Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Assessment and management of roof fall risks

in underground coal mines
H.S.B. Duzguna,*, H.H. Einsteinb
a
Middle East Technical University, Geodetic and Geographic Information Technologies,
ODTU Insaat Muh. Bol., Room K4-123 06531, Ankara, Turkey
b
Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 1-342, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA

Abstract
Accidents caused by roof falls are commonly faced problems of underground coal mines.
These accidents may have detrimental effects on workers in the form of injury, disability or
fatality as well as mining company due to downtimes, interruptions in the mining operations,
equipment breakdowns, etc. This study proposes a risk and decision analysis methodology for
the assessment and management of risk associated with mine roof falls in underground coal
mines. In the proposed methodology, risk assessment requires the determination of prob-
abilities, possible consequences and cost of consequences. Then the risk is managed by the
application of decision-making principles. The probabilities are determined by the analysis of
1141 roof fall data from 12 underground mines in the Appalachian region. The consequences
are assessed based on the type of injuries observed after roof falls and the place of the mining
activity. The cost of consequences is modeled by the so-called ‘‘relative cost criterion’’. A
decision analysis framework is developed in order to manage the evaluated risk for a single
mine. Then this model is extended to a regional model for the management of the roof fall
risks in the mines of whole Appalachia. The proposed model is illustrated with an example
and it is found to be a powerful technique for coping with uncertainties and the management
of roof fall risks.
# 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Roof fall accidents; Risk assessment and management; Injury; Underground Coal Mines;
Probability

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +90-312-2105415; fax: +90-312-2101002.

E-mail address: duzgun@metu.edu.tr (H.S.B. Duzgun).

0925-7535/03/$ - see front matter # 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0925-7535(02)00067-X
24 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

1. Introduction

Roof falls are one of the major problems in underground coal mining. Although
their occurrence is usually considered to be a part of mining activities, their con-
sequences can be problematic. Apart from the costs due to downtime, overtime
work, loss of wages and equipment and hospitalization the tragedy associated with
personal injury, disability and fatality constitute the most important consequences
(Scott, 1982; Smith, 1984). Karhnak (1981) states that 34% of US underground
coal mine fatalities in 1980 were caused by ground control failures. Furthermore,
the US Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) reports that the fatalities
due to roof and rib accidents present almost 70% of all underground fatalities
(Anon).
Literature studies on mine roof fall control (Kaiser, 1981, Hucka and Singh, 1982,
Tennant, 1982, Karmis and Kane, 1984, Smith, 1984, Schaller and Savidis, 1986,
Shepherd et al., 1986, Maleki and McVey, 1988, Greb and Cobb, 1989) are usually
based on research conducted in specific mines. Hence, the results are specific to the
considered mines, and it would be preferable to have more generally applicable
procedures to manage the risk of roof falls during the course of mining operations.
In this paper, a risk and decision analysis methodology, which was previously
developed for civil engineering structures (Baecher, 1981) and applied to dam safety
(Vanmarcke and Bohnenblust, 1982) and landslide risk assessment (Einstein, 1997)
is proposed for the assessment and management of risk associated with mine roof
falls in underground coal mines. The procedure is general and can be adopted in
particular mines.
Roof fall risk assessment requires the determination of probabilities, possible
consequences as well as the cost of consequences. The management of the risk, on
the other hand, is handled by the application of decision-making principles. Speci-
fically, the proposed framework is presented with an illustrative example in which
data provided by the US MSHA from 12 underground coal mines in the states of
Alabama, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and West Virginia are utilized for the evaluation
of the probabilities.
In the following sections, after defining the basic terms related to the risk analysis,
the details of the risk assessment with the quantification of probabilities and con-
sequences will be discussed. Then the general principles of decision analysis will be
explained. Finally, the proposed methodology will be implemented in an example.

