FIRST DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 10378, June 09, 2014 ]

JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JONATHAN T.

SEMPIO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Jonathan T.
Sempio (respondent), for violation of Canons 15,[1] 17,[2] 18[3] and Rule 18.03[4] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), commenced thru a complaint-
affidavit[5] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens (complainant).

This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent to represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit dated March
15, 2010, the complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent: (1) despite
receiving the sum of P250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in the said case, [6] failed to
file the corresponding petition, and it was the complainant's wife who successfully
instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08,[7] for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December
8, 2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated
December 15, 2008,[8] belatedly filed an Answer[9] and was able to file it only on March
13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make
an objection on the petition on the ground of improper venue as neither the
complainant nor his wife were and are residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never
bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to discover and attend all the
hearings set for the case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided [10] on
October 27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence.

In his Answer,[11] the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained
that: (1) after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and asked the complainant to go over said draft after which he
proceeded to file the same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the
complainant was aware that said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the latter had
signed the verification and certification of the petition; (3) the case became pending
and was later on withdrawn because of the complainant's refusal to testify; (4) what
contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact that he still had to let the
complainant go over the same and sign the verification thereof; (5) he was not able to
attend the hearings for the case because he did not receive any notice from the trial
court; and (6) it was only on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial court
has already rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed counsels.

In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29, 2010, only the
complainant appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to
further participate in the IBP proceedings. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both
parties were required to submit their respective position papers.[12]

The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and Recommendation [13] dated

October 22, 2011, finding the respondent guilty of violation of the Code and
recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6) months from the practice
of law. Specifically, the Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent failed to
diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his
responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated. The
Investigating Commissioner said that the respondent should have manifested or made
known to the trial court that he was not receiving any notice at all since it behoves upon
him to make a follow-up on the developments of the cases he is handling.

As to the respondent's argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage for the complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that it
cannot be taken at face value absent the presentation of the pleading itself which by a
perusal of the records of the case was not submitted to the IBP-CBD. Moreso, the
veracity of the Certification attached to the respondent's answer was highly
questionable because it failed to state when the said petition was filed. Lastly, the
Investigating Commissioner faulted the respondent for not sufficiently explaining to
the complainant the consequences of the petition being filed in the RTC of Malabon
City since it was the respondent's duty and responsibility to explain the complexities of
the same to his client for he is the one tasked with the technical know-how in the field
of law.

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
Investigating Commissioner's report but deemed it proper to increase the
recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.[14] On February
14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to
the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[15]

The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBP's findings and the recommended sanction of
suspension from the practice of law since the attendant facts of the case show
substantial evidence to support the respondent's delinquency.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful
of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling
their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
[16]
 Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.[17]

It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to
handle his case. The records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent was
completely remiss and negligent in handling the complainant's case, notwithstanding
his receipt of the sum of P250,000.00 for the total expenses to be incurred in the said
case.

The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices
from the trial court is highly intolerable. In the first place, securing a copy of such
notices, orders and case records was within the respondent's control and is a task that a
lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of
procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the
respondent. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary
and incidental to the advancement of his client's cause of action.

Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the progress
of his client's case with the trial court, and neither did he resort to available legal
remedies that might have protected his client's interest. Although a lawyer has
complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he
must present every remedy or defense within the authority of law to support his client's
interest. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client's cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. [18]

Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness,
and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs
his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.[19]

In this case, the respondent's reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of
due process and his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients' interests. A
lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the
client or the court.[20]

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that
"a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."[21]

It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant's
case, he became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to
champion his cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every
remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is
expected of him as an officer of the Court.[22]

Thus, for the respondent's negligence and inadequacies in handling his client's case,
the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice of law is
well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors increased the period of suspension to
one year, the Court finds the period of six months as recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner commensurate to the facts of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution

dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in
CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately upon receipt of this
Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Jonathan T.
Sempio as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6174

SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 6174, November 16, 2011 ]

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RODOLFO T.

GALING, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196[1] of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint[2] for
disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City
Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa).  After she paid his professional fees, the
respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks. [3] 
Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the
demand letter before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
[4]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation [5] filed by

respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the
latter's daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba).  Further, on 8 August 2003,
respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated

the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him.  He admitted that he

drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference
to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as
professed by complainant.  He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he
rendered.  It was allegedly their understanding that complainant would have to retain
the services of another lawyer.   He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement,
engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Año.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant
against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand
letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Año.

Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal
cases.  He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long
time friends, as in fact, they are "comares" for more than 30 years since complainant is
the godmother of Ms. Torralba.[7]  Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he
accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughter's request that they be represented by him in
the cases filed against them by complainant and complainant's daughter.  He
maintained that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which is a non-adversarial
pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him
and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba.  Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings
should only be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or
arbiter of the parties.

He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties
achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation.  He reported that his
efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.

Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the
other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly
led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict
of interest.

In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner.  They
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for
the pronounced malignancy of his act.   It was recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.[8]

We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,

[9]
 as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant

regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.

It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by
respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S. No.
03G-19582-84 entitled "Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba".   Respondent stated that the
movants in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants are likewise
mother and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same transaction.  Thus,
movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and

complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. 
Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal favor to
complainant who is a close friend.

We are not persuaded.  A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent.  The relationship was established the
moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored
checks.  By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. 
The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that
respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the criminal
cases is of no moment.  As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by referring to
complainant Justo as "my client" in the demand letter sent to the defaulting debtor [10],
respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client relationship.  Such admission
effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.

Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
liability.  Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying
with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests.  The prohibition
attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends
beyond the duration of the professional relationship. [11]  We held in Burbe v. Atty.
Magulta[12]that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for
which his service had been sought.[13]

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts."  Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from
representing parties with conflicting interests in a controversy.   By doing so, without
showing any proof that he had obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties,
respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of

public policy and good taste.[14]   In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns of the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case.  The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.[15]

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.[16]

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or

more opposing parties.  The test is 'whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client.  In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client.'[18]  This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.[19]  Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection.[20] Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance thereof.[21]
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Año who was
eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  The take- over of a client's cause
of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to represent the
opposing party.  It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the
confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.

Considering that this is respondent's first infraction, the disbarment sought in the
complaint is deemed to be too severe.  As recommended by the Board of Governors of
the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance.  The Office of the Bar Confidant is
directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6160 March 30, 2006

NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre
with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting
interests.

Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines

Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom,
among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police
authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and
Avila were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom
if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused,
respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the
extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein complainant
who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal
activities for which they were being charged.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being
detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting
an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for
ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision
to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the
possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial
confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was
convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in
executing the extrajudicial confession.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.2 On August 16, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the
period of suspension to two years.

In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating

Commissioner opined that:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to
prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent
admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was
able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two
accused, he was also representing the interest of the victim’s family. This was declared
by the victim’s daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of Atty.
Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers. She even admitted
that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on one
occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services to Avila and
Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the two accused’s
victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent purposely offered to help the
accused in order to further his other clients’ interest. The respondent failed to deny
these facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample
opportunity given him.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from
representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing
precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the written consent of
both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent should
be sanctioned.

We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.3

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer

will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.4

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of

public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.5

To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services
to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in
executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to
act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being
convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their confession.

The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the
accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the
family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the
murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of
their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal
offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the
victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have
exercised his better judgment before conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did
not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even
assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.

Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, disbarment as sought by the

complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a
suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is
SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
DIVISION

[ AC. No. 9860, Sep 11, 2013 ]

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS +

RESOLUTION

A.C. No. 9860

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a disbarment complaint[1] filed against respondent Atty.
Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-
Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of
the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).[2]

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola

(Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named
complainants and the son of Emilio.[3]

In the settlement of Trinidad's estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were
represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in
behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad);
(b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar,
Karen, and the other heirs[4] of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as
collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of
Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidad's estate. In the course of the
proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of
Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latter's son,
Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order[5] dated September 20, 2007 (RTC
Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance
as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration
of the RTC Order.[6]

Due to the respondent's new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated:
(a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the
subject case;[7] and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust
and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.[8] Complainants
further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of
Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent's appearance, the same was obtained
only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on
October 10, 2007.[9] In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the
affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required
under the Rules.[10]

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never
appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed
out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were
represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by
Atty. Azarraga.[11] He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to
temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the
scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were
free of charge.[12] In fact, he obtained Maricar's permission for him to withdraw from
the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise,
he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case.[13] He
added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in
this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel
of record at any instance.[14] Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in
the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator,[15] and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on
December 6, 2007.[16] In support of his assertions, respondent submitted the
affidavits of Maricar[17] and Atty. Azarraga[18] relative to his limited appearance and
his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation[19] dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP
Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),
respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to
Karen as the records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other
complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's
withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of
the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.[20]

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that
respondent "did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he
use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment."[21] Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead,
recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.[22]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641[23] dated December 11,
2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed against respondent
the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-
2013-17[25] dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP's finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the
Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing
new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or
not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.[26] It behooves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.[27] In Hornilla v. Salunat[28] (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest, to wit:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or

more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon
in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The
intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests
only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters
that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.[30]

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP's finding that
respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held
administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as
claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In
the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in
removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their
interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of
seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against
the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen in violation of the above-
stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot

fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as
enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with
respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change
his representation from one party to the latter's opponent in the same case. That
respondent's previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a
friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule
holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has
acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.[31]

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a
mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family
members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is
likewise improper since Rule 15.04,[32] Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the
lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this
respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full
disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio's counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio
particularly, Karen and equally secure their express written consent before
consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such
in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.[33] Accordingly, for
respondent's violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was

increased from severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that the
said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of
Governors' modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules
which specifically mandates that "[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be
in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based."[34] Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change in the recommended
penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end, the Court is wont to
remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement to announce
in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary
proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to
what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing
down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.[35]

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration
the following factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed
that respondent merely accommodated Maricar's request out of gratis to temporarily
represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer's
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that
the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually
acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of
Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants
admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of
Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his
previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his
subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,[36] the
Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period
of three months to the counsel therein who represented parties whose interests are
hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of

representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.

446 Phil. 1

THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 5024, February 20, 2003 ]

ARSENIA T. BERGONIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARSENIO A.

MERRERA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A motion for extension to file an appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that
the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within the period granted.  Failure to so file
the brief without any reasonable excuse is a violation of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.  For such violation, a lawyer may be administratively sanctioned,
especially if it results in damage to the client.

The Case

This administrative case stems from an Affidavit-Complaint [1] filed by Arsenia T.

