Peter Olivi’s Rejection of God’s Concurrence with Created Causes

Gloria Frost
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN, USA

Abstract: The relationship between divine and created causality was widely discussed in medieval and early
modern philosophy. Contemporary scholars of these discussions typically stake out three possible positions:
occasionalism, concurrentism, and mere-conservationism. It is regularly claimed that virtually no medieval thinker
adopted the final view which denies that God is an immediate active cause of creaturely actions. The main aim of
this paper is to further understanding of the medieval causality debate, and particularly the mere-conservationist
position, by analyzing Peter John Olivi’s neglected defense of it. The paper also includes discussion of Thomas
Aquinas’s arguments for concurrentism and an analysis of whether Olivi’s objections refute his position.

This is an Author's Original/Accepted Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version of
Record, has been published in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, September 2, 2014, copyright
Taylor & Francis, available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.949218

The interaction between divine and created causality in the ordinary course of nature was

a topic of great interest in medieval and early modern philosophy. Thinkers of this period held

that God creates everything that exists and everything depends on God’s conservation to

continue to exist after its creation. 1 God’s all pervasive causality presented a challenge to

explaining the role that creatures have in the causation of new substances and qualitative

changes. If God is an active cause of all entities at all times when they exist, how can creatures

also be causally responsible for the coming to be and changing of things in the created world?

There are three general accounts of the relation between divine and created causality:

occasionalism, mere-conservationism, and concurrentism. Occasionalists deny that creatures

have active causal powers and consider God to be the only active cause in nature. Creatures are

merely passive “occasions” for God to produce an effect. 2 In sharp contrast, mere-

conservationism restricts God’s causal activity to sustaining created causal powers in being,

while they are the sole immediate active causes of their operations and effects. Concurrentism
1
On differing medieval understandings of God’s creative act see Kukkonen, "Creation and causation.”
2
On occasionalism see Perler and Rudolph, Occasionalismus; Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique.
1
attempts to carve out a middle path between these extremes by affirming both God and creatures

as immediate active causes of created actions and effects. Concurrentists debated amongst

themselves about the mechanics of divine and created causal cooperation. But they all agreed

that God’s causal activity does not obliterate the causal activity of creatures (contra

occasionalism), and that created powers require God’s causal contribution to operate (contra

mere-conservationism).

According to an account widely adopted in the secondary literature nearly all Christian

thinkers from the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries were concurrentists and the main debate

in the period was between them and the occasionalists (who were mainly Islamic thinkers) over

the question of whether creatures have active causal powers. It is regularly claimed that only one

prominent medieval thinker denied that God was an immediate cause of the actions of creatures:

Durandus of St. Pourçain (ca. 1275-1332).3 The contemporary view of the medieval discussion

is not without historical precedent: Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) also reported that nearly all of

the medievals regarded the concurrentist position as dogma.4 Nevertheless, this assessment is

not accurate. Although it has escaped the notice of historical figures and contemporary scholars

alike, there were other prominent medieval thinkers who defended the view that creatures were

the sole immediate causes of their actions.

The main aim of this paper is to further understanding of the medieval discussion of the

interaction between divine and created causality by presenting and analyzing Peter John Olivi’s

3
See Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence: Why Conservation is Not Enough;” “God’s general concurrence:
pitfalls and prospects;” “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against secondary causation.” Freddoso’s account is
adopted by Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, p.11; von Bodelschwingh, "Leibniz on Concurrence, Spontaneity,
and Authorship," p. 267; McDonough, “Berkeley, Human Agency, and Divine Concurrentism,” p. 570; and
Kvanvig, “Conservation, concurrence, and counterfactuals,” p.4. On Durandus see Stufler, “Bemerkungen zur
Konkurslehre des Durandus.”
4
Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disp. 22.1, n. 6, (1: 803): “Secunda sententia est, Deum per se et immediate
agere in omni actione creaturae, atque hunc influxum ejus simpliciter necessarium est, ut creatura aliquid efficiat. Et
haec vera sententia est… Probatur primo ex communi consenu Scholasticorum, qui ita sentiunt de hac veritate, et de
Catholico dogma…”
2
(ca. 1248-1298) neglected defense of mere-conservationism. My focus in the paper will be on

the unrestricted form of mere-conservationism which uniformly denies that God immediately

causes the actions of created causes. This view is contrasted with a limited form of mere-

conservationism which only denies divine concurrence in the case of creatures’ free actions.5

Olivi was not the sole proponent of the more extreme view. 6 Yet, he is particularly noteworthy

because of the nuance of his arguments against the concurrentist position. He considers several

versions of the view and identifies problems that each run into. Thus, his text is particularly

important because of the insight it provides regarding the range of positions on divine and

created causality defended in the late thirteenth century.

In section I, I will present the basic arguments on behalf of concurrentism to provide

some context for Olivi’s rejection. Then in section II, I will discuss Olivi’s arguments against

two main varieties of concurrentism. In section III, I will assess these arguments. Finally, in

section IV I will note some significant features of Olivi’s own account of divine and created

causation. Not only did Olivi object to various developments of the concurrentist position, but

he also rejected the position’s fundamental assumptions about creatures’ causal capabilities and

the entailments of God’s status as first cause.

I. On behalf of concurrentism

Medieval thinkers discussed the relationship between divine and created causality in a

variety of different philosophical and theological contexts. The most extensive discussions
5
John Duns Scotus seems to maintain this view at the end of his career. See Frost, “John Duns Scotus on God’s
Knowledge of Sins” and Wolter, “Alnwick on Scotus and Divine Concurrence.” William of Alnwick and Henry of
Ghent more explicitly endorse it. See Alnwick’s Determinationes, q. 11 (quoted in Wolter) and Henry’s Quodlibet
9.5, ll. 14–26 (Opera Omnia, 13: 120–21); and Quodlibet 12.26, ll. 78–88 (Opera Omnia, 16: 155–56).
6
Peter Auriol defends this position in II Sent. 38.1 [“Utrum actus malus sit a Deo”] (302-304). Henry of Ghent
considered this position possible and refers to other (unnamed) thinkers who explicitly defended it. See his
Quodlibet 14.1 [“Utrum agens secundarium agens in virtute primi agentis habeat in se virtutem illius mansivam”],
(Badius, fol. 556v). Auriol and Olivi’s defenses of unrestricted mere-conservationism occur in the context of
discussing restricted mere-conservationism. Both attempt to prove that God does not immeditaley cause the actions
of any created cause in order to infer that God does not immediately cause the human will’s action.
3
frequently occurred in the course of addressing the theological question of whether God is a

cause of creatures’ sinful actions.7 Yet, many of the arguments advanced regarding God’s causal

involvement in sins applied to created actions in general, including natural ones. Aquinas was

noteworthy among thirteenth century thinkers since he treated the issue of God’s causal

involvement in the operations of natural causes as a separate question in several of his works.8 In

this section, I will rely primarily on his texts to present the main arguments on behalf of the

concurrentist position. Yet, I will also present textual evidence which shows that many other

thirteenth century thinkers shared his motives for adopting the view.

