J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2015) 20:17–33

DOI 10.1007/s11366-014-9325-z
R E S E A R C H A RT I C L E

China’s Foreign Strategy After the 18th Party Congress:

Business as Usual?

Nele Noesselt

Published online: 21 December 2014

# Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2014

Abstract Chinese foreign policy is still an undertheorized domain of international

relations studies. One puzzle that preoccupies international observers is the impact of
leadership changes on Chinese foreign behavior. Based on an in-depth reading of
official statements made by China’s new political leaders and their first actions
in office this paper analyses continuity and change in China’s foreign strategy.
Following a combined multidimensional analytical approach the evaluation
focuses on the interrelation between indigenous (leadership changes,
subsystemic challenges) and exogenous factors (global crises, critical junctures)
on the modeling of China’s international strategy. My main conclusion is that
shifts and role changes in Chinese foreign policy should not be misread as the
outcome of the latest leadership transition. Most “changes” that are now
associated with the fifth generation have originally been introduced by their
political ancestors. As a context-sensitive, historical-reflectivist analysis shows,
China’s “new” approach to world affairs stands for a continuing, incremental
adaptation of the PRC to socio-economic evolutions on the domestic and the
global level.

Keywords China . Fifth Generation . Foreign Policy . Leadership Change . National

People’s Congress . 18th Party Congress

Introduction

In the last 30 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has undergone a transfor-
mation from a passive observer at the border of international politics to an active player
in international affairs. With growing global interdependencies, China’s international
posture and its internal development have direct implications for world affairs. This
partially explains why the changing of the guard in 2012/2013 attracted widespread

N. Noesselt (*)
GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Rothenbaumchaussee 32, 20148 Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: noesselt@giga-hamburg.de
18 N. Noesselt

attention. One major question was whether the new generation of political leaders
would pursue a “new” approach to international politics [38, 64] or stick to the status
quo [19, 42].
A similar question surrounded the leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu
Jintao in 2002/2003. At that time, most analysts came to the conclusion that domestic
concerns and issues of social stability would be given priority over foreign affairs [10].
Due to the lack of inside information about China’s future strategy, most of these
studies undertook a retrospective examination of past politics to formulate some vague
projections for the future [9]. They agreed that some modifications of domestic policies
would be necessary in order to rebalance state-society interactions, especially in the
period of step-by-step power transition (i.e., the months between the Party Congress
and the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress). No shifts or changes, by
contrast, were expected for foreign policy, as Jiang’s approach had proven rather
effective and favorable for Chinese development interests and was thus most likely
to be continued under the new leadership [1].
However, the domestic and international circumstances of China’s leadership tran-
sition in 2012/2013 differ from those of 2002/2003. The financial crisis of 2007/2008
has opened a strategic window of opportunity for China to implement its own ideas and
principles for a restructuring of the international order. China is now the biggest creditor
of the US, is referred to as a potential “rescuer” of the Eurozone and has become one of
the most active players in Africa and Latin America. The images and roles assigned to
China by the international community have changed almost over night. China is no
longer seen as a backward and underdeveloped country but rather as one of the major
economic power centers in the international system [4].
While the international community is speculating about China’s future global
strategy, Chinese think tanks and government advisers are currently involved in a
similar process. In 2012, as part of the preparations for the 18th Party Congress, several
conferences were held that discussed China’s tactics in international relations and
resulted in some first proposals for updating China’s foreign strategy.1
This paper analyzes China’s foreign policy orientation after the changing of the
guard in 2012/2013. It starts by discussing the level of analysis problem in Chinese
foreign policy and argues that a micro–macro linkage approach—one which integrates
internal and external determinants of foreign behavior and also includes elite “percep-
tions”—is critical to understanding China’s foreign policy behavior. This paper argues
that the issue of legitimacy is the link between domestic and foreign policy decision
making. To make any statements on the foreign policy implications of China’s chang-
ing of the guard, it is thus necessary to identify challenges and obstacles for the new
leaders’ consolidation of political power in the domestic context and to outline the
function of foreign policy for the party-state’s legitimacy.
In the main part, the paper then sheds some light on the formal and informal
mechanisms of leadership changes in China and raises the question of continuity and
change in Chinese foreign policy with regard to the developments in 2012/2013. Next,

1
Among these were the conferences “Research on international relations in China: Topics and
directions“(September 22, 2012) organized by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as well as the
conference at Fudan University entitled “Constructing a systematic “Chinese” theory of international relations
– Welcoming the 18th party congress” (July 18–19, 2012).
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 19

the paper briefly summarizes challenges on the domestic level and assesses their impact
on the new leaders’ foreign policy decision making. It then proceeds by analyzing
Chinese academic and policy-related publications on the international system that
reveal the impact of international power shifts on China’s international behavior.
Based on several sets of experts interviews conducted in China and an in-depth reading
of Chinese international relations (IR) journals this paper argues that leadership tran-
sitions in China do not automatically cause major changes in Chinese foreign policy.
Leadership changes are not based on elections and multi-party competition and thus the
changing of the guard is normally not followed by the replacement of the country’s
national preferences and policy principles. Leadership changes, however, do represent a
time for the critical evaluation of past achievements, current challenges and future
strategies by the Chinese political elites and their foreign policy advisers.

