INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE

HUMAN PERSON
Summary of Discussion

Topic 1: Nature of Accountability

1stQ: Week 8 (September 27 – October 1)

Nature of Accountability
Meaning of Accountability

What do we mean by moral accountability?

Deservingness of blame or praise (punishment or reward) for the actions that we perform
is a necessary consequence of our intelligence and freedom. Our intelligence enables us to
distinguish between what is right and wrong actions, or between actions that we ought and ought
not to do. Our freedom, on the other hand, enables us to choose the kind of action that we would
like to perform or to intentionally perform an action. Consequently, in choosing to perform an
action that we know to be either right or wrong we deserve either blame or praise. We, in
particular, deserve blame for choosing to perform an action we know to be wrong; while we
deserve praise for choosing to perform an action we know to be right. We deserve blame, for
instance, when we intentionally and knowingly inflict unnecessary pain to a person, but we
deserve praise when we intentionally and knowingly help a person in need.

We refer to the deservingness of blame or praise for the actions that we do as

accountability. It must be emphasized that accountability includes both blame and praise, for
accountability is often associated only with blame. Accountability can be of various types, such
as legal and moral kinds, based on the kind of principle or standards that we use in judging an
action to be right or wrong. Legal accountability, for instance, results from the application of
legal standards while moral accountability results from the application of moral standards in
assessing the rightness or wrongness of our actions.

Thus, in legal accountability, a person is given punishment or penalties by the state for
performing an illegal action; while he/she is given certain benefits or services by the state, such
as police protection and free education, for not doing an illegal action. In moral, accountability, a
person is thought to deserve moral blame for performing an immoral act; while moral praise for
performing a moral act. Legal accountability coincides with moral accountability if laws embody
moral principles, which does not always happen. For instance, during the period when racial
discrimination was legal, acts of white people that racially discriminated against black people did
not result in legal punishment though it certainly deserved moral blame.

In our discussion of accountability, we shall assume the moral kind. Whenever we use the
word “accountability”, we shall mean moral accountability. Now it is usual to use the word
“accountability” interchangeably with the word “responsibility.” Zimmerman for instance,
writes: “The sort of moral responsibility with which I am concerned here is familiar... In this
sense of ‘responsibility,’ if someone is responsible for some event, then he is worthy of praise or
blame for the event.” In addition, to the meaning of responsibility as accountability, the word
“responsibility,” however, has other meanings. Though different, these meanings, however, are
related in some significant ways to accountability; and because of this, confusion is, and
accountability we are not mindful of these differences in the meaning of the said term. Thus, in
addition to the meaning of responsibility as accountability, we also have the meanings of
responsibility as duty and as an agency.

Responsibility as duty refers to the sense of “responsibility” in which being responsible

means holding certain duties or obligations. Parents, for instance, are responsible for their
children in that they hold certain duties or obligations toward their children, which include
providing for the physical, spiritual, and educational needs of their children, and disciplining
them so that they will grow up to become morally upright individuals and socially responsible
citizens. It is, in fact, by this light that we describe someone as a responsible person when he/she
is mindful of his/her duties toward other persons, while as an irresponsible one when otherwise.

But while responsibility as duty and responsibility as accountability is not the same or do
not refer to the same thing, they are, however, closely related in that responsibility as duty gives
rise to responsibility as accountability. This is because performing and failing to perform one’s
duties are themselves actions for which one can deserve blame or praise; that is, we can deserve
blame for failing to perform our duties toward other persons, while praise for being able to
perform them.

Responsibility as an agency, on the other hand, refers to the sense of responsibility in

which being responsible means being the cause of something or being the one that brings about
something. Causes can be humans or nonhumans. As we can say that the criminal was
responsible for the death of the innocent bystanders; we can also say that the strong wind was
responsible for the broken glasses window. When we speak of human causes of certain actions,
philosophers usually refer to these causes as agents.

Here, when we say that person X is responsible for a particular action we just mean that it
is person X who does such an action. This is different when we take person X responsible for
that action in that he/she deserves blame or praise for doing it. Person X may be the agent of
such action, but he/she may not deserve blame or praise for performing it; and this is because, as
we shall see later, there are conditions for a person to deserve blame or praise for performing any
action other than simply being the person who performs it. An agent who also deserves moral or
praise for the action that he has performed is, properly speaking, a moral agent.

