EVIDENCE

(Part VIII of IX)

Evidence (Rule 128-133)

A. General Provisions
1. Definitions
Rule 128, Sec. 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining
in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
Evidence – the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact.
Relevant evidence – evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact
in issue.
Material evidence – evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of
substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such quality of substantial importance to the particular issue, apart
from its relevance
Escolin: The terms “relevant” and “material” are practically the same. They are used interchangeably by the SC.
They differ in effect. Material evidence has substantial effect.
Competent evidence – evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court
Direct evidence – evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption
Circumstantial evidence – proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the particular fact in
dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence
Expert evidence – testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he is skilled
therein
Prima facie evidence – evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and
overcome by other evidence
Conclusive evidence – evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law does not allow to be contradicted
Cumulative evidence – evidence of the same kind and character as that already given and tends to prove the
same proposition
Corroborative evidence – evidence of a different kind and character tending to prove the same point
Best evidence – evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question
Secondary evidence – evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best evidence and shows on its fact
that better evidence exists
Factum probans – the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be established; material
evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the consideration of the tribunal
Factum probandum – the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to be established, hypothetical,
and that which one party affirms and the other denies
Factum probandum Factum Probans
Proposition to be established Material evidencing the proposition
Conceived of as hypothetical; that which one Conceived of for practical purposes as existent, and is
party affirms and the other denies offered as such for the consideration of the court
Collateral facts – matters other than facts in issue and which are offered as a basis merely for inference as to
the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue
Real evidence – evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or inspection as distinguished from a
description by them of a witness; that which is addressed directly to the senses of the court without the
intervention of a witness
Rebuttal evidence – evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given in evidence
by the adverse party
Positive evidence – when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence – when a witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact

2. Distinguish
Admissibility of evidence
Pertains to the ability of the evidence to be allowed
and accepted subject to its relevancy and competence
Substantive essence or characteristic feature of
evidence as would make it worthy of consideration
by the court before its admission
Weight of evidence
Pertains to the effect of evidence admitted
The probative value of evidence which the court may
give to admit after complying with the rules of
relevancy and competency

Proof Evidence
Effect and result of evidence Medium of proof
End Result Means to the end

3. Scope
a. Rule 128 §2
Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings,
except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)
b. Cases
Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992)
The Rules of Court, and its rules on Evidence, are not even suppletorily applicable to agrarian cases. Special
law allows affidavits to be admitted in evidence in agrarian courts, even without the witness testifying nor
subject to cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was presented were affidavits. Ordinarily, affidavits are not admissible before
the regular courts because there is no opportunity for the other party to cross-examine. Depositions are
admissible because there was an opportunity for the adverse party to cross-examine.
Pp v. Turco 337scra714 (2000)
Subject: Failure to qualify the doctor who conducted the medical exam as an expert witness. In People vs.
Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule since entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions
to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert
witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications.
We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3,
Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to
such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the
jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no
weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special
rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it
has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said
that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary
to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to
rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone
even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is
well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R.
No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The
absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs.
Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper (People vs.
Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
Famador: medical certificate can be used by the defense when:
1. the lacerations have already healed or that the lacerations are already old.
2. the admission of more fingers into the vagina would prove the “sweetheart defense”
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 237 (1993)
The unverified position paper is a mere procedural infirmity which does not affect the merits of the case.
Procedural technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before the LA.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
1. probation board
2. CTA
3. SEC
4. Immigration cases
5. LA/NLRC
6. CAR
B. Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Requisites for admissibility
1. relevant
2. competent

1. Relevancy
a. Rule 128 §4
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. – Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
(4a)
Relevance – relation to the facts in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence
Evidence on collateral matters allowed only when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability
or improbability of the fact in issue.
b. Cases
Bautista v. Aparece, 51 OG 805 (1954)
Nicolas Añasco sold 3 parcels of land to Valentin Justiniani, who in turn sold the same to Claudio Justiniani.
Claudio executed public instrument, whereby he sold same property to Apolonio Aparece. Hermogenes
Bautista illegally entered portions III & IV and took possession thereof, prompting Aparece to file complaint
with guerilla forces.
Upon hearing this, Bautista executed public instrument recognizing Aparece’s ownership of the property.
Possession was restored to Aparece.
Bautista filed complaint vs. Aparece for allegedly usurping portion of his land.
Aparece’s special defense: portion of land referred to in the complaint was acquired by him from Claudio
Justiniani and prayed for dismissal of the case.
TC decision: Defendant Aparece is the owner of portions III & IV.
Bautista appealed alleging that TC erred in admitting in evidence the document relinquishing plaintiff’s
ownership & possession as embodied in “exhibit I”. Bautista argued that the document was executed under
duress, force, intimidation and that guerilla officer has no jurisdiction over the matter.
SC: Test of admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is WON it is relevant, material or competent.
Relevant Evidence – one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter provable in an action.
Evidence is material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law &
pleadings.
Competent Evidence – one that is not excluded by law in a particular case.
The mere fact that the document in question was executed before a guerilla officer does not make the same
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleading.
Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)
Both prosecution and defense presented their respective expert witnesses. The testimonies were naturally in
contradiction with each other.
GR: Expert evidence is not conclusive upon the court. The court is not bound to accept said evidence. The
court may use it as an aid.
Exception: when the court is not knowledgeable or completely ignorant on the subject, the court should admit
the expert evidence.
State of Missouri v. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960)

2. Competence
a. Rule 128 §3
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Competence – not excluded by the law or the RoC
b. Constitutional rules of exclusion
1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3
Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
2) Art. III, Sec. 12
Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
XXX
3) Art. III, Sec. 17
Art. III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Absolutely inadmissible – evidence obtained
1. from unreasonable searches and seizures, or
2. in violation of the right of privacy of communication and correspondence
Relatively inadmissible (inadmissible only against the person whose rights are violated, admissible for other
purposes) – evidence obtained
1. in violation of the right be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel
2. from means which vitiate the free will
3. in violation of the right against self-incrimination
c. Statutory rules of exclusion
1) NIRC, §201, as amended by RA 8424
Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. — An instrument, document or paper which is
required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being
duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same
be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add his jurat or
acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary
stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
Failure to stamp a document required by law to be stamped shall render the document inadmissible in any court
until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled (§201 NIRC). This is an
absolute inadmissibility.
2) General Banking Act of 2000, RA 8791, §55.1 (b)
Sec. 55. Prohibited Transactions. -
55.1. No director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank shall –
(b) Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction, disclose to any unauthorized person any
information relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the bank belonging to private
individuals, corporations, or any other entity: Provided, That with respect to bank deposits, the
provisions of existing laws shall prevail;
Elements of the exclusion
1. director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank
2. disclosure to unauthorized person
3. information relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the bank belonging to private individuals,
corporations, or any other entity
4. without a court order
de Leon: Note that this provision covers only property in the custody of the bank other than bank deposits. For
bank deposits, RA 1405 governs. Note also that the provision does not state the nature of the inadmissibility. I
submit that it is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.
3) RA 1405: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
GR: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau or office.
Exceptions
1. written permission of the depositor
2. impeachment, or
3. order of a competent court in cases of
a. bribery or
b. dereliction of duty of public officials, or
4. where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
de Leon: I submit that this is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.

4) RA 4200: Wire-tapping
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Unlawful acts
1. any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
2. any person to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured in the manner prohibited by this law; or
3. any person to replay the same for any other person or persons
4. any person to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or
5. any person to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
The use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of
the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following
section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace
officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war
and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall
only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is
about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
1. any peace officer
2. authorized by a written order of the Court
3. in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping, espionage and other offenses
against national security:
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Information obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping act is absolutely inadmissible.
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)
Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter violates the anti-wiretapping act. The recording is inadmissible in evidence.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)

Salcedo Ortañez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

C. What Need NOT be Proved:

3 things that need not be proved
1. matters of mandatory judicial notice
2. matters of discretionary judicial notice
3. judicial admissions
1. Judicial notice
a. Mandatory (Rule 129 §1)
Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (1a)
Mandatory Judicial Notice
1. existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality
2. the law of nations
3. the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals
4. the political constitution and history of the Philippines
5. the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines
6. the laws of nature
7. the measure of time, and
8. the geographical divisions
Sermonia v. CA, 233 SCRA 155 (1994)
In determining prescription in a prosecution for bigamy, the reckoning point is actual discovery of the
subsequent marriage by the offended party, not from the registration of the marriage contract. The doctrine of
constructive knowledge does not apply, even if it is more favorable to the accused.
b. Discretionary (Rule 129 §2)
Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. (1a)
Discretionary Judicial Notice – matters which are
1. of public knowledge, or
2. are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
3. ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions
 c. When hearing required (Rule 129 §3)
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter
is decisive of a material issue in the case.(n)
When court takes judicial notice
1. During trial, on any matter – allow the parties to be heard thereon
2. After trial, and before judgment or on appeal – any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hearing is necessary when
1. During the trial, the court
a. motu propio, on request of a party
b. announces its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
2. After trial
a. before judgment or on appeal
b. motu propio, on request of a party
c. takes judicial notice of any matter, and
d. if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during the trial as long as there is a hearing. If trial is
already over, the court can take judicial notice only of matters decisive of a material issue in the case as long as
there is a hearing (p. 88, Francisco).
de Leon: Why on earth would a court take judicial notice of a matter which is not decisive of a material issue in
a case?
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19scra413 (1967) L26053

Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (1971) L28100

Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965) L17885

Ozaeta Romulo etc. , 92 SCRA 1 (1979) x

Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988) L55960

Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) 85423

As a general rule courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before
them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge. However, an exception is when in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into
the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it
for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) 115908-09

BPI-Family Bank v. CA 330scra507 (2000) 122480

 2. Judicial admissions
a. Rule 129 §4
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
Requisites for judicial admission
1. made by a party
2. in the course of the proceedings
3. in the same case
de Leon: If the admission was made in outside the proceedings or in another case, it is also admissible under
admissions of a party (Rule 130, Sec. 26).
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
1. it was made through palpable mistake or
2. no such admission was made
b. Instances of Judicial admissions
Instances of Judicial admissions
1. the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document copied or attached to a pleading, when the
other party fails to specifically deny under oath (Rule 8 §8)
2. material allegations in the complaint, when the other party fails to specifically deny it (Rule 8 §11)
3. admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in evidence (Rule 10 §8)
4. act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 §26)
5. implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases, except quasi-offenses
and those allowed by law to be compromised (Rule 130 §27)
6. admission by silence (Rule 130 §32)
c. Cases
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (1914) 8200

Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984) L37420

Bitong v. CA 292scra503 (1998) 123553

D. Object and Documentary Evidence

1. Rule 130 §1-2
Sec. 1. Object as evidence. – Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When
an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
Object Evidence – evidence addressed to the senses of the court
Ocular inspection qualifies as object evidence.
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. – Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their
contents. (n)
Documentary evidence – any material containing modes of written expressions offered as proof of their
contents
2. Cases
People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 (1980) L29271

Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) 108280-83

Adamczuk v. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2 (1940)

 State v. Tatum, 360 P. 2d 754 (1961)

E. Best Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 §3-4
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced, exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. (2a)
Best Evidence Rule – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself
Exceptions: When the original
1. has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
3. consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office
2. Cases
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990) 80505 
The best evidence rule does not apply to the marked money in a buy bust operation because the inquiry is not on
the contents of the marked bill, but merely its existence.
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966) L21438 

Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948)

BER only applies if the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document; such an inquiry need not be the main
issue
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) L14257

Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504 (1986)

US BER “or their equivalents” vs. Philippine BER “other modes of written expression;” is a disputed work in
an infringement case object or documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910) 5791

Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 (1931) 35366 05aug31

Sec. 4. Original of document. –

(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
 (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or
near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
Original documents
1. one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
2. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all
such copies are equally regarded as originals.
3. When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the
time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals
F. Secondary Evidence
1. Rule 130 §5-8
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. – If the document is in the
custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved
by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 §25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be
removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just
determination of a pending case. (27 a)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. - An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the
custody. (28a)
To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from all the people who possibly has a copy of the original, e.g. Notarized
Deed of Sale
1. Vendor
2. vendee
3. notary public
4. clerk of the court which gave the notary public commission
5. Bureau of Archives
Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds
1. the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
a. prove execution or existence
b. prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror
c. proof of contents in the following order
1) copy
2) recital of its contents in
a) some authentic document, or
b) testimony of witnesses
2. the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party
a. adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the original (Subpoena duces tecum)
b. proof of the original’s existence
c. adverse party fails to produce the original
d. proof of contents in the following order
1) copy
2) recital of its contents in
 a) some authentic document, or
b) testimony of witnesses
3. the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office – contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
a. Rule 132 §25: What attestation of copy must state
1) the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof
2) under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court
b. Rule 132 §27: Public record of a private document - may be proved by
1) the original record, or
2) by a copy thereof
a) attested by the legal custodian of the record
b) with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
2. Cases
Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149scra32 (1987) L31189 31mar87
Facts: In action to recover land, a party failed to produce the deed of sale, but presented only a Certificate from
the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records Management of an entry in a notarial register.
Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the original has been lost or destroyed, the offeror may prove its contents
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document or by testimony of witnesses. The Certificate is one such
authentic document.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218scra602 (1993) 83377 09feb 
In case of loss of the original of a document, the order of proof is as follows; 1) existence of the original, 2) its
due execution, 3) loss, and 4) its contents. Failure to prove loss of all the originals without fault of the offeror
renders secondary evidence inadmissible.
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) 
When the existence of a document is proven or admitted by both parties, the court should allow the lost
document to be proven by parole; testimony of a witness regarding the contents of the document need not be
verbatim or perfect.
Compañia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) L28999 24may77
Voluminous character of accounts must be established, and it must be made available to the adverse party
before parole; audit made by or testimony of private auditor is inadmissible as proof of original record or books
of accounts; auditor’s opinion not admissible; best evidence on cost of equipment are sales invoices not
testimony of an auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25scra845 (1968) L23893 29oct68 
It is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce copy to prove that original is in actual possession of adverse
party as long as it is under his control; adverse party need not admit that it is in his possession before a copy
may be introduced.
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 (1915) 10824 24dec15
To prove a lost document, must prove due execution, delivery (if required), and the fact of lost or destruction; it
is important to have qualified witnesses.
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not, bound to offer it. - A party who calls for the production of a
document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
G. Parol Evidence Rule
1. Rule 130 §9
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
 However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The terms "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Parol Evidence Rule:
When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
Exceptions:
a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading
1. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement
2. failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
3. validity of the written agreement; or
4. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement
If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequently-agreed terms must also be put in issue in the
pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the evidence sought to be admitted refers to matters
other than the terms of the agreement (e.g. statement of facts), then the PER does not apply, such evidence is
admissible.
PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does not apply where PER is invoked against a litigant
who is a stranger to the agreement.
Requisites for mistake as exception to PER
1. mutual between the parties
2. of fact, not of law
3. alleged and put in issue in the pleadings
4. proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance of, evidence
Escolin: Note that the rule on self-defense also requires that the circumstances of self-defense be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
2. Art. 1403 and 1405 Civil Code (Statute of Frauds)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following
cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences,
or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but
when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of
the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and
person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
 (f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are ratified
by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of
benefit under them.
Statute of Frauds: (Art1403 NCC)
If the following agreements are not in writing and subscribed, it is unenforceable and evidence thereof is
inadmissible
1. not to be performed within a year from the making thereof
2. special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
3. agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
4. agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than P500, unless the buyer
accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in
action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money;
5. lease for more than 1 year, or sale of real property or of an interest therein;
6. representation as to the credit of a 3rd person.