2. Basic definitions

Roof falls in underground coal mines, which have detrimental consequences, are
closely related to the geology of the mining environment, to the mining method and
to the method of roof support or control. It is often difficult to predict them because
of the uncertainty associated with the inherent variability of the roof fall phenom-
enon. As it is inherently not possible to ascertain the roof fall occurrences, this
phenomenon is called the ‘‘state of the nature’’. Hence, risk assessment first requires
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 25

the determination of the state of the nature. As a second step, it is necessary to find a
way to deal with the unpredictable nature of the roof falls, in other words to quan-
tify the uncertainties. Finally, the uncertainties have to be related to the con-
sequences. In this paper, danger, hazard and risk are used to express state of the
nature, quantification of uncertainties or estimation of probabilities and the con-
sequences, respectively. The followings are the definitions of danger, hazard and risk
adopted from Einstein (1997):

Danger: In the roof fall case it is the potential of rock fall from the roof. As the
definition implies the characterization of danger does not include any forecasting.
Hazard: Probability that a roof fall occurs within a given period of time.
Risk: Since the same hazard may lead to entirely different consequences depending
on the mine environment, risk is introduced here as:
Risk ¼ Hazard  Consequences

ðor more specifically; risk of roof fall :Þ

R ¼ P½Roof fallConsequences

where R =Risk associated with mine roof fall; and P[ ]=Probability that a roof fall
occurs in a certain period of time (Hazard)
Consequences may involve fatalities, injuries, disabilities, equipment breakdown,
downtimes, clean up, etc. In other words, risk can be defined by probability of
occurrence of a roof fall times the consequences if the event occurs. The earlier
definitions above are somewhat simplified, for a more detailed discussion see for
instance, Einstein (1997).

3. Risk assessment

Risk has two components as defined in the previous section: Probability or hazard
and consequences. In order to evaluate the risk involved in roof falls, its components
have to be quantified. In the following two sections, the quantification of the prob-
abilities and the consequences will be explained in detail.

3.1. Assessment of probabilities

The probability of roof fall can be determined either by subjective or objective

means. Subjective methods use judgment. On the other hand, objective methods
utilize statistical analysis of available roof fall data. In practical applications, it is
usually difficult or sometimes impossible to find sufficient data for objective prob-
ability assessment. In such cases, subjective assessment of probabilities can be used
effectively. When an experienced miner looks at the roof, he/she can develop a sub-
jective feeling about the state of the nature depending on some indicators such as
position and extent of the blocks formed in the roof, the type of sound when scaling,
26 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

etc. In this way, a miner/engineer correlates his/her judgment and experience with
performance of the roof. This judgmental approach can be formalized using Baye-
sian techniques. Details of the subjective probability assessment together with its
applications are well explained by Baecher (1981), Raiffa and Schlaifer (1964) and
Benjamin and Cornell (1970).
In this study, since sufficient data about coal mine roof falls were obtained
from MSHA, the objective method is utilized for the probability assessments.
For this purpose, time intervals between the roof fall accidents (TBF) between
1979 and 1997 are analyzed for 12 coal mines. Furthermore, the number of roof
falls in each year (NOF) for the earlier time period is evaluated and statistically
processed. Details of the statistical analysis of TBF and NOF are discussed in
Section 5.1.

3.2. Determination of consequences

The consequences of roof falls have to be identified and quantified in order to

evaluate risk. The consequences may differ depending on the mine environment.
Moreover, a particular hazard may have different consequences. For example, a
roof fall in the development of a gate roadway may result in damage to a road-
header, personal injuries, and fatalities in that part of the mine, while the same
accident in a main road can damage the transportation system leading to interrup-
tion of transportation; moreover, the number of injuries and fatalities can be quite
different from that in the development part. The different consequences are descri-
bed by different attributes of damage (Xi). For roof falls, major attributes of damage
can be listed as:

 fatality;
 disability;
 injury;
 equipment damage;
 interruption and delay in operation;
 clean up;
 emergency operations;
 loss of wages; and
 documentation of the accident.

Although some authors (Udd, 1992, Gibbs and Pintus, 1978, Brooks and Berry,
1972) state that it is usually impossible to determine the true cost of an accident due
to a number of intangibles, the cost of each attribute listed earlier can be estimated
by establishing so called relative cost criterion. By using such an approach one can
capture the importance of different attributes, without directly associating cost with
consequences on human life, while still relating attributes to cost [Clearly, another
possibility would be to use multiattribute utility analysis (Baecher, 1981)]. The rela-
tive cost criterion with unit cost expressions for the consequences will be explained
in Section 5.1.
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 27

