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National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan: Homeland Security Council
National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan: Homeland Security Council
September 27,2007
President Bush has approved the National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan ("Plan")
required by National Security Presidential Directive-51lHomeland Security Presidential
Directive-20 of May 9, 2007. The Plan is attached as Tab A. The Plan further enhances our
national continuity capability, which allows us to preserve our form of government under the
Constitution and continue to perform National Essential Functions under all conditions.
The Plan prescribes significant continuity capability goals and an aggressive timeline to
accomplish them. Tab B summarizes the Plan's initial requirements for all departments and
agencies. The Plan also establishes a new process to identify department and agency Mission
Essential Functions and Primary Mission Essential Functions. Tab C provides an overview of
the upcoming essential functions process.
Attachments
My fellow Americans,
On May 4, 2007, I issued the National Continuity Policy, an updated, integrated approach to
maintaining a comprehensive and effective continuity capability to ensure the preservation of our
constitutional form of government and the continuing performance of National Essential Func-
tions under all conditions.
Ours is a Nation of laws, engaged in a war against terror. We recognize, and must prepare for,
the possibility of unforeseen events, natural disasters, and acts of terror. We must be prepared as
a Nation, as a Federal Government, and as individual citizens to preserve, protect, and defend our
way of life.
This National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan builds upon the National Continuity Policy
and provides guidance to executive departments and agencies on appropriately identifying and
carrying out their Primary Mission Essential Functions that support the eight National Essential
Functions—the most critical functions necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during a cata-
strophic emergency. This Implementation Plan also seeks to ensure that our Nation’s efforts and
resources will be brought to bear in a coordinated manner through integrated Continuity of Op-
erations and Continuity of Government programs interwoven into routine, daily government oper-
ations. This Implementation Plan directs more than 75 critical actions, many of which have been
initiated already, to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of our national continuity capability
through any circumstance.
This Implementation Plan also articulates a recommitment of focus in the executive branch and
highlights the importance of our partnership with the other branches of the Federal Government,
other levels of government, and the private sector.
Working together, we will continue to prepare our Nation to confront the challenges of tomorrow.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
AUGUST 2007
iv National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan
National Essential Functions
1. Ensuring the continued functioning of our form of government under the Consti-
tution, including the functioning of the three separate branches of government;
2. Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world and maintaining the trust
and confidence of the American people;
3. Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its
people, property, or interests;
6. Providing rapid and effective response to and recovery from the domestic conse-
quences of an attack or other incident;
7. Protecting and stabilizing the Nation’s economy and ensuring public confidence in
its financial systems; and
8. Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health,
safety, and welfare needs of the United States.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………………………....….....................ix
On May 4, 2007, the President issued the Na- Regardless of what it is called, continuity plan-
tional Continuity Policy (“Policy”) in National ning is simply the good business practice of
Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland ensuring the execution of essential functions
Security Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/ through all circumstances, and it is a funda-
HSPD-20), which sets forth a new vision to mental responsibility of public and private enti-
ensure the continuity of our government. The ties responsible to their stakeholders.
President directed that:
While some of the details relating to the execu-
“It is the policy of the United States to maintain a tion of particular Federal Government conti-
comprehensive and effective continuity capabil- nuity programs are classified, the unclassified
ity composed of Continuity of Operations and Policy makes clear that continuity planning for
Continuity of Government programs in order to
execution of Federal executive branch Essential
ensure the preservation of our form of govern-
Functions must be integrated into daily opera-
ment under the Constitution and the continuing
performance of National Essential Functions tions, functions, plans, and mission areas.
under all conditions.”
Therefore this Plan directs that continuity
In order to implement this Policy, government planning occur simultaneously with the de-
and private sector leaders should understand velopment of Federal department and agency
(1) the history, importance, and key compo- programs. This means that organizations must
nents of our continuity program; (2) the impor- incorporate redundancy and resiliency as a
tance of our key partners and the necessity to means and an end. This Plan provides the
identify and ensure the continued execution of guidance and direction necessary to achieve
our Nation’s Essential Functions; (3) the proce- that result and identifies how the Federal ex-
dures to obtain metrics by which to measure ecutive branch will utilize thorough preparation
our Nation’s continuity capability and readi- and a continuous Continuity Program Manage-
ness; and (4) the coordination, communication, ment Cycle to analyze and execute programs,
and integration among the three branches of policies, and procedures to ensure continuity.
the Federal Government, among all levels of
government, and between government entities Chapter 1 – Background and Overview
and the private sector.
In order to understand the new Policy, a conti-
This National Continuity Policy Implementation nuity foundation must be laid that describes the
Plan (“Plan”) was directed by the President to history of Federal executive branch continuity
be the means by which the Policy is translated programs and articulates the President’s direc-
into action and is intended to be a compre- tion that the executive branch reorient itself
hensive and integrated list of directives for the and utilize an integrated, overlapping national
Federal executive branch in order to ensure the continuity concept. This new continuity vi-
effectiveness and survivability of our national sion will significantly enhance our prepared-
continuity capability. It is also an educational ness and ability to ensure the preservation of
primer for those unfamiliar with continuity. government and the continuation of essential
While each chapter can be read independently functions. This chapter articulates goals and
for readers interested in a particular compo- objectives and a continuity concept of op-
nent of continuity, the entire Plan represents erations to fulfill the President’s vision. The
a comprehensive source for current continuity continuous performance of essential functions
resources and direction. must be supported with the right people, the
right resources, and the right planning. An and action items of the Nation’s senior continu-
organization’s continuity capability—its ability ity officials, including the following:
to perform its essential functions continuous-
ly—rests upon key components or pillars built • The National Continuity Coordinator
from the foundation of continuity planning and (NCC) is responsible for coordinating,
continuity program management. Upon this without exercising directive authority, the
foundation four key continuity pillars must be development and implementation of conti-
built that represent the following: nuity policy for executive departments and
agencies;
• Leadership; • The Secretary of Homeland Security serves
• Staff; as the President’s lead agent for coordinat-
• Communications; and ing continuity operations and activities; and
• Facilities. • Continuity Coordinators at each executive
department and agency are senior account-
All of those elements are important during nor- able officials at the Assistant Secretary (or
mal operating status and become critical dur- equivalent) level responsible to work with
ing times of crisis. Because an organization’s their department or agency head to en-
resiliency is directly related to its continuity sure effectiveness and survivability of the
capability, all organizations can improve their organization’s continuity capability.
capability by developing a continuity concept
of operations, which is further described in the Chapter 3 – Continuity Readiness Procedures
chapter. and Metrics
Overarching Goals:
(1) To educate readers on the National Continuity Policy and the basic concepts of our
continuity capability to ensure the preservation of our form of government under
the Constitution and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions
under all conditions;
(2) To develop a comprehensive and integrated list of assignments for the Federal
executive branch; and
(3) To provide a comprehensive source for current continuity resources and direction.
Goals and
• Goal #1 – To understand the transformation of continuity.
Objectives: o Objective 1A – To understand the history of continuity and the President’s
vision.
o Objective 1B – To understand our Nation’s continuity concept of
operations and key considerations.
o Objective 1C – To understand continuity roles and responsibilities.
{
nuity planners to expand planning parameters framework under which the Nation is gov-
to include natural disasters and terrorism, in erned and the capability of all three branch-
addition to the continued nuclear threat. In es of government to execute constitutional
1998, Presidential Decision Directive-67 (PDD- responsibilities and provide for orderly suc-
67) (“Enduring Constitutional Government and cession, appropriate transition of leadership,
Continuity of Government Operations”) reaf- interoperability, and support of the National
firmed an all-hazards approach to continuity Essential Functions during a catastrophic
(i.e., preparation for all scenarios) and called emergency.
for “continuity of operations” (defined below)
to be the foundation of Federal Government – Note: These are operational definitions
continuity programs. PDD-67 emphasized the provided to facilitate a better understanding.
responsibility of executive branch departments
and agencies to perform essential government Box 1
functions under all conditions. The all-hazards
approach and importance of performing essen- In the past, COOP, COG, and ECG plans and
tial functions continues today. programs were separate, compartmented ac-
tivities. However, the lessons we now have
Historically the Federal Government has from such catastrophic events as the attacks
defined continuity efforts using the terms of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina
“COOP”, “COG”, and “ECG” (see Box 1 below). in 2005, demonstrate the need to reemphasize
continuity as a “good business practice” to be
incorporated into day-to-day planning in order
“COOP,” or Continuity of Operations, is an to reduce vulnerability and ensure continuity.
effort within individual organizations (e.g.,
Federal executive branch departments and The old organizational framework has changed.
agencies) to ensure that Mission Essential Pursuant to NSPD-51/HSPD-20, and with this
Functions continue to be performed during National Continuity Policy Implementation
a wide range of emergencies, including Plan, the President directs the executive branch
localized acts of nature, accidents, and tech- to reorient itself and to utilize an integrated,
nological or attack-related emergencies; overlapping national continuity concept in
order to ensure the preservation of our govern-
“COG,” or Continuity of Government, means ment and the continuing performance of essen-
a coordinated effort within each branch of tial functions. (See Figure 1.)
government (e.g., the Federal Government’s
executive branch) to ensure that National
Essential Functions continue to be performed
during a catastrophic emergency; and
Communi-
• National Essential Functions (NEFs) – The
Facilities
Leader-
cations
eight functions the President and national
ship
Staff
leadership will focus on to lead and sustain
the Nation during a catastrophic emer-
gency.
CONTINUITY PLANNING & PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The Federal executive branch recognizes that Figure 2
the entire spectrum of essential functions might
not be performed or needed in the immediate A resilient continuity capability includes
aftermath of an emergency. Indeed, in a crisis, the following concepts:
resources may be scarce. Allocating resources
based on sound planning helps to ensure that “Continuity Capability” is the ability of
the delivery of essential services will remain an organization to continue performance
uninterrupted across a wide range of potential of essential functions, utilizing Continuity
emergencies and provides a mechanism for of Operations and Continuity of Govern-
the resumption of all functions as resources ment programs and integrated, day-to-day
become available. Directly linking PMEFs to a operations with a primary goal of ensuring
NEF requires the Federal executive departments the preservation of our form of govern-
and agencies to identify the most critical func- ment under the Constitution and the con-
tions that must continue through an emergency tinuing performance of National Essential
and the planning required to perform those Functions under all conditions. Built from
functions. This model serves as a template for the foundation of continuity planning and
other government organizations and for private continuity program management, the key
sector entities. pillars of continuity capability are Leader-
ship, Staff, Communications, and Facilities.
“Essential Functions” are the critical activities “Program Management” is the continuous
that are performed by organizations. cycle of planning, training, evaluating, and
implementing corrective actions. (This is
“Leadership” comprises the senior decision- further discussed in Chapter 3.)
makers designated to head an organization
(e.g., President, Cabinet Secretary, Gover- Note: These operational definitions are provided to facilitate
a better understanding of Figure 2.
nor, Chief Executive Officer, or manager).
