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Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Contextual Meaning

Author(s): Elizabeth Struthers Malbon


Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion , Jun., 1983, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun.,
1983), pp. 207-230
Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1463635

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Journal of the American Academy of Religion, LI/2

Structuralism, Hermeneutics,
and Contextual Meaning
Elizabeth Struthers Malbon

erhaps one should begin by defining one's terms. But, were I


attempt to define "structuralism" and "hermeneutics" carefull
completely, and in a way that would satisfy all-or even mo
structuralists or hermeneuticists, I fear I would never move beyond
beginning. Thus, although I shall not begin entirely in mediis rebu
must assume some experience of the workings of structuralism an
hermeneutics. I regard structuralism and hermeneutics as approach
meaning, as ways of investigating the significance of "things"-
individual texts to whole cultures-and the significance of significa
My present task is to compare and contrast these two approach
meaning-structuralism and hermeneutics-by considering espe
their goals, or end points, and their presuppositions, or beginning p
Although my references will be chiefly to approaches to meani
biblical studies, I wish to understand in a more general way the cont
in which structuralism and hermeneutics seek meaning and seek to
meaning.
Relations between structuralism and hermeneutics are often implied
in the characterization of either structuralism or hermeneutics. For
example, Robert Culley, in characterizing structuralism, present
model of the three focal points of scholarly approaches to biblical te
author, text, reader./1/ According to this model, the author is the sha
focal point of source criticism; the text is the focus of rhetorical critic
and structural analysis; the reader is the focus of biblical hermeneut
(167-69). Thus Culley's model indicates a fundamental differenc
between structuralism and hermeneutics. A model presented by Robe
Polzin, on the other hand, suggests a fundamental similarity between
structuralism and hermeneutics: self-conscious awareness of the role of

Elizabeth Struthers Malbon (Ph.D., Florida State University) is Assistant Profes-


sor of Religion at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. She is the
author of articles in Semeia, Catholic Biblical Quarterly, and New Testament
Studies. This paper was first presented to the American Academy of Religion at
its annual meeting in 1981.

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208 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

the subject, the analyst, in the analysis./2/ Since Polzin's "subject" is


related to Culley's "reader," Polzin's stress on this aspect of structuralism
that is shared with hermeneutics undercuts Culley's suggestion that
structuralism is distinguished by its focus on the text from hermeneutics
with its focus on the reader. Perhaps Culley's model overemphasizes the
distinction between structuralism and hermeneutics, whereas Polzin's
argument overemphasizes their commonality.
What is needed is a way both to compare and to contrast structural-
ism and hermeneutics as approaches to meaning. Toward that end, the
first step of my investigation involves an examination and classification
of the respective-and various-goals of structuralists and of hermeneu-
ticists. Goals are the projected end points of investigators, the "why" of
investigations. Thus, a comparison of structuralist and hermeneutical
goals should help us establish the scope of each of these two approaches
to meaning. After a brief look at the basis of structuralism, we will turn
to a systematization of several important goals of structuralists. Then we
will repeat this procedure with regard to hermeneutics and the goals of
hermeneuticists.

Structuralism, Structuralists, and Goals

Historically, structuralism, particularly literary structuralism, is


rooted in Saussurean linguistics. Conceptually, structuralism is centered
in concern for relations, or networks of relations, rather than isolated
elements. Ferdinand de Saussure, Swiss linguist of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, is acclaimed the "grandfather" of structur-
alism (Bovon:8), its "founding father" (Lane:27); and Saussure's Course
in General Linguistics, first published in 1915 on the basis of the lecture
notes of his students, is proclaimed "the magna carta of modern struc-
tural linguistics" (Polzin:17). The "crux of de Saussure's theory ... is the
role of relations in a system . . ."; for signs, as for phonemes, "to be is to
be related" (Wells:97). A linguistic sign itself is a relation-between a
signifier, or "sound-image," and a signified, or "concept." Language is a
system of signs. Before Saussure, traditional linguistics focused on dia-
chronic analysis, the study of changes in language over time. Saussure's
insistence on the priority of synchronic analysis, the investigation of the
structure of language, revolutionized linguistics.
Also seminal for the history and the concepts of structuralism was
Vladimir Propp, Russian folklorist, whose Morphology of the Folktale
has quite rightly been termed "the exemplar par excellence" of syntag-
matic structural exegesis (Dundes:xi). In his study of Russian fairy tales,
Propp isolated thirty-one "functions" (or types of actions) and seven
"spheres of action" (or character types) that remain constant amid the
varying details of the stories. Although Propp did not discover every

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Malbon: Structuralism 209

function manifest in every tale, he did f


functions in the narratives to be invariab
tion" was, in the words of Susan Wittig, "
that the description of a tale's invariant
appropriate mode of analysis than the des
which manifests the structure" (152).
Whereas Propp serves as a representati
analysis, the "champion of paradigmati
Levi-Strauss" (Dundes:xii). It is the con
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss who
"father" of structuralism (Bovon:8; Pettit
of structuralism" (Polzin:41). To Levi-St
honor of being "perhaps the best-known
ist" (Polzin:17). His work is heralded as "t
atic application of structuralist methods
human phenomena" (Lane:12). Levi-Stra
as both an extension of Saussure and a "c
Saussure, Levi-Strauss insists upon "the
terms" (Culler:23). These relations are un
through which things can function as sig
structuralist aims to make explicit (Cu
which Levi-Strauss applies this central co
(the linguistic phenomenon of langue)
(Le"vi-Strauss, 1969) or the "language" of
languages, like langue itself, have two di
the paradigmatic. Against Propp, Levi-St
significance of the paradigmatic dimensi
over their syntagmatic dimension and (2
graphic context of narratives to their ove
Wittig:153-58).
We turn now from this briefest of looks a
on the concern for relations, or networks of
of several important goals of structurali
ers."/3/ I employ the two terms "adherent
for structuralism in its broadest sense ma
methodology. These two basic directions a
but common to intellectual movements g
Michael Lane (13) refers to, although wit
the two categories of "the means that
universe."/4/ By ideology-or philosoph
abrasive/5/-is meant "any more or less c
values which describes and accounts for the relations of men to one
another, and to the material, and not infrequently the immaterial, un
verse" (13)./6/ Structuralism as an ideology or philosophy is, in the wor

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210 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

of Robert Scholes, "a way of looking for reality not in individual things
but in relationships among them" (4). By way of an example, Levi-
Strauss's desire to understand the structure of the human mind from an
examination of its cultural products, his discovery of "vast homologie
(Bovon:11), represents an ideological (or philosophical) goal of
structuralism. By methodology is meant "any set of rules or regulations
which describes and prescribes the operations to be performed upon any
matter . . . with the purpose of ordering it and understanding its
working" (Lane:13). Most structuralists view structuralism as a methodol-
ogy, although they may recognize that its basic presuppositions are
philosophical (Lane:13,17; Patte, 1976:14,19; Bovon:6-7; Ehrmann:ix;
Via:1; Gardner:10). I offer this distinction between ideology and method-
ology as a descriptive one,/7/ not as an evaluative one, although "ideol-
ogy," or its equivalent, generally serves as the negatively valued pole
among commentators on structuralism./8/ In fact, neither ideology nor
methodology is manifest concretely in total isolation-in structuralism or
in any intellectual movement (Lane:13).
But, speaking abstractly, structuralism as a methodology may be said
to focus upon either theory or analysis./9/ Structuralism as theory may
be directed to various issues: a theory of Russian fairy tales (Propp), a
theory of kinship or of myth (Levi-Strauss), a theory of narrativity (Grei-
mas). In the field of literature, theoretical structuralism approaches not
so much the meaning of individual works of literature as the meaning of
meaning, that is, the presuppositions that enable literature to be written
and to be read; theoretical structuralism seeks not so much to tell the
meaning as to recreate the process of meaning (cf. Spivey:185; Culler:
30-85). From this description, the reverberations between theory and
ideology should be loud and clear; in somewhat simplistic terms, ideol-
ogy may be understood as theory (or theories) further abstracted and
further generalized.
In the other direction, theory is resonant with analysis, for analysis is
applied theory. In the field of literature, structuralism as analysis focuses
upon the meaning of individual works, although this meaning must be con-
sidered (theoretically) as a subset of the meaning of meaning. Structural-
ism as analysis is concerned not just with the what of individual meaning,
but with the how of individual meaning. Observers have noted that struc-
turalism as theory appears dominant over structuralism as analysis (e.g.,
Lane:38; Culler:34; Jacobson:157; Detweiler:118); some commentators
have even identified structuralism as theory with structuralism per se./10/
Since theoretical hypotheses offer starting points for analysis, theoretical
dcminance may be a mark of structuralism's youth; if so, signs of matura-
tion (or aging, depending upon the point of view) may be discerned in an
increasing number of analytical studies. However, theory and analysis, like
ideology and methodology, are separable only in the abstract./11/

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Malbon: Structuralism 211

Just as structuralism as methodology b


ysis, so structuralism as analysis subdivi
narrative hermeneutics. In relation to
theory and analysis are forms of method
both structural exegesis and narrative her
As theory is, in a sense, applied philosoph
ory applied to an "object" (a text) and na
tural exegesis applied to a "subject" (a r
book on the interrelationships of herme
which I have borrowed the term "narrat
sents this goal of structuralism. Structura
ism has been the aim of much of my
1982; 198?).

structuralist goals

philosophy methodology
(or ideology)

theory analysis

structural narrative
exegesis hermeneutics

These four-philosophy (or ideology), theory, struct


narrative hermeneutics-may be considered terminal goal
ism;/14/ a structuralist may choose any one of them as
mate goal, though she or he may reach it via another go
penultimate./15/ Thus, in the Mythologiques (1969-8
moves from an analysis of individual myths (structur
theory of myth to an ideological (or philosophical) un
what makes humanity human. In Structural Exegesis: Fr
Practice, Daniel Patte and Aline Patte move from a semio
structural exegesis of Mark 15 and 16 toward a narrative
In actuality, both Levi-Strauss and Patte and Patte
forth between goals, or forms, of structuralism in the proces
meaning. However, their respective directions and ultimat
Levi-Strauss moves toward ideology, Patte and Patte towar
Yet ideology and narrative hermeneutics are not as unrelat
appear from the diagram above. The desire to philosophize

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212 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

ethnography is not unlike the desire to theologize on the basis of


narratology. Ideology, in its philosophical aspects, and narrative herme-
neutics, in its theological aspects, share a concern for the breadth of
humanity and the depth of human beings./16/ It is true that the contin-
uum might be represented as a line, running from ideology to narrative
hermeneutics. But it might better be represented as a circle, in which ideol-
ogy and narrative hermeneutics would not be poles apart but only ninety
degrees apart. Furthermore, such a circle might better depict the move-
ment among goals that often characterizes interpreters.
Thus, my typology of structuralist goals is not meant to pigeonhole
scholars or to portray as static the dynamism of scholarship, but to clar-
ify the basic thrust of various approaches. We turn now from this consid-
eration of structuralist goals to a parallel consideration of hermeneutical
goals, in our attempt to interrelate these two fundamental approaches to
meaning.

Hermeneutics, Hermeneuticists, and Goals

Richard Palmer, James Robinson, and others open their discussions of


hermeneutics with considerations of the various meanings of the Greek
verb hermeneuein and its noun form hermaneia (Palmer:12-32; Robin-
son:1-7; Achtemeier:13-14). The words share a linguistic root with the
name of the Greek god Hermes, the messenger of the gods and the inventor
or discoverer of language and writing. The three basic meanings of hermp-
neuein are: (1) to speak (or express or say), (2) to explain (or interpret or
comment upon), (3) to translate. As Palmer notes, "all three meanings may
be expressed by the English verb 'to interpret,' yet each constitutes an
independent and significant meaning of interpretation" (13-14). Since the
ancient Greeks, each of these three meanings has found its applications by
various hermeneuticists. Hermeneutics as speaking has included not only
the oral recitation of Homer's epics but also the proclamation demanded
by the new hermeneutic. Hermeneutics as commentary has a long and
varied history in biblical exegesis, from third-century Alexandrian allegor-
ization to nineteenth-century historical-critical method. Hermeneutics as
translation may be seen not only literally in traditional philology but also
metaphorically in Bultmannian "demythologizing." Yet one may note,
with Palmer, that in all three cases "the foundational 'Hermes process' is at
work: in all three cases, something foreign, strange, separated in time,
space, or experience is made familiar, present, comprehensible; something
requiring representation, explanation, or translation is somehow 'brought
to understanding'-is 'interpreted'" (14). It is the new hermeneutic, claims
Robinson, that has regained and reexpressed the "profound implication
that these three functions belong together as interrelated aspects of a single
hermeneutic" (16).

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Malbon: Structuralism 213

From these three definitions-and implic


hermaneuein, Palmer moves to six modern
(33-45). "From the beginning," comments P
the science of interpretation, especially th
exegesis, but," Palmer adds, "the field of
preted (in roughly chronological order) as:
sis; (2) general philological methodology; (
understanding [Schleiermacher]; (4) the
Geisteswissenschaften [or "human studies"
of existence and of existential understand
and (6) the systems of interpretation, bot
used by man to reach the meaning behind
(Palmer:33). Furthermore, Palmer draws t
"each of these definitions is more than an his
important 'moment' or approach to the pro
Thus the six modern definitions, in conju
ones, seem to suggest various goals toward
cists may aim. The basic shape of the ty
appears to serve also for outlining hermen
our comparison of these two basic approac
as speaking (or proclamation) moves tow
Hermeneutics as commentary (or explan
either in a general sense as theory, or in
sense as biblical exegesis. Hermeneutics
particularly clear with the new hermeneut
understanding.

hermeneutical goals

philosophy methodology
(or theology)

theory analysis

biblical existential
exegesis understanding

In relation to philosophy, both theory and analysis a


methodology. In relation to theory, both biblical exegesis an
understanding are forms of analysis. As theory is, in a

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214 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

philosophy, so biblical exegesis is theory applied to a so-called "object"


(a text) and existential understanding is biblical exegesis applied to a so-
called "subject" (a reader). These four-philosophy (or theology), theory,
biblical exegesis, existential understanding-may be considered terminal
goals of hermeneutics; a hermeneuticist may choose any one of them as
her or his ultimate goal, though she or he may reach it via another goal
(or goals) as penultimate.
As a check on the valididty and usefulness of this typology, let us
consider the place within it of several important hermeneuticists. It
would seem that the contrast between the work of Heidegger and Gada-
mer on the one hand and of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Betti on the
other represents a contrast between philosophy and methodology as her-
meneutical goals. Palmer notes a "clear polarization" in contemporary
hermeneutical thinking: "There is the tradition of Schleiermacher and
Dilthey, whose adherents look to hermeneutics as a general body of
methodological principles which underlie interpretation. And there are
the followers of Heidegger, who see hermeneutics as a philosophical
exploration of the character and requisite conditions for all understand-
ing" (46, my emphasis). As a comparison of the thought of Hans-Georg
Gadamer and Emilio Betti makes plain, however, having or not having
philosophy as a goal of hermeneutics does not deliver a hermeneuticist
from philosophical presuppositions; the conflict of Betti's "realist" pre-
suppositions and Gadamer's "phenomenological" ones is in addition to
the contrast of their methodological or philosophical goals (see Palmer:
46-65)./17/
The hermeneutical goals of archetypical new hermeneuticists Ger-
hard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs might be expressed as either philosophy
or theology. "The proponents of the new hermeneutic," as Achtemeier
notes, "in some instances, are quite prepared to invade the precincts of
philosophy, so broad is their understanding of the implications of their
approach. The new hermeneutic is therefore not limited to exegesis; it is
a way of doing theology, and it will be better understood if that is kept
in mind" (86-87; cf. Robinson:6,63,67). "Both Ebeling and Fuchs,"
Palmer observes, "have made the word event the center of their theolog-
ical thinking, which has been labeled 'word-event theology'" (53). "The
effect of the word event emphasis in theology," Palmer continues, "is to
bring philosophy of language to the very center of hermeneutics" (54).
Philosophy (or theology) and methodology comprise the first branches
of the tree of hermeneutical goals; the second branches are theory and
analysis as forms of methodology. The theory/analysis option of my
typology of hermeneutical goals appears to parallel what Palmer terms
"the double focus of hermeneutics." According to Palmer, the "historical
development of hermeneutics as an independent field seems to hold within
itself two separate foci: one on the theory of understanding in a general

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Malbon: Structuralism 215

sense, and the other on what is involved i


the hermeneutical problem. These two
canceling or absolutely independent, yet
separateness for one to instruct the other
noted above that Schleiermacher and Dilt
hermeneutical goal of methodology rathe
however, is not a terminal goal within t
macher and Dilthey are to be associat
methodology rather than the analysis opt
neutics is true to its great past in Schleierm
its bearings from a general theory of li
emphasis). Theory, however, as a goal
concentrated on a number of areas: a the
and Dilthey), a theory of approaches u
(Dilthey), a theory of literary interpretat
The direct alternative to theory as a h
Analysis, however, does not represent a t
hermeneutical goals but suggests in turn
gesis or existential understanding. Again
overall significance if not in specific
pointed out by Palmer. The distinction
and existential understanding is compa
observes "between the moment of under
itself and the moment of seeing the exist
one's own life and future" (56). While th
hermeneutics is probably "the theory of
tional goal of hermeneuticists in the field
history of hermeneutics is probably bib
the nineteenth century, as Achtemeier n
and "exegesis" were often used interchan
ever, in the twentieth century-to a cert
more fully with the new hermeneutic-t
been overwhelmed by the insistent emp
ing, on biblical exegesis pro nobis, pro m
new hermeneutic what is interpreted
existence of the hearer of the proclamati
the object of interpretation, as with Bul
interpretation of present existence" (Cob
McKnight:77-78).
Bultmann serves as a good reminder, h
hermeneutical goals is not to be viewe
shares much with the philosophical he
Palmer:48-52; Achtemeier:53-70; Thiselto
65-71) and with the methodological or the

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216 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

(see Thiselton:234-40; McKnight:65-71). Clearly, Bultmann the preacher


and New Testament scholar is concerned with biblical exegesis (see
Palmer:50), but, equally clearly, Bultmann the "demythologizer" and New
Testament theologian aims at existential understanding of the biblical text
(see Palmer:56). Thus, while theology (or philosophy), theory, and biblical
exegesis are for Bultmann penultimate goals of hermeneutics, the ultimate
goal is existential understanding./18/ Yet, as we observed analogously of
the typology of structuralist goals, the continuum from theology (or
philosophy) to theory to biblical exegesis to existential understanding
might well be represented as a circle, with existential understanding
moving toward theology. Certainly this movement is descriptive of
Bultmann's exegesis of Paul and John for twentieth-century persons as part
of a comprehensive theology.
The sketching out of parallel typologies of structuralist and hermeneu-
tical goals suggests that, in terms of their end points, certain structuralists
may have more in common with certain hermeneuticists than with other
structuralists, and vice versa. For example, those structuralists most
interested in narrative hermeneutics and those hermeneuticists most con-
cerned with existential understanding might view each other as colleague
in a common endeavor as against their more "theoretical" associates on
either side. Those very associates, however, whether structuralist o
hermeneutical theorists, may welcome closer association as they aim at
theoretical clarification rather than "simply" applied analysis. To remind
us of what structural theorists have in common with structural exegetes
and hermeneuticists of one emphasis with those of another, we turn from a
consideration of end points, or goals, to a brief consideration of beginnin
points, or presuppositions. We will concentrate on structuralist and
hermeneutical presuppositions in two key areas: history and language.

The Historical, the Historic, and Historicity


Norman Perrin, in an aside to his discussion of the New Testament
as myth and history, suggests three centers of meaning of the term "his
tory" (27-29): (1) history as the historical, or "factual history" of the typ
"that would satisfy a court of law"; (2) history as the historic, or the sig
nificance of factual history "in the broader context of the totality of
human experience"; and (3) history as the historicity of human existence
in the world, or all those things, from historical circumstances and event
to ideas and interpretations, that can change one's life. To borrow, and
extend, Perrin's example: all the authentic speeches of all the U.S. presi
dents are historical; Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" is historic; and the
"Gettysburg Address" has had an impact on the historicity of all Ameri-
cans, changing the lives of both northerners and southerners, both white
and blacks.

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Malbon: Structuralism 217

The distinctions among the historical, t


may, I believe, help to clarify and distin
structuralism and of hermeneutics regardi
criticism, based on the historical-critical m
as the historical. This is clearly seen in for
lish the Sitz im Leben of the text and in redaction criticism's concern to
illuminate the situation of each community by examining the theology
of each synoptic gospel.
Structuralism has not infrequently been criticized by biblical schol-
ars (and others) as being ahistorical if not antihistorical. But, as Dan Via
more realistically observes, any adoption and adaptation of structuralism
by biblical studies "will entail, not a rejection of the historical method,
but a relegating of it to a more marginal position than it has been enjoy-
ing" (2; cf. McKnight:239,242). Structuralism reacts against concentra-
tion on the diachronic by focusing on the synchronic. Structuralism
responds primarily not to history as the historical but to history as the
historic. For example, Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" is recognized as
historic, structuralists would point out, not primarily because of its place
in the chronological syntagm of presidential addresses from George
Washington to Ronald Reagan but because of its place in the paradigm
of all presidential addresses, no matter when they were given. Likewise,
the significance of a text, that which interests structuralists, is to be
determined by its intertextual and intratextual relationships, not merely
from its historical context. Oversimplifying in order to clarify our
schema, we might say that fact is to significance as the historical is to the
historic and as historical criticism is to structuralism.
Hermeneutics focuses on neither the historical nor the historic but on
history as the historicity of human existence in the world. "For herme-
neutic itself," states Robinson, "is rooted in man's historicness, namely,
the call placed upon him to encounter the history of the past in such a
way as not to deny his own existential future and present responsibility"
(9). In fact, Heidegger's ontology, on which much of recent hermeneuti-
cal thinking rests, suggests that the historical is founded upon historicity.
Paraphrasing Heidegger, Achtemeier states, "Time itself is grounded in
the structure of the self, so that the possibility of temporal existence, i.e.,
history, is itself grounded in the structure of the self" (39-40). Or, as
paraphrased by Thiselton (184), "history is what it is by virtue of the
historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) of Dasein, rather than because of the
mere pastness of historical events and objects. Hence the focus of history
lies not in the past but in the present."/19/ Paul Ricoeur, in speaking
for hermeneutics as over against structuralism, states explicitly, "I will
reserve the term 'historicity'-historicity of tradition and historicity of
interpretation-for any understanding which implicitly or explicitly
knows itself to be on the road of the philosophic understanding of self

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218 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

and of being" (55). For this reason, biblical exegesis in the Bultmannian
tradition is primarily concerned not with the historical past but with the
present and future historicity of human existence; it is not historical
exegesis but exegesis pro nobis; it is, in the words of Ebeling, a "process
from text to sermon"; it is "proclamation" (Ebeling:107; cf. Fuchs:
141)./20/
At least as applied in the field of biblical studies, both structuralism's
focus on the historic and hermeneutics' focus on historicity may be seen
as reactions against the excesses of the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries' concern for the historical./21/ Structuralism has challenged tradi-
tional historical criticism to respect the integrity of the text and to
appreciate the presuppositions that enable texts to be written and to be
read (e.g., Via). Hermeneutics has challenged traditional historical criti-
cism to bridge the distance between "the two horizons," the horizon of
the ancient text and the horizon of the contemporary reader (e.g.,
Palmer). Structuralism has sometimes accused hermeneutics of ignoring
the interrelations and the constraints of the text as a linguistic product
(e.g., Kovacs). Hermeneutics has sometimes accused structuralism of ana-
lyzing the text in isolation from the living process of communication
(e.g., Ricoeur).
Evidently, in the responses of structuralism and hermeneutics to
historical criticism and in the responses of structuralism and hermeneu-
tics to each other, we are sometimes dealing with overreactions to over-
reactions. In order to defuse this situation, it is helpful to remember
Perrin's presentation of the historical, the historic, and historicity as
three dimensions of history, three interrelated-not independent-ways
of conceiving of history. Analogously, various approaches to textual
meaning are to be viewed as interrelated; the focus of traditional biblical
criticism on the historical is better supplemented than supplanted by the
concern of stucturalism for the historic and that of hermeneutics for
historicity./22/
For structuralism, the historic is determined by syntagmatic and
especially paradigmatic inter- and intrarelationships of cultural phenom-
ena, and syntagmatic and paradigmatic are the two dimensions of lan-
guage. For hermeneutics, the bridge between an historical text and the
historicity of a reader is formed by language. Yet structuralism an
hermeneutics approach language, as they approach history, with differ
ent concerns and different presuppositions.

Langue, Parole, and Sprachereignis


In somewhat oversimplified terms, we may say that structuralism
regards language as a system of signs and hermeneutics regards language
as an event of disclosure. While these assumptions are not necessaril

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Malbon: Structuralism 219

contradictory or exclusive, they do represe


the appropriate starting point of a discussi
The foundations of structuralism's pres
were set by Saussure. As we noted abov
theory . . . is the role of relations in a syst
sign itself (a word) is a relation, a relation
fied; and language is a system of signs. In t
presented his answers to three questions co
(1) what are the components of language
studied? (3) what are the dimensions of la
broad sense (French langage) is compri
(langue) and language-behavior or speec
social phenomenon; langue is its inherited
its innovational element. Langue, langua
parole, speech, is individual and active. Seco
the task of the linguist to study langue
synchronically rather than diachronically, t
across a moment in time, rather than
Diachronic analysis of language is the stud
time; synchronic analysis is the investigation
Third, in focusing on langue synchronic
two dimensions of langue, two kinds of relati
signs of the language-system: syntagmati
tions of contiguity are syntagmatic; relatio
tic. Principles of selection are paradigmatic
syntagmatic. Consider, for example, the s
Here "wrote" is related syntagmatically to "
essay" by preceding it, while, paradigmat
and "essay" to "poem." While the syntagm
the paradigm concerns the potential sente
meaning of the actual sentence is made
dimension, the "axis of simultaneity," and
"axis of succession," are essential if lan
anything.
Language as a system of signs, language
tagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions, is a
turalism. Thus, without reference to Sa
syntagmatic aspects of the Russian fairy
of Saussure's linguistic model,/25/ Levi-St
matic aspects of the "language" of kinship
Levi-Strauss's work has been heralded as "
attempts at the extension of linguistic the
own discipline" (Robey:3), and with this ex
sion of the syntagmatic/paradigmatic disti

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220 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

Whereas structuralism focuses upon the syntagmatic and paradig-


matic dimensions of language (French langue) as opposed to speech
(French parole), hermeneutics, and especially the new hermeneutic, con-
centrates on language as language-event (German Sprachereignis). And
whereas Saussurean linguistics is foundational for structuralism's view of
language, Heideggerian philosophy is foundational for hermeneutic's
view of language. For Heidegger, "language is the house of being";
"words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for
the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language
that things first come into being and are" (as quoted by Palmer:135).
Language, then, is insufficiently accounted for as a system of arbitrary
signs. Language originates not with human beings but with Being itself.
Language is, in Achtemeier's paraphrase of Heidegger, "the response to
Being, it is the act of being-open-to Being, of letting-be-manifest in
response to the call of Being" (Achtemeier:48; cf. Robinson:48-49). Thus,
for the new hermeneuticist Ernst Fuchs, "Language is not necessarily
talk. Language is rather primarily a showing or letting be seen, an indi-
cation in the active sense" (as quoted by Robinson:54). Language and
reality, word and event, are inseparable, and it is their unity that is indi-
cated by the term "language-event." To approach language as language-
event is to presuppose that, quoting Achtemeier, "event and word are
born together," "that an event needs the words, the language, it calls
forth in order to be itself," and that "the language thus given birth
illumines the reality that summoned it forth" (Achtemeier:90-91; cf.
Robinson:46-48,57-58)./26/ Thus language as language-event is a living
process of communication-or better, of illumination, since the "saving
event" (Bultmann's Heilsgeschehen or Heilsereignis) is a "language
event" (Ebeling's Wortgeschehen or Fuch's Sprachereignis) (Robinson:
57; see also 61-62). By contrast, language as a system of signs is a human
product-though more an unconscious than a conscious one./27/
Structuralism's insistence on the importance of synchronic study of
language, including cultural "languages," correlates with its concern for
history as the historic. Hermeneutics' understanding of language as
language-event correlates with its concern for history as the historicity of
human existence in the world. For the new hermeneutic, language is the
bridge between the historical and historicity. Central to Fuchs's hermeneu-
tical program is the task of "exhibiting the historicness of existence as the
linguisticality of existence" (as quoted by Robinson:55). Language,
explains Achtemeier (91), "contains the possibilities of self-understanding,
and therefore of human existence, as they have found expression in the
past." "Language," summarizes Palmer (207), "is the medium in which the
tradition conceals itself and is transmitted. Experience is not so much
something that comes prior to language, but rather experience itself occurs
in and through language. Linguisticality is something that permeates the

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Malbon: Structuralism 221

way of being-in-the-world of historical m


Thus, and not so surprisingly, presup
are intertwined with presuppositions con
neutics and structuralism. Furthermor
the goals generally pursued by stru
Although both structuralism and herm
are open to four analogous goals, struct
a system of signs predisposes structural
hermeneutics' approach to language as l
meneutics to seek existential understan
and/or theology. This would seem to b
see also 62-78), for example, recommen
"science") of exegesis and hermeneutics
of particular presuppositions to favor p
behind Culley's observation that struct
hermeneutics on the reader, for structu
historic predisposes structuralism to fo
linguistic context, whereas hermeneutic
toricity of human existence in the wor
focus on the reader in the context of hi
both structuralism and hermeneutics as
text is crucial.

Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Contextual Meaning

Structuralism, as a way of concentrating on the text, may be distin-


guished from hermeneutics, as a way of concentrating on the reader; this is
the simple but powerful suggestion of Culley's model. Yet structuralism
shares with hermeneutics an awareness of the relation of the reader to the
text, of the interpreter to the interpreted; this is the recurrent theme of
Polzin's argument. Thus, as we noted at the beginning, Culley emphasizes
a fundamental difference between structuralism and hermeneutics,
whereas Polzin emphasizes a fundamental similarity between them. It has
been my aim to consider both differences and similarities, both distinctions
and commonalities, between these two approaches to meaning. I have
suggested that structuralism and hermeneutics share a similar range of
goals: that four terminal goals of structuralism-ideology (or philosophy),
theory, structural exegesis, and narrative hermeneutics-are analogous to
four terminal goals of hermeneutics-theology (or philosophy), theory,
biblical exegesis, and existential understanding. I have suggested that
structuralism and hermeneutics differ, however, in their presuppositions
concerning history and language: that structuralism approaches history as
the historic and language as a system of signs, and hermeneutics
approaches history as historicity and language as language-event. Because

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222 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

of these presuppositions, literary or biblical structuralism focuses on


intertextual and intratextual relationships and literary or biblical
hermeneutics focuses on the text-reader relationship.
But, to borrow the terminology of Michael Polanyi, what is of focal
awareness for the one is of subsidiary awareness for the other. Structural-
ists know, sometimes more tacitly than explicitly, that to remove the text
from its author-text-reader context is an abstraction; they insist, however,
that this procedure is not arbitrary but essential, for it enables the reader
to listen openly and fully to the text itself. Hermeneuticists know, some-
times more tacitly than explicitly, that, if the reader is to hear and
respond to the text, the text itself-in detail and as a whole and as a
system of relationships forming of details a whole-this text must be
allowed to speak in its own voice. In their most thoughtful moments,
both structuralists and hermeneuticists realize, with Robert Funk, that
"the text cannot speak for itself if it is not painstakingly exegeted in its
own context, and it cannot be interpreted if it cannot be brought into
intimate relation with contemporary modes of thought and experience"
(Funk, 1964:181; see also Foust; Scholes:9-10).
But one cannot focus on everything at once./29/ In this the scholar,
whether a traditional historical critic, a structuralist, or a hermeneuticist,
is no better off than a child at a three-ring circus-and no worse off
either. We do not regard the circus as primarily a frustrating experience
for the child, nor need we regard the scholarly world as primarily such
for ourselves. Yet, like the child whose head spins at the circus, we
would do well to shift our focus occasionally, to allow our work to be
refreshed by tacit knowledge coming to explicitness.
Structuralism focuses on "meaning of," on meaning in the context of
intertextual and intratextual relationships. Hermeneutics focuses on
"meaning for," on meaning in the context of the text-reader relationship.
Because both structuralism and hermeneutics appreciate the importance
of context to meaning, these two approaches to meaning should manifest
a "preunderstanding" of each other, or, to change the figure, should
perceive a common structure between themselves, and thus establish a
creative relationship. Structuralism might guide hermeneutics away from
a premature application of the text to the reader. from an immature
abstraction of the text from the reader. Both structuralism and herme-
neutics affirm that all textual meaning is contextual meaning. Perhaps
both structuralists and hermeneuticists need to reaffirm that all inquiry is
interrelated.

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Malbon: Structuralism 223

NOTES

/1/ Compare (1) the model of a literary work (in the broades
term) as the interrelation of author, text, reader, world pres
1980:321-22; (2) the model of the "coordinates of art criticism"
universe) presented by Abrams (especially 6); and (3) the "map
critics (central point: work; cardinal points: author, reader, in
guage) presented by Hernadi.

/2/ Polzin defines structuralism as an approach (1) to objects


regulating systems of transformations, (2) by means of hypo
models, (3) with self-conscious awareness of the personal, oper
of the subject making the approach (see especially 1-2). In his
ations of what makes a structural analysis structural, howeve
primarily on the third element, the relationship of the analyz
analysis (see especially 38,33-34). Polzin's purpose here-and
structural analysis of structural analysis," not an evaluation of
between structuralism and hermeneutics.

/3/ An earlier version of the following typology of structuralist goals w


presented in Malbon, 1980:318-21.

/4/ Lane expresses these two categories not as ideology and methodology but
as "theories" and "methods"; but note Lane's use of the terms "philosophies an
methods" (17) and "ideology" (18).

/5/ I do not mean by this to ignore the possible distinctions between ideolog
and philosophy, but rather to refer, in general and with neutrality, to what
Robert Scholes identifies and Robert Polzin affirms as "structuralism as a move-
ment of mind" (Scholes:1; Polzin:iv,1).

/6/ Lane is here describing what he terms a "theory" as opposed to a


"method." See note 4 above.

/7/ Cf. Scholes's discussion of "structuralism as a movement of mind" and


"structuralism as a method" (1-12). See also Culley:169.

/8/ For example, Ehrmann:viii; Lane:17-18; Patte, 1976:19; Spivey:144;


Wilder, 1974:11. Among the more positive, or at least neutral, discussions of
structuralism as an ideology are Scholes:1-7; Gardner:213-47; McKnight:
295-312; Detweiler:202-4,207.

/9/ This distinction between theory and analysis is paralleled by, for exam-
ple, Patte and Patte's distinction between "theory" and "practice" or "fundamen-
tal research" and "applied research" (1); Patte's distinction between the search
for "universal structures" and the search for "structures which characterize each
specific narrative" (1980a:7); Detweiler's distinction between "theory" and
"application" (3-4,103,124); Barthes's distinction between "poetics" and "criti-
cism," as discussed by Culler (30-35).

/10/ This appears to be the case with Spivey:135; Robey:3; Culler (following

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224 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

Barthes):30-all of whom are commenting in the context of literary structura


ism. Cf. also Calinescu:5,9,16, on "poetics" (see note 28 below).

/11/ See Polzin:34. Patte's discussion of "five types of structuralist research"


(1980a:7-9) may be understood as a development of the various relationshi
between theory and analysis: analysis in disregard of theory (Patte's type 1),
theory in isolation from analysis (type 2), analysis for the sake of theory, wh
ther inductive or deductive (types 3 and 4), and analysis in the light of theo
(type 5, "structural exegesis").

/12/ The term "methodology" is somewhat problematic. Whereas methodol-


ogy does seem an appropriate term in opposition to ideology, that which sub
divides into theory and analysis might more appropriately be labeled
methodology/method.

/13/ Cf. Patte, 1976:3-6, on "exegesis" and "hermeneutic." See also Patte and
Patte:vii,94; and Patte, 1980a:22.

/14/ My diagram of goals, although developed independently of Pettit's tree


of options (54), may be fruitfully compared with it. However, Pettit's tree of
options serves as an evaluative tool (54-64): according to Pettit, theory fails-
generative theory more drastically so than descriptive theory, and straight analy-
sis is uncontrolled, thus only systematic analysis is workable; there is only one
real option for structuralism.

/15/ See Glucksmann's five levels of the "problematic," or conceptual frame-


work, of structuralism-or of any theoretical system, listed according to
"descending levels of abstraction rather than a hierarchy of determinacy" (10):
(1) epistemology [cf. structuralism as an approach to meaning], (2) philosophy
[cf. philosophy (or ideology)], (3) theory [cf. theory], (4) methodology [cf. analy-
sis], (5) description [cf. structural exegesis]. Glucksmann stresses that "each coher-
ent thought system includes the five mentioned in some form" (10).

/16/ See Patte and Patte's diagram of "the path taken by Levi-Strauss" and
the path they follow to the "semantic universe" (15-16).

/17/ As an analogous example we note that, although Daniel Patte shares with
Edgar McKnight the structuralist goal of "narrative hermeneutics," Patte
(1980b) underscores a fundamental difference in their philosophical and theolog-
ical presuppositions: McKnight, according to Patte, affirms the reality of the
world as an extralinguistic reality and revelation as immanent, while Patte, fol-
lowing Greimas, affirms the reality of the world as a linguistic reality and reve-
lation as transcendent.

/18/ Robinson (52), Cobb (229-30), and McKnight (77-78) would, presum-
ably, consider existential understanding the ultimate goal of the new hermeneu-
tic but biblical exegesis the ultimate goal of Bultmann. To be sure, exegesis of
the text is more central (and essential) for Bultmann than for Ebeling and
Fuchs, but Bultmann's approach to the text is motivated by his concern for the
reader's (or hearer's) existential appropriation of it, and for Bultmann biblical

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Malbon: Structuralism 225

exegesis that does not result in existential und


For further examples of penultimate and
consider Heidegger (penultimate: textual e
Palmer:141,161) and Ebeling and Fuchs (antep
ultimate: existential understanding, ultimate:

/19/ Cf. Achtemeier (125) on Fuchs and Palmer on Dilthey (Palmer:111,


116-18) and on Gadamer (Palmer:176-93) as well as Palmer's own "Thirty
Theses on Interpretation" (242-53), especially theses 8 and 24-30. See also
Ricoeur:16-19.

/20/ Wilder's critique of the new hermeneutic's concentration on histo


(1964:205), of its foundation "on a violent acultural and anticultural imp
(1964:204), is well taken. See also Cobb's discussion of the existentialist (
ing the new hermeneutical) view of history (the historical) as external to

/21/ From the point of view of the new hermenuetic, see Fuchs:237
the reaction against historicism in twentieth-century literary criticism ge
see Calinescu:1-3,12,15-16.

/22/ As Funk notes in a warning to the new hermeneutic, "historical criticism


as an integral element in the interpretation of the text is subject to pre-
understanding. But the pre-understanding that is brought to the text is itself
(both humanly and) historically situated and must itself be submitted to histori-
cal criticism" (1964:195).

/23/ The terms language-system and language-behavior are Lyons's expres-


sion (13) of Saussure's langue/parole distinction.

/24/ "Paradigmatic" is actually Louis Hjelmslev's term, but it is more com-


monly employed (and less ambiguous) than Saussure's term "associative
(Lyons:12).

/25/ Pettit (68) considers Levi-Strauss's work "as a development of the linguis-
tic model rather than as an application of it." This evaluation appears to reflect
Pettit's observation-and disapproval-of Levi-Strauss's move beyond interpre-
tation to philosophy or ideology.

/26/ For a critique of the new hermeneutic's view of language (Does lan-
guage express reality directly? Is existentialist language about language as
abstract and objectifying, in another direction, as that which it rejects?), see
Dillenberger (151) and Wilder (1964:211-12).

/27/ With this distinction between language "product" and language "process,"
compare Ricoeur's discussion of the word as "structure" and the word as "event"
(79-96; see also 62-78). Patte suggests that both emphases are found within struc-
turalism (1980a:9-12), and the inclusion of both structural exegesis and narrative
hermeneutics within my typology of structuralist goals indicates my agreement at
that level. However, at the level of presuppositions about language, I regard the
language "product" orientation as more distinctive of structuralism and the
language "process" orientation as more distinctive of hermeneutics.

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226 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

/28/ See also Calinescu's discussion of "Hermeneutics or Poetics," in which what


I have isolated as goals and as presuppositions are not delineated. At times
Calinescu's discussion of poetics vs. hermeneutics appears to parallel my discussion
of goals: poetics is opposed to hermeneutics as theory is opposed to analysis (5,9,16)
or perhaps as structural exegesis is opposed to narrative hermeneutics (16-17). At
other times Calinescu's discussion of poetics vs. hermeneutics appears to parallel
my discussion of presuppositions: poetics is opposed to hermeneutics as structural-
ism's focus on language as a sytem of signs is opposed to hermeneutic's focus on
language as language-event (13-15) and as structuralism's focus on history as the
historic is opposed to hermeneutic's focus on history as historicity (13,15-17).

/29/ The collection of papers and responses that comprises The New Herme-
neutic (edited by Robinson and Cobb) illustrates the human drama of this state-
ment.

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