4. Decision analysis

After the assessment of the risk, the course of actions to be taken under uncer-
tainty has to be determined. The actions could be maintaining the status quo or
taking some precautions to decrease the risk such as changing the support type,
providing extra support. The problem of choosing an action among the available
alternative actions, a0, a1, a2,. . ., am can be formulated within the decision analysis
framework. A convenient way to display this graphically is the ‘‘decision tree’’ illu-
strated in Fig. 1 (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1964).
If the consequences can be represented with a utility function, u(Xi), then the risk
associated with an action, Rj, can be formulated as e.g:
X
n
Rj ¼ P½Roof fall uðXi Þ þ Ci ð1Þ
i¼1

where i =1,2,3,. . .,n; j=1,2,3,. . ., m; Xi =Number of roof fall; Cj=Cost of action aj;
n =Possible number of Xi; and m =Possible number of alternative actions.
Therefore the branch having the minimum risk is chosen as the final decision.

Fig. 1. Typical decision tree for roof fall in underground coal mines.
28 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

5. Example

The proposed model is implemented in 12 underground coal mines in the US, one
from Alabama, eight from Kentucky, one from Pennsylvania and two from West
Virginia. The analysis of data provided by MSHA reveals that the previously chosen
mines, which are in the Appalachian region where the geology of the region causes
ground instability problems, have frequent roof fall problems. The records of roof
falls in each mine from 1979 to 1997 are analyzed and the TBF and NOF variables
are processed statistically. Each mine considered in this study is identified by a Mine
ID number, which is given by MSHA. The summary statistics of TBF and NOF
variables are given in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Then the standard deviation and the
mean of TBF and NOF variables are normalized based on the average number of

Table 1
Summary statistics for TBF (days)

Mine ID State Range Minimum Maximum Mean Standard

deviation

0100758 Alabama 235 1 236 71.53 67.41

1502132 Kentucky 446 11 457 140.85 144.32
1502502 Kentucky 487 1 488 105.50 100.77
1502709 Kentucky 261 2 263 93.35 78.38
1503178 Kentucky 441 6 447 122.40 123.69
1504020 Kentucky 398 6 404 111.86 137.62
1512941 Kentucky 272 1 273 83.85 81.24
1513920 Kentucky 229 3 232 48.10 50.59
1514492 Kentucky 167 1 168 31.73 34.80
3600958 Pennsylvania 356 2 358 66.34 78.27
4601816 West Virginia 394 1 395 56.94 68.62
4605978 West Virginia 337 7 344 124.91 104.00

Table 2
Summary statistics for NOF (number of failure/year)

Mine ID State Range Minimum Maximum Mean Standard

deviation

0100758 Alabama 7 2 9 4.89 2.26

1502132 Kentucky 6 0 6 1.89 1.76
1502502 Kentucky 6 0 6 3.80 1.93
1502709 Kentucky 7 0 7 3.26 1.85
1503178 Kentucky 3 1 4 3.00 1.21
1504020 Kentucky 5 0 5 1.81 1.66
1512941 Kentucky 7 0 7 2.43 2.14
1513920 Kentucky 12 0 12 4.75 3.49
1514492 Kentucky 17 1 18 7.14 5.46
3600958 Pennsylvania 9 0 9 3.53 2.63
4601816 West Virginia 11 1 12 5.68 3.11
4605978 West Virginia 3 1 4 2.70 1.34
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 29

employee in each mine, since the frequency and the number of failures in each mine
are dependent on the number of employee in the mines (Tables 3 and 4). The results
of the statistical analysis serve as input to risk assessment and decision analysis.

5.1. Risk assessment

Our main concern is to evaluate P[Roof fall]. For this reason, we need to fit NOF
and TBF to statistical distributions. The nature of NOF data suggests that it may fit
to Poisson distribution. If NOF fits to Poisson distribution then the distribution of
TBF will exhibit exponential distribution. The reason is the fact that if the events
occur according to a Poisson process, then the time between the events (in this case
TBF) has exponential distribution (Ang and Tang, 1975).