Ensuring survivable leadership is accom-
plished by physically protecting the person Box 3
(sheltering in place or relocating away from
the threat), as well as having a prioritized Before and during an emergency situation that
list of designated successors. The designa- triggers a continuity plan, leaders and staff
tion as a successor enables a person to act must be prepared to allocate scarce resources.
for and exercise the powers of the principal Organizations must identify the people, com-
in the event of death, incapacity, or resigna- munications, facilities, infrastructure, transporta-
tion. tion, and funding needed to support continuity
programs. Those programs must be integrated
“Staff” comprises those personnel that pro- into the budget process at all levels.
vide the leadership advice, recommenda-
tions, and the functional support necessary Pillars 1 and 2: People – Leadership and Staff
to continue essential operations.
People are the heart and soul of any organi-
“Communications” are voice, video, and zation and the most valuable resource it has.
data capabilities that enable leadership and Choosing the right people for an organization’s
staff to conduct Essential Functions. Robust staff is always important, and this is especially
communications help ensure that leadership true in a crisis situation. Leaders are needed to
receives coordinated, integrated policy and set priorities and keep focus.
operational recommendations and enable
coordination with Federal executive branch Continuity of leadership is critical to ensure
departments and agencies; State, local, continuity of essential functions. Organiza-
territorial, and tribal governments; and the tions must provide for a clear line of succession
private sector as necessary to perform Es- in the absence of existing leadership and the
sential Functions. necessary delegations of authority to ensure
that succeeding leadership has the legal au-
“Facilities” represent locations where lead- thorities to carry out their duties. Continuity of
ership and staffs may operate. Leadership leadership during crisis, especially in the case
and staff may be co-located in one facility of senior positions like the President and heads
or dispersed through many locations, con- of departments and agencies, is important to
nected virtually through communications reassure the Nation and give confidence to our
systems. Facilities must be able to provide citizens that the principal or appropriate suc-
survivable protection and enable continued, cessor is managing whatever crisis the Nation
endurable operations. faces and ensuring the performance of our
National Essential Functions.
“Planning,” the first step in a robust Pro-
gram Management Cycle, includes pre-iden-
tifying the right people, places, budgeting,
resources, tasks, and procedures required to
fulfill Essential Functions.
For the Presidency, the Constitution and statute establish the Order of Presidential
Succession for officials who meet the constitutional requirements as follows:
Box 4
Leaders and staff must be sufficiently trained to appropriate. Communications and business
be able to perform their duties in a continuity systems, including hardware and software for
environment (i.e., one in which an organiza- continuity operations, should mirror those used
tion is faced with an interruption of normal in day-to-day business to assist continuity lead-
operations for a potentially protracted period ership and staff in a seamless transition to crisis
of time). In order to ensure that required skill operations.
sets are available, personnel should be both
cross-trained and “vertically” trained to be able Pillar 4: Facilities
to perform the functions of their peers and
the person above and below them in an emer- Facilities are the locations where Essential
gency. Functions are performed by leadership and
staff. Organizations should have adequate,
Pillar 3: Communications and Technology separate locations to ensure execution of their
functions. Physical dispersion should allow for
The capability to communicate is critical to easy transfer of function responsibility in the
daily operations and absolutely essential in event of a problem in one location.
a crisis. The Nation’s domestic and interna-
tional telecommunications resources, including Daily operating facilities must be evaluated for
commercial, private, and government-owned “hardness” (i.e., the ability to withstand natu-
services and facilities, are essential to support ral disasters and utility failures and to protect
national continuity policy. Under NSPD-51/ people who need to shelter-in-place). While
HSPD-20, all organizations must identify the the hardness of daily operating facilities is
communication requirements needed to per- a key consideration, alternate facilities must
form their PMEFs during both routine and con- also be identified for the relocation of a lim-
tinuity conditions. Communication systems and ited number of key leaders and staff. Those
technology must be interoperable, robust, and facilities should replicate essential capabilities
reliable. Planners must consider the resilience by providing systems and configurations that
of their systems to operate in disaster scenarios are used in daily activities. Additionally, it is
that may include power and other infrastructure financially prudent to structure and configure
problems. alternate facilities such that daily activities can
be replaced or augmented with those required
Organizations must use technology to perform during an emergency (often referred to as dual-
MEFs as an intrinsic part of daily operations, use facilities).
utilizing voice, data, and video solutions as
Foundation: Continuity Planning and Program o The threat environment (as it relates
Management to a particular business or concern);
and,
While an organization needs leaders, staff,
communications, and facilities to perform its o The level of vulnerability(ies) to the
Essential Functions, it also needs well thought relevant threats.
out and detailed plans for what to do with
those key resources. Planning must include When reviewing an organization’s risks and
thinking through all of the requirements and risk management programs, additional fac-
procedures needed to perform Essential Func- tors such as probability, mission priorities,
tions and establishing contingency plans in and impact assessments must be considered.
the event that key resources are not available. Further, cost may also be a factor as informed
Other planning components include budgeting, decisions about acceptable and unacceptable
developing operational plans, and identifying levels of risk will ultimately drive the expen-
clear goals and priorities. diture of resources (i.e., money, people, and
time) to mitigate risk. Risk will never be fully
Chapter 2 of this Plan discusses national priori- mitigated, and no organization could afford to
ties and the planning required for Executive counter every threat to its mission. Intelligent
Branch MEFs and PMEFs, including information analysis of where and when to focus resources
about conducting a Business Process Analysis and/or apply funding and other assets is criti-
and a Business Impact Analysis. cal for successful continuity planning.
Chapter 3 of this Plan discusses planning as A threat assessment for continuity integrates a
the first step in a robust Continuity Program historical review of past events that have af-
Management Cycle and details the rest of the fected normal operations (e.g., natural disas-
continuous process to test, evaluate, and make ters; disruption of communication, power, and
corrective actions to continuity plans. other utilities; and threats to public safety) with
a dynamic analysis of other potential forms and
In addition to the planning elements listed likelihood of threats, such as acts of terrorism
above, continuity planning requirements also (both from foreign and domestic actors) and
include consideration of risk management, geo- war.
graphic dispersion, security, preparedness, and
integration of continuity and incident manage- Appropriate planning and investment to ensure
ment. survival from natural disasters and deliberate
attack must go beyond classical risk analysis
• Risk Management of “severity times probability.” As an integral
part of risk management, an organization’s
Risk management is the process to identify, leaders must think beyond the internal effects
control, and minimize the impact of uncertain of their inability to perform Mission Essential
events. While there are many well-document- Functions. Department and agency heads and
ed methodologies for risk management—some staff at all levels must consider the interdepen-
are referred to as risk analysis—most require dencies between and among departments and
an assessment and understanding of three basic agencies that share critical roles in the delivery
concepts: of NEF capabilities.
ate, can significantly enhance the organization’s Another key component of our homeland secu-
resilience and reduce the risk of losing the rity is securing cyberspace. This is an ongoing,
capability to perform essential functions. While complex challenge that requires a coordinated
some leadership and staff want to be located and focused effort from the Federal Govern-
“close to the flagpole” (i.e., headquarters), or- ment, State and local governments, the private
ganizations should appropriately disperse staff sector, and the American people. As identified
elements and functions away from the main by The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,
headquarters building on a routine operating our Nation’s critical infrastructures consist of
basis to enhance the survival of key personnel the physical and cyber assets of public and
and functions. With the continuing improve- private institutions in several sectors: agricul-
ments in desktop teleconferencing and collab- ture; food; water; public health; emergency
orative tools, the ability to conduct daily busi- services; government; defense industrial base;
ness from geographically dispersed locations information and telecommunications; energy;
is growing more commonplace and, if done transportation; banking and finance; chemi-
routinely, will serve as a model for dispersed cals and hazardous materials; and postal and
operations in the event of an emergency. Geo- shipping. Cyberspace is the nervous system of
graphic dispersion of leadership, data storage, these infrastructures—the control system of our
personnel, and other capabilities may be es- country. Cyberspace consists of hundreds of
sential to the performance of MEFs following a thousands of interconnected computers, serv-
catastrophic event. ers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables
that make our critical infrastructures work.
Thus, the healthy functioning of cyberspace
The US Department of Health and Human
is essential to our economy and our national
Services, which pays for about 40 percent of
security.
the Nation’s healthcare, established multiple
nodes of payment processing centers which
• Readiness and Preparedness
were geographically dispersed to ensure un-
interrupted capability. Each node maintains
Readiness is the ability of an organization to
the capability to assume the responsibilities
respond to an incident. While readiness is a
of the other payment centers.
function of planning and training, it is ultimate-
Box 5 ly the responsibility of leadership to ensure an
organization—through normal procedures or
with a continuity plan—can perform before,
• Security
during, and after an incident.
Security is a key element to any continuity
For the Federal executive branch, the Con-
program to protect plans, personnel, facilities,
tinuity of Government Readiness Conditions
and capabilities to prevent adversaries from
(COGCON) system establishes readiness levels
interdicting your continuity plans and opera-
in order to provide a flexible and coordinated
tions. In order to ensure the safety and success
response to escalating threat levels or actual
of continuity operations, an effective security
emergencies, focusing on possible threats to
strategy must address personnel, physical, and
the National Capital Region. The COGCON
information security. Organizations must adopt
system is a means to establish, measure, and
appropriate security measures to protect infor-
report the readiness of executive branch con-
mation and capabilities while ensuring aware-
tinuity programs independent of other Federal
ness of plans and procedures by leadership
Government readiness systems.
and staff to enable them to effectively function
in an emergency.
Four COGCON levels provide for an incremen-
tal increase in and deployment of people and
resources to enhance staffing, survivability, re- Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security
sponsiveness, and availability of assets for im- Advisory System (HSAS). (Appendix D in-
mediate support to leadership. The designated cludes a matrix with the various requirements
COGCON level is based on the current threat and stages of COGCON for departments and
and/or risk to the Federal Government. agencies.)
HIGH
HIGH RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS
ELEVATED
SIGNIFICANT RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS
GUARDED
GENERAL RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS
LOW
LOW RISK OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS
Figure 3
INTRODUCTION Partners
The ultimate goal of continuity in the execu- While this Implementation Plan is primarily
tive branch is the continuation of National directed at the executive branch of the Federal
Essential Functions (NEFs). In order to achieve Government, continuity cannot occur without
that goal, the objective for executive depart- the commitment and dedication of many others
ments and agencies is to identify their Mission who play integral roles in ensuring our home-
Essential Functions (MEFs) and ensure that land security.
those functions can be continued through-
out, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of Those partners include the following (see Fig-
normal activities. While the Federal Govern- ure 4):
ment provides myriad services to the American
people, it is important to identify those services • Federal Government: legislative branch,
that must be continued during an emergency. executive branch (including all depart-
Setting priorities is difficult, but organizations ments and agencies), and judicial branch;
should not wait for a crisis to determine what • State, local, territorial, and tribal govern-
is important. This chapter defines the most ments; and
important national priorities, directs executive • Private Sector Critical Infrastructure Owners
departments and agencies to identify their most and Operators
important functions, tasks the NCC to validate
department and agency Primary Mission Essen- Federal Government
tial Functions, and acknowledges the important
ors
partnership that the Federal Government has
rat
Sta
pe
with other government entities and with private
te,
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Figure 4
MEFs
Government Functions are the collective func-
tions of executive departments and agencies as
defined by the Constitution, statute, regulation,
presidential direction or other legal authority
and the functions of the legislative and judicial
branches. The activities of State, local, ter-
ritorial, tribal governments, and private sector
organizations often support Federal Govern-
ment functions, particularly in the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/
KR). This interdependency relies upon greater
interoperability between and among these
Figure 6
partners to facilitate a more rapid and effective
Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs):
response to and recovery from any emergency.
