CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

Case No. 1
Case Title: Barredo v. Garcia Date: July 8, 1942
GR No.: L-48006

Doctrine:
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

Facts:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of
prision correccional

The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla
has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted.

Issue/s:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.

Ruling:
YES. Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
“Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by
their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. (Art. 1903 of Spanish
Civil Code)”

However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
"It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director
who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could
not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal
or director." Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited that before
third persons the employer and employee ("become as one personality by the merging of the person
of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a
peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

NOTE:
DISTINCTION OF TORT AND CRIME:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
 Case No 2.
Case Title: Elcano v. Hill Date: May 26, 1977
GR No.:L-24803

Doctrine:
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'.
But said article forestalls a double recovery."

Facts:
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin
Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."

Issue/s: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

Ruling:
NO. It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here
is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had
its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p.
162.)

to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Case No. 3
Case Title: Virata v. Ochoa Date: January 31, 1978
GR No.: L-46179

Doctrine:
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.

Facts:
Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City
by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that
Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through
reckless imprudence was instituted on September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City. That on September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal
at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the
ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First
Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the heirs of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages based on
quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the
passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.

Ruling:
YES. The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal
Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate
civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on
quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act
or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict
and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation. That culpa aquilina
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have
only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
 Case No. 4
Case Title: Banal v. Tadeo Date:December 11,1987
GR No.: 78911-25

Doctrine:
Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.

Facts:
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against
respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch
84.

On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito
L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against
property but public order."

The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly
issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State
and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.

On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or
not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its
jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.

Ruling:
YES. Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: “Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.” Regardless,
therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be
had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act
of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing
Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the
punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).

Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed
against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public
which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with
money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
 Case No. 5
Case Title: Occena v. Icamina Date:
GR No.:

Doctrine:
As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or
society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured
or damaged by the punishable act or omission.

Facts:
Eulogio Occena, herein petitioner, filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the
following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus,
traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar import which caused great and
irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which
petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened
thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was
sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that
"the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of
moral damages."
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court.

Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by
private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

Ruling: YES. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil
actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the
Civil Code.
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a
fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the
felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is
found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the
individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable
act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies
where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to
a private person. There is here an offended party,hence, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and
reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00
and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
 Case No. 6
Case Title: Pacis v. Morales Date: February 25, 2010
GR No.: 169467

Doctrine:
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are
not needed for ready-access defensive use.

Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Facts:
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident
inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun
store.

On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and
caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun
owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer.
Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears
that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the
sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The
latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the
head. A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of
the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of
the RPC. By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide
against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses
incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA,
which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.

Issue/s: Was Morales negligent?

Ruling:
YES. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article
1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action
for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the
homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages
against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No.
9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the
business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and
safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended
or canceled.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm
or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not
needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair
should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge
such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun
for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first
place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for
repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure
that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this
case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms
to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as
would exempt him from liability in this case.
 Case No. 7

Case Title: Casupanan v. Laroya Date:August 26, 2002

GR No.:145391

Doctrine:
Yes, Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation.
The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant.

Facts:
Respondent filed a criminal action against petitioners for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage
to Property. While the criminal case is pending, the Petitioners filed with the MCTC a civil case for
Quasi-delict. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said civil action against him on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MCTC. They appealed to the
RTC, which was also denied. Hence this case.

Issue/s:
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.

Ruling:
Yes, Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the
crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil
case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most
cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

RESERVATION OF CIVIL ACTION

 Case No. 8
Case Title: Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals Date: March 21, 1989
GR No.:80194

Doctrine:
The same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to
a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced
against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

Facts:
Edgar Jarantilla, the petitioner allegedly with his Volkswagen Beetle, side-swiped private respondent
Jose Kuan Sing. Petitioner was criminal charged for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Serious
Physical Injury. During trial, Private Respondent did not reserve the separate prosecution of
his civil action and participated in the prosecution of the criminal action. The criminal court
eventually dismissed the criminal complaint for failure to prove the guilt of the Petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. Subsequently, Private Respondent filed in the CFI a civil action against the
Petitioner to which the latter filed a motion to dismissed. The CFI denied the motion of the Petitioner
and suggest bringing the action to the Supreme Court to which the SC denied for lack of Merit.
Continuing the prosecution of the civil action, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the Petitioner to
pay the Private Respondent for the actual and moral damages, including Attorney’s Fees.Petitioner
appealed to the CA who affirmed the decision with modification on the moral damages. Petitioner
filed a motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA. hence this appeal to
the SC.