Before discussing the support for concurrentism, it is helpful to first clarify the basic

similarities and differences between it and the mere-conservationist position adopted by Olivi.

Like the concurrentists, Olivi held that all creatures were sustained in being by God at every

moment of their existence. He, likewise, agreed with the concurrentist position that God is a

mediate cause of creatures’ actions since creatures depend on God’s conserving activity to

remain in existence in order to operate. 9 The central disagreement between Olivi and the

concurrentists regarded the question of whether God is also an immediate cause of the operations

of creatures in virtue of making an additional necessary causal contribution to created operations

that is distinct from the conservation of created powers. Concurrentists held that God’s power

had to be immediately involved in the production of creaturely actions. Olivi, on the other hand,

7
This question was addressed in commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences Bk. II, d. 37. Other relevant locations in
Sentences commentaries include Bk. I, d. 45, on God’s will as cause of all things, and Bk II, d. I on “making” and
“creating.” For Lombard’s texts on these topics, see his Sent. (2: 543-547, 308, 330).
8
See his De Pot. 3.7 [“Utrum Deus operetur in operatione naturae”] (2:20); ST I.105.5 [“Utrum Deus operetur in
omni operante”] (5: 475-476); ScG III.67 [“Quod Deus est causa operandi omnibus operantibus”] (14: 190). For a
recent article on Aquinas’s position see Dvořák, “The Concurrentism of Thomas Aquinas.”
Some other thirteenth century thinkers also discussed the relationship between divine and created causality in
disputed and quodlibetal questions on this topic. See Glorieux’s entry “causa secunda creata” in the Table
Idéologique of his La littérature quodlibétique.
9
Olivi, II Summa q. 116 (3: 336): “[Deus] non facit eas [i.e. actiones creatorum] nisi per hoc quod fecit et tenet et
conservat in esse omnes causas activas et passivas…”
4
rejected that an operation of divine power, beyond God’s conservation of the creature, was

required for the creature to cause its action. He maintained that creatures operated solely

throught their own powers, but nevertheless created acts depended on divine power mediately

because God’s failure to sustain the creature would result in the non-existence of the creature’s

action.10

The most important consideration that led thirteenth century concurrentists to reject that

creatures act solely through their own power was the desire to maintain God’s unique status as

first cause of all beings. Aquinas advances at least two different arguments in his works to

establish that God’s status as first cause of all that exists entails that creatures require a

contribution from God’s power to operate. The first argument assumes that every action of any

agent causes existence. From this premise it is inferred that creatures must act in virtue of God’s

power. Aquinas writes:

Since existence is the common effect of every agent, given that every agent
makes something to be in actuality; it is necessary that they produce this
effect in so far as they are ordered under the first agent, and act in virtue of
it.11

Aquinas does not explain why the fact that creaturely actions cause existence necessitates that

creatures act in virtue of the first cause’s (i.e. God’s) power. Perhaps he takes the reasoning that

supports this inference to be obvious: If creaturely actions cause existence and creatures do not

act in virtue of God’s power, then it would follow that something exists which is not caused

10
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 346): “Non enim minus indigent virtute et manutenentia primae causae illud quod exit
mediate ab ea quam illud quod exit immediate. Unde cessationem totalis influxus Dei non minus deficerent a suo
esse quam illa quae exeunt immediate.”
11
Thomas Aquinas, ScG III.66 [“Quod nihil dat esse nisi inquantum agit in virtute divina”] (14: 188-189): “Cum
igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum
producunt inquantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius.” See also ScG III.67 (14: 190): “Ex hoc
autem apparet quod Deus causa est omnibus operantibus ut operentur. Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa
essendi, vel secundum esse substantiale, vel accidentale. Nihil autem est causa essendi nisi inquantum agit in virtute
Dei, ut ostensum est. Omne igitur operans operatur per virtutem Dei.”
5
through divine power. By positing that the creature acts in virtue of God’s power, it is secured

that divine power is a cause of the being caused by the creature’s action.

This passage also includes a brief clarification of the respect in which creaturely actions

cause existence as their effect.12 Aquinas maintained, like most of his contemporaries, that

creatures were unable to create. 13 Medieval Christians understood creation as causing something

to exist ex nihilo, i.e. without presupposing any materials out of which the being is made. In

contrast to creation, the actions of creatures actualized potentialities in pre-existing matter by

introducing substantial and accidental forms into them.14 Aquinas thought that by actualizing a

form in matter creatures caused existence since composites and their qualities come to exist

through matter’s acquiring a form. 15 This point can be illustrated with an example. Through the

act of building the builder arranges bricks and mortar to be a house. By introducing a house

form to the parts that pre-existed and were potentially able to have such a form, the builder

causes those parts to actually be a house, which is the same as causing a house to exist.

Aquinas’s point in the passage is that whenever an agent causes something to be actual, the agent

causes what it actualizes to exist. Thus, if God’s power is a cause of all existence, then it is

necessary for God’s power to be an operative principle in the creaturely operations by which

forms are actualized in matter.

In the context of discussing God’s causal involvement in creatures’ sinful actions,

Aquinas advanced another argument for concurrentism that also relates to God’s status as first

12
Some interpreters maintain that Aquinas denied that creaturely operations cause existence. Wippel refutes this
position in “Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of Esse.”
13
See for instance De pot 3.4 [“Utrum potentia creandi sit creaturae communicabilis”].
14
Aquinas explains how this differs from creation in De pot 3.8: “Nihil ergo obstat per hoc quod dicitur quod per
naturam ex nihilo nihil fit, quin formas substantiales, ex operatione naturae esse dicamus. Nam id quod fit, non est
forma, sed compositum; quod ex materia fit, et non ex nihilo. Et fit quidem ex materia, in quantum materia est in
potentia ad ipsum compositum, per hoc quod est in potentia ad formam.”
15
Thomas Aquinas, I Sent. 17.1.1 (1:198): “Constat enim quod omne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est, sicut esse
album ab albedine, et esse substantiale a forma substantiali.”
6
cause of all existence. While the previous argument began from the assumption that creaturely

actions produce existence as their effect, the present argument begins from the assumption that

creaturely actions themselves exist. Based on the assumption that actions exist, Aquinas reasons

that if the act of sin is not caused by God—but rather is caused solely by the created will—then

there will be something that exists which is not produced by God. This would be at odds with

God’s status as universal cause of all existence. This argument, of course, applies to all created

actions.16

The same reasoning advanced by Aquinas compelled many other thirteenth century

thinkers to adopt concurrentism as well. In his discussion of God’s causation of sinful actions

Albert the Great claims that nearly all of his contemporaries were convinced that if it were

maintained that the created will caused its sinful actions solely through its own power, “it would

follow that there are two sources of existence.” He goes on to explain that “this is why the other

opinion [i.e. that the sinful act is not from God] all but disapeared from the lecture halls and

many moderns regarded it as heretical.”17 Giles of Rome goes so far as to charge that the

position that the act of sin is caused through the creature’s agency alone implies the “Manichean

error” that there are two opposed sources of existence: one good and one evil. 18 Like Aquinas,

Albert and Giles thought that rejecting God’s power as an immediate cause of creaturely actions

entailed that there were beings not caused by God.