PMEFs are those department and agency mis-
sion essential functions, validated by the Na-
Government Functions
tional Continuity Coordinator, which must be
performed in order to support the performance
of the NEFs before, during, and in the after-
math of an emergency. PMEFs are defined as
those functions that need to be continuous or
resumed within 12 hours after an event and
maintained for up to 30 days or until normal
operations can be resumed.
Figure 5
MEFs
Sta
pe
&O
PMEFs
Lo
NEFs
ca
l, T
wn
eO
tur
ria
uc
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an
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va
• Identify their MEF(s) that require vital sup- • Validate and approve the identified MEF
port from another Federal executive de- and BPA analysis by the department or
partment or agency to ensure execution of agency head.
their mission and identify when and where
the particular interdependency is executed Once MEFs have been identified and analyzed
within the BPA business process flow; and as described, the planning process for identify-
ing the PMEFs can begin.
1 STEP #1
Outline each MEF in a business process mapping format
(i.e., inputs, outputs, resources, systems, facilities, exper-
2 tise, authorities, etc.) that impact the ability to complete the
MEF products/services.
Department or
agency conducts STEP #2
Business Process Identify internal and external interdependencies that are part
Analysis (BPA) for of and/or influence each MEF business process.
each identified MEF
(Led by STEP #3
department/agency Ensure that all identified MEF interdependencies are
Continuity Coordi- inserted into the proper location within the MEF business
nator and continuity process flow map(s).
staff) 3
STEP #4
Provide completed BPA package and results to the
4 department or agency Continuity Coordinator for review,
validation, and approval in consultation with department
or agency head.
Joint effort between National Continuity Coordinator and department or agency Continuity Coordinator to
identify and confirm MEF(s) that must serve as PMEF(s).
Final department or agency PMEF(s) submitted to National Continuity Coordinator for further BPA and
Business Impact Analysis (BIA).
threats is that they do not necessarily emanate tions and preparation for incident management.
from a single, fixed, and understood actor; While DHS has primary incident management
asymmetric threats are, in many ways, less pre- responsibility, many different departments and
dictable and less understood, requiring plan- agencies at multiple levels are involved in suc-
ners to consider different approaches to plan cessfully navigating a critical incident manage-
for, mitigate, and respond to threats. ment scenario.
A successful BPA will identify gaps within a de- Continuity requirements must be incorporated
partment or agency and areas where more than into the daily operations of all executive branch
one department or agency has responsibilities. departments and agencies to ensure seamless
This gap identification provides departments and immediate continuation of PMEF capabili-
and agencies an opportunity to fill the gap and ties. The department and agency planning
ensure successful execution of essential func- process is described in Chapter 3.
Interagency Board (IAB) submits NEF BPA & BIA reports to National Continuity Coordinator (NCC)
IAB compiles and submits final NEF BPA Mapping and BIA Report with findings and recommendations
for mitigation, risk reduction, and risk management actions for each NEF. Risk management options shall
include policy development, business process reengineering, asset dispersion, continuity system(s)
design redundancy and survivability requirements, and other relevant options.
update its training program for department and ment, conduct, and evaluation of homeland
agency continuity planners with a focus on the security exercises. HSEEP also provides tools
identification of MEFs and PMEFs. and resources to facilitate the management
of self-sustaining homeland security exercise
programs.
As required by NSPD-51/HSPD-20, a Federal
Continuity Directive (FCD) establishes con-
The Secretary shall coordinate the integration
tinuity planning requirements for executive
of Federal executive branch continuity plans
branch departments and agencies. The Sec-
and operations with State, local, territorial, and
retary of Homeland Security develops and
tribal governments and private sector owners
promulgates FCDs in coordination with the
and operators of critical infrastructure, as ap-
Continuity Policy Coordination Committee.
propriate, in order to provide for the delivery
Box 10 of essential services during an emergency.
The Secretary, through the National Communi- The Secretary will develop and promulgate
cations System, is responsible for developing, continuity planning guidance to non-Federal
implementing, and maintaining a comprehen- Governments and others to ensure that the Na-
sive Continuity Communications Architecture tional Preparedness Goal, the Target Capabili-
(CCA), in consultation with the APHS/CT, the ties List, and State and Local Homeland Secu-
APNSA, the Director of the Office of Manage- rity Grant Programs criteria provide guidance
ment and Budget, the Director of the Office on continuity priorities and implementation
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the guidelines. Guidance should include proce-
Chief of Staff to the President, and the Secretary dures and models for development of PMEFs,
of Defense. The CCA is especially important orders of succession, delegations of authority,
to support the National Command and Coordi- devolution, reconstitution, establishment of al-
nation Capability (NCCC) which provides the ternate facilities, interoperable communications,
President and the Vice President with the abil- the safeguarding of vital resources, facilities,
ity to respond deliberately and appropriately to and records, and a test, training, and exercise
any crisis. The Secretary is also responsible for program that will ensure a viable continuity
conducting quarterly and annual assessments program.
of continuity communications capabilities in
consultation with an official designated by the The Secretary will establish regional and State-
Chief of Staff to the President. level Continuity Working Groups (CWGs) to
provide critical infrastructure assistance and
The Secretary is responsible for developing, support for the Nation’s continuity of opera-
leading, and conducting the Federal execu- tions plans and programs in accordance with
tive branch continuity training and exercise guidance in HSPD-7. Councils and committees
program, which shall be incorporated into the established to support the National Infrastruc-
National Exercise Program (NEP) developed ture Protection Plan will provide members to
pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential and support the activities of the DHS/FEMA
Directive-8 of December 17, 2003 (“National CWGs. These working groups will, at a mini-
Preparedness”), in consultation with an official mum, conduct annual continuity conferences to
designated by the Chief of Staff to the Presi- address joint Federal and non-Federal Govern-
dent. The NEP utilizes the Homeland Security ment continuity planning and other elements
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) as of a viable continuity program.
the common exercise methodology. HSEEP is
a capabilities and performance-based exercise
program that provides standardized policy, doc-
trine, and terminology for the design, develop-
Task Box 2
INTRODUCTION Test,
Communi-
Facilities
Develop Training,
Leader-
cations
Corrective
ship
and
Staff
Action Plans Exercise
Development of an effective continuity pro-
gram begins with a review and identification CONTINUITY PLANNING & PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
of all of an organization’s responsibilities and Evaluations,
functions as they relate to the four key continu- After Action Reports,
and Lessons Learned
ity pillars. Once Essential Functions are priori-
tized and resourced, a process must be used Box 11
to ensure that the functions can be sustained
under an all-hazards threat environment.
OBJECTIVE 3B – To establish
continuity requirements and metrics.
OBJECTIVE 3A – To establish a
Continuity Program Management
Cycle. KEY CONSIDERATIONS
Task Box 3
The Director of the Office of Science and 3. Within 30 days after validation of PMEFs,
Technology Policy distribute requirements for, and update
as needed, a comprehensive Continu-
The Director of the Office of Science and ity Communications Architecture (CCA)
Technology Policy (OSTP) defines and issues in consultation with the APHS/CT, the
minimum requirements for continuity com- APNSA, the Director of OMB, and the
munications for executive departments and Chief of Staff to the President (as well as
agencies in consultation with the APHS/CT, the the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
APNSA, the Director of OMB, and the Chief of Security).
Staff to the President. The Director establishes 4. On an ongoing basis, monitor the de-
requirements for, and monitors the develop- velopment, implementation, and main-
ment, implementation, and maintenance of a tenance of a CCA to integrate continuity
comprehensive Continuity Communications components, in consultation with the
Architecture to integrate continuity components APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of
in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, OMB, and the Chief of Staff to the Presi-
the Director of OMB, and the Chief of Staff to dent (as well as the Secretaries of Defense
the President. In performing those tasks, the and Homeland Security).
Director of OSTP will also consult with the 5. Quarterly and annually, review assess-
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security ments of continuity communications capa-
because of their significant roles in implement- bilities and report the results and recom-
ing the minimum continuity communications mended remedial actions to the NCC.
requirements and the Continuity Communica-
tions Architecture. In order to support those Task Box 5
tasks and to aid in ensuring the success of the
Continuity Communications Architecture, the An official designated by the Chief of
Director of OSTP will establish and chair a
Continuity Communications Architecture Board Staff to the President
(CCAB). The Director of OSTP also reviews
quarterly and annual assessments of continu- Recognizing that each branch of the Federal
ity communications capabilities and reports the Government is responsible for its own conti-
results and recommended remedial actions to nuity programs, an official designated by the
the NCC. Chief of Staff to the President shall ensure that
the executive branch’s COOP and COG poli-
cies in support of ECG efforts are appropriately
Actions for the Director of the Office of coordinated with those of the legislative and
Science and Technology Policy judicial branches in order to ensure interoper-
ability and allocate assets efficiently to main-
1. Annually review and revise as required, tain a functioning Federal Government. This
minimum requirements for continuity individual will advise the President, the Chief
communications for executive branch of Staff to the President, the APHS/CT, and
departments and agencies, in consulta- the APNSA on COGCON operational execu-
tion with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the tion options; and consult with the Secretary of
Director of OMB, and the Chief of Staff Homeland Security in order to ensure synchro-
to the President (as well as the Secretar- nization and integration of continuity activities
ies of Defense and Homeland Security). among the four categories of executive depart-
2. Within 60 days, establish and chair a ments and agencies.
Continuity Communications Architecture
Board (CCAB).
and the Secretary of Defense, provide Actions for the Secretary of Homeland
geospatial products to support continuity Security
planning, training, and exercise activities.
3. During emergencies and disasters, pro-
1. Within 90 days, coordinate with the
vide geospatial continuity operational
APHS/CT in developing a continuity as-
support to DHS to assist in response and
sessment tool for the departments and
recovery operations.
agencies to measure continuity readi-
Task Box 8 ness against requirements contained in
NSPD-51/HSPD-20.
The Secretary of Homeland Security 2. Quarterly, ensure FEMA’s Continuity
Coordinator chairs meetings of the CAG
The Administrator of the Federal Emergency and reports to the Continuity PCC.
Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for 3. Every two years, conduct department
coordinating the implementation, execution, and agency assessments of continuity
and assessment of continuity activities and pro- capabilities and report the results to the
grams. Upon establishment of the Continuity NCC.
