CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND

PAKISTAN: SOVEREIGNTY OVER

KASHMIR

PP5164 International Conflict Analysis and Resolution by Prof. Francesco Mancini

Group Members
Eng Sovannchita
Nikhil Saraswat
Someth Somnea
Vybhav Dhar
CONTENTS
Executive summary ............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1 Client ........................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Rationale: Turning Drag into a Growth Engine ......................................................................................... 2
1.3 Self-Assessment ......................................................................................................................................... 2
1.4 Methodology .............................................................................................................................................. 3
2.0 Kashmir Conflict-Profile .................................................................................................................................. 3
2.1 Key Historical Events .................................................................................................................................. 3
2.2 Roots of Territorial Conflict ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 Socio-Political Profile ................................................................................................................................. 6
2.4 Politico-Economic Profile ........................................................................................................................... 6
2.5 Conflict Affected Areas .............................................................................................................................. 7
3.0 Stakeholder Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 7
3.1 Local Stakeholders: Pro-India .................................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Local Staheolders: Pro-Independence: ...................................................................................................... 8
3.3 Local Stakeholders: Pro-Pakistan............................................................................................................... 8
3.4 State Organizations ................................................................................................................................... 9
3.5 International Stakeholders ..................................................................................................................... 11
4.0 Systems Conflict Analysis: Key Drivers of Conflict ....................................................................................... 12
4.1 Key Driver 1: - Geographical Challenge in Securing Border .................................................................... 13
4.2 Key Driver 2: - Terrorist Attacks and Insurgency ..................................................................................... 13
4.3 Key Driver 3: - Functioning of ‘State within a State’ ............................................................................... 14
4.4 Key Driver 4: - Trust deficit between the governments .......................................................................... 15
4.5 Key Driver 5: - Geo-political interests and foreign interventions ........................................................... 15
4.6 Key Driver 6: - Legacy and History of Conflicts ........................................................................................ 16
5.0 Capacity for Peace Building ........................................................................................................................... 16
5.1 Ceasefire: First step in Peace Process ...................................................................................................... 16
5.2 Bringing Non-State Actors for discussions on the Table ......................................................................... 17
5.3 Bilateral Dialogue ..................................................................................................................................... 17
5.4 Opening Borders for Grassroot engagement .......................................................................................... 18
5.5. Political dialogue with people of Kashmir and strengthening local governance .................................... 18
6.0 Kashmir Conflict- Scenario Building .............................................................................................................. 19
6.1 Scenario One: Formalizing the status quo ............................................................................................... 20
6.2 Scenario Two: Kashmir joins Pakistan ..................................................................................................... 20
6.3 Scenario Three: Kashmir joins India ........................................................................................................ 21
 6.4 Scenario Four: Independent Jammu & Kashmir ...................................................................................... 21
6.5 Scenario Five: Conflict as Usual ............................................................................................................... 22
7.0 Kashmir Conflict: Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 22
7.1 RECOMMENDATION 1: Technology driven solutions for border management....................................... 23
7.2 RECOMMENDATION 2: Military cooperation agreement......................................................................... 23
7.3 RECOMMENDATION 3: Settling border differences with China as precursor .......................................... 23
7.4 RECOMMENDATION 4: Earnest implementation of 'Insaniyat’ (Humanity), ‘Jamhooriyat’ (Democracy)
and ‘Kashmiriyat’ (Identity of the people of Kashmir) doctrine..................................................................... 24
7.5 RECOMMENDATION 5: Evidence based security force withdrawal ....................................................... 24
7.6 RECOMMENDATION 6: Oslo accord style negotiations .......................................................................... 25
8. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 25
References ............................................................................................................................................................ 26
List of interviewees ............................................................................................................................................... 27
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan concerning sovereignty
over Kashmir. Dispute over the Kashmir owes its origin to pre-existing tensions between the
Hindu rulers of Kashmir and its Muslim dominated population. Partition of both the countries on
religious lines at the time of their independence in 1947 laid the foundations of territorial
conflict over Kashmir which witnessed three full scale wars. The religious fault lines in
combination with state apathy towards political and economic inclusion led to rise of insurgency
and militarization of youth in Indian administered Kashmir during late 1980s and was
opportunely exploited by Pakistan-based actors including Pak ‘FAUJ’, ISI, terrorist groups, NGOs
etc. with ideological, financial and logistics support. Several international actors are involved in
the conflict inter alia UN since its intervention in 1947, United States with its counter terrorism
agenda and reliance on Pakistan for Afghan exit, China’s rapidly developing infrastructure like
CPEC in disputed territories.

This report is addressed to Prime Minister’s Office (Govt. of India) as our client. Govt. of India
exercise the direct control over union territory of Kashmir through its appointed Governors.
Government of India is also the authority for restoration of diplomatic/political ties with
Pakistan. The existing capacities for peace between both the countries is delved in this report in
terms of ceasefire, bilateral dialogue, open borders facilitating grassroot engagement with
simultaneous socio-political dialogue and politico-economic reforms strengthening local
governance in Kashmir. Future scenarios are build considering the variables of mediation-
enabled resolution and plebiscite driven self-determination.

The recommendations recognize the role of stakeholders like China and neutral mediators like
Nepal in peaceful resolution of conflict. Evidence-based security forces withdrawal from Kashmir
is suggested as a precursor to democratic and developmental reforms like constitution of
inclusive special task force for early implementation of reformative national legislations,
financial package, extension of Panchayati Raj Institutions and promotion of local industry
among others. However, the solution to Kashmir crisis remains contingent on political will and
rapprochement. Confidence-building-measures like exchange of most wanted
terrorists/insurgents could be the beginning.

1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan has witnessed several full-scale wars,
ceasefire violations, terror attacks, trade embargos, diplomatic downgrades as well as multiple
rounds of bilateral talks, joint declarations, top-level summits etc. However, the Kashmir
conflict remains unresolved till date. It has rather grown from a political conflict to
humanitarian crisis with its spill-overs in form of under-development and radicalization in the
region. This policy report explores the roots of Kashmir Conflict, why Kashmir conflict matters
and what should be the practical solutions to this prolonged conflict.

1.1 CLIENT
Government of India is one of the most critical actors involved in the conflict and has the
authority to take tactical and strategic decisions, which shape the socio-political landscape of
Kashmir conflict and its peaceful resolution. Various organizations and institutions of Indian
government are directly involved in the conflict like Armed Forces of India, J&K Police,
Intelligence Agencies, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of External
Affairs, Intelligence Agencies among others. The recommendations of this report are made for
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) as its client, which enjoys the status of department under
Government of India. Reason for choosing PMO as the client is its faster decision making,
working directly under the Prime Minister of India (head of govt.), and for coordinated action
on Kashmir maintaining liaison with central ministries/departments and the state/UT
government.