Analytical Toolbox

Some basic reflections on the framework of analysis are indispensable to the assess-
ment of the potential impact of leadership changes on Chinese foreign policy. The
analysis of so-called “closed” political systems such as China’s is a challenging
endeavor. Due to the lack of available information concerning the functional of the
system ([34: 25]), most studies have entailed historical accounts and summaries of
official political statements. As details about the foreign policy decision-making pro-
cess are generally not made public, any (perceived) turns in China’s foreign behavior
often seem to come out of the blue. The scarcity of available sources and information
thus explains why most researchers do not examine the foreign policy formulation
process itself but rather focus on visible foreign policy behaviors. The general frame-
works of analysis that guides the systematic scrutiny of Chinese foreign policy can be
roughly divided into two categories: external/systemic versus domestic/societal ap-
proaches [23].
The external/systemic approach identifies the structure of the international system as
the key independent variable that determines the behavior of a state vis-à-vis other
states or international institutions. 2 This would imply that all states, being rational
profit-maximizers, will follow the same patterns of behavior and model their foreign
policy as a reflection of power distributions within that international system. The focus
of analysis lies on political actions that are regarded as objective and measurable
“facts.” With regard to China, neorealist studies following an external/systemic ap-
proach would hereby come to the conclusion that China’s gain in terms of relative
financial and economic power—using the past rise of Germany and Japan as key points
of reference—would result in it acting more aggressively and adopting more assertive
expansive global interests [33].
The neorealist approach does not take into account the specific structure of the
Chinese political system and its historical-cultural foundations. However, the applica-
tion of theoretical assumptions that have been developed in the Euro-Atlantic world,
could, as David Kang correctly remarked, result in “getting Asia wrong,” as politics in

2
More recently, however, analysts of Chinese foreign policy have started to pay more attention to the role of
institutions and processes of socialization.
20 N. Noesselt

different regional and cultural contexts might be determined by distinct causal mech-
anisms [22] – contrary to the predictions of structural realism, the end of the Cold War
did not result in any direct reformulation of Chinese foreign policy [61].
Although the first image approach remains an influential tool in the analysis of
Chinese foreign policy, unidimensional explanations are rather inadequate to interpret
and anticipate current and future developments. Uncertainty about China’s individual
leaders political preferences imply that generalizations and the development of new
frameworks can only be made ex post, when more information about these preferences
become openly available, or have to relie on political tea leave reading. 3 Symbolic
dimensions ([11]: 381–383)—e.g., historical remembrance and reconstruction in the
case of Sino-Japanese relations; or patterns of behavior resulting from role conceptions
of ego and alter [43], e.g. the old communist comradeship that, on a rather abstract
level, still determines Sino-DPRK relations—obviously have a major impact on the
conduct of Chinese foreign relations.
The domestic/societal approach tries to open the black box of the Chinese state to
examine the impact of internal developments on the PRC’s formulation of foreign
policy. It assumes that domestic developments—such as the Cultural Revolution of
1966–1976; the economic reforms of 1978 and their sociopolitical implications—
alongside the interests of societal groups more or less directly translate into foreign
policy preferences [26, 28, 29]. This mostly resonates with most statements on the
expected development of Chinese foreign policy under the new Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang
administration. Almost in unison, the community of international China watchers
agreed that priority would be given to domestic development needs [7, 24]. At a first
glance, the fact that the third plenary session of the new 18th Central Committee
outlined major reform tasks for the years to come [57]—all of them linked to China’s
unfinished economic modernization and resultant socio-economic externalities – seems
to prove this hypothesis. However, these decisions are not isolated policy formulations
but respond to perceived changes in the PRC’s regional and global environment as well
as on the domestic level.
As the focus of the reforms rests on (sustainable) economic growth and ascribes a
central role to the market and the private sector, it is more than self-evident that the
restructuring of the economy at home will somehow impact on China’s global business
activities. Due to China’s growing economic power—it is now the world’s second
largest economy (expected to surpass the US in the very next years) and already has
become the number one creditor of the US—and its “going global” strategy the
linkages and interdependencies between the national and the international dimension
of China’s policy formulation and implementation have increased. In order to secure its
national core interests—economic growth and socio-political stability—China needs a
stable regional and global environment. In this vein, the actions undertaken by China’s
new leaders could be expected to focus on power consolidation at home and conflict
resolution abroad.
However, some researchers have stated that the global financial crisis has opened a
strategic window of opportunity that allows China to demand a greater say on issues of
international politics in exchange for its cooperation in the re-stabilization of the