Issue/s:
Whether the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil
action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability
arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action
on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Ruling:
YES. The same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can
create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability
ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a
quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability.

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of
Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in
the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability
based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability
or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the
causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon
may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of
evidence. Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated,
that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same
criminal act or omission.

Case No. 9
Case Title: Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi Date: June 29, 2007
GR No.: 165496

Doctrine:
There are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of
the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a
criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the
action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff
and the accused is the defendant. (demurrer of evidence with leave of court yung sa trial court ata)

Facts:
Hun Hyung Park filed a criminal action against Eung Won Choi for violation of BP 22 to the METC.
Eung Won Choi filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court assailing that Hun Hyung Park failed
to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds did not arise. METC granted the demurrer to evidence of Eung Won Choi.
After denying his MR, Hun Hyung Park appealed to the RTC. RTC held that while the evidence
presented was insufficient to prove Eung Won Choi's criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish
his civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of Hun Hyung Park and ordered Eung Won Choi to
pay him the amount of ₱1,875,000 with legal interest. Upon Eung Won Choi’s motion for
reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the
METC “for further proceedings, so that the Eung Won Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect
of the case.” Hun Hyung Park’s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been
denied, he elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for
faulty appeal requisite. Hence this case.

Issue/s:
Whether the dismissal of the Criminal complaint also dismisses the Civil Complaint with finality?

Ruling: No, Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a
criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the
People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the
civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the
defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted the respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Either the offended party or the accused may,
however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The
public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the
accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real
parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.The civil
action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.

Notes:When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including
its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived
or reserved.30

If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of
civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any.31

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.32

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist.33

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing
evidence if the court denies the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of
the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and
at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt,
it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For
if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The
only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil
aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus
this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.36

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Case No. 10
Case Title: Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco Date: December 14,
2006
GR No.:165732

Doctrine:
The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission of an employee reflects the
negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in order to overcome this presumption, the
employer must prove that there was no negligence on his part in the supervision of his employees.

Facts:
The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She was also a licensed-fire arm
holder, thus during the incident, she was entering the bank to renew her time deposit and along with
her was her firearm. Suddenly, the security guard of the bank, upon knowing that the victim carries a
firearm, the security guard shot the victim causing the latter’s instant death. The heirs of the victim
filed a criminal case against security guard and an action against Safeguard Security for failure to
observe diligence of a good father implied upon the act of its agent.

Issue/s:
WON Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its agent.

Ruling:
Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission of an employee reflects
the negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in order to overcome this presumption, the
employer must prove that there was no negligence on his part in the supervision of his employees.

It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. Thus, due diligence on the
supervision and operation of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. Thus, in this case,
Safeguard Security committed negligence in identifying the qualifications and ability of its agents.

EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY EX-DELICTO (TORT)

 Case No. 11
Case Title: People v. Navoa Date:September28,1984
GR No.: L-67966

Doctrine: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely theron. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

Facts:
Mario Navoa, Rafael Navoa, Ricardo Sitchon (accused Mario Saguinza was discharged and utilized
as a state witness) were found by the then Court of First Instance of Bataan Fifth, Judicial District,
Branch II, "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged, defined, and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced each to suffer an imprisonment

RTC: Guilty of the crime charged.

CA: The judgment of conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him. However, the plea for
extinguishment of the deceased’s civil and criminal liability is without merit. Only his criminal liability
is extinguished by his death but the civil liability remains

Issue/s:
Whether or not civil liability is extinguished by his death.