Exceptions (Art1405 NCC)

1. failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence, or
2. acceptance of benefit under the agreement

3. Parol Evidence Rule vs. Best Evidence Rule

Parol Evidence Rule Best Evidence Rule
No issue as to the contents of a writing Issue is contents of a writing
Parol evidence is offered Secondary evidence is offered
Presupposes that original is in court Applies when the original is not available
Effect is: cannot add, subtract, or explain the contents Effect is: cannot present any evidence on the
contents other than the original
Invoked only if the controversy is between parties to the Invoked by anybody, whether a party to the
agreement instrument or not
Applies only to agreements and wills Applies to all kinds of writing

4. Cases
Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990) 79962 
Facts: Conrado Salonga (respondent) filed a complaint for collection and damages vs. petitioner Lucio Cruz in
Lucena RTC alleging that in the course of their business, Cruz borrowed from him 35T as evidenced by a
receipt. Cruz admitted having received the 35T not as a loan but as consideration for their fish pakyaw
purchase and sublease agreement. RTC ruled in favor of Cruz and found that the transactions were indeed
pakyaw and sublease agreements. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA ruled that the receipts are clear
in its language and its tenor must not be clouded by any parol evidence introduced by Cruz such as self-serving
testimonies.
Held: PER does not apply to receipts because it is not an agreement. It is proof only of delivery of money.
Furthermore, the parole evidence bars only evidence as to the terms, it does not bar evidence as to statement of
facts. The receipt of money is merely a statement of fact. Lastly, failure of the adverse party to object renders
parole evidence admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA 740 (1993) 105419 27sep93
Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car in favor of Michael Santos. Pioneer claims that the car was merely a
security for the time deposit placements of Santos’ relatives. Since Santos’ relatives have recovered their
placements, Pioneer sued for recovery of the car.
Held: Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict
or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain
the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake. Pioneer failed to produce any instrument or written document which would prove that the deed of sale
in question was only a security for the time deposit placements of Santos' relatives in Pioneer. The 2 main
witnesses for Pioneer, were not mere employees of the bank. They were bank officers; one being a lawyer and
supposed to be steeped in legal and banking knowledge and practices. They were expected to know the
consequences of their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred ownership over the subject vehicle
in favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed of sale (if such was the intention or agreement of
the parties) a stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration of the vehicle in Santos' name were
conditioned on the failure of his relatives to recover their time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No such
stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright and unconditional transfer of ownership
of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.
de Leon: Note that the PER exceptions of other term agreed by the parties refer to those agreed after, not before,
the execution of the agreement. Pioneer should have invoked the exception that the agreement did not express
their true intent and agreement.

Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962) L18077 29sep62 

Facts: In a foreclosure of REM case, plaintiff invokes the registered mortgage agreement. Defendant answers
that the contract did not express the true agreement of the parties because it did not include the undertaking of
plaintiff to construct roads on the land. Furthermore, defendant argues that the ordinance that requires the
construction of such roads in the subdivision before the lots could be sold is deemed included in the contract.
Held: Since the answer alleged that the contract did not express the true intention of the parties, it has therefore
been put in issue in the pleadings. The same may therefore be subject of parole evidence.
Canuto v. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840 (1918) 11346 21mar 
Facts: Canuto executed a DoS with 1-year right to repurchase of a parcel of land to Mariano. Redemption
period elapsed so Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownership despite the insistent demand of Canuto that she
be permitted to exercise said right in accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the
redemption period. Canuto presented witnesses to corroborate her testimony on the oral agreement. Mariano
contends that Canuto should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by
the introduction of oral evidence. Manila CFI ruled in favor of Canuto.
Held: The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary contradict a written
instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a
writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such
agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of
the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original
agreement of the parties was but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or
abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was made. If it was in
fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced.
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove subsequent agreement regardless of how soon such agreement was
made.
Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 (1915) 9935 01feb 
Facts: Yu Tek & Gonzales had a written contract where Gonzales will deliver sugar to Yu Tek. Gonzales
received 3T in advance. The contract stipulated that in the event there is no delivery of sugar, Gonzales will
return the 3T and pay 1.2T in damages. Sugar was not delivered, 3T was not returned and 1.2T was not paid.
Judgment was rendered on the 3T only. Both parties appealed. Gonzales alleges that the court erred in refusing
to permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which
Gonzales raised in his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract due to total failure of his crop.
Held: Parol evidence inadmissible to incorporate additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there is fraud or mistake.
Land Settlement & Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation , 7 SCRA 750 (1963) L17820 24apr 
Facts: LSDC sued Garcia Plantation for specific performance of contract and for payment of unpaid balance of
the purchase price of 2 tractors. Salud Garcia was made a co-defendant because of 2 IOU notes executed by
her. Defendants admitted the execution of the IOU notes but contended that the same had been novated by a
subsequent agreement in a letter giving them an extension to pay the account. LSDC in their reply and answer
to the counterclaim, admitted the due execution and genuineness of the letter but contended that the same did
not express the true intent and agreement of the parties, thereby placing the fact in issue, in the pleadings.
At the trial, LSDC presented Atty. Guinto to testify on the true agreement and intention of the parties at the time
of the letter’s execution. Upon Garcia’s objection, the lower court ruled out said testimony and prevented the
introduction of evidence under the parol evidence rule. LSDC intended to present Kintanar (the writer of the
letter) to testify but in view of the court’s ruling, LSDC rested its case.
The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar, to the effect that in view of the
plea of defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants an extension of time to pay their accounts, Atty.
Kintanar gave the defendants up to May 31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest "provided that they will
make a substantial down payment immediately, with the understanding that upon non-payment of the
substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted and the LASADECO shall feel free to seek
redress in court". That there was such condition precedent is manifested by the second paragraph of the letter.
Lower court dismissed the case stating that the action was premature due to the agreed extension. LSDC
appealed to CA. CA certified case to SC.
Held: Exception to PER may be put in issue in answer to counterclaim; when operation of contract made to
depend upon occurrence of an event, which for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by
parol evidence, since if it is proven, there will be no contract. PER does not apply to condition precedent
because such condition is part of the terms of the contract. It does not modify, alter, or vary the terms or
tenor of the contract.
Had the trial court permitted, as it should, LSDC to prove the condition precedent to the extension of the
payment, LSDC would have been able to show that because the defendants had failed to pay a substantial down
payment, the agreement was breached and the contract contained in Exhibit "L", never became effective and the
extension should be considered as not having been given at all. So that, although the complaint was filed on
February 20, 1957, three months before the deadline of the extension on May 31, 1957, there would be no
premature institution of the case. The lower court, therefore, erred in dismissing the case. The decision
appealed from is reversed, and case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 8844 16dec 
Facts: Maulini brought an action upon the contract of indorsement alleged to have been made in his favor by
Serrano on a IOU note executed by Padern, Moreno & Co with Serrano as payee. The indorsement did not
indicate “without recourse”. Maker failed to pay the note upon presentation for payment. Maulini opted to
collect from Serrano as indorser.
Manila CFI although it received parol evidence on the subject provisionally, held that such evidence was
inadmissible to alter, vary, modify or contradict the terms of the contract of indorsement. Thus this tended to
show that, by verbal agreement between Maulini and Serrano, Serrano, in making the indorsement, was acting
as agent for the indorsee, as a mere vehicle for the transfer of title and that his indorsement was w/o
consideration.
It seems that according to the parol evidence, Serrano was a broker doing business of looking up and
ascertaining persons who had money to loan as well as those who desired to borrow money and acting as a
middleman, negotiate a loan between the two.
Issue: WON Serrano may show by parol evidence that the indorsement was w/o consideration and that in
making it, Serrano acted as agent for Maulini as a mere vehicle of transfer of the naked title from Padern to
Maulini for which he received no consideration.
Held: CFI erred in ruling as so. Consideration of a negotiable IOU note is, between the immediate parties to
the contract, open to attack, under proper circumstances, for the purpose of showing an absolute lack or failure
of consideration.
PER does not apply where the purpose of parol evidence is to show that no written contract ever existed. CFI
ruling is REVERSED.
FAMADOR: I agree with dissenting opinion.
PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952) L4388 13aug 
Facts: Seeto went to PNB Surigao and presented a 5T check dated 10Mar pay to cash/bearer drawn by Gan Yek
Kiao against PBCom Cebu. After consultation with PNB employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified
indorsement of the check and PNB accepted it and paid Seeto. Check was mailed to PNB Cebu 20Mar and was
presented to PBCom 09Apr but the check was dishonored for ISF. PNB demanded refund of the check but
Seeto refused claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check the drawer had sufficient funds and that
had PNB forwarded the check earlier, it would have been paid.
PNB filed a complaint with Surigao CFI alleging that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had
sufficient funds and that upon these assurances PNB delivered the 5T to Seeto after the latter had made a
general and unqualified indorsement. Seeto denied having made the alleged assurances. PNB presented 2
witnesses who testified that it was not the practice of PNB to cash out of town checks and that check was
cashed because of Seeto’s assurances. CFI found that Seeto made an undertaking to refund the check in the
event of dishonor and that there was no unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check.
CA held that PNB was guilty of unreasonable retaining and withholding the check and that the delay in the
presentment for payment was inexcusable, so that Seeto was discharged from liability. It also held that parol
evidence is incompetent to show that one signing a check as indorser is merely a surety or guarantor, rejecting
the evidence adduced at the CFI about Seeto’s assurances and promise to refund. CA reversed CFI ruling.
PNB appealed to SC.
PNB argues that the verbal assurances given by Seeto to the employees of the bank that he was ready to refund
the amount if the check should be dishonored by PBCom is a collateral agreement, separate and distinct from
the indorsement, by virtue of which PNB was induced to cash the check, and, therefore, admissible as an
exception to the parol evidence rule.
Held: Assurances made by an indorser that the drawer has funds, which assurances induced bank to cash the
check, are admissible in evidence. We find, however, that the supposed assurances of refund in case of
dishonor of the check are precisely the ordinary obligations of an indorser, and these obligations are, under the
law, considered discharged by an unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment.
There was no express obligation assumed by the respondent herein that the drawer would always have funds, or
that he (the indorser) would refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation, so that
while the CA may have committed an error in disregarding the evidence submitted by petitioner at the trial of
the assurances made by respondent herein at the time of the negotiation of the check, such error was without
prejudice, because the supposed assurances given were part of his obligations as an indorser, which were
discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment. The judgment appealed
from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Woodhouse v. Halili, 93Phil526 (1953) L4811 31jul 
Inducement by fraud may be proved by parol (drafts of the agreement as in this present case) because it goes
into the validity of the agreement.
Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50Phil387 (1927) 26173 13jul
Facts: Robles was a co-heir and at the same time a lessee of Hacienda Nahalinan. Lizarraga Hermanos wanted
to buy the hacienda 2yrs before the expiry of Robles’ lease.
Held: Parol may be received regardless of whether the written agreement contains any reference to the
collateral agreement and whether the action is at law or in equity even if it deals with related matters
Lechugas v. CA, 143scra335 (1986) L39972 06aug 
PER not applicable where suit is between one of the parties to the document and 3 rd persons; PER does not
apply and may not be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not party or privy to the written agreement and does not base a claim on the instrument; both
parties to the agreement must be parties to the suit
Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 96405 26jun
PER does not specify that the agreement be a public document; need not be in any particular form or signed by
the parties; fraud must be corroborated
Facts: Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe and
Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch.
Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their obligation. Both obligors did not respond to the demands made,
private respondent filed a complaint for collection of the sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors.
Petitioner alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his
signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud
and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00.
The lower court ruled in favor of the bank. The petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may overcome the contents of a promissory note.
Held: Petitioner asserts that since the promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a mere
commercial paper which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the contents of the
promissory note. The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.
What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is so
much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties
intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a
written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other
instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
Ortañez v. CA 266scra561 23Jan97
Contemporaneous conditions not referred to in the contract can not be proven by parol; merely alleging that the
contract is subject to conditions does not “put” the exception “in issue in the pleadings”
Facts: On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a
consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9,
1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title
of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain
conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private
respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale:
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between ….
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions,
although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the
introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually
dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo.
Held: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible.
First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the
case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation
where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of
that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an
agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case,
made no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into
the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the
Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms
thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED
H. Interpretation of Documents
1. Rule 130 §10-19
Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. – The language of a writing is to be
interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties
intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. – In the construction of an
instrument where there are several provisions or particulars. such a construction is, if possible, to be
adopted as will give effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions. – In the construction of
an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular
provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a
general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. – For the proper construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties
to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to
interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. – The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in
their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local,
technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance,
in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.(12)
 Sec. 15. Written words control printed. – When an instrument consists partly of written words and
partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings. – When the characters in
which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the
court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understand the language, is
admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred. – When the terms of an agreement have been intended
in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he
supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally
proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was
made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. – When an instrument is equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one is favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. – An instrument may be construed according to usage, in
order to determine its true character. (17)
Rules of interpretation of documents
1. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning in the place of execution
2. Instrument construed so as to give effect to more provisions
3. Interpretation according to intention of the parties
4. particular over general
5. Interpretation according to circumstances of the parties and the subject
6. Terms presumed to be used in primary and general acceptation, evidence of local, technical, or peculiar
signification use admissible
7. Written words control printed
8. When the characters are difficult to decipher, or the language is foreign, the evidence of experts and
interpreters is admissible
9. When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that
sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it
10. When different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the
most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made
11. preference for natural right
12. usage may be considered
2. Arts. 1370-1379 Civil Code
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over
the former.
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood
as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in
keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the
ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission
of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the
greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be known
what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be
observed in the construction of contracts.
Statutory rules of interpretation
1. If the terms are clear, the literal meaning shall control.
2. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the intention shall prevail
3. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
4. terms of a contract shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different
from those upon which the parties intended to agree
5. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
6. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
7. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in keeping with the
nature and object of the contract.
8. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a
contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established.
9. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.
10. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding articles
a. the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of
1) a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail
2) an onerous contract, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests
b. If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be known
what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and void.
11. The principles of interpretation stated in the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed

3. Cases
Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588 (1914)
If from the words the meaning is plain, contract should be enforced according to the words
Facts: Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and stationery business, found itself in such
condition financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, together with many others, agreed to take over the
business, incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant
becoming the two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the
incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant entered into the following agreement:
Therefore, the undersigned mutually and reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part of their
present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co. Inc., till after one year from the date hereof.
Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos as liquidated damages,
unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough
of the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc.
The trial court in dismissing the case, decided favor of the defendant upon the ground that the intention of the parties as it
appeared from the contract in question was to the effect that the agreement should be good and continue only until the corporation
reached a sound financial basis….chuva chu chu.

Issue: Whether or not interpretation is needed in enforcing the contract.

Held: Contracts should be enforced as they read. The first duty of courts in enforcing contracts is to give attention to the words
thereof. If from the words the meaning is plain, the contract should be enforced according to its words.
The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to be
presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English. Interpretation and construction should by the instruments
last resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction
and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for the parties. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil.
Rep., 504.)
In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall
last only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract should last a year and it
was their judgment and conviction that their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. What reason can give for refusing to
follow the plain words of the men who made the contract? We see none.

