CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH BIHAR

SCHOOL OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE

NAME- KISHAN KUMAR

En.No.-CUSB1813125042
Programme-B.A.LL.B(2nd sem.)
Section- “B”
Subject- Law of Crimes- I

TOPIC: Abetment Under Section (107-120) of

Indian Penal Code

Submitted by- KISHAN KUMAR

Submitted to- Prof. Dr P.K. Mishra
Session- 2018-2023

1|Page
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The success and final outcome of this assignment required a lot of guidance and
assistance from many people and I extremely fortunate to have got this along the
completion of our assignment work. Whatever I have done is only due to such
guidance and assistance and I would not forget to thank them. I respect and thank
Dr. P.K. Mishra for giving me an opportunity to do this assignment on time. I
extremely grateful to him for providing such support and guidance.

I am really grateful because I managed to complete this assignment within the

time given by Dr. P.K. Mishra. This assignment cannot be completed without the
effort and co-operation from our group members. I would like to express my
gratitude to my friends for support.

- KISHAN KUMAR

2|Page
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION - 04-
05

CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION - 05

ABETMENT BY INSTIGATION - 05-09

ABETMENT BY CONSPIRACY - 09

ABETMENT BY AID - 09-

10

ABETTOR - 10-
11

ABETMENT OF OFFENCES OUTSIDE INDIA - 11-

15

CONCLUSION - 16

BIBILOGRAPPHY - 17

3|Page
 INTRODUCTION
Under the Penal Code a person becomes liable as an abettor if he instigates another to
commit a crime, or engages in a conspiracy with another to commit a crime and some
act is done in furtherance of such conspiracy or if he intentionally aids another in order
to facilitate the commission of a crime. The term 'abet' in general usage means to assist,
advance, aid, conduce, help and promote. The word 'abet' has been defined as meaning
to aid; to assist or to give aid; to command, to procure, or to counsel; to countenance; to
encourage; induce, or assist, to encourage or to set another one to commit 1. The term
'abetment' in criminal law indicates that there is a distinction between the person
abetting the commission of an offence (or abettor) and the actual perpetrator of the
offence or the principal offence or the principal offender. Chapter V of the IPC on
'Abetment' provides for the law covering the responsibility of all those considered in
law to have abetted the commission of offence. The chapter on abetment contains 15
sections. Section 107 which defines abetment generally speaks of three kinds of
abetment, viz., abetment by instigation, abetment by conspiracy and abetment by aid.
Section 108 explains as to when an abetment of an offence takes place, and S. 108-A
provides for the case of abetment in India of an offence committed in a foreign country.
Section 109 prescribes the punishment for the offence of abetment when the offence
abetted is committed, while S. 110 prescribes the punishment for abetment where the
person abetted commits the act with a different intention or knowledge from that of the
abettor. Section 111 provides for cases of abetment resulting in a different offence but
which is a probable consequence thereof. Section 112 provides for cumulative
punishment in cases covered by S. 111. Section 113 which is supplementary to S.111
provides for punishment in cases where the act abetted causes a different effect from
that intended by the abettor. Section 114 provides for cases where the abettor is present
at the time of the offence, and makes him liable for the main offence and not merely as
an abettor. Sections 115 and 116 prescribe for the punishment in cases where the
offence abetted is not committed. Section 117 deals with abetment of offences by the
public generally or large groups of persons. Section 118 prescribes the penalty for
concealing the existence of a design in another to commit a grave offence. Sections 119
and 120 provide for punishment in the case of public servants and others respectively

1
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 Cri LJ 3139;

4|Page
for concealment of a design in another person to commit the offence not covered by S.
118.

Criminal Intimidation

According to S. 107, IPC, a person abets the doing of a thing when he: (i) Instigates a
person to commit an offence; or (ii) Engages with one or more persons in a conspiracy
to commit an offence; or (iii) Intentionally aids a person by any act or illegal omission
to commit an offence or illegally omits the doing of an act which would prevent the
commission of the offence. An act done under criminal intimidation cannot constitute
an abetment. Thus, where money was obtained by extortion, by way of bribe, the
person who gave the money would not be an abettor of the offence of taking bribe. But
the offence of abetment will not require any kind of mens rea where the provision
relating to the substantive offence itself makes no reference to mens rea and abetment
of the offence is coupled together with the main offence itself in the same provision. It
was held by the Orissa High Court that the giver of a bribe would be an abettor even if
he gave it in response to a demand accompanied by threats. This view cannot be
considered good law. There can be no criminal intention or mens rea on the part of the
giver in such a case as held in Dulpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan wherein the Supreme
Court observed that those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants (Reserve
Police constables) cannot be considered as accomplices as the same (bribe) was
extorted from them. The Supreme Court while considering the validity of TADA, 1987,
and stated that 'when mens rea is not essential in the substantive offence, the same is
also not necessary in the abetment thereof.