3
For an overview of China and the first image approach, see also Jean-Marc F. Blanchard’s introduction in
this special issue.
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 21

international system and its institutional backbone. According to this approach, the
turning point in Chinese foreign policy would not be the reshuffling of personnel but
the change and transformation of the international system that became visible from
2007 onwards. Nonetheless, no amendments to China’s official foreign strategy and no
new foreign policy concepts were introduced between 2007 (US banking crisis) and
2012 (changing of the guard in China). It was in 2012 that China’s newly designated
core leaders made novel ideas officially public.
Single-level approaches obviously do not mirror the complexity of foreign policy
decision making in an increasingly globalized world in which domestic and global
processes have become intertwined. Even an approach that took into account a
combination of external and systemic explanatory factors would have its limitations
and deficiencies as it would remain restricted to the structural macro-level. It is essential
to recognize that China’s foreign policy formulation is guided by interpretations of
domestic and international processes and structures, which do not necessarily corre-
spond with the interpretations held by other players involved in world politics. This is
clearly discernible in the writings of Chinese and US government advisors and policy-
related think tanks on the general structure of the international system. While the US
world order narrative has recently replaced the idea of unipolarity by nonpolarity [16,
25], the official Chinese IR discourse sticks to the idea of multipolarity [17]. While
multipolarity ascribes a leading role the “great power” and opposes unipolar ambitions,
nonpolarity balances the power ambitions of rising regional economic power centres by
conceiving of world politics as more than intergovernmental bargaining of great
powers. While both scenarios are based on oversimplifications, they illustrate the
normative-ideational scenarios behind these two powers’ foreign policy and foreign
policy legitimation.
Information about the strategic calculations underlying China’s foreign policy
decision-making process is generally not made public. One way, however, to under-
stand the calculations and perspectives that guide China’s choice of positioning in
international affairs is to be found in a close reading of think tank publications, as
members of these thinks tank circles participate, along with individual scholars, in
direct dialogue with the party-state’s key institutions (for example, via the study
sessions of the Politburo) and prepare dossiers containing the background information
that “inspires” the policy-making process [41].
To identify (potential) changes and turns in Chinese foreign policy, one would have
to examine whether and when elements of these internal strategic debates—which are
partly reflected and revealed in the think tanks’ journal publications and policy briefs—
become integrated into official strategy. The problem here is that insight into the official
positions of the Chinese party-state can only be derived from official speeches and
newspaper articles. These statements do not, however, necessarily mirror the political
elites’ “real” positions and worldviews. Newspapers may also be or have been
instrumentalized for propaganda purposes and the post hoc legitimation of political
acts ([34]: 28).
Changes in foreign policy can be understood as processes of adaptation to changing
domestic and/or external structures (material level) and/or changes in the interpretation
of domestic and/or external structures (ideational level).4 Despite the fragmentation of

4
The ideational level also includes the cultural dimension of foreign policy, see [27].
22 N. Noesselt

the foreign policy decision-making process in China, the political elites can be regarded
as “gatekeepers” in the formulation of China’s official foreign policy. Changes in
official rhetoric are thus indicators of a recalculation of China’s approach to interna-
tional politics taking place, and are most likely to result in a subsequent adaptation of its
foreign strategy. The sources of these foreign policy readjustments are potentially to be
found in the (internal) debates occurring between the political elites and their advisors,
as well as inside the epistemic communities in which more abstract ideas are debated
before being considered as possible elements of official strategy.

Leadership Change, Policy Continuity

With the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2013
China’s long-planned leadership transition finally came to completion. Based on both
formal and informal retirement regulations, two-thirds of the leading personnel of the
party, the state, and the Chinese military were replaced [5, 28]. Still, leadership change
in China is more about continuity rather than change. It entails a highly organized
processes designed to secure the persistence and continuity of China’s political system
and to maintain the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) power monopoly. The incoming
leaders are handpicked and have long party careers and experience in different posi-
tions inside the party-state apparatus. Loyalty, adherence to the party line, and inclusion
in patron–client networks are fundamental requirements for climbing the ladder of
success up to the top echelons of the Chinese party-state [6].
The institutionalization and formalization of leadership changes in China is based on
the CCP’s observations of legitimacy crises both in its own past and in other political
systems. The historical experiences of power transitions in the PRC’s lifetime (such as
the ousting of Mao’s designated successors or the fall from grace of Zhao Ziyang) are
illustrative of the destabilizing effect that an unorganized and sudden reshuffle of
China’s top leaders can have. Unplanned leadership transitions always run the risk of
ending up in turmoil and upheaval. Any interruption or fissure of the party’s power
monopoly might cause internal cleavages and ideological conflicts to surface and lead
to a questioning or even revision of the party’s fundamental ideas. Continuously using
the past to serve the present, during their first years in office, China’s incoming new
leaders are generally expected to place great emphasis on stability, continuity and
power consolidation.
The general outline of the PRC’s foreign policy for the next 5 years is to be found in
Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. According to the
Chinese media, the report already included the views and prospective projects of the
new core leaders, as Xi is said to have been involved in the drafting of it [53]. With
regard to foreign and security policy, the line taken herein remains consistent with the
party’s axiomatic principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, though
some statements that could be seen as a slight modification of China’s foreign strategy
also were included. The country, the report states, is in need of an army that is
“commensurate with China’s international standing” and that is capable of defending
and safeguarding China’s security and development interests. Maritime, space, and
cyberspace security have been added to the military’s agenda. The goal is to set up a
modern army that is able “to win local war in an information age” [40].
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 23