The moral agent should not be confused with moral recipients. Moral agents are entities
who hold certain moral duties; while moral recipients are the targets of these moral duties and
thus are entities whole hold moral rights. Moral agents, however, are necessarily moral recipients
as well; and in addition to their moral duties, they are necessarily bearers of moral rights as well.
On the other hand, moral recipients may or may not be a moral agents as well; and thus in
addition to their moral rights, they may or may not have moral duties. Humans, who are rational
and free, are the usual moral agents; moral recipients include both humans and nonhumans.
 Moral recipients who are not rational and free include animals and humans whose
capacity for rationality and freedom has been severely and irreversibly damaged, and for some
people, they may also include other nonhuman members of nature such as trees. On the other
hand, moral recipients who are potentially rational and free include normal infants and children.
To say we are morally responsible of moral recipients is to say that we have moral duties toward
them and that they are the objects of our actions for which we can be morally accountable.

In sum, when we say that a person is responsible for an action, we either mean that the
person has to act, the person is the agent of the action, or the person deserves blame or prise for
acting. These meanings are related in some important ways, but they are not the same.

Conditions for Accountability

The attribute of moral accountability to a person for an action that he or she does is a
result of two conditions. One is that he or she does the action intentionally, that is to say, he or
she has the intention of doing the action and he or she acts to carry out the intention. We may
refer to this condition as the intentionality condition. The other is that the person knows or is
capable of knowing that the action he or she is thinking of performing is right or wrong, good or
bad. We may refer to this second condition as the knowledge condition. Putting these two
conditions together, we thus say that a person is accountable for his or her action when he or she
performs this action intentionally and he or she knows or is capable of knowing, that this action
is right or wrong, good or bad.

Suppose a sniper shoots a person intending to kill the person. Since the sniper’s act of
shooting the person is an intentional action, which he presumably knows to be wrong, he should
be accountable for such an act – in particular, he should deserve blame for it. On the other hand,
suppose a security guard upon seeing this sniper who is about to shoot the person suddenly
decides to save the life of the person using his body to cover the person. Since this act is
intentional and is something that the security guard presumably knows to be right, then he should
be accountable for it – he should, in particular, be praised for doing it. In both cases, the
knowledge and intentionality conditions obtain, and so the attribution of accountability is proper.

These conditions – the intentionality and knowledge conditions – are usually referred to
as incriminating conditions, and they’re the opposite as excusing conditions. The excusing
conditions are the absence of the two incriminating conditions: the absence of the intentionality
conditions means that the action under consideration is not done intentionally, while the absence
of the knowledge condition means that the action is done out of ignorance. It must be noted,
however, that in the two incriminating conditions, both conditions should occur to make one
accountable for his/her action. If at least one does not occur, then one is not accountable for his
or her actions. Consequently, in the case of the two excusing conditions (ignorance and lack of
intention), it is sufficient that only one condition does not occur to excuse, and accountability.
 Suppose someone suddenly holds and moves your hand which then causes you to spill
your coffee on somebody’s laptop. You are not accountable for spilling your coffee on this
person’s laptop for it is not your intention to do it. You presumably know it to be wrong but since
you do not intend to perform then you should not be blamed for it. In this case, the knowledge
condition occurs but is not intentionally done. Onand accountability poses a child mistakes a real
gun for a toy gun and then shoots a person. Assuming that this child is of an age where he is not
yet capable of discriminating between a real gun and a toy gun and, more importantly, of
knowing the immorality of shooting a person, h/she should then be executed from accountability
for his/her act. And here the intentionality conditions obtain but not the knowledge one.