1.2 RATIONALE: TURNING DRAG INTO A GROWTH ENGINE

Indian strides to become one of the largest economies of the world thrusts for regional stability
and peaceful neighbours as its precursor. The Government of India cannot risk Kashmir conflict
to grow into an armament race or a full-blown nuclear war. India government needs realistic
and implementable solution committed by all parties to effectively settle Kashmir conflict and
rather make it a model of development.

1.3 SELF-ASSESSMENT

This report assesses the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan concerning sovereignty over
Kashmir. The zone of direct influence of Govt. of India (PMO) is primarily on the Indian side of
Kashmir. Therefore, stakeholder analysis made as part of this report excludes non-state actors

2
acting on Pakistan side of Kashmir. However, the geographical scope of conflict analysis is whole
Kashmir. It in fact assesses the role of various international actor’s inter-alia US, China, OIC, UN etc.

The contents of this report are thus confidential and are prepared for the exclusive purpose of
internal-assessment at LKY School of Public Policy. Two of the four authors of this report are
Indian nationals representing a quorum of 50 percent. This report relies on the data1,2 from
government records as well as international agencies like UN missions, global news agencies
etc. It attempts to eliminate the probable biases by carefully examining both primary evidences
like first-hand testimonies as well as secondary information sources like reports of various non-
governmental organizations based in India or Pakistan. For the purpose of this report,
telephonic interview of experts from Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotic Force (ANF) and Institute for
Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) were conducted. In addition, publicly available interviews
with practitioners, researchers and experts in this field who are closely associated with India
Pakistan issue, were also used as primary sources in this report.

1.4 METHODOLOGY
This report uses a combination of USAID Conflict Assessment Framework and Systems approach
for conflict analysis. Conflict Assessment Framework tools were used for analysis of the profile
of the conflict, identifying capacities for peace building, and scenario building. However,
System’s approach was adopted for comprehensive stakeholder analysis and identifying key
drivers of conflict. This report applies the above specified framework with specific lens of
security on the border dispute and its peaceful resolution. However, it also briefly touches upon
the development of Kashmir and certain foreign policy actions as a part of its
recommendations.

2.0 KASHMIR CONFLICT-PROFILE

2.1 KEY HISTORICAL EVENTS

The Kashmir conflict owes its origin to unresolved status over its sovereignty at the time of
India’s and Pakistan’s independence from British in Aug 1947. The delay in decision on part of
Maharaja of Kashmir to either accede to India or Pakistan followed by invasion of Pakistani
tribesmen led Maharaja to sign Instrument of Accession with India in Oct 1947. This brought
both countries in direct conflict with each other leading to India Pakistan war of 1948. India

1
Crisis Watch, “Crisis Watch.”
2
“Datasheet-Terrorist-Attack-Fatalities.”
3
approached the United Nations (UN), which recommended holding referendum and letting the
state of J&K decide whether to join India or Pakistan. However, the referendum could
materialize because both India and Pakistan could not agree to withdraw their militaries in the
region. In 1949, both the countries signed a ceasefire agreement and Kashmir was divided on
as-is basis

Another war erupted between the two countries over Kashmir in 1965 and over Bangladesh in
1971. The signing of Shimla Agreement in July 1972 marks a watershed in the history of Kashmir
conflict as both the countries agreed to settle their differences by peaceful means through
bilateral negotiations. It stated that:
“The two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their
relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the
establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote
their resources and energies to the pressing talk of advancing the welfare of their peoples.”

Figure1: Kashmir Conflict Timeline3

3
BBC News, “Kashmir Profile - Timeline.”
4
The limited democratic development in Kashmir converted into insurgency and separatist
movement during early 1990s with Pakistani supported rebels. This led to militarization of
Kashmir. India and Pakistan went into another armed conflict when Pakistani soldiers disguised
as Kashmiri militants infiltrated into the Indian side of the LOC in 1999. Off late, the Uri attack
(2016) and Pulwama attack (2019) during which several security personnel of India were killed,
brought the issue of terrorism at the centre of India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.
Condemning the Pakistan’s inaction towards terrorist networks, India conducted retaliatory
surgical strike in 2016 and Balakot air strike in 2019 on terrorist camps located in Pakistan. This
in conjunction with abrogation of special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir by India
in Aug 2019, brought the diplomatic ties to all times low.

4
2.2 ROOTS OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICT
The territorial dispute between the two countries relates to two different, and diametrically
opposed, perceptions of what has been called the problem of Kashmir.5 It dates back to the
Treaty of Amritsar signed in 1846, when British gave the control of Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab
Singh of the Hindu Dogra dynasty. In the year 1947, he signed a standstill agreement with
Pakistan, which India refused to sign. After the independence and partition of India, Muslim
insurgents rebelled and they were armed by Pakistan. In exchange for India’s assistance, Hari
Singh signed the document of accession to India on 27 October 1947.

However, by this time Kashmir was divided into Azad Kashmir, Kashmir (under direct control of
Maharaja) and the Gilgit region. Two days before the Maharaja signed his Instrument of
Accession to India, the Poonch rebels and their tribesman-allies set up the Azad Kashmir
government headquartered at Muzaffarabad. Separately, the Jammu and Kashmir government
was set up under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah by Maharaja which came into effect in
March, 1948. However, the Gilgit region comprising one-third of the state's area simply passed
into Pakistani hands during Oct-Dec 1947 without any conflict. Pakistani experts interpret that it
was the British, who wielded real authority there and when they surrendered their lease on the
eve of partition, the sovereignty reverted to Kashmir. Maharaja was never able to exercise his
sovereignty and in fact when Maharaja sent a governor to Gilgit, he was imprisoned by the
Gilgit Scouts, who later handed over the territory over to Pakistan.

4
Rao, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem.
5
Anonymous, IDSA Expert on Kashmir (2020)
5
However, Indian analysts claim that if Maharaja’s predecessors never exercised the sovereignty,
how they could have transferred their control to the British at first place. As a natural
consequence to the termination of the said lease signed between the Maharaja and British, the
control of Gilgit region reverted back to Maharaja. Gilgit scouts had no authority to transfer its
possession to Pakistan. Further, signing of standstill agreement between Maharaja and Pakistan
in 1947 did not provide sovereign control over the territory of Kashmir. In addition, the
accession was accepted by Sheikh Abdullah, President of National Conference, the ruling party
of the J&K legislative assembly at that time, and also by Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General
of India.