Advisory Group (CAG), FEMA’s Continuity Co- 4. On an ongoing basis, operate and main-
ordinator will chair regular meetings and report tain the Readiness Reporting System.
to the CPCC on the activities of the CAG. 5. On an as needed basis in coordination
with the CAG and in consultation with
In coordination with the CAG and in consulta- the CPCC, develop and promulgate Fed-
tion with the CPCC, DHS/FEMA will develop eral Continuity Directives that establish
and promulgate Federal Continuity Directives continuity planning requirements, con-
that establish continuity planning requirements, tinuity plan templates, TT&E programs,
including continuity plan templates to assist and assessment criteria.
departments and agencies and others in devel- 6. On an ongoing basis, ensure that the
oping internal continuity processes and proce- FEMA Operations Center (FOC) main-
dures, TT&E programs, and assessment criteria tains 24-hour operations to ensure
for executive departments and agencies. appropriate procedures for emergency
operations. (See further discussion of
In accordance with Federal Continuity Direc- the FOC in Chapter 2.)
tives, FEMA will conduct biennial assessments
Task Box 9
of individual department and agency continuity
capabilities and report the results to the NCC
through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Director of the Office of Personnel Man-
agement (OPM)
FEMA will develop, operate, and maintain a
continuity Readiness Reporting System (RRS) The Director of OPM will provide guidance
which will measure and report both the indi- to departments and agencies on developing
vidual and aggregate ability of departments and personnel policies that address continuity plans
agencies to continue their PMEFs in support and procedures, including alternate work op-
of the required NEFs. This system identifies tions. The Director, in coordination with the
near real-time COOP and COG programmatic Secretary of Homeland Security, will provide
capabilities and requires monthly or as required guidance to and coordinate with the Federal
data input from system users. Executive Boards (FEBs) to assist in facilitating
planning meetings and exercises to develop
effective continuity programs among par-
ticipating Federal executive departments and
Task Box 12
• Perform branch essential functions and ate support is available to the Vice Presi-
support activities during any emergency; dent, the Speaker of the House, and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate. The
• Provide for capabilities that allow for re- Vice President, the Speaker of the House,
covery from a catastrophic emergency and and the President Pro Tempore should be
resumption of normal operations; prepared at all times to execute their role
as a successor President.
• Provide for the acquisition of resources
necessary for continuity operations on an ACTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
emergency basis;
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches
• Safeguard vital resources, facilities, and re- will continue cooperation to ensure interoper-
cords, and provide official access to them; ability, integration, and appropriate allocation
of national assets to ensure Federal Govern-
• Maintain and integrate effective, redundant, ment continuity. Supporting organizations will
survivable continuity communications sys- develop and execute appropriate memoranda
tems at daily operating sites and alternate of understandings and agreements to formalize
facilities in order to support connectivity continuity plans and procedures.
between and among key Federal Govern-
ment leadership and the public; The appropriate senior decision-makers of the
legislative and judicial branches, through es-
• Provide for the identification, training, and tablished channels with the executive branch,
preparedness of personnel capable of relo- should continue to:
cating to alternate facilities where necessary
to support the continuation of the perfor- • Coordinate the implementation and execu-
mance of branch essential and support tion of continuity operations and activities
functions; and with the executive branch;
DHS coordinates overall domestic incident facilitate continuity efforts. A plan to provide
management and response procedures and is for the acquisition of resources serves both the
the Federal executive branch’s contact for co- NFG and the larger national continuity pro-
ordination with NFGs for continuity programs. gram. These actions will permit timely recon-
DHS shall provide guidance for the integration stitution and recovery from catastrophic emer-
of national continuity plans and operations with gencies and resumption of normal operations.
State, local, territorial, and tribal governments NFGs are encouraged to share intelligence and
in order to provide for the delivery of essential law enforcement information through estab-
services during an emergency. The National lished channels with the Federal Government
Infrastructure Protection Plan and the support- where relevant and useful, especially through
ing organizations established under HSPD-7 the Homeland Security Information Network
provide support to the Nation’s continuity plans (HSIN) and the Homeland Secure Data Net-
and programs. To promote rapid continuity work (HSDN).
program implementation and further integration
of continuity efforts across government entities Availability, redundancy, and connectivity of
and the private sector, DHS will make available communications between and among NFGs,
continuity planning and exercise funding in the key Federal Government leadership, and the
form of grants as provided by law to NFGs. public is a critical capability necessary for sus-
tained operations through a crisis. Tools that
The Federal intelligence and law enforcement can be used to help on this front include the
agencies will share relevant and useful intel- Emergency Alert System (EAS), the Integrated
ligence and law enforcement information with Public Alert Warning System (IPAWS), the Na-
NFGs, as appropriate, using existing processes tional Alert Warning System (NAWAS), and the
and communications methods. Washington Metropolitan Area Warning System
(WAWAS).
State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal
The large and diverse universe of State, lo-
Governments cal, territorial, and tribal governments makes
it imperative that each consider the others’ es-
NFGs are encouraged to develop a robust con-
sential function requirements and responsibili-
tinuity program to ensure that essential func-
ties, communication capabilities, and needs. It
tions are performed. The initial step is to iden-
is also essential that NFGs utilize their existing
tify the essential functions and the supporting
relationships with DHS and consistently update
activities that are critical to continue during an
all essential contact information.
emergency. Further discussion on this process
is found in Chapter 2. NFGs are encouraged to
Development of a strong continuity program is
establish continuity programs that facilitate the
only the first step. Identification and training
performance of essential functions during any
of personnel capable of relocating to alternate
emergency for a period of up to 30 days or lon-
or other continuity facilities where necessary to
ger, until normal operations can be resumed,
support the continuation of the performance of
and the capability to be fully operational at
PMEFs and essential functions is also required.
alternate sites as soon as possible after the oc-
The National Preparedness System, established
currence of an emergency, but not later than 12
by HSPD-8, provides guidance for the Federal
hours after COOP activation.
executive branch and NFGs in coordinating
capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond
Each NFG should identify successors, put in
to, and recover from all-hazards in a way that
place emergency delegations of authority, and
balances risk with resources and includes exer-
plan for geographic dispersion of staff and
cises, assessments, and reporting requirements.
infrastructure where appropriate. Safeguard-
The Federal Government and all citizens rely
ing of vital resources, facilities, and records will
immensely on officials at the local level, and • Provide critical infrastructure assistance and
this will especially be true during a local emer- support for the Nation’s continuity of op-
gency situation. Local emergency response and erations plans and programs in accordance
incident command personnel will be first on the with guidance in HSPD-7. Organizations
scene of a crisis, and they will have the local established to support the National Infra-
knowledge and relationships required to suc- structure Protection Plan will be members
cessfully resolve the crisis. When a local crisis of and support the activities of the Conti-
affects the performance of a critical Primary nuity Working Groups.
Mission Essential Function (PMEF)—and there-
fore a NEF—the role of local government of- Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
ficials and personnel cannot be understated.
• Assure that Federal Executive Boards assist
ACTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS and coordinate continuity efforts before,
during, and after an emergency.
Department of Homeland Security
Federal Intelligence and Law Enforce-
• Develop and promulgate continuity plan- ment Communities
ning guidance to State, local, territorial,
and tribal governments. Guidance should • Continue providing intelligence through
include procedures and models for de- existing channels to NFGs as appropriate,
velopment of PMEFs, orders of succes- using official processes and communica-
sion, delegations of authority, devolution, tions methods.
reconstitution, establishment of alternate
facilities, interoperable communications,
the safeguarding of vital resources, facili-
State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Gov-
ties, and records, and a test, training, and ernments
exercise program that will ensure a viable
continuity program; The Federal Government is dependent on
State, local, and other governments, especially
• Provide planning guidance to NFGs on during a crisis. Local governments provide the
development of internal Mission Essential local law enforcement, first responders, and the
Functions (MEFs). Guidance will be based first line of defense against local threats that
on the requirement of continuing the per- could have national implications. As identified
formance of essential functions. (Guidance by the National Response Plan, the primary
for the Federal executive branch is con- responsibility for initial incident response re-
tained in Chapter 2 of this Implementation mains at the local level.
Plan);
NFGs are encouraged to consider the following
• Make available continuity planning and recommendations:
exercise funding, in the form of grants as
provided by law, to State, local, territorial, • Appoint a senior accountable official to be
and tribal governments; responsible for planning and implementa-
tion of continuity programs for the organi-
• Establish DHS/FEMA regional and State- zation;
level Continuity Working Groups (CWGs).
These working groups will, at a minimum, • Establish a continuity plan and program
conduct annual continuity conferences to that facilitates the performance of MEFs
address joint Federal and NFG continuity during an emergency for a period up to 30
planning and other elements of a viable days or longer, until normal operations can
continuity program; and
be resumed, and the capability to be fully • Plan, program, and budget for continuity
operational at alternate sites or other conti- capabilities consistent with this Implemen-
nuity locations as soon as possible after the tation Plan, and provide to DHS grant
occurrence of an emergency, but not later funding requests, as provided by law;
than 12 hours after COOP activation;
• Plan, conduct, and support annual conti-
• Develop succession orders and pre-planned nuity tests, training, exercises, and assess-
devolution of authorities in accordance ments in order to prepare and evaluate
with applicable law; program readiness and ensure adequacy
and viability of continuity plans and com-
• Develop a vital resources, facilities, and munications systems;
records program that ensures these are
safeguarded and that there is official access • Participate in DHS/FEMA Regional and
to them. Develop and implement training State Continuity Working Groups and in
to support this program; the annual continuity conferences conduct-
ed by DHS;
• Make provisions for the acquisition of the
resources necessary for continuity opera- • Establish an organizational continuity
tions on an emergency basis; working group. States may consider desig-
nating their State Emergency Management
• Provide for the availability and redundancy Offices to lead their respective continuity
of critical communications capabilities at programs and working groups, with sup-
alternate sites in order to support connec- port from the National Guard, law enforce-
tivity between and among key government ment, medical, fire, human services, and
leadership, internal elements, and other other organizations; and
organizations, critical partners, and the pub-
lic; • Develop interoperable communications
capability with Federal, State, local, tribal,
• Provide information to Federal intelligence and territorial governments and other
and law enforcement agencies as appropri- organizations as appropriate to support
ate and using official processes and com- continuity and emergency response re-
munications methods; quirements.
