History of Education Society

Socrates and Alcibiades: The Alcibiades Major

Author(s): Robert R. Wellman
Source: History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter, 1966), pp. 3-21
Published by: History of Education Society
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EDUCATIONIN ANTIQUITY

Socrates and Alcibiades:

The Alcibiades Mafor*

ROBERT R. WELLMAN

SINCE SCHLEIERMACHERthere has been little agreement as to the

authenticity of the Alcibiades Major. Taylor, for example, doubts that
Plato wrote the dialogue because of its language, its colorless portrayal
of Alcibiades, and the textbook character of its substantive elements,
and an impressive list of scholars seem to agree, although perhaps
for different reasons. While fewer individuals-especially Friedlander
and Vink-accept the dialogue as genuine, they at least have the an-
cient weight of Olympiodorus, Proclus, and Plutarch behind them. Per-
haps the most interesting view to be presented in recent years is that
of Clark who, in a heroic effort at compromise, ascribes the first two
thirds of the dialogue to a student of Plato and the final part to Plato
himself. Presumably the bulk of the dialogue is ascribed to a non-
Platonic source since the majority of commentators question its authen-
ticity, but I find Clark's position unconvincing, especially when she
suggests that it was Plato's "usual affection for his pupils and asso-
ciates" that prompted him to finish the work when the student died. (i)
Regardless of the dialogue's authenticity, the Alcibiades Major is a
vivid and compelling portrait of the erotic Socrates in pursuit of the
beautiful Alcibiades, and, whether it was authored by Plato or not, we
cannot help but agree with Olympiodorus that it is the gateway to
Plato's dialogues. We have no way of determining the historical accu-
racy of the picture presented in the dialogue or whether it represents

r I am indebtedto the ResearchCouncilof the Universityof Massachusetts

for a grantthat assistedin the preparationof this paper.
Mr. Wellmanis AssociateProfessorof Educationat the Universityof Massa-
chusetts.

Winter 1966 3
the actual relationship that existed between Socrates and Alcibiades.
But polemics concerning the historical Socrates and his actual beliefs
and doctrines are, I believe, largely irrelevant, at least regarding his
educational ideas. Various sources present us with a portrait of Socrates,
and obviously the writings of Plato and Xenophon are primary. We
may glean a consistent picture of Socrates and his educational ideas
from all these sources by using Plato and Xenophon, perforce, as the
final authorities. The view that emerges may or may not be that of the
historical Socrates, but it hardly matters. It is a profound and meaning-
ful theory and warrants our close attention in its own right, regardless
of its authorship. (2)
In this regard the Alcibiades Major is especially interesting to the
educationist, for the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades is
represented as intensively erotic or, what for Plato amounted to the
same thing, intensively educational. An examination of the form and
meaning of this relationship, therefore, should provide further insight
into the Socratic view of education and its proper conduct with the
young.
The representation of Socrates in erotic pursuit of Alcibiades is
surely correct since several other sources paint a similar picture. In
Plato's Gorgias Socrates admits to being enamored of two things: Al-
cibiades, son of Cleinias, and philosophy (481d). The erotic setting of
the Protagoras is furnished by reference to Socrates chasing the youth-
ful beauty, Alcibiades, and the amorous tone is heightened by Socrates
implying he loves Alcibiades even more since the youth has matured
(309b, cf. Symposium x8xd, 21ga). And the Alcibiades Minor, which
undoubtedly was not composed by Plato, concludes with Socrates ex-
pressing the desire to overcome Alcibiades' many other lovers (151c).
Plutarch also provides support, both in his life of Alcibiades, which is
probably in part based on the Alcibiades Major, and in the Moralia
where he characterizes Socrates as yielding to the embraces of Alci-
biades (Alcibiades i, 2; iv, 1-4; vi, 1-5; Moralia, "On the Fortune and
Virtue of Alexander the Great"). A major source that fails to mention
the erotic relationship between the young man and his older lover is
Xenophon. The principal reference to Alcibiades occurs in the Memora-
bilia where the author claims Alcibiades and Critias associated with
Socrates for political ends and left him when they thought they had
achieved proficiency in speech and action (I, ii, 12-40). While such a

4 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONQUARTERLY
motive would hardly conduce to an intimate love affair such as de-
scribed by Alcibiades in the Symposium, this is only a conjecture on
Xenophon's part who was not, after all, on the scene all that much.
Regardless, Xenophon's view does not preclude Socrates passionately
loving Alcibiades, which is the brunt of most of our references, includ-
ing the Alcibiades Major.
The most complete picture of Socrates' love for Alcibiades outside
the Alcibiades Major occurs in the Symposium. Since Alcibiades' speech
in Plato's educational masterpiece serves as a suitable prelude to the
remarks I wish to make about the Alcibiades Major, I will deal with it
briefly before taking up the dialogue proper. It will be realized that it is
impossible to extricate completely Alcibiades' speech from the totality
of the Symposium. Since the dialectical levels of the Symposium are
beyond my immediate concern, I will reserve lengthy comment for a
longer study of Socrates which I hope to complete in the near future.
While the present treatment is unfair to the poet Plato, I hope it is not
unfair to the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades.
The erotic banter between Socrates and Alcibiades following the lat-
ter's drunken interruption of Agathon's dinner party provides both an
appropriateanticlimax to Diotima's higher mysteries of love and an in-
troduction to Alcibiades' speech. In addition, the interlude serves to
underscore again Socrates' intense love for Alcibiades: Socrates speaks
of his "love for this fellow" and refers to "the time I fell in love with
him" (213c-d). And when it is time for Alcibiades to follow suit with
the earlier guests and make a speech to Eros, he demurs and proposes to
praise Socrates instead on the excuse that if he praises a god or another
person in Socrates' presence, Socrates will not leave him alone (214d).
During the first part of the speech there is a passage that is especially
interesting for the light it sheds on the erotic Socrates' relationships
with Alcibiades (215d-216e). Alcibiades speaks of the effect of Socrates'
words on him, such that he becomes wildly enraptured and emotional
at the sound of his voice. Unlike the effect of an eloquent orator such as
Pericles, who does not touch the spirit of a man, the speech of Socrates
leaves him in such a frenzy of anxiety that he believes his life not worth
living in its present state. So profound is Socrates' love that under its
influence Alcibiades cannot but admit his own deficiencies and forgo
power and prestige to seek his own good. So compelling is his love that
it is only by withholding his ears entirely that Alcibiades can keep from

