified are
more powerful than those that cannot. The nature of the connections, then, does
matter (T. Carpenter, personal communication, August 24, 2006). A corollary of
this point is that connections or relations are not equal; some can be formed
Arthur J. Baroody, Yingying Feil, and Amanda R. Johnson 13

without understanding, others with some understanding, and yet others with
considerable understanding (cf. Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986).
A third implication is that big ideas are a critical aspect of understanding the
nature, structure, or quality of connections. Theoretically, they should provide
connections with considerable understanding—a relatively strong and general
basis for connecting procedures and concepts within and among domains and,
thus, for promoting adaptive expertise (Baroody et al., 2004). Indeed, instruction
based on big ideas—more than typical procedural, conceptual, or integrated
procedural-conceptual instruction—may help facilitate a chain of self-directed and
meaningful conceptual and procedural learning in new domains. For instance, a
professional development program that focused on the big idea of algebra as a
shorthand for generalizing and representing arithmetic patterns and relations
(and justifying and using arithmetic generalizations) enabled participating teachers
to help their students generate a wider range of meaningful strategies and better
understand symbols, such as the equals sign, significantly better than nonpartic-
ipating teachers (Carpenter & Franke, 2001; Jacobs, Franke, Carpenter, Levi, &
Battey, in press).
In conclusion, de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler’s (1996) and Star’s (2005) recom-
mendation to disentangle knowledge type and quality—to define procedural and
conceptual knowledge independently of the degree of connectedness—makes
sense. It also makes both psychological and pedagogical sense, however, to view
meaningful knowledge of mathematical procedures and concepts as intricately
and necessarily interrelated, not as distinct categories of mathematics. A case can
be made that conceptual understanding is a key basis for all other aspects of math-
ematical proficiency, including procedural fluency (Baroody, 2003), and that big
ideas are particularly important in promoting all aspects of mathematical proficiency.
Psychologists have long known that meaningful memorization is a more effective
means than memorization by rote for ensuring retention and transfer of factual and
procedural knowledge (Ginsburg, 1977; Katona, 1967; Skemp, 1978; Wertheimer,
1959). Linking procedural to conceptual knowledge can make learning facts and
procedures easier, provide computational shortcuts, ensure fewer errors, and reduce
forgetting (i.e., promote efficiency). Children who understand procedures are more
likely to recognize real-world applications and be able to adjust their extant knowl-
edge to new challenges or problems. This is, in part, why the National Research
Council (Kilpatrick et al., 2001) recommended that the strands of mathematical
proficiency be taught in an intertwined manner.

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Authors
Arthur J. Baroody, baroody@express.cites.uiuc.edu, address to come, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820
Yingying Feil, ???? (couldn’t find on UIUC web site)
Amanda R. Johnson, amandaj@express.cites.uiuc.edu, address to come, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820

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