16
Thomas Aquinas, II Sent. 37.2.2 co. (2: 952): “[Q]uia cum actio etiam peccati sit ens quoddam… secundum quod
res in genere existentes entia sunt, eo quod et ipsae actiones in genere ordinantur, sequeretur, si actiones peccati a
Deo non sunt, quod aliquod ens essentiam habens a Deo non esset; et ita Deus non esset universalis causa omnium
entium, quod est contra perfectionem primi entis.”
17
Albertus Magnus, II Sent. 35.1.7 [“An omnis actus sit a Deo tam bonus quam malus”] (27: 575): “…alioquin
sequeretur duo principia esse: et haec est causa quare et alia opinio fere cessit ab aula et a multis modernorum
reputatur haeretica.”
18
Giles of Rome, II Sent. 37.1.3 (551): “Si enim aliquod ens, vel aliqua res: ut ens, vel ut res non reduceret in Deum,
tanquam in causam: oporteret dare duo principia: unum bonorum, et aliquid malorum. Rediret ergo error
Manicheorum. Concdunt enim sic errantes quod anima, vel voluntas, quae est in anima: est causa actus mali, vel
actus peccati, tamen hoc non reducitur in ulterius agens, vel in Deum, sed anima a seipsa, vel per seipsam est agens
talem actum.”
7
 Both Aquinas and Albert noted that there were some earlier thinkers who wished to deny

that God causes the sinful actions of creatures for the obvious reason of exempting God from

moral responsibility.19 They reported that these thinkers tried to avoid the implication that there

are two sources of existence by appealing to the fact that God sustains all created causes in

being. While there may be multiple immediate sources of existence, God’s causal primacy is

supposedly secured because all immediate sources of existence depend on God for their own

existence.20 Albert explains the reply that his contemporaries made to this reasoning and it

reveals a second consideration which motivated acceptance of concurrentism:

Since the moderns have seen that it is more perfect to act than to exist: that which
is not of itself and is not able to remain in being of itself, is much less able to act
by itself, and since the sinful act according to its matter is simply an act arising
from an active power perfected according to nature, they concluded, therefore,
that it does not arise from the power unless it is moved by the first cause.21

This text reveals that Albert and his concurrentist contemporaries held that beings which depend

on another for their existence cannot act solely through their own power. Albert supports this

position with the claim that ‘acting is more perfect than existing.’ Aquinas argues that while

mere-conservationism is able to secure that God is the absolute first cause because all other

sources of being depend on God for their existence, they cannot avoid the implication that

creatures are first causes since it is the nature of a first cause to operate without the help of

19
Concurrentists addressed the difficulty of God’s causal involvement in sinful actions by distinguishing two
elements in a sinful action: a positive action and the defect or privation of sinfulness. They claimed that God and
the creature together caused the positive action, but the created will alone was responsible for introducing the
privation which constituted the act’s sinfulness. Aquinas advances this position in ST I-II 79.2 for instance. For a
recent defense of his view see Grant, “Aquinas on how God causes the act of sin.” Olivi criticizes the view defended
by Aquinas in II Summa II q. 116 (3: 342-343).
20
Albertus Magnus, II Sent. 35.1.7 (27: 575): “Et dixerunt, quod ex hoc non sequitur duo principia esse: quia
voluntas per se agit actum malum, tamen ipsa non est a se.” Thomas Aquinas, II Sent. 37.2.2 co. (2: 952): “…
quamvis solvere hoc nitantur, dicentes, quod voluntas etsi per se possit actionem producere sine influentia prioris
agentis, non tamen habet a se esse, sed ab alio, quod etiam exigeretur ad rationem primi principii.”
21
Albertus Magnus, II Sent. 35.1.7 (27: 575): “Quia vero moderni viderunt, quod perfectius est agere, quam esse:
quod id quod non est a se, nec potest a se manere in esse, multo minus potest agere a seipso: et cum actus malus
secundum conversionem ad materiam, sit simpliciter actus egrediens a potentia activa perfecta secundam naturam,
ideo concluserunt, quod non egreditur ab ea nisi secundum quod movetur a causa prima.”
8
another agent.22 Accordong to Aquinas, secondary causes by their nature require the help of the

primary cause in their operations.

The texts presented in this section identify two main reaons that led several thirteenth

century thinkers to uphold the concurrentist position: (1) God’s status as universal first cause

required that all existence is caused through his power and (2) creatures required help from

divine power to operate because of their dependent nature as secondary causes. It is worth

noting that while these reasons compelled many thinkers to embrace the position that God is an

immediate cause of creaturely actions and effects, some, such as Aquinas, maintained that God’s

immediacy to the creature’s effect differed from the creature’s own immediacy to its effect. In

his De Potentia Aquinas writes:

If we consider the subsistent agent, any particular agent is immediate to its effect.
If however we consider the power by which the action is done, then the power of
the superior cause will be more immediate to the effect than the power of the
inferior because the inferior power is only joined to the effect through the power
of the superior...23

In this passage, Aquinas distinguishes between immediacy of supposit and immediacy of power.