• Provide critical infrastructure assistance and • Develop a vital resources, facilities, and
support for the Nation’s continuity of op- records program that ensures these are
erations plans and programs in accordance safeguarded and that there is official access
with guidance in HSPD-7. Councils and to them. Develop and implement training
committees established to support the Na- to support this program;
tional Infrastructure Protection Plan should
be leveraged to support the activities of the • Develop procedures for the acquisition of
DHS/FEMA regional and State level Conti- resources necessary for continuity opera-
nuity Working Groups (CWGs); and tions on an emergency basis;
• Invite the private sector to participate in • Develop succession orders and pre-
government training and exercises, where planned devolution of authorities that en-
appropriate. sure the emergency delegation of authority
when necessary;
Federal Intelligence and Law Enforce-
• Provide for the availability and redundancy
ment Communities of critical communications capabilities at
critical infrastructure sites in order to sup-
• Provide intelligence to the private sector
port connectivity between and among key
as appropriate and using official processes
government and private sector leadership,
and communications methods.
internal elements, other organizations, and
the public;
Private Sector Critical Infrastructure Own-
ers and Operators • Provide intelligence to Federal intelligence
and law enforcement agencies as appropri-
The Federal Government, in conjunction with ate using official processes and communi-
State and local governments, is extremely de- cations methods;
pendent on private sector leaders, especially
during a crisis. The private sector owns and • Plan, program, and budget for continuity
operates our Nation’s communications back- capabilities consistent with this Implemen-
bone, energy infrastructure, financial networks, tation Plan, and submit to DHS grant fund-
and other key components of our daily lives. ing requests, as provided by law;
Citizens and government are dependent on the
owners and operators who make these pillars • Plan and conduct continuity tests, training,
of our lives work on a daily basis. and exercises, independently or in concert
with government entities, in order to pre-
Private sector organizations are encouraged to pare and evaluate program readiness and
consider the following recommendations: ensure adequacy and viability of continuity
plans and communications systems;
(b) “Catastrophic Emergency” means any (g) “Government Functions” means the collec-
incident, regardless of location, that results in tive functions of the heads of executive de-
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, partments and agencies as defined by statute,
or disruption severely affecting the U.S. popula- regulation, presidential direction, or other legal
tion, infrastructure, environment, economy, or authority, and the functions of the legislative
government functions; and judicial branches;
(i) “Primary Mission Essential Functions,” or (a) Ensuring the continued functioning of our
“PMEFs,” means those Government Functions form of government under the Constitution,
that must be performed in order to support or including the functioning of the three separate
implement the performance of NEFs before, branches of government;
during, and in the aftermath of an emergency.
(b) Providing leadership visible to the Nation
Policy and the world and maintaining the trust and
confidence of the American people;
(3) It is the policy of the United States to main-
tain a comprehensive and effective continuity (c) Defending the Constitution of the United
capability composed of Continuity of Opera- States against all enemies, foreign and do-
tions and Continuity of Government programs mestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks
in order to ensure the preservation of our form against the United States or its people, prop-
of government under the Constitution and the erty, or interests;
continuing performance of National Essential
Functions under all conditions. (d) Maintaining and fostering effective relation-
ships with foreign nations;
Implementation Actions (e) Protecting against threats to the homeland
and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes or
(4) Continuity requirements shall be incorporat-
attacks against the United States or its people,
ed into daily operations of all executive depart-
property, or interests;
ments and agencies. As a result of the asym-
metric threat environment, adequate warning of
(f) Providing rapid and effective response to
potential emergencies that could pose a signifi-
and recovery from the domestic consequences
cant risk to the homeland might not be avail-
of an attack or other incident;
able, and therefore all continuity planning shall
be based on the assumption that no such warn-
(g) Protecting and stabilizing the Nation’s
ing will be received. Emphasis will be placed
economy and ensuring public confidence in its
upon geographic dispersion of leadership, staff,
financial systems; and
and infrastructure in order to increase surviv-
ability and maintain uninterrupted Government
(h) Providing for critical Federal Government
Functions. Risk management principles shall be
services that address the national health, safety,
applied to ensure that appropriate operational
and welfare needs of the United States.
readiness decisions are based on the probabil-
ity of an attack or other incident and its conse-
(6) The President shall lead the activities of the
quences.
Federal Government for ensuring constitutional
government. In order to advise and assist the
(5) The following NEFs are the foundation for
President in that function, the Assistant to the
all continuity programs and capabilities and
President for Homeland Security and Counter-
represent the overarching responsibilities of the
terrorism (APHS/CT) is hereby designated as
the National Continuity Coordinator. The Na- (9) Recognizing that each branch of the Federal
tional Continuity Coordinator, in coordination Government is responsible for its own continu-
with the Assistant to the President for National ity programs, an official designated by the Chief
Security Affairs (APNSA), without exercising of Staff to the President shall ensure that the
directive authority, shall coordinate the de- executive branch’s COOP and COG policies in
velopment and implementation of continuity support of ECG efforts are appropriately coor-
policy for executive departments and agencies. dinated with those of the legislative and judicial
The Continuity Policy Coordination Committee branches in order to ensure interoperability and
(CPCC), chaired by a Senior Director from the allocate national assets efficiently to maintain a
Homeland Security Council staff, designated functioning Federal Government.
by the National Continuity Coordinator, shall
be the main day-to-day forum for such policy (10) Federal Government COOP, COG, and
coordination. ECG plans and operations shall be appropri-
ately integrated with the emergency plans and
(7) For continuity purposes, each execu- capabilities of State, local, territorial, and tribal
tive department and agency is assigned to a governments, and private sector owners and
category in accordance with the nature and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropri-
characteristics of its national security roles ate, in order to promote interoperability and to
and responsibilities in support of the Federal prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of
Government’s ability to sustain the NEFs. The authority. The Secretary of Homeland Security
Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve shall coordinate the integration of Federal con-
as the President’s lead agent for coordinating tinuity plans and operations with State, local,
overall continuity operations and activities of territorial, and tribal governments, and private
executive departments and agencies, and in sector owners and operators of critical infra-
such role shall perform the responsibilities set structure, as appropriate, in order to provide
forth for the Secretary in sections 10 and 16 of for the delivery of essential services during an
this directive. emergency.
(8) The National Continuity Coordinator, in (11) Continuity requirements for the Executive
consultation with the heads of appropriate ex- Office of the President (EOP) and executive
ecutive departments and agencies, will lead the departments and agencies shall include the fol-
development of a National Continuity Imple- lowing:
mentation Plan (Plan), which shall include
prioritized goals and objectives, a concept of (a) The continuation of the performance of
operations, performance metrics by which to PMEFs during any emergency must be for a
measure continuity readiness, procedures for period up to 30 days or until normal operations
continuity and incident management activities, can be resumed, and the capability to be fully
and clear direction to executive department operational at alternate sites as soon as possible
and agency continuity coordinators, as well as after the occurrence of an emergency, but not
guidance to promote interoperability of Federal later than 12 hours after COOP activation;
Government continuity programs and proce-
dures with State, local, territorial, and tribal (b) Succession orders and pre-planned devolu-
governments, and private sector owners and tion of authorities that ensure the emergency
operators of critical infrastructure, as appropri- delegation of authority must be planned and
ate. The Plan shall be submitted to the Presi- documented in advance in accordance with ap-
dent for approval not later than 90 days after plicable law;
the date of this directive.
(c) Vital resources, facilities, and records must
be safeguarded, and official access to them
must be provided;
(d) Provision must be made for the acquisition (b) In coordination with the National Continuity
of the resources necessary for continuity opera- Coordinator, issue annual continuity planning
tions on an emergency basis; guidance for the development of continuity
budget requests; and
(e) Provision must be made for the availabil-
ity and redundancy of critical communications (c) Ensure that heads of executive depart-
capabilities at alternate sites in order to support ments and agencies prioritize budget resources
connectivity between and among key gov- for continuity capabilities, consistent with this
ernment leadership, internal elements, other directive.
executive departments and agencies, critical
partners, and the public; (14) The Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy shall:
(f) Provision must be made for reconstitution
capabilities that allow for recovery from a cata- (a) Define and issue minimum requirements
strophic emergency and resumption of normal for continuity communications for executive
operations; and departments and agencies, in consultation with
the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of the
(g) Provision must be made for the identifica- Office of Management and Budget, and the
tion, training, and preparedness of personnel Chief of Staff to the President;
capable of relocating to alternate facilities to
support the continuation of the performance of (b) Establish requirements for, and monitor
PMEFs. the development, implementation, and main-
tenance of, a comprehensive communications
(12) In order to provide a coordinated response architecture to integrate continuity components,
to escalating threat levels or actual emergen- in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA,
cies, the Continuity of Government Readiness the Director of the Office of Management and
Conditions (COGCON) system establishes Budget, and the Chief of Staff to the President;
executive branch continuity program readiness and
levels, focusing on possible threats to the Na-
tional Capital Region. The President will deter- (c) Review quarterly and annual assessments
mine and issue the COGCON Level. Executive of continuity communications capabilities, as
departments and agencies shall comply with prepared pursuant to section 16(d) of this direc-
the requirements and assigned responsibilities tive or otherwise, and report the results and
under the COGCON program. During COOP recommended remedial actions to the National
activation, executive departments and agencies Continuity Coordinator.
shall report their readiness status to the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security or the Secretary’s (15) An official designated by the Chief of Staff
designee. to the President shall:
(13) The Director of the Office of Management (a) Advise the President, the Chief of Staff to
and Budget shall: the President, the APHS/CT, and the APNSA on
COGCON operational execution options; and
(a) Conduct an annual assessment of executive
department and agency continuity funding re- (b) Consult with the Secretary of Homeland
quests and performance data that are submitted Security in order to ensure synchronization and
by executive departments and agencies as part integration of continuity activities among the
of the annual budget request process, in order four categories of executive departments and
to monitor progress in the implementation of the agencies.
Plan and the execution of continuity budgets;
(16) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall: biennial assessment of the foreign and domes-
tic threats to the Nation’s continuity of govern-
(a) Coordinate the implementation, execution, ment.
and assessment of continuity operations and
activities; (18) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
(b) Develop and promulgate Federal Continuity provide secure, integrated, Continuity of Gov-
Directives in order to establish continuity plan- ernment communications to the President, the
ning requirements for executive departments Vice President, and, at a minimum, Category I
and agencies; executive departments and agencies.
(c) Conduct biennial assessments of individual (19) Heads of executive departments and agen-
department and agency continuity capabilities cies shall execute their respective department
as prescribed by the Plan and report the results or agency COOP plans in response to a local-
to the President through the APHS/CT; ized emergency and shall:
(d) Conduct quarterly and annual assessments (a) Appoint a senior accountable official, at
of continuity communications capabilities in the Assistant Secretary level, as the Continuity
consultation with an official designated by the Coordinator for the department or agency;
Chief of Staff to the President;
(b) Identify and submit to the National Con-
(e) Develop, lead, and conduct a Federal con- tinuity Coordinator the list of PMEFs for the
tinuity training and exercise program, which department or agency and develop continuity
shall be incorporated into the National Exercise plans in support of the NEFs and the continua-
Program developed pursuant to Homeland Se- tion of essential functions under all conditions;
curity Presidential Directive-8 of December 17,
2003 (“National Preparedness”), in consultation (c) Plan, program, and budget for continuity
with an official designated by the Chief of Staff capabilities consistent with this directive;
to the President;
(d) Plan, conduct, and support annual tests and
(f) Develop and promulgate continuity planning training, in consultation with the Secretary of
guidance to State, local, territorial, and tribal Homeland Security, in order to evaluate pro-
governments, and private sector critical infra- gram readiness and ensure adequacy and vi-
structure owners and operators; ability of continuity plans and communications
systems; and
(g) Make available continuity planning and
exercise funding, in the form of grants as (e) Support other continuity requirements, as
provided by law, to State, local, territorial, and assigned by category, in accordance with the
tribal governments, and private sector critical nature and characteristics of its national secu-
infrastructure owners and operators; and rity roles and responsibilities.
(3 U.S.C.19), with consultation of the Vice (c) Is not intended to, and does not, create any
President and, as appropriate, others involved. rights or benefits, substantive or procedural,
Heads of executive departments and agencies enforceable at law or in equity by a party
shall ensure that appropriate support is avail- against the United States, its agencies, instru-
able to the Vice President and others involved mentalities, or entities, its officers, employees,
as necessary to be prepared at all times to or agents, or any other person.
implement those provisions.
(22) Revocation. Presidential Decision Direc-
(21) This directive: tive 67 of October 21, 1998 (“Enduring Consti-
tutional Government and Continuity of Gov-
(a) Shall be implemented consistent with ap- ernment Operations”), including all Annexes
plicable law and the authorities of agencies, or thereto, is hereby revoked.
heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject
to the availability of appropriations; (23) Annex A and the classified Continuity
Annexes, attached hereto, are hereby incorpo-
(b) Shall not be construed to impair or other- rated into and made a part of this directive.
wise affect (i) the functions of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget relating (24) Security. This directive and the informa-
to budget, administrative, and legislative propos- tion contained herein shall be protected from
als, or (ii) the authority of the Secretary of De- unauthorized disclosure, provided that, excepts
fense over the Department of Defense, includ- for Annex A, the Annexes attached to this di-
ing the chain of command for military forces rective are classified and shall be accorded ap-
from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, propriate handling, consistent with applicable
to the commander of military forces, or military Executive Orders.
command and control procedures; and
GEORGE W. BUSH
ACRONYMS
APHS/CT Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism
IT Information Technology
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Alternate facilities – Locations, other than the communicate internally and with other entities
primary facility, used to carry out essential (including with other Federal agencies, State,
functions, particularly in a continuity situation. local, territorial, and tribal governments, and
the private sector) as necessary to perform their
Biennial Continuity Assessments – An evaluation Mission Essential Functions.
every two years of a department or agencies
cumulative, integrated Continuity Capability. Continuity Capability – The ability of an orga-
nization to continue performance of Essential
Business Impact Analysis – A method of identi- Functions, utilizing Continuity of Operations
fying the effects of failing to perform a function and Continuity of Government programs and
or requirement. integrated, day-to-day operations with a pri-
mary goal of ensuring the preservation of our
Business Process Analysis – A method of exam- form of government under the Constitution and
ining, identifying, and mapping the functional the continuing performance of National Essen-
processes, workflows, activities, personnel ex- tial Functions under all conditions. Built from
pertise, systems, data, and facilities inherent to the foundation of continuity planning and con-
the execution of a function or requirement. tinuity program management, the key pillars
of continuity capability are Leadership, Staff,
Catastrophic Emergency – Any incident, regard- Communications, and Facilities.
less of location, that results in extraordinary
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption Continuity Communications Architecture (CCA)
severely affecting the U.S. population, infra- - An integrated, comprehensive, interoperable
structure, environment, economy, or govern- information architecture, developed utilizing
ment functions. the OMB-sanctioned Federal Enterprise Archi-
tecture Framework, that describes the data,
Category – Refers to the categories of execu- systems, applications, technical standards, and
tive departments and agencies listed in Annex underlying infrastructure required to ensure
A to NSPD-51/HSPD-20 and Appendix B to this that Federal executive branch departments and
Implementation Plan. agencies can execute their Primary Mission Es-
sential Functions and Mission Essential Func-
COGCON – The Continuity of Government tions in support of National Essential Functions
Readiness Condition system is a means to and continuity requirements under all circum-
establish, measure, and report the readiness of stances.
executive branch continuity programs inde-
pendent of other Federal Government readi- Continuity Coordinators – Representatives of
ness systems. (See Appendix D for a detailed the executive branch departments and agencies
matrix.) at the Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) level.
Communications – Voice, video, and data ca- Continuity of Government (COG) – A coordi-
pabilities that enable the leadership and staff nated effort within the Federal Government’s
to conduct the mission essential functions of executive branch to ensure that National Essen-
the organization. Robust communications help tial Functions continue to be performed during
ensure that the leadership receives coordinated, a Catastrophic Emergency.
integrated policy and operational advice and
recommendations and will provide the abil- Continuity of Operations (COOP) – An effort
ity for governments and the private sector to within individual executive departments and
agencies to ensure that Primary Mission Esse-
tial Functions continue to be performed during field levels, and all other organizational loca-
a wide range of emergencies, including local- tions. Generally, pre-determined delegations of
ized acts of nature, accidents, and technological authority will take effect when normal channels
or attack-related emergencies. of direction are disrupted and terminate when
these channels have resumed.
Continuity Policy Coordination Committee
(CPCC) – A committee led by HSC established Devolution of authority – The passing of an
to comprehensively address national level unexercised right, devolution of authority is
continuity program coordination, integration, an essential planning requirement for depart-
oversight, and management. This forum institu- ments and agencies manifested as a formal list
tionalizes national security policy development, of personnel who are pre-delegated the author-
implementation, and oversight for continuity ity and responsibility to assume leadership of
programs. The Committee serves in a continu- organizational elements within a department or
ity oversight and management role with mem- agency with the approval of the department or
bership at the Assistant Secretary level from the agency head.
following organizations: the Office of the Vice
President; the Homeland and National Security “Dirty bomb” – A type of radiological dispersal
Councils; the White House Military Office; the device (RDD) that combines a conventional
Office of Management and Budget; the Office explosive with radioactive material.
of Science and Technology Policy; the Depart-
ments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, and Emergency Alert System (EAS) – A national com-
Homeland Security; the Director of National munications network and public warning sys-
Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; tem started in 1994 that replaced the Emergen-
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the United cy Broadcast System jointly administered by the
States Secret Service; the Federal Emergency Federal Communications Commission, FEMA,
Management Agency; and the Joint Chiefs of and the National Weather Service. The System
Staff. Other observers may be invited to attend. requires broadcasters, cable television systems,
wireless cable systems, satellite digital audio
Continuity Program Management Cycle – An radio service (SDARS) providers and, effective
ongoing, cyclical model of planning, training, in May 2007, direct broadcast satellite (DBS)
evaluating, and implementing corrective actions service providers to provide the communica-
for continuity capabilities. tions capability to the President to address the
Corrective Action Program System – The Correc- American public during a national emergency.
tive Action Program (CAP) System is a web- The system also may be used by state and lo-
based application that allows Federal, State, cal authorities to deliver important emergency
and local emergency response and homeland information such as AMBER alerts and weather
security officials to track and analyze Improve- information targeted to a specific area.
ment Plans. The Department of Homeland
Security is developing this system as part of a Emergency Support Function (ESF) – From the
larger effort to systematically translate Home- National Response Plan (NRP), a grouping of
land Security Exercise and Evaluation Program government and certain private-sector capabili-
(HSEEP) outputs—including findings, areas ties into an organizational structure to provide
for improvement, recommendations, lessons support, resources, and services. The NRP
learned, and best practices—into meaningful groups functions as follows:
inputs for homeland security plans, programs,
and budgets.
Homeland Security Advisory System – A series information. The HSIN serves as a nationwide
of tools used by the Department of Homeland information-sharing and collaboration tool and
Security to provide guidance to the public on is intended to offer real-time chat and instant
the status of our homeland security. The sys- messaging capability as well as a document
tem combines threat information with vulnera- library that contains reports from multiple
bility assessments and communicates this infor- Federal, State, and local sources. HSIN features
mation to public safety officials and the public. suspicious incident information and analysis of
The System includes Homeland Security Threat terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons. HSIN
Advisories, Homeland Security Information Bul- includes over 35 communities of interest, such
letins, and the Threat Level System. as emergency management, law enforcement,
counterterrorism, States, and private sector
Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) – A communities. Each community of interest has
communications system and IT infrastructure Web pages that are tailored for the community
used by the Department of Homeland Security and contain general and community-specific
to streamline and merge classified networks news articles, links, and contact information.
into a single, integrated network which is being HSIN features include a document library, a
designed to become a major secure information discussion thread/bulletin board capability, and
thoroughfare joining together intelligence agen- a chat tool among others.
cies, law enforcement, disaster management,
and front-line disaster response organizations. Homeland Security Threat Advisories – Guid-
ance provided to Federal, State, local, and
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation other governments; private sector organiza-
Program (HSEEP) – The NEP utilizes the HSEEP tions; and international partners with action-
as the common methodology for exercises. able information about an incident involving,
HSEEP is a capabilities- and performance- or a threat targeting, critical national networks,
based exercise program that provides standard- infrastructures, or key assets. The Threat Advi-
ized policy, doctrine, and terminology for the sories includes products formerly named alerts,
design, development, conduct, and evaluation advisories, and sector notifications.
of homeland security exercises. HSEEP also
provides tools and resources to facilitate the Homeland Security Threat Level System – A
management of self-sustaining homeland secu- color-coded system used to communicate with
rity exercise programs. public safety officials and the public at-large
through a threat-based, color-coded system so
Homeland Security Information Bulletins that protective measures can be implemented
– Guidance for Federal, State, local, and other to reduce the likelihood of impact of an attack.
governments; private sector organizations;
and international partners concerned with Integrated Public Alert Warning System (IPAWS)
our Nation’s critical infrastructures that do not – Pursuant to Executive Order 13407, IPAWS
meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance is a comprehensive DHS/FEMA program, in
thresholds of warning messages. Bulletins partnership with NOAA, the FCC, and other
often include statistical reports, periodic sum- public and private stakeholders, begun in 2004
maries, incident response or reporting guide- to improve public alert and warning. The sys-
lines, common vulnerabilities and patches, and tem will deliver digitally-based alert and warn-
configuration standards or tools. ing messages to radio and television stations,
personal computers, cell phones and other
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) consumer wireless devices. The System seeks
– A communications system and IT infrastruc- to upgrade EAS, enhance NAWAS, and begin
ture used by the Department of Homeland other pilot programs, among other initiatives
Security to transmit sensitive but unclassified for current technological options.
Interagency Board – A working group estab- Mission Essential Functions – The limited set
lished by the NCC to review and recommend of department- and agency-level government
validation of potential PMEFs submitted by functions that must be continued throughout,
departments and agencies for submission to the or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal
NCC for final approval. activities.
