Interpretation of Statutes Assignment.

Submitted to :- Submitted by :-

Divyansha Dwivedi mam Name :-Ratnesh kumar

Assistant Professor Enroll: 18FLICDDN02104

Question 1- If two construction are possible one which suppresses the mischief and
advances the remedy should be given \ Discuss in the light of Heydon’s Rule as applied by
Indian Courts in various judicial admissions.

Answer - The mischief rule of statutory interpretation is the oldest of the rules. The mischief

rule was established in Heydon’s Case. In Re Sussex Peerage, it was held that the mischief
rule should only be applied where there is ambiguity in the statute. Under the mischief rule the
court’s role is to suppress the mischief the Act is aimed at and advance the remedy.

Mischief Rule - This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned.
It is often referred to as the “rule in Heydon’s Case.  This very important case reported by Lord
Coke and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the following
rules:

That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered –

1)       What was the common law before the passing of the Act?

2)       What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

3)       What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the
Commonwealth”.

4)       The true reasons for the remedy.

And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. 

RMDC v. UOI  AIR 1957 SC 628-

In RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Prize
competition act 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive
skill is involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt
from the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Act. Hence, in the aforementioned
case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s Rule in order to suppress the mischief was
intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which could have covered prize competitions
where no substantial degree of skill was required for success.
Smith v. Hughes   [1960] 1 WLR 830

The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon
Street, London and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959,
between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the
purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being
some 8–10 feet above street level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was

(i)  to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object and
by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and

(ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the
premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the same time
as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a Street’
within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no
offence had been committed. “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the
appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this
form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place
for the purpose of prostitution’.

Lord Parker CJ said Case that she ‘being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the
purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.’ It was found
that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was
in a street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a
house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by
tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in ground-floor windows,
either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances each
defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of section 1(1) of the Act of
1959 are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a
street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’

Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must be
in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation
or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by considering
what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to
clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or
solicited by common prostitutes.

Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or
is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open
or half open; in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in
the street. For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.

Question 2- For interpreting the word vegitable and green vegitable in clauses providing
for exemption from tax liablility under various sales tax legislation the Indian Courts
including the Supreme Court of India were having various choices in interpreting these
terms ranging from botanical dictionary and ordinary meaning of the said words clearly
bring out the rule of interpretation adopted by the Supreme court while interpreting these
words meaning given to them and the rational behind such interpretation.

Answer:- Words used in a statute should be interpreted in the light of their ordinary sense.
When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out
the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance.

Dictionaries can be consulted by the courts whenever the need arises to know the ordinary sense
of a word. However , in selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must
always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that the meaning of words and
expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear.

The court must be careful because it is not necessary the dictionary meaning of a word may be
the true meaning in a particular context. It is for the court to interpret the statute as best as it
may.

In so doing the court may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty b y any
literary held they can find , including of course the consultation of standard authors and
reference to well known and authoritative dictionaries. In words of Jeevan Reddy, J A statute
cannot always be construed with the dictionary in one hand and the statute in ither.
Regard must also be had to the scheme, context and to the legislative History.

Again judicial decision expounding the meaning of words in construing statutes in Pari
materia will have more weight than the meaning furnished by dictionaries.

In the case of Ramavtar Vs Assistant Sales Tax officer – the question before the court was
whether betel leaves are vegitables and, therefore, exempt from imposition of sales tax under
the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of 1948. The
dictionary meaning of vegetable was sought to be relied on wherein it has been defined as
pertaining ti, comprised or consisting of or derived or obtained from plants or their parts.

It was held that the dictionary meaning could not be said to reflect the true intention of the
framers of the sales tax law and betel leaves should be understood in the same sense in which
they are commonly understood.

Therefore, sales tax could be levied on the sale of betel leaves.

In the case of the Motipur Zamindary Comp. Pvt. Ltd Vs State of Bihar – The question was
whether sales tax could be levied under the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1947 on the sale of sugarcane.
The applicant argued that sugarcane being green vegetable was exempt from imposition of tax.

The dictionary meaning of vegetable was quoted in Support of the argument. the Supreme Court
rejected the contention and held that in the context of the Act vegetables mean only such
vegetables as can be grown in a kitchen garden and used during lunch and dinner as articles of
food. this was the common paralance meaning of the term and the legislature intended the word
to be understood only in such sense and consequently, the dictionary meaning was not of much
consequence under the circumstances of the case.

Question 3- Write short notes on- Preamble as a source of interpretation ?

Answer:- It is often described as a key to open the minds of the makers of the act . the makers
of the Act give the preamble as an abridged statement of objects purposes and grounds for
making of the Act. while interpreting preamble is favoured by the codes more than the long title
as it gives a deeper and broader scenario of the Act.

The role of preamble in interpretation can’t be curtailed or restricted. Preamble can be an aid in
construing a provision when the meaning of the provision is ambiguous. it can afford usefull
assistance to ascertain the legislative intention but can’t control the otherwise palin meaning of
the provision.
Statute must be Read as a Whole-
The meaning of the maxim Ex Visceribus Actus is that every part of the statute must be construed within
the four corners of the Act. No provision should be interpreted in isolation. The statute as a whole, the
previous state of the law, other statutes in pari material (on same subject matter), the general scope of the
statute, and the mischief it is to remedy, is the basic context of any statute. The elementary rule states
that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Every clause needs
to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, to make a consistent
enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter. It is the most natural
and genuine exposition of a statute.

The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying the
statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each component influences the meaning of the other ,
would be different in each given case. Each word, must however, be allowed to play its role, however
significant or insignificant it may be. in achieving the legislative intent. Each section must be construed
as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a proviso. They may be interdependent,
each portion throwing light, if need be on the rest.
According to Lord Davey, every clause of the statute must be construed with reference to context and
other clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes
relating to the subject matter.
Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. V. Suresh Chand (1978) the SC observed that to construe one part of a
statute by another part of the same statute is most genuine and natural exposition of statute.
State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee (2002) the SC held that the statute have to be considered in its
entirety and picking up of one word from one particular provision and thereby analyzing it in a manner
contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neither permissible not warranted.