Bergonia on March 2, 1999, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera for
violating Canons 12 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Complainant
alleged that his inexcusable negligence, while acting as her counsel, caused the
unceremonious dismissal of her appeal.  Specifically, despite obtaining two extensions,
he still failed to file the required appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals.  After a
careful consideration of the Complaint and respondent's Comment [2] thereon dated
November 22, 1999, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala's November 15, 2001

Report[3] recommending the six-month suspension of respondent from the practice of
law was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its June 29, 2002
Resolution No. XV-2002-236.  On August 15, 2002, the Notice of the IBP
Resolution[4] and that of the Commissioner's Report were forwarded to the Office of the
Bar Confidant by Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, director for bar discipline of the IBP. [5]

The Facts
Complainant, together with her relatives, filed a case for the quieting of title (docketed
as Civil Case No. U-4601) against her niece Josephine Bergonia, as well as Spouses
Rodolfo and Remedios Parayno and their minor daughter Gretchen.[6]  After due trial,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, [7] promulgated its
Decision in favor of the Parayno spouses and their daughter. [8] On appeal, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court[9] and the Decision became final and executory. [10]

Since the disputed land was still in the possession of complainant, the Paraynos
instituted Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover possession. [11] After the Answer was filed,
respondent became her counsel of record.  After due trial, Branch 48[12] of the same
RTC rendered its Decision[13]ordering her to vacate the premises and to surrender
possession thereof to the Parayno spouses.

Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgment to the CA.  Respondent, as

counsel, received a Notice to File Brief[14] on December 17, 1997.  Acting on his Motion
for extension to file the appellant's brief,[15] the CA in its February 18, 1998 minute
Resolution[16] granted him until March 17, 1998 to do so.  Even before the first
extension had lapsed, however, he again filed an Urgent Second Motion for extension
to file brief,[17] praying that he be given until April 16, 1998 to submit the required
pleading.  The CA again granted his Second Motion.[18]Eventually, the deadline, which
had already been extended twice, lapsed without his filing the appellant's brief.  Hence,
the CA, upon motion of the appellees, dismissed the appeal in its June 25, 1998
Resolution.[19]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Commissioner Maala found respondent guilty of inexcusable negligence.  She rejected

his explanation that he had already advised complainant not to pursue the appeal even
before the filing of the Notice of Appeal.  In fact, after the appellee filed a Motion to
Dismiss the appeal, he even filed an Opposition, thus raising complainant's hopes of
eventual victory.

If respondent thought it was best to dispense with the appellant's brief, he should have
filed a manifestation or motion to that effect.  Instead, he opposed the Motion to
Dismiss and asked for further extensions of time.  His actions clearly showed how
negligent and irresponsible he had been in filing the brief.

The board of directors of the IBP concurred with Commissioner Maala that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
 The Court's Ruling

We agree with the IBP.

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, requires all the
members of the bar to observe the following:

"A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so."
Expressly stated is the requirement to show good and sufficient cause for requests of
extension of time to file appellate briefs.  Section 12 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court
provides that an extension of time for the filing of a brief shall not be allowed, except
when there is good and sufficient cause, and only when the motion is filed before the
expiration of the extension sought.

From time to time, a request for extension becomes necessary when an advocate needs
more time to study the client's position.  Generally, such request is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.  Lawyers who, for one reason or another, decide to
dispense with the filing of the required pleading, should promptly manifest this intent
to the court.  It is necessary for them to do so in order to prevent delay in the
disposition of the case.  Those who file motions for extension in bad faith misuse the
legal process, obstruct justice,[20] and thus become liable to disciplinary action.[21]

A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith and with a genuine intent
to file the required pleading within the extended period.  In granting the request, the
court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a justifiable reason for failing to
comply with the period allowed. Without this implied trust, the motion for extension
will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart the appealed decision.  The motion
will thus be regarded as a means of preventing the judgment from attaining finality and
execution and of enabling the movant to trifle with procedure and mock the
administration of justice.

In this case, respondent twice moved for an extension of time to file the required
appellant's brief.  In his first Motion, he alleged that he had a hectic daily schedule of
hearings and other pressures from work.  In his next Motion, he claimed he had acute
arthritis and asthmatic attacks.  The granting of his two Motions implied that he had
been given ample time either to finish researching his case or to withdraw his appeal. 
Yet, he still failed to file the required brief.  In its June 25, 1998 Resolution, the CA
noted that the appellee's Motion to Dismiss the appeal was filed only after forty (40)
days from the expiration of the last extension.

Respondent claims that he never planted false hopes in the mind of complainant. 
Upon receiving the Decision in Civil Case No. U-6061, he purportedly advised her that
her chances of winning in the appellate court were slim, because the ownership of the
disputed land had already been adjudicated to the other party in Civil Case No. U-
4601.  He avers that he tried to persuade her to accept her defeat "like a good soldier."

We are not persuaded. If, indeed, respondent failed to convince complainant to drop
her appeal, he should have just withdrawn his appearance.  Based on his arguments in
his Opposition to the Motion for Execution and Demolition, however, we do not believe
that he even tried to convince her to withdraw the appeal.  We are inclined to believe
that this excuse was merely an afterthought to justify his negligence.

Moreover, respondent claims that after filing the Motions for Extension, he surmised
that the appeal would be useless, because he could not show sufficient cause to reverse
the Decision.

This justification is even more inexcusable.  Respondent, should have checked first if
there was a good ground to support the appeal.  If there was none, he should have been
forthright in his evaluation of the case.

Lawyers should fully familiarize themselves with the causes of their clients before
advising the latter on the soundness of litigating.  If they find that the intended suit is
devoid of merit or that the pending action is defenseless, [22] they should promptly
inform and dissuade their clients accordingly.

Assuming that respondent indeed tried to persuade complainant to abandon the

appeal, he should have manifested to the CA that he had decided not to file the
appellant's brief anymore, instead of just letting the period lapse.  His contention that
he could not find the appropriate jurisprudence to support her case is too flimsy to be
credible.  A competent and ethical lawyer would have at least tried to persuade the CA
with reason and logic.

Respondent alleges that complainant knew of the dismissal of the appeal. That she had
referred the Motion for Execution and Demolition to him for comment allegedly
showed that she had already given up her desire to pursue her appeal.  He pointed out
that if she had indeed blamed his inexcusable negligence for its dismissal, then she
would not have referred that Motion to him.

We are not convinced.  Anyone would have done what complainant did, because no one
else would know the case better than one's lawyer.  Contrary to respondent's allegation,
we do not read any intention on her part to withdraw the appeal, which showed that
she wanted to oppose the execution of the Decision.

We concur in the IBP's finding that respondent was negligent in the performance of his
duties as counsel for complainant, and that his negligence was inexcusable. If indeed it
was true that he found her case to be futile, he should have just withdrawn the appeal,
instead of filing several Motions for extension to file the appellant's brief.

Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable

membership in the legal profession.[23] Lawyers are required to act with the highest
standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their
relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. 
They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients.  Canon 18.03 of the Code requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith renders him liable."

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is hereby found guilty of violating Canons 12

and 18 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDEDfrom the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt of this Decision.  This
Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS,
and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,

vs.

ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent,
pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may
be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto
an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-
G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition
[sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on
record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the
performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case. That the
said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and
confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita
Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order.
That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand
for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he
never answered it after all because according to him he was a very busy man. Please
refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the
Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper
that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by
his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court.
He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants
because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern
University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final
decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional
Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the
case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein)
illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He
further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to
share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since
his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that
such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were
willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In
their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and

Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.
The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal

Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's
name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on
grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-
OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-
union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered
the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it
reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants
herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both
denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in
default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-
parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00
as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but
his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants
an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in
default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's
evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment,1
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.2 He must serve the
client with competence and diligence,3 and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.5 This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense.6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-
91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead,
thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with
the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the
petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and
because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an
honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal
disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to
set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure of
legal work."9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the
respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order,
the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his
Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to
his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work"
on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the
respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a
reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its
previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to
reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because
of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did
not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of
diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such
error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even
after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no
showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he
alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a
meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not
even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of
default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's
inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91
was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages
were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of
expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which
hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any
defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule
15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he
took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack
of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court
and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply
delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely
without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not
entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a
reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for
the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and

ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his
clients.

SO ORDERED.
517 Phil. 690

EN BANC

[ G.R. NO. 160445, February 16, 2006 ]

JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO AND MA. AGNES R. MERCADO,

PETITIONERS, VS. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment.   The people should not be given cause to break
faith that a magistrate is the epitome of honor amongst men.   To preserve its dignity, a
court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.[1]
 
Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the contempt proceedings
against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado arising from his letter dated October 18,
2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponentesuccumbed to the "tremendous pressure" of
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2)the Security Bank
Corporation, respondent, financed the ponente'stravel to the United States;
and (3)the ponente gave respondent a "go signal" to sell his property.

The facts are as follows:

On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and  Ma. Agnes R. Mercado,
petitioners, filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorariassailing the Court
of Appeals  (a)Decision[2] dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their
petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) its Resolution[3]dated October 23, 2003
denying their motion for reconsideration.

On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of petitioners' failure to show that
a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court.[4]   

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Court of Appeals, in
dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment, merely relied on technical rules of
procedure, thereby sacrificing the greater interest of justice and equity; and that their
former counsel's gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud, a ground for annulling
the trial court's judgment.
On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and reinstating their petition. We likewise required Security Bank
Corporation, respondent, to comment on the petition.

In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the present petition are
mere rehash of the issues petitioners raised before the Appellate Court.  As to the
alleged negligence of their counsel, respondent pointed out that the same cannot be
considered an extrinsic fraud since through the same counsel, they actively pursued
and recovered moral damages and attorney's fees.   Furthermore, assuming that
petitioners' counsel refused to file a motion for reconsideration with the trial court,
still, they had the option to terminate his services and hire another; and that they
should not have waited for four (4) years before filing the petition for annulment of
judgment.

On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the ground that
petitioners indeed failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the
Appellate Court.  

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the same in our
Resolution dated September 15, 2004, thus:

We find no compelling reason to grant petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a petition for annulment of
judgment can prosper, petitioners must first file an appeal, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief as required by the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they
cannot avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would benefit
from their inaction or negligence. 

It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is
not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. 

Petitioners' contention that their failure to appeal from the trial court's Decision was
due to the negligence of their former counsel lacks merit. Records show that they
participated actively, through their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As
party litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and, therefore, should
monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should have constantly communicated
with their counsel to be advised of the status of their case. This way, they would not
have lost their opportunity to appeal. 

Granting that petitioners' petition for annulment of judgment is in order, still the same
is dismissible. For the remedy of annulment of judgment to prosper, either one of the
following grounds must be present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process. Petitioner argues that their counsel's negligence constitutes
extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel
against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court.
This situation is not present in this case. 

We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit
reversible error in dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the trial court's order of execution of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.
In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant case.[5]
Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was denied for being
prohibited.

On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
stating that:

On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution, granted our Motion for
Reconsideration and even gave due course and reinstated our petition.