Medieval thinkers understood a supposit to be a substance or subject and they understood a

power to be a feature of a substance in virtue of which operations and effects are caused. A

cause c has an immediacy of supposit to an act a and the effects which follow from a iff c is the

agent who performs act a. It is possible for a cause d which lacks an immediacy of supposit to a
22
Thomas Aquinas, II Sent. 37.2.2 co. (2: 952): “Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, ut quod a se esse non habet, a se
agere possit; cum etiam per se durare non possit quod a se non est. Omnis etiam virtus ab essentia procedit, et
operatio a virtute; unde cujus essentia ab alio est, oportet quod virtus et operatio ab alio sit. Et praeterea, quamvis
per hanc responsionem evitaretur quod non esset primum simpliciter, non tamen posset vitari quin esset primum
agens, si ejus actio in aliquid prius agens non reduceretur sicut in causam.” Aquinas’s understanding of “first cause”
here is influenced by the Liber de causis. See especially propositions 1 (“Omnis causa primaria plus est influens
super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda”) and 14 (“Et causa prima adiuvat secundam causam super
operationem suam…”) at p. 134 and 136-137 of Pattin ed., Le Liber de causis.
23
Thomas Aquinas, De Pot. 3.7, co. (2:20): “[S]i consideremus supposita agentia, quodlibet agens particulare est
immediatum ad suum effectum. Si autem consideremus virtutem qua fit actio, sic virtus superioris causae erit
immediatior effectui quam virtus inferioris; nam virtus inferior non coniungitur effectui nisi per virtutem
superioris….” See also ScG III.70 (14: 206): “In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quae
agit, et virtutem qua agit…”
9
to have an immediacy of power to a (and a’s effects) if the agent of a depends on the power of d

to perform a. Aquinas provides the example of an apprentice who produces a craft under the

direction of a master to illustrate what it means for one cause to act in virtue of another cause’s

power.24 In this case, the master is not the immediate supposit who performs the act of

production and the apprentice has many of his own powers which he exercises in the act. Yet,

nevertheless the act of making of the craft is done through the master’s power since the master’s

power is that which enables the apprentice to employ his own powers to perform the act of

production. Aquinas thinks that differentiating between immediacy of supposit and power shows

how both God and the creature can be immediate to the same effect without causal conflict or

competition and this distinction will be relevant to assessing Olivi’s critique of concurrentism in

section III. 25

II. Olivi’s Arguments against God’s Concurrence with Secondary Causes

Peter Olivi’s most extensive discussion of God’s causal relationship to the actions of

creatures is in chapter 116 of the second book of his Summa (begun 1270’s; redacted mid-

1290’s) where he addresses the question of whether God is a cause of sin. 26 Olivi’s main goal in

this text is to show that sinful actions are immediately caused by creatures alone, and therefore,

not immediately caused by God.27 However, one of the main arguments he uses to establish this

24
Thomas Aquinas, ScG III.67.
25
Thomas Aquinas, ScG III.70 (14: 206): “Sicut igitur non est inconveniens quod una actio producatur ex aliquo
agente et eius virtute, ita non est inconveniens quod producatur idem effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo: ab utroque
immediate, licet alio et alio modo.”
26
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 [“An Deus sit eius [i.e. peccatis] causa”] (3: 333-347). On the dating of Olivi’s works see
Piron, "Les oeuvres perdues d'Olivi: Essai de reconstitution." On this text see Stufler, “Die Konkurslehre des Petrus
Olive;” Kaup, “Zur Konkurslehre des Petrus Olivi.”
27
Olivi opens the question by explaining the range of positions on the question of whether God is a cause of sin.
The first position denies that sinful actions are caused by God in any way, while the second maintains that sinful
actions are caused by God in some way (3: 333-336). Within the second position there is a division between those
who think that God causes sinful actions immediately and those who hold that God causes sinful actions mediately
in so far as he creates and sustains the creatures who immediately cause sin (3: 336). Olivi’s main aim in the
question is to defend this latter view by refuting those who maintain that God immediately causes the act of sin (3:
337).
10
conclusion relies on a premise about created actions in general: (1) Actions that are immediately

from secondary causes cannot be immediately produced by God; (2) Sinful actions are

immediately caused by secondary causes; (3) Therefore, sinful actions are not immediately

produced by God.28 This first premise is, of course, the denial of the central thesis of

concurrentism. It is clear that Olivi understood the premise to apply to natural causes, as well as

free causes, because in the course of defending it, he relies on arguments that specifically involve

natural causes.29 In what follows, I will present the main arguments that Olivi puts forward to

show that the actions of secondary causes in general cannot be immediately produced by God.

Olivi advances many other interesting arguments that pertain only to free or sinful actions. I will

leave these aside, however, to focus on uncovering his thinking about God’s causal relationship

to all created causes—both natural and free.

Olivi attempts to prove that God is not an immediate cause of creaturely actions by

showing the incoherency of the alternative view. He argues against several different versions of

the concurrentist position, each of which offered a different account of how God immediately

causes creaturely actions. These positions can be grouped into two categories, which I have

labeled the “direct production of the action” [DPA] model and the “augmentation of power” [AP]

model.

On the DPA model, the operations of secondary causes are immediately produced by God

in the same way that God immediately produces other objects, e.g. substances and properties,
28
In q. 116, Olivi advances four main arguments with this same implicit logical form, i.e. (1) Actions that are x
cannot be immediately from God; (2) Sins are x; (3) Therefore, sins are not immediately from God. The relevant
features of sinful actions that are supplied for x are the fact that they are: (a) immediately caused by secondary
causes, (b) from free will, (c) evil, and (d) such that creatures can be held responsible for them (3: 337-347).
29
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 339): “Item, effectus immediate causarum secundarum sunt similitudines virtutis
activae earum, ut radius est similitudo lucis solaris, et primus effectus caloris non est aliud quam similitudo caloris.
Si igitur praedicta cooperatio divina est specie diversa ab ipso calore, quomodo similitudo caloris erit ab ea?” See
also Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 340): “Sed contra hoc [i.e. quod ista cooperatio est quaedam applicatio potentiae
agentis creatae ad suum actum]. Primo, quia multae potentiae naturales sunt a sua creatione vel generatione
sufficienter applicatae ad actum…”
11
through the act of creation. 30 In the case of a transitive action (i.e. an action that results in an

external effect), God immediately causes the effect in the passive power that receives the action.

In the case of fire burning cotton, for example, God immediately produces the heat and the

flames (which fire also immediately produces) in the cotton. In the case of an action that does

not have an external effect, such as willing or knowing, God immediately produces an actualized

state (which the creature also immediately produces) in the active power. When I will x, for

instance, this model holds that God and I together immediately produce the actualized state of

willing x in my power of will. God does not do anything to my power of will prior to (or other

than) the production of its actualized state in volition.