Joint Field Office (JFO) – The JFO is a tempo- National Alert Warning System (NAWAS) – Oper-
rary Federal facility established locally to pro- ated and maintained by FEMA, the NAWAS was
vide a central point for Federal, State, local, and originally created as part of the Civil Defense
tribal executives with responsibility for incident Act of 1950 in order to pass emergency infor-
oversight, direction, and/or assistance to effec- mation to the American public regarding an
tively coordinate protection, prevention, pre- actual attack or an accidental missile launch
paredness, response, and recovery actions. The against the United States. The NAWAS is avail-
JFO utilizes the scalable organizational structure able on a 24/7 basis as a non-secure, continu-
of the NIMS in the context of both pre-incident ous, private line, telephone system and is used
and post-incident management activities. The to convey warnings to Federal, State, and local
JFO organization adapts to the magnitude and governments, as well as the military and civil
complexity of the situation at hand, and incor- populations. Although the original mission
porates the NIMS principles regarding span of of NAWAS was to warn of an enemy attack or
control and organizational structure by utiliz- missile launch, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
ing the Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974
Finance/Administration Sections. Although expanded the NAWAS mission to include warn-
the JFO uses an ICS structure, the JFO does ing for acts of terrorism, as well as natural and
not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the technological disasters and events. NAWAS is
JFO focuses on providing support to on-scene used by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
efforts and conducting broader support opera- Administration (NOAA) to pass severe weather
tions that may extend beyond the incident site. alerts as conditions develop as well and to pass
When incidents impact multiple States or locali- critical sheltering information in the event these
ties, multiple JFOs may be established. In these severe weather conditions materialize. There
situations, one of the JFOs may be identified are currently approximately 2050 NAWAS drops
(typically in the most heavily impacted area) to (referred to as Warning points) across the Na-
serve as the primary JFO and provide strategic tion, to include Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
leadership and coordination for the overall in- and the US Virgin Islands.
cident management effort, as designated by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. National Capital Region (NCR) – The National
Capital Region was created pursuant to the
Leadership – The senior decision-makers desig- National Capital Planning Act of 1952 (40 U.S.C.
nated to head an organization (e.g., President, § 71). The Act defined the NCR as the District
Cabinet Secretary, Governor, Chief Executive of Columbia; Montgomery and Prince George’s
Officer, or manager). Ensuring survivable lead- Counties of Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax,
ership is accomplished by physically protect- Loudon, and Prince William Counties of Vir-
ing the person (sheltering in place or relocat- ginia; and all cities now or here after existing
ing away from the threat), as well as having a in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic
prioritized list of designated successors. The area bounded by the outer boundaries of the
designation as a successor enables a person to combined area of said counties. The NCR
act for and exercise the powers of the principal includes the District of Columbia and eleven
in the event of death, permanent disability, or local jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and
resignation. the Commonwealth of Virginia.
National Command and Coordination Capability as well as members of the private sector, and,
(NCCC) – The NCCC is the means to provide at times, our international partners. The NEP
the President and Vice President with the abil- has developed common policy and guidance
ity to respond deliberately and appropriately and has established collaborative management
to any crisis. It includes responsive, reliable, processes and tools to link its partners and
survivable, and robust processes and systems to stakeholders nationwide. Lessons learned and
command, control, and coordinate operations peer-validated best practices identified through
among Federal, State, tribal, insular, and local exercises and actual incidents are made avail-
governments, as required. able to the homeland security community.
Readiness Reporting System (RRS) – Department security mission areas: Prevent, Protect, Re-
of Homeland Security program to collect and spond, and Recover. The List defines and pro-
manage continuity capability data and assess- vides the basis for assessing preparedness. It
ments of executive branch departments and also establishes national targets for the capabili-
agencies and their status to perform their Prior- ties to prepare the Nation for major all-hazards
ity Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) in sup- events, such as those defined by the National
port of the National Essential Functions (NEFs). Planning Scenarios. The current version of the
The RRS will be used to conduct assessments TCL contains 37 core capabilities.
and track capabilities at all times under all con-
ditions, to include natural disasters, manmade Washington Metropolitan Area Warning System
incidents, terrorism, and war. (WAWAS) – The Washington Area Warning Sys-
tem (WAWAS), is a portion of the NAWAS, but
Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) is not tied directly to the NAWAS. It is oper-
– The RRCC is a standing facility operated by ated and maintained by the FEMA Operations
DHS/FEMA that coordinates regional response Center. While the NAWAS is nationwide, the
efforts, establishes Federal priorities, and imple- WAWAS is dedicated to the Washington, DC,
ments local Federal program support until a metropolitan area. On a day-to-day basis, the
JFO is established in the field and/or other key DC Office of Emergency Management man-
DHS incident management officials can as- ages the WAWAS due to the amount of local
sume their NRP coordination responsibilities. information disseminated across the system.
The RRCC establishes communications with the OPM uses the WAWAS to pass duty information
affected State Emergency Operations Center to the various Federal departments and agen-
(EOC) and the NOC-NRCC, coordinates deploy- cies located in the Washington, DC, area in the
ment of the Emergency Response Team–Ad- event of bad weather or other business affect-
vance Element (ERT-A) to field locations, as- ing government operations.
sesses damage information, develops situation
reports, and issues initial mission assignments.
D e p a r t m e n t & A g e n c y ( D / A )
Readiness
Level Time to Transition to
Operations Staffing Level
Successive Stages
• Continue to perform headquarters busi- • No staffing required at alter- • Continuity plan is fully
ness functions at normal location(s) nate operating facility(ies) operational within
• Maintain alternate operating facility(ies) • Maintain normal delegations 12 hours
in accordance with agency continuity and devolution of authority
plans to ensure readiness for activation to ensure performance of
COGCON 4 at all times essential functions to respond
• Conduct training and exercise activities to a no-notice event
in accordance with agency continuity
and Test, Training, and Exercise (TTE)
plan(s) to ensure personnel readiness
• Continue to perform headquarters busi- • No staffing required at alter- • Continuity plan is fully
ness functions at normal location(s) nate operating facility(ies) operational within
• Maintain alternate operating facility(ies) unless necessary to meet 8 hours
in accordance with agency continuity 8-hour operational require- • 4 hours to COGCON 2
plans to ensure readiness for activation ment.
COGCON 3 at all times • Maintain normal delegations
• Conduct additional training activities to and devolution of authority
increase personnel readiness (e.g. Team to ensure performance of
tabletops, review recall lists, review essential functions to respond
plans and procedures) to a no-notice event
• Continue to perform headquarters busi- • Deploy sufficient staff to al- • Continuity plan is fully
ness functions at normal location(s) ternate operating facility(ies) operational within
• Monitor/track major HQ activities to allow activation with 4 4 hours
• Maintain alternate operating facility(ies) hours notice • 4 hours to COGCON 1
in accordance with agency continuity
COGCON 2 plans to ensure readiness for activation
at all times
• Take appropriate steps to ensure al-
ternate operating facility(ies) can be
activated with 4 hours notice
C o n t i n u i t y C a p a b i l i t y
Impact on Departments
Communications Succession
& Agencies
• Test all internal agency communications • No special measures to protect or • No additional requirements
capabilities between normal operating loca- track the location of agency leader-
tions (HQ and other) and alternate operating ship and successors
facility(ies) no less than quarterly • Ensure delegations of authority
• Test all communications capabilities at all al- to lead departments and agencies
ternate operating facility(ies) with applicable are in place for senior personnel
interagency partners no less than quarterly located outside of the National
Capital Region
• Conduct at least one additional internal • Track the locations of agency lead- • Additional staff time for
agency communications test between normal ers and their successors on daily communications testing and
operating locations (HQ and other) and al- basis tracking agency leadership
ternate operating facility(ies) within 24 hours • Potential shorter response
times for basic staffing of
alternate facility(ies)
• Conduct internal agency communications • Track the locations of agency lead- • Potential increased travel
tests between normal operating locations ers and their successors on daily requirements for agency
(HQ and other) and alternate operating basis leadership
facility(ies) within 24 hours and repeat not • Ensure at least one headquarters- • Some staff is required
less than weekly level agency successor is out of the to work from alternate
• Conduct communications tests at all alter- National Capital Region at all times location(s)
nate operating facility(ies) with applicable • Potential shorter response
interagency partners within 48 hours and times for additional staffing
repeat not less than weekly of alternate facility(ies)
• Test internal agency communications be- • Track the locations of agency lead- • Some agency leaders work
tween normal operating locations (HQ and ers and their successors on a daily from alternate facility(ies)
other) and alternate operating facility(ies) basis • Significant number of staff
daily • At least one headquarters-level are required to work from
• Conduct communications tests at all alter- agency successor must be at alter- alternate location(s)
nate operating facility(ies) with applicable nate operating facility(ies)
interagency partners daily
Executive Order 4/1984 Assigns national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications
12472 functions.
Executive Order 11/1988 Assigns responsibilities to each Federal agency for national security and emer-
12656 gency preparedness.
NOTE: Upon the
development of
department and
agency MEFs and
PMEFs, which
will replace the
specific func-
tions assigned to
heads of depart-
ments and agen-
cies in EO 12656,
it is anticipated
that a recom-
mendation to
revoke EO 12656
entirely will be
sent to the Presi-
dent.
Federal Prepared- 7/1999 Provides guidance to Federal executive branch departments and agencies for
ness Circular 60 use in developing viable and executable contingency plans for the continuity of
operations.
Federal Prepared- 6/2004 Provides guidance to Federal executive branch departments and agencies for
ness Circular 65 use in developing viable and executable contingency plans for the continuity of
operations.
Homeland 10/2001 Provides for the organization and operation of the Homeland Security Council.
Security Presiden-
tial Directive-1
(HSPD-1)
Homeland 3/2002 Provides for a Homeland Security Advisory System to provide a comprehensive
Security Presiden- and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist
tial Directive-3 acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American people.
(HSPD-3)
Homeland 12/2003 Establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify
Security Presiden- and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to pro-
tial Directive-7 tect them from terrorist attacks.
(HSPD-7)
Homeland 12/2003 Establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to
Security Presiden- prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major
tial Directive-8 disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards
(HSPD-8) preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal
preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to
strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.
Homeland 2/2004 Establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against
Security Presiden- terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
tial Directive-9
(HSPD-9)
Homeland Secu- 8/2004 Establishes a policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal employ-
rity Presidential ees and contractors.
Directive-12
(HSPD-12)
Homeland Secu- 5/2007 Establishes a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of Federal Gov-
rity Presidential ernment structures and operations and a single National Continuity Coordinator
Directive-20 / responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of Federal
National Security continuity policies; establishes “National Essential Functions”; prescribes con-
Presidential Di- tinuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies; and provides
rective-51 (HSPD- guidance for State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector
20/NSPD-51) organizations in order to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national con-
tinuity program that will enhance the credibility of our national security posture
and enable a more rapid and effective response to and recovery from a national
emergency.
National Infra- 2006 Provides a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resources
structure Protec- (CI/KR) protection roles and responsibilities for Federal, State, local, tribal, and
tion Plan (NIPP) private sector security partners. The NIPP sets national priorities, goals, and
requirements for effective distribution of funding and resources which will help
ensure that our government, economy, and public services continue in the
event of a terrorist attack or other disaster.
National Re- Last Provides the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of Federal support
sponse Plan updated to State, local, and tribal incident managers and for exercising direct Federal
(currently under 5/2006 authorities and responsibilities.
review)
National Security 3/2006 Promotes freedom, justice, and human dignity; confronts the challenges of the
Strategy threat of pandemic disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terror-
ism, human trafficking, and natural disasters; and emphasizes effective multina-
tional efforts to solve these problems.
National Strategy 7/2002 Mobilize and organizes the Nation to secure the U.S. homeland from terrorist
for Homeland Se- attacks; establishes a foundation upon which to organize efforts; and provides
curity (currently initial guidance to prioritize the work ahead.
under review)
National Strategy 11/2005 Provides a framework for future U.S. Government planning efforts to address
for Pandemic the pandemic threat that is consistent with the National Security Strategy and
Influenza the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
National Strategy 5/2006 Represents a comprehensive effort by the Federal Government to identify the
for Pandemic critical steps that must be taken immediately and over the coming months and
Influenza Imple- years to address the threat of an influenza pandemic; assigns specific respon-
mentation Plan sibilities to departments and agencies across the Federal Government; and
includes measures of progress and timelines for implementation to ensure the
preparedness objectives are met.
National Strategy 2/2003 Serves as a critical bridge between the National Strategy for Homeland Security
for the Physical and a national protection plan to be developed by the Department of Home-
Protection of land Security. The strategic objectives that underpin the national infrastructure
Critical Infra- and key asset protection effort include:
structures and • Identifying and assuring the protection of those infrastructure and assets
Key Assets we deem most critical;
• Providing timely warning and assuring the protection of those infra-
structures and assets that face a specific, imminent threat; and
• Assuring the protection of other infrastructures and assets that may
become targets over time by pursuing specific initiatives and enabling a
collaborative environment between the public and private sector.
The National 2/2003 Engages and empowers Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace that
Strategy to Se- they own, operate, control, or with which they interact.
cure Cyberspace
Presidential Suc- 6/1948 Lays out procedures for succession to the Office of the President and Office of
cession Act of the Vice President.
1947 (3 U.S.C.
19)
Twenty-Fifth Ratified Clarifies a provision of the Constitution regarding succession to the Presidency,
Amendment 2/1967 and establishes procedures both for filling a vacancy in the Office of the Vice
President as well as responding to Presidential disabilities.
Paragraph 11 of the National Continuity Policy From the list of continuity requirements (see
(NSPD-51/HSPD-20) identifies the continuity below), department and agency heads shall use
requirements for the Executive Office of the the key questions and metrics guidance below
President and executive branch departments to certify that their organizations have a robust
and agencies. This Implementation Plan re- continuity capability.
quires department and agency heads to take
the following action:
NSPD-51/HSPD-20 Paragraph 11 – Continuity requirements for the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and
executive branch departments and agencies shall include the following:
METRICS
(Provide justification including quanti-
CONTINUITY REQUIREMENTS KEY QUESTIONS tative and/or qualitative data to show
you have met the requirement <OR>
identify steps you will take to do so.)
1. The continuation of the perfor- • Is your organization able to • Measure ability to perform
mance of PMEFs during any emer- perform your current PMEFs PMEFs through test, training,
gency must be for a period up to during any emergency and for and exercise, identifying gaps
30 days or until normal operations up to 30 days or resumption of and solutions.
can be resumed, and the capability normal operations? • Measure capability to be fully
to be fully operational at alternate • Is your organization able to be operational at a COOP site
sites as soon as possible after the fully operational at an alternate within 12 hours through test,
occurrence of an emergency, but site within 12 hours of COOP training, and exercise, identify-
not later than 12 hours after COOP activation? ing gaps and solutions.
activation;
2. Succession orders and pre-planned • Does your organization have • Document and train on succes-
devolution of authorities that accessible and complete orders sion orders
ensure the emergency delegation of succession familiar to suc- • Document and train on devolu-
of authority must be planned and cessors? tion of authorities
documented in advance in accor- • Does your organization have
dance with applicable law; accessible and complete devo-
lution of authorities known by
those to whom they devolve?
3. Vital resources, facilities, and • Are your vital resources safe- • Document measures taken to
records must be safeguarded, and guarded? safeguard vital resources, facili-
official access to them must be • Are your facilities safeguarded? ties, and records.
provided; • Are your records safeguarded? • Document measures taken to
• Will your continuity staff have ensure official access to vital re-
official access to your vital sources, facilities, and records.
resources, facilities, and records
in an emergency?
METRICS
(Provide justification including quanti-
CONTINUITY REQUIREMENTS KEY QUESTIONS tative and/or qualitative data to show
you have met the requirement <OR>
identify steps you will take to do so.)
4. Provision must be made for the • Have you identified emergency • Identify your emergency conti-
acquisition of the resources neces- continuity resources? nuity resource requirements.
sary for continuity operations on an • Do you have agreements/ • Identify what agreements/ con-
emergency basis; contracts to acquire emergency tracts you have made to meet
continuity resources? these requirements.
• Identify what additional agree-
ments/contracts are needed.
5. Provision must be made for the • Do you have critical com- • Identify your current com-
availability and redundancy of munications capability at your munications capability at your
critical communications capabilities alternate site(s)? alternate site.
at alternate sites in order to sup- • Do you have redundant com- • Identify what communications
port connectivity between and munications capability at your capability is necessary
among key government leadership, alternate site(s)? • Identify the plan to improve
internal elements, other executive communications at your alter-
departments and agencies, critical nate site in six months, one
partners, and the public; year, and two years.
6. Provision must be made for recon- • What is your plan to ensuring • Identify your reconstitution
stitution capabilities that allow for your reconstitution capability? capability plan.
recovery from a catastrophic emer-
gency and resumption of normal
operations; and
7. Provision must be made for the • Have you identified, trained, • Verify that staff are identified,
identification, training, and pre- and prepared personnel to trained, and prepared to relo-
paredness of personnel capable of relocate to alternate sites to cate to alternate sites.
relocating to alternate facilities to continue PMEFs?
support the continuation of the per-
formance of PMEFs.
Stoplight Scoring System The NCC and the HSC, in coordination with
DHS, will work with departments and agencies
For each of the seven continuity requirements, to further define continuity standards using a
department and agency heads will self-iden- consistent Continuity Capability Scoring System
tify a simple grading system, consistent with to allow continuing assessment of improvement
the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) to in continuity capability.
show status:
30 30
entities briefing on submit submits submits Days approves Days ensure
30 created 30 MEFs/PMEFs 90 MEFs 30 compiled 60 MEFs PMEFs. key
Days Days and issues FCD Days and Days MEFs Days and leaders
CAG on continuity potential and validated 180 are
IAB requirements PMEFs potential PMEFs Days trained
and MEF/PMEF to DHS PMEFs to to NCC on
identification IAB for MEFs
process
approval. and
PMEFs.
Department and agency heads are requested to send to the National Continuity
Coordinator (a) a cover letter with the name and contact information for their
Continuity Coordinator and (b) a report on their continuity capability, as
described below, by Monday, October 29, 2007. Please send the information via
email to Tim Kennedy, Director, Continuity Policy with the Homeland Security
Council at tkennedy@who.eop.gov.
• First, appoint a senior accountable official, at the Assistant Secretary or equivalent level,
as the Continuity Coordinator for the department or agency. This Continuity
Coordinator is responsible for working with the organization head to ensure the
organization’s continuity capability.
• Secondly, submit a report to the National Continuity Coordinator certifying that the
department or agency has a continuity capability plan that includes the continuity
requirements in Paragraph 11 of NSPD-51/HSPD-20 (copied below). Appendix F of
the Plan includes key questions and metrics to use when writing the report. Reports
need to include justification, including quantitative and/or qualitative data to show that
an organization has met a requirement, or identify steps to be taken in order to eventually
meet a requirement. This initial report will be used as a baseline for future
improvements and help identify initial gaps in our continuity capability.
In the coming months, the Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Office of Management and Budget, among others, will develop a Continuity Capability
Scoring System, consistent with the President’s Management Agenda, to assist departments and
agencies in improving their continuity capabilities.
Continuity requirements for the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and Executive Branch
departments and agencies shall include the following (NSPD-51/HSPD-20 Paragraph 11):
• The continuation of the performance of PMEFs during any emergency must be for a period up to 30
days or until normal operations can be resumed, and the capability to be fully operational at
alternate sites as soon as possible after the occurrence of an emergency, but not later than 12
hours after COOP activation;
• Succession orders and pre-planned devolution of authorities that ensure the emergency delegation
of authority must be planned and documented in advance in accordance with applicable law;
• Vital resources, facilities, and records must be safeguarded, and official access to them must be
provided;
• Provision must be made for the acquisition of the resources necessary for continuity operations on
an emergency basis;
• Provision must be made for the availability and redundancy of critical communications capabilities at
alternate sites in order to support connectivity between and among key government leadership,
internal elements, other executive departments and agencies, critical partners, and the public;
• Provision must be made for reconstitution capabilities that allow for recovery from a catastrophic
emergency and resumption of normal operations; and
• Provision must be made for the identification, training, and preparedness of personnel capable of
relocating to alternate facilities to support the continuation of the performance of PMEFs.
In the coming weeks, the National Continuity Coordinator will work with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
establish the CAG and schedule its first meeting.
ATTACHMENT C
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS AND INTERAGENCY BOARD PROCESS
Chapter 2 of the Plan describes in detail a new effort to identify department and agency Mission
Essential Functions (MEFs) and Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs). This process is
a refinement of an effort begun in 2005 and will build upon it to produce a more refined and
synchronized set of MEFs and PMEFs. Many of the PMEFs identified by departments and
agencies in 2005 may have been part of the larger set of MEFs.
• MEFs are the limited set of department- and agency-level government functions that
must be continued throughout, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal activities.
• PMEFs are a subset of MEFs. PMEFs are those department and agency mission
essential functions, validated by the National Continuity Coordinator, which must be
performed in order to support the performance of the National Essential Functions
(NEFs) before, during, and in the aftermath of an emergency. PMEFs are defined as
those functions that need to be continuous or resumed within 12 hours after an event and
maintained for up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed.
• NEFs are a subset of PMEFs. NSPD-51/HSPD-20 codified the eight National Essential
Functions (NEFs), which represent the overarching responsibilities of the Federal
government to lead and sustain the Nation and which shall be the primary focus of the
Federal government leadership during and in the aftermath of an emergency.
Pursuant to the Plan, within 30 days the National Continuity Coordinator (NCC) will establish an
Interagency Board (IAB), as a working group of the Continuity Policy Coordination Committee
(PCC), to review and recommend validation of potential PMEFs submitted by departments and
agencies. The IAB will work with departments and agencies to review their MEFs and help
determine their PMEFs. The IAB will produce a logical, comprehensive, and integrated list of
PMEFs.
Within 60 days, in coordination with the HSC and the Continuity PCC, the Secretary of
Homeland Security will issue a Federal Continuity Directive containing the formalized process
for identifying MEFs and PMEFs as described in Chapter 2 of the Plan and host a briefing for
department and agency Continuity Coordinators and appropriate continuity planning
representatives who will be involved in their organization’s MEF/PMEF process. At a minimum
this should include the Continuity Coordinator and others who are experts on the organization’s
essential functions and on the four key pillars of a continuity capability as described in Chapter 2
of the Plan. The four key pillars are leadership, staff, communications, and facilities.
After the DHS briefing on the MEF/PMEF process, departments and agencies will have 90 days
to submit their MEFs and PMEFs for IAB review. Appendix H of the Plan contains a chart with
the steps and the timeline for the MEF/PMEF process.