Capital Insurance v. Sadang, 21 SCRA 1183 (1967)

Doubt resolved against one who prepared the document
Facts: Plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., subscribed to a bond in behalf of Mateo Pinto and in favor of the Macondray
Farms, Inc., the purpose of which was to guarantee the payment of rentals of the fishpond and other obligations of Mateo Pinto.
To protect the interest of plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. from any liability that may arise from the above-mentioned
bond, Mateo Pinto and the defendants in this case, Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica, executed an idemnity agreement and a deed
of real of real estate mortage on the property of the defendants.
Mateo Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the leased fishpond to Macondray Farms, Inc.
Because of the failure of Mateo Pinto to pay the said amount to Macondray Farms, Inc., plaintiff in the instant case as surety had
to pay, as it did pay Macondray Farms, Inc., to settle the obligation of Mateo Pinto with the said Macondray Farms, Inc.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, Mateo Pinto and his indemnitors including herein defendants failed to reimburse the Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., the the said amount.
Because of such failure to make reimbursement, the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., filed Civil Case against Mateo Pinto
and his indemnitors including the defendants in this instant case for the collection.
On the strength of the agreement of the parties in the Civil Case wherein it is agreed among others, that if after the sale of all the
said properties, the judment shall not have been fully satisfied, then plaintiff may file as separate civil action against the defendants-
spouses, Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica, the other indemnitors, but at the same time dismissed the case against the herein
defendants without prejudice.
Two executions were issued by the court for the enforcement of the above-mentioned decision in Civil Case No. 30061 and after
applying the proceeds of the sale of the properties in public auction there is still a deficiency in the amount of P14,456.44 which, in
view of the failure of the herein dependants to pay in spite of plaintiff's repeated demands, had to become the subject of this instant
case.
The trial court rendered judgment on April 20, 1961 (pp. 93-101, Record on Appeal) ordering defendants to pay to plaintiff only,
the amount of P300.00.
Issue: Which among the two interpretations is correct?
Held: To point on which the parties disagree is the interpretation of the following stipulation in the mortgage contract executed by
defendants-appellees:
This mortgage is constituted to indemnify the mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever kind and nature that
it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted as surety on the bond referred to above, and or its substitution, modification,
alteration, change and/or renewals. That liability secured by the above properties is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be
incurred under the bond issued in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc.
Appellant lays stress on the general statement of appellees' liability as it appears in the contract, to wit; "to indemnify the
mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of
having acted as surety or the bond.
Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total
P42,000.00 bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to
them." The trial court found the said testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be
vague or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance
with the real intention of the parties as explained by defendants-appellees.

I. Rule 130 §20: Qualifications of Witnesses

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (18 a)
Qualifications of witnesses
1. can perceive
2. perceiving
3. can make known their perception to others
NOT ground for disqualification
1. Religious belief
2. political belief
3. interest in the outcome of the case, or
4. conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, e.g.
a. A state witness must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17
(e)]
b. A person who has been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony is
disqualified from being a witness to a will (Art. 821 NCC)
1. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
a. Rule 130 §21
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons cannot
be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they
are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at the time of production, even if
he was not so at the time of perception. A child must be mentally mature both at the time of perception and at
the time of production.
With regards to the subject matter of the testimony, we must make a distinction between absolute
disqualifications and relative disqualifications. Objections based on absolute disqualifications may be raised
upon the calling of the disqualified witness. Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised when it
becomes apparent that the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses
1. can’t perceive
2. not perceiving
3. can’t make known their perception to others
4. whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, render them incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others
5. whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and relating them truthfully
6. marital disqualification
7. parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications
1. dead man’s statute
2. marital communication privilege
3. attorney-client privilege
4. an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity
5. Physician-Patient Privilege
6. Priest-Penitent Privilege
7. State Secrets
b. Cases
People v. de Jesus, 129 SCRA 4 (1984)
Even though feeble minded, there is no showing that she could not convey her ideas by words or signs
competent; even if she had difficulty comprehending the questions.
Facts: Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of 28, lived with her parents. Clara Mina, however, is feeble-minded. She is unable to comb
her hair, bathe herself and wash her clothes. Because of her mental condition, she just stayed in the house, doing no household chores
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old farmer, who lived in the house of his sister some 15 meters away from the victim's
house, knew of Clara's mental infirmity, and has often seen her left alone in the house.
While home alone, Clara Mina was seated on top of a trunk when Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered the house, carried her in his
arms and laid her on the floor. Objecting to what was being done to her, Clara gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" ( or SHODI! SHODI!
which translated means "I don't like! I don't like!") Rogelio, ignoring her cries, removed her panties as well as his own trousers. He lay
on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the sexual act. Otherwise stated, BOMBA NA SHO!
Pastora Simon, Clara Mina’s mother caught Rogelio doing “The Nasty.” Rogelio sensed the mother and ran away shouting:
ADTO NA MI NANG!
Returning from the barrio captain's house, Pastora Simon investigated Clara, who revealed to her that she was carried away from
the trunk where she was seated, then forcibly laid on the floor to have sexual intercourse with Rogelio.
 Medical examination conducted the following day revealed the following:
(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, 8 o'clock and 11 o'clock.
(2) vagina admits one finger with ease. Two fingers with difficulty.
(3) fresh perineal abrasion.
(4) smear, not done due to lack of microscope.
(5) contusion — left temporal area. Lesions to heal within one week.
LOVERBOY(Rogelio) was later surrendered by his brother-in-law.
The trial court found LOVERBOY guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
Issue: Whether or not a feeble-minded person (naay teriring) may be a competent witness.
Held: That the complainant was feeble-minded and had displayed difficulty in comprehending the questions propounded on her is an
undisputed fact. However, there is no showing that she could not convey her Ideas by words or signs. It appears in the records
that complainant gave sufficiently intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the court and the counsels. The court is
satisfied that the complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way her own perceptions to others. She is a competent
witness.
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 402 (1993)
Being mental retardate is not per se a disqualification; although speech was slurred, testimony was positive,
clear, plain and unambiguous.
Facts: While Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental retardate, was walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan, Gandara, Samar,
Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for her, accosted her and forcibly took her to the ricefield some
ten meters away. There she was raped by Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met her brother Senecio, to whom
she related her ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to their father. That same night, the family walked the three-kilometer
distance to the police station, where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of his daughter by Salomon and Conge. Sylvia was
medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr. Susan Tanseco, who issued the following certificate:
A physical examination has been done on Miss Sylvia Soria, 20 years of age, a resident of Brgy. Casab-ahan, Gandara,
Samar. P.E. showed a single, linear, laceration on the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock position. There are isolated erythematous
areas on both thighs. There is also the presence of sandy particles on the genital area. Speculum exam, however, showed
negative findings.

Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a four-month search that they were arrested in
Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after being detained there for one month, they were taken back to Samar. Following a
protracted investigation, an information for rape was filed against them with the RTC.

The principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia Soria herself, who recounted in detail the manner of her ravishment by Salomon
with the help of his co-accused Conge. She described how she was dragged to the ricefield by the two accused and there undressed
against her will. As Conge spread and pinned her legs, Salomon mounted and penetrated her, although with difficulty because she was
still a virgin. She felt pain in her vagina and "something slippery." She could not cry out or repel the attack because the two were
stronger than she and Conge was holding a bolo. After her rape, Salomon sucked and twisted her nipples and demanded that he suck
his penis. Her low mentality was demonstrated in her angry testimony of her refusal: "The devil with him, it is not an icedrop."

The trial court found respondents guilty.

Issue: Whether or not a mentally retarded person is qualified to testify.

Held: A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance of
his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them
known to the court. Thus, in People v. Gerones, the Court accepted the testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that she had the
mentality of a nine or ten-year old "because she was able to communicate her ordeal... clearly and consistently." In the case of People
vs. Rondina, this Court declared:
The testimony of the offended party herself was especially telling and credible despite the fact that she was somewhat
mentally deficient, as the trial court noticed. Although she was really of limited intelligence, the complainant nevertheless did
not forget the harrowing experience she suffered during that frightful night in the bushes when the three men seared her
memory with the lust they forced upon her. The tale she narrated in court was not woven out of sheer imagination but born in
anguish and remembered with pain and as plain an unembellished as the simple life she led. If she spoke in forthright
language at the trial, it was because she was speaking the truth of that horrible ravishment she could not push out of her mind.

In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask her leading
questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility. We
also believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases that a woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trail,
with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her
abuse.

People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, Feb. 2, 1996

Any child, regardless of age, can be a witness as long as he meets the qualifications for competency:
observation, recollection, and communication.
Facts: Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in her home. She suffered extensive second to
fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her husband, accused-
appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with the crime of parricide.
As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul Michael could testify thereon.
 In his testimony during the presentation of the evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul Michael declared that one evening
inside their house, his father boxed his mother on her mouth and then tied her up. However, the witness did not answer succeeding
questions which sought to elicit what happened thereafter, although he kept on looking at his father throughout this period. He later
revealed that he saw matches and kerosene in their house. He likewise declared that his mother was now in heaven because she was
dead. During his rebuttal testimony, Paul Michael categorically declared that it was his father who "burned" his mother.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael and ruled against the accused. The appeal was
likewise unfavorable to the accused.
Issue: The competence of the five-year old witness.
Held: Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to
others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the:
(a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and
(c) capacity of communication.
And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial
court is called upon to make such determination. As held in United States vs. Buncad, quoting from Wheeler vs. United States, and
reiterated in People vs. Raptus and People vs. Libungan:
The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his
apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and
intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into
the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it
was erroneous.
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. We agree. A close and careful examination of the testimony of
Paul Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a child of above average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving
responsive answers to the questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and relating them to such recollections.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

2. Marriage
a. Rule 130 §22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification rule
1. marriage subsists
2. a spouse is a litigant
3. no consent from the spouse-litigant
4. not a civil case by one against the other, or a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
GR: During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse
Exceptions:
1. in a civil case by one spouse against the other spouse, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one spouse against
a. the other spouse or;
b. the other spouse’s direct descendants or ascendants
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or not communicated by one spouse to the other.
It applies only during the existence of the marriage. It can be invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action.
It is an absolute disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to testify.
This is a testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial privilege of ascendants and descendants
(Rule 130 §25). Hence, the witness has no say whether the objection is to be raised or not. The holder of the
privilege is the spouse-litigant. When the spouse-litigant consents to the testimony, the spouse-witness must
testify whether he wants to or not.
cf Rule 130 §24 (a), Marital Communications
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other,
or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
Marital Disqualification Marital Communications
 Covers all matters regardless of source
Applies during the marriage
A spouse must be a litigant
Invoked when a spouse is called to testify
Covers only those communicated by one spouse to
another
Applies during and after the marriage
A spouse need not be a litigant
Invoked when the testimony appears to cover
privileged matters

Note that the exceptions under the marital disqualification and marital communications rule are the same.
b. Cases
Ordoño v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270 (1975) L-39012 jan31
The wife can therefore testify against her husband in such a case for rape against her daughter because it is
considered a crime against the wife. When an offense directly attacks, or directly impairs the conjugal relation,
it comes within the exception to the marital disqualification rule.
de Leon: Note that when this case was decided, a crime by a spouse against the other’s descendant was not yet
an express exception to the marital disqualification rule.
Facts: Avelino Ordoño was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his
daughter, Leonora, on 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty four
year old victim.
In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife,
respectively) if they reported the crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoño in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter,
Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense.
Catalina Ordoño said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoño against Leonora was mentioned during the
investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoño for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoño.
The defense counsel objected to the wife’s competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoño's motion for the reconsideration of
the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his
wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
Held: Under the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court providing that the
husband or wife cannot be a witness for or against the other, ". . . except in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other." the wife is competent to testify against her husband in a case of rape
committed by the husband against their daughter, In the law of evidence, the rape of a daughter is a
crime committed by the husband against his wife within the meaning of the exception.
The phrase "in a tribunal case for a crime committed by one against the other," an exception to the marital
disqualification rule, should be interpreted to refer to an offense which directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs the conjugal relations.
In Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257, it was held that the wife was a competent witness against the husband in
a prosecution for rape committed by the husband against his stepdaughter, who is the wife's natural daughter
because the crime was "an outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest relations as well as a crime against
humanity itself." The court adopted the interpretation the "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other" may refer to a crime where the wife is the individual partially and directly
injured or affected by the crime for which the husband is being prosecuted."
In State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090, it was held under the statutory provision the husband or wife
shall in no case be a witness for or against the other, except in a criminal proceeding for a crime committed by
one against the other, that the wife was competent to testify against the other, that the wife was competent to
testify against the husband in a case where he was prosecuted for incest committed against his stepdaughter.
In State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N.W. 539, it was held that the wife may testify against the husband in a
case where he was prosecuted for incest committed against their eleven-year old daughter because incest is a
"crime committed against the wife."
People v. Castañeda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979) L-46306 feb27
The wife can testify against the husband in a case for falsification of the wife’s signature (marital consent) in
public documents to sell share of wife in conjugal property because it is a crime committed by the husband
against the wife.
Facts: The above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, forged the signature of his spouse Victoria M.
Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria
M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify
her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the
rule.
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifying for or against her husband. A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by
respondent Judge.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document committed by a husband against
his wife, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held: We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule.
A criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against the husband—who allegedly forged the
signature of his wife in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent to the
sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife, and, therefore, an
exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by
one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual
antecedents of the instant case.
In Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the other spouse is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad. The
better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who
stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is
undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation.
Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from
testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," to espouse
the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications
against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and
prejudice her in secret — all with unabashed and complete impunity.
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) L-25643 jun27
Wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in a case of collusive fraud, where their interests are not separate,
can not be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party.
Facts: Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., together with C.N.
Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice
Plant. Named as defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the spouses
Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the
La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership,
Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court for the collection of P150,000,
which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose
Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain
judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons was served on Jose
Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila acquired no jurisdiction over
the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that court was void.
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while admitting that the company was placed
under receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president of the La Paz Ice
Plant and that as such he had authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case
39827. They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's claim
because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a
resolution of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a
subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of
Court." The request was granted over the objection of the petitioners.
Issue: Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness
by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, without infringing on her marital
privilege not to testify against her husband under section 20 (b) of Rule 130.
Held: The reason for the privilege of husband and wife not to testify against each other is the natural
repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's
condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate
life partner.
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be
asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether
her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be
to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.
Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the
spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the
possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a
manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.
In a suit charging fraud against the spouses, the wife cannot be compelled to testify as an adverse party
witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without violating section 20(b) of Rule 130,
where as in this case, the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident
purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge. Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one
spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to
the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is
merely a formal or nominal party.
People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) L-568 jul16
When the husband imputes crime against wife, he waives the marital disqualification rule.
Facts: On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held
as detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested permission from
the chief of police, and he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him.
Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room
of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the
scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right
breast which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo,
aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his
child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on: (1)
the affidavit, Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is a virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit D,
which is the record made by the justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon
which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of the
appellant.
Issue: Whether or not the rebuttal testimony of the wife of the appellant violates the rule on disqualification by
reason of marriage.
Held: "The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have
been stated thus:
 First, identity of interests;
 second, the consequent danger of perjury;
 third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private
life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its
admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and,
 fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the other." (70 C. J., 119.)
The rule that the husband and wife cannot testify for or against each other, as all other general rules, has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
The defendant, who was accused of killing his son, testifying in his own behalf, not only limited himself to
denying that he was the killer, but went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in the
imputation of the crime upon his wife. Held: That in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness,
be held to have intended all its natural and necessary consequences. by his said act, the husband--himself
exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations — must be
taken to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such
objection would have been available at the outset.
As above modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
3. Dead Man’s Statute
a. Rule 130 §23
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind. (20a)
Requisites for dead man’s statute
1. the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff
2. Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the person of unsound mind is the
defendant
3. upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind
4. as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.
5. [no counterclaim is filed]