Table 3
Normalized mean and standard deviation values for TBF (days/employee)

Mine ID State Average number Mean Standard

of employees deviation

0100758 Alabama 589 0.121 0.114

1502132 Kentucky 252 0.559 0.573
1502502 Kentucky 184 0.573 0.548
1502709 Kentucky 329 0.284 0.238
1503178 Kentucky 162 0.756 0.764
1504020 Kentucky 244 0.458 0.564
1512941 Kentucky 131 0.640 0.620
1513920 Kentucky 290 0.166 0.174
1514492 Kentucky 222 0.143 0.157
3600958 Pennsylvania 416 0.159 0.188
4601816 West Virginia 627 0.091 0.109
4605978 West Virginia 204 0.612 0.510

Table 4
Normalized mean and standard deviation values for NOF (number of failure/year/employee)

Mine ID State Average number Mean Standard

of employees (10
3) deviation (10
3)

0100758 Alabama 589 8.30 3.84

1502132 Kentucky 252 7.50 6.98
1502502 Kentucky 184 20.06 10.05
1502709 Kentucky 329 9.91 5.62
1503178 Kentucky 162 18.52 7.47
1504020 Kentucky 244 7.42 6.80
1512941 Kentucky 131 18.55 16.34
1513920 Kentucky 290 16.38 12.03
1514492 Kentucky 222 32.16 24.59
3600958 Pennsylvania 416 8.79 6.32
4601816 West Virginia 627 9.60 4.96
4605978 West Virginia 204 13.23 6.57
30 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

In order to obtain the appropriate distribution for NOF Chi-square goodness of

fit test is carried out for the data of each considered mine. The result of the tests
indicates that Poisson distribution well fits to NOF (Table 5). This implies that
occurrence of roof falls are independent of each other, which can also be confirmed
by intuition. There are two basic reasons for statistical independence. First of all
roof falls in a year usually occur in different parts of the mine, which may have dif-
ferent roof and support conditions. Secondly, as mining progresses, there are always
newly developed parts in a mine. Hence, the roof falls occurring in the present year
are unlikely to be related to the ones having occurred in previous years. This is
particularly so when the interval between the years increases since the mine envir-
onment is changing during the life of the mine due to opening or abandoning of
faces or development works.
The probability density function (pdf) of an exponential distribution and the
probability mass function (pmf) of a Poisson distribution are given in Eqs. (2) and
(3), respectively.
1
x=
fðxÞ ¼ e ; 04x < 1 ð2Þ

e
l lx
PðxÞ ¼ ; x ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ð3Þ
x!
where  and l are the parameters of the exponential and Poisson distributions,
respectively. The histograms of NOF obtained from the data analysis of 12 mines
are given in Fig. 2. Note that the histograms are given for non-normalized data.
As both Poisson and exponential distributions are one-parameter distributions, it
is only necessary to estimate the mean values of TBF and NOF for the considered
mines. Assuming that the individual average of the data for TBF and NOF collected
from the 12 mines are the best estimates of the distribution parameters, the esti-
mated parameters of the variables for each mine are given in Table 6.

Table 5
The result of Chi-square goodness of fit tests for NOF at 0.01 significance level

Mine ID State w2 Test Degrees of Critical Fitting

Statistic freedom value status

0100758 Alabama 57.28 9 21.66 Good fit

1502132 Kentucky 18.41 6 16.81 Good fit
1502502 Kentucky 20.55 6 16.81 Good fit
1502709 Kentucky 30.04 7 18.48 Good fit
1503178 Kentucky 15.04 4 13.28 Good fit
1504020 Kentucky 14.04 4 13.28 Good fit
1512941 Kentucky 21.80 7 18.48 Good fit
1513920 Kentucky 39.40 12 26.22 Good fit
1514492 Kentucky 69.22 23 44.31 Good fit
3600958 Pennsylvania 40.40 9 21.66 Good fit
4601816 West Virginia 77.27 12 26.22 Good fit
4605978 West Virginia 10.60 4 8.61 Good fit
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 31

Thus the probability of having a roof fall in t days, P, is simply:

ðt
1
x=
P¼ e dx ) P ¼ 1
e
t= ð4Þ
0

Having determined the probabilities, the next step is to quantify the consequences
in terms of costs. Among various attributes of roof fall damage listed in Section 3.2,
the following major attributes are taken into account for considered mines:

Fig. 2. The histograms of NOF for the considered mines.

32 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

Fig. 2 (continued).

 Injury (X3).
 Equipment damage (X4).
 Interruption and delay in operation (X2).
 Clean up (X1).