In the passages of the report dealing with foreign affairs, it is declared that China will
continue its strategy of peaceful development and pursue an independent foreign policy
of peace. Hu also, once more, confirmed China’s opposition to and rejection of
hegemonic ambitions. However, some of the formulations included appeared to reflect
China’s new international standing and the current global power transition. The
statement that “we are firm in our resolve to uphold China’s sovereignty, security,
and development interests and will never yield to any outside pressure” [40] stresses
that China will actively defend its core interests. Nonetheless, this passage also includes
a carte blanche proviso that allows for flexible and pragmatic behavior in international
politics: “We will decide our position and policy on an issue on its own merits and work
to uphold fairness and justice” [40]. Furthermore, the report integrates some novel ideas
into China’s formal strategy, such as the “new type of great power relations” [40].
Already prior to being promoted to the highest levels of political power, Xi, in his role
as the PRC’s vice president, visited the US in February 2012 and used this new
formulation [14].
The reorganization of the foreign policy decision-making bureaucracy underlines the
central role that China’s incoming political elites ascribe to the US and the Asian
region. In March 2013 China’s former minister of foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi, was
named state councilor and replaced Dai Bingguo, a specialist on the former Soviet
Union and (Eastern) Europe. Yang, in contrast to Dai, has vast experience in Sino–US
relations, as he formerly served as China’s ambassador to the US. As the position of the
state councilor is one of the highest in China’s rather informally organized foreign
policy decision-making body, this might indicate a refocusing on great power relations
and also imply a diminishing role for the EU/Europe in Chinese foreign policy. China’s
new foreign minister, Wang Yi, is a specialist on Sino–Japanese relations. His promo-
tion is quite timely, as tensions between China and Japan have recently been aggravated
after the latter’s purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Wang Yi has a broad
experience of dealing with China’s Asian neighbors, as not only did he serve as
ambassador to Japan but also until recently acted as director of China’s National
Taiwan Affairs Office (2008–2013).5 Although the inner dynamics and causal relations
leading to the promotion of the next wave of political elites still remain rather obscure,
the involvement of specialists on the US and Asia in China’s foreign policy drafting
process could be a sign that the new generation of leaders will first of all seek to
appease and balance regional tensions and intra-Asian cleavages before turning their
attention to the global level.
Even though the new generation of leaders generally is not expected to advance any
new foreign strategy, Xi has nevertheless still introduced some terminological innova-
tions. Shortly after taking up the position of general secretary in November 2012, Xi
began using the term “Chinese dream.”6 Since his speech at the “The Road to Revival”
exhibition at the National Museum of History in Beijing in December 2012 [54, 56],
the “Chinese dream” has been quoted in almost every article dealing with the new
leaders’ policy preferences. The idea of a “dream” of wealth and power is obviously

5
On the biographical background of China’s core cadres, see http://www.chinavitae.com.
6
The Renmin Ribao’s webportal maintains a page that presents a collection of selected articles dealing with
the theoretical underpinnings and the official definition of the “Chinese Dream,“see http://theory.people.com.
cn/GB/40557/359404/index.html.
24 N. Noesselt