b. Cases
Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) GR#74306 16mar 
The dead man’s statute does not apply where the case is filed by the estate. Besides, cross-examination of the
witness is a waiver of the privilege.
Facts: In his complaint, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., et. Al.
be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in
the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the defendants from disposing of the said shares of
stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment vs. properties of defendants having possession of shares of stock and
for receivership of the properties of defendant corporation . . .
In their answer, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record of the
corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement between
defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession of
Razon. Appellees also alleged…that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question…
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication
of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead
man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case
did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased
opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such
testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the “Dead man’s statute is applicable in the case at bar.
Held: In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner
herein) to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the
1,5000 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian
opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late
Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is
clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not
filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner
as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was
subject to cross-examination by the private respondents' counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony
is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed
to have waived the rule.
Reyes v. Wells, 54 Phil 102 (1929) 
If the witness sought to be disqualified is not the plaintiff (e.g. disinterested 3 rd party), the dead man’s statute is
not applicable.
Guerrero v. St. Clare’s Realty, 124 SCRA 553 (1983) L58164 02sep 
Mere witnesses not parties to the case are not disqualified by the dead man’s statute. Furthermore, the rule
requires that the defendant must be the estate. It does not apply where the heirs are being sued in their
individual capacities. “Representatives” are only those who, like the executor, one sued in their representative,
not personal, capacity.
Facts: During their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the
disputed property, which is a parcel of land. The spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio,
Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his
demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to
Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots. Accordingly,
upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot and cultivated it through his
tenant Dominador Ramirez. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted
the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner's
share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in
the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner's share in the produce for as long as she needed the
property. Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of Andres Guerrero.
Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their
children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres
Guerrero.
The land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrer. Sometime during the
latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land approached some of
the plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the
land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered the
following: that Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a 'Deed of Sale of
Land' purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero, assisted by Felicisimo
Guerrero, father of the defendants Guerreros, filed an application for registration of land; that notwithstanding
the opposition of the heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite
oppositors' appeal to a higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title to the applicant;
that on there was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by
Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the
registration of that deed; that on the same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros
caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves
as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute
Sale" to the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the
name of said realty company.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had been sick for a long
time before she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; and that her mother could walk only inside their house in
Parañaque; that the money spent for the illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her
children, Cristina Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres Guerrero
had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros objected to the line of
questioning on the ground that the said witness was testifying "on matters which are prohibited under Sec.
20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court."
The defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of
Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. On November
16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other
witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded.
Held: Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in error.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are
being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the
estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of dead man's rule. "
It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse
party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their
spirit. The law uses the word 'against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.'
It should be noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative
follows, which means that the word 'representative' includes only those who, like the executor or administrator,
are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words
'against the estate of such deceased persons,' which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased
at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in
the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative." (Moran, ibid., pp.
169-171)
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and
neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are
mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but
Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina
Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero
Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 (1962) L16741 31jan 
A cross-examination of the disqualified witness is a waiver of the dead man’s privilege, even if there was a
continuing objection.
Facts: Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. and executed a promissory note in favor of
the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest. The note was executed in the presence of
Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto.
Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay.
On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April
23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid.
 In Special Proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, Florencia Q. Vda. de
Abraham, together with her sons, filed a pleading entitled "Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount
represented by the note. As soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the claimants
reproduced their "Reclamation" before the lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. The counsel for
the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham
invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the claimant had
testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters against which he interposed a general objection.
The trial court issued in Order-Decree allowing the claim against the intestate estate of Juan C. Ysmael
The appellate court concluded that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants have established a
just and valid claim.
Issue: Whether or not the wife of the deceased was disqualified from testifying.
Held: There was a waiver of the prohibition contained in Section 26(c), Rules 123 of the Rules of Court,
when the counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on the very matters
subject of the prohibition. The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate
as to what his examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which
he may pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he
has put the opposite party to the expense, and has consumed the time of courts in a trial of the case in
accordance with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such
course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be countenanced in any court
of justice (IV Francisco, Rules of Court, 876, 877, citing the case of Comstock's Adm'r vs. Jacobs, 89 VT. 133,
94 A. 497, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 465).
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) L2016 23aug
This in effect ruled that the Dead Man’s statute can not be invoked against a plaintiff-corporation. Interest no
longer disqualifies a witness. Officers/stockholder of corporation may testify in a case filed against the estate of
a deceased by the corporation
Escolin: In an action where the administrator is the plaintiff, the defendant may testify on facts occurring prior
to the death of the decedent.
Facts: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Company of Manila when the Pacific war broke out. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545
shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the company. In
1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of
stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company. Under his agreements with the
company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of
stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the
amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding number of the company's shares of
stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944 and special proceeding was subsequently instituted for the
settlement of his estate.
In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of Richard T. Fitzsimmons. In his answer to the
amended claim the administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of the deceased to the claimant.
It is admitted that all the prewar books and records of the company were completely destroyed or lost during the
war so testimonies of witnesses were admitted.
The claimant called as witnesses Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-president-treasurer and
president, respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the status of the personal account of the deceased
Fitzsimmons with the company; but upon objection of the administrator the trial court refused to admit their
testimony on that point on the ground that said witnesses were incompetent under section 26(c) of Rule 123,
they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer
and president, respectively, of the claimant company.
Issue: Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or
administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person.
Held: Officers and directors of corporations are not considered to be parties within the meaning of the law.
(City Savings Bank vs. Enos)
Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties,
the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying for or against the
corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 (1927) 27498 20sep
Action must be brought against the estate, not by the estate, to be covered under the dead man’s statute
Escolin: The dead man’s rule does not apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument evidencing the claim, it would be difficult to prove the claim in the estate
proceeding because of the dead man’s statute. However, if there is such an instrument, it is not barred by the
dead man’s statute (Neibert v. Neibert)
Facts: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. Marcelino died leaving
Anastacia as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It
appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which
he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his
wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long
after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action when she presented a motion for a revision of certain decrees
within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was joined by the administratrix of the
estate. A decision was rendered by ordered that in lieu of the issued decrees, new decrees and certificates of title
be issued as the exclusive properties of Anastacia Vianzon. Sometime later, a motion for a new trial was
presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel for the losing party (administratrix). This motion was denied
by the trial judge.
The administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the recovery of specified property
and for damages. The court renders judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint. The motion for a
new trial was denied by His Honor, the trial judge.
From both of the judgments hereinbefore mentioned, the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco had
appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the widow should be discarded.
Held: Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on the part of the surviving party.
He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth
and was not designed to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix
of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is
one by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds
true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and
there is no defendant.
Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested
person with respect to the prohibited matters.
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties
were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted
to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to
"guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party."
We are of the opinion that the witness was competent.
Goñi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986) 
Heirs of a deceased are “representatives” within the ambit of the dead man’s statute; waived by defendant if he
files counterclaim against plaintiff; adverse party may testify to transactions or communications with deceased
which were made with an agent of such person if the agents is still alive and can testify as long as it is confined
to the transactions
J. Privileged Communications
Privileged Communications
1. marital
2. attorney-client
3. physician-patient
4. priest-penitent
5. state secrets
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification. Each of those enumerated is disqualified to testify as to specific
matters only. It does not disqualify them from testifying on matters not privileged. Hence, it is improper to
object to their testimony upon mere subpoena. One must wait until it becomes apparent that their testimony
covers matters that are privileged (e.g. upon asking of a question that covers privileged matters; when the
purpose of their testimony as admitted by the offeror covers privileged matters) before one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is nevertheless a testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial
privilege of ascendants and descendants (Rule 130 §25). [careful not to be confused in the multiple meanings of
the word “privilege”] Hence, the witness has no say whether the objection is to be raised or not. When the
holder of the privilege (not necessarily the opposing party) consents to the testimony, the witness must testify.
Note that the wording of the law is to the effect that “(someone) may not be examined without the consent of
(another).” The law does not say that one can not testify or be examined over the objection of another. The
wording of the law is to the effect that an objection of the other party in the privileged communication is not
necessary for the privilege to hold. Consent of the other party in the privileged communication is an act that
needs to be proved for the testimony to be admitted. This is not to say that failure of a such a party to object
will never render such testimony admissible. This is to say that where the other party to the privileged
communication is not a litigant in the case, and privileged communication is offered in evidence without the
consent of such party, the litigant against whom the testimony is offered may object to its admission on the
ground of privileged communication. Where the other party in the privileged communication is a litigant, then
his failure to object will be taken as a consent to the testimony or a waiver of a privilege.
The communication that is privileged need not be in any form. It can be oral or written.
The communication ceases to be privileged if knowingly communicated in the presence of 3 rd persons. In such
a case, the privilege may not be invoked at all. However, if the privileged communication was within the
surreptitious observation of a 3rd person, then the communication can be invoked if either the communicator or
communicatee called to testify. However, the privilege can not be invoked if the 3rd person is called to testify.
1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 §24 (a)
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
Requisites for Marital Communications Rule
1. communication received
a. from the spouse
b. in confidence
c. during the marriage
2. without the consent of the spouse
Note that the marital communication rule applies even after the marriage. It applies only to matters
communicated by one spouse to another in confidence. It does not cover knowledge of matters that a spouse
obtains from a source other than other spouse. It can be invoked even if neither spouse is a party to the action.
It is a relative disqualification and can be invoked only when it is apparent that the testimony would cover
privileged matters.
The exceptions to the rule are:
1. in a civil case by one against the other, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants
cf Rule 130 §22: Marital Disqualification Rule
 Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or communicated by one spouse to the other. It
applies only during the existence of the marriage. It can be invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It
is an absolute disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to testify.
Marital Disqualification (Rule 130, Sec. 22) Marital Communications (Rule 130, Sec. 24 [a])
Covers all matters regardless of source Covers only matters communicated by one spouse to
another, during the marriage
Applies during the marriage Applies during and after the marriage
A spouse must be a litigant A spouse need not be a litigant
Invoked when a spouse is called to testify Invoked when the testimony appears to cover
privileged matters
MEMORIZE!
b. Cases
People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925) L22948 17mar
Where the privilege communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a 3 rd party, without
collusion or voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, not privilege; illegality of seizure must be raised
by motion before trial for return of letter; unanswered letter inadmissible
Facts: It appears from the evidence that the victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, performed a
surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. After her release
therefrom she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the
wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The
defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and
that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that
his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the
two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape but
the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him
and as a consequence of the three wounds he died within a few minutes. The defendants made his escape but
surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following.
The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore constituted murder.
This finding can only be sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant by his
wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before the
commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore
not admissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the letter was a privileged communication.
Held: The letter in question was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued.
The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was
written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to
impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that
purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in
the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his
possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay
and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be
confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.
The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible
on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that
where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his
silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.

2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 §24 (b)
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity;
Requisites for attorney-client privilege
1. existence of an attorney-client relationship
2. witness is an attorney
3. as to communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
4. the communication was made in confidence
5. communication was made in the course of, or with a view to professional employment
The privilege extends to the attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity. The difference being consent of only the client is needed for the
attorney to testify. However, the consent of both the attorney and the client is necessary for the attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk to testify.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply if the attorney was sued by his client.
b. Cases
Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) L-9231 06jan
Communication made by client to attorney for purpose of being communicated to others not privileged, e.g.
compromise agreement.
Facts: The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods
destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a
business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it
under the same name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's
interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire
"Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father.
During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the
administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or
P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this
action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased
father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the
policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the
policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff
was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the
surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose.
Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and
objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal, base their
argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted
upon
Issue: Was the testimony in question privileged?
Held: It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being
communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has
faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was
intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person,
and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
AS to whether a waiver of the client's privilege personally made in open court can be withdrawn before acted
upon, quaere. (consider whether it is correct).
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) 105938 20sep
Prosecution can not use attorneys as leverage to compel them to name their clients; client’s identity is protected
when there is a strong probability exists that revealing client’s name would implicate him in the very activity for
which he sought advice.
Facts: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by
the RP, through the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its
members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these
services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name,
and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their
clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal
and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No.
0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
The PCGG alleged that ACCRA law firm was involved in setting up financial and corporate framework and
structures through the use of coco levy funds. In their answer, ACCRA said that the acts were made the course
of rendering professional and legal services to clients.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of
its client covering their respective shareholdings.
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by
respondent PCGG
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer may refuse in giving the identity of his client.
Held: Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the
identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in
street parlance.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.
Reasons:
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to grope in
the dark against unknown forces.
Exceptions:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal
client confidences.
What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a
fishing expedition by the prosecution.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which
there would be not attorney-client relationship).
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal
service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners,
therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which
legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of
Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime."
The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be difficult to
simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information
revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly
privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a
principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
Boss Joel manifestation: it is premature to apply the rules on evidence for there is no case yet, hence, there is
no compulsion on the part of the lawyer to disclose the identity of there client.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) L-21237 22mar
Letter from client to attorney obtained by adverse party, admitted authentic in court, not privileged regardless
whether legally or illegally obtained (what about constitutional rule of exclusion on evidence obtained in
violation of the right to privacy of communication and correspondence?); one who overhears the
communication with or without client’s knowledge is not privileged.
Facts: The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in the City of Manila, while the defendant is a
corporation organized under the law of the Philippine Islands with its principal office in the City of Cebu. Said
company appears to be the owner by a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products,
located in Leyte and known as the Lucio mine. William Anderson, as president and general manager of the
defendant company, addressed a letter to the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the products of the
Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter.
Plaintiff alleges that during the life of the agency indicated in Exhibit B, he rendered services to the defendant
company in the way of advertising and demonstrating the products of the defendant and expended large sums of
money in visiting various parts of the world for the purpose of carrying on said advertising and demonstrations,
in shipping to various parts of the world samples of the products of the defendant, and in otherwise carrying on
advertising work.
Anderson wrote the plaintiff, to the effect that the company was behind with construction and was not then able
to handle big contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12, Anderson was in Manila and the two had an interview, in
the course of which the plaintiff informed Anderson of the San Francisco order. Anderson thereupon said that,
owing to lack of capital, adequate facilities had not been provided by the company for filling large orders and
suggested that the plaintiff had better hold up in the matter of taking orders. The plaintiff expressed surprise at
this and told Anderson that he had not only the San Francisco order (which he says he exhibited to Anderson)
but other orders for large quantities of bituminous limestone to be shipped to Australia and Shanghai. In another
interview on the same Anderson definitely informed the plaintiff that the contracts which be claimed to have
procured would not be filled.
Barton sued for specific performance. In the course of the trial, the defendant offered in evidence a carbon copy
of a letter written by the plaintiff to his attorney in which plaintiff states, among other things, that his profit
from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of eigthy-five cents (gold) per ton. The authenticity
of this city document is admitted, and when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant the
counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence
if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney for the
defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant without
explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. Upon this the attorney for the
plaintiff made this announcement: "We hereby give notice at this time that unless such an explanation is made,
explaining fully how this carbon copy came into the possession of the defendant company, or any one
representing it, we propose to object to its admission on the ground that it is a confidential communication
between client and lawyer." No further information was then given by the attorney for the defendant as to the
manner in which the letter had come to his hands and the trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on the
ground that it was a privileged communication between client and attorney.
Issue: Whether or not the letter should be considered as privileged communication bet. Atty & client.
Held: We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the
privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter
came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The
law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal
relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. In this connection Mr. Wigmore says:
The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of exemption from its processes of
disclosure against himself or the attorney or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit
more, is necessary for the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third
persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication, whether
with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought
to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy.
Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) 34098 17sep
Introduction in evidence of a part of a paper by one party waives privilege as to other parts of the same writing;
when a party invokes BER, it is the party who produces the original who is deemed to have introduced it in
evidence; contract for attorney’s fees is not privileged; there is no partial waiver of privilege.
Facts: The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the CFI of Manila for the
purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company, upon
merchandise destroyed by a fire. In one of the clauses of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that
all benefit under the policy would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and
action or suit should not be commenced within three months after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient
Insurance Company, interposed in the case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of defense, that the company
rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same
day, and that suit was not instituted on the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three months after
the rejection of the claim.
In the Course of the trial the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being
examined in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the circumstances surrounding the
institution of the action, said that he had reported certain conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: he
waited for about a week longer and not having heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, he
(Bachrach) received a letter from their attorneys urging him to file these cases. The attorney for the defendant,
Orient Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, asking that the witness be required to produce the letter
referred to from Mr. Guevara, or else his answer be stricken out. The witness replied that he had the letter with
him and that he had no objection to show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged him to proceed with the
cases. Upon being asked about the other part of the letter, the witness said that the other part contained private
matter, "between the attorney and ourselves. Thereupon the attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance
Company, said he would like to see the letter, inquiring as to its date. The witness replied that it bore date of
July 13, 1929; and upon the court inquiring whether the witness had any objection to the reading of the letter by
the attorney for the defendant, the witness replied that he wished to consult with his attorney. Upon this the
attorney for the adversary party, the Orient Insurance Company, suggested that he would like to have the letter
marked without his reading it and it was accordingly marked as Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In view of
the production of the letter, I withdraw the objection to the statement of the witness as to its contents," and he
added: "I now ask the permission of the court to read the letter for my information." The court thereupon
inquired of the attorney for the Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any objection, and the attorney observed
that he would have no objection to the disclosing of that part of the letter which referred exactly to the point of
the urging of the filing of the complaints, and he added: "Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being a
communication between a client and attorney, I don't think, if your Honor please, it can be disclosed without the
consent of both."
Issue: Whether or not a communication may be presented only in part, excluding other parts for being
privileged communication.
Held:  The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing by one party waives privilege as to other parts
of the same writing.
 When part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one litigant, his adversary is entitled to use other parts of
the same writing, so far as relevant to the issues in the case; and to this end the attorney of the latter has a right
to inspect the writing and to require its production in court.
A witness for the plaintiff made an oral statement as to the substance of part of a letter which had been received
by the plaintiff from its attorney, and when the fact was revealed that the communication had been made by
letter, the attorney for the defendant requested that the witness be required to produce the letter in court, and if
not, that his answer should be stricken out. This in legal effect was a demand for the production of "the best
evidence," it being a well-known rule of law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the
contents of a paper writing which can be produced in court. In response to this request that portion of the letter
to which the witness had supposedly referred was read into the record.
It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other portions of the
letter in proof, that the other parts were privileged, because they related to the terms of employment between
attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid to the attorney. With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a
contract for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might, under certain circumstances, certainly be,
but not privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private
matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of
privileged nature. Privilege primarily refers to communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course
includes communications from attorney to client relative to privileged matters.
But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the adversary
was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the
letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration,
conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as
to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any exception.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
Privilege does not extend to information gathered by an attorney from witnesses; Work-Product of atty can not
be secured without sufficient justification.
Facts: On February 7, 1943, the tug 'J. M. Taylor' sank while engaged in helping to tow a car float of the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident was apparently unusual in
nature, the cause of it still being unknown. Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later the
tug owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend
them against potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for
damages to the tug.
A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United States Steamboat Inspectors, at which the four
survivors were examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to all interested parties. Shortly
thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with an eye toward
the anticipated litigation; the survivors signed these statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh also interviewed
other persons believed to have some information relating to the accident and in some cases he made
memoranda of what they told him. At the time when Fortenbaugh secured the statements of the survivors,
representatives of two of the deceased crew members had been in communication with him. The fifth claimant,
petitioner herein, brought suit in a federal court under the Jones Act on November 26, 1943, naming as
defendants the two tug owners, individually and as partners, and the railroad.
One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the tug owners. The 38th interrogatory read:
'State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia'
or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug
'John M. Taylor'.
The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the interrogatories except No. 38 and the supplemental
ones just described. While admitting that statements of the survivors had been taken, they declined to
summarize or set forth the contents. They did so on the ground that such requests called 'for privileged matter
obtained in preparation for litigation' and constituted 'an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files.' It
was claimed that answering these requests 'would involve practically turning over not only the complete files,
but also the telephone records and, almost, the thoughts of counsel.'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, held that the requested matters were
not privileged. The court then decreed that the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for the tug
owners forthwith 'Answer Plaintiff's 38th interrogatory and supplemental interrogatories. Upon their refusal, the
court adjudged them in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they complied.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of the District Court.
Issue: Whether or not any pre-trial device at the disposal of either counsel be used to inquire into materials
collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation.
Held: In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials secured and prepared by Fortenbaugh, petitioner
emphasizes that the deposition- discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to
enable the parties to discover the true facts and to compel their disclosure wherever they may be found. It is said
that inquiry may be made under these rules, epitomized by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which is not
privileged; and since the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly and liberally as possible, the
privilege limitation must be restricted to its narrowest bounds. On the premise that the attorney-client privilege
is the one involved in this case, petitioner argues that it must be strictly confined to confidential
communications made by a client to his attorney. And since the materials here in issue were secured by
Fortenbaugh from third persons rather than from his clients, the tug owners, the conclusion is reached
that these materials are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26.
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental impressions in issue in this case fall outside the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is
unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the federal courts. For
present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does
this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel
for his own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an
attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
Privilege extends to information given by employees to corporate communications not to facts.
Facts: Certain foreign subsidiaries of the parties, made questionable payments to foreign govts to secure
business.  The main offices directed their counsel to interview those employees and advise them on acceptable
courses of conduct.  The corporation thereafter voluntarily submitted a report to the SEC disclosing the
questionable payments, which in turn transmitted a copy of that report to the IRS.  The IRS was given a list of
all those interviewed, but the attys refused to produce their notes and memorandum.
Issue: Whether atty-client privilege is available to communications between corporate officers and employees
and attys for corporation
Held: The communications by petitioner's employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege
If an employee making the communication, of whatever rank, is in a position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the atty, then
he is (or personifies), the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would
apply.  The privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice, but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice, because the lawyer must be fully
informed in order for his client to obtain full advantage of the legal system.  The ethical obligation of a lawyer
to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client, but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance
(Hickman v. Taylor).   The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure
of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the atty.  The protection of the privilege extends only
to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning a fact is an entirely
different thing.  The client cannot be compelled to answer the question >What did you say or write to the atty?=
but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact . . . merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into
his communication to his atty.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447 (1983)
The general rule is the identity of a client is not protected; legal advice exception may be defeated through
prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of present or intended continuing
illegality, as where the representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy; it is the link between the client and the
communication, not the link between client and possibility of potential criminal prosecution which is protected;
last link exception is abandoned; disclosure might possibly implicate client in criminal activity not an exception
US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)
Statement made by co-defendant to an investigator acting for defendant’s counsel protected; communication by
client to attorney remain privileged when attorney shares them with co-defendant for a common defense
US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975)
Protection does not extend to the communication regarding an intended crime; communication divulged to
strangers not protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975)
Facts: During respondent’s federal criminal trial, which resulted in a conviction, defense counsel sought to
impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a defense investigator regarding
statements previously obtained from the witnesses by the investigator. When the investigator was called as a
witness, the District Court stated that a copy of the investigator’s report would have to be submitted to the
prosecution for inspection at the completion of the investigator’s testimony. Defense counsel said he did not
intend to produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator could not testify about his interviews with the
witnesses. CA, considering such ruling to be a reversible error, held that both the Fifth Amendment and Federal
Rule Criminal Procedure 16 prohibited the disclosure condition imposed.
Held: Work-Product Doctrine waived when client presents investigator as witness. Statements made by 3 rd
persons gathered by investigation not covered by the privilege.
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
Facts:

3. Physician-Patient Privilege
a. Rule 130 §24 (c)
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cf Rule 28, Sec. 3 and 4
Sec. 3. Report of findings. — If requested by the party examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver to
him a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions. After such request and
delivery, the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party examined a like
report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses
to deliver such report, the court on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a
physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial. (3a)
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by taking the deposition of
the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same controversy,
regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or
physical examination. (4)
Requisites for physician-client privilege
1. civil case
2. witness is a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
3. as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending
such patient in a professional capacity
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity
5. the information would blacken the reputation of the patient
Escolin: The old rule used the word “character” (what the person actually is). The new rules use the word
“reputation” (what people think of the person).
Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.
Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are covered by the privilege. Hence, nurses,
midwives and other people who attend to the ill can be called to testify as to any matter.
The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the witness does not testify to matters specifically
referring to the patient.
There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.
de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal cases?

1) Cases
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 91114 25sep
The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting physician to give expert testimony regarding
hypothetical facts.
Facts: Petitioner Nelly Lim and private respondent Juan Lim are lawfully married to each other. Private
respondent filed a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly
suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
present."
Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own
behalf. Private respondent's counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes
in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring
Dr. Acampado to testify. Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought
to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional
capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena
was issued.
Petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending
resolution of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard this urgent motion. Movant argued that having
seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the
rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel for private respondent contended,
however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information
acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge,
denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify.
Petitioner filed with the public respondent CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the aforesaid
order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado's testimony.
CA denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish the confidential nature of the testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is covered by the disqualification by reason of privileged. (doctor-patient)
Held: We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication because the
information were not obtained from the patient while attending her in her professional capacity and neither were
the information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And
neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the patient or bring
disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge of the Female Service
of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of
the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an
attending physician of petitioner.
RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. — This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and
make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously
to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.
SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no
timely objection is made to the physician's testimony.
REQUISITES. — In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient.
CONDITIONS. — These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties;
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered;
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
SCOPE. — The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to
the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."
Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) 108854 14june
Non-physician testimony on a medical psychologist’s report is not covered by the physician-patient privilege.
This is hearsay (because the other party could not cross examine the doctor who prepared the report) but there
was no objection.
Facts: Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. The relationship between the couple developed
into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital
strain. The effort however proved futile. They finally separated in fact.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by
Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with
Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the
time of the wedding and thereafter." The decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite."
Later, voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was ordered by the CFI of Pasig.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in
her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
The trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals which denied the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is covered by the disqualification by reason of privileged. (doctor-patient)
Held: Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced.
Lim v. Court of Appeals (214 SCRA 273 [1992]) clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may
be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
 (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient."
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed
by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and
effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
4. Rule 130 §24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined
as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
Requisites for Priest-Penitent Privilege
1. witness is a minister or priest
2. as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character
3. in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs
5. State Secrets
a. Rule 130 §24(e)
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. (21a)
Requisites for the State Secrets rule
1. witness is a public officer
2. as to communications made to him in official confidence
3. the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
b. Cases
US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, executive privilege
can not prevail over due process.
Facts: A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the
Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of
conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena
claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to
preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest.
Issue: Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality
power, entirely immune from judicial review?
Held: No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential
privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic
affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned
shortly after the release of the tapes.
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) 70054 08july
Confidential information is not necessarily privileged; no public interest is prejudiced by disclosure, thus not
protected; is there a need for a law to declare it confidential?
Facts: Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents" is the Order of RTC, Makati,
granting the motion of the petitioner herein, based on Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court, for the
production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records which are claimed as needed by the Petitioner
Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservator's report dated and
Receiver's Report.
The documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino
…
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank
Governor Jose Fernandez; …..etc, etc, etc.
The RTC considered the documents not privileged because these constitute or contain evidence material
to the issues into by the Court. These materials are said to comprise of records of the administrative
proceedings conducted by respondent's officials and representatives from the inception of and preparation of the
challenged reports and the resolution placing petitioner under receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it
is the regularity and impartiality of these administrative proceedings which are being assailed by the petitioner,
the trial court saw no reason why said documents should be thus concealed from it.
The grounds recited in support of their petition are the following:
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and
15 of the Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. ….
Sec. 15. Responsibility. — Any member … wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such
violation or negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of a confidential
nature about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act,
or about the operations of the Bank, and to the use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of
the Government, the Bank or third parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).
Issue: Whether or not the said documents are privileged.
Held: We accept the view taken by the court below that the documents are not privileged and that these
constitute or contain evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.
The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision
in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit
pending before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties.
Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful and
indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
This privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of
public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol.
5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the
papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January
25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or
peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason for
their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public officials acted
rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke
fear of disclosure
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and
its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not
there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that—
Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public, the
community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected
(State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
6. Newsman’s Privilege
a. RA 53 as amended by RA 1477
Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor,
columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or
committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
Requisites of newsman’s privilege
1. publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter
2. of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
3. cannot be compelled to reveal
4. as to the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication
5. related in confidence
Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of
the State.
b. Cases 
Matter of Farber (A.B.), 394 A. 2d 330 (1978)
Constitution prevails over shield law, but entitled to hearing to prove relevance.
7. Bank Deposits (RA 1405)
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Note that the privilege applies only to bank deposits. As to other property being held by a bank, bank personnel
may be examined upon order of a court (Sec. 55.1 [d], RA 8791, General Banking Act of 2000).
K. Parental and Filial Privilege
1. Rule 130 §25
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. – No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other
direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
There is no distinction between legitimate or illegitimate relations.
Note that this is a testimonial privilege, not a testimonial disqualification, found in §22-24 of Rule 130 [careful
not to be confused in the multiple use of the word “privilege”]. Here, the witness is the holder of the privilege
and has the power to invoke or waive the privilege. The relative against whom he is testifying can not invoke
nor waive the privilege. However this must be construed in the light of Art. 215 of the Family Code
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such
testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)
Hence, a descendant may be compelled to testify in a criminal case where
1. the descendant-witness himself is the victim, or
2. the descendant-witness’s parent commits a crime against the descendant-witness’s other parent.
Note that an ascendant may not be compelled to testify even if it is a crime by the descendant against the
ascendant-witness. The ascendant-witness may testify voluntarily though.
2. Case
People v. Publico, 7 CAR (2s) 703 (1972)
Information given by child to 3rd person is protected
L. Admissions
Admissions that are admissible against a party
1. Admissions against interest
2. Compromises
3. Exceptions to Res Inter Alios Acta
a. Partner’s/Agent’s admissions
b. Co-conspirator’s statements
c. Admission by Privies
4. Admissions by silence
1. Admissions against interest
 a. Rule 130, §26
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him. (22)
The general rule is evidence as to extra-judicial acts, omissions, and declarations (AODs) of a party is
admissible. These evidences can either be favorable or unfavorable to a party. Rule 130, §26 expressly allows
evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer. However, an objection may be raised as to the admissibility of
AODs favorable to the AODer on the grounds of that these are self-serving AODs. The argument is “Rule 130
§26 only allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer.” However, §26 is only a rule of admissibility. It
allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer, but does not prohibit evidence on AODs favorable to
AODer. There being no express prohibition, any evidence on AODs favorable to the AODer falls under the
general rule that evidence not excluded by law or the Rules is admissible (Rule 128 § 3). Any doubt as to such
evidence refers to its weight or probative value and not to its admissibility.
Self-serving statements = hearsay? Declaration against interest as an exception to the hearsay rule only applies
if the declarant is deceased or unable to testify. Self-defeating statements can not be excluded by the hearsay
rule because it is expressly admissible by the rules.
Is personal knowledge on the part of the AODer required?
b. Cases
Keller & Co. v. COB L-68097 jan86 
President’s admission binds corporation.
Facts: Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Mktg, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its household
products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement. Under that agreement Keller
sold on credit its products to COB Group Marketing.
As security for COB Group Mktg's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one Asuncion Manahan
mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group Mktg the faithful performance of
all the terms and conditions of the sales agreement.
On May 20, COB Group Mktg, through Jose Bax (president & GM) executed two second chattel mortgages
over its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security for its obligation to Keller
amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971. However, the second mortgages did not become effective
because the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not give its consent. But the second mortgages served the
purpose of being admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.
The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter dated July
24, 1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971 and thereafter every thirtieth
day of the month for three years until COB Group Marketing's mortgage obligation had been fully satisfied.
They also proposed to substitute the Manahan mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).
On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation statements wherein he
showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7 and 8). He claimed overpayment
although in his answer he did not allege at all that there was an overpayment to Keller.
These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group Marketing and to
justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Keller to pay COB the overpayment. The CA affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not there was Admission on the part of COB group.
Held: We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax as
president and general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving credence to the alleged overpayment
computed by Bax.
The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB Group Marketing but
they also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its supposed overpayment in the sum of
P100,596.72 in spite of the fact that COB Group Marketing was declared in default and did not file any
counterclaim for the supposed overpayment.
The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices, with
delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, together with a tabulation thereof covering the period
from October 15, 1969 to January 22, 1971. Victor A. Mayo, Keller's finance manager, submitted a statement of
account showing that COB Group Marketing owed Keller P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That
amount is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.
Bax in that discussion did not present his reconciliation statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8
were an afterthought. He presented them long after the case was filed. The petitioner regards them as
"fabricated",
Viacrusis v. CA L-29831 mar72 
Facts: It appears that the land of about 4 hectares involved in this case is part of a bigger lot of about 14.6303
hectares, covered Title in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that, on June 8, 1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit
B, selling said lot of 14.6303 hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on 1936, filed with the RD,
and recorded in the memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July 7, 1941, or about
5 yrs later Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10, conveying the disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to
Balentin Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on 1945, to Guillermo Viacrucis (Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959,
Anastacio Orais — who claimed to have made oral demands — formally demanded from Viacrucis that he
vacate said portion and surrender its possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not heeded by Viacrucis
who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed, Exhibit 9, confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly
made by him, on January 12, 1954, in favor of his brother-in-law Claros Marquez; and that the deeds of sale,
Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not been registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.
The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein — respondent herein.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, said decision, against them and in favor
of Mr. and Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not there was admission by silence on the part of Orais.
Held: It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Castelo and this recognition by the now deceased
Pelagio Castelo — which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G — constitute a declaration of Mr.
and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said Rule
130. Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission,
the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest,
Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest
in the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in
evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his successors in interest," but, also, "against third
persons."
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the bank refused to accept OCT No. 243 as
collateral for the loan applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land covered by said certificate of title was
not his property, there is no competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything in response to said
statement. Moreover, OCT No. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the
latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in question as security for said loan, unless and until
OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued to Orais. This, however, could
not take place before the filing of his loan application, because the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title
— admittedly delivered by Sanchez to Orais — had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel, to whom
he (Orais) had turned it over in connection with a given criminal case.
2. Compromises
a. Rule 130, §27
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer
of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not
admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (24a)
Note that the offer of compromise in civil cases is not admissible only as evidence of liability. If the offer of
compromise is offered as evidence on other matters (e.g. amount of liability), then the evidence is admissible.
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless of the cause of action. In criminal cases, the
general rule is an offer of compromise is admissible. However, it is inadmissible under the following cases:
1. quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)
2. cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases)
3. plea of guilty later withdrawn
4. unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense
5. offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an injury
6. [the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of litigation]
Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses occasioned by an injury. It does not include
offers to pay other expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay for damages to property is admissible in criminal cases.
Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those occasioned by an injury is inadmissible in civil
cases. Though the 3rd paragraph of §27 excludes in civil cases offers to pay only for expenses occasioned by an
injury, offers to pay for other expenses fall under the general rule that an offer to compromise in civil cases is
not admissible. The exclusion in civil cases of offers to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury is merely a
superfluity. Even if the exclusion was expressly applied to only criminal cases, an offer to pay for expenses
occasioned by an injury is in the nature of an offer to compromise which is undoubtedly admissible in civil
cases. The bottomline is: an offer to pay for any expense in civil cases is inadmissible.
b. Cases
Veradero v. Insular Lumber, 46 Phil. 176 (15sep1924) 21911
Evidence on an offer to compromise is admissible even in civil cases if it is to prove amount of a liability and
not the liability itself.
Facts: El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the lighter Tatlo, the property of the
Insular Lumber Company. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, what could be secured from any other company.
The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented by El Varadero de Manila was
grossly exorbitant they proposed compromise. During the course of the abortive negotiations, however, the
defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff P8,070.12. Having failed of realization, the matter was
taken to court with the result that in the CFI of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured judgment
against the Insular Lumber Company, the defendant, in the amount of P5,310.70. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff
has appealed to this court and here as asked us to increase the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise was admissible.
Held: The general rule is that an offer of compromise is inadmissible.
Where, however, the amount named in the offer to accept a certain sum in settlement appears to have been
arrived at as a fair estimate of value, it is relevant.
The rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations does not apply where there is no denial expressed or implied
of liability, and the only questions discussed relate to the amount to be paid.
Case at bench:
Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question discussed was the amount to be paid which the
plaintiff insisted should not be more than P8,070.12.
Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the reasonable value
of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by the Insular Lumber Company, was
something less than P8,000. We fix the sum definitely at P7,700.
US v. Torres, 34 Phil. 994 (20aug1915) L-10566
Offer of compromise in criminal cases inadmissible when accused shows that it was made not under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason; in this
case, the law allowed compromise, thus the offer to compromise is not admitted.
Facts: Walker(secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse) testified that he had received information that on
the night of 20Jan1914, Regino Torres would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium;
that at 7:30 that evening they stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short
while afterwards saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises; that Samson
seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and
Torres saw two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the latter continued to run, after
he had thrown one tin over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with
lights to search for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the other two tins,
about a meter from the place where Samson had been holding Torres.
That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when questioned by the
defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did
say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was also asked by the
defense whether Walker had proposed to the defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to
which he replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who made this offer.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in evidence.
Held: An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code of Civ. Proc.,
sec. 346). In a criminal case for theft (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court said that the weight both of
authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but
permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences
which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of
public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance and private interests are
concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action, however it may be with
respect to the civil liability.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (06dec1995) 115908-09
Offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused is inadmissible if the accused repudiated the
actions of such person by raising the trial court’s admission of evidence of such offer as an error.
Facts:
Complainant’s version: According to complainant Mia Taha, 17yrs old, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21,
1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which
is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the
house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was
nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck,
dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was
dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice,
as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the
other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against
her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not
utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight
back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was
threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
The following morning, complainant went home to her parents' house. She likewise did not tell her parents
about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day,
appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could
accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed,
she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.
The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they stayed for three days. During
the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was
always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never
drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always
carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend where she was raped
by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant.
After two days, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and
indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem, an imam, from whom
appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case
with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was
examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal
opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis,
approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2
fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of laceration,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an
average size penis in erection with laceration.
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration,
which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the inflicted laceration
which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force applied because there were no
scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of
bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
Accused’s version: They were sweethearts
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the
case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia
Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave
them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case for
kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office,. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because
that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate.
Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise offered by the accused’s wife was an implied admission of guilt.
Held: The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of
guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally
admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the
bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no
compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in
such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence
of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually
suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he
could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first
made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did
not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases.
Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband,
Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration
was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court
ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court,
where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in
accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to
prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties.
People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (02dec1996) 117217
The offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused was admitted in evidence because the
accused failed to repudiate such acts by raising the trial court’s admission of evidence on such offer as an error.
Facts: Homeward bound from where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray was waiting for a
tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she noticed the accused, then
wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered
in a stammering manner. The complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the
gate of the subdivision was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she
agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. The accused would
once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When they reached Phase II of
the same subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She
alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she
had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly.
She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away
from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made noise. She
fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while
holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she obligingly followed
because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted "Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako!," but the
accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and
positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate
herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she
struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried to stand,
he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She
pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two children. He warned her: "Huwag kang
sisigaw, papatayin kita!" The accused again tried to insert his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing
so. The accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle
against the accused's sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then
pulled out his penis and "fingered" her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell
anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family. He told her that she was his third victim
but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran
toward her home, without looking back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by
the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's mother.
Gilda Ambray was medically examined by a medico legal officer from the NBI and found the following:
III. Conclusions:
1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual intercourse with man on or about the alleged date of
examination.
IV. Remarks:
Laboratory Report S-92-94 shows positive result for the presence of human spermatozoa.
"Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the
accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the accused's sake. The following day, Resurreccion
accompanied the accused's parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. Gilda met them, but to
their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that should not be tolerated."
Accused’s defense: Alibi, tricycle broke down.
Issue: Whether or not the plea for forgiveness by the accused’s family is equivalent to an attempt to
compromise and therefore an admission of guilt.
Held: Any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the
overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused
did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda
herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court
that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house
of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and
conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused
was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and
consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea
for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask
for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to
feel resentment against on account of wrong committed ; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon an
offender.
People v. Yparriguirre, 268 SCRA 35 (10feb1997) 117702
Whether a complaint has been filed or not is irrelevant as to the admissibility of an offer to compromise.
Facts: Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00 in the evening of July
6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one
aged four years old and the other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two
children asleep. He approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her
skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from
one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by
appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized
that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed
and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed
her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her.
Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and
punched Rosita in the stomach. She lost consciousness.
Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before
leaving them to return to her mother's house. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She was brought to
the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. The Health officer found that:
Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by
appellant.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise by the appellant’s wife was admissible in evidence (and should
be considered as admission of guilt).
Held: Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to
twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no
criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident
was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3,
1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a
criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to
compromise and such offer is proved.
NB: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (14mar1914) L-8931
Facts: The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and
sentenced to imprisonment.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value in accepting proof as to
certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise
the case by the payment of a sum of money.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise can be construed as admission or confession of guilt.
Held: The weight of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in
criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt,
but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by
the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the
legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise
and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in
the hope that it accepted he would escape prosecution.
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in imposing
the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of
"instruction and education" of the offender.
• Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if made
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence.
(US vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)
• In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is
inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)
• On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible on
behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the prosecutrix to
ascertain if the case could be compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
• In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could be
settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would be prosecuted for damages, and a
solicitation to settle. (Frain vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)
• In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of a
civil action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)
• An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are
admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.)
• An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an admission
of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and larceny charged in
the indictment. (State vs. Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)
3. Res Inter Alios Acta
a. Rule 130, §28
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
The general rule is extra-judicial acts of a person other than a party are inadmissible against such party.
However, the rules also provide for exceptions:
1. Partner’s admissions;
2. agent’s admissions;
3. admissions by a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party;
4. Co-conspirator’s statements;
5. Admission by privies.
Is personal knowledge required for these exceptions to apply?
b. Cases
People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)
Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extra-judicial confession of another
admitting his participation in the offense.
Held: This is not a co-conspirator’s statement because there was no evidence of conspiracy independent of the
extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the confession was executed long after the supposed conspiracy had
ended.
Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his co-accused, the testimony would
have been admissible. In this case, what was presented was a merely his affidavit.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) 
Absent independent evidence of conspiracy, extra-judicial confession of the accused is not admissible against
others.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found
strangled in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd., Ignacio St., Pasay City, in the early morning
of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in "shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, & some
personal garments, handbags & papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of
the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for investigation in connection with the case, but was
later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of
pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into
possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo. This
appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966. In this
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok," Jesus
Medalla, Mario Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one "Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan
again executed an extrajudicial confession on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal
of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the
commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service
Division, & identified them. Based on this, they were charged for Robbery with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however,
testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was
based principally and mainly on the EJ confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime were taken from
the "Pasay Sworn Statement." The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of
appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements
as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was
investigated by the police. The lower court nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of Cudillan (now deceased) against appellants;
in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and Medalla are hereby ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct
how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof
against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet," there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of
an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-
accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview
of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported
tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their
purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may
not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also
been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has
a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his
right of silence would be illusory.
People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996)
Extra-judicial confession of accused can not be used to implicate co-accused unless repeated in open court.
FACTS: At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan, Jr. attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of
their kitchen and was surprised to find heavily armed men declaring a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband dead while a man took her husband's
gun and left hurriedly.
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran
away. George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police
came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's
house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. He was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police
station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them
there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. Appellants were later on apprehended on
different occasions.
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense. Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986,
he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of
his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he
harvested palay on July 3 and 4.
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told
him that he was going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other
son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of
assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two (2)
sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tunggol where they arrested his son
Valeriano.
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in
the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his
division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986.
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly.
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were
appealing the decision to the CA which forwarded it to the SC in view of the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas and Valeriano Raquel of the crime
charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime?
HELD: Acquitted Sabas. TC reversed.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. The identity of
the Raquels as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to
them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could
testify in court and he has been at large since then. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a
co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused
never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is
elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. A distinction should be made between
extrajudicial & judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine
the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-
accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts
are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those exceptions do not however
apply to the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever
linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas
Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, was
negated by Dr. Anulao.
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of
the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same
Sgt. Andal S. Pangato. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation w/o the assistance of
counsel are inadmissible & can’t be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may
be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. Without the positive
identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. It would not even have been necessary to stress that every
reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met
nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.
c. Exceptions
Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that the relationship be proven by evidence
independent of the act or declaration sought to be admitted.
1) Partner’s/Agent’s admissions
a) Rule 130, §29
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. – The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party. (26a)
Requisites for admission by co-partner or agent
1. act or declaration of a partner, agent, or person jointly interested with the party
2. within the scope of authority
3. made during the existence of the partnership, agency or joint interest
4. the partnership, agency, or joint interest is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration
b) Cases
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil 194 (1909)
Discharge of a debt given by a managing partner, 2 years after the partnership had been dissolved does not
qualify as a partner’s admission and can not prejudice or bind the other partners.
Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, 46 Phil 193 (1924)
Facts: After a partner died, the remaining partner sought to recover his share in the partnership.
Held: The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of his co-partner, are not competent to prove the
existence of a partnership, between them as against such other partner. The existence of a partnership cannot be
established by general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198)
The jurisdiction in which this case is decided has a law which explicitly declared that an act of a party or his
agent is not hearsay; agent need not have personal knowledge of his statement as long as it is within the scope
of his authority, may be used against him and his principal
2) Co-conspirator’s statements
a) Rule 130, §30
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. – The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (27)
Requisites for co-conspirator’s statements
1. act or declaration of a conspirator
2. relating to the conspiracy
3. made during its existence
4. the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
b) Cases
People v. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (28june1974) L-37398
Facts: Accused was convicted based on the extra-judicial confession of his co-accused.
Held: The statement was made after, not during, the conspiracy, hence it was inadmissible.
Facts: At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Sgt. Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan, while on a
patrol duty received an instruction to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to
investigate an abandoned person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds.
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz. In the ante-mortem statement the
deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep but did not know the names of the
three men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep.
The next morning (01/18), defendant Cabrera was arrested by the police. Two days later, she executed an extra-
judicial confession. In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to appellant Villanueva as the mastermind
of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery and the killing of the
deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified companions.
Lt. Palomares of the Valenzuela PD who took the extra-judicial confession of defendant Cabrera testified to
identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial confession over the continuing objection of appellant's
counsel. Appellant reiterated his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in
evidence.
The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the extra-judicial
confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the continuing objection of
appellant's counsel. Appellant reiterated his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered
in evidence.
Counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the reversal of appellant's conviction and his
acquittal.
Issue: Whether or not the admission by the co-conspirator was admissible in evidence.
Held: Said admission is inadmissible against appellant who made timely objection thereto. (Said statement
could be used against Cabrera if there is corpus delicti. There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory
statements were made by her during the investigation conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972,
two days after the date of the incident in question. For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not
made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed
conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities.
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (28nov1955) L-9181
Confession regarding conspiracy may be used against confessor (multiple admissibility); confession regarding
conspiracy should be conditionally admitted until conspiracy is proved; statements must be made during the
conpiracy and in furtherance of its object to be admissible.
Facts: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together
in the murder of one Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection
with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji
to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any
evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other
accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether
different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by
a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
The prosecution then moved in writing for reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the motion was
denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari.
Issues: Whether or not the admission of a co-conspirator is admissible against his co-conspirator. Whether or
not the admission should be completely excluded.
Held: Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent
as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such.
Sec. 30 of Rule 130 refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case,
long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the
objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued
motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other
accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court
overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its
own motion, to disregard the evidence.
People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968)
Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession; reiterated “in furtherance”.
Facts: Alvarez was charged with the murder of Hector Crisostomo. During the investigation he made a tape-
recorded statement admitting his participation in the crime. Subsequently, he made a handwritten statement
also admitting his participation but implicated Chaw Yaw Shun as the one who ordered him to kill Crisostomo.
Shun surrendered after which he was investigated. Believing that Shun was not telling the truth, because he
would not admit participation in the crime, the investigator destroyed the statement. In view of such denial,
Shun was investigated again and made a written confession that he ordered the killing of Crisostomo. While
Shun was detained, he gave a statement that the written confession was obtained thru force, threat and
intimidation.
The TC, finding conspiracy, convicted Alvarez and Shun for murder.
Issue: WON the statements made by Alvarez and Shun are admissible to establish conspiracy?
Held: The SC held that the confession made by Shun is inadmissible as evidence because it was induced,
extorted by means of torture, abuse or by personal violence.
Moreover, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The admissibility of
a confession by one accused against the other must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprise. In this case, the conflicting confession of Alvarez are not binding on Shun
for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore no
locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of Shun
connected to the crime.
People v. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531 (27apr1959) L-7973
Requirement that conspiracy must be shown 1 st other than confession applies only to extra-judicial confessions
not to testimony in open court.
Facts: In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Piping Serrano,
Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes then gathered at the sala of the
house of the first, that Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo
Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire and
plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the town of Bacolor, lure
him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. They tried to execute the plan for three days but failed.
Finally, on the forth day they succeeded in executing the said plan when Navarro, together with Manguera,
agreed to join them in a drinking session. Navarro and Manguera were killed that same day.
Appellants defense: Alibi & under fear of greater evil. Cadiang – at the farm working with palay; Cenzon – at
the market, hauled lumber, gas up; Yumul – worked as laborer removing railroad tracks.
The defendants were found guilty based on a testimony made by Anastacio Reyes.
The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence
against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the
conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the
conspiracy.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of Reyes can be used against the appellants.
Held: The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the
stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the
testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from
a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless
admissible and competent.
The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the
death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants.
3) Admission by Privies
a) Rule 130, §31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. – Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
(211)
Requisites for admission by privies
1. a party derives title to property from another
2. act, declaration, or omission of the transferor
3. made while holding the title
4. in relation to the property
Tequillo: Does this not violate the Property Registration Decree, that says 3 rd parties are not bound unless the
encumbrance is registered?
b) Cases
Alpuerto v. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785 (1918)
“Privies” denotes any act whereby the successor is substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest;
purchaser at execution sale is a privy of the execution debtor; “3rd parties” are persons who have not intervened
in the execution of the instrument either as principals or witnesses.
Facts: The three parcels of land involved in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos. Plaintiff Eladio
Alpuerto petitioned the lower court to make a declaration against the defendant Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect
that the plaintiff is the owner of the said lands by virtue of a contract of sale with right of repurchase executed
by Llenosin his (plaintiff’s) favor. Defendant Pastor alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief
sought because the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired title was simulated and fictitious
and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of
Llenos.
It appears that at the time of the supposed sale to Alpuerto, there had been pending for nearly two years in the
CFI an action for collection of a considerable sum of money, in which pastor was plaintiff and Llenos was
defendant. On July 3, 1912, the contract of sale with right of repurchase was executed (not notarized) by the
parties, Llenos and Alpuerto. This document was signed by the contracting parties and was altered by two
subscribing witnesses. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the sale took place, judgment in the
collection case was rendered in favor of Pastor. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal to the SC on
November 20, 1914. On December 3, 1914, the contract of sale was acknowledged before a notary public. And
on April 12, 1915, an execution was issued upon the judgment in the collection case and the property in
question was levied upon as property of Llenos. Despite Alpuerto’s objection on the ground that he owned the
property, the sheriff proceeded with the public sale and the property was sold to Pastor.
Issue: Who is entitled to the property in question? Was the sale from Llenos to Alpuerto fraudulent?
Held: Article 1297 of the Civil Code says that a transfer of property made by one against whom a
condemnatory judgment has been pronounced is to be presumed fraudulent. The cardinal question in the case
therefore is: Was the transfer in question made after a judgment had been entered against Llenos? This in turn
depends upon whether the contract of sale shall be considered effective as from the date upon which it purports
to have been executed (July 3, 1912) or from the date when it was acknowledged before a notary public
(December 3, 1914), for in the interval between these two dates final judgment had been rendered against
Llenos both in the CFI and in the SC.
According to Article 1225 of the Civil Code, a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to
those who signed it and their privies (causahabientes), the same force as a public instrument.
The expression “legally recognized” means recognized or acknowledged by the person or persons executing the
document.
Concerning the meaning of the expression “privies”, Manresa has this to say:
 “The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but
also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts intervivos and for special purposes; hence, an
assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, et., will be privies; in short, he, who, by succession is
placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private
document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations, is a privy.”
Thus, Pastor, the purchaser at public sale must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution
debtor and is bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to Alpuerto- and this from the date of the
execution of that instrument as a private document.
Nevertheless, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was one in fraud of creditors; the
deed of sale with right of repurchase must therefore be annulled and the property delivered to defendant.
Judgment reversed.
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)
Admission must be made while one holds title.
Facts: The City of Manila wanted to recover two lots in Calle Clavel and Barcelona. The witnesses gave
different answers as to whether or not the lots were owned by the City. It appears that what actually happened
was that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and later on sold it to Jacinto del Rosario.
The City of Manila wanted to make use of two documents made by Lorenzo, one of which contained an offer to
buy the land from the City of Manila (Lorenzo mistakenly thought that the City owned the land) and the other
was a letter to the Municipal Board of Manila (the President of the Board advised Lorenzo to write this to avoid
litigation with the City).
Issue: May these two letters be used in evidence against Jacinto del Rosario (the present owner)?
Held: No. Lorenzo signed the first document before he acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and the second
one was signed by him after he had transferred the land to Jacinto del Rosario. This being the case, the
statements contained in the documents are not binding on Jacinto as they were made when Lorenzo no longer
had title to the lands.
4. Admissions by silence
a. Rule 130 §32
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. – An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call
for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in
evidence against him. (23a)
Requisites for admission by silence
1. The act or declaration is made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party
2. The party does or says nothing
3. The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true
4. Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part of the party.
b. Cases
People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978) 
Failure by a supposed rape victim to rebut sweetheart defense based on testimonial evidence may be taken
against her. Requirements for admission by silence: 1) heard and understood, 2) at liberty to deny, 3) affects his
rights, 4) within his knowledge, and 5) material to the issue.
Facts: This case involves a review of the CA’s conviction of the accused for rape and its imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused Bienvenido Paragsa was charged and convicted for allegedly raping
complainant Mirasol Magallanes, who is 12 ½ yrs. old. Mirasol alleges that while she was alone in her hosue,
Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered and managed to rape her. On the other hand, Paragsa admits
having sexual intercourse with her but denies that he used force and intimidation against her. He claims that
they were sweethearts, that Mirasol invited him to her house that day and that it was already their 3rd
intercourse. This was corroborated by 2 other witnesses, Batosbatosan and Ducay.
Issue: WON Paragsa should be convicted for rape?
Held: No, he should be acquitted. The prosecution’s evidence is weak and unsatisfactory to satisfy a
conviction.
1. Force and intimidation was not proven. Mirasol did not make any outcry or resist the accused. She did not
immediately tell her aunt, who happened to have passed by at the time of the alleged incident, what had
happened nor did she tell her parents about it.
2. Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the accused which was corroborated by 2 other
witnesses to the effect that she and the accused were sweethearts. The rule allowing silence of a person to
be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in
criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must
appear:
o that he heard and understood the statement
o that he was at liberty to interpose a denial
o that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested
and calling, naturally, for an answer
o that the facts were within his knowledge
o that the fact admitted or inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue.
3. These requisites are all present in this case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts alleged by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) 
Silence of accused in custody during investigation can not be used as evidence against him.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found
strangled in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd., Ignacio St., Pasay City, in the early morning
of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in "shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, & some
personal garments, handbags & papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of
the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for investigation in connection with the case, but was
later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of
pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into
possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo. This
appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966. In this
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok," Jesus
Medalla, Mario Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one "Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan
again executed an extrajudicial confession on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal
of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the
commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service
Division, & identified them. Based on this, they were charged for Robbery with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however,
testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was
based principally and mainly on the EJ confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime were taken from
the "Pasay Sworn Statement." The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of
appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements
as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was
investigated by the police. The lower court nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of Cudillan (now deceased) against appellants;
in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and Medalla are hereby ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct
how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof
against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet," there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration
of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-
accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within
the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their
purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan,
and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may
not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also
been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as
he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 853 (1965)
Court may not comment on accused’s failure to testify regarding facts within his knowledge.
Facts: Griffin was convicted of murder in the first degree. He did not testify at the trial on the issue of his guilt
but he testified at the separate trial (California penal laws provide separate trials if the case has two issues) on
the issue of penalty. Pursuant to the California Constitution (Art. I, sec 13 of the California Constitution
provides in part: “…in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or deny
by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and
counsel, and may be considered by the court or jury.”), the trial court instructed the jury on the issue of his guilt
and reminded its members that Griffin had a constitutional right not to testify. It declared that the failure of the
defendant to deny or explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt nor
by itself warrant an inference of guilt. It commented further:
“As to evidence or facts against him which defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain
because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or explain such evidence, the jury may take
that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that
among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are
the more probable.”
The prosecutor had this to say:
“The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at the time he left the
apartment and went down the alley with her…What kind of man is that would want to have sex with a
woman that beat up at the time he left…He would know how she got down the alley. He would know
how the blood got on the bottom of the steps…He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her…
He would know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber…because he was
conscious of his won guilt…These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And
in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she can’t
tell you her side of the story. The defendant won’t.” (underscoring supplied)
Griffin was sentenced to death. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether comment on the failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the US Constitution.
Held: The Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the federal government and its bearing on states by
provision of the Fourteenth amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution of the accused’s silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. The principle behind the rule that a defendant
may be a competent witness, but that his failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against
him, was designed to bar the prosecutor’s counsel from commenting on the defendant’s refusal to testify. Thus,
the state constitutional provision allowing comment by the court or counsel directly contravenes the
Constitution. The decision of the lower court was reversed.
M.Confessions
1. Rule 130, §33
Sec. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. (29a)
This rule is applicable only in criminal cases.
A confession need not be in writing in order to be admissible in evidence.
If it is in writing, it is NOT required to be under oath.
Escolin: However, if it is not in writing, the prosecution may find difficulty in proving it.
2. Art. III, §§12 and 17, 1987 Constitution
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

3. Rule 115 (e)

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. – xxx
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
4. Cases
People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252 (1987)
A confession, to be admissible, must have been executed in the presence of counsel. Waiver of right to counsel
must be with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994)
Where the confession was made even before the accused was under custodial investigation, it is admissible even
if he was not assisted by counsel. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. Only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the accused is said to be under custodial
investigation.
People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (1976)
Where the extra-judicial confessions of the accused are consistent in many material details and manifest
amazing consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of facts which could not have been known to
the police investigators if the same were not voluntarily given by the accused, such statements are admissible
against the accused on the doctrine of interlocking confessions.
de Leon: The value of the doctrine of interlocking confessions is when a confession is inadmissible against one
accused (e.g. obtained without counsel), but it is nevertheless admissible against the other co-accused. The
confession of one may be used against another to produce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)
FACTS: On 23 October 1987, midnight, MJ Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
which also served as the dwelling of the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay was robbed.
The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the second
floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers placed the 2 maids into the bathroom
while Mary was caught, tied and gagged in the bedroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store along Tomas Pinpin Street, also
in Sta. Cruz.
The bedroom was ransacked and they took some P35,000 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the bathroom, heard
Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor.
After noticing that the two (2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers dashed out of the bathroom and
proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took
out the towel from her mouth.
They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of
furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to 13 stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the
WPD that just before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type
jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his co-workers Compil, Mabini and Jacale go to the back of the
furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police.
On 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, where able to arrest
Compil in Tayabas, Quezon. Upon being arrested, Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting
officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was
then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he
was again questioned.
He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ
Furnitures. He said he was only a lookout for which he received P1,000 He did not go inside the furniture shop
since he would be recognized. Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that
after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-
conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared the loot and drank beer until 4:30 a.m. They all left for Quezon
and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit
who confirmed this narration of Compil.
On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz
executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a
lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the crime as Jacale, Mabini, Alvos, Pakit, a certain "Erning"
and one "Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jacale and Mabini who were the
masterminds.
Meanwhile WPD agents failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a
counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution had rested, the
accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the RTC of Mla. denied the demurrer and found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused Compil’s confessions were admissible in evidence?
HELD: THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION IS INADMISSIBLE. Citing Gamboa v. Cruz, the SC held
that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point
or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of the offense." The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Here, Compil was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in
Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And
while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three
instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those
instances, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if
prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were
already able to extract incriminatory statements from Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial
confession.
Although the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible, nevertheless, the accused had been found by the SC to be
guilty of the crime. The guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial evidence. The
circumstances as gleaned from the factual findings of the trial court in case at bar form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Hence even disregarding Compil’s oral and written confessions, as we do, still the prosecution was able to show
that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.
Although, the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a warrant, Compil is now estopped
from questioning this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Compil’s argument the TC
should have convicted the arresting police officers of arbitrary detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained
persons, is misplaced, since, the law enforcers who arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the
case at bench.
Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of Compil that granting that he had participated in the commission of
the crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice. Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by
reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his behalf, the SC had considered only the evidence of the
prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. Direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and after the commission of the
crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. Thus, circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to prove conspiracy. And where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be
held in the same degree of liability as the others.
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
FACTS: The eleven (11) accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung (British nationals), Tan
Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai
Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun (all Malaysian nationals) arrived in Manila from Hong Kong on board a PAL
flight. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Wing
Cheung, an employee of Select Tours acted as their tour guide.
After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to
the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart
and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at the time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing
Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports.
Upon inspection, Gomez allowed two of the group to pass but after finding a number of Alpen Cereal boxes in
each of the baggages of the accused, he became suspicious and opened one of them with a cutter. It was found
to contain a white crystalline substance which was later found to be shabu.
The tour group was ordered to proceed to the district collector's office. Inside the collector's office, Gomez
continued to examine the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He allegedly found a total of thirty
(30) boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages
of the eleven (11) accused. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said
boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled
boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign
on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also present at
this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs and several news
reporters. A few minutes later, District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then
NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison. Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals
were recovered, he conducted a field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that
the substance was indeed "shabu." Capt. Francisco immediately informed the eleven (11) accused that they were
under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box,
were brought to Camp Crame.
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified them,
they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing
their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered from accused was
"shabu." The total weight of "shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms.
For their part, the. defense interposed by all accused was basically anchored on the testimony of their co-
accused Lim Chan Fatt, a technician and self-confessed "call boy", who admitted being responsible for bringing
the boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country although he denied any knowledge that they contained "shabu."
Lim Chan Fatt testified that except for Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, all other accused were unknown or
complete strangers to him until their trip to the Philippines on 7 September 1991. With respect to Chin Kong
Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, Lim Chan Fatt allegedly met them at his boarding house in Hongkong where the two
(2) temporarily lived a few days before said trip. According to Lim Chan Fatt, prior to their departure date, a
certain Ah Hong, a co-boarder and a Hongkong businessman, approached him and asked him if he could kindly
bring with him boxes of cereals to the Philippines. Ah Hong promised Lim Chan Fatt that a certain Ah Sing will
get these boxes from him at the Philippine airport and for this trouble, Ah Sing will see to it that Lim Chan Fatt
will have a good time in the Philippines. Ah Hong allegedly even opened one (1) box to show that it really
contained cereals. Lim Chan Fatt acceded to Ah Hong's request as he allegedly found nothing wrong with it.
Consequently, Ah Hong delivered to Lim Chan Fatt thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals. Since his baggage could
not accommodate all thirty (30) boxes, Lim Chan Fatt requested Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun to
accommodate some of the boxes in their baggages. Lim Chan Fatt claimed that he entrusted five (5) boxes to
Chin Kong Song and another five (5) to Lim Nyuk Sun. He allegedly placed four (4) boxes inside a hand
carried plastic bag while the rest were put inside his baggage. On the basis of this testimony, the defense
endeavored to show that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun were responsible for
bringing boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country and even then they cannot be held liable for violation of
Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, as they allegedly had no knowledge that these boxes
contained "shabu.”
Accused Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun' and accused-appellants Au Wing Cheung and Wong Chuen
Ming. Accused-appellants denied that boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered from their baggages. They
claimed that they affixed their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by police authorities
who were present during the examination inside the collector's office. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung
maintained that he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. and that he had no prior
knowledge that the tour group he was supposed to accompany to the Philippines brought boxes containing
"shabu." For his part, accused-appellant Wong Chuen Ming tried to dissociate himself from the other accused
by testifying that he was not a part of their group. He claimed that he was originally booked with another travel
agency, Wing Ann Travel Co., for a five-day Cebu tour. This Cebu tour was allegedly cancelled due to
insufficient number of clients and accused-appellant was subsequently transferred to and accommodated by
Select Tours. The other accused who did not take the witness stand opted to adopt as their own all testimonial
and documentary evidence presented in court for the defense.
On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused.
Only accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung filed their joint appeal brief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Accused’s contention that they were deprived of their right to counsel and due process when their
previous counsels also represented the other accused despite "conflicting interests" was not accepted by the SC
having found that said counsels tried to present all the defenses available to each of the accused and that they
did not, in any way, put in jeopardy accused-appellants' constitutional right to counsel. It does not appear from
the records that the effectiveness of accused-appellants' previous counsels was diminished by the fact that they
also jointly represented the other accused.
The SC held that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing "shabu," are
inadmissible in evidence. Accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to
remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against them, when they were
made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the
plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures, accused in
effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law.
These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not
sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore,
inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is
inadmissible against them.
The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because
the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
Among the prosecution witnesses, only Gomez testified that all the seized baggages, including those owned by
Chuen Ming and Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of "shabu." His testimony was given credence by the
TC since he was presumed to have performed his duties in a regular manner. However, Gomez' testimony
inculpating accused-appellants was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. Customs collector
Bonifacio cannot recall if each and everyone of accused were found in possession of any box or boxes of Alpen
Cereals and the testimony of NARCOM officer Capt. Francisco casts doubt on the claim of Gomez that he
recovered boxes of "shabu" from the baggages of accused-appellants. While Capt. Francisco was categorical in
stating that boxes of "shabu" were recovered from the baggages belonging to the other nine (9) accused
Malaysians, he admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez actually recovered boxes of "shabu" from
accused-appellants' baggages. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties accorded
to Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellants to be presumed
innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution witnesses.
There are other circumstances that militate against the conviction of accused-appellants. First, accused-
appellants are British (Hongkong) nationals while all the other accused are Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine
how accused-appellants could have conspired with the other accused, who are total strangers, when they do not
even speak the same language. Second, overwhelming evidence consisting of testimonies of accused-appellant
An Wing Cheung's superiors was presented to show that he was a bonafide employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that accused-appellant Ming was not originally part of the tour
group arranged by Select Tours but he was only accommodated by the latter at the last minute when his package
tour to Cebu was cancelled by Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by Capt. Francisco, both accused-
appellants adamantly refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags containing shabu." The SC, thus, held that
accused-appellants' participation in the illegal transportation of "shabu" into the country has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found
strangled in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd., Ignacio St., Pasay City, in the early morning
of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in "shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, & some
personal garments, handbags & papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of
the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for investigation in connection with the case, but was
later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of
pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into
possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo. This
appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966. In this
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok," Jesus
Medalla, Mario Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one "Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan
again executed an extrajudicial confession on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal
of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the
commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service
Division, & identified them. Based on this, they were charged for Robbery with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however,
testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was
based principally and mainly on the EJ confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime were taken from
the "Pasay Sworn Statement." The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of
appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements
as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was
investigated by the police. The lower court nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of Cudillan (now deceased) against appellants;
in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and Medalla are hereby ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct
how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof
against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet," there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of
an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-
accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview
of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported
tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their
purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may
not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also
been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has
a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his
right of silence would be illusory.
People v. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila
on vacation on July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a day had passed when Lam Po
Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room.
On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers
while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and was not feeling well
enough to do the sights.
For the slaying, Yip Wai Ming was charged for murder. He was later on convicted by the RTC of Manila.
There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is
circumstantial.
Evidence presented by the prosecution alleged that on the day of the murder, Cariza Destresa, the occupant of
room 211, the room adjacent to room 210 of the couple heard a loud argument inside the couples room and a
struggle where there was supposedly a faint cry and a loud thud (like someone banging on the floor). The front
desk clerk also testified that Yip Wai Ming, at about 10 a.m., came down later to meet with Gwen de los Santos
who was to accompany them to a tour around Manila. Ming left his fiancée Lam in their room and gave
specific instructions that she shouldn’t be disturbed. He was perspiring and kind of in a hurry. During the
whole morning of July 11, 1993, after appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock in the evening, he did
not call his fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify her physical condition. When Ming arrived at 11 p.m. on that day, he
asked the receptionist for the key of his room. Then together with Fortunato Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to
Room 210. When the lock was opened and the door was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead lying face down
on the bed covered with a blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to exclaim 'My God, she is
dead' but did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, Ming asked the room boy to go down the hotel to inform
the front desk, the security guard and other hotel employees to call the police. When the police arrived, they
conducted an examination of the condition of the doors and windows of the room as well as the body of the
victim and the other surroundings. They found no signs of forcible entry and they observed that no one can
enter from the outside except the one who has the key. The police also saw the victim wrapped in a colored
blanket lying face down. When they removed the blanket and tried to change the position of her body, the latter
was already in state of rigor mortis, which indicates that the victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12)
hours. The police calculated that Lam Po Chun must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July 11, 1993
(pp. 2-29), tsn, September 22, 1993).
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured with the
Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with Ming as the beneficiary. The premium
paid for the insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in
Hongkong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking Ming to the killing is sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Judgment reversed. Accused acquitted.
The SC found that the trial court relied only and conjectures and surmises in arriving at its conclusion. Before a
conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person Every hypothesis consistent with innocence must be excluded if guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is based on circumstantial evidence. All the evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The SC found that certain key elements, without which the picture of
the crime would be faulty and unsound, are not based on reliable evidence. A key element in the web of
circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution tried to establish. Nevertheless, the supposed insurance
policy with which motive was established was not duly proven. The prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere
xerox copy of a document captioned "Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof of the alleged insurance. It is not a
certified copy, nor was the original first identified. The authenticity of the document has thus not been duly
established. The policy was unsigned and it was not clear whether it was indeed taken out by Lam. Also, Law
only earned $5000 a month while the premium of the policy was for $5400. Such a discrepancy negates the
assumption that there was a policy taken and a motive for the crime.
There was also no conclusive findings as to the time of the death as testified to by Dr. Manuel Lagonera,
medico-legal officer of the WPD.
The fact that there as no forcible entry does not presupposes nor negates the possibility that somebody may have
knocked and entered the room after Lam opened the door thinking it was hotel staff. Detective Yanquiling was
so convinced that it was Ming who did it that he did not conduct any other further investigation.
The TCs reliance on the Destreza testimony was also rebutted by the SC being unreliable having given
contradictory statements as to the time when she heard the “banging” sounds or even to the date as to when her
Australian boyfriend came to Manila.
Ming was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer
Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested Ming based on “series of circumstantial
evidence.” He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Ming stated that five
police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a bench,
sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face. When he
could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged, participated in a re-enactment, and signed an
extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel
of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime.
The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17,. Article III provides: "No confession, shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself." Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to
silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence.
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)
FACTS: British Horace William Barker, a WB consultant, and his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza lived in
Tuba, Benguet where, in the early morning of 27 August 1991, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly
battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery in their home.
Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante as one of the suspect.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the prosecution initially included Richard Malig in the information for robbery
with homicide and serious physical injuries filed with the RTC of Benguet. Prior to the arraignment of Malig,
the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda but, later,
the Prosecutor asked that accused Malig be dropped from the information since the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused
Salvamante and Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was subsequently arrested on March 1992 in Guinyangan, Quezon and was brought to the
headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer,
Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, directed SPO3 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according
to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house.
On 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail where he stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a
State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the
company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an
affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the
latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that
Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor but found out later that they
were going to rob the Barkers. He initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it. He admitted having hit
Mrs. Barker with a lead pipe after she came down and in helping Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had
followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already unconscious on the floor, Salvamante looted the
house. They made their escape through Baguio City & then rode a Philippine Rabbit Bus heading for Manila.
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Information with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the
accused. Salvamante remained at large and trial proceeded against Maqueda only who entered a plea of not
guilty.
Maqueda interposed a defense of alibi stating that he was not in Benguet then and that he was working as a
caretaker in a polvoron factory in Sukat, Muntinlupa. This was denied however by the owner Castrence.
In its decision promulgated on 31 August 1993, the TC found Maqueda guilty on the ground that there was a
conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing the supposed confession of Maqueda to be admitted in
evidence against him?
HELD: The trial court erred in admitting the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Maqueda to SPO3 Molleno.
The TC pointed out that the Sinumpaang Salaysay is not an extrajudicial confession, it is only an extrajudicial
admission. There is a distinction between the two as shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his
guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. And under Section 3 of Rule
133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti. HOWEVER, the exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior
to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is
"under investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily, once a criminal complaint or information
is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge , and
since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public
officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for
which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. Here, the Sinumpaang Salaysay
of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of the said
Constitutional provision. As disclosed by a reading thereof. Maqueda was not even told of any of his
constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such
uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution.
NEVERTHELESS, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely
made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to
be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of
the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental
grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect. or restrictions on
the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general
principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited.'' They are
the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not
govern the relationships between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a
private party, are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Citing Aballe vs. People, the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense
may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The
said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that
rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent
Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the
above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of these
admissions, Maqueda's guilt was established beyond moral certainty.
His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein.
Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were
duly proved in this case: (1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour
after the crime in question was committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively
identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the
crime; (3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in
Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991, (5) He was arrested in Guinyangan,
Quezon, on 4 March 1992, and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the
least guilty." Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
1. There is more than one circumstance
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,
i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
All the requisites are present in this case. Therefore, conviction affirmed.
Bruton v. US,

Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

Facts: Three co-defendants, who had been convicted or murder at a joint trial before a jury in a Tennessee trial
court, sought habeas corpus relief from a District Court claiming that an error had been committed when the
trial court admitted some of their confessions into evidence. All three co-defendants none of whom had
testified at trial, claimed that error had occurred when their interlocking oral confessions were admitted into
evidence with cautionary instructions to the jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant
who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a co-defendant’s guilt.
The District Court granted habeas corpus relief holding that as to the admission of the interlocking oral
confessions, that the co-defendant’s rights had been violated under the SC’s decision in Bruton v US, in which
it had been held that an accused’s right of cross-examination is violated by the admission of a co-defendant’s
confession inculpating the accused, notwithstanding jury instructions that the co-defendant’s confession must be
disregarded in determining the accused’s guilt or innocence. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: WON the admission of co-defendant’s confessions infringed respondent’s rights
Held: No. The SC held that the admission of respondent’s confessions with proper limiting jury instructions did
not infringe respondent’s constitutional rights.
In this case, unlike in Bruton, the defendant had already confessed. Incriminating extrajudicial statements will
not have the same devastating consequences to a defendant who has already confessed.
In this case, defendant corroborated his co-defendant’s story and has blamed himself. Thus the natural
motivation to blame others, which renders incriminating statements suspect (as held in Bruton), does not exist in
this case.
The right to confrontation does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement by a
nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way implicates the defendant. An instruction directing the
jury to consider a co-defendant’s statement only against its source is sufficient to avoid offending the
defendant’s confrontation right.
When the defendant’s own confession is before the jury, the possible prejudice that may result from the jury’s
failure to follow the court’s instructions is not so devastating or vital as to require departure from the general
rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions.
Dissent: J. Stevens expressed the view that there had been a violation of right under Bruton and that such was
not harmless.
People v. Encipido, G.R. No. 7009l, Dec. 29, 1986

People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, Feb. 20, 2001

N. Previous Conduct as Evidence

1. Rule 130, §34-35
 Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. (48 a)
GR: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or a similar thing at another time
Exceptions: It may be received to prove a specific
1. intent
2. knowledge
3. identity
4. plan
5. system
6. scheme
7. habit
8. custom or
9. usage, and
10. the like.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. – An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a
written instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the
actual production and tender of the money instrument, or property. (49 a)
2. Cases
US v. Evangelista, 24 Phil 453 (1913)
In a trial for arson, the prosecution may prove that the accused had attempted to set fire to the house on the day
previous to the burning alleged in the information, for the purpose of showing the intent of the accused in
subsequently setting fire to the house. Where a person is charged wit the commission of a specific crime,
testimony may be received of the other similar acts committed about the same time, only for the purpose of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)
Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a poison, causing the death
of two horses. After analyzing the packages, two chemists went to the drug store of the defendant and bought
potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate defendant's motive and negligence.
It is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on
more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is
intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it
tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
Facts: Feliciano Santos, owner of some sick horses, went to the drug store of Santiago Pineda, a registered
pharmacist with a prescription from Dr. Richardson to purchase potassium chlorate for the sick horses. When
Santos administered the medicine to his horses, the horses died. Santos, thereupon brought the remaining
packages to the Bureau of Science for examination and it was found that the packets contained not potassium
chlorate but barium chlorate (which was a poison). The two chemists, Drs. Peña & Darjuan of the said Bureau
when to Pineda’s drug store and bought potassium chlorate but where again given barium chlorate. Dr.
Buencamino performed an autopsy of the horses and found that indeed they were poisoned. In the trial, the two
chemists testified to their purchase of potassium chlorate but where instead given barium chlorate. The
admission of such testimony was objected to by the defense. The TC convicted Pineda for violation of the
penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law, thus, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the two chemists?
Held: The SC affirmed the judgment. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a
defendant is inadmissible. But Pineda has confused the res inter alios acta maxim with certain exceptions
thereto. The testimony presented was not to convict the accused of a second offense nor is there an attempt to
draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant’s case. The purpose is to
ascertain Pineda’s knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If Pineda has on more than one occasion
performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent
intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the
commission of another offense by the defendant.
People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)
Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her money and jewelry. As
she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left
eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial,
Maximiana’s neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by
malefactors. de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that
man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony that the man of the
same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While
evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.
Facts: On the night of November 8, 1935, 7 persons with white stripes on their faces, two carrying guns while
the rest had bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto and Maximiana Melocotones. Some of these
persons went up the house while the rest remained on guard downstairs. The men ordered Perfecto to bring out
his money but before he could do so Perfecto was attacked with bolos by the men. Perfecto slumped to the
floor dead. So, the men instead ordered his wife to get the money and jewelries to which she complied and
surrendered about P70 in case and P200 worth of jewelry.
That same night, a group of men with similar descriptions as those that robbed the Melocotones assaulted the
house of Juana de la Cruz.
After they left the house of the Melocotones, Toribio Melocotones, son of Perfecto and Maximiana, who had
seen the assailants arrive and leave their house reported the incident to the police. Maximiana gave a
description where she stated that one of her assailants had a pockmarked face. When groups of men where
presented to Maximiana for identification she pointed to Benjamin Irang as the one who struck her with the butt
of his gun and demanded delivery of money and jewelries. He was also identified by Juana de la Cruz as one of
those who assaulted her home.
Irang later on executed an affidavit which was sworn to by him before the deputy clerk of the CFI of Nueva
Ecija stating he was merely invited to the said town and when already there he was brought by a certain Fidel
Estrella to be part of a group that would raid the house of Perfecto Melocotones and that he merely stood guard.
He also assailed the admission of the testimony of Juana de la Cruz that the said group supposedly assaulted her
house.
The CFI of Nueva Ecija convicted said accused Irang.
Issue: Whether or not Juana de la Cruz testimony is admissible?
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz that her house is located only about 100 meters from that of Perfecto
and that they were assaulted by a group of men fitting the same description as those who assaulted Perfecto’s
house is admissible.
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when
it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or
tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence
of a circumstance connected with the crime.
His affidavit is also admissible. An admission made under oath before a deputy clerk of court cannot be
considered involuntary merely because the person who made it allegedly having done so under threat, the
persons supposed to have threatened him having denied such fact.
Judgment affirmed.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
Facts: Ernesto Basa and Ernesto Balaktaw were sleeping in a pushcart along a sidewalk when Basa was
assaulted by Sofronio Palin (who held down Basa) and Geronimo Soliman (who stabbed him many times with a