Since the data obtained do not contain any fatality and disability, these con-
sequences are not included in the attribute list. Now, the associated costs can be
defined. Note that costs due to emergency operations, loss of wages and doc-
umentation of the accident are neglected The total cost of a roof fall (CT) will be the
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 33

Table 6
Estimated parameters of TBF and NOF

Mine ID State Mean TBF  (days) Mean NOF l

0100758 Alabama 71.526 5

1502132 Kentucky 140.850 2
1502502 Kentucky 105.502 4
1502709 Kentucky 93.353 3
1503178 Kentucky 122.400 3
1504020 Kentucky 111.857 2
1512941 Kentucky 83.846 2
1513920 Kentucky 48.103 5
1514492 Kentucky 31.728 8
3600958 Pennsylvania 66.343 4
4601816 West Virginia 56.938 6
4605978 West Virginia 124.905 3

sum of the costs of clean up, C(X1), delayed operation, C(X2), injury, C(X3) and
damage to equipment, C(X4).
CT ¼ CðX1 Þ þ CðX2 Þ þ CðX3 Þ þ CðX4 Þ ð5Þ
It is at this point, where cost contributions are given different weights or, using the
terminology proposed in Section 3.2, where the relative cost criterion is applied. It is
assumed that 50% of CT belongs to injury, C(X3), 30% of CT is due to the damage
to equipment, C(X4), 15% and 5% of the total cost is shared by C(X2) and C(X1),
respectively. Accordingly, if the cost of clean up is A then:
CðX1 Þ ¼ A; CðX2 Þ ¼ 3A; ðX3 Þ ¼ 10A; CðX4 Þ ¼ 6A ð6Þ
The reason for assuming that the cost of injury constitutes half of the total cost is
as follows: the commonly faced injuries are cut, bruise, scratch, fracture and chip,

Table 7
Categories of commonly occurring injuries (total 1141 injuries)

Injury type Category Occurrence

percentage

Cut Minor 32
Bruise Minor 23
Scratch Minor 2
Fracture and chip Major 17
Sprain and strain Major 8
Crushing Major 1
Dislocation Major 1
Combinations Major 16

Total Major 43
Minor 57
34 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

sprain and strain, crushing, dislocation and the combinations of these. These injuries
can be grouped into the two categories as minor and major (Table 7). In the major
injury case the person usually needs to be hospitalized and sometimes stays a few
days away from the work. On the other hand, the person having a minor injury may
go back to his/her work immediately after the treatment. Hence, minor injuries
generally result only in loss of some hours of work. In Fig. 3 and Table 7 the per-
centages of commonly faced injuries in the considered mines are shown. It is clear
from Fig. 3 and Table 7 that a large portion (43%) of the injuries in the considered
mines requires hospitalization and hence causes loss of wages due to not being able
to work or correspondingly, compensation without production.
Accordingly, one can conclude that major injuries should be considered to be an
important consequence of roof fall. We would like to point out here that the relative
weights in Eqs. (5) and (6) are the authors’ engineering judgment and can be mod-
ified based on the particular experience of the mining engineer. If the engineers face
different situations, the number of cost components and their relative weight in Eqs.
(5) and (6) can be rearranged.
Having determined the component of total cost of roof fall, the risk in t days is
formulated as:
 
RðtÞ ¼ CT 1
e
t= ð7Þ

5.2. Decision analysis

The evaluation of risk leads to the following two questions: Is the calculated risk
acceptable? If not, what should be done to decrease the risk? The answers to these
questions can be determined by a decision analysis approach. In our specific exam-
ple, the NOF is estimated and found to have Poisson distribution. The problem is to
decide on whether the present situation, i.e. the mean NOF is acceptable or if there
is a need for support improvement to reduce the costs by decreasing the expected
NOF. In other words, the decision has to be made between the two actions namely,

Fig. 3. Percentages of injuries due to roof fall in the considered mines.

 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 35

Fig. 4. Decision tree for the illustrative example.