In contrast, the AP model maintains that God has an action on the created power that is

prior to and distinct from the actualized state of the power. This divine action on the created

power augments that power to enable it to produce its act. There are two versions of this view

that Olivi discusses: the “influx” model and the “application” model. The first view maintains

that God’s concurrence is an influx of power imparted to the secondary cause which enables the

power to produce its action. 31 The second identifies divine concurrence as God’s application or

movement of the secondary cause to its action, similar to how an artisan applies a tool to an

action.32 The following figure illustrates the differences between the two general models of

concurrence.33
30
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 336): “…quidam dicunt quod essentia omnium actionum tam naturalium quam
vitiosarum est ita immediate a Deo sicut essentiae quas creat.”
31
Giles of Rome expresses this view in Quodlibet VI.2 [“Utrum habens charitatem sine speciali Dei influxu possit
exire in actum meritorium”], (355): “Ideo omnia secunda agentia dicuntur nihil facere, sive sint illa opera naturae
sive gratiae, sine speciali influxu Dei sive hac influentia divina quod est speciale ipsi Deo.”
32
Aquinas describes God as moving or applying secondary causes to their actions. See De pot. 3.7, (2: 20): “Sed
quia nulla res per se ipsam movet vel agit nisi sit movens non motum... Et quia natura inferiora agens non agit nisi
mota, eo quod huiusmodi corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata; caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen
non est movens nisi motum, et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum: sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit
causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.” On Aquinas’s understanding of
God’s motion of secondary causes, see Shanley, “Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas.”
33
According to Schmutz’s “La doctrine médiévale des causes,” the view I label the DPA model was associated with
Franciscans, such as Scotus and Ockham, while the view I label the AP model was defended by Dominicans.
12
 Figure 1

Against the “Direct production of the act” (DPA) Model

Olivi thinks that the DPA model results in at least three incoherencies:

(1) God produces the creature’s action according to two different and incompatible modes of
production: mediate production and immediate production

(2) God produces the creature’s action twice

(3) Two different agents, i.e. God and the creature, are total immediate causes of the same
action

In what follows, I will consider some of the arguments he advances to show that the DPA model

implies these difficulties.

God has two different and incompatible modes of production

On the DPA model, God is a mediate cause of creaturely actions because he sustains

creatures in being while they cause their actions and he is an immediate cause of those same

actions because he directly produces them as he does with other created objects. Olivi thinks

that one of two problematic implications follow from maintaining that God produces the same

action both mediately and immediately. It must be accepted that either (1) the act is just as

perfectly and directly from God through his mediate production of the act using secondary

Sixteenth century thinkers debated about which of these two models was correct. For Suárez’s discussion of these
models and his refutation of the AP model, see his Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disp. 22. 2 (1: 809-826).
13
causes as it is through his immediate production of the act himself; or (2) the same act both (a)

depends on God alone and is less distant from God in so far as it is immediately produced by

God and (b) does not depend on God alone and is more distant from him in so far as it is from

him mediated by secondary causes. The differences between these two options can be illustrated

with a case of burning that is both (a) immediately caused by God and (b) immediately caused by

an instance of fire that is sustained in existence by God. According to the first option, the

burning in cotton has the same degree of causal proximity to God in so far as he causes it by

sustaining the fire which burns the cotton and in so far as he burns the cotton himself

immediately. In contrast, the second option implies that the burning in cotton has a lesser degree

of proximity to God in so far as he causes it by sustaining the fire which burns the cotton and a

greater degree of proximity to God in so far as he burns the cotton immediately himself. 34 Olivi

finds both of these options untenable.

The first option is problematic because it collapses the difference between mediate and

immediate production. Effects produced through immediate prodictions are distinguished from

effects produced through mediate productions precisely because they have a greater degree of

proximity and dependence on the agent. An instance of burning which God immediately

produces in cotton should have a greater degree of causal proximity and dependence on God than

an instance of burning which God mediately produces by sustaining the fire that burns the cotton.

The involvement of the secondary cause in the mediate production causally distances the primary

cause from the effect. Thus, it cannot be maintained that an effect which is produced by an agent

through both a mediate and an immediate production has the same degree of causal proximity to

the agent in virtue of each of the agent’s productions. The second option, which states that the
34
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 338): “Quaero etiam an ita perfecte sit a Deo et ita indistanter secundum unum modum,
sicut secundum alterum. Et puto quod oportebit dicere quod sic. Alias secundum unum modum entitas actionis
minus dependeret et plus distaret a Deo quam secundum alterum.”
14
same action depends on God more in so far as he immediately produces it and depends on him

less in so far as he mediately produces it, fares no better. This alternative implies that

incompatible properties are attributed to the same act, e.g. depending on God directly and not

depending on God directly, being produced by God alone and not being produced by God alone.

The same instance of burning, for example, cannot both causally depend on God alone in virtue

of God’s immediate production of it and not depend on God alone in virtue of God’s mediately

producing it by sustaining the fire that causes it.

God produces the same action twice

This argument attempts to show that the DPA model implies causal overdetermination by

positing that the same act is produced by God both mediately and immediately. Olivi begins by

noting that God’s mediate production of the act either has a necessary order or connection to his

immediate production of the act (using secondary causes) or it is independent of it.

Concurrentists must admit the former option because a tenet of their position is that secondary

causes can only produce their acts if God also immediately produces them. Thus, God’s mediate

production of an act a entails that God immediately produces a. Olivi states that there are two

options for how the necessary connection between God’s mediate and God’s immediate

production of an act can be explained. First, God’s immediate production of the act and God’s

mediate production of it can be related as two parts of one total production of the act. 35 The

second option locates the necessary connection in the fact that one mode of production is a

necessary condition for the other. An example that illustrates the first option is the case of the

male and the female who together generate a child. There is one total act of generating the child
35
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 338): “Item, aut isti duo modi producendi actionem sunt disparati aut sunt sibi connexi
et subordinati. Si disparati, ergo unus potest esse sine altero, immo et semper est, quantum est de se. Si vero
necessario sunt sibi connexi, tunc ambo non habent vim nisi unius totalis modi producendi cuius sunt quasi partes,
quia secundum hoc ab uno eorum sine altero non poterit fieri actio ista. Tunc etiam aut concurrunt de pari ad
eundem effectum, quod esse non potest, cum unus sit mediatus, alter immediatus, aut unus est prior altero et causa
alterius, quod etiam dari non potest.”
15
of which the male and the female’s individual “productions” are both constituents.36 Olivi claims

that God’s two productions of the creature’s action cannot be two parts of one total act of

production because one production is mediate and the other is immediate.37 He does not support

this claim with a further argument. Perhaps he thinks that since immediate productions and

mediate productions have contradictory properties, e.g. being done by an agent alone and not

being done by an agent alone, they cannot constitute parts of one total act of production.

According to Olivi, however, the second option, which holds that God’s immediate

production of the creature’s act is prior to and makes possible his mediate production, also runs

into difficulties. He writes: “the one which is immediate is the cause of the one which is mediate

and prior to it. And what follows is astonishing: that first the action is immediately produced by

God and subsequently God will move inferior causes to produce that same action already

produced by him naturally prior.”38 Olivi’s point here is that the DPA model implies causal-

overdetermination. If God’s prior immediate production of the effect is sufficient to the effect,

then God’s posterior mediate production of the effect with secondary causes will cause again

what has already been caused. Another inference one could make here is that creatures have no

real causal efficacy in bringing about the effect, which is the occasionalist position.

Two different agents are total and immediate causes of the same action

Olivi’s final argument is fairly straightforward:

Again, it is impossible for the same action to be totally and immediately from two
agents. But the action of secondary causes, just as the action of the evil will, is

36
Many medieval Aristotelians rejected that the female was an active cause in generation. Scotus, however, held
that both male and female were active in generation and he viewed their cooperative act as a paradign example of
essentially ordered co-causality. See, for instance, Ordinatio 1.3.3.2.496 (Vatican 3:293-294).
37
See n. 35.
38
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 338): “ille qui est immediatus sit causa eius qui est mediatus et prior illo. Et tunc est
mirabile, quia prius actio illa est immediate facta a Deo et postea movebit Deus causas inferiores ad producendum
eandem actionem iam a se prius naturaliter productam.”
16
 totally and immediately from the will or its proximate causes, and nevertheless it
is claimed to be totally from God in another immediate way. Therefore, etc.39

He provides no support for the main premise in this argument, but it is not difficult to see why

one might find the principle that the same action cannot be totally caused by two agents

plausible.40 It seems that if agent a is an immediate cause of the total action, then there is no part

of the act left for another agent b to immediately produce. If there is no part of the act left for

agent b to immediately produce, then agent b cannot be an immediate cause of the act. Olivi

applies this principle to the case of God and creatures. If creatures are the immediate causes of

their actions in their entirety, then it seems that there is nothing left for God to produce.

Olivi considers that the concurrentist might reply by claiming that one part of the action

is immediately from God and the other part of it is immediately from creatures, and therefore, the

act (which is a whole comprised of these two parts) is totally and immediately from God and

creatures. Yet, he thinks this response has several problems. He notes that the part of the act

which is immediately from secondary causes would have to also be immediately from God since

the concurrentist holds that everything a creature produces is immediately produced by God.

The initial objection could then be raised against this part of the act. Regarding the act’s part

which is immediately from God, Olivi claims it would be different in number and species from

the part produced by the creature. Because these two parts are specifically and numerically

distinct, Olivi notes that they cannot comprise one composite action which has God and creatures

and its total immediate causes. Rather, each part constitutes a different act: one immediately

caused by the creature and another immediately caused by God. 41

39
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 338): “Item, impossibile est eandem actionem totaliter et immediate esse simul a
duobus agentibus. Sed actio secundarum causarum, sicut actio malae voluntatis, est totaliter a voluntate seu a suis
causis proximis, et nihilominus ponitur esse totaliter a Deo per alium modum immediatum. Ergo et cetera.”
40
This principle was well known and widely accepted by 13 th century thinkers. Aquinas makes reference to it in the
objections he considers in ScG III.70 [Quomodo idem effectus sit a Deo et a natura agente], (14: 206). Bonaventure
also considers it in I Sent. 45.2.2, ob. 1 & ad 1, (1: 806-7).
41
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 338-339).
17
Olivi’s Rejection of the “Augmentation of Power” [AP] Model

After rejecting the DPA model, Olivi considers two positions that I have grouped together

which both conceive of divine concurrence as something that God does to or imparts to the

creature’s power in order to enable its action. Olivi first refutes the “influx” version of this

model, which maintains that creatures have inherent capacities for action, but in order to exercise

those capacities, God must infuse an additional power into the capacity prior to each exercise.

Olivi repudiates the idea that created powers would be in need of such an influx in order to

operate. He thinks that if God is able to make a power that is able to do an action once it is given

an influx of power, then it follows that he is able to make a power that intrinsically has what that

influx is supposed to provide. Not only does he find it inconsistent to maintain that God is

unable to create powers that can act without an influx, but he also finds it denigrating to God’s

sovereignty. God would be unduly restricted because he would not be able to cause a creature to

perform an action without first providing an influx to it. 42 Moreover, he argues that even if it is

granted that created powers operate through an influx of power given by God, it would not

follow that the actions or effects of those powers were immediately from God. The infused

power would itself be a created intermediary through which God indirectly caused the action or

the effect of the creature.43

Olivi next considers the “application” version of this model, which maintains that created

powers inherently possess what is required to operate efficaciously, but the powers cannot move

themselves from a state of potentially operating to actually operating. 44 God’s concurrence is

42
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 339): “Praeterea, dicere quod Deus non possit per intermediam potentiam causae
secundae facere actionem, nisi adiungat ibi quondam cooperationem creatam videtur derogare potentiae Dei.”
43
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 339): “...actio praedicta non plus est per hoc immediate a Deo quam si fieret ab eo
solum per potentiam causarum secundarum; quia modo non est ab eo nisi per hoc quod est ab illa cooperatione
creata et a causis secundis. Et certe, illa cooperatio creata inter causas secundas debet computari.”
44
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 340): “Forte dicetur, sicut quidam dicunt, quod ista cooperatio est quaedam applicatio
potentiae agentis creatae ad suum actum.—Sed contra hoc arguitur.”
18
conceived of as God’s moving or applying the created power to its activity. As with the previous

view, Olivi thought that even if it is granted that God applied every power to its action it still

would not follow that the power’s action is itself immediately from God. The application of the

power would be a secondary cause by which God produced the action. 45 Furthermore, Olivi

thought that this view similarly rested on a deficient notion of created powers. He writes, for

example, that “many natural powers are sufficiently applied to action by their creation or

generation, so that they do not require anything except the presence of a suitable patient.” 46 Olivi

thinks that passive created powers can adequately explain why the active powers of natural

agents act on a given occasion after a period of not acting. One need not invoke an application

from God to explain this. Lastly, Olivi argues that even if it is granted that powers need to be

applied to every one of their acts, there is no good reason to think that God must do all of the

applying. Why couldn’t God apply one created power which then applied a second created

power?47 Here again Olivi sees no contradiction in the idea of a created power that fills the

causal role which concurrentists assign to God.

In sum, Olivi rejects both versions of the AP model of concurrence because he thinks

that: (1) it is problematic to suppose that created powers need the kind of assistance to operate

which these models claim; (2) even if created powers need such assistance, one created power

could provide the needed assistance to another; and (3) even if it is assumed that God aids

created powers in the ways postulated, it would not follow that God is an immediate cause of the

creature’s action as the concurrentist maintains.

III. Assessing Olivi’s Critique of Concurrentism

45
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 340): “[I]sta applicatio est computanda inter causas secundas, unde per hoc actio ipsam
sequens non erit immediate a Deo.”
46
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 340): “...multae potentiae naturales sunt a sua creatione vel generatione sufficienter
applicatae ad actum, ita quod non egent nisi solum praesentia patientis idonei.”
47
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 340): “[Q]uia mirabile est, si per unam potentiam superiorem sufficienter applicatam
non potest Deus sufficienter applicare inferiorem…”
19
 In this section, I will assess the philosophical merits of Olivi’s critique of concurrentism

by analyzing how Aquinas’s position fares against his objections. We saw in section I that

Aquinas distinguished between the kind of immediacy which God has to the creature’s effect

(immediacy of power) and the kind of immediacy which the creature has to its own effect

(immediacy of supposit). The three difficulties that Olivi finds with the DPA model of

concurrentism can be overcome by employing this distinction.

Olivi’s first argument against the DPA model reasoned that if the same act is produced by

God both mediately and immediately, then either (a) there would be no difference between act

a’s causal dependence on God in virtue of his immediate production of a and a’s causal

dependence on God in virtue of his mediate production of a; or (b) the act would have the

incompatible properties of depending on God alone and not depending on God alone, being

directly from God and being indirectly from God, etc. If it is assumed, however, that the act is

related to God immediately qua power and mediately qua supposit, then the second option is not

problematic. There is no contradiction involved in positing that the same act depends on God

more perfectly qua power than it does qua supposit. The differing degrees of dependence which

the act has on God are indexed to differing respects in which the act depends on him.

The second argument attempted to show that the DPA model entailed that God would

produce the creature’s action twice. The argument assumed that God’s mediate production of

the creature’s act must be distinct from God’s immediate production of the creature’s act. If it is

posited, however, that God’s immediate production of the act is qua power—not qua supposit—

then the assumption that God has two distinct productions of the act can be denied. The case of

the master who directs the apprentice’s production of the craft illustrates that it is possible for a

20
cause to produce an effect by an immediacy of power and a mediacy of supposit in one

production.

Olivi’s third objection to the DPA model was that it violated the principle that one act

cannot be totally and immediately from two agents. Aquinas, however, held that the proper

interpretation of this principle included the qualification qua supposit. He did not think it was

problematic for one and the same act to be totally and immediately from two different agents as

long as it was totally and immediately from each in a different repect (i.e. qua power vs. qua

supposit.48

Although Aquinas’s distinction between immediacy of power and immediacy of supposit

can be employed to solve Olivi’s objections to the DPA model, the manner in which the

distinction is employed in the responses seems to presuppose a different version of

concurrentism. Positing that God has an immediacy of power to the creature’s action without

also having an immediacy of supposit to it seems to entail the AP model of concurrentism. This

is because a cause c that lacks an immediacy of supposit to an effect e can only gain an

immediacy of power to e by acting through a supposit s which is immediate (by supposit) to e.

But a cause c can only act through a distinct supposit s by having an action on s. The master, for

instance, acquires an immediacy of power to the action of the apprentice by teaching him. The

DPA model, however, denies that God has an action on secondary causes themselves. This is the

distinguishing tenet of the AP model, and we have seen that Olivi raised several objections to it.

It remains to be seen how Aquinas’s position fares against these difficulties.

One of Olivi’s main criticisms of the AP model was that it denigrated both creaturely and

divine power by postulating that created powers need additional help from God in order to

operate. This criticism touches on a broader question regarding the operation of created powers
48
See n. 23.
21
which was debated in the middle ages. Medieval thinkers disagreed about whether any created

power could move itself from a state of potentially acting to actually acting. Olivi, along with

several other late thirteenth century thinkers held that some created powers, particularly the

human will, were capable of self-motion and able to apply non-self-moving powers to their

actions.49 Many thirteenth century defenders of concurrentism, in contrast, defended the

Aristotelian axiom everything that is moved is moved by another rejecting the possibility of self-

motion.50 Given that Olivi accepts self-moving powers, he sees no reason why it is

metaphysically necessary for God to act on created powers to apply or move them to their acts.

Yet, for those who thought that self-motion was impossible, an ultimate uncreated cause was

required to explain how created actions are initiated. 51 Yet, even these thinkers still have to face

up to the question of why God must immediately apply every created power to every one of its

acts.

Recall that Olivi wondered why God could not apply one created power a to its act b

which in turn applied another created power c to its act d. On this view, God is merely the first

cause in a series of successive applications of powers to their actions, rather than the immediate

cause of every application of a created power to act, as the concurrentist assumes. Aquinas did

in fact hold that some created powers applied other created powers to their actions. He thought,

for instance, that the human will commanded the actions of other human powers. 52 But he

recognized that created power a could only apply created power b to its act c, if another created

49
For Olivi on self-moving powers see Pasnau, “Olivi on Human Freedom;” Yrjönsuuri, “Free will and Self-control
in Peter Olivi;” Silva and Toivanen, "The Active Nature of the Soul.” Olivi thought that natural powers must be
applied to their acts, but he thought that created powers, such as the will, could apply them. See Summa II q. 2, (1:
11): “Omne enim agens naturale seu naturaliter et necessario est ab altero applicatum et inclinatum…” Ibid. : “…
nostrae potentiae inferiores moventur et applicantur a voluntate…”
50
On Albert and Aquinas’s acceptance and interpretation of the Aristotelian motion axiom see Weisheipl, “The
principle omne quod movetur.”
51
For Aquinas’s and Albert’s claims that God “moves” created causes to their actions see nn. 21 and 32.
52
Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II.17.
22
power d simultaneously applied a to the act of applying b to c. Thus, the application of b to its

act c causally depended not only on power a, but also on the simultaneous activity of d (which

applied a to the act of applying b). For Aquinas, created powers which apply other created

powers to their activities are intermediary members in per se causal series, i.e. a series in which

subsequent members depend on the simultaneous activity of all prior members to exercise their

own causal powers. A standard example of such a series is an instance of a hand which moves a

stick to push a ball. Should the hand stop moving the stick, the stick stops moving the ball. In

the case of created powers, if d stops applying a to its act of applying b to c, then c would cease

to occur. But the series of applications of powers on which c depends does not stop with d since,

assuming that self-motion is impossible, power d must be applied by another power to its act of

applying a. As Aquinas claims in his famous proofs for God, the series of created appliers who

are applied by another created power cannot go on forever. 53 According to him, the series must
54
terminate with God as its first member. Every application in the series depends on God’s

activity because if he ceases to apply the second member to its act of applying the third, then all

powers cease to be applied to act. Yet, even if it is granted that every application of a created

power depends on divine power, it is still not clear why this would provide God with causal

immediacy to the operation of the final power in the series. Why, for instance, would God be

immediate to the hand’s act of writing in virtue of applying the will to the act of applying the

hand?55 This question relates to another of Olivi’s objections to the AP model.