quite appealing to other rising powers and regional players from the Global South. Xi
referred to this shared dream during his first trip abroad, which led him first to Russia
[54] and then to South Africa [39]. The integration of this new slogan into bilateral
exchanges seems to be nothing less than an attempt to enhance China’s public
diplomacy and to increase its global soft power.7 It definitely does not represent any
major changes in China’s international posture.
To some observers this new notion might look like a reawakening of the formula “a
rich country, a strong army” (fu guo, qiang bing), which served as the ideological
orientation for the Chinese self-strengthening movement that gained momentum in the
decades following the Chinese empire’s defeat by the West (and later also by Japan in
1894–1895). A high-ranking colonel from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Liu
Mingfu (2010) reactivated the use of this slogan with his well-received book The
Chinese Dream (Zhongguo meng) [31]. By coining a rather loosely defined “Chinese
dream” Xi is obviously seeking to unify the people behind the party, as this catch-all
phrase allows different groups within Chinese society to project their own ideas onto
the new slogan.
Xi’s “Chinese dream” is presented as a development model for China and the world,
and shows clear parallels to the twin concepts of “harmonious society” and “harmoni-
ous world [15]. 8 The “harmonious society” paradigm emerged at the 16th Party
Congress (2002) as a follow-up to the earlier propagated “well-off society” one, and
was continuously repeated in various declarations made by the Hu-Wen government
[52]. In 2004 the 6th Plenum of the 16th Central Committee passed a resolution on
some major questions surrounding the construction of a “harmonious society,” with the
concept being defined as a Chinese mode of good governance [8]. While first used at
the Asian–Africa Summit (April 2005), the concept of “harmony” was officially
presented as a new guiding principle for global politics at the summit held to mark
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (September 2005) [18]. It
thus replaced China’s earlier concept of a “better world,” as had been formulated by
Jiang Zemin during his speech at the 50th anniversary meeting of the United Nations
[20]. Harmony, peace, stability as well as wealth and power–elements developed in the
political harmony debate under the fourth generation–serve now as corner stones of the
“Chinese dream.”
Some hints at what foreign policy under Xi might be like were documented in the
reports and transcripts of the newly elected Politburo’s third study session, held on
January 28, 2013 [39]. Xi stressed the party’s adherence to the concept of a “peaceful
rise,” but at the same time also asserted that China would not tolerate any violation of
its national core interests. One explanation for this move might be the growing
awareness among China’s political elites of the causal relation between public opinion
and the system’s legitimacy. In order to secure the support of its people, the government
seeks to respond to the national(ist) interests and demands prevailing inside society. Or,
from a more strategic point of view, in order to increase the system’s legitimacy, a
government can support the formation of patriot movements and then present itself as
an advocate of these postions in international bargaining constellations ([37]: 215).
While the rhetoric used in internal documents and declarations has been sharpened, the

7
For a critical discussion of the concept of soft power in China, see [62].
8
On the implications of the harmonious world paradigm for China’s economic foreign policy, see [2].
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 25

general political key concepts and axiomatic foreign policy principles have not been
altered.

Legitimacy and Power Consolidation

Wen Jiabao’s report to the NPC in March 2013 not only summarized the main
achievements of the past 10 years but also outlined the three key challenges to be
faced by the incoming leaders: social justice, developmental imbalances, and environ-
mental protection [50]. The prioritization of domestic issues in the new leaders’ agenda
is illustrated by the fact that in the budget plan that was adopted by the NPC in March
2013 the total allocated expenditure for domestic and public security is, again, signif-
icantly higher than that for external defense.9 This once more indicates that the main
threat to the stability of the Chinese system and the persistence of one-party rule is to be
found in the domestic context. However, given that domestic and international devel-
opments are intertwined, many domestic goals can only be attained through engage-
ment in global affairs. At the same time, global developments also can impact the
domestic arena. In any event, the old and new elites’ focus on domestic issues does not
automatically imply continuity in foreign affairs.
The key issue for the new political leaders, alongside the three aforementioned
challenges, will be to consolidate their power and to re-legitimate the Chinese party-
state. Legitimacy in the post-Mao era mainly consists of three pillars: the party’s ability
to maintain sociopolitical stability and stable economic growth, the safeguarding of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the representation and defense of
China’s (core) interests in international bargaining rounds. These three pillars of
legitimacy are all interrelated. A stable economic growth rate is the necessary precon-
dition for sociopolitical stability and people’s general well-being. As China’s economy
is—despite all the government’s efforts to increase domestic consumption and prod-
uct—still heavily dependent on export markets and imports of energy and raw mate-
rials, China’s domestic economic conditions continue to directly impact its foreign
strategy. Given China’s deep involvement in global trade and Chinese companies’
increased engagement abroad, the PRC’s official foreign trade strategy has to reflect
both the interests of its domestic business actors and relevant government agencies as
well as the concrete power constellations of the international system itself. The political
leaders’ economic strategy (both at home and with regard to China’s “going global”
strategy) is thus a crucial factor in the general conduct of China’s foreign policy.
With his “journey to the South” in December 2012, Xi symbolically expressed his
support for Dengist style economic policies and a continuation of China’s continued
engagement with the global economy. Xi’s trip to Guangdong not only reminded
people of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern tour in 1992, through which Deng had symbol-
ically affirmed China’s commitment to reform and opening, but also showed his