‘‘do nothing’’ (status quo), denoted by action a1 and ‘‘support improvement’’, which
is called action a2. The decision tree of the problem is given in Fig. 4.
Here k denotes number of roof falls per year, P(k) is the probability that k is equal
to 0,1,2,. . .. Assuming that action a2, that is support improvement, enhances the
roof condition leading to a reduction in CT by Q%, cost functions for a1 and a2 can
be formulated as follows:
C1 ¼ CT k; k ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ð8Þ
 
Q
C2 ¼ 1
CT k þ Cs k ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ð9Þ
100

where, Ci=Cost function for the action ai, i=1,2; k =Number of falls; CT=Total
cost of a roof fall; and Cs=Support improvement cost.
For example, if the support improvement leads to 20% reduction in the total cost
of roof fall and assuming that the support improvement cost is 30% more than the
total cost of roof fall, cost function for the action a2 becomes:
C2 ¼ 0:8CT k þ 1:3CT ð10Þ
Then the expected value of any action can be calculated as:
X
1
E½ai  ¼ Ci PðkÞ ð11Þ
k¼0
For action a1, the expected value is:

X1
e
l lk X1
e
l lk
E½a1  ¼ CT k ) E½a1  ¼ CT k
k¼0
k! k¼0
k!
36 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

P1 e
k lk
Since E½k ¼ k¼0 k¼ l is also an expression for the expected value of
k!
Poisson distribution (l), the expected value of a1 becomes:
E½a1  ¼ CT l ð12Þ

Similarly, using Eq. (11), the expected value of action a2 can be calculated as follows:
1 
X 
l k
Q e l
E½a2  ¼ 1
CT k þ Cs
k¼0
100 k!
  X 1 X
Q e
l lk 1
l k
e l
E½a2  ¼ 1
CT k þ Cs
100 k¼0
k! k¼0
k!

Summation over all possible values of k, i.e. sum of all probabilities, which is
P e
k lk
expressed by the term 1 k¼0 , is equal to 1 according to law of total probability.
k!
Hence expected value is:
 
Q
E½a2  ¼ 1
CT l þ Cs ð13Þ
100
For our specific example expected value of actions a1 and a2 is calculated by using
Eqs. (12) and (13) and given later:

E½a1  ¼ CT l

E½a2  ¼ 0:8CT l þ 1:3CT

Our basic aim is to choose the branch in the decision tree, which has minimum
expected value. The expected value of branches of a1 and a2 for the considered
mines, each of which has a different l value are evaluated (Table 8) together with the
chosen action. Although the considered mines do not have expected NOF of 7, the
value of 7 in Table 8 is taken into computations in order to determine a limiting
NOF value for choosing action a2.

Table 8
Expected values of alternative actions for the considered mines

Expected State Number E[a1] E[a2] Selected

NOF (l) of mines action

2 Kentucky 3 2CT 2.9CT a1

3 Kentucky West Virginia 3 3CT 3.7CT a1
4 Kentucky Pennsylvania 2 4CT 4.5CT a1
5 Alabama Kentucky 2 5CT 5.3CT a1
6 West Virginia 1 6CT 6.1CT a1
7 – – 7CT 6.9CT a2
8 Kentucky 1 8CT 7.7CT a2
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 37

From Table 8, it can easily be seen that for the chosen cost relations [Eq. (6)] only,
the mine with mine ID of 1514492 in Kentucky having expected NOF of 8 requires a
support improvement. In other words, for the given utility functions, the mines with
expected NOF less than 7 do not need any support improvement. Hence, for this
case, NOF less than 7 can be considered acceptable value. If the NOF value exceeds
6, the mine manager has to think about support improvement. Note that these
values are valid for the following assumptions:

 The support improvement leads to 20% reduction in the total cost of roof fall
after the improvement.
 The support improvement cost is 30% more than the total cost of roof fall
before the improvement.

For different cost assumptions the values listed in Table 8 are subject to differ.
A sensitivity analysis regarding the different cost assumptions can be conducted in
order to find acceptable values of NOF (l). To select support improvement E[a2] has
to be less than E[a1] [Eq. (14)].
 
Q
1
CT l þ Cs hlCT ð14Þ
100
If the ratio of support improvement cost to total cost of roof fall (Cs/CT) is , Eq.
(14) can be expressed as follows:
 
Q Q
1
CT l þ CT hlCT ) hl ð15Þ
100 100
Q
Hence, if m is less than l, the mine management should improve the support
100
system of the mine.