But when I received the Resolution dated June 7, 2004 denying my Petition for Review
on July 12, 2004, I immediately called my counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the
phone. I asked him why on earth the ponente denied again my petition on the same
ground 'for failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by
the appellate court? My counsel said, the ponente informed him that she has to deny
our petition on the same ground because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief
Justice to favor Security Bank Corporation (SBC).  By the way, my counsel and
the ponente are very close and long time friends to each other. When I heard the bad
news, I was so shocked in disbelief. It is true, what you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and
malicious. It is also very suspicious that after a few days after my conversation with
Atty. Villanueva, he and his family left for London, leaving my case to the care of one of
his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for the U.S.A. to visit her children. Is
this a coincidence? As the saying goes, 'when there is smoke, there is fire.' Another
coincidence, before the receipt of the Resolution dated June 7, 2004, denying our
petition on the basis of SBC's unsubstantiated 'Comment,' SBC  sold our property to M.
Miranda Development Corporation and succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the
four (4) building erected in our property from the Forbes Park Association, even if the
case is still pending and we have not even filed  our  Motion for Reconsideration with
the Supreme Court, not to mention the Lis Pendens annotated on the title of the
property in the name of SBC. The person who bought our property from SBC for
P120,000,000.00 is known to my nephew and us. While the buyer is drinking with my
nephew and others, not knowing that one of them is my nephew, he bragged to them
that he just bought the property of the Mercados in Forbes Park. The buyer said 'I paid
already the property because SBC told me that they already have the go-signal from the
ponente to sell the property.' Few days thereafter, all the improvements in our property
were totally demolished by a construction company owned by my provincemate in
Pampanga by the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally met at the site while the
demolition was being carried out.

Have you no conscience at all?  Are you not bothered of the final judgment after life? Is
this the legacy you want to impart to your children and all the Filipino people?  What
you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. You have
deprived us of our precious possession without due process. This is also the abode of
my wife, my children, their respective spouses, and my 10 grandchildren, not to
mention the several household members and their families.

I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last bulwark of true justice. If you,
the Chief Justice, himself, are the first person to make a mockery of our laws, no
wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country because they said,
there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. This is in the highest
degree of injustice. You have deprived us of our basic fundamental rights in the
protection of our property without due process. There is no justice in our courts, the
Supreme Court in particular. Do you   think I will bring my case to the Supreme Court
by mere question of facts?  From our petition for Annulment of Judgment filed before
the Court of Appeals and now the Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, my wife and I as petitioners-movants have clearly invoked 'LACK OF
JURISDICTION' on the part of the trial court to adjudicate respondent SBC's
'counterclaim' for the payment of the loan.  As I understand, when the ground invoked
as basis for Annulment of Judgment is 'LACK OF JURISDICTION', the Petition may be
filed at any time before it is barred by estoppel or laches, neither of which is obtaining
in our case.   Even in layman's legal point of view, this Petition of ours clearly and
undoubtedly raises a question of law.

Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the two (2) Motions for
Reconsideration and let us focus and not evade on the real issue on 'LACK OF
JURISDICTION' on the part of the trial court and not concentrate on negligence of
counsel and other trivial reasons, etc.  Or better yet, please refrain from influencing the
members of the Third Division. Let them deliberate regularly on our case or inhibit
themselves on the case. Please let the Institution serve justice, and not individual
pecuniary interests. SBC's counsels are experts in fabrication of facts and in misleading
the courts. I have a feeling that they might as well have led you to believe something,
which is not true. Please don't be an instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the
Supreme Court itself becomes their means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank
which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of my several sincere offers of
amicable settlement since the case was filed in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in
writing and duly received by SBC. Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them.

I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I looked up at you before
as the most honest and upright Chief Justice. As we would like to know if you really had
intervened and put pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to
favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten us before we seek
another forum to seek redress the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and
embarrassment we suffered.   If we are wrong about you, and I hope we really are
wrong, please accept our appeal for forgiveness and apologies.  GOD is my witness, that
what I have told you is the truth. 

Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious you are.  Please do what a
religious man ought to do in serving justice.  Please live up to our, as well as HIS
expectations. (Emphasis supplied)
On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercado's  lawyer, Atty. Jose P.
Villanueva, to comment on the letter and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court.[6]

On November 17, 2004, the Court's Third Division ordered Mercado  to personally
appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court.[7]

On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new
counsel, appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he
wrote.[8] He manifested that he only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him that
his petition was denied for the second time "because of the tremendous pressure from
the Chief Justice."  He further manifested that during the wake of Atty. Villanueva's
mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging
that she is "a very very good, close and long time friend of his." [9]   However, while
stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez.
[10]

Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a Resolution [11]directing Atty.
Macapagal to submit a written explanation why Mercado should not be held in
contempt of Court.

For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,[12] strongly denying Mercado's

allegations in his letter.    He denied having told petitioners that their petition had to be
denied again "because there was a tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice in favor
of Security Bank Corporation."   He also stressed that there was no correlation between
the ponente's  trip  to  the  United States and his trip to London.   He explained that he
and his family went to London to attend the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya
Veloso Villanueva.  To substantiate this, he submitted a photocopy of "London School
of Economics (LSE) and Political Science Presentation Ceremonies" where the name of
his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the successful
graduates.   He likewise submitted a photocopy of his passport indicating his departure
for London on July 14, 2004 and his arrival in the Philippines on July 27, 2004.   In
addition, he said he never met anyone from respondent bank, including its lawyers,
and that there is no truth to Mercado's statement regarding his nephew's alleged
encounter with the new owners of the subject property.

On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his explanation[13]  why he should not be
punished for contempt of court.   He claimed that the contemptuous statements in his
letter merely reiterate the tenor of  Atty. Villanueva's statements.  He offered an
apology, explaining that he wrote the letter while he was "under the impulse of
personal stress" as he was losing his residential house. 

On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both Mercado and Atty. Villanueva to
appear on February 21, 2005 to elucidate their respective positions.

Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that the ponente is
Justice Gutierrez.   Atty. Villanueva even bragged that she is his "very, very close
friend."

For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him that
Justice Gutierrez is the ponente.  He also confirmed that she attended the wake of his
mother.   But he denied Mercado's claim that he pointed to Justice Gutierrez and said
that she is his close friend.[14]

Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao
as Commissioner to receive evidence on the factual issues involved in the contempt
incident. [15]

On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and
Recommendation. He found Mercado "guilty of improper conduct tending to bring the
authority and the administration of justice by the Court into disrespect when he openly
belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the
Chief Justice  x  x  x." However, he held that "there was no showing that he acted with
malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly motivated."  Thus, he recommended
that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).  
We cannot sustain Justice Dacudao's finding that Mercado did not act with malice or
bad faith in imputing those derogatory and disrespectful  remarks against Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente.

Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
a wrong.[16]It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.[17] Malice is of the same
genre.   It connotes a sinister motive.

Mercado's addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration of bad
faith and malice tending directly to degrade the administration of justice. It
transgresses the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms bringing into
disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente,
but also of the entire Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for truth on whether
Chief Justice Davide indeed exerted "tremendous pressure" to the ponente, he
repeatedly humiliated him and the Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner.
He accused him of doing an "unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious" act and of depriving
his (Mercado's) family of their "basic fundamental rights in the protection of (their)
property without due process." He concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his
family "is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity."  In an insulting and insolent
tenor, he stated that "if the Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery
of our laws," then there is "no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in
our country."

Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his

petition for review.  He insinuated that the travels of  Atty. Villanueva and
the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank, stating that "when there is
smoke, there is fire."  He also recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank
a "go-signal" to sell his property.  In this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice Davide to
"refrain from influencing the members of the Third Division;" "let them deliberate
regularly on the case or inhibit themselves on the case;" and "let the Institution serve
justice, and not individual pecuniary interests."

Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying "there is no justice in our courts,
the Supreme Court in particular." And with impudence, he threatened Chief Justice
Davide to enlighten him before he "seeks another forum to seek redress for the
injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment" his family suffered.

Without doubt, Mercado's letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross disrespect.
He committed a remarkable feat of character assassination and honor vilification. 
Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanueva's statements,
the words in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is
that his accusations have no basis in fact and in law.  Obviously, they caused intense
pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.

The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September 15, 2004 denying
Mercado's motion for reconsideration is well explained. A principle almost repeated to
satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal."  A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new
trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper.  Its obvious
rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence.  Also,
the action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud
or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.[18] Having failed to avail of the
remedies and there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the
petition must be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal
disposition unacceptable.

Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition through a mere Minute
Resolution and after reinstating the petitionApparently, he finds the Court's manner of
denial and change of heart unusual and casts sinister undertone to them. 

In In Re Laureta,[19]  we  ruled  that  the  Court  is not "duty-bound" to render signed
decisions all the time.   It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute
resolutions, provided a legal basis is given depending on its evaluation of a case.   In the
same case, we held that "the recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of
the case is a common occurrence in the Court."    Like the respondents in the said case,
Mercado should not think that it is only his petition which has been subjected to such
recall.

The Third Division initially denied Mercado's petition because it is apparent on its face
that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing his petition for
annulment of judgment.  Considering his motion for reconsideration alleging that the
Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and that his former
counsel committed gross negligence, the Third Division took the most prudent course
by reinstating the petition.  Now, after considering the petition and the comment
thereon, the Third Division was convinced that, indeed, the Appellate Court did not
commit any reversible error.   Is this irregular? The answer is a resounding "no."  The
reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee that it will be subsequently granted. 
Otherwise, the filing of comment and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in
futility. 

Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and
privacy of communication.
We are not persuaded.

A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute
contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech.   Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse of
such liberty.   When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice Davide
and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty.  His statements cast aspersions to their
reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.

The fact that Mercado's letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not rinse it
of its contemptuous character.   In In Re Laureta,[20]  we ruled that letters addressed to
individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions
become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.

Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x   x   x                                                                   x   x    x 

d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade

the administration of justice;

x   x   x                                                                   x   x    x

As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically state that he (Atty.
Villanueva) told Mercado that Chief Justice Davide exerted "tremendous pressure" on
the ponente, the reason why the petition was dismissed for the second time, however,
we are inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to Mercado.   Not
only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of the ponente; that he and
the ponentehave known each other since 1964; and that the ponente would be at the
wake of his mother, thus: 

After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence adduced in the instant
case, the undersigned investigator is fully convinced that it was only through Atty.
Villanueva that petitioner could have learned or known the name of the ponente in the
case.
As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned investigator in inclined to
give more credence to the testimony of petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent,
firm, and candid and detailed in his testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his
claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by presenting the
testimony of his nephew. x   x   x

Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice Gutierrez have
known each other since 1964 and that Justice Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother.
These admissions tend to strengthen the allegations of petitioner that Atty. Villanueva
was the one who told him the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that
he and the ponente are very close; and that when petitioner attended the wake of Atty.
Villanueva's mother, he was told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez, the
ponente, was coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer
shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body."  Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."   Atty. Villanueva took
the forbidden course.   In informing Mercado that he was "a very very good, close and
long time friend" of the ponente,Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he
can obtain a favorable disposition of his case.  However, when his petition was
dismissed twice, Mercado's expectation crumbled.  This prompted him to hurl
unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente.    

We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients.  
A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy
pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs.  But when the case is lost,
he will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion.   As what happened
in this case, Atty. Villanueva's statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to
believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente,
could be pressured or influenced, 

Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and
the judicial officers.[21]   Atty. Villanueva's conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and
dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.  

Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court. 