Winter 1966 5
sitting by his side until old age. And under the influence of Socrates
alone does Alcibiades feel shame shame that he falls victim to the
crowd and fails to realize what he admits to be true in his conversations
with his lover: "So I flee from him, and when I see him again and re-
member my former admissions, I am ashamed."
Through the power of Eros, Socrates transforms his beloved into a
frenzied lover of himself. The importance of this idea is brought out
later when Apollodorus reports that upon the completion of Alcibiades'
speech, "there was some laughter at his candor which showed him still
erotically inclined toward Socrates" (222c). At first this appears to be
an odd statement, for is not Alcibiades' frankness caused by his drunk-
enness? Certainly strong drink tends to unravel the socially acceptable
cloak most of us wear most of the time. But Alcibiades' candor mani-
fests far more than inebriation, as Apollodorus notes, since it is only in
the presence of his lover, and beloved, that it is natural, and perhaps
requisite, that he be honest and forthright. The love relationship de-
scribed by Alcibiades is a relationship in which the participants mani-
fest and maintain their integrity at all levels of human association. As
Xenophon notes in his Symtposium, "there is no meaningful human
association without love" (viii, 13). The compulsion of the erotic Soc-
rates is the compulsion of good faith and probity which perforce obtain
in the relationship between lovers. This is the point of the continuation
of the erotic banter following Alcibiades' speech in praise of Eros in-
carnate, Socrates (222c-223b).
Note, incidentally, the citation of Pericles and other good orators
(aya%6v kprOpwv). This is precisely Socrates' objection to the Sophists and
the developing rhetorical tradition. It was not simply a polemic against
ignorant and evil men blindly leading the ignorant crowd, for Pericles
was neither ignorant nor evil. But even aya89v prropowv, for all their
goodness and skill, could not achieve the kind of meaningful human
relationships demanded for the educative enterprise envisioned by Soc-
rates. At best they could persuade the crowd to op92) S6$a, an unstable
guide to correct action, for the relationship between the orator and his
audience did not demand a genuine commitment on the part of indi-
vidual listeners-a personal admission and conviction to a point of
view and a course of action. For without Eros, according to Socrates,
there could be no truth.
These thoughts from the Symposium are elaborated in the Alcibiades

6 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONQUARTERLY
Major.In the openinglines of the dialogueSocratesis representedas
Alcibiades'first lover who was prohibitedfrom consortingwith his
belovedby his 8a(v. (3) Now that Alcibiadeshas attainedmanhood
-and, incidentally,has been forsakenby his many otherlovers who
sought only physicalpleasurefrom the beautifulyouth-and the dai-
monic oppositionhas disappeared,Socrateshas hurriedto Alcibiades
hoping therewill be no furtherprohibitionto fulfillinghis desire.The
eroticsetting is heightenedby a referenceto Alcibiades'highminded-
ness, which accountsfor his otherloversleavinghim, andby reference
to Socratesfollowingthe youthfulbeautyaroundeven while the Safp,n'
forbid intercourse-so overwhelming is the power of Eros in Socra-
tes. (4)
The referenceto Alcibiades'highmindedenessintroducesan instruc-
tive ambiguitythat we are surelyintendedto keep in mind duringthe
laterdiscussion.Literally,the passageat lo3b reads,"I have watched
you... [Alcibiades],"says Socrates,"and I have a fair idea how you
act with your lovers; for althoughtherewere many of themwho were
highminded (<yaAop6owvo), they discovered your highmindedness
([povTjpTat) too muchandfled fromyou." p.yax6qpwv can meanhigh-
mindedbothin the senseof nobleandin the sense of proudor haughty.
Similarly,ppo6ycamay referto high feelingor high spiritor, in the bad
sense, pride,insolence,or arrogance.Since the contextdoes not make
the meaningclear-and it is difficultto believeit is not intentional-
we could just as well translate it, "your haughty lovers found you too
arrogant."Thuswe areinformedearlyin the dialoguethat Alcibiades'
claim as a aXobs Kaya8os (125a), as well as his lovers'-presumably
KayaOot of Athens-may or may not be genuine. Ob-
the usual iaXAol
viously, the subsequentdiscussionallows us to guess they are not.
Beyondthe eroticsetting, the AlcibiadesMajoris especiallyfruitful
for the insightit providesinto themeaningof Erosin the educativerela-
tionship.As in the Symposium,the necessityfor integrityis empha-
sized and linkedwith the effect of the eroticSocrateson his beloved.
WhileSocratesprofesseslove for Alcibiadesfromthe outsetof the dia-
logue, the youth apparentlydoes not reciprocatefully until the end.
Throughoutmost of the conversation,therefore,SocratesremindsAl-
cibiadesthathe must answerthe questionsput to him as he genuinely
believes.At iloa, for example,SocratesadmonishesAlcibiadesto "an-
swertruly"so the discussionwill not be in vain; or at 117c Alcibiades

Winter1966 7
is reprimanded for not doing his full share in understanding the argu-
ment; and at 126e and 127e Socrates urges him to do his best in answer-
ing. It is not until later in the conversation that Alcibiades gradually
begins to realize why Socrates is invaluable to him as a lover, and it is
not until the conclusion that the erotic relationship reaches a stage
where there is no more need to admonish Alcibiades to be sincere.
The reasons for this insistence on integrity premised in Eros are ex-
plicated in a passage early in the dialogue (ii2d-iL4e). By the force
of the argument, Alcibiades is driven to admit he does not know what
is just and what is unjust and, indeed, is bewildered about the entire
question of justice and injustice in the polis. In responding to the ques-
tions, however, the youth admits only that this seems to be the case
according to what Socrates says. Socrates rebukes Alcibiades for this
statement and proceeds to show by argument that in the dialogic form
of interchange it is not the questioner who does the speaking but the
answerer. In a dialogue, where the participants are engaged in resolving
difficulties and perplexities, it is the answerer, in the genuineness of
his answer, that actually does the speaking or the saying by his agree-
ment or disagreement with the argument. The respondent is not agree-
ing or disagreeing because it pleases the questioner, the audience, or
the public; he agrees when he is genuinely convinced that the discus-
sion has reached a stage that he believes correct.
This point, incidentally, will hopefully quiet the criticisms directed
against Socrates in the slave boy experiment in the Meno. It is some-
times maintained that Socrates does not demonstrate that learning is
reminiscence in his discussion with Meno's slave because he asks lead-
ing questions that literally put words into the boy's mouth. This utterly
misses Socrates' point. No one, least of all Socrates, doubts that an in-
telligent man of mature years has more information in his grasp than
an untutored lad; and no one doubts that young persons should be pro-
vided with as much information as they desire. Socrates' point is not
that the boy literally remembers how to double the area of a square;
clearly, Socrates shows him. His point is simply that the boy, in order to
respond to the questions sincerely, has to exercise the same sort of intel-
lectual skills as the questioner. It is the exercise of these skills, premised
on integrity, that Socrates means by reminiscence.
The idea of subjective integrity that emerges in the Alcibiades Major,
while perhaps simple-and hopefully obvious-is absolutely funda-

8 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONQUARTERLY
mental to Socrates' educational position. One of the clearest statements
of its importance occurs at the end of the section under discussion. At
114e Socrates asks, "Is it not your desire to be persuaded? And is not
the best means of persuasion when you state that you agree? Then an-
swer the questions, and if you do not agree that the just is expedient,
do not trust the words of others." And further, at 116d: "If anyone
claims, then, to advise the Athenians or Peparethians, purporting to
know justice and injustice, and if he claims that justice is sometimes
evil, you will laugh and scorn him since you have said yourself that
justice and expedience are the same." Without the inner conviction pro-
vided by the maintenance of integrity through the erotic relationship,
knowledge is impossible. Socrates insists that knowledge, worthy of
the name, is a subjective, internal matter. Genuine knowledge is some-
thing that is actively enfeoffed by the individual-to borrow a phrase
from Montaigne. And the inner man is ultimately persuaded, not by
the crowd or the lecturer, but by himself when he says it. As I men-
tioned earlier in relation to the Aya6&v prTO6pwvin the Symposium, this
is Socrates' fundamental objection to Sophistical education, that it does
not, and cannot by its very nature, reach the inner man. In Socrates'
view, the most Sophistical education can do is provide a veneer of
polish and social grace, for the lecture, the oration, cannot enjoin the
listener to participate and speak in the educative enterprise. The point
of the dialogic form epitomizing, for Socrates, the educative process is
the emotional commitment necessitated when the individual is required,
because of Eros, to genuinely agree or disagree with arguments. (5)
Those who claim that Platonic and Socratic education proceed wholly
on the intellectual plane fail utterly to grasp the meaning of the dia-
logic form. The dialogue, as Socrates and Plato understand it, links the
intellectual with the emotional levels of human experience and de-
mands a visceral involvement without which education is impossible.
Man's intellectual life is firmly and inextricably premised in his emo-
tional life, and as Eros is neither god nor man but a Sa(cjwv mediating
between the two, desiring but never attaining divinity, so Eros is the
mediating energy between the divine aspect of man, the intellect, and
his emotional involvement in earthly human experience (Symposium,
Diotima's speech).
While developing the subjective integrity of the dialogue by means
of his erotic relationship with Alcibiades, Socrates is also engaged in

Winter 1966 9
directingthis energy towardits properend. The first level of the dia-
lectical development, following the erotic setting (lo3a-lo6a), com-
prisesnearlyhalf the dialogue(lo6c-llg9b). I identify this passage as
the first dialecticallevel becauseits educativeconcernis with showing
how disgracefulAlcibiadesis due to his ignorancein what he professes
to know-in Socrates' view, a necessary propaedeutic to education. (6)
Thediscussionfollows theusualpatternof the elenchus:In the rixvr,
discussionfollowingAlcibiades'proposalto advise the Athenians,the
young man is unableto specify the rexm on which decisionsof state
are based. Hence the emotionallevel of human experienceis reached
throughthe acute feeling of shame: "Surely this is shameful,"'says
Socrates, "are you not ashamed to claim rrrarp,iuwvin matters in which
you cannoteven identifytheirrEXV2?" (ro8e-ioga). And the firststage
towardlinking the emotionalwith the intellectualdimensionsof edu-
cationalexperience,as well as the first stage towardthe realizationof
ignorance,is achieved:Alcibiadesis disgracedbeforehis lover. We are
remindedof the Lysis, where the intentionof the discussionbetween
SocratesandLysisis to show Hippothalesthe properway of conducting
a love affairwith a youngboy-by disgracingandhumblinghim rather
than puffinghim up with conceit,for only in this way can the lover
attackhis belovedat the emotionallevel.
It is appropriatethat the attackof Socratesis directedtoward the
emotionof shame.Actually,shameis a bit too weakforaocr6x.Itis per-
haps betterrendereddisgraceful,base, or ugly, bringing to mind the
kind of conduct that shocks others and prompts acute pangs on the part
of the perpetrator.ako-vvl, the sense of shame,is the disgust one feels
in the presence of alhrpovpyia (ahcXfpoS + 'fpyov), lewd and base behavior,
such as an especiallylicentiouslove afairor otherformsof utterlydis-
gracefulbehavior.Thusthe disgracefulnessSocratesaccusesAlcibiades
of and the shamehe attemptsto elicit from the depths of the youth's
beingis eroticallydirected:to fail to knowwhat one professesto advise
on is as base and ugly as to be involved in illicit relationswith young
boys or women. Indeed,it is even more ugly, for the consequencesof
such ignoranceare far more reachingand affectfar morepeople.
The introduction of alr^o6 at io8e is reminiscent of the vravyS8roSof
Pausanias'speechin the Symposiunm (180d ff) and the ignoblesteed in
the myth of the Phaedrus(246b). As the noble steed in the Phaedrus
is called KaAo%, so alaxo6sdenotes its opposite-ignoble, ugly, in-

10 HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

famous.(7) This becomes especially important later in the Alcibiades
Major when the xaXAoKhyaGoq of z12a is gently set against Alcibiades'
more profound and meaningful realization of his alaxivvrat 127d: to
experience alaX;vnris to become acutely aware one is not KaXAoKaya6o5
More of this later, however; for the moment, at io8e, before his erotic
encounter with Socrates has had the opportunity to develop, it is too
monstrous to consider the well-born, well-bred Alcibiades as anything
but KaAo9 KayaOoS.
The remainder of this passage is concerned with completing the
elenchus. This is highlighted by the digression on the meaning of dia-
logue which I mentioned earlier and continued admonitions for the
proper form of argument: an insistence Alcibiades must answer the
questions (114e) and a reminder of the contextual character of discus-
sion (115b-c). Finally, after he is unable to ascertain how he learned
the science of justice and then fails to realize that justice and expedience
are the same, Alcibiades is reduced to a state of bewilderment: "By the
gods, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying, and I feel very strange-
ly; forwhen you question me I seem to change my mind by the minute."'
This commences an interlude (116e-11gb) that culminates the first
section of the dialogue. Its purpose is not so much to reduce Alcibiades
to a state of ignorance-he is not yet emotionally preparedfor this final
step-as to get the youth to ratiocinate on his own bewilderment and
wonder why he is at a loss to know what he thinks. The delineation of
the knowing, the unknowing, and the ignorant-the unknowing who
thinks he knows-is a gentle preparation for the not so gentle accusa-
tion at 118c: "Bless me, Alcibiades, but you are in sad straits. I hesitate
to mention it, but I will say it anyway since we are alone: My friend,
you are extremely stupid, and you say so yourself by your own words."
This abrupt statement, one of the sharpest Socrates is represented mak-
ing anywhere, does not. startle or perturb Alcibiades as much as we
might expect.
Alcibiades' lack of perturbation is to be expected, for we are reminded
a few lines later that the youth's ,cyaxoppoalv27 continues to get in the
way of genuine education (119c). This, of course, has been the basic
difficulty throughout the first part of the conversation: While agreeing
he may be a bit ashamed at ioga, Alcibiades is in fact only embarrassed,
and in a few moments his MeyaAopoav>resurges in an arrogant claim
that he discovered the science of justice on his own (loge-llod); later

Winter 1966 11l

he attempts, though an irrelevancy, to deter from the argument (113e);
and finally he becomes petulant and refuses to answer Socrates' ques-
tions (114d-e). J?yaXofpoaVv7r remains with us, and we cannot expect
more until it is shattered through a deeper emotional probe.
In addition, we must remember that the Alcibiades Major represents
the first meeting of the erotic Socrates and the beautiful youth because
of the daimonic prohibition. Not only does Alcibiades not return Soc-
rates' love; he is unaccustomed to the Socratic way of life. The first level
of the dialectic has moved through an attempt at emotional excitation
to a description of its manifestation, the realization of ignorance, and a
glimmer (9lgb-KOtvf fPovXj) of its result, the desire on the part of the
beloved for the lover. This section serves as a 7rapa8i&y,ua, then, a model
of the meaning of a love relationship with Socrates. The way is thus
prepared for a more meaningful encounter with Socrates in the second
half of the conversation-an encounter that will repeat the essential
educative features of the first dialectical stage, only at a more profound
level, and will culminate in a genuinely erotic relationship.
If this educational view of the first half of the dialogue is correct, the
meaning of the interlude (119gC-124b),including the Royal Speech, fol-
lows. Commentary on the Royal Speech has in general suffered from
treating the passage as an entirety unto itself, or at best using 119c-
124b as the total context. (8) This is understandable, of course, since
we can jump from Socrates' question at lga directly to Alcibiades'
question at 124b without any apparent hiatus or loss of meaning. I sub-
mit, however, that this very fact suggests the meaning of the interlude
and the Royal Speech.
At lga Socrates asks if Alcibiades is willing to care (e7rqteAhta)for
himself. Rather than responding affirmatively and asking how he can
best care for himself, he interjects the thought that perhaps this is not
necessary since the rest of the Athenians are uneducated also: "I am
sure my native ability alone will carry me to an easy victory." I base
this view of Alcibiades' statement at i9lgb-c on translating Kowv)pfovXrt
at 9lgb, in direct response to Socrates' question, as "Let's think for a
moment." His complete response to the question is, KOL'77pov\Xr, $
>wKpaTCE. KaiTOl EvvO aov(lTO OVTO? Kat crvyxopu). sOKOVic yap LOL ol Ta T9S

7r6\eoS irpar TOVTes

YALyWvCaKTOS &7ratTeVTO cT
Alcibiades' agreement.in
al.
the second sentence could refer either to Socrates' question, will you
care for yourself?, or to the earlier statements concerning Pericles and

12 HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

the ignorance of the Athenians. Since the very next sentence refers to
the latter, I take KOLVYPovtjI in the first sentence as a check on Socrates'
question-although the author of the dialogutesurely intends the phrase
to prepare us for Socrates' response at 124c. The purport of Alcibiades'
statement at 9lgb would then be, "Let's think about this matter for a
moment, Socrates. For indeed, as you put it I agree, that the men in
charge of the city's affairs appear to me to be uneducated, with a few
exceptions." "If my competitors are mere amateurs," Alcibiades goes
on to say, "then why should I worry? Since my natural ability is more
than enough to defeat them why should I go to all the trouble of caring
for myself?" In agreement with Friedlanderand others then, the Royal
Speech serves to introduce the need to care for oneself.
If my view concerning the stage of Alcibiades' educative develop-
ment is correct, however, the purport of the Royal Speech goes beyond
this and flows integrally into 124c-d. For Alcibiades is not yet prepared
to understand the meaning of the Delphic motto, nor is he prepared to
genuinely care for himself, since in spite of Socrates' biting accusation
at 118c Alcibiades does not yet realize his own ignorance. What must
occur, in Socrates' view, is for Alcibiades to genuinely commit himself
to the educative enterprise-deliberating together-to place all his in-
tellectual and emotional powers in the service of the argument, and to
believe in the efficacy of the discussion and not in his own natural
prowess vis-a-vis his fellow man (cf. supra). As I see it, the purpose of
the Royal Speech is not only to show Alcibiades the necessity of caring
for himself, for given his present emotional development this can affect
him at best only superficially. Perhaps even more important, the Royal
Speech is intended to persuade Alcibiades of the necessity for common
deliberation, and the passage culminates not at i24b when he admits
that Socrates' words are "remarkablyakin to the truth" that the Athen-
ian can surpass the Spartan and Persian only by diligence and practice
over himself, but a few lines later at the end of i24d when he agrees to
deliberate in common with Socrates.
124C-d also opens the second dialectical stage of the dialogue. As I
suggested earlier, the second stage repeats all the essential steps of the
first; but with Alcibiades better prepared than before, each step pene-
trates further into the depths of human emotion and introduces dimen-
sions of understanding that would have been futile during the first
stage. 124C-d provides the first illustration of this, thereby suggesting

Winter 1966 13
that what follows will go considerablybeyondthe firsthalf of the dis-
cussion.At the beginningof the dialogue,the conversationgets under
way by Alcibiades consenting to answer Socrates' questions (lo6b).
I-Ieagrees to this proceduresince he does not considerit difficultor
troublesome(xaXcros). A similarintroductionappearsat 124c-d,except
thereis no doubt that the subsequentdiscussionwill be difficultand
troublesome.For now we are going to witness not simply replies to
questions,but a genuineeffortat commondeliberation.We must delib-
eratetogether,says Socrates,for we badlyneed to attendourselves.So
there will be no carelessness or taking the easy way out (xa.XaKiaT^ov).
And we will leave nothing unsaid (&iroppqriov)if the argument dictates
it. Alcibiadesagreeswith Socratesand adds that in our presentcondi-
tion it wouldbe unseemlyto do otherwise.Thus,in the introductionto
the secondhalf of the dialoguewe areagainthrowninto the eroticrela-
tionship,only at a higherlevel. In the presenceof Eros,who has been
with us fromthe beginning,it is not fitting-indeed it is disgraceful!-
to be carelessor leave anythinghiddenfromview.
After the agreementto deliberatetogether, the parallelswith the
first section of the dialogue continue.The first part, you will recall,
commenceswith Alcibiadesagreeinghe wishes to excel,andspecifically
to excel in ruling the Athenians,so he may becomefamous and es-
teemedby all society.So with parttwo: WhileAlcibiadeswishes to care
for himself (124c), the means for achieving this, in his view, is by
being good, and specifically,being good or excellingin managingthe
affairs of caAoi Khcya0ot(124e). But this obviously requires intelligence
('p6v7wfacr); and again as in the first stage of the dialogue we must ask
what art (e'v)) this entails, that is, what knowledge (bnm7?r.t',)is re-
quired for exercising po6vYrTls in ruling Ka\o\KLyaot? And as before,
the discussionbreaksdown shortlythereafter,for Alcibiadesis unable
to defend his answer: Prudence (evpovAwa)is required, the 1epyovof
which is friendship(qbLA(a)which apparentlyentails samenessof mind
(8,ovoLa); but we can have justice without &p.ovoUa.
"Bless me," declares
Alcibiades,"I do not know what I mean.It is truethat I have lived in a
disgracefulconditionwithoutknowingit" (i24d; cf. Symposium 2i6b).
This is a crucialpoint in the dialogue,for it marksthe first point at
which Alcibiadesmanifestsa genuine emotionalupheavaldue to the
discussionitself. This is supportednot only by the fact thatAlcibiades
uttersit himself,but in the few lines followingas well. Socratesimme-

14 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONQUARTERLY
diately reassures the youth-something that was not needed while
pridewas still present.And Alcibiadesrespondsby requestinghelp in
escapinghis disgracefulcondition,whereuponthey agree,with the as-
sistanceof Socrates'diviningpowers,to pursuethe argumentfurther.
I submitthe toneof this sectiondifferssharplyfromanythingwe have
encounteredpreviously,a tone which suggests the start of a genuine
emotionalrelationshipbetweenthe two men thatwas not possibleear-
lier.Also, Alcibiadesagreesto dialoguewith Socratesimmediatelyand
with conviction rather than, as heretofore, merely agreeing to answer
questions: Answer, Alcibiades, and we will both benefit. It shall be,
respondsAlcibiades,so far as my partin answeringgoes. (g)
As a resultof the deepeningof the emotionalrelationshipbetween
the two men, the belovedis transformedinto the lover. Immediately
following the emotional upheaval, at 128a, Socrates heightens the in-
tensityof the discussionby returningto the questionof caringfor one-
self suggestedby the RoyalSpeech.Socratesdoes this, not becauseAl-
cibiadeshas suddenlybecomemore intellectuallycapableof dealing
with the question-or at least thereis no indicationthis is the case-
but becausehe is concernedto redeemhimself in Socrates'eyes. Alci-
biadesis disgracedbeforehis lover,andthe questionof fameand social
esteem-the form the question takes immediately after the Royal
Speech-is of far less immediateimportancethan maintaining the
erotic relationship with Socrates. In this new situation, which did not
obtain until his emotional upheaval, Alcibiades is ready to accept a
probing question that reaches ultimately, although perhaps not in the
AlcibiadesMajor,to the very rootsof his being; for he is now pursuing
the erotic Socrates, not the crowd. (lo) This transformation, which
we encountered earlier in the Symposium, is restated at 13id-132b be-
foreits finalstatementat the conclusionof the dialogue.Socratesshows
that the trueloveris the loverof the soul, and thathis trueobjectis the
handsome or fair soul which develops its intelligence, not the beautiful
body of a youth. Alcibiadesreadilyagreesand expresseshope that he
will stay handsomeenoughto attractSocrates,for he would despairif
Socrates left him.
The transformation of Alcibiades into Socrates' lover is the back-
ground for the remainder of the dialogue, especially the important mir-
ror passage (132d-133c), the passage 133C-134d with its precursor at
115c-116e,and the conclusion.The mirrorpassageis promptedby the

Winter 1966 15
discussion 128a-131b: Caring for oneself is predicated upon knowing
oneself, and the self, so far as we can ascertain at the present, (11) is
the soul.Hencethe injunctionof the PythianApolloenjoinsus to know
our souls, which means oofpoavvri-moderation or self-discipline(cf.
Charmides 164b, Amatores 138a). But in what fashion can we clearly
perceivethe soul?Forall the discussionit has causedamongcommenta-
tors, (12) it seems to me the mirrorpassageprovidesa straightforward
answerto this question:one clearlyperceiveshis own soul by looking
deep into the soul of his lover, especiallythe divine part of his soul,
intelligenceor the potentialfor knowing.
Theanalogicalreasoningwhichleadsto this conclusionalso explains
it. Socratessuggestsat the outset of the passagethat thereis only one
illustrationof the Delphicmotto-sight. If I wish to see my own eye I
must look into the pupil of another'seye, that is, the part of his eye
which exercisessight. And I can see my eye only by exercisingthis
same excellence (lpEr-j) of sight vis-a-vis that which exercises it in the
other, or, Socrates adds, vis-a-vis a similar potential in nature. The
other'seye and its potentialfor sight, therefore,is a necessarycondi-
tion for seeing my own eye, although the actual exercising of sight must
comefrom me and not the other.Also, a point frequentlyoverlooked
in discussingthe mirrorpassage, in orderfor me to see my eye the
other'seye must be open and perforceseeing, that is, exercisingthe
same functionas myself as I gaze at the reflectionof my eye in the
other'spupil. By analogy, if I am to know my own soul, I must look
into or know (by the terms of the analogy, /PAE7rTovmust be taken fig-
uratively)my beloved'ssoul, and specificallythatpartof his soul-in-
telligence (ofoa) (13)-which exercises the divine process of knowing.
I choosemy beloved'ssoul as themirrorsince, throughthe powerEros,
it is the only one accessibleto me. I know my own soul, then, only by
exercising the soul's excellence of knowing vis-a-vis the potential for
knowingin my loved one's soul. And as in the case of seeing, while I
am the one who must do the knowing,my beloved'ssoul must be open
and thereforeknowingin its own right. Thus "he who gazes upon the
divinityof his loverperceiveshimselfmost especially"(133c).
As my perhapstorturedlanguageis meant to indicate,it is funda-
mentalto realizethat the analogy with sight is intendedto maintain
the functionalcharacterbothof the knowinginvolvedin knowingone-
self and the objectof knowing, the potentialfor knowing of the be-

16 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONQUARTERLY
loved's soul. It is this functionalconnotationthat makes it important
to recognizethat the other'ssoul is open when acting as a mirror;for
unlike sight, wherethe objectof my seeing is a perceptibleobject,the
objectof my knowing in my beloved'ssoul is perforcethe processof
knowing itself: ao?la, the seat of fpovyacL (133C), is knowable only as
a functioningmanifestation.When I desireto know myself, therefore,
is
I look upon the way in which my loved one knows. Since pXErrTEov
clearly intendedin a figurativesense, my "lookingupon" is itself a
processof knowing, which means I must manifest the same kind of
knowing as my beloved.As the slave boy in the Meno had to think
mathematicallyin orderto understandSocrates'questionsconcerning
the doublingof the areaof the square,so I must think as my beloved
in orderto know myself.
It is now clearwhy Socratesagreesto consortwith Alcibiadesonly
so long as he remainsbeautiful.The beautyof Alcibiades,now that he
has attainedmanhood,is hopefullyof the soul,not the body,so Socrates
will remainonly so long as he maintainsbeautifulknowing,for other-
wise Socrates,in knowing himself, will becomeugly in his thinking.
Converselywith Alcibiades-and this is why the eroticSocratesis in-
valuableto him as a lover-if he desiresexcellencehe must know him-
self throughthe beautifulknowingof Socrates.This is the point of the
transformation of thebelovedinto the lover:it is only when the partici-
pantsin the educativeenterprisearebothloversandbeloveds,engaging
in a reciprocallove affair,that eithercan genuinelyknow himself.The
pointis restatedin the Symposium, wherethe functionof beautyvis-a-
vis the lover is not to improvethe beautifulbut to providea medium
(TOKO' (v KaXiw)in which the lover may becomebeautiful(20ogb-c).
The identification of self-knowledge (yLyv6aKElva1Tjov) with moder-
ation (oaopooavwv), which Socrates repeats immediately upon the
conclusionof the mirrorpassage (133c), is also now clear, as is the
remainderof the passage 133c-134d. To know oneself in the sense
suggestedby Socratesis to manifest,in tune with one's beloved,com-
petenciesfor knowingbeautifully.Throughknowingourselveswe de-
velop ourpotentialfor knowingthe worldin whichwe live in beautiful
terms: these categories of thought become our Weltanschauung, or
better, our Welterfahrung. Also, since the beautifulsoul is the good
andwise soul (125a,132a), the manwho knowshimselfknows goodly
and wisely. And since the good is that which is most beneficial(i16c)

Winfer 1966 17
and man naturally desires long-term "beneficience"-that is, ?v8aipoov(ac
or well-being (iu6a, 134a)-the man who knows goodly and wisely
is good andwise: "Gazingupondivinity,"Socratessays, "you will act
well and rightly" (134d, cf. 116b). Knowledgeis virtue, and he who
sins does so, not purposely, but through ignorance.
Having followedSocratesthroughthe intricaciesof these final pas-
sages, Alcibiades at last is in a position to "perceive only too clearly"
(135c) his presentconditionand what he must do to improvehimself.
Alcibiadesis truly "weddedto ignorance,"but not simply becausehe
is unableto identify the art of managingthe affairsof men. Evenmore
startling-and withoutthe emotionalintimacyof the love relationship
the candorrequiredfor this recognitionis impossible-Alcibiadesreal-
izes he is not doingwell; he is the oppositeof KaX^K&yaOos-heis evil.
Alcibiades'genuine professionof ignoranceat the conclusionof the
dialogue is the realization that his ignorance is tantamount to sinning;
he is no betterthana wretchedslave, in spiteof his wealth, good looks,
andinfluentialfriends.
This completesthe developmentof the dialogue.Fromthe agreement
to genuinelydeliberatein common,the dialectichas moved to an in-
tense emotionalinvolvementand the consequenterotic relationship.
Fromthis vantagethe educativeprocessintensifies,and Alcibiadescan
finallyadvanceto a recognitionof his ignoranceandits meaning.In his
ignorantand sinful state, Alcibiadesbecomesthe frenziedlover of the
beautifulSocrates,andrealizeshe mustpursuehim as avidlyas Socrates
pursueshim-unless the powerof the polls overcomesthem both and
prohibitsintercourse,
Notes
i. While the questionof the authenticityof the Alcibiadcles
Maioris irrele-
vantto my presentpurpose,thereis a wealthof references
for anyone
especiallyinterestedin the subject.Among thosewho rejectthe dialogue
as coming from the pen of Plato areJ. Bidez,Eos; ou, Platon et l'Orient
(Bruxelles,1945), chap.13; R. S. Bluck,"TheOrigin of the GreaterAl-
cibiades,' ClassicalQtuarterly,n.s. iii (1953), 46-52; J. Burnet,Plato's
Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito (Oxford, 1924), pp. 27-28 n.;
E. R. Dodds, Gnomon,xxvii (1955), 164 (a review of Westerink'sedi-
tion of Proclus'Commentaryon the First Alcibiades);E. Dupreel,Les
Sophistes: Protagoras,Gorgias, Prodicus,Hippias (Neuchatel,1949),
pp. 151 ff., and La LegendeSocratiqueet Les Sourcesde Platon (Brux-
elles, 1922), pp. 172-81; H. Gauss, Philosophischer Handkommentar za

18 HISTORYOF EDUCATIONQUARTERLY
den Dialogen Platos (Bern, 1952-1961), i, 2, 205 fK.; E. Hoffman, Platon
(Zurich, 1950), p. 125; G. Jachmann, Der Platontext, Nachrichten der
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen (1941), p. 308 ff.; J. Ker-
schensteiner, Platon und der Orient (Stuttgart, 1945), p. 203 ff.; W. J.
W. Koster, Le Mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des Chaldeens (Lei-
den, 1951), p. 23 f.; W. Lutoslawski, The Origin and Grozwthof Plato's
Logic (London, 1897), pp. 197-98; H. Raeder, Platons philosophische
Entwickelung (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 24-25; Sir David Ross, Plato's Thleory
of Ideas (Oxford, 1951), p. 3; P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago,
1933), p. 415; E. de Strycker, "Platonica I: L'authenticite du Premier
Alcibiades," Etudes Classiques, xi (1942), 135-51; and A. E. Taylor,
Plato, the Man and his Works (London, 1960), pp. 13 and 522. The two
most staunchadherentsto the authenticityof the dialogueare P. Fried-
lander, Der Grosse Alcibiades; ein weg zu Plato (Bonn, 1921 and 1923)
and PlatoII (New York,1964), and C. Vink, Plato's"EersteAlcibiades,"'
een onderzoeknaar zijn authenticiteit(Amsterdam,1939), although
authenticityis also maintainedby A. Festugiere,Contemplationet vie
contemplativeselon Platon (Paris, 1935), pp. 67-68 and "Grecset sage
orientaux,"Revue de I'Histoiredes Religions,csss (1945), p. 29 ff.; G.
Grote, Plato and the other conlpanionsof Socrates (London, 1865),
pp. 353-55; G. M. A. Grube,Plato's Thought (London,1935), P. 8;
G. Stallbaum, Platonis opera omnia (Berlin, 1826), V, 1, 295 ff.; and
L. Stefanini,Platone (Padua,1932), i, 78 ff. (ist ed.). Also see P. M.
Clark, "The GreaterAlcibiades,"Classical Quarterly,n.s. v (1955),
231-40, and E. Delcominette,Sur I'authenticitedu "PremierAlcibiade"
de Platon (Liege,1949). In general,thosewho doubtthe dialogue'sgen-
uineness argue that the language is anachronisticor un-Platonic for
Plato's early period,that the argumentsare tedious, and that the char-
acter portrayalof Alcibiadesis not worthy of Plato, even the young
Plato. Bidez presents an excellent summary of the usual arguments
against authenticity (pp. 119-20); I find his presentation the most per-
suasive of those opposed to authenticity.Friedlandersummarizesthe
argumentsof the doubtersby saying they amountto one: "I do not like
it." Bluckis an exception:he argues for inauthenticityby translating
auro ro avro at 129b and 13od as "mind." I shall have more to say of
this later (n. 11). Eventhe doubters,however,generallyagree that it is
"l'oeuvretres respectabled'unprofesseureruditet de noble inspiration"
(Dupreel),that the substanceof the dialogue is "authentiquementpla-
tonicien"(Bidez),and that "thereare severalpassages which it is hard
to attributeto any lesser hand than Plato's" (Shorey);with a few ex-
ceptions,for exampleJachmann,it is only with the "greatestreluctance"
(Taylor)they ascribethe dialogueto a close studentof the PIatonicphi-
losophy. Friedlanderand Vink, on the other hand, counterthese argu-
ments, includingBluck's,with varying degreesof successand argueex-
haustivelyand persuasivelythat the substanceof the dialogueis worthy

Winter 1966 19
 only of Plato himself. Other references of interest include Alain (Emile
Chartier), Idees: Platon, Descartes, Hegel (Paris, 1932), p. 69 f.; M.
Croiset, Platon oeuvre completes (Paris, 1920), i, 50-59; H. Dittmar,
Aeschines von Sphettos (Berlin, 1912), pp. 163-77; G. C. Field, Plato
and his Contemporaries;a study in fourth century life and thought
(London, 1930), p. 146 ff.; and cols. 2367-68 on Plato in Paulys.
2. This approach is, I believe, an appropriate modification for Socrates'
educational ideas of SchIeiermacher's question for resolving the Socratic
problem.
3. Considering the importance Socrates attributes to the Sal,uwvlater (127e)
in pursuing the discussion further, and hence its intimate connection
with the erotic relationship between the two men, Bidez (op. cit., pp. 113-
14; de Strycker, op. cit., p. 144) is surely incorrect in saying that "Le
'signe demonique' de Socrate y recoit une importance excessive...."
4. Clark (op. cit., p. 234, n. 1) believes the situation that opens the dialogue
is "grotesque." I am at a loss to understand why, as I fail to comprehend
Bidez (op. cit., p. 105): "On y respire une atmosphere abstraite, theo-
rique, tout entiere dominee par les problemes et non par les personnes."
Rather, with Friedlander (Plato II, 232), from the beginning "the en-
counter [of Socrates and Alcibiades] is frought with a tension unequalled
in Plato," a tension provided certainly not by "une atmosphere ab-
straite," but by an intensely erotic atmosphere. Also see Alain (op. cit.,
p. 69 ff.).
5. Cf. R. Schaerer, La Question Platonlicienne (Neuchatel, 1938), pp. 51-52.
Note especially p. 51, n. 2: "Les Grecs du quatrieme siecle n'ont aucun
mot pour exprimer exactement l'idee moderne de sincerite. La notion se
confond entierement, pour Platon, avec celle de verite, de connaissance,
de clarte, ou de realite. Repondre sincerement, selon lui, c'est repondre
de son propre fonds: et eavrovuou reellement: ^vrws, ou conforemeent
a sa propre pensee: Ji7 rapa So6av,
6. The identification of dialectical levels in Socratic dialogues is an arbi-
trary expedient for analytical purposes. The dialectical levels of any
given dialogue will vary according to the objectives of the analysis. In
the Alcibiades Major, for example, if the objective is to gain further in-
sight into the Socratic epistemology, the dialogue would be carved into
somewhat different dialectical levels than the ones I will identify. Ulti-
mately, of course, a Socratic dialogue must be seen synthetically in its
entirety.
7. See Gorgias 474C on ahrxpo6Sand KcaKoq.
8. While most commentators deal at least briefly with the Royal Speech,
I would refer especially to Bidez, op. cit., pp. 122-25; Bluck, op. cit.,
p. 47; n. 9; W. Jaeger,Arisfotle: Fundamentalsof the History of his
Development (Oxford, 1934), 131 f.; Friedlander (op. cit., pp. 235-36
and 350-51, n. 12). The argument over the oriental influence in the
Royal Speech is one instance of restricting its context.

20 HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

 9. Friedlander(op. cit., pp. 235-36) disagrees;he believesthe "prideof the
young manbeginsto collapse"earlier,at 1i6e. This is too stronga state-
ment for nl6e, although I would agree Alcibiadesis "perplexed."But
given the fact this is their first direct encounterI cannot believe the
"highminded"Alcibiadeswould collapseso quickly and easily. I have
alreadycited the appropriatesectionsof the text 116e-11g9bwhich I be-
lieve supportthis point of view.
10. This interpretationovercomesTaylor's (op. cit., p. 525) problemwith
this transitionalpassage as being "oddly abrupt."
1. This apparent"adumbrationof the Platonic'idea' or form" (W. R. M.
Lambin the Loebeditionof the AlcibiadesMajor,p. 194, n. 1) at 129b
(a'r?o Ta7TO) and 130d (airo To auro) has caused some discussion amongst
commentators. Bluck translates aro ro aBTroas mind "and finds essen-
tial support in this interpretationfor the rejectionof the dialogue"
(Friedlander,op. cit., p. 351, n. 13). Since this is a later meaningof the
phrase,it soundsstrangelyas thoughBluckis at least partiallyassuming
the very thing he sets out to demonstrate,althoughI have not readthe
introductionto his editionof the AlcibiadeswhereI imaginehe clarifies
this point. Friedlander(Der Grosse,ii, 17), on the other hand, claims
a?To T7oauro occurs naturally in its context and does not necessarily
carrya technicalimplication.Clark(op. cit., pp. 235-36) countersBluck
and cites Friedlanderfor support:she believes at 129b it means some-
thing like "what exactly self is." The argumentsof Friedlanderand
Clark are even more cogent if we maintain a consistently functional
connotationto Uvxif,in which case the allusion is not to some myste-
rious"same-in-itself"(Lamb'stranslation,which seemswholly unsatis-
factory) but to the problemof knowing the very process of knowing
itself. This is warranted,as I will try to show, by the mirrorpassage.
Cf. infraand my "TheProblemPosedat Charmides165a-l66c," Phron-
esis, ix, 2,107-14.
12. For commentson the mirrorpassage see, among others, Bidez, op. cit.,
pp. 114 and 119g; Bluck, op. cit., p. 46, n. 2; Clark, op. cit., 236 ff.; Fried-
lander, Plato II, pp. 236-38 and 351-52; Jaeger, op. cit., p. 165, n. 1;
Kerschensteiner,op. cit., p. 2Q2, n. 3; de Strycker,op. cit., pp. 146-49;
and E. des Places, Revue des Etudes Grecques, xliv (1931) 164. Clark's
discussion is especially interesting,in which she connects the mirror
passage with the myth in the Phaedrusand the educativefunction of
astronomyin the Timaeus.
13. On the use of intelligence for <roQia see Festugiere, op. cit., p. 68, n. 3.

Winter 1966 21