Abetment by instigation

The word 'instigate' literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite, or encourage
to do an act and a person is said to instigate another when he actively suggests or
stimulates him to the act by any means, or language, direct or indirect, whether it take
the form of express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or encouragement or a wilful
misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact. It is not necessary that

5|Page
 express words should be used to indicate what should be done by the person to whom
the directions are given. While there has to be a reasonable certainty in regard to the
meaning of the words used in order to decide whether there was incitement, it is not
necessary in law to prove the actual words used. Advice amounts to instigation only
when intended to actively suggest or stimulate the commission of an offence. Mere
acquiescence does not amount to instigation. Thus, the word denotes incitement or
urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of
mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common
knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of the moment cannot be
taken to be uttered with mens rea required to constitute instigation as they are uttered in
a fit of anger and emotional state. In Queen v. Mohit the persons who followed a
woman preparing herself to be a sati on the pyre of her husband and chanted, Rama,
Rama were held guilty of abetment by instigation to lead that woman to commit
suicide. Their approval of the woman's act by participation in the procession gave
encouragement to the lady to commit suicide.

A person may incite another by threats or pressure as well as by persuasion. Incitement

may be by expression or implication. The mere incitement of another to commit an
indictable offence is a common law misdemeanour, whether the incitement is
successful in persuading the other to commit, or to attempt to commit the offence or
not. It is argued, that a mere intent to commit evil is not indictable, without an act done;
but is there not an act done, when it is charged that the defendant solicited another to
commit a felony? The solicitation is an act: and the answer given at the bar is decisive,
that it would be sufficient to constitute an overt act of high treason.

Incitement to commit any criminal offence, even an offence triable only summarily,
amounted to a misdemeanour2 at common law. It was highly anomalous that the mere
incitement should be regarded as more serious than the actual commission of the
offence, even though the use of the greater powers of sentencing might be defensible
where the incitement was to commit a large number of summary offences.

For the purpose of the first two clauses of the S. 107, it is immaterial whether the
person instigated commits the offence or not or the persons conspiring together actually
carry out the object of the conspiracy 3 or the act abetted must be committed. The
2
a minor wrongdoing.
3
a secret plan by a group to do something unlawful or harmful.

6|Page
 offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence. As observed by the Supreme
Court in Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar4

The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor has instigated another or
engaged with another in a conspiracy to commit the offence. It is not necessary for the
offence of abetment that the act abetted must be committed.

Similarly, in Madan Raj v. State of Rajasthan 5, the Supreme Court observed as a

general rule a charge of abetment fails when the substantive offence is not established
against the principal but there may be exception. Abetment of an offence being a
distinct offence by itself, the question whether a conviction for abetment can be made
in a case where the accused is charged with the substantive offence only and no
separate charge for abetment has been framed will depend upon the circumstances of
each case. If the accused had notice of the facts, which constituted abetment, and if
there had been no prejudice to the accused by the omission to frame a separate charge
for abetment, he can be convicted for abetment even though the charge for the main
offence fails.

It is only in the case of the person abetting an offence by intentionally aiding another to
commit that offence that the charge of abetment against him would be expected to fail
when the person alleged to have committed the offence is acquitted of that offence.
Where, several persons constituting an unlawful assembly, some only were armed with
sticks, and one of them was not so armed, but picked up a stick and used it, the person
who gave a general order to beat, was held guilty of abetting the assault made by them.
In cases where the abetment consists of instigation or conspiracy, it is immaterial for
the conviction of the abettor whether the person instigated commits the offence or not.

Where a forged receipt had been brought into existence and it was intended by the
parties that it should be attested by a certain person and that person attested it
subsequently, it was held that in view of the said intention, the offence of forgery was
complete once it was so attested. Therefore, the person was held guilty of abetment.