On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts have inherent power to
impose a penalty for contempt reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the
offense.  And that the degree of punishment for contempt is said to lie within the sound
discretion of the court.[22]   Considering the circumstances obtaining herein, we believe
that Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00 each and warned that a
repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.  

One last word.   The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution.  Without
such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. [23]   Thus,
we must act to preserve its honor and integrity from assaults of disrespect.   One reason
why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is because of unscrupulous
lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be influenced or bribed.  Such conduct
has no place in the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are

declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court.  They are FINEDP50,000.00 each
and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanueva's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

  SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio,

Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Tinga and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
Corona and Callejo, Sr., JJ., On leave.
 DIVISION

[ AC. No. 5736, Jun 18, 2010 ]

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE v. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO +

DECISION
635 Phil. 176

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors [1] of
the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict
Florido (respondent) for "acts constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as
counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over
the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and intimidation."

The Facts

On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. [2] RBCI
alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano
Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel
(Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed
men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly
evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the bank's vault, and
installed their own staff to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCI's allegations. Respondent explained that he

acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos
group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he
was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of management. Respondent alleged
that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002,
to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the Nazareno-
Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay
reacted violently and grappled with the security guard's long firearm. Respondent then
directed the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who
had no transaction with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-
Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the bank's vault.

Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him
by RBCI was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered
suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the
disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for the administrative cases
he filed against RBCI's counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their
allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never
identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary
exhibits were originals or certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner

Villadolid, Jr.) submitted his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to
the exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and justice. [3] Commissioner
Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the repetition of
similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known

that his clients could not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI
without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to
manage and gain majority control over RBCI was one of the issues pending before the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that respondent
had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a "naked power
grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever."

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against

respondent before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension of the
criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI
complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and
submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to
dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit
their position papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120
which declared that respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of
the law profession and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year with
a warning that repetition of similar conduct will warrant a more severe penalty. [4]

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December

2008 Resolution, the IBP denied respondent's motion.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governors' resolution.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6] Likewise, it is the
lawyer's duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from
activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. [7]

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within
the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to
impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer
must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. [8] It
is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice
and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. [9]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.'s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking  their
professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they
appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and
foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients' interests is
secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense, their
fidelity to their clients must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics,
never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice. [10]
A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTYof

violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year effective
upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Nachura, Peralta, Abad, and Perez,*JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014 ]

CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, COMPLAINANT, VS.

NICOLAS C. TORRES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint[1] dated October 30, 2008 filed by
complainant CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated (complainant) against
respondent Nicolas C. Torres (respondent), charging him with violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws

engaged in overseas maritime employment.[2] It hired respondent, a medical doctor and
a lawyer by profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to
serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal
cases and medical-related claims instituted by seafarers against complainant's various
principals. Among the cases respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims
Manager were the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani
(Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua (Chua). [3]

In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent's request,

complainant issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00,
P97,100.00, and P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi,
Sampani, Delgado, and Chua.[4] However, complainant later discovered that, save for
the check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the
checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at International Exchange
Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. [5] With
respect to Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts of
P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of
P652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant.[6]

On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an
Order[7] requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither
did respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor
did he file his position paper.[8]

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation[9]dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner found respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and
accordingly recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.[10]

The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was
issued checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua on the pretense that the requested amounts represented what was lawfully due
them.[11]However, instead of giving the said checks to the named seafarers, he deposited
the same at the International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under
Account No. 003-10-06902-1,[12]except for the check in the amount of P145,650.00
issued to Delgado.[13]

Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open
Investigation)[14]on March 24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an
answer because complainant supplied a wrong address to the IBP and filed non-
bailable criminal cases against him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell
and, thus, his inability to comply with the IBP's directives.[15]

On the merits of the complaint, respondent maintained that the seafarers' claims had
long been settled and that the release documents signed by the named seafarers were
already in actual custody and possession of the complainant.[16] He further contended
that he only signed the dorsal portions of the checks as a form of guaranty of their
genuineness[17] and that he could not have encashed them as they were all payable to a
particular payee.[18] Lastly, respondent claimed that when he resigned in August 2008,
complainant forced him to sign promissory notes to reimburse certain amounts which
had not been accounted for by the latter in exchange for his clearance documents.
[19]
 But before he was able to settle the promissory notes, he was already arrested in
connection with the criminal cases filed by complainant against him. [20]

In a Resolution[21] dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously

adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification,
increasing the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2)
years, and ordering respondent to return the full amount of money he received from
complainant which is legally due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration [22] on April 22, 2013 which
was, however, denied in a Resolution [23] dated March 8, 2014.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP
in its report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.

It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. [24] The highly
fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from his client.[25]This is the standard
laid down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.
[26]
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had
duly proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed
respondent's modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks
purportedly for the purpose of settling seafarers' claims against the complainant's
various principals, only to have such checks (except for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized bank account,
particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under
Account No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-settled that "when a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to
the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to his client."[27] This, respondent failed to do.

Clearly, respondent's acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and

confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client's interests
which he is duty-bound to protect.[28] They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct." Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law.[29]

Anent the proper penalty for respondent's acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the
penalty recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers misappropriated their clients' money, the Court imposed upon them the
ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v.
Mijares III,[30] the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his client's money
intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter's behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v.
Reyes,[31] the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated the
insurance proceeds of her client's deceased husband.

As already discussed, respondent's conduct of misappropriating complainant's money

has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the
moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral acts.
[32]
 As a member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.[33] Membership in the legal profession is a privilege,
and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of the Court to withdraw the same,[34] as in this case. In view of the foregoing,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP's recommendation regarding the return
of the settlement money respondent received from complainant, considering, among
others, that it was not specifically prayed for in the latter's administrative complaint
and that the civil liability of respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing
cases involving the same parties.

WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
393 Phil. 188

[ A.C. No. 5315, August 23, 2000 ]

MODESTO CUNANAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. REX C. RIMORIN,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
The complainant Modesto Cunanan seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Rex C.
Rimorin for allegedly embezzling funds which properly belong to the complainant.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On or about August 2, 1997 complainant Cunanan, a retired U.S. citizen, engaged the
professional services of respondent as a lawyer in the matter of settling his "overstaying
alien status" (in the Philippines) with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID
for brevity) so that he could attend to the funeral and burial needs of his son, Andrew
Phillip Cunanan, in the United States. According to the complainant, he verbally agreed
to pay the respondent a professional fee of P40,000.00 out of the P200,000.00
commitment of the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN for brevity).
Initially, however, complainant gave to the respondent the sum of P2,500.00 for his
expenses.
It appears that an agreement was entered into between complainant Cunanan assisted
by his counsel, respondent herein, and ABS-CBN represented by Noli de Castro,
regarding the story of his son, Andrew Cunanan, who died on July 23, 1997 in the
United States. In consideration for an exclusive interview with the complainant, ABS-
CBN agreed to pay to complainant Cunanan, as goodwill money and assistance for his
planned trip to the United States, the total amount of P200,000.00. For the first partial
payment, Noli de Castro, acting in behalf of ABS-CBN, issued a check intended for
complainant Cunanan but per their verbal arrangement, it was made payable to
complainant's counsel, herein respondent Atty. Rex C. Rimorin, more specifically a
PCIBank Check No. 0827808 dated July 28, 1997 in the amount of P100,000.00. [1] To
complete the payment of the agreed price of the interview, ABS-CBN deposited the
balance in the amount of P100,000.00 in the bank account of respondent Atty.
Rimorin with the Far East Bank and Trust Company per deposit slip dated July 29,
1997.[2] The interview of the complainant by Noli de Castro of ABS-CBN was done in
the law office of the respondent in Baguio City.
According to the Affidavit[3]executed by Noli de Castro of ABS-CBN, the two payments
in the total amount of P200,000.00 were intended for complainant Cunanan although
they were placed in the name of the respondent as lawyer for the complainant.
Complainant Cunanan testified that the balance of the P200,000.00 was intended for
the payment to the BID of his penalty for overstaying, as an alien, in the amount of
P120,000.00 and for his plane tickets and travelling expenses to the United States in
the amount of P40,000.00.[4]
On the other hand, according to the Counter-Affidavit[5] executed on October 29, 1997
by respondent Rimorin, the complainant assured him, prior to the said interview
conducted by ABS-CBN in his law office, that the amount to be given as consideration
for the interview of complainant would be split between the two of them. He also
claimed that he never received a check from complainant for P100,000.00 on August 2,
1997 or a check for P100,000.00 on August 4, 1997 as contained in the Affidavit-
Complaint. He, however, admits that Noli de Castro, in behalf of ABS-CBN, indeed
handed to him a check for P100,000.00 on July 26, 1997 and another amount of
P100,000.00 was deposited in his (respondent's) bank account.
In a letter[6] dated August 8, 1997 sent by respondent to the complainant, the former
advised the latter that "due to the rains there is no way of checking whether the check
deposited by ABS-CBN has been cleared... I'll try my very best to produce the other
P30,000.00 today and drive to Bulacan tomorrow for delivery." The complainant
testified[7] that he indeed received the amount of P30,000.00 from respondent in
Plaridel, Bulacan but after that, there was no more communication from respondent.
Hence, complainant Cunanan filed the present administrative case with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline praying for the disbarment of the respondent for
swindling him and for failing to render any accounting of the P200,000.00 which
respondent received, in trust for the complainant, from ABS-CBN represented by Noli
de Castro.
In his Answer, respondent states that the Affidavit-Complaint which Cunanan filed
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline is exactly the same Affidavit-Complaint
which he filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on September 25,
1997 wherein complainant charged the respondent with Estafa. However, on December
5, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution [8]dismissing the said
Estafa case. Hence, respondent prays that the present administrative complaint against
him be also dismissed.
In the nine (9) scheduled hearings of this administrative case before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, only complainant and/or his counsel appeared.
Respondent did not appear despite due notice. Hence, complainant was allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte. The records show that respondent was given all the
opportunity to attend the scheduled hearings, present evidence and substantiate his
defense. However, respondent failed to do so.
It is the finding of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that there is a need for an
appropriate accounting of the P200,000.00 which respondent received in trust for his
client, herein complainant, from the ABS-CBN represented by Noli de Castro, in
accordance with Canon 16[9] and Rule 16.01[10] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
We agree with the said finding of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that there is a
need for an appropriate accounting. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of
attorney and client require that respondent lawyer should promptly account for the
said funds which he received and held for the benefit of his client, the herein
complainant. That is because those funds properly belong to the client. The client has
the right to know how the funds were applied, used or disbursed by his counsel. A
lawyer should always keep in mind the welfare and interest of his client.
From the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint on January 9, 1998
and up to the present, complainant's demand for an accounting has not been satisfied
by respondent. This case has been set for hearing for over a year but respondent has
not given any indication that he would render the accounting of funds as demanded by
the complainant. The Answer of the respondent does not show how the P200,000.00
which was delivered to respondent, in trust for the complainant, by Noli de Castro
representing ABS-CBN, was used. Complainant claims that except for the P30,000.00
cash given to him, respondent "fraudulently embezzled the funds." However, there is
nothing in the record to show how the balance of P170,000.00 was applied or used, if it
was used at all, by the respondent for the benefit of the complainant.
It is established that those funds amounting to a total of P200,000.00 were received by
respondent for the benefit of and in trust for the complainant, as corroborated by Noli
de Castro of ABS-CBN in his Affidavit. Complainant is entitled to know how the funds
were used and applied. In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show how the funds
were used and applied by respondent. It is clear, therefore, that respondent has fallen
short of his duty as a lawyer under Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, respondent should be penalized accordingly.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year. He is also hereby ordered to render, within twenty (20)
days from notice hereof, an accounting of the P170,000.00 representing the balance of
the sum of P200,000.00 which he received, in trust for complainant Modesto
Cunanan, from ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and copies thereof be furnished to the head office and Baguio City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

633 Phil. 25
 EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 8159 (formerly CBD 05-1452), April 23, 2010 ]

REYNARIA BARCENAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANORLITO A.