Ruling:
It appears that the accused, Mario Navoa, died on June 14, 1984 due to a cerebro-vascular attack
as shown by the Death Certificate attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. When counsel for the
accused manifested that fact before the Appellate Court on June 20, 1984, he was unaware that the
latter had already certified the case to this Court, which, in turn, promulgated its Decision on July 31,
1984 unaware of appellant Mario Navoa’s death. The judgment of conviction will thus have to be set
aside as against him. However, the plea for extinguishment of the deceased’s civil and criminal
liability is without merit. Only his criminal liability is extinguished by his death but the civil liability
remains.

Case No. 12
Case Title: People v. Badeo Date: Nov 21, 1991
GR No.: 72990

Doctrine: Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict but as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According
to Justice Aquino, the term "pecuniary penalties" (laspecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and
costs as distinguished from "pecuniary liabilities" (responsabilidades pecuniarias) in Article 38
which include reparation and indemnity.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Facts:
According to the sole prosecution eyewitness Eñega Abrio (Iñega Abreo), at around six o'clock in the
evening of March 21, 1981, she was walking on her way home. Cresenciano Germanes was walking
ahead of her. Near the house of Esperidion Badeo, four men attacked Cresenciano. Being about
ten arms length away, she saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back with a bolo measuring
around fifty-five centimeters in length. Rogelio Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with another long
bolo also at the back. Bonifacio Tangpusfollowed with a stab at the right por­tion of Cresenciano's
stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked Cresenciano's back. Cresenciano fell down on his
back.Cresenciano shouted after he had fallen. Noticing that Cresenciano was still alive, Rogelio
came back and "finished him off."
The body of Cresenciano, who was single and 42 years old when he died, was autopsied on
March 23, 1981 by Dr. Lesmes C. Lumen, the municipal health officer of Dagami, Leyte.
​Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred that he did so in self-defense.
Manuel and Esperidion appealed to this Court contending that the trial court erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender in favor of Manuel, and in not giving weight and credence to the alibi of
Esperidion. On August 10, 1990, Esperidion died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
pulmonary tuberculosis at the prison hospital in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.[20] Inasmuch as no
final judgment had as yet been rendered, in the resolution of August 21, 1991 the case against
Esperidion was dismissed with costs de oficio and entry of judgment was made on August 22, 1991

Issue/s:
Whether or not the civil liabilities of Esperidion were extinguished through his death.

Ruling:
We find merit in the motion for reconsideration. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment." In People vs. Alison,[23] the Court, upon the recommendation of the
then Solicitor General who was required to comment on the information that appellant Alison had
died at the prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil
liability (sic) of Alison was extinguished by his death."
The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre[24] similarly dismissing
the case against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate
Justice Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict but as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the
term "pecuniary penalties" (laspecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished
from "pecuniary liabilities" (responsabilidades pecuniarias) in Article 38 which include reparation
and indemnity.
The resolution of August 21, 1991 is hereby reconsidered insofar as it considers as extinguished
Esperidion Badeo's civil liability. However, finding that Esperidion Badeo should be acquitted as he
did not commit the crime imputed to him, no civil liability is hereby imposed on him.

Case No. 13
Case Title: People v. Bayotas Date: September 2, 1994
GR No.:102007

Doctrine: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as his civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the
death of the accused prior to final judgement, terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.”

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio
respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the
accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in
People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the
final judgement is rendered.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

Ruling:
The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo
case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before
the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will
be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist.
Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the
civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than
delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability
will only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30
of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto
is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a
summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil
liability based solely on the act complained of.

Case No. 14
Case Title: Calang and Philtranco v. People Date: August 3, 2010
GR No.:190696

Doctrine:
If the cause of action was based on a delict, a person cannot be held to be jointly and severally
liable with another based on a quasi delict under 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Said articles
pertain to vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed and
cannot be applied to civil liability arising from delict.

(So pag arising from quasi-delict, solidary liability of employer If arising from delict, or crime (Art
132.), no solidary liability, at the most is subsidiary liability but not automatic, there must be a
hearing, tapos may requitues pa yan) kailangan din final judggement daw to enforce.

Facts:
Calang is a bus driver of Philtranco who was convicted of multiple homicide with multiple serious
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. In the same criminal case,
Philtranco was ordered to pay jointly and severally with Calang death indemnity and actual damages.