2.3 SOCIO-POLITICAL PROFILE

The multi-ethnic territory of Kashmir comprises of the Muslim majority Kashmir, Hindu majority
Jammu, and Buddhist majority Ladakh. The clamour for its freedom precedes the eruption of
insurgency in the winter of 1989-90. Hindu-majority Jammu and Ladakh’s Buddhist majority felt
alienated under the Muslim Kashmiri rule and they supported the removal of Sheikh Abdullah.
Abdullah was removed from his position by the central government, however subsequent
rigged elections in 1987 drove young Kashmiri Muslims to mobilize and call for secession.6

The secessionist movement was initially dominated by groups like Jammu Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF) who wanted Kashmir to secede from India and merge with Pakistan occupied
Kashmir. 1990s saw the rise of the insurgency, but within a few years the tide of the insurgency
changed, replacing the leader of the insurgency, JKLF, with HM. Pakistan backed the HM and
similar groups through the provision of training, arms, and support. In addition to fighting
against India, these groups and others splintered and fought amongst themselves over
ideological differences.

This period of insurgency makes up only one layer of the conflicts that have taken place in the
Kashmir Valley since 1947. The area is currently in a period of unrest after the government
revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and changed it from a state to a union territory.

2.4 POLITICO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

The eruption of insurgency was a reaction to the lack of appropriate and responsive avenues
for the people to express themselves. The population was young and educated, but they were
unable to enter the political institutions to ensure their representation. Besides, Jammu and

6
Rothstein, Drivers of Conflict in Kashmir.
6
Kashmir also experienced poor roads, inadequate healthcare and education, corruption, and
lack of good governance. The population felt that the government did not address the
economic problems that the area was experiencing, so they reacted to the lack of economic
opportunity. Pakistan invariably provided support to the insurgent groups to shelter, organize,
train, and arm and fanned the religious fanaticism and separatism by way of its national
broadcaster Pakistan TV, which urged Kashmiri Muslims to take up religious war of ‘Jihad’
against India.

2.5 CONFLICT AFFECTED AREAS

India’s side consists of Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory and the Union Territory of Ladakh,
while the Pakistan controlled region consists of Gilgil-Baltistan (earlier called Northern Areas)
and so-called Azad Jammu & Kashmir consisting of regions like Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and major
areas of Poonch district annexed by it in 1947. However, the conflict has spilled over to other
parts of both the nations with rising number of pan-country terrorist attacks.

3.0 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

The Kashmir conflict features a diverse group of stakeholders who are politically, militarily,
economically, and socially engaged in the conflict. The interests of these actors are not always
publicly disclosed. They act on rational as well as irrational considerations, and in some cases, it
may not be evident to the actors themselves. Predominantly these stakeholders’ reactions are
guided by the interpretation of the context around them, and subsequently their self-interested
assessments of the opportunities and risks presented by this context in both the short and the
long term. This section focuses on six core groups of stakeholders who play prominent roles in
the conflict dynamics, which are unpacked in the section 3.2.

Figure 2: Stakeholders Involved

7
3.1 LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS: PRO-INDIA
The political parties participating in India's democratic processes and fighting elections are
dominated by two main parties, the National Conference (NC) and the People’s Democratic
Party (PDP). Both of these parties officially stand for Kashmir's right to autonomy and self-rule
within the federal structure of India. The people of Kashmir themselves or several non-
governmental organizations also form part of the local stakeholders who are pro-India.

3.2 PRO-INDEPENDENCE:
Separatist movement is currently dominated by All Parties Hurriyat Conference (Hurriyat) i.e. a
group of some twenty-six parties which had come together in 1993 seeking Kashmiri separation
from India. However, there is little common ground among the member parties/groups beyond
the threadbare unity regarding demand for self-determination. Since its formation, the Hurriyat
has split into “hard-line” and “moderate” factions. The Islamists advocating merger with
Pakistan, leads the hardliners while convenors of the latter faction are pro-independence.
These groups have routinely boycotted elections.

3.3 LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS: PRO-PAKISTAN

Armed/Militant groups in Kashmir comprise of Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) at its top. It is
headquartered in Pakistan and wants eventual accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. The HM has
claimed responsibility of carrying out multiple terror attacks in India. It has been designated as
a terrorist group by the European Union, India, and the United States. However, it remains a
lawful organisation in Pakistan. Over the years Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, such as the
Lashkar-e Taiyyaba (LeT) and the Jaish-e Muhammad (JM), also started supplying manpower to
fight ostensibly for Kashmiri freedom. These radical groups were founded and headquartered in
Pakistan and led by Pakistanis. These groups harness the psychological impact of
fidayeen campaign, both on the Indian security establishment and the civilian population at
large.7
Since 2016, Kashmir has witnessed emergence of militants who went beyond Pakistan-backed
groups and swore allegiance to global jihadist. Al-Qaeda affiliate ‘Ansar Ghazwat ul Hind’ (AGH),
‘Lashkar-e-Islam’ and ISIS affiliate ‘Jammu Kashmir Islamic State’ (JKIS), emerged during this
period though HM continues to dominate the landscape. A surge in militant recruitment and
gravitation towards HM was facilitated with the use of social media to attract Kashmiri youth.
They were all home-grown militants who had no arms training, unlike their predecessors who

7
EFSAS, “Pakistan Army and Terrorism; an Unholy Alliance.”
8
were sent to Pakistan to get trained. Off-lately another group had split from HM and formed
‘The Resistance Front’ (TRF) over a dispute with HM’s policy to kill Kashmiri policemen and
civilians. This new militant group TRF has been active in Kashmir since the abrogation of Article
370 in August last year. This group is claimed to be a front of LeT which was primarily created to
step up militancy in response to the revocation of Article 370.8
"Fringe elements" generally comprise men in the age group of 17 to 25 years who have been
indulging in violence like stone pelting and protests in the valley. These fringe elements do not
owe their immediate allegiance to any particular terror group. This provides them with the
leeway to indulge in terror incidents as they remain outside the radar of security agencies.