Instigation as a form of abetment has generally been one of the essential considerations
in cases involving death of young brides or women within seven years after marriage,
as a consequence of dowry harassment. The apex court has laid down that before
4
1967 AIR 553, 1967 SCR (1) 469
5
1970 AIR 436, 1970 SCR (1) 688

7|Page
 anybody can be punished for abetment of suicide, it must be proved that the death in
question was a suicidal death. In Protima Dutta v. State of WB6 a charge under S. 306
read with S. 34, IPC was laid against the mother-in-law of the deceased and her
husband of having abetted the commission of suicide by instigating and inciting her.
The evidence revealed many circumstances which showed that the mother- in-law
suggested to the deceased by conduct, language direct or indirect expressions to commit
suicide. Although, it did not amount to express solicitation, but her cruel conduct
towards the deceased over the months made the deceased suffer mentally. Therefore,
the series of conduct amounting to actively suggesting or stimulating the deceased to
commit suicide, it was held, clearly amounted to instigation. Where one person
instigates another to the commission of an offence by means of a letter sent through the
post, the offence of abetment by instigation is completed as soon as the contents of such
letter become known to the addressee. If the letter never reaches him the act is only an
attempt to abet.

In the context of bride-burning and dowry related deaths, S. 306 which provides for
abetment of suicide, is often pressed into service. Here too, abetment is in terms of
promoting, encouraging and thereby instigating suicides. The husband had been
convicted by the trial court for abetting the suicide under S. 306, IPC and sentenced to
four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1000. The high court held that while
asking for divorce by itself cannot be called provocation to commit suicide, it is the
cruelty and the overall atmosphere created by cruelties precedent and antecedent of
such demands of divorce, which are material and which had the effect of leading the
deceased person to take poison to end her life. The word 'instigates', it was held, should
not be given restricted meaning to actual words spoken, but ought to be given a wider
meaning commensurate with the 'ordinary experiences of life'. While every case has to
be examined against the specific circumstances and facts of that case, in the present
case, it was the cruel conduct of the accused husband which provoked his wife to
commit suicide. Hence, he was rightly convicted of abetment to commit suicide under
S. 306 IPC, and the sentence was not interfered with. In Ram Kumar v. State of HP 7,
the Supreme Court considered the case of a constable who dragged a young newly
married 19-year-old girl and her husband from the latter's brother's house. In the police
station, the head constable took the girl to a room, repeatedly beat her and committed
6
May 11, 2017 - 1 11.05.2017 2/skp. W.P. 12526(W) of 2012 with C.A.N. 4437 of 2017
7
AIR 1995 SC 1965, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 67

8|Page
 rape on her, while the other constable kept watch in outside holding the hapless
husband, who was helplessly hearing the frantic screams of his wife. The Supreme
Court held that the constable by his conduct had abetted rape and therefore, did not
merit acquittal. In Saju v. State of Kerala8, a young woman, Jameela, was found killed.
At the time of her death, the deceased was in advance stage of pregnancy. Upon trial
the two accused were found guilty of the offences punishable under Ss. 120-B and 302
besides S. 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Sessions
Court, both the accused persons filed appeal before the High Court, which was
dismissed. The apex court held that there is no direct evidence either regarding
abetment or the criminal conspiracy attributable to the appellant. Both the offences are
held to be proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Hence, the appellant could
not have been convicted and sentenced with the aid of S. 120-B or S. 109 IPC. The
court further held that to prove the charge of abetment, the prosecution is required to
prove that the abettor had instigated for the doing of a particular thing or engaged with
one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing or
intentionally aided by an act of illegal omission, doing of that thing. The prosecution
failed to prove the existence of any of the ingredients of S. 107 IPC.

Abetment by conspiracy

A person is said to abet the commission of an offence by conspiracy, if he enters into an

agreement with one or more persons to do a legal act by illegal means, or to do an
illegal act, and some act is done in pursuance thereof. A conspiracy to do a thing is a
combination of two or more persons with a common design of doing a specific thing. It
has been held that where a criminal conspiracy amounts to an abetment under S. 107, it
is unnecessary to invoke the provisions of Ss. 120-A and 120-B, as the Code has made
a specific provision for the punishment of such a conspiracy.