We earlier noted that if the knowledge condition does not obtain then there cannot be any
attribution of accountability. The absence of such a condition, or the presence of the condition of
ignorance, is one of the excusing conditions. But suppose a factory manager does not do
preventive measures to protect the health of his workers from the hazardous fumes emitted in his
factory; and as a result, many of his workers get seriously sick. Later on, when an investigation is
done in Mar, the manager claims that he does not know that such fumes are hazardous. Can we
say here that the manager is excused from accountability? Is this a case where the knowledge
condition does not obtain? We obviously would think that he is not excused from accountability.
For not only is he capable of knowing the effects of the factory fumes on the health of his
workers, but as a factory manager he has to know such things. But how is this type of ignorance
different from the ignorance of the child who shoots a person using a real gun which he mistakes
for a toy?

This consideration calls for a distinction between two kinds of ignorance, which we shall
call irresponsible ignorance where we can say to an ignorant person that he/she should have
known better; while real ignorance is the kind of ignorance where we cannot say to an ignorant
person that he/she should have known better. With this consideration, it becomes clear that it is
only real ignorance that qualifies as an excusing condition. But what determines whether we
should know better in a situation is helpful: Do we have the capacity to know what we ought to
know in a given situation? And given our role in a given situation, is it our duty to know what
ought to be known in such a situation?

What determines one’s capacity to know can vary depending on the nature of the given
situation. It can include, among others, maturity, mental health, and access to relevant
information. In our example of the child mistaking a real gun for a toy gun, we cannot expect the
child to know better, or more specifically, to know the difference between a real gun and a toy
gun and that it is wrong to fire a gun to a person. And this is because his/her biological capacity
to know such information has not yet developed. Now the person who mistakes a real gun for a
toy gun may be an adult already, but then he/she may be mentally handicapped, and here it is not
that the capacity to know has not yet developed but that it is impaired.
 On the other hand, what determines one’s duty to know is one’s role in a given situation?
Take again the case of the factory manager that we earlier talked about. Because of his role as the
factory manager, he/she ought to know certain things about the factory which should include
whether the fumes emitted in his/her factory are hazardous to the health of his/her workers. If so,
then his failure to know these things constitute negligence of his/her duty to know such things. In
this regard, his/her ignorance of the things he ought to know is irresponsible.

Now it is often said that we are not living in a perfect world. For there are moments
where we know that certain actions are wrong; and yet, because of some reasons or
circumstances we happen to be in, we decide nonetheless to perform such actions. How do these
reasons or circumstances we happen to be in effect our accountability for such actions? Mainly,
these reasons or circumstances will not excuse us from accountability but will either lessen or
increase the degree of our accountability. We call these factors that lessen the degree of
accountability mitigating. While those that increase it aggravating.

Accountability thus comes in degree, and four factors generally form the basis for
determining such degrees. The first is the degree of difficulty or pressure that forces one to
perform actions that one believes to be wrong. In this case, the greater the degree of difficulty or
pressure, the lesser the degree of accountability; or: the lesser is the degree of difficulty or
pressure, the greater is the degree of accountability. For instance, a person who steals a loaf of
bread to feed his starving family has a lesser degree of accountability compared to a person who
steals fortunes just to amuse himself.

The second is the intensity of the injury that results from a wrongful action. Here the
greater is the degree of injury, the greater is the degree of accountability; or; lesser is the degree
of injury, the lesser is the degree of accountability. For instance, stealing 20 pesos from a beggar
has a greater degree of accountability compared to stealing a thousand peso from a billionaire. Or
stealing a loaf of bread from a bakery has a lesser degree of accountability compared to stealing
it from a kid who just bought it for his own starving family.

The third is the degree of one’s involvement in the case of collective action. Here the
greater is the degree of involvement, the greater is the degree of accountability; or: the lesser is
the degree of involvement, the lesser is the degree of accountability. For instance, the person who
intentionally and knowingly assists the murderer in carrying out his criminal intention, say by
providing the murderer some information about the whereabouts of the victim is accountable to a
lesser degree compared to the murderer himself.

And fourth is the degree of one’s knowledge of the wrongfulness of action and relevant
facts. Here the more knowledgeable one is about the wrongfulness of action and relevant facts,
the more accountable one is, or the lesser-known one is about the wrongfulness of action and
relevant facts, the lesser accountable one is. This explains for instance, why do the same kind of
crime, the law gives a lesser degree of punishment to a minor compared to a normal adult.