3.4 STATE ORGANIZATIONS

Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence [ISI] is believed to be a significant force
behind the growth of Islamic radicalism and extremism in Jammu and Kashmir. The ISI's focus
has been to destabilize Pakistan's enemies by the promotion of Sunni Islamism at home and of
pan-Islamist jihad abroad. The US State Department's report on Patterns of Global Terrorism,
released in April 2001, specifically identified Islamabad as the chief sponsor of militant groups
like HM, LeT, Al Badr, JeM, fighting in Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir. The ISI has
almost replicated its anti-Soviet Afghan model of training young mujahideen to participate in
Kashmir conflict on grounds of higher moral duty owed to Jihad (holy war). As per the said
report, the yearly expenditure of ISI towards the terrorist organizations runs between 125-250
million USD, covering salaries, cash incentives for high-risk operations and retainers for guides,
porters and informers. Apart from training and funding the terrorist organizations, the ISI has
fundamentally altered the dimensions of the conflict in Kashmir by transforming it to a
movement being carried out by foreign militants on Pan-Islamic religious terms.
The Pakistan’s Fauj exercises its control over Islamabad’s foreign policy towards its neighbours
in all directions, specifically India. It ensures there is no “strategic shift” or reset in cross border
relations.9 The active role of Pakistan’s military in derailing the peace initiatives of civilian
governments is no longer a secret. Kargil war, Parliament attacks, 26/11 and the attack on
Pathankot airbase have all taken place when there was a thaw in the relations between India
and Pakistan. These attacks reflect the existence of ‘state within a state’ working at cross-
purpose.10 Sartaz Aziz, (2009) 11has cited several anecdotes in his book “Between Dreams and

8
The Print, “Is Kashmir Militancy Beginning to Ebb? Last Decade Trend Shows It Could Be Another False Dawn.”
9
Deedar, “Why Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Is So Confused.”
10
Anonymous Pakistan’s ATF Expert’s view on ‘FAUJ’ (2020)
11
Waheed, “Sartaj Aziz. Between Dreams and Realities.”
9
Realities: some Milestones in Pakistan’s History” where he accepts that General Musharraf met
with him before and after his visit to India as the foreign minister to ensure that he does not
concedes Pakistani captured forward positions.

The ‘FAUJ’ thrives on anti-Indian sentiments and nuclear brinksmanship with India. This
propaganda helps it fill its coffers by increasing the military budgets and gaining even more
influence in the civilian sphere. It may help the ‘Fauj’ to foster a belief in the masses that the
army is much more efficient and professional than the corrupt civilian politicians in the nation.
However, over the years it has rather acted counterproductive to the Pakistani state-building
and Institution-building process. Pakistan’s military is also perceived to be giving a strategic
angle to the Belt Road Initiative citing the perceived threat from India and has moved large
number of soldiers to Gilgit-Baltistan.

Figure 3: China Pakistan Economic Corridor

Unlike other militaries globally, Pakistan Army has expanded itself much beyond the security
functions and has become a parallel economy in itself. This is best illustrated by Ayesha Siddiqa
in her book “Military Inc.”12 wherein she referred military capital used for personal benefit as
“milbus”. This is neither recorded nor part of the defence budget. The Fauji Foundation is one
such conglomerate headquartered in Rawalpindi. It employs thousands of military personnel
and controls various sugar mills, natural gas companies, fertilizer and cement, plastics, corn and
cereal, and provides healthcare facilities too. Similarly, the Bahria Foundation, controlled by
the navy is involved in various commercial real estate and housing ventures. Coupled with
several schools and colleges under its banner, Askari group of companies is another such
conglomerate which is controlled by the Pakistan Army and the Fauji Foundation and is

12
Khawaja, “Ayesha Siddiqa. Military Inc.”
10
involved in more than 15 businesses which include banking, insurance services, real estate and
aviation.13

3.5 INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS

China has a substantial economic and geostrategic interest in Kashmir and especially the
Pakistan controlled Kashmir. China so far has remained indifferent to the establishment of
terror groups within the Pak controlled Kashmir and is likely to continue to keep India engaged
along the Line of Actual Control. Chinese enjoys a strategic partnership with Pakistan and is
pumping billions of dollars in China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) comprising many mega
transport infrastructures, railway lines, oil and gas pipelines and feeder roads, passing through
Gilgit-Baltistan. In-fact, China is the only UNSC permanent member that has been continuously
blocking the Indian attempts at UN Security council to ban Pak-based terrorists. 14

The United States’ interest in Kashmir Conflict is mostly limited by India and Pakistan largely
cancelling each other at its South Asian security interests. It relies on Pakistan for its Afghan exit
while India is its major economic partner. The United States has recognized Kashmiri peoples'
aspirations for self-rule however it resists playing a mediatory role as it does not want to draw
ire form the either countries. Therefore, it has confined itself to a crisis management role
rather than the much-needed conflict resolution.15

The United Nation’s deference to its established principle of state sovereignty over the
principle of self-determination has disengaged it from the Kashmir conflict post 1948
resolution. It does however continue to maintain a formal interest in the form of the UN
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, which continues to monitor activities on both
sides of the Line of Control. 16As an immediate reaction to abolition of Article 370 of Indian
constitution, Pakistan’s vehement persuasion called for an emergency closed door session of
the Security Council on 16 August 2019. However, the Council ultimately took no action, and
instead urged both sides to ‘refrain from taking any unilateral action which might further
aggravate the situation’ (UN News 2019).

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) founded in 1969 is a multilateral body with 57
member states representing the Muslim collectiveness. Pakistan has been successfully able to

13
The WIRE, “How Pakistan’s Military Monopolised State Resources For Personal Use.”
14
PARJANYA, “Revisiting China’s Kashmir Policy | ORF.”
15
Mahmud, “Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy.”
16
Stephen P, “The Case of UN Involvement in Jammu and Kashmir.”
11
block the Indian membership of OIC as it requires a voting by consensus. OIC is facing
continuous pressure from Pakistan to take active interest in Kashmir issue as it often threatens
to form another Islamic block if India is granted even a status of observer. OIC in several of its
meetings used strong words against Indian actions in Kashmir. However, several of its member
nations continue to enjoy strong bilateral relations with India and they are in support of India’s
approach of bilaterally resolving the Kashmir issue. 17

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is another international agency which has a critical role
to play in Kashmir Conflict as it primarily deals with terror-financing. Pakistan in its ‘Grey List’
and is warned of severe consequences for failure to prosecute and penalise those involved in
terror financing. Pakistan has almost managed to address 14 of 27 actions18 for restraining
terror-financing to radical organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) who are accused of carrying out terror attacks in India,
especially J&K.

4.0 SYSTEMS CONFLICT ANALYSIS: KEY DRIVERS OF CONFLICT

17
The Week, “How the OIC Has Handled the Kashmir Issue and India’s Membership.”
18
EurAsian Times Desk, “Is Pakistan Using ‘Kashmiri Militants’ To Get Away From FATF Grey List?”
12
This section applies the Systems Analysis tool to identify and further investigate the key drivers
of conflict spanning across colonial history of the region, sociocultural underpinnings,
geopolitical drivers and socio-cultural as well as economic drivers.

4.1 KEY DRIVER 1: - GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGE IN SECURING BORDER

The fast-flowing rivers of Himalayas like Jhelum and Chenab, abundant green dense forest of
Shamsbari and Kafirkhan mountain ranges, and extreme weather conditions in border areas like
Siachin ranging from minus 40 to minus 70 degrees Celsius, is one of the major drivers
exacerbating the Indo-Pak territorial conflict. It creates difficulty in manning the border and
also results into different perceptions on ground. In addition, geographical landscapes like
Siachin themselves become the part of territorial conflict because of its strategic location in
terms of height and location advantage. Similarly, rivers flowing through Kashmir continue to
be the bone of contention on grounds of metered water flow or its diversion. It has become a
water security issue for both the countries and none of them wants to lose Kashmir especially
its drainage area.
The rugged terrain and inaccessible border areas creates a perfect breeding ground for
terrorist’s infiltration and trespassing into territory of India and Pakistan across Line of control.

4.2 KEY DRIVER 2: - TERRORIST ATTACKS AND INSURGENCY

Numerous non-state armed groups are active in Kashmir, ranging from the pro-Kashmir
independence groups like Hizbul Muzahideen (HM) to pro-Pakistan militants like Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) to transnational groups like Islamic State in J&K (ISJK) owing allegiance to global
jihad. These groups have largely played the role of spoilers and are one of the key drivers of
conflict which has made brought the India Pak relations at its worse.

Several factors have contributed to creating an enabling environment for the rise of extremist
groups and their operation across India-Pak border. The state of Jammu and Kashmir ranks
fourth amongst all Indian states by way of per capita income (Teng and Gadoo 2002).19
Moreover, the inequality of resources allocation also take an important role in intensifying the
conflicts. The elites of J&K have power and possesses huge amount of resources while the
masses are seeking for survival. Interestingly, the elite group who controlled Kashmir take this
opportunity to ask for more financial support from Indian government in combatting the
separatists (Bakaya and Bhatti, n.d.).20 Not only the inequality, but unemployment is also a

19
Teng and Gadoo, “WHITE PAPER ON KASHMIR.”
20
“Kashmir Conflict - A Study of What Led to the Insurgency in Kashmir Valley.Pdf.”
13
problem for youth who does not belong to upper class groups. Therefore, those youngsters are
easily lured by terrorist organizations and are sponsored to cross border for becoming trained
jihadists.

Another sub-driver for rise of insurgency is the public demand not being met and abuse of
power by the authorities. Lack of good governance alienated the supply of good public officers
and increased the discontent among people of Kashmir. The protestors were often labelled as
Pakistani backed groups and faced the wrath of local bureaucracy for calling them Indian agent.
(Bakaya and Bhatti, n.d.).

However, the lifeline of these jihadists and terrorist groups is their financial resources. There is
a global consensus among anti-terror agencies that several of such groups are provided logistics
and financial support by Pakistan military and intelligence agency ISI as they quite often feature
in FATF Grey list and the US State Department’s Annual Country report on Terrorism. Most of
these groups have their training camps in Pak controlled Kashmir which receive intelligence,
weapons, and protection from the Pakistan establishment.21 In addition, these groups receive
donations from the Pakistani diaspora community in the gulf as well as from West like from UK.
Several Muslim NGOs across the globe also sympathize with their cause and provide financial
support to them.

4.3 KEY DRIVER 3: - FUNCTIONING OF STATE WITHIN A STATE

The Pakistani ‘FAUJ’ acts as a reinforcing loop for another key driver of conflict promoting
further distrust between India and Pakistan political dispensations. Pakistan had a difficult time
right from its independence as first there was an extraneous delay in constitution making, then
general elections for selecting the members of the constituent assembly were cancelled.
Pakistan experienced Military coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999, which weakened its democratic
institutions, and adversely impacted the constitutional and legal developments of the country.

The Pakistan army has been using the organized propaganda of India as an existential threat to
Pakistan to serve self-perpetuating interests. As a result, the defense budgets of Pakistan
bloated to three to four times higher than countries of its size. The role of spoiler played by
Pakistan ‘Fauj’ has been evident all throughout the history as Pakistan was drawn into multiple
wars with India (refer para 3.4 for more details).

21
Singh, “Militant Training Camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.”
14
4.4 KEY DRIVER 4: - TRUST DEFICIT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS
The legacy and history of conflict is one of the major reinforcing loops of ‘lack of trust’ between
India and Pakistan. It can be seen in terms of regular rhetoric in which their political leaders are
involved as quite visible on their respective national media. Despite signing the Shimla
Agreement to resolve their territorial disputes bilaterally, both the countries have often
resorted to international forums to settle smallest of the disputes like Kishenganaga water
dispute taken to International Court of Arbitration in 2013 and Indian naval officer trial at
International Court of Justice in 2018. One of the major drivers forming part of this sub-system
is presence of Pakistan based non-state actors fuelling separatist movements in India. Further
there are several front organizations of various militant groups like Jamat-ud-Dawah and its
charity wing Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation. These organizations have properties including
seminaries and mosques across the Pakistan and are considered to be the source of financing of
their parent cadres.

Similarly, the perceived intervention of Indian intelligence agencies in Baloch separatist

movements forms another sub-driver of trust-deficit.22 This is primarily because some of the
Baloch separatist leaders were found to be sympathizing with India and also travelled to India
for their medical treatment. These grounds are then used to launch tit-for-tat actions against
India worsening the confidence between both the countries. In addition to above, the role
played by international actors like US, China, OIC and FATF is widening the trust deficit forms
another reinforcing loop altogether.

4.5 KEY DRIVER 5: - GEO-POLITICAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS

The United States played a critical role in rise of Mujahedeen during 1980s as a consequence of
its anti-Soviet policy in Afghanistan wherein CIA in association with Pakistan provided safe
haven to them. Several factions of the same set of people who have been trained and fought in
some part of Afghanistan formed terror outfits supporting the Kashmir struggle. It is often
claimed by the Indian military establishment that several Pakistan based terrorists’ groups are
often accompanied by US origin arms and ammunitions. US’s strategic reliance on Pakistan for
Afghan exit has also resulted in US aid being provided to Pakistan. However, off lately it has
been suspended during Trump’s administration. As a result, this driver has a potential of
turning to a leveraging factor for peace.

22
General Mussharaf (Former President of Pakistan) at India Today Conclave, New Delhi, 2017
15
The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan is another sub-driver reinforcing the
territorial dispute and growing distrust between both the countries. In fact, it dates back to
1963 when Pakistan signed Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement and gave hundreds of square
kilometers of land (Shaksgam Valley) in Northern Kashmir to China. Further, Pakistan has
permitted China to construct China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its several mega
projects in the disputed territories of Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Kashmir which does not form
part of the Pakistan as per its constitution itself. This makes the dispute resolution more
complex to resolve.

4.6 KEY DRIVER6: - LEGACY AND HISTORY OF CONFLICTS

The legacy and history of India Pakistan conflict is older than even their independence as
discussed in detail in para 2.1 and 2.2. The boundary between India and Pakistan was drawn
crudely by Radcliff commission, which comprised of members, who were all lawyers by
profession and had no time to conduct any survey and gather regional information.

The commemoration and valorisation of four wars fought between both the countries in 1948,
1965, 1971 and 1999 further increases the hostility between both the nations. Further, the
recent abrogation of special status of Jammu and Kashmir under 370 of the Indian constitution
has led to new low of bilateral relations which is followed by highest no. of ceasefire violations
ever. In retaliation to the India’s actions, Pakistan also initiated its political process to grant
provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan and recognizing it is as part of Pakistani constitution in Oct
2020.

5.0 CAPACITY FOR PEACE BUILDING

The exercise to identify elements that can be used to break the feedback loops of KDFs
(presented in the conflict dynamics above) is done in two separate sections. This section
attempts to identify the existing elements (for KDF-2,4,6) that can be used to develop capacities
for peace. The remaining key-drivers (KDF-1,3,5) which requires new elements to be created as
leveraging factors are dealt in final section (recommendations).

5.1 CEASEFIRE: FIRST STEP IN PEACE PROCESS

The United Nation Commission for India Pakistan (UNCIP) was created in 1948 to mediate in the
Indo-Pak war. It led to the ceasefire agreement (known as Karachi Agreement) between India
and Pakistan in July 1949 and accordingly UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,
16
(UNMOGIP) was constituted to observed, investigate and submit its finding on complaints of
ceasefire violations to each party as well as to the Secretary-General.23 Since, the ceasefire
violations continue on both sides till date, it requires strengthening the capacities of UNMOGIP
as an independent and neutral observer to strictly enforce the Karachi Agreement and Shimla
Agreement signed in 1972.

5.2 BRINGING NON-STATE ACTORS FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE TABLE

(FOR KEY DRIVER 2: - TERRORIST ATTACKS AND INSURGENCY)

In July 2000, covert negotiations between the different stakeholders were held and the largest
militant group Hizbul-Mujahideen operating in Kashmir declared a unilateral ceasefire with
Indian forces, in hope that India would declare Kashmir as a disputed territory, however
tripartite negotiation could not begin because of hard-line policy adopted by Govt. of India
toward militant groups.

Negotiating with NSAs does not mean acceding to their demand. Negotiations not just act as
safety valve easing the discontent and angst of alienated groups but also stall the pace of
human casualties. In fact, it provides a platform for state institutions to closely understand the
agenda and strategy of extremist groups. However, in order to engage with such groups, govt.
would need grass-root and community leaders who are trained in mediation/negotiation,
peace-building and community decision-making. In order to gain the trust of militant groups
over such peace-building leaders, peace-building experts from international organization and
trainers from non-governmental organization should be engaged who should focus on problem

5.3 BILATERAL DIALOGUE

(FOR KEY DRIVER 4: - TRUST DEFICIT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS)

Dialogue is considered as the most popular and useful mechanism to ease tensions. It provides
the platform for discussion, sharing information, raising concerns and suggest for solution. It
involves confidence building measures used to strengthen negotiation between both sides and
collaboration from all related stakeholders. “By putting Kashmir at the centre of the dialogue
and building a new strategic relationship with Pakistan based on trading and people-to-people
interaction, it was hoped that a security spill-over could be created, making negotiations on
other long-standing disputes easier”, as pointed out by Bhatnagar and Chacko.24

23
“UNMOGIP Working for Stability of Peace in the Subcontinent since 1949 | United Nations Peacekeeping.”
24
Bhatnagar and Chacko, “Peacebuilding Think Tanks, Indian Foreign Policy and the Kashmir Conflict.”
17
The Lahore declaration of 1999 and Agra Summit of 2001 in the past signalled the possibility of
a major breakthrough in overcoming the historically strained bilateral relations between the
two nations through bilateral dialogue. Similarly, five-stage talks between India and Pakistan
government during 2003 met some progress in terms of increased trade and movement across
the borders. Though such developments could not culminate into a mutually acceptable
solution over Kashmir, they indicate the necessities for the building the capacities for peace
between both the countries through bilateral dialogue.

5.4 OPENING BORDERS FOR GRASSROOT ENGAGEMENT

(FOR KEY DRIVER 6: - LEGACY AND HISTORY OF CONFLICTS)
Removal of border controls for travel and trade opens the door for people to people
engagement and can play a critical role in easing tensions over Kashmir. Open borders not just
enlarge social connectivity and economic linkage but also gives chances for local people to
interact and engage gradually building trust, exchange personal experience and lead to the
forming of collaboration.25

Building on several socio-cultural commonalities between the two countries, capacities for
peace can be built by restarting and reinvigorating existing mechanisms like Lahore Bus,
Samjhauta Express, pilgrimage tourism, cultural exchanges like allowing musical groups like
‘Coke studio’, which are very popular presently since a decade, let freely visit each other;
allowing actors/actresses work across the border, playing all sports including cricket. Such
interactions let the civil populations to interact, have an opportunity to understand the person
from other country better and realize the similar human joys and frailty.

5.5. POLITICAL DIALOGUE & STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN KASHMIR

(FOR KEY DRIVER 6: - LEGACY AND HISTORY OF CONFLICTS)

Abrogation of Article 370 in J&K has opened a window of opportunities26 to strengthen the
local governance institutions as several national laws like for ‘Panchayati Raj’ (Village councils),
Right to Information, Children Education Act etc. will be extended to Kashmir. Inclusive political
dialogue and collaborative mechanisms has been missing for quite long in Kashmir as it was
hijacked by the elite Kashmir families. Grassroots peace-building will only be achieved when
local political set-up work together with the national government to reach the common
developmental goals and promote good governance.