Abetment by aid

8
 2001 AIR (SC) 3488,

9|Page
 A person is said to abet the commission of an offence, if he intentionally renders
assistance or gives aid by doing an act or omitting to do an act. Mere intention to render
assistance is not sufficient. There must be some active conduct on the part of the abettor
and the act must be accomplished in pursuance thereof. Aid may be given both by an
act of commission as well as by an act of illegal omission. For instance, if a police
officer knowing that certain persons were likely to be tortured for the purposes of
extorting confession, keeps himself away from the place, he is liable for abetment to the
offence of extortion by an act of omission. a) The act or omission which constitutes the
aid must have been done intentionally; b) The aid must have been given either prior to
or at the time of the commission of the offence abetted. It was held that unless it is
shown that the commission of the crime was not possible without the specific aid
rendered by a person, he would not be liable for an offence under this section. Aiding
and abetting of an offence are different from actual participation in a crime. Hence,
where the accused have been charged with actual participation in a crime but are only
found to have aided and abetted the commission of the crime, they cannot be convicted
of the crime charged. However, insignificant the aid may be, it would be abetment if it
was given with the requisite intention or knowledge. The test is not to determine
whether the offence would or would not have been committed if the aid had not been
given but whether the act was committed with the aid of the abettor in question.

Abettor

It is not necessary to make the abettor liable that the crime abetted should be committed
or the effect desired should be produced. However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in
Fagunanath v. The Stated 9in the case of abetment by intentional aid, unless the person
who is abetted is found guilty of the offence charged the abettor cannot be punished.
Explanation 2 to S. 107 of the Penal Code provides: "whoever either prior to or at the
time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of
that act and thereby facilitates the commission thereof is said to aid the doing of that
act." The liability of the abettor extends to all acts which are probable consequences of
the act abetted and even to consequences which though not intended were nevertheless
known to be likely to ensue. Section 108 IPC defines abettor as a person who abets:
9
AIR 1959 SC 67

10 | P a g e
 (i) the commission of an offence, or

(ii) the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person

capable of committing an offence in law

An abettor may be either an instigator, or a conspirator, or helper in the commission of

a crime as defined in S. 107 of the Penal Code. The abetment must be an offence or an
act, which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable in law of committing
the offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor. The abetment
of an illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not
himself be bound to do that act. To constitute an offence of abetment, it is not necessary
that the act abetted should be committed or that the effect requisite to constitute the
offence should be used. It is not required for abetment that the person abetted should be
capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have any guilty intention or
knowledge or should commit an offence. Abetment of an offence being an offence, the
abetment of such an abetment is also an offence. It is not necessary in abetment by
conspiracy that the abettor should plan the offence with the person abetted.

Abetment of offences outside India

Section 108A was added in the Penal Code in 1898 with a view to overrule a decision
of the Bombay High Court in the case of Queen Empress v. Ganapatrao
Ramachandra10, in which it was held that the abetment in India by an Indian citizen of
an offence committed in a foreign country was not punishable under the Code. The
section states that a person would be guilty of an abetment, if he abets the commission
of an act outside India, which if done in India, would constitute an offence. Sections
109 to 120 prescribe certain rules as to punishment for different kinds of abetment.
Sections 109 and 110 prescribe punishment of abetment, if the act abetted is committed
in consequence of abetment, whereas Ss. 115 and 116 provide for punishment where
the offence is not committed in consequence of the abetment. Sections 109 and 110
provide for punishment in cases in which the act done is the act abetted. In Jai Narain
Mishra v. State of Bihar 11the Supreme Court considered the case of an accused who