Issue/s: Whether or not Philtranco should be solidarily liable in the criminal case.

Ruling:
No. Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in
this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA
erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under
Articles 2176[1] and 2180[2] of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the
vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of
law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.

If at all, Philtranco liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the
subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishments. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written
into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
Nonetheless, before the employer's subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which
the employee liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.

DISTINGUISHED FROM A CONTRACT

 Case No. 15
Case Title: Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. Date: October 14, 1918
GR No.:L-12191

Doctrine:
In this case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of the company to inform their
employees to not put any hindrance in the platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract of the
defendant to transport the plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that
the fault was morally imputable to the defendant's servants. Therefore, the company is liable for
damages against Cangco.

Facts:
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he was
an employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about
to alight from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to
notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result, he slipped and
fell violently on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually
amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the
sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security
of passenger alighting from the company’s trains.

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an obstruction
upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own
contributing negligence.

Issue/s: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

Ruling:
NO. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at
the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of
the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The
Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the
train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.

Case No. 16
Case Title: Air France v. Carrascoso Date:September 28, 1966
GR No.:L-21438

Doctrine:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
obligation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, could give ground for an action for damages. Petitioner's contract with
Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of
quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Facts:
Carrascoso bought a first-class ticket from Philippine Air Lines, agent of Air France. From Hongkong
to Saigon and Saigon to Bangkok, Carrascoso only received first-class accommodations from Air
France after Carrascoso protested and argued with Air France’s employees. From Bangkok to
Tehran and/or Casablanca, Carrascoso was ‘compelled’ to give up first-class accommodations to a
‘white man’ whose better right to the same had not been established either then or in Court.
Carrascoso was already seated at the time. Air France’s own witness testified that, based on the
“O.K.” marks on Carrascoso’s ticket, there was space for Carrascoso. Lower court and CA ruled in
favor of Carrascoso.

Issue/s: W/N Carrasco is entitled to damages arising from tort.

Ruling:
YES. The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. In this case, when Air France breached its
contract of carriage, it also became liable for a tortious act which gave rise to payment of damages in
favor of Carrasco. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation... it generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages…
Petitioner insists the first-class ticket was no guarantee to first-class accommodations, as the same
“would depend upon the availability of first class seats.” First, Air France could not have the
“indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all”. Second, Air France’s own witness,
Rafael Altonaga said that the “O.K.” mark in Carrascoso’s ticket meant that space is confirmed.
Passengers do not merely contract for transportation, but have a right to expect kindness, respect,
courtesy, and due consideration from the carrier’s employees. The act of petitioner’s employee in
forcing respondent to vacate constituted the breach of the contract, attended with evident bad faith.
Therefore the contention of petitioner that there was no bad faith fails: though bad faith was not
alleged expressly, it may be implied from the airline’s actions. As employer, petitioner airline was held
liable.
 Case No. 17

Case Title: Singson v. BPI Date: June 27, 1968

GR No.:L-24837

Doctrine: The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by
the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. The act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.

Facts:
Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI Manila. Judgment was
rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the
sum of P105,539.56 to Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the decision
became final and executory as to Villa-Abrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to BPI against the
Villa-Abrille’s account.

The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s name and, without reading the full text,
wrote a letter for the signature of the bank President, informing Singson of the garnishment.
Subsequently, Singson issued two checks. The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was
dishonoured, and so petitioner’s account with the latter was closed. Singson wrote a letter to the
bank, claiming that his account is not included in the writ of garnishment. Having confirmed so, the
bank President Santiago Friexas apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson filed a
claim for damages. The lower court ruled that damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because
the relationship between the parties is contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.

Issue/s:
WON the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar recovery of damages.

Ruling:
NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in
effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation
between a passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature … the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort”.

In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award
of nominal damages — the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of P1,000, in addition
to attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s rights.

Case No. 18
Case Title: LRTA v. Navidad Date: February 6, 2003
GR No.:145804

Doctrine:
The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers,
provides:

"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.