ALVERO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case
No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio),
entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to
give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of
a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money
was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt[2] dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt,
Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta
refused to accept the same.[3]

Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To
check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow
P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed
or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied,
"Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na?"Subsequently, Barcenas
discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted
and used the same for his personal needs.

In his letters dated August 18, 2004[4] and August 25, 2004,[5] Atty. Atty. Alvero
admitted the receipt of the P300,000.00 and promised to return the money. The
pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as follows:

Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang perang tinanggap

ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at pilit kong kinukuha kahit iyon man lang
na hiniram sa akin na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng
gayong halaga. Pero tiniyak sa akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin.
Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng karagdagang
halaga upang maisauli ko ang buong P300,000.00. Nakikiusap ako sa
iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng
kaunting panahon upang malikom ko ang pera na ipinagkatiwala mo sa
akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x x"[6]

Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking ipinagbibili ng Dalawang
Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili gusto lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa
Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran.

Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00 na utang ng taga-

Liliw ay darating sa akin ngayong umaga bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng
pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo ngayong hapon.

xxxx

Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak ko ay

tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting panahon pa, hindi
matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka
na."[7]

However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty.
Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred
for being a disgrace to the legal profession.

On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the
complaint.[8]

In compliance, in his Answer[9]dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he did
not know Barcenas prior to the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know that San
Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know Barcenas only
when the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 "from the amount entrusted to
Rodolfo San Antonio" who entrusted to respondent. At that time, Atty. Alvero claimed
that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it might jeopardize the
main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of
P300,000.00 from San Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal
cause of action in the reconveyance action.[10]

Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and
San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further
emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact,
manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client
relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant
complaint be dismissed.

On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory
conference.[11]

Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit[12] dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated

that he indeed sought Atty. Alvero's professional services concerning an agricultural
land dispute. He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him believe that he needed to provide
an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the same would be
deposited in court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: "Hindi pwedeng hindi
kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos
ay nasa korte na ang pera." Believing that it was the truth, San Antonio was forced to
borrow money from Barcenas in the amount of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San
Antonio gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition to the professional fees, as
shown by an acknowledgment receipt.[13]

San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas' allegation that they tried to borrow
P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found out that
the latter lost a big amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty. Alvero
declined and stated, "Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na."
Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty. Alvero lied to them since the money was never
deposited in court but was instead used for his personal needs. For several times, Atty.
Alvero promised to return the money to them, but consistently failed to do so. San
Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alvero's letters dated August 18, 2004[14] and August 25,
2004[15]showing the latter's promises to return the amount of P300,000.00.

During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he
was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the mandatory conference.

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended
that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for
gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account for and
return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The
pertinent portion thereof reads:
The record does not show and no evidence was presented by respondent
to prove that the amount of P300,000 which was entrusted to him was
already returned to complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by way of
justifying his non-return of the money, respondent claims in his Answer that the
P300,000 "was the source of the principal cause of action of the petitioner, Rodolfo
San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case No. R-0403-0011-04 as shown by a copy
of the Amended Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "1" and made an
integral part hereof.

A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October 31, 2004 and filed
on November 3, 2004, will show that the Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying
that he be allowed to cultivate the land after the P300,000 is consigned by Petitioner to
the Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant
complaint, no such deposit or consignment took place and no evidence
was presented that respondent deposited the amount in court.

The fact is respondent promised to return the amount (Annex "B" and "C"
of the Complaint), but he failed to do so. The failure therefore of
respondent to account for and return the amount of P300,000 entrusted
or given to him by his client constitute gross misconduct and would
subject him to disciplinary action under the Code.[16]

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification as to penalty the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for and
return the amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice.

The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular administrative
complaint against Atty. Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that this Court issue
an extended resolution for the final disposition of the case.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and
16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 16.

A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules
of Court.

In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount of
P300,000.00 from San Antonio, specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court.
However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no evidence that he had
indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any
evidence that he had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio.

From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations.
When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.[17] These, Atty. Alvero failed to
do.

Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and
properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the
same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case,
respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainant's
repeated demands.[18]

Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client
relationship between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client
relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or
otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him.[19]

Atty. Alvero's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and
moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to
the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted
a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.[20] They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which
he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Small v. Banares,[21] the respondent was suspended for two years for violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case
for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for failing to
return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are
attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on
respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.

As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is
granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard
of honesty and fair dealing.[22] For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the
responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege
to practice law.[23]

WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the

IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which found respondent Atty. Anorlito A.
Alvero GUILTY of gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for
a period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

DIVISION

[ AC. No. 5082, Feb 17, 2004 ]

MILAGROS N. ALDOVINO v. ATTY. PEDRO C. PUJALTE +

DECISION
467 Phil. 556
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment and/or disciplinary action [1] against Atty. Pedro C.
Pujalte, Jr. filed by Milagros Nicodemus-Aldovino, Virgilio Nicodemus, Angela
Nicodemus-dela Cruz, Julita Nicodemus-Soco, Magdalena Nicodemus-Talens and
Teodoro S. Nicodemus for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Complainants alleged in their complaint that they are brothers and sisters and heirs of
Arcadia Nicodemus. Sometime in March, 1995, they hired the services of respondent
Atty. Pujalte, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. 95-46 filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 56, Lucena City. The suit was for specific performance with damages to
compel their sister, Loreto Nicodemus Pulumbarit, to deliver to them their shares in
the estate of their deceased mother.

On November 9, 1998 the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, FROM THE FOREGOING, the court finds for the defendant Loreto
Pulumbarit and accordingly orders the dismissal of the case with costs against plaintiffs
and orders the Branch Clerk of Court of this branch, upon finality of this decision to
withdraw from Savings Account No. 435-527745-9 at the Philippine National Bank and
to deliver the proceeds to all the heirs of Arcadia Nicodemus upon proper receipt. Both
counsels are directed to oversee the distribution and for them to jointly file their
manifestation on the matter."[2]
Accordingly, on December 1, 1998, Branch Clerk of Court Angelo A. Serdon withdrew
from the Philippine National Bank the sum of P1,335,109.68 under Savings Account
No. 435-527745-9.

In the presence of defendant Mrs. Loreto N. Pulumbarit and respondent counsel,

Branch Clerk of Court Serdon divided the withdrawn amount into eight shares of
P166,888.71 each. He gave the defendant two shares.  Then he handed the remaining
amount of P1,001,332.26, corresponding to six shares, to respondent upon his
representation that he is authorized to receive the money and to oversee the
distribution to complainants of their respective shares.

However, complainants did not receive their shares from respondent despite repeated
demands.  Thus, they engaged the services of Atty. Francisco I. Chavez who, on
December 17, 1998, sent a letter to respondent demanding that the amount of
P1,001,332.26 entrusted to him by the Branch Clerk of Court be turned over to
complainants.
On December 21, 1998, respondent wired Atty. Chavez that he will deliver to
complainants their respective shares "tomorrow morning."

What respondent delivered to herein complainants was only P751,332.26, instead

of P1,001,332.26 because he deducted P250,000.00 therefrom.  He claimed that this
amount is his attorney's fees per his agreement with Milagros Aldovino, complainants'
representative.  On February 23, 1999, Atty. Chavez again wired respondent
demanding that he return to complainants the amount of P236,000.00.  As explained
by Atty. Chavez in his telegram, respondent could retain only P14,000.00 (not
P250,000.00), which amount is in addition to the P86,000.00 initially paid to him by
complainants as his attorney's fees.  According to complainants, the sum of
P100,000.00 (P86,000.00 plus P14,000.00) is more than the amount of attorney's
fees agreed upon by the parties. Still, respondent failed to return to complainants the
amount of P236,000.00, which is the balance after deducting P14,000.00 from
P250,000.00.

In his comment dated September 3, 1999, respondent admitted that he received from
the Branch Clerk of Court "P1,335,109.68" representing complainants' shares.
Thereafter, he waited for complainants Virgilio and Teodoro Nicodemus and Engr.
Isidro Aureada at the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon where he had a hearing,
but they did not come.

To disprove deceit on his part, he attached to his comment his letter dated December 2,
1998 to Engr. Isidro Aureada[3] informing the latter that he waited for those
complainants in order to give them the money.

Respondent claimed that there is a verbal agreement between him and Milagros
Aldovino, representative of complainants, that they will pay him P250,000.00 as his
attorney's fees. Consequently, he deducted and retained this amount from the money
delivered to him by the Branch Clerk of Court.  At any rate, he wrote complainants on
December 23, 1998 regarding this matter.[4]

In her Report dated March 10, 2003,[5] IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala

made the following findings and recommendation:

"xxx. In the case at bar, after respondent got hold of the entire settlement amount, he
did not immediately turn over the said amount to the complainants who had to look
and search for him. It was only when respondent was threatened with a legal action
(Estafa, docketed as Grim. Case No. 99-1017, RTC Br. 58, Lucena City) that he decided
to return the balance of the settlement amount but after deducting P250,000.00 which
he claims to be his attorney's fees. Complainants alleged that they have already paid
respondent the amount of P86,000.00 which was more than double the agreed upon
professional fees. Complainants even agreed to pay an additional P14.000.00 to
complete the amount of P100,000.00 but there was no agreement to the effect that
respondent will be paid P250,000.00. Respondent unilaterally appropriated the
amount of P250,000.00 without the conformity of complainants. The lawyer is allowed
to apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursement subject to the condition that he shall promptly notify his client (Rule
16.03, CPR). The lawyer cannot unilaterally appropriate for himself the money of his
client for payment of his attorney's fees which the client owes to the former (Cabigao
vs. Rodrigo, 57 Phil 20; Capulong vs. Alino, 22 SCRA 491).

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, we find respondent to have violated Canon 16 and 16.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommends that he be suspended for the
period of one (1) year from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member
of the Bar."
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, Pasig City, passed Resolution No. XV-
2003-347 adopting and approving the Report of IBP Commissioner Maala.

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent
violated Canon 16, Code of Professional Responsibility and suspending him from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

Canon 16 and its Rule 16.03 provide:

"CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

"x x x            x x x                x x x

"Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court."
Respondent should have complied with the above provisions.  When complainants
demanded that the sum of P1,001,332.26 be delivered to them, he should have heeded
promptly.  Had they not hired a lawyer and charged him with estafa, he would not have
turned over the money to them. While it may be true that he has "a lien over the funds,"
he should have notified complainants about it in due time.

Respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally as lawyer's lien, [6] the sum
of P250,000.00.  As found by IBP Commissioner Maala, there was no agreement
between him and complainants that he could retain P250,000.00 as attorney's fees. In
fact, he did not adduce any proof of such agreement.  His mere allegation or claim is
not proof.[7]Obviously, his failure to return the money to complainants upon demand
gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed
on him.[8] His act of holding on to their money without their acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of, integrity and propriety. [9] He was clinging to something not his and
to which he had no right.[10]

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar.  They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession[11] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession.[12]Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[13] And whenever it
is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made
him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.[14]Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity
as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pedro C. Pujalte, Jr. is hereby declared guilty of

violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
immediately.  He is ordered to return the sum of P236,000.00 to complainants within
five (5) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5454 : November 23, 2004]
CARMELINA Y. RANGWANI, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON S. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against Atty. Ramon S. Diño by Carmelina Y.
Rangwani before this Court. In her complaint, Rangwani alleged that sometime in the
years 1995 to 1996, Atty. Diño befriended her. Owing to his status in the community as
a good lawyer and businessman, respondent was able to convince the complainant to
part with her title to a parcel of land located in Dasmariñas, Cavite, under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2791-97, Entry 5320-102. After the lapse of five months,
complainant demanded the return of her title from respondent who promised to return
the same but failed to do so. After ten months, respondent was nowhere to be found.
Complainant, with the help of an informer, was able to locate respondent who turned
out to have transferred his residence to Makati City. Upon confrontation, respondent
retorted that he could not give back the title to the land. Instead, he offered to buy the
property. Thus, he issued the following checks1 to complainant:

Check No. 0062631 0062632 0062633 0062634

Date May 15, 1999 June 15, 1999 July 15, 1999 July 30, 1999

Amount 50,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 52,570.00

When deposited, all the checks bounced for the reason "closed account."

In the year 1999, complainant filed Criminal Cases No. 55666, No. 57029, No. 276070,
and No. 279784 for violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against the respondent.
Warrants for the arrest of respondent in relation to these cases were issued.2

On 29 August 2001, this Court, acting on the Complaint, issued a resolution requiring
the respondent to comment thereon on the complaint.3 On 22 November 2001,
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment and for a
Formal Hearing. In this motion, he bared that the Court's resolution requiring him to
comment was sent to his parents' residence. He claimed he has been living for the past
two years in a rented house at Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, and has been in the
province for the last three weeks attending to business concerns. He said he was not
aware that a disbarment complaint has been filed against him. While he admitted that
there were cases previously filed by complainant against him, said cases had already
been withdrawn and the corresponding desistance, waiver and quitclaim had been
signed by her and that complainant had in fact "received (already) the monetary claims
or their equivalent involving said cases."4 Respondent was, therefore, under the belief
that all those cases had been dismissed. Hence, he said, he was unaware that warrants
for his arrest were issued. He had been a lawyer for the past twenty-three years and this
is the first and only case filed against him before the Court and in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). He was a working student who took various jobs at the early age
of seventeen. He took the 1977 bar exams and landed No. 13 with an average of
88.88%. He said his title as a lawyer and his license to practice are the only legacies he
can leave to his children; hence, he prays that he be given the chance to be heard
formally to be able to air his side.
On 16 January 2002, complainant filed her counter-affidavit5 disputing her alleged
withdrawal of this complaint and the denial by the respondent of the standing warrants
of arrest against him arising out of the incident in question. The same was referred to
the IBP.

In a resolution dated 28 January 2002,6 this Court resolved to grant respondent's

Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment on the administrative
complaint and for a Formal Hearing, and noted the comment therein. The case was
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days
from notice.
On 02 May 2002, complainant submitted a letter7 to the IBP withdrawing the
complaint she filed against respondent, stating that "after much reflection and recall of
the antecedent facts that led to the filing of the complaint, I have finally decided to
withdraw the same as it arose purely out of misunderstanding and miscommunication
and definitely not warranting any disciplinary action much less disbarment and
apologize for whatever inconvenience the complaint had cause[d] the office."
In an Order dated 19 June 2002, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the IBP,
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), to whom the case was assigned for investigation,
report and recommendation, notified the parties to appear for a hearing at said office
on 03 July 2002.
Per order dated 03 July 2002 of Commissioner Maala, it appears that when the case
was called for hearing, neither complainant nor respondent appeared. It was not
shown, however, whether they received notices of the scheduled hearing, hence, the
same was ordered cancelled and reset to 17 July 2002.

In a resolution dated 05 August 2002, this Court acting on the letter of complainant
dated 02 May 2002, resolved to note the same and referred it to the IBP.
On 07 October 2002, complainant submitted to the IBP a motion to hold and to quash
withdrawal of the administrative case expressing a desire to actively pursue her
complaint.
According to complainant, respondent begged her to dismiss the administrative
complaint she filed and promised to settle his obligations with her. It was only for this
reason that she agreed to sign a written withdrawal of her complaint. This was,
however, a mere promise which remained unfulfilled.8
Not very long after, on 25 October 2002, complainant again filed before the IBP a
Motion to Dismiss Complaint. As is usual in desistance, complainant manifested her
interest to have the complaint dismissed after what she said was a mature reflection,
realizing that respondent had served her faithfully, honorably and well in the various
cases that he had handled for her at a time when she needed it most. She articulated
that the cases she had filed against the respondent have long been settled between
them and should have been dismissed by the Court, but she was not aware that
respondent's presence is necessary for the dismissal of those cases, and she could not
locate respondent. She only discovered later on that he was actually taken very ill due
to hypertension and gastro-intestinal problems. On the other hand, respondent, in an
effort to exculpate himself, averred he was under the impression that complainant
would take care and see to the dismissal of the said cases against him. To convince the
IBP that the case should be dismissed, complainant likewise claimed that respondent
had no more obligation to her because the same had been offset by legal services
rendered by the latter after an accounting was taken.9
In an Order dated 05 November 2002, issued by IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, the parties were notified to attend a hearing on the case which was
set on 04 December 2002.10 This scheduled hearing was, however, reset to 12
December 2002 for failure of the complainant to appear on the earlier date.11 At the
hearing set on 12 December 2002, both parties appeared but complainant moved to
reset on 29 January 2003 without objection from the respondent.12
On 31 January 2003, the IBP, in Compliance13 with this Court's resolution dated 20
November 200214 directing it to submit a status report on the case every first day of
the month until termination of the investigation, stated that because of complainant's
failure to appear and affirm her Affidavit of Desistance despite several hearings set by
the Commission, it now considered the cases submitted for report and
recommendation and to be decided on the merits thereof.
Per report of Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, respondent Atty. Ramon S.
Diño was found to have committed gross misconduct, and he was, thus, recommended
to be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of his profession as a lawyer
and member of the bar. This was reduced to six months by the IBP Board of Governors
in a resolution dated 21 June 2003, which reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XV-2003-343
Adm. Case No. 5454
Carmelina Y. Rangwani v. Atty. Ramon S. Diño
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification as to penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering that
respondent's issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. 22 constitutes
serious misconduct and in addition respondent committed gross misconduct when he
failed to comply his promise to complainant to settle the case, Atty. Ramon S. Diño is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree with the IBP's finding of guilt as the same is fully anchored on the evidence
on record and on applicable laws, rules and jurisprudence.

Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute the

charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation. The record is
bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing
evidence to meet the charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him
as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to
investigate the cases.15 On the contrary, respondent's comments only markedly
admitted complainant's accusations.16 When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.17
These, the respondent miserably failed to do.

Respondent relies, quite heavily, on the complainant's move to dismiss the complaint,
to secure exoneration. His reliance is misplaced. Firstly, because the same has not been
confirmed and substantiated by the complainant at all as she failed to appear in the
hearings scheduled for the purpose despite due notice. Secondly, and most
importantly, we have consistently looked with disfavor upon such desistance of
complainants because of legal and jurisprudential injunction.

Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. - . . . .

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

In Bais v. Tugaoen,18 the Court frowned upon the complainant's affidavit of desistance,
hence, in spite of it, proceeded with the complaint against the erring judge.
In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,19 we expostulated that:

The withdrawal of a complaint for lack of interest of a complainant does not necessarily
warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint (Dagsa-an v. Conag, 290 SCRA 12
[1998]). The Court cannot be bound by the unilateral decision of a complainant to
desist from prosecuting a case involving the discipline of parties subject to its
administrative supervision (Zamora v. Jumamoy, 238 SCRA 587 [1994]). The need to
maintain the faith and confidence of our people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities demands that proceedings in administrative cases against public
officers and employees should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of
complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses (Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705
[1991]).

The later case of Executive Judge Pacifico S. Bulado v. Domingo Tiu, Jr. (A.M. No. P-
96-1211, 31 March 2000, pp. 4-5, 329 SCRA 308), more pointedly stated that '

While complainant in this case may have forgiven respondent, this Court, charged as it
is with enforcing discipline in the judiciary, cannot simply close its eyes to respondent's
acts of extreme intransigence. Withdrawal of the complaint will not free respondent
from his administrative liability (Estreller v. Manatad, Jr., 268 SCRA 608 [1997]),
particularly because administrative proceedings are imbued with public interest, public
office being a public trust (Gacho v. Fuentes, Jr., 291 SCRA 474 [1998]).

The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government, its
agencies and its instrumentalities requires that proceedings in administrative cases
should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are,
in a real sense, only witnesses therein (Estreller v. Manatad, supra; Gacho v. Fuentes,
supra). The court cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
that involves its disciplinary authority over all employees of the judiciary; otherwise,
our disciplinary power may be put to naught (Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611
[1996]).

Finally, in Bolivar v. Simbol,20 the Court, citing In re Davies,21 ruled that the
discipline of lawyers cannot be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges:

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this settlement operated as an
absolution and remission of his offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the
exercise of the power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties,
but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices
in his profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an attorney at the bar,
and without "good fidelity" to his client. The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could
not thus settle or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.
Respondent's act of having borrowed the title to the land of complainant, his presumed
use of the said title for his personal gain, his failure to return the same despite repeated
demands and worse, his issuance of three checks in exchange for the said land title
which bounced, constitute gross misconduct for which he must be disciplined. In this
connection Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unequivocal. It
states:

Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.22

In the case of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles v. Atty. Thomas Uy, Jr.,23 this Court held:

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high
degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to
prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client"
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1992 ed., p. 188).

Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall
hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession."
Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that "a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client." The Canons of
Professional Ethics is even more explicit:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should
not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

This Court, in several cases,24 has time and again ruled that the fiduciary duty of a
lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and
confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence
is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal
profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required
to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of their profession.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.25

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity,
that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Every lawyer should act
and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.26

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers at all times to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.27

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The question now arises as to the proper penalty to be imposed.

As to the propriety of imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.28 While we will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.29 In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient
sanction against respondent - suspension being primarily intended not as a
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.30

The following cases rendered by this Court and the penalties imposed thereto where
Rule 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility finds application are enlightening.

In the earlier case of Aya v. Bigornia,31 the Court ruled that money collected by a
lawyer in favor of his clients must be immediately turned over to them and failure to do
so merits a penalty of suspension for six months. In Daroy v. Legaspi,32 the Court held
that lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on
behalf of their clients and failure to do constitutes professional misconduct warranting
disbarment. Subsequently, in the case of Obia v. Catimbang,33 respondent Atty. Basilio
M. Catimbang was ordered indefinitely suspended for failure to return the amount of
P11,000 entrusted to him. Still later, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,34 the Court likewise
ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya for his receipt of and
failure to deliver the amount of P4,344 to his client, complainant in the case.

In the case of Burbe v. Magulta,35 this Court imposed upon Atty. Magulta the penalty
of suspension for one (1) year for his conversion into legal fees the filing fee entrusted
to him by his client.

In the case of Nuñez v. Ricafort,36 this Court ordered the indefinite suspension of Atty.
Romulo Ricafort for his act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of an alias writ of
execution for money judgment rendered against him.

Therein, the Court held:

There is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that

respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and
committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her
property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court
for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time
and energy therefore. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint
resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the
Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the
docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails
and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the
latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to
complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But,
remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly
malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged
by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his
obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22, he did not pay the obligation.

While the case of Nuñez v. Ricafort37 holds some similarity to the present case, it is
material to note that this is the first time that a complaint of this nature has been filed
against the respondent. Likewise, unlike the Nuñez case, the criminal cases filed by the
complainant have not been finally disposed of, hence, no conviction against respondent
was ever obtained. On all fours to this case is the case of Lao v. Medel.38 Respondent
Atty. Robert W. Medel, who issued four checks which were subsequently dishonored
totaling twenty-two thousand pesos (P22,000) in payment of his outstanding
obligation, was ordered suspended for one year by this Court in line with the cases of
Co. v. Bernardino,39 Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,40 and Saburnido v. Madroño.41

Finally, in the most recent case of Isidra Barrientos, et al. v. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
Meteoro,42 this Court imposed upon respondent Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months for having issued several checks to the
complainants in payment of a pre-existing debt without sufficient funds -

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a
lawyer's low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold
in high esteem.

This Court justified the imposition of a lighter penalty of six months upon Atty.
Libiran-Meteoro instead of one year as was imposed in the case of Lao v. Medel43 on
the ground of Atty. Libiran-Meteoro's payment of a portion of her debt to the
complainant.

In the same manner, we find that the lesser penalty of six months cannot be imposed
upon herein respondent Atty. Diño on the ground that, just like the case of Lao v.
Medel, there is no showing of any restitution whatsoever in this case on the part of the
respondent. Likewise, the fraudulent manner by which he was able to entice
complainant to entrust to him the title to her land should also be taken into account.

As was so aptly stated in Cuizon v. Macalino:44

Such conduct indicates the respondent's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon S. Diño is found guilty of GROSS

MISCONDUCT and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent's suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this Decision.
Let notice of this Decision be spread on respondent's record as an attorney in this
Court, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

473 Phil. 161

 SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 5817, May 26, 2004 ]

EMMA V. DE JUAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In her Salaysay filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 29, 2002,
complainant, former client of respondent, charged respondent with negligence in
handling her labor case and threats against her person.

The complainant alleged that respondent Atty. Oscar R. Baria III, as her counsel in
NLRC NCR CA No. 022654-00/NLRC RAB IV-7-11287-99-R, Emma De Juan v. Triple
AAA Antique/Mr. Yappe and Mr. Godofredo Nadia, negligently failed to file motion
for reconsideration of the decision dated September 24, 2001 of the NLRC in her
behalf.[1]

The complainant avers that she was hired by Triple AAA on or about December 15,
1998 as packer on probation status for six months in its Packing Department. [2] Based
on a performance evaluation citing her irregular attendance and inefficiency, the
company terminated her services on June 11, 1999, [3] after waiting for two weeks for
her to report. She claims that she was terminated without notice nor explanation [4] so
she filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against
the company for illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday, rest day,
and 13th month pay. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.[5]

In search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance of Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation

(BBC) which assigned respondent to handle her labor case. Respondent represented
complainant on a contingency fee agreement.

On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of complainant.
[6]
 Triple AAA appealed to the NLRC. In a decision promulgated on September 24,
2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared there was no illegal dismissal.
[7]

Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she came to know of the
reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision when she called respondent in October 2001.
When she asked the respondent what they should do, respondent answered, "Paano
iyan iha…eh…hindi ako marunong gumawa ng Motion for
Reconsideration." Sometime in November 2001, her husband called respondent to ask
if he did anything in connection with the NLRC's Decision and he was advised by
respondent's secretary that, "Sabi ni Atty…huwag na kayong magpakita sa kanya
dahil galit na galit sa inyo si Attorney at baka kung ano pa ang magawa niya sa
inyo."[8]

The Court required respondent to comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [9]
In his Comment, respondent explained that soon after passing the bar in 1999, he was
employed as a broadcaster in DWAN's radio program offering free legal services to the
poor. He gave free legal services to indigent clients one of whom was complainant. As a
practice, he said he forewarned his clients that he was just a new lawyer and that they
should not expect too much from him because of his limited legal experience.
According to respondent he tried to explain to complainant the legal remedies available
to her as well as the time her case may take. It appeared to him that complainant did
not fully grasp the usual delays that may be involved in her case. He recalled that when
he told complainant that the Labor Arbiter's decision was in her favor, she was so
jubilant at the money judgment. Later however, the complainant became furious when
he told her that Triple AAA Antique had appealed. Respondent filed a Motion for Writ
of Execution of the Labor Arbiter's Decision but this Motion was ruled premature.
Respondent then filed an opposition to the appeal filed by Triple AAA but the NLRC
still gave due course to the appeal. While Triple AAA's appeal was pending resolution
he told complainant to call him every week so that she could be advised of any
developments in her case. He generously suggested that complainant call "collect" to
lessen her expenses. He even allowed complainant and her husband to stay in his home
when they came to Manila from the province. He said he even fed them when they were
in Manila.

In October 2001, the NLRC rendered its decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. By this
time, according to respondent, he confronted complainant for lying to him about her
employment with Triple AAA and told her that because of her lies there was a
possibility she could lose the appeal. He advised complainant to get a more experienced
lawyer for her appeal because as a new lawyer he was not confident he could handle her
appeal. Thereafter, complainant no longer contacted him and at some time, he even
had to ask her whereabouts from her relatives.

On December 2001, respondent received calls from the staff of Raffy Tulfo, a radio
commentator. In one of these calls, his wife talked to one of Tulfo's employees and she
was told that complainant told Tulfo that the respondent received money from Triple
AAA Antique. As a result Tulfo lambasted him on his radio program. Respondent
thereafter called Tulfo, explained his side, and demanded that the latter apologize on
air otherwise he would file a libel case against Tulfo.

Sometime in January 2002, respondent's secretary received a call from the

complainant's husband. When respondent's secretary confronted the husband
regarding the Tulfo incident, complainant's husband retorted, "Sabihin mo sa kanya
mag ingat siya at baka may mangyari sa kanya." Shortly thereafter, respondent
began receiving death threats over the phone and also noticed armed men casing his
office. He reported these calls and presence of suspicious armed men to the police.

Respondent surmises that complainant believed Triple AAA paid him off and he
pocketed money supposedly for her. Respondent vehemently denied he did. He asks
that Triple AAA be summoned to bear witness to his story. Respondent asserts that he
has not committed any breach of his oath and that he has vigorously pursued his
client's cause to the end. He avers that it was his client's own negligence and folly that
caused her to lose her case. He asks that the complaint be dismissed.

In a Resolution dated March 15, 2003, this Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline required complainant to reply. In her reply written in Filipino, complainant
denied that she accepted money from respondent during the pendency of her labor
case, except on one occasion when she borrowed P100 from respondent's secretary for
travel fare back to the province. She reiterated that she filed her Salaysaybecause of
respondent's failure to file a motion for reconsideration. She further insists that she
does not believe that respondent did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration
as he claims since she was aware that even a law student would know how to.
In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, the IBP approved the recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of
negligence in handling the aforecited labor case and recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law for three months. The charge of grave threats was
dismissed for complainant's failure to substantiate the same.[10]

The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainant a motion for
reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client,
but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. [11]Further,
among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes
an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case
becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and
withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in
the circumstances.[12] Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the client.[13] This
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.[14]

The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration
of the NLRC such that the said decision eventually had become final and executory.
Respondent does not refute this. His excuse that he did not know how to file a motion
forreconsideration is lame and unacceptable. After complainant had expressed an
interest to file a motion for reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to
diligently return to his books and re-familiarize himself with the procedural rules for a
motion for reconsideration. Filing a motion for reconsideration is not a complicated
legal task.
We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright and candid with his
client when he warned her of his lack of experience as a new lawyer. We are also not
unaware that he had advised complainant to get a new lawyer. However, his candor
cannot absolve him. As already stressed by this Court:
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure and
anyone who acquires his service is entitled to not just competent service but also
whole-hearted devotion to his client's cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client
with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect within the
bounds of law the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable
for disciplinary action.[15]
Again, the Court held in the case of Santos v. Lazaro,[16] that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[17] explicitly provides that negligence of lawyers in
connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable.
Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent
remains counsel of record and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from
the case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold. An attorney may only
retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the
court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.[18] Respondent did not comply with
these obligations.

WHEREFORE, respondent lawyer Oscar R. Baria III is hereby FINED in the amount

of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of this or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9387 (Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

 SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9387 (Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562), June 20, 2012 ]

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VENANCIO B.

PADILLA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer,
Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his
alleged negligence in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an
ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge

Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be
cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan),
attorney's fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants' Brief. They chose
respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal instead of an Appellants' Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution [2] dated 16 December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed
by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he
acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law." [3]Complainant and
her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent "several
times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld
response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. [4]

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was
informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came
to her house and informed her of the Resolution.                             

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint [5]with the

Committee on Bar Discipline  of the  Integrated  Bar  of the Philippines (IBP), seeking
the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave
misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of P350,000.

Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A.

Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-
Affidavit/Answer,[7]respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior
to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met
complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him.
According to respondent, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a
Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was to
lapse within two or three days."[8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which
was required."[9]

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant's husband to settle

the case. The latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice." [10]

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent
never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his
advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring
him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his
office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of communication, but to no
avail."[11]Thus, when complainant's husband went to the office of respondent to tell the
latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CA's

Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer
exclaimed, "KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."[12]

In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid,

Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code).  He recommended that respondent be suspended from
practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August
2010.  Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the relaxation of the
application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors
passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17[15] partly granting his  Motion  and  reducing the
penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis
A.B. Funa, through, a letter[16] addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court,
however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. 
We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August
2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal
of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed
as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her
husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-
APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and
further allege that: x x x."[18 ]Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on
behalf of complainant's husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainant's husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for
a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client
entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x[19]

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he
also alleges that complainant's husband never contacted him after the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if
he really believed that he engaged" the former's services.[20]

Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer, because he
accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P7,000.

According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant's claim that he

charged P7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading
which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: xxx."[22]

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.[23] Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case,
it is that lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. [24] Respondent
has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant's husband

asked from him.  Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal,
because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading required, based on what
complainant's husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner's observation on this matter, in the 5 January

2009 Report, is correct.  Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have
believed to be necessary, it was respondent's duty to know the proper pleading to be
filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should
have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by
ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Ru]e 41 of thel997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.  In all such cases. Rule 44 of the said Rules applies. [25]

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule
44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant's brief be filed
after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator,
was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing
legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as
well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been

expounded in Dularia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not. be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the
reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time
to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP
reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent's plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the
case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant's lawyer
from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to
diligently study a case he had agreed to handle.  If he felt he did not have enough time
to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant's
husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant's
Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper
pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline
set by the Court of Appeals."[27]

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed
the wrong pleading.  However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as
ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA's Order. He claims that he
was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the
case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latter's
Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent's actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of,
from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the
disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, He chose to sit
on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their
case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which
reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent
could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance
as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of
complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no
longer contact them.[28] His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan's
Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable
for negligence in handling the client's case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence
in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. [29 ]

Respondent has failed to live up' to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his
duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he
should be held accountable.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules

18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
VICENTE A. PICHON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the
late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On
three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 -₱3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - ₱5,250.00 or a
total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed
by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.1

Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received
the amount of ₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that
complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the
complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed
attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he
advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the
30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that
since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of ₱10,050.00 was
deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and
attorney’s fee.2

In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee
and asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to ₱7,836.60.

In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months.

In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of only one (1) month. The Court agrees with the recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty imposed. Atty. Agleron violated
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.6 He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.7

In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared
and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the
attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate
him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had
not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to
his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant
and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.

In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action
such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the Court
finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR.
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766, August 05, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, v. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated

February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against
respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a
spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the
case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late

Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of
property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After
accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25,
2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence.5 While respondent was
notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the
same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office.7 On such occasion,
respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal
fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as
payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On
September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on
even date, filed a notice of appeal9 before the RTC.

In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent,
however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated
November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing
the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan,
within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for
such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension
of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9,
2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also
found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it

was complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of P1,400.00 to pay for the
appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed
complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in
pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant “not for money or
malice” but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable
decision.16cralawred

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively
liable, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one
(1) year be meted out against him.

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent

to be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations
squarely, particularly, the issue of the non-disclosure of the dismissal of the partition
case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the
issues at hand.19cralawred

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s

accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant,
ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover
up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it
appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20cralawred

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client
constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the
latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should
notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case
will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The
lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the
client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that
his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and
legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client’s cause.

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew
of the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he
never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the
same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury,
respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September
12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright
dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of
the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment.

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by

fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to
make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the
same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the
part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which
whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his
practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with
utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and
thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful

scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the
use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should
not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard,
the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship
with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member
of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their
clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of
six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same
period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of
their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed
on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases,
notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct
by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and
disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who
falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property.
Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer
who falsified an inexistent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to
misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his
case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an
appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are
so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral
unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode
rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of
the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client,
respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross

Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll
of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante’s record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2417. February 6, 2002.]
ALEX ONG, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a disbarment 1 case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City,
against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig
City) found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-
month suspension from the practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand
against him. 2

First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a
demand-letter from the respondent, in the latter’s capacity as legal counsel of one
Nemesia Garganian. The full text of respondent’s letter 3 reads:

"Dear Mr. Ong,

This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client)
from you for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian)
and other claims which Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two
months that you have abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only
child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given
said financial support.

I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire

so, so that you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection
with your legal and moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.

May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should
return to her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during
her absence and without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this
demand, this office will be constrained to file the proper action in court against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law
Office at the above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to
discuss with me about the preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss
Garganian against you.

I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly,
otherwise your intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our
office might be construed as your absolute refusal really.

Expecting you then.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN"

A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno
(Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the
alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and
discussed the courses of action that he would take against the complainant should the
latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The
relevant portion of the respondent’s second letter reads: 4

"These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. P1,500.00 monthly — For the sustenance of Mr. Ong’s son. . . . (Note: That this
amount of P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr. Ong’s son in the
elementary course and this is subject to adjustment when the son is already in the
secondary course or up to his college course).

2. P50,000.00 — This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting

capital for her planned business venture to give her a source of her living since she
cannot anymore be a teacher in any government position because of her status, having
a child without being lawfully wedded. . . .

3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss
Garganian, without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong . . .

4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorney’s fees should be given or paid to me

tomorrow before noon in my Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.

Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr.
Alex Ong will be withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise
agreements.

Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one week time as grace period for
Mr. Ong is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian"

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s brother
and that the complainant merely assumed his brother’s obligation to appease Ms.
Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply
with the demands against him.

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint 5 with the Office of the City Fiscal (now
Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim,
and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and
the Anti-Dummy Law.

The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant,
Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant

before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, and the Office of the Solicitor General. 6 According to the complainant,
these cases were subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid
government agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment.
Essentially, the complainant alleged that the respondent "manufactured" the criminal
and administrative cases against him to blackmail him or extort money from him. He
claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be used against
him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would be witness a certain
percentage of whatever amounts they could get from him. The complainant branded
the respondent’s tactics as "highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constituting . . . malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer."

In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1)
the afore-quoted letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr.
Bueno; (2) Nemesia Garganian’s affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding
the demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit
allegedly prepared by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was
acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganian’s son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal
complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta,
a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of the respondent had
asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer "to
give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex
Ong." To further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant
also included a Supplemental Affidavit, 7 citing several cases previously filed against
the respondent by other parties. 8

The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the
complaint lodged against him. 9 He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was
endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the
investigation.

It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then
Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he
moved for postponement. After denying the respondent’s third request for
postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainant’s
evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the on-going investigation but he did not
show up. When it was the respondent’s turn to present evidence, notices of the
preliminary investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros
Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City.
The return cards showed that he could not be located, although his wife received some
of the notices sent to his home in Dumaguete.

Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with
some of them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2nd
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondent’s
absence as waiver of his right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the
complainant’s cause, the investigator recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be severly reprimanded.

The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General. 10
Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
Manila, "for proper disposition, conformably with adopted policies and procedures." 11
The IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinili’s report and
recommendation in toto. 12

We affirm with modification.

The complainant seeks the disbarment of the Respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the
importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed
in Noriega v. Sison. 13 We then held:
"In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity
and respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the
profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of
patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself
and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value
of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily
arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every attorney is
deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief
Justice Marshall of the United States Court when he said:

‘On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the
prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise.

The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the
other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be
maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these
objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.’

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a

source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them."

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 14 It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within
the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that "a lawyer shall employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding."

Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good
faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the
records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by
threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not
heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and
administrative cases against the complainant. We find the respondent’s action to be
malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing
or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has
violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could
provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage
in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that
a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding 15
and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. 16 In the case of
Choa v. Chiongson, 17 we held:

"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as
the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of his client’s case with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal
processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him
to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that "he
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same" ; . . . Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his
client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice,
and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyer’s
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a
course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party."

(emphases ours)

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity. 18 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded
by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer
should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19

Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified
thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions,
the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His
nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards
the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of
his conduct. 20 The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath 21 he took before
this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyer’s oath should not be
reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high
standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one
(1) month suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis-a-vis the
misconduct of the Respondent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty

of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Unto’s personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7298 June 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the
contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax
evasion and falsification of documents.

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in
an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of
MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation and Mediation
Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference,
respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from
her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless.
Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences
and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter
to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also
contained the following threat to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established
precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.

2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion

3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents

4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).1

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards,
complainant filed an administrative complaint2 with the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with
Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)3 claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A.
Jocson, complainant's legal counsel, also played an important part in imputing the
malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him. Respondent also pointed
out that the complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated
only to confuse the issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way of
counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment of Atty. Jocson.
Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for
Usurpation of Public Functions4 and for violation of the Notarial Law.5

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to

appear.6 Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.

The Report and Recommendation7 of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San

Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum shopping and,
accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent. On 26
May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.8 On 10 July 2006, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said
Resolution and the records of the case.9 Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent
filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification of Decision)10
reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four hundred
million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the "false,
malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive,
evasive filing [of] a groundless and false suit."11

Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline)12 alleging that he personally submitted and filed with
the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered
mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due process when the IBP
dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and without ruling on
the merits thereof.

Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006
Resolution13 of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.

Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his position
paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP
stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21
December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the same document also shows that it
was sent by registered mail to respondent on the same date. 14
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this
Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint
against respondent.

The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by

Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed
with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made
effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed
in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No.
04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party
concerned.16

The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against
complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his
complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees
and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would
unduly prolong its adjudication.

The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment

proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement,
complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the merit of
complainant's complaint against respondent.

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,17 dwelt on the sui generis character of
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.18 [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum

shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings,
must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same
respondent, because such other proceedings or "action" is one that necessarily involves
"the same issues" as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the
certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is
to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same
issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid
the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse
of court processes,19 which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.20 Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping
seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the
pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice,
prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the
courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or
agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.21

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification
against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario
sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting
decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings
are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person."22 Thus, if the
complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping,
the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of
forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible."23

At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the
supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that complainant
submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6 December 2006
when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss the present
petition.

Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies the grant
of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter
to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice;
to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.24 In particular, Rule 19.01
commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded
or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to
secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against
the lawyer's client.25

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the
amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including
moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to
blackmail.

Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure

or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of
refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated
to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is
equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the
performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not
infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by
promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the
victim.26

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27 we held that "[a]n accusation for blackmail and
extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only
respondent's disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal
prosecution."28 While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence,
the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the
offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the
same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party,
and, with boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to
report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State."29 He
further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition
and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that

respondent's threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some
leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not respondent's
intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far
from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about the said
violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship
that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent,
the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary
to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified
period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to
pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have
nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously
designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed,
letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule
under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is
not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used
it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of
his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that
disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he
wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client's interests. Accordingly,
the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006

Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the
penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS,

Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.

Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction

the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for
at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A - "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil

Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B - "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM

Annex C - "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney
may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ
En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November
13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof,
what appears to be respondent’s signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2 dated February
14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, Makati, denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent’s "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged: 5

3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and
pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe
in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only
to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor
and honest belief in all good faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which
found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration
of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999.
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final
action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example."

x x x

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent’s
Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least
six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in
the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the
years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged
in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since
1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

SECTION 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter
and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

SECTION 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section

12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true
that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby

misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.chanrobles.com :

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas’ personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.