25
“Kashmir Line of Control and Grassroots Peacebuilding.”
26
S Jaishankar (Indian Foreign Affairs Minister) interview at Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 2019
18
  A diverse set of actors ranging from different religious groups and local community
should be encouraged and trained to educate and empower people to participate in the
political process of Kashmir.
 Engagement platform with grassroots to get their feedback, comments, suggestions and
exchange insights should be created as an avenue to target decision-makers by
initiating analysis and debate about the role of leadership in advancing peace-building.
This would link the local knowledge with governing bodies at different levels to act and
defuse tensions preventing a violent conflict
 Urban settings offer many opportunities to strengthen capacities for peace by
providing access to services, including basics such as housing, schooling, health care,
food, transportation, security, and justice. With abolition of special status of Kashmir,
several reformative legislations and schemes are extended to Kashmir. Therefore,
national missions like Digital India Mission, Affordable Housing for Small, Smart Cities
etc. needs to be rapidly expanded to Kashmir for its inclusive development. This would
discourage local youths from joining extremist groups in search of cash and bring down
insurgency overall in control.27

6.0 KASHMIR CONFLICT- SCENARIO BUILDING

In the backdrop of chronic nature of the conflict, there are following five diverse scenarios28 of
a probable solution which are developed along two variables viz. Mediation and Plebiscite.
These scenarios focused on the territory of Kashmir valley and are discussed as below:

Figure 5: Scenarios of Kashmir Future

27
Anonymous, IDSA Expert on Kashmir (2020)
28
BBC News, “The Future of Kashmir.”
19
6.1 SCENARIO ONE: FORMALIZING THE STATUS QUO

Figure 6.1: Scenario One (left) and Current Situation (right)

Formalizing the current de-facto boundary, the Line of Control (LOC), which is well-settled and
demarcated, except at Siachen glacier, as international boundary is the most viable and
practical approach towards reaching any consensus on reaching an understanding on boundary
settlement. However, Kashmiri separatists may not be inclined to accept the plan because they
aspire for greater territory. This arrangement was also one of the four steps of the so-called
‘four-point solution’ proposed by then Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf during his famed
Agra Summit visit (July 14-16, 2001). If Musharraf’s plan were to be accepted, India would have
to accept Pakistan’s sovereignty over Pakistan controlled Kashmir and in return, Pakistan would
accept Indian suzerainty over the part of Jammu and Kashmir on India’s side of the LOC.
However, the likelihood of this scenario is highly contingent on the effective mediation efforts
from international community or neutral party to both the countries.

6.2 SCENARIO TWO: KASHMIR JOINS PAKISTAN

Figure 6.2: Scenario Two (left) and Current Situation (right)

This scenario is based on the presumption that referendum/plebiscite is conducted in fair and
impartial manner under the UN supervision and Kashmir decides to join Pakistan. Pakistan
thinks this to be the most favoured solution to the dispute, believing that the state’s majority

20
Muslim population would vote to become part of the Islamic state. However, a plebiscite result
would be strongly protested by Kashmiri Hindus, Hindus of Jammu, and the Buddhists of
Ladakh, who have never shown any inclination to join Pakistan.

6.3 SCENARIO THREE: KASHMIR JOINS INDIA

Figure 6.3: Scenario Three (left) and Current Situation (right)

This scenario is based on the presumption that referendum/plebiscite is conducted in fair and
impartial manner under the UN supervision and Kashmir decides to join India. Such result
would always be welcomed by India however the challenge lies in conducting and meeting the
conditions for a UN supervised plebiscite. India also has reservations over the same given the
unconditional accession agreement signed by Maharaja.

6.4 SCENARIO FOUR: INDEPENDENT JAMMU & KASHMIR

Figure 6.4: Scenario Four (left) and Current Situation (right)

This scenario is based on the presumption that referendum/plebiscite is conducted in fair and
impartial manner under the UN supervision and Kashmir decides to form Independent territory
of Kashmir consisting of both Pak-occupied Kashmir and Indian administered Kashmir. Although
projected as the political goal by a now weakened group of secessionists, this utopian idea is
divorced from any geo-political reality as both Pakistan and India are unlikely to give up any
territory. Even China is most likely to oppose this plan as it leaves strategically important Gilgit-
Baltistan with Independent Kashmir, through which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) runs through. Further any plebiscite resulting in independence would be opposed by
21
both the neighbours. The feasibility of an independent Kashmir is near to zero because of the
extant geo-political situation and unviability of Kashmir to exist as a state with its inherent
ethno-religious, culture-lingual complexity, vulnerability to external aggression, and practically
grant-dependent economy.

6.5 SCENARIO FIVE: CONFLICT AS USUAL

Figure 6.5: Scenario Five (Current Situation)

This scenario is based on the presumption that no referendum can be agreed upon by either of
the nations and all mediation efforts are foiled. This scenario has high probability of occurrence
if no positive actions are taken to deal with the current conflict. In such scenario India will
continue to control Indian-administered Kashmir including Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh region
while Pakistan continues to administer Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

7.0 KASHMIR CONFLICT: RECOMMENDATIONS 29, 30

There is large consensus among global experts that the ideal solution to this conflict is the
implementation of resolution adopted by United Nations on 21 April 1948 i.e., to demilitarise
the state and thereafter hold a plebiscite, under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to
determine whether the Kashmir wants to accede to India (Scenario 2) or Pakistan (Scenario 3).
However, impediments to the same are also well known as separatist want another option of
independence to be exercised as part of plebiscite (scenario 4). Further, lot of water has flown
since 1948 and it is considered that inhabitants of respective side of Kashmir can no longer
exercise independent franchise as they are naturally influenced by both the countries
controlling respective side of Kashmir. Therefore, the scenario one is more pragmatic and
achievable among all.

The diagnosis of conflict dynamics may be reasonably complete and probable scenarios could
also be identified. But when it comes to the solutions, the first question which arises is where

29
https://web.stanford.edu/class/Ashraf, F. (2003).
30
Ashraf, “Models of Conflict Resolution and the Kashmir Issue.”
22
shall one begin? With extremely polarized attitudes on both sides, offering recommendations
for such an intricate and complex conflict seem quite a difficult task. In fact, when the authors
of this paper interacted with the police officers of either countries serving Kashmir, they
explained that when either country is not able to agree over the ceasefire as there are more
than average no. of daily violations, how could you expect them to reconcile such huge
differences over Kashmir. Their views reflected both realism and pessimism over Kashmir
Conflict. The conflict over Kashmir has become chronic in nature over the past 70 years and has
evolved from a simple territorial dispute into a more complex culture-religious, socio-political
issue having global implications. Thus, a mere territorial dispute resolution would be simply
inadequate in resolving this conundrum. It is therefore essential to deal on its religious, cultural
and social fronts too for giving peace a chance.