"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required
of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a
carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare).
While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security
guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how
the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
The widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint
for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC-Pasig: ordered defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin to pay actual,
compensatory, and moral damages including attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
2. CA: exonerated Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor
Navidad. While the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage
theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from
liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad

LRTA
: Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a
stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate
court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA
lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the
LRTA.

Respondent Navidad and Prudent

: contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station
and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation

Issue/s:
Whether LRTA is liable

Ruling: Yes.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury
to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required
of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a
carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing,
one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
apply.
In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Case No. 19
Case Title: American Express v. Cordero Date: October 14, 2005
GR No.: 138550

Doctrine: To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the
damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
In this case Codero was negligent when he refused to talk to an AEII representative over the phone
while in the Hong Kong store for verification, hence Cordero was negligent and caused the proximate
reason of the confiscation of his card. Plus wala naman daw sa policy nung AEII na sabihin kung
may unauthorized charges. Ire-refund nalang daw if ever kung meron.

Facts:
American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to purchase
goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of
respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An extension charge card,
was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his
family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watson’s Chemist Shop.
While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed his American Express extension charge
card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed
respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American Express
card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and
humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.

The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a
protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards.
Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is
tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the
card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed
for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the
humiliation he suffered.

RTC: According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1,
1991, a person in HongKong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of
respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the
“confiscation and cutting of respondent’s extension card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which the petitioner should be held liable.

CA: Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue/s:
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the ‘public humiliation’ allegedly suffered by
Cordero to Amex

Ruling:
YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondent’s card without notice, as was done. The
subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself,
he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the
card. Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If
at all, the cause of respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s
representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner
and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

NOTES: Meaning of proximate cause.

Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the
damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

Case No. 20
Case Title: So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals Date:September 21, 1999
GR No.:120554

Doctrine:
Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioners of the legal liability
for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. The elements of Tort of interference are: (1) Existence of a valid
contract; (2) Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; (3) Interference of
third person is without legal justification or excuse. (liable for tort of interference, however no
damages, kasi wala naman malice.)

Facts:
In this case, Tek Hua Trading entered into a contract of lease agreement with Dee C. Chua & Sons
Inc (DCCSI). This was done through Tek Hua Trading’s manager So Pek Giok. The subject of the
lease were premises located in Binondo which will be used Tek Hua as stores in its textile business.
Note that each contract has a 1 year term. More so, it is provided that should the lessee continue to
occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month to month basis. When the contract
expired, parties did not renew the contract but Tek hua continued to occupy the premises. On 1976,
Tek Hua trading was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua, including Manuel C. Tiong
formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. In 1986, So pek Giok died in 1986 and was replaced by So Ping
Bun who occupied the warehouse for his own textile business named “Trendsetter Marketing”. Later
on, Tek Hua Enterprising Corp, through Manuel Tiong, requested petitioner So Ping Bun to vacate
his business and request for the company to use it. However, the petitioner refused to vacate the
premises for his textile business and requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. He claimed
that after his grandfather died, he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and
religiously paid the rent. Hence, the lease contract in favor of Trendsetter was executed. Tek Hua
Enterprises Corp filed an injunction for nullification of the lease contract between DCCSI and
petitioner. Also, they filed a damage suit.

RTC: Annulled the contract of lease without awarding damages.

CA:This ruling was upheld by the CA.

Issue/s:
Whether injunction be upheld and damages be granted
Ruling:
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. The elements of Tort of interference are: (1) Existence of a valid
contract; (2) Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; (3) Interference of
third person is without legal justification or excuse. The above elements are present in this case. This
situation pertains to a third person who induces a party to violate his undertaking under a contract. In
this case, the petitioner asked DCCSI to execute the contract of lease in its favor. As a result, the
petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter’s property rights.

Petitioner, however, argues that damage is an essential element of Tort of interference. Because the
lower courts ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, it follows that he be absolved of any liability including attorney’s fees.

There was a situation in Gilchrist v. Cuddy where it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent
of damage and there was nothing on the record to serve as basis thereof.

It is true that lower courts did not award damages but this was only because the extent of damages
was not quantifiable.