Fig. 5. The required NOF values to take action a2 for various Q and  values.
38 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

The NOF values satisfying the condition of Eq. (15) against percent reduction in
total cost of roof fall (Q) are plotted for various m values ranging from 0.5 to 3.00
(Fig. 5).
Fig. 5 illustrates that NOF values increase with increasing  values. This means
that when the support improvement cost increases, the value of NOF for choosing
support improvement rises. Hence, higher NOF values become acceptable for
choosing the status quo (do nothing). The asymptotic behavior of the curves in Fig. 5
shows that as the cost of support improvement approaches to infinity, the NOF will
approach to zero.
The decision procedure for a single mine described earlier can be extended to a
regional model. If the whole Appalachian region is considered, the coal mines that
are statistically analyzed are just some samples from the region. Now our basic
concern is to decide on the actions to be chosen (a1 or a2) for any mine in the region.
Since the geology of the region can be assumed to be similar, coal mines in the
region suffer from frequent roof fall problems; the proposed model might be
applicable to all mines, which are in the same geological region. In the Appalachian
region, the actual value of l is uncertain but using the estimated l from the 12
sampled mines a risk management scheme can be formulated. Table 4 suggests that
the probable value of l can be grouped into six categories (Table 9).
Therefore, the probability that l can take one of the values of li, which is denoted
by i, can be calculated. i is simply the number of l in each category divided by the
total number of l values, which is 12. As an alternative to this model, the average of
1 X6
possible l values, i.e. l , can be used as an estimate for l value of the whole
i¼1 i
6
region. However, this method can produce underestimates for the mines having l
higher than the average or vice versa.
The decision tree for the regional problem is illustrated in Fig. 6. In the decision
tree x denotes NOF and i is the probability that l can take one of the six categories’
value. Thus, the probability that there will be i number of accidents, expressed by
P(x=i) can be calculated by using Eq. (3).
The basic aim is to choose the branch in the decision tree, in which one of the
values among the six categories have minimum expected value. Therefore, the

Table 9
Probable values of l in the Appalachian region with their probabilities

Group (i) Possible value Number of observations Probability

of l (li) from each li value that l=li (i)

1 2 3 0.25
2 3 3 0.25
3 4 2 0.17
4 5 2 0.17
5 6 1 0.08
6 8 1 0.08
Total 12 1.00
 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41 39

Fig. 6. Decision tree for the regional model.

expected value of actions a1 and a2 can be formulated by modifying Eqs. (12) and
(13) as follows:
X
6
E½a1  ¼ i CT li ð16Þ
i¼1
X6  
Q
E½a2  ¼ i 1
CT li þ Cs ð17Þ
i¼1
100

Again, if support improvement leads to 20% (Q) reduction in total cost and
assuming that support improvement cost is 30% more than CT, Eqs. (16) and (17)
yield to the following for our particular case:
40 H.S.B. Duzgun, H.H. Einstein / Safety Science 42 (2004) 23–41

E½a1  ¼ ð2  0:25 þ 3  0:25 þ 4  0:17 þ 5  0:17 þ 6  0:08 þ 8  0:08ÞCT

¼ 3:9CT
X6 X
6 X
6
E½a2  ¼ i ½0:8CT li þ 1:3CT  ¼ 0:8 CT li i þ 1:3 CT i
i¼1 i¼1 i¼

E½a2  ¼ 3:9  0:8CT þ 1:3CT ¼ 4:42CT

Hence, for a mine in the Appalachian region with the above cost conditions, there
is no need to take action a2. The action to be chosen for this example can be
  
Q
generalized by Min 3:9CT ; 3:9CT 1
þ Cs , which is Min [3.9CT,
100
(3.9
0.039Q)CT +Cs]. Accordingly, the decision among the alternative actions can
be made for various cost combinations.

6. Conclusions

The quantification of risks associated with the roof falls in underground coal
mines enables the engineer to evaluate the past and present performance. Moreover,
depending on the level of risk, appropriate actions can be taken and the success of such
actions can be evaluated by using the decision analysis. The proposed risk-based
decision framework is a general procedure, which can be adapted to different types
of mine roof fall problems. In this paper, its use is illustrated with an example by
using the data from mine roof failures in Appalachian region. Two alternative
actions, ‘‘do nothing’’ (status quo) and ‘‘support improvement’’ are compared with the
decision framework. The proposed risk and decision analysis technique is a powerful
method for coping with uncertainties and the management of the associated risks.

Acknowledgements

This study conducted at MIT Civil and Environmental Engineering Department is

financially supported by Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Council and
Middle East Technical University. The authors also appreciate the help in data col-
lection phase by Candy Krowzyk from office of Injury and Employment Informa-
tion, US Department of Labor, MSHA,

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