Olivi’s other main objection to the AP model was that it failed to make God an

immediate cause of creatures’ actions. Olivi argued that God’s influx of power or motion of the
53
Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia.2.3. In his first proof, Aquinas proves that God is the first “mover,” but “motion” here is
understood broadly to include other changes from potency to act. The text quoted in n. 32 explicitly identifies God’s
application of created powers to act with his motion of created movers.
54
For Aquinas’s reasoning, see Cohoe, ‘There Must Be a First.’
Aquinas thought that it was in a state of actuality of itself. Cf. De pot. Q. 1, ST I.25.
55
On God’s motion of the human will and the will’s freedom, see for instance De malo, 3.2 ad 4.
23
created cause would itself be a mediating cause that distanced God from the creature’s action. It

is clear that AP models do not give God an immediacy of supposit to the creature’s action, but

whether they give God an immediacy of power is less certain. Regarding the influx model, Olivi

rightly notes that the influx which God supplies to the created cause is itself a created entity.

Thus, even if the influx has an immediacy of power to the creature’s act, it does not follow that

God himself is immediate to that act. In the case of the application of power model, it is God

himself who moves the created power to its action. Thus, it is more plausible that this model

secures an immediacy of power to the creature’s act for God himself.

In his De potentia, Aquinas explicitly claimed that God was related more immediately by

power to the creature’s effect than even the creature was to its own effect. Aquinas explained

that God’s power is more immediate to the creature’s effect because the creature’s power is

“only joined to its effect through the power [of God].” 56 Aquinas’s brief remark here requires

some unpacking. He is assuming the principle that if any a is united to any c in virtue of a third

b, then b is more immediate to c than a is to c. This principle clearly applies in cases of objects

in continguous physical contact. If, for instance, paper a is physically joined to paper c in virtue

of glue b, then b is physically more immediate to c than a is. Aquinas seems to think to that the

principle also applied in cause-effect relationships. If any cause a depends on the activity of

cause b to cause effect c, then cause b is more immediate by power to effect c than cause a is to

c. The master’s power, for instance, is more immediate to the craft produced by the apprentice

than even the apprentice’s own power because the apprentice’s own power can only be active in

making the craft if the master’s power is active.

Aquinas’s acceptance of this principle about causal immediacy explains why he would

think that even the first cause in a per se causal series has an immediacy of power to the final
56
See n. 23.
24
effect in the series although several other members intervene between it and the final effect. If

all members in the series depend on the activity of the first member’s power to cause the effect,

then all of those members are joined to the effect in virtue of the first cause’s power. When Olivi

critiques the AP model for failing to make God an immediate cause of the creature’s actions, he

does not provide a definition of an immediate cause or a set of conditions that a cause must

satisfy to be one. It seems likely, however, that he was operating with a different conception of

immediacy than Aquinas’s notion of immediacy of power. He may have only accepted causes

with an immediacy of supposit to an effect as immediate causes of it.

In sum, the success of Olivi’s rejection of concurrentism depends on the soundness of

some of his background assumptions. If self-motion is impossible, then the AP model of

concurrentism does not carve out an unnecessary role for God and if Aquinas’s notion of

immediacy of power and his conditions for its obtainment are correct, then this model succeeds

in giving God causal immediacy to creaturely actions.

IV. Olivi on creatures as sole immediate causes of their actions and the causal primacy

of God

In section I, we saw that earlier concurrentists thought it was impossible for created

causes to operate solely through their own powers and that all existence must be immediately

caused by God’s power in order to secure God’s causal primacy. Olivi’s rejection of

concurrentism also involved rejection of these two assumptions.

Olivi argues that the primacy and uniqueness of God as first cause can be maintained

even if creatures are the sole immediate causes of their actions. He writes:

Those things which flow from the first cause mediately require the power and
maintenance of the first cause no less than those which flow from it

25
immediately. With the cessation of the total influence of God they do not pass out of
existence any less so than those things which flow from God immediately.57

Olivi rejects the inference that a creature c’s act a depends on God’s power less than c itself does

because God is an immediate cause of c and merely a mediate cause of a. He argues that the

creature and its act equally depend on God since the cessation of God’s causal activity which

sustains c in existence is a sufficient condition for the annihilation of both c and a. Defenders of

concurrentism think that if it is granted that creatures are the sole immediate productive causes of

their acts, they will threaten God’s unique status as first cause. In contrast, Olivi thinks that the

fact that all realities essentially depend on God’s causal activity is sufficient to guarantee God’s

primal and unique status as first cause. Unlike his concurrentist opponents, he does not think

that God’s status as unique first cause requires that God is an immediate cause of every reality.

We saw above that Albert was familiar with a view like Olivi’s regarding sinful actions

and in response to it he argued that it was not possible for a being that depends on another for its

existence to operate in virtue of itself. Olivi disagrees with this assumption about powers. He

explicitly states that active created powers are created by God with the ability to cause their acts

to exist.58 Olivi does not provide an argument to establish that it is possible for created powers to

have such an ability. He maintained like his concurrentist opponents that God cannot give

creatures the power to create since infinite power is required to cause existence ex nihilo.59 Yet,

since causing a creaturely action is a case of causing a modification in a pre-existing power

(rather than a case of causing existence ex nihilo), he probably saw no reason to think that God’s

power must be operative in causing created actions. Moreover, Olivi held that it was impossible

57
See n. 10.
58
With respect to the created will he writes in Summa II q. 116 (3: 345): “In quantum ergo est positiva potentia, facit
entitatem actus…”; Ibid.: “…ideo sola causalitas entitatis sui actus potest reduci in Deum tanquam in primam
causam, quia ipse non fecit in causa proxima nisi illud per quod est causa entitatis ipsius actus.”
59
See Olivi, Summa II q. 1 [“an Deus alicui creato vel creabili possit communicare potentiam creandi”] (1:2-22).
26
for God’s power to be an immediate cause of imperfect actions.60 From this, he may have

reasoned that since imperfect created actions exist, it must be possible for creatures to

immediately cause at least some acts solely through their own powers.

V. Conclusion

Olivi’s rejection of concurrentism has both philosophical and historical significance. On

the historical side, Olivi’s texts provide evidence that medieval discussions of divine and created

causality were more complex than scholars have previously recognized. Not only was there a

lively debate in the middle ages between concurrentists and occasionalists, but there were also

sophisticated challenges to concurrentism made by mere-conservationists. Olivi’s arguments

also illustrate significant differences between concurrentist positions that are typically

overlooked in contemporary discussions of the medieval causality debate. On the philosophical

side, Olivi’s critique brings into focus the differing philosophical challenges that arise according

to the various ways in which the concurrentist position is developed.61

60
Olivi, Summa II q. 116 (3: 345): “…et ideo [Deus] non potest facere tales [i.e. defectivae] actiones nisi solum per
intermediam potentiam defectivam...”
61
I am grateful to Fred Freddoso, Tobias Hoffmann, Jake Tuttle, the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion
discussion group, and especially anonymous referees for helpful comments on prior drafts. I would also like to thank
the NDCPR and the John Templeton Foundation for a research fellowship which supported my work on this paper.
27
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