In such situations, the Court will refrain from awarding damages. Same conclusion applies in this
case. However, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is
allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such occasion is
when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest. But we have consistently held that the award of considerable
damages should have clear factual and legal bases.
 Case No. 21

Case Title: Consolidated Bank & Trust Co. v. CA Date: Sep 11, 2003
GR No.: 138569

Doctrine:
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the
defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault
or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
was negligent.
In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to
return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption
that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The
burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees.

Facts:
In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C.
Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a
savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael
Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the
passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate
copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words “DUPLICATE”
and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE.” Since the transaction took time and
Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with
Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the
passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that “somebody got the passbook.” Calapre went back to
L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.

Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000.
Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check.
The teller stamped the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE”
on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told
Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the
passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered
that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.
The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14 August
1991) of P300,000 from its savings account.

The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz,
namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A
certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.

L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed
a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The trial court absolved Solidbank.
L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA reversed the decision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration of Solidbank. But it modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.

Issue/s: WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.

Ruling:
Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual. The contract
between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan.
Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “x x x savings x x x deposits of money in banks
and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.” There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the
depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the
depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the
contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties.

The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind
the fiduciary nature of their relationship.

This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high standards of integrity and
performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The
fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good
father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an
obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good
father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks – that
banks must observe “high standards of integrity and performance” in servicing their depositors.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract between
the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or implied.
Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust. The
law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying with its
obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a
similar contract of simple loan.

The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because banks
do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves.

Solidbank’s Breach of its Contractual Obligation

Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that “responsibility arising from negligence in the performance
of every kind of obligation is demandable.” For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to
negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the “transaction took time” and he had to go to
Allied Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of
Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when Calapre left Solidbank. When the passbook is in the
possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an
even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.

Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook
only to the depositor or his authorized representative. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre,
the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe
such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party
authorized to receive the same.

In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the
defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault
or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a
presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to
Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its
employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court
Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the
passbook to him. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the
identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6
implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or
command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.
The bank must not only exercise “high standards of integrity and performance,” it must also insure
that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its
fiduciary duty.

Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal

Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.

L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in
possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction,
Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the
passbook to another person. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of
P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was
Solidbank’s negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa
contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid
the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear
chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not
exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract

Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, “liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.” This means that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, then the courts
may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in
allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor.
Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
In PBC v. CA where the Court held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the
damages between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case,
we hold that L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court.
Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

 Case No. 22
Case Title: Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals Date: August 25, 2003
G.R. No. 138334

Doctrine:
The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the
degree of care required in the performance of the latter’s obligation under the contract. For reasons
of public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as far
as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and
with due regard for all the circumstances.11 As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a common
carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in
the performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims.

Facts:
ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, contracted the service of the respondent which is a travel agency. to
arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed "Jewels of
Europe". The package tour included the countries of England, Holland, Germany, Austria,
Liechstenstein, Switzerland and France at a total cost of P74,322.70. June 12 , 1991 , the ticket was
delivered to the petitioner by her niece who works on the agency (Menor), Menor then told her to be
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two hours before her flight on board
British Airways.

June 15, 1991, petitioner went to NAIA, in her dismay, she discovered that the flight she was
supposed to take had already departed the previous day. Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take
another tour – the "British Pageant" – which included England, Scotland and Wales in its itinerary.
For this tour package, petitioner was asked anew to pay US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then
prevailing exchange rate of P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment
Upon her return , she asked for the difference from the previous tour to be returned to her.
respondent company refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same was
non-refundable

Issue/s: WON petitioner is entitled to damage.

Ruling: NO. It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the
business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common
carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its
covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements on their behalf. Respondent’s
services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as
booking customers for tours.

While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company, this
does not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as an
agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe.
Respondent’s obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply to see to it that petitioner was properly
booked with the airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination,
meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline. After the travel papers were delivered to the petitioner, it
became incumbent upon her to take ordinary care of her concerns. the plane ticket. issued to
petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and time, contrary to petitioner’s contention.
Menor’s negligence was not sufficiently proved, considering that the only evidence presented on this
score was petitioner’s uncorroborated narration of the events. In the case at bar. (Menor not longer
available she is working in France already) The evidence on record shows that the respondent
company performed its duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach.