26 Candijay vs.

CA
G.R. No. 116702/1995
Panganiban, J./ frl

SUBJECT MATTER: Gen Prov.>Basic Principles>Gen. Power & Attributes> De Facto Corporations

SUMMARY: Petitioner (Municipality of Candijay) and private respondent (Municipality of Alicia) are both
municipalities of Bohol that are both claiming Barrio Pagahat (among other contentions) to be part of their
territorial jurisdiction. RTC ruled for petitioner and CA reversed due to equiponderance of evidence and left the
two municipalities without a determination of who has jurisdiction. One of the arguments raised by M. of
Candijay is a collateral attack on M’ of Alicia’s juridical personality as a municipality created under a void law
(invalid delegation of legislative power). SC held that while M. of Alicia may have been created under a void law,
the continued recognition of the State/government of its existence via official acts, and the subsequent curative
provision of Sec 442 of Local Government Code (declaring as regular municipalities all those organized
pursuant to presidential issuance/executive order.) are enough for it to be considered as a regular de jure
municipality.

DOCTRINES:
Despite a void law creating a municipal corporation, the municipal corporation can attain a status uniquely
of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation when
certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of said municipality
and in its long period of time in existence no one questions its juridical personality seasonably.

Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code: Municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Municipality of Candijay, Bohol

Respondent Court of Appeals; Municipality of Alicia, Bohol

1. Petitioner Municipality of Candijay and private respondent Municipality of Alicia are both claiming
Barrio Pagahat as part of its territory.
2. RTC first ruled in favor of petitioner, but CA reversed after declaring equiponderance of evidence
(See Other notes). Declaring Barrio Pagahat (and other barrios as a consequence) to be part of
petitioner’s territory would also have meant enlarging the territory of Candijay – exceeding her
territorial jurisdiction under the law that created her. Hence, CA dismissed the case.
3. One of the arguments raised by petitioner in the lower courts was Municipality of Alicia’s lack of
juridical personality as EO 265 which created it 35 years ago was void- as it was based on an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President- Sec 68 of Rev. Admin. Code, as declared in Pelaez
vs. Auditor General)
4. Candijay’s Petition for review on certiorari questioned improper application of equiponderance of
evidence, CA error in not deciding on the issue raised by both towns as to territory, and M. of
Alicia’s lack of juridical personality.

ISSUES:
1. WON CA improperly applied the principle of “equiponderance of evidence,” for having based its
ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which are allegedly void
2. WON the CA erred in not solving the problem of both towns but instead throwing them back again
to their controversy.
3. WON the respondent municipality lacks of juridical personality, as a result of having been created
under a void executive order

HELD/RATIO:
SC cited the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., to be instructive:
In said case, the juridical personality of Municipality of San Andres was being attacked by a quo warranto
proceeding instituted by the petitioners in said case, 30 years after its creation. The court held that a a  quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised as public interest
demands it. During the 30 years, San Andres began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a
duly created local government unit.

SC held that M. of San Andres in the cited case attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation:
1. certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres (other EO pertaining to San Andres – promoting it to a 5 th class municipality
from a district; inclusion in establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country)
2. long period of time in existence without anyone questioning the law creating it despite Pelaez vs
Auditor General being promulgated a mere 6 years from its creation.

Equally significant are the ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution: the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of
Quezon

Also, Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.” No pretension of unconstitutionally per se of Section 442 (d) of the Local
Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to
create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. 

SC held in that case: All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of
Quezon
must now be conceded.

Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should
likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be
considered as a regular, de jure municipality.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED

Others:
Issues 1 & 2:

SC held that the issues of fact in this case had been adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision,
and is well-supported by the evidence on record. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by
the
respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed
unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.

As evaluated by the respondent Court, neither party was able to make out a case; neither side could establish
its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded
to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have
no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

Equiponderance of evidence rule states:

When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one
side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.

Under the principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.