9
The budget plan 2013 is available online, see: http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013lh/2013-03/05/c_114898637_
3.htm. Liff and Erickson ([30]: 22) decrypt China’s military expenditures and present some slightly different
numbers of the overall budget, but finally come to the conclusion that “increases in the official defence budget
are roughly consistent with GDP growth and constitute a declining percentage of central government
expenditures.”
26 N. Noesselt

support for the “Guangdong Model”—which is linked to the name of Guangdong’s

then liberal-minded party secretary, Wang Yang [45].
High economic growth rates are, as such, not the only necessary precondition for
social stability. The uneven distribution of wealth that has resulted from the privatiza-
tion of the business sector and the abolition of the “iron rice bowl” (the guarantee of
employment and granting of access for the general population to basic social security
systems under Mao Zedong) have led to rising levels of unrest among members of
Chinese society. Redistributive measures and new tax regulations for China’s nouveau
riche would be required to successfully rebalance tensions both inside society and
between the ruling party and the Chinese people. Currently the middle class and the
newly rich, those who have profited the most from China’s economic reforms, serve as
the main supporters of China’s political regime [13, 46]. The question will be whether
the new leadership manages to retain the support of these groups while at the same time
working on policies and regulations that target their acquired privileges.
Simultaneously, as more and more Chinese entrepreneurs have started to operate and
invest globally, the actor groups that are pressuring the government’s approach to
global affairs have multiplied.
In the logic of Chinese politics, apart from winning people’s hearts and minds the
new leaders also need the general support of the military. As Mao put it, “political
power grows out of the barrel of the gun.” Whereas Jiang Zemin stayed at the head of
the Central Military Commission even after the transfer of political power to Hu
Jintao—who assumed office in 2002 as general secretary and in 2003 became president
of China—, Xi took over the leadership of the military already on the occasion of the
18th Party Congress. Since then, Xi has continuously made steps to co-opt the
military’s new leaders and to secure their loyalty to the party. During his trip to
Guangdong in early December 2012, for example, Xi also visited PLA naval and air
force units. During a meeting with PLA deputies at the NPC on March 12, 2013, he
delivered a speech in which he urged the armed forces to be absolutely loyal to the
party, to sharpen their fighting capacities, and to abide by the principle of discipline
[55].
The armed forces, especially the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP), are not
only key players for maintaining domestic stability—they are central to the defense of
China’s territorial interests and to the securing of its transport routes as well. The White
Paper on China’s armed forces released in April 2013 mentions certain “risks” that
could endanger “China’s overseas interests” [44]. This term exemplifies how China’s
security strategy is no longer limited to traditional and non-traditional security concerns
within the geographical borders of the PRC.
Growing global interdependencies and China’s continued integration into the realms
of global trade and finance have finally resulted in a global turn being taken in China’s
security strategy. For example, given that China’s national growth heavily relies on
energy and raw material imports the security of the sea lines of communication is now
of vital importance for China’s continued economic stability. “Vessel protection at sea”
is thus one of the key mandates of China’s naval forces. In December 2008, for
example, the Chinese government decided to dispatch its naval forces to Somalian
waters, where they are charged with escorting and protecting Chinese merchants as well
as vessels operating on behalf of the World Food Programme. Consequently, central
control over the military is of crucial importance for China’s external relations.
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 27

In addition to these military and territorial matters, there are also security concerns
that have arisen out of China’s going global strategy, which has led numerous Chinese
companies and banks to now operate globally and open overseas branches.
Simultaneously, Chinese workers are involved in large infrastructure construction
projects all over the world. As a result, the PLA’s new responsibilities and tasks now
include the evacuation of Chinese nationals based in conflict regions and the provision
of general “security support for China’s interests overseas.” In February 2011 the PLA
organized the evacuation of more than 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya [44].
The extension of the PLA’s operating range and the assignment of new tasks to it
were first initiated under the Hu-Wen administration. The recent 2013 White Paper on
China’s armed forces has primarily served to institutionalize these new practices and
inscribe them into the PRC’s official foreign strategy. In the years to come, the fifth
generation of leaders—with Xi and Li at the helm—will thus have to base their foreign
and security strategies on these adjusted and renewed security concepts.

China Debates its Foreign Strategy

The fine-tuning of China’s “new” foreign strategy was based on the various different
workshops and conferences that preceded the 18th Party Congress. Some of the main
ideas discussed on these occasions made their way into the report to the 18th Party
Congress, while others are now to be found in the new leaders’ official statements. The
debate about the now incumbent leaders’ “new” strategy is still ongoing.
Overall, there seems to be an emerging consensus among China’s academic
and policy-advising circles that the PRC’s foreign strategy requires some
readjustments and updates, and that the changing of the guard provides the
symbolic opportunity to do this [36].
The argument for why China has to revise its foreign strategy is first of all a
structural one. There is the general perception, already documented in the Chinese
Blue Book on the International Situation edited and published by the Chinese Institute
for International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing in 2012, that power is now shifting towards
Asia and that, furthermore, the Global South will become one of the major players in
world politics ([12]: 3). This power shift, catalyzed by the outbreak of the global
financial crisis in 2008, has caused the US and other formerly core players to revise
their foreign strategies—and thus China needs to rethink its own policies and strategies
accordingly [47]. Furthermore, these global power shifts have been accompanied by the
outbreak of regional conflicts and the emergence of new cleavages in the Asian region
(such as the US “pivot to Asia,” the island disputes in the East and South China Seas,
the North Korea issue) [65]. China’s new political leaders thus have to (re)position
themselves in a changing regional security environment, in which the success of the
targeted preservation of the status quo will not only be decided by China but will
depend also on the (re)actions of the multitude of different actors involved.
China’s official foreign strategy is built on the assumption that the currently evolving
structural changes of the international system have opened a strategic window of
opportunity [60, 49, 35]. While redefining its foreign strategy in this period of change,
China will have to rethink its identity as a global player. However, any reconfiguration
of China’s development strategy and its national identity, even though conceived as a
28 N. Noesselt

response to global power shifts, will, in return, directly impact the remodeling of the
international system.
Starting from the assumption that China has already reached a leading position in the
world’s concert of great powers, the current internal debates on China’s foreign policy
critically reassess the formulation taoguang yanghui, commonly translated as “nourish
obscurity and bide your time.” According to Ye Zicheng (2002) this term was used by
Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s as part of a 28-character statement on foreign strategy [59].
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the democratic transition of the former
Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, China had become the main target of
the West’s criticism and anticommunist strategy. Deng’s statement had mainly served to
avoid the emergence of a new Cold War, this time between the US and China. Recent
scholarly debates in China—conceived as being responsible for guiding and justifying
the new leaders’ foreign strategy—argue that taoguang yanghui does not stand for
passivity in international politics but has to be seen as a counterpart to Deng’s phrase
you suo zuowei (“to play an active role”) [51]. Along this line, taoguang yanghui
means a circumspect and modest engagement in international affairs, but does not ex
ante exclude any interference or active participation. To make this point clear, the
current Chinese strategy debates therefore complement taoguang yanghui with qianxu
jinshen (“considerateness and prudence”). Qianxu jinshen can be traced back to Mao’s
speech at the second plenary session of the 7th Central Committee, where it referred to
the working style of CCP cadres. Transferred to the realms of international politics, it
stands for China’s self-imposed commitment to a nonaggressive foreign policy. While
neorealist hardliners postulate that China should play a more important role in global
affairs (geng da de you suo zuo wei),10 liberals vote instead for modesty and cooper-
ation (qianxu jinshen) ([48]: 38–39). China’s new leaders will thus have to find a
balance between these two mutually exclusive positions.
Even though the focus of the new leaders’ policy is on national economic develop-
ment and social stability (which both ultimately correlate with the regime’s efforts to
stay in power), the Xi-Li administration now has to cope with various external
challenges. The security dilemma in the East and South China Sea—the dispute with
Japan over ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island; maritime resource competition
and conflicts with the South East Asian countries and the US’ “pivot to Asia—are a
major test for China’s self-proclaimed role as a peacefully rising and cooperative actor.
China’s political decision-makers have to calculate the demands and interests of the
various interest groups at home and conduct a foreign policy that is reflective of both
their populace’s expectations and of China’s general developmental interests. At the
same time, they have to consider the way in which China’s international engagement is
perceived by others and also generate support—or at least sympathy—for China’s
demands in global affairs. Public diplomacy that addresses not only heads of states but
also the people at large (in other countries and regions) will thus be one cornerstone of
the new elites’ foreign strategy ([21]: 3).
What can be said about the direction of Chinese foreign policy under the Xi-Li
administration so far is that changes and modifications have remained limited to foreign
policy rhetoric and do not directly translate into policy behavior(s). New slogans

10
See Yan Xuetong’s speech on shifting principles of Chinese foreign policy: http://www.fyjs.cn/bbs/simple/
index.php?t558657.html
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 29

address the domestic society and serve to bolster the legitimacy of China’s new leaders
and, at the same time, also seek to restore strategic networks with other rising
economies, which are invited to dream the “Chinese” instead of the “American” dream.
Recognition of China’s projections for a future world order by other players and respect
for Chinese demands by the old centres of the world economy further contribute to
convince the Chinese people of the righteousness and legitimacy of the party-state’s
development strategy—despite its apparent negative environmental and socio-
economic externalities.
What implicitely underlies recent assessments by international China watchers who
identify a rising assertiveness in Chinese foreign behavior is the idea that the increase in
economic and military power will ultimately result in an open struggle for hegemony
[32]. Contrary to this structuralist realist approach, constructivist theories argue that it
would be China’s interpretation of its own position and strategic room of maneuver that
determines its foreign actions. The international role that China so far declares for itself
is that of a responsible and benign power (daguo) that does not pursue any expansionist
goals (thus, it is opposed to the notion of empire or diguo). The international
community’s request that China should, in compliance with the existing rules, shoulder
more global responsibilities and the demands of domestic patriotic movements that call
for a more self-confident presentation of Chinese core interests make the conception of
China’s “new” international role even more complex.
Although Zhao Kejin (2012) labels the new Xi-Li era in Chinese foreign policy as
one of “leadership diplomacy,” he also underlines that China will not act as a revolu-
tionary power intent on the overthrow of the international system but rather have to use
its new power to reform and restructure existing global institutions [63]. The underlying
assumption here is that the international order has been defined by the old Euro-
Atlantic players, whose power has slowly started to wane in recent years. If emerging
powers are now in the process of rising to global status, the old system is no longer
justifiable in terms of these new actors’ interests and beliefs [58]. However, China’s
more assertive posture on global issues is definitely not an outcome of the changing of
the guard in 2012/2013. Already since 2007/2008—as a response to the global
financial crisis—China has continuously repeated its demands for a reform of
international institutions through BRICS joint declarations, G20 meetings, and
the Davos summits.11
The above-sketched internal debates prove that the recent rhetoric adjustments in
China’s foreign policy should not be read as a grand strategy to overthrow the existing
order. The new leaders’ recent modifications of China’s foreign strategy—e.g., the
“new type of great power relations”—are first of all a response to perceived power
shifts in the international system and in the regional context that impose new con-
straints on Chinese foreign policy. China’s new government has to master a difficult
balancing act between domestic groups that try to use the opportunity to increase their
say on Chinese politics and the expectations of the international community. The main
justification for China’s modest foreign policy reformulation is thus a structural (or, to
be more precise, a perceptional-structuralist) one and, in the Chinese view, not a result
of the changing of the guard.

11
For a critical analysis of China’s use of economic tools as part of its international strategy, see [3].
30 N. Noesselt

Conclusion and Outlook

What has become obvious from the first few statements made on foreign affairs by the
country’s new leaders is a reconfirmation of China’s core interests—national sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, domestic development—and the staking of the claim to
having a greater say, on the basis of China’s own worldview and principles, in
international politics. The global financial crisis has opened a window of opportunity
for China to accelerate its rise to new global power status; it will be one of the new
leadership generation’s tasks to define how China will deal with its increased capacities
and to determine what role the country will play in the international arena over the
course of the next decade. In any case, as this article evidences, business interests and
stable economic growth remain at the top of the party’s agenda. Given the Chinese
party-state’s prioritization of stability and continuity, a major reshuffling of its foreign
strategy priorities is rather unlikely to occur. If at all, these changes have already been
prepared by past generations of political leaders.
Nonetheless, as China’s development interests can only be realized in a stable
international environment and as the Chinese economy is heavily dependent on its
supply chains being secure, the country’s foreign diplomatic engagement and the
deployment of its armed forces overseas have been adapted accordingly. On a symbolic
level, China’s more active global positioning pursues two goals. On the one hand,
China presents itself as a responsible great power and is attempting to win the trust and
support of the international community of states. On the other, the way that other actors
abroad perceive China can increase its political system’s symbolic legitimacy at home.
A widespread international acknowledgment of China’s rise to global power status
could, as such, be read as providing confirmation of the success of the party-state’s
development strategy.
The two new catchphrases that have come to the fore in the foreign policy of the Xi-
Li-administration—the “Chinese dream” and the “new type of great power relations”—
illustrate China’s revised rhetoric positioning in international affairs. The country’s new
leaders hope to play a major role in the joint reconstruction of a post-crisis world order,
one that is no longer based on the principles of a unipolar system but that reflects the
interests of the world’s new rising powers. This, however, does not represent a major
deviation from China’s general foreign policy principles, but stands in line with China’s
“old” strategy of a peaceful re-ascent.
This last observation leads us back to the general question of how to analyze recent
and past events in China’s foreign politics and how to predict its future orientations.
Perceptions and cognitive dimensions, as this article has outlined, are key determinants
of the PRC’s foreign behavior. The end of the Cold War did not cause a major
reframing of China’s external relations as the country had started to normalize its
relations with the US already in the 1970s and did not, contrary to the states situated
in the former Soviet hemisphere, have to look for new alliances and strategic partners
after 1989/1991. By contrast, the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 is interpreted as a
critical juncture that does not mean a final decline of the US but at least allows China
(and other rising economies) to play a more central role in intergovernmental
bargaining processes such as the G20 meetings. This interpretation of the international
system together with China’s rising material capacities might imply that China’s self-
defined role in the international system could undergo gradual changes. Nonetheless,
China’s Foreign Strategy after the 18th Party Congress 31

any role change that would equal a redefinition of China’s national and
systemic identity is rather unlikely to occur as this step could trigger a general
debate about the country’s internal structure and its political regime type. The
central axiomatic principle of Chinese foreign policy is and remains the sur-
vival of its one-party system.

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Nele Noesselt is research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg. Since April 2012 she acts
as spokesperson of GIGA Research Team III on Comparative Regionalism Research. She studied Modern
Chinese Studies and Political Science in Heidelberg, Beijing and Vienna (PhD in Political Science: 2012; PhD
in Chinese Studies: 2009). Her research interests include Chinese IR theory, China’s role in world affairs,
Sino-European relations, new modes of governance in China as well as processes of learning, adaptation and
transformation of (post-)socialist systems.