10
(1931) 33 BOMLR 1169
11
AIR 1972 SC 1764, 1973 (0) BLJR 241

11 | P a g e
 was accused of instigating others belonging to the Mishra community to attack
members of the Tiwari family of village Bareja in Chapra district. The trial court had
originally acquitted all the accused. On appeal by the state government, the Patna High
Court convicted them for offences under Ss. 147, 148, 323, 324, 326 and 307 read with
S. 109 IPC. However, when the Supreme Court examined the evidence, it found that
the witness while tendering evidence during trial had stated that the accused had
instigated others to kill him, in the statement made by him recorded as dying
declaration, he had stated that the accused had only instigated others to 'assault the
rascal'. This, the court felt, warranted a substitution of conviction from S. 307 to S. 324
read with S. 109 IPC. The sentence of two years imposed by the high court was,
however, not disturbed, as it was felt appropriate for the offence committed. In
Harabailu Kareppa v. State of Karnataka, there was a dispute between the deceased
Kushalappa and two other persons over cutting of trees from the forest land near the
land of the accused, which resulted in the murder of the deceased. However, the court
held that while the evidence proved clearly the direct role of the accused and there was
no evidence to prove that the offence committed by him saws with the abetment.
Hence, the person charged with abetment was acquitted. However, the Supreme Court
in Mahindra Rai’s case set aside the judgment of the Patna High Court acquitting the
first accused and second accused of murdering a 12-year-old boy as there was
discrepancy in timings in preparation of the inquest report and the absence of names of
the assailants in the same. After reassessing the evidence, the Supreme Court observed
that the high court was in error on coming to a finding of innocence, as the facts
established clearly that while the second accused held the boy who was sleeping in a
cot under a mango tree in an orchard near his house, the first accused cut his neck with
a kakut (chaff cutter). Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the trial
court of offence under S. 302, IPC against Al and under S. 301 read with S. 109, IPC
against A2.

In Joseph Kurian v. State of Kerala12, the apex court held that S. 109 of IPC is by itself
an offence though punishable in the context of other offences. When his direct
involvement in these crimes could not be established, it is difficult to uphold the view
of the high court that he could lopsidedly be taken to have answered the charge of
abetment and convicted on that basis. There would, as is plain, be serious miscarriage

12
1995 AIR, 4 1994 SCC (6) 535

12 | P a g e
 of justice to the accused in causing great prejudice to his defence. The roles of the
perpetrator and abettor of the crime are distinct and stand apart from each other.
Further, in Wakil Yadav v. State of Bihar13, the Supreme Court laid down that an
offence under S. 109 is a distinct offence.

Section 111 holds the abettor liable when the act done is different from the act abetted.
The section enunciates the principle of constructive liability. As the person abetted is
working as an agent of the principal, the abettor is responsible in law for his deeds. The
liability of the abettor under this section is based on the well-established principle of
criminal law that 'every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequence of his act'. A natural and probable consequence of an act is one which is
likely or which can reasonably be expected to follow from such an act. Section 111
extends the liability of an abettor in respect of an act done, which was not contemplated
by the abettor, provided the later act was the probable consequence of the act abetted,
and is committed under the influence of the abetment. But an unusual act, which could
not be expected to ensue as a result of abetment cannot be said to be the probable
consequence of an act abetted. In other words, the abettor is liable for the act
committed, if:

(i) it was a probable consequence of the abetment, and

(ii) it was committed-

(a) under the influence of the abetment, or

(b) in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted abetment.

Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, if

present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of
the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.

There are three essential ingredients of S. 114:

1) The abetment should be prior to the commission of the offence

2) The abetment must be complete by itself

3) The abettor must be present at the time of the commission of the act.
13
2000 10 SCC 500

13 | P a g e
 If these ingredients are present, the section provides that the abettor shall be deemed to
be liable for the punishment as if he had himself committed the offence. Thus, the
section applies to a case where a person abets the commission of an offence sometime
before it takes place and happens to be present at the time when the offence takes place
and the abettor helps in the commission of the offence. In such a case, the person is
guilty of committing the offence itself and not merely of abetment.

Based on this principle, the Supreme Court in State of Karanataka v. Hemareddy 14, set
aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and acquitted the appellant who was
charged with offences under S. 467 read with S. 114, IPC, for forging some documents
in respect of an alleged sale of some agricultural land. The appellant was alleged to
have helped the other accused Pyatal Bhimakka, to impersonate another person.
Bhimakka, wife of Nagappa, the real owner of the land in question who had died in
1953, forged a document and took her to the sub-registrar's office (where documents of
sale, mortgage etc., are registered), helped her affix the thumb to the document and get
it registered. The High Court had acquitted the appellant, although on facts it held that
the offence under S. 457 read with S. 114, IPC had been proved on a technicality,
namely, on the question whether a private complaint could have been filed or whether
the criminal complaint should have been filed under S. 195(l)(b) of Criminal Procedure
Code, by the court before which a civil dispute over the same land had been instituted.
The Supreme Court, however, confirmed the conviction under S. 467 read with S. 114,
IPC against the appellant and sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment.

It should be noted that S. 114 is evidentiary in nature and not punitive because it
established a presumption which is irrebuttable that actual presence plus prior abetment
can mean nothing else but prior participation.

The effect of the provision is that if a person is present at the commission of the
offence, he is deemed to have committed it, not that he has actually committed it. Thus,
actual presence plus prior abetment can mean nothing else but participation.

Distinction between conspiracy in Ss. 34, 107, clause (2) and S. 120A, IPC: To
constitute an offence under clause (2) to S. 107, IPC-(abetment by conspiracy)-an act or
illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy, whereas under S.
120A, IPC, a mere agreement is enough if the agreement is to commit an offence.
14
1981 AIR 1417, 1981 SCR (2) 695

14 | P a g e
 The Supreme Court elaborated on the difference between Ss. 34, 109 and 120-B, IPC in
the case of Noor Mohammad Mohd Yusuf Monin v. State of Maharashtra 15. This case
involved the conviction of the appellant along with three others to a conspiracy to kill a
neighbour Mohammad Yahya, with whom the appellant had been having a dispute over
the right of passage and the right to collect water from a tap nearby. The trial court
originally found only the person who was alleged to have stabbed the deceased, guilty
of offence under S. 302 and acquitted the other three. However, on an appeal against
the acquittal filed by the state, the appellant and two others were convicted for offences
under S. 302 read with S. 34, IPC, and additionally, the appellant in the above case for
offence under S. 302 read with S. 109, IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. Since
the conviction under S. 302 read with Ss. 34 and 109, IPC was challenged on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence because of which grave injustice was done to the
appellant, the Supreme Court entered into a detailed examination of the evidence on
record. While discussing the manner in which the appellant had instigated the killing of
the deceased and other circumstances, the court elaborated the distinction between the
various sections as under:

So far as S. 34, Indian Penal Code, is concerned, it embodies the principle of joint
liability16 in the doing of a criminal act, the essence of that liability being the existence
of a common intention. Participation in the commission of the offence in furtherance of
the common intention in its application. Section 109, Indian Penal Code on the other
hand may be attracted even if the abettor is not present when the offence abetted is
committed, provided that he has instigated the commission of the offence or has
engaged with one or more persons in a conspiracy to commit an offence and pursuant to
that conspiracy some act or illegal omission takes place or has intentionally aided the
commission of an offence by an act or illegal omission.

Turning to the charge under S. 120-B, IPC, criminal conspiracy was made a substantive
offence in 1913 by the introduction of Chapter VA in the Indian Penal Code. Criminal
conspiracy postulates an agreement between two or more persons to do, or cause to be
done, an illegal act, or an act, which is not illegal, by illegal means. It differs from other
offence in that mere agreement is made an offence even if no step is taken to carry out
that agreement.

15
1971 AIR 885, 1971 SCR (1) 119
16
the obligation of two or more partners to pay back a debt or be responsible for satisfying a liability

15 | P a g e
 CONCLUSION

Though there is close association of conspiracy with incitement 17 and abetment, the
substantive offence of criminal conspiracy is defined in S. 107, IPC. A conspiracy from
its very nature is generally hatched in secret. It is, therefore, extremely rare that direct
evidence in proof of conspiracy can be forthcoming from wholly disinterested quarters
or form utter strangers. But, like other offences, criminal conspiracy can be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Indeed, in most cases, proof of conspiracy is largely inferential
thought the inference must be founded on solid fact. Surrounding circumstances and
antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other factors, constitute relevant material.
In fact because of the difficulties in having direct evidence of criminal conspiracy, once
reasonable ground is shown for believing that two or more persons have conspired to
commit an offence then anything done by anyone of them in reference to their common
intention after the same is entertained becomes, according to the law of evidence,
relevant for providing both conspiracy and the offences committed pursuant thereto.
The requirement under S. 34 of the Code is something more than what Section 109
contemplates. Actual participation in the offence in addition to other ingredients that go
to make an offence under S.109 is necessary to attract the provisions of S. 34.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

17
the action of provoking unlawful behaviour

16 | P a g e
BOOKS

 The Indian Penal Code 1860

 PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law, Tenth Edition
 K.D. Gaur Indian Penal Code, Sixth Edition

WEBSITES

 www.scconline.com
 https://www.researchgate.net
 https://indiankanoon.org

 https://home.heinonline.org

17 | P a g e