7.1 RECOMMENDATION 1: TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN SOLUTIONS FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT

(FOR KEY DRIVER 1: - GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGE IN SECURING BORDER)
Technology solutions such as robots with body mounted camera or UAV based surveillance
should be explored to address the geographical challenges of peaceful management of the
Kashmir border. At present, the local intelligence received from forward posts along LOC
provides the status of violations and retaliatory shelling is accordingly initiated. With
introduction of 5G and AI technologies, the concept of digital border outposts should be
explored. This would enable both the armed forces to independently observe the compliance of
ceasefire agreement and neutrally present the ground realities to higher echelons.

7.2 RECOMMENDATION 2: MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENT

(FOR KEY DRIVER 3: - FUNCTIONING OF STATE WITHIN A STATE)
A multi-level defence dialogue between different branches of armed forces of both the
countries should be created to engage on regular basis. This would lay down foundation for
early conclusion of mutual legal assistance on criminal matters and extradition treaties. A joint
anti-terrorism squad and collaborative counter-insurgency force could be created to carry out
joint operations which might involve extricate diplomatic craftsmanship for putting adequate
checks and balances mutually acceptable to both the nations.

7.3 RECOMMENDATION 3: SETTLING BORDER DIFFERENCES WITH CHINA AS PRECURSOR

(FOR KEY DRIVER 5: - GEO-POLITICAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS)
India must actively seek to resolve border disputes and develop friendly relations with China
before it engages Pakistan for resolving the Kashmir issue. The strategic importance of Kashmir
to China remains there as long as China and Pakistan remain strategic allies and have India as a
23
common adversary, which will not allow any solution to the issue. It becomes manifest by many
actions of China in blocking moves to nominate terror suspects like Maulana Masood Azhar
wanted in India at UN Security Council, disputing India’s legal claim over the state of Jammu &
Kashmir, supplying arms or in extending life line to Pakistan in the Financial Action Terror Force
(FATF) forum.

7.4 RECOMMENDATION 4: EARNEST IMPLEMENTATION OF 'INSANIYAT’ (HUMANITY),

‘JAMHOORIYAT’ (DEMOCRACY) AND ‘KASHMIRIYAT’ (IDENTITY OF THE PEOPLE OF
KASHMIR) DOCTRINE
The Govt. of India must put emphatic and intensive efforts for greater involvement of the
common people of the Kashmir in the national development process. This would go a long way
towards ending the sense of alienation that persists over major part of the Kashmir valley. This
can be achieved by ending corruption, injustice and inefficiency in the local administration
through bureaucratic reforms as implemented across rest of the India and by early conduct of
election to local-self-governments post abolition of Article 370. A special task force consisting
of local leaders who has an advantage in the form of a strong grassroots network should be
constituted for implementation of all the national legislations, regulations and centrally
sponsored schemes, in accordance with requirements of Kashmir in expeditious manner.

Investment in infrastructure, in general, would improve the life of the people and would lead to
less resentment against India. Promotion of local artisan industries and their upgrades to large
scales would engage the youth positively. Similarly, big-ticket investments in tourism, film-
making (both sectors had been thriving till late 70s in the valley) needs to be accelerated to
make Kashmir a new investment hub. 15th Finance Commission’s 1% additional award to J&K
from Centre's divisible pool of revenue in 2020-21, may also be utilized to create a corpus for
promoting manufacturing by national and international investors to spur the Kashmir economy,
employ the youth and wean off the population from terror-money.

7.5 RECOMMENDATION 5: EVIDENCE BASED SECURITY FORCE WITHDRAWAL

The government must also bring the wanton abuse of Human rights by security forces into
check. Evidence-based security force withdrawal31 policy concomitant with the demonstrated
violence reduction is an important step to bring a sense of normalcy to the area. Further,
security forces should be deployed in civil dress to ease communal tensions. Army schools,
canteens, hospitals should increase its outreach for common citizens and conduct sports meet,

31
Anonymous, Senior Official of Indian Police Service (J&K Cadre), Sept 2020
24
fests, skilling sessions involving local youth on regular basis to build an environment of trust for
the security forces as the protector. Importantly, the Kashmiri Hindu population displaced from
Kashmir should be resettled into their original homes. This is very crucial to maintain the ethnic
mix of the Kashmiri population and would lead to promoting religious tolerance and also
greatly contribute to the economy of Kashmir.

7.6 RECOMMENDATION 6: OSLO ACCORD STYLE NEGOTIATIONS

Oslo accord is one of the good experiences that Kashmir could consider which allowed the
parties to sit and talk and do the negotiation as the government of Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization did in Norway. Oslo accord-style negotiations have never been tried
and thus remain to be given a chance in this scenario but for the want of a proper and neutral
host. We recommend Kathmandu, Nepal as the neutral ground for testing informal Oslo-style
heart to heart talk through track 2 diplomacy routes. Kathmandu is the headquarters of the
now largely defunct South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and has good
relations with both countries and could host an informal Oslo-style negotiation. Both India and
Pakistan should not possibly have any objection to the venue. 32

8. CONCLUSION
Kashmir landscape is likely to witness spoilers attempting to derail peace process even in
future. Notwithstanding the passion-fomenting call from popular, jingoistic militaristic political
groups, top political leadership needs to appreciate and internalize the famous proclamation by
the Indian statesman and ex-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that “you can change your
friends but not neighbours”. It’s the political will and courage as shown by Late Vajpayee in
inviting then Pak President Musharraf for a state visit (Agra Summit 2001), his visit to Lahore on
a Bus (Feb 19, 1999), and formulation of cease-fire along International Border in 2003, are
some such exemplary polictical decisions which raised the hopes of resolution of Kashmir
conflict.33

Therefore, the most significant of all recommendations is active political engagement and
political rapprochement forming the cornerstone of mutually acceptable, dignified and peaceful
conflict resolution. Confidence-building-measures like exchange of most wanted
terrorists/insurgents on date of signing of Shimla Agreement i.e. July 2 and celebrating the
same as India Pakistan-Solidarity Day could set the ball rolling.

32
Discussions with Professor Francesco Mancini, LKYSPP, NUS
33
News 18 Politics, “When Vajpayee and Musharraf ‘Almost Resolved’ the Kashmir Dispute.”
25
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

1. Official of Anti-Narcotics Force, Pakistan (Interview conducted in Sept. 2020)

2. Senior Researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (Interview conducted in
Sept. 2020)
3. Senior Official of Indian Police Service, J&K Cadre (Interview conducted in Sept 2020)
4. Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, spoke on India's relations with Pakistan,
Kashmir and the revocation of Article 370 at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York
(Retrieved from: https://youtu.be/559fl6Km4mM)
5. Q&A Session with General Mussharaf (Former President of Pakistan) on Pakistan's
perspective of Indo-Pak conflict at India Today Conclave, New Delhi, 2017 (Retrieved from:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBA4gGFjbb8)

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