The Road to Damascus: Iranian Assistance

(Photo Courtesy of Tehran Times)

Amid the unrest in Damascus it has come to light that

Tehran has been funneling weapons and other
support to President Bashar Al-Assad’s government to
insure that a revolution will not overthrow the
government.

Tehran’s motives appear to be driven by the desire that its regional partnership with
Damascus remains in place.

Tehran has been offering assistance in tracking down the leaders of the protest
movement in Syria and they have also shipped the government crowd control gear
such as tear gas and riot gear. “We believe that there is credible information that Iran
is assisting Syria,” said State Department spokesman Mark Toner in reference to
evidence of tertiary and direct support from Tehran to Damascus.

Tehran is uniquely qualified to assist Syria in putting down dissent. Iranian unrest
following the widely panned 2009 presidential election and recent unrest following the
turmoil in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya demonstrates the abilities of the Iranian
government to squelch dissent. Iran has been successful in cutting off Internet access
to Facebook and Twitter which were especially useful to the protest organizers in
Egypt. Further, Tehran worked quickly to arrest opposition leaders following the
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.

Syria’s domestic turmoil began following the downfall of Egyptian strongman Hosni
Mubarak in February of this year. After Mubarak’s exit, small demonstrations began
throughout Syria. The demonstrations were quickly dispersed by a larger number of
police who converged on the demonstrators. However, the situation began to change
in March following the arrest of several schoolchildren for defacing property with
graffiti expressing outrage directed at the Assad regime. Following the protests in
Dara’a over the arrest of these schoolchildren, the protest movement spread to other
cities. By April, according to reports compiled by human rights groups, the death toll
resulting from government crackdowns numbered in the hundreds.

On April 8th, after prayers in Dara, security forces opened fire on demonstrators. At
the same time in Damascus and across Syria as many as 10,000 protesters gathered to
denounce Bashar. Other incidents of unrest occured on April 11th when government
forces and those loyal to Al-Assad killed four protestors in the city of Banias.

Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad has reason to be concerned about his ability to remain in
power. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak believed he was immune and Libya’s Col. Muammar
al-Qaddafi’s hold over his country is tenuous at best. Despite the current situation on
the ground, Syria for many weeks appeared to be immune to the same level of unrest
witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. As is often the case, heavy-handed tactics by
Syrian security forces increased the level of opposition in many cities.

Bashar Al-Assad has been Syria’s president since 2000 following the death of his
father, Hafez al-Assad who had ruled Syria for three decades. The Assad family is a
member of the Allawite sect. The Allawites are in the minority but control key
positions in the military and government. Syria under Hafez al-Assad had supported
terrorist groups specifically opposed to the West and Israel. Despite some progress on
the part of Bashar Al-Assad to mend ties with the West, Syria has continued to offer
support to the same groups that have enjoyed support from Iran, in particular, Hamas
and Hezbollah.

Despite the ability of Bashar Al-Assad’s father to rule Syria with absolute control, the
country has not been immune to civil unrest in the past. In 1982, clashes between the
government and the Muslim Brotherhood led to the government to unleashing the
army on the protestors and at least 10,000 were killed and the government destroyed
the city of Hama. In the process, those not killed were jailed and many disappeared.

The fact that the Assads come from the Allawite sect poses a unique problem for the
government. Because the Allawites are Shiite and the majority of the country is Sunni,
unless Bashar Al-Assad is able to hold the old alliances together that his father built,
the government will fall. Hafez was able to hold onto power even during the unrest in
1982 because he had developed sect loyalties, co-opted Syrians and created a society
based upon fear. If these efforts unravel under Bashar, his ability to remain in power
will be greatly diminished.

This fact also makes keeping the allegiances of the military and security forces
essential if Bashar is to remain in power. Because the military and security forces are
also from the minority Allawite sect they have reason to fear that if the government
falls to the majority Sunnis they will suffer recriminations. However, if they feel that
they will fare better if they abandon Bashar Al-Assad, they very well might do so in
order to seek the best outcome.

Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, sensing that the Iranian/Syrian relationship was

threatened by Bashar Al-Assad’s rapprochement with the West following the Obama
administration’s decision to appoint an ambassador to Syria, flew to Damascus last
year for meetings with Bashar Al-Assad. “The Americans want to dominate the region
but they feel Iran and Syria are preventing that…We tell them that instead of
interfering in the region’s affairs to pack their things and leave. If the Zionist entity
wants to repeats its past errors, its death will be inevitable,” Ahmadinejad said during
a press conference with Bashar.

In strategic terms, support from Tehran to Damascus is crucial if Iran is to stay

relevant in the region. While this support does undermine the chances for a settlement
of the Palestinian question and an end to hostilities towards Israel, Iran has never
concerned itself with creating or maintaining stability in the wider Middle East region.
The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya pose threats to both Iran and Syria and
contain a common theme: these revolutions were not initiated by the West or Israel
and are being propelled by Arabs seeking more freedoms and a say in how their lives
function.

If Iran and Syria are able to hold onto power their ability to do so hinges on their
abilities to kill popular uprisings. Both Assad and Ahmadinejad are also in a optimal
position. They both are aware that no matter how severely they crack down on their
citizens, the West will not intervene as it did in Libya. The West would be well
advised to tread carefully regarding Syria and Iran. The U.S. and other Western
powers can ill-afford the resources necessary to intervene in either country. If Syria or
Iran sense that domestic unrest is being encouraged by the West then in order to
remain in control they may well become even more repressive.

John Lyman is the Editor-in-Chief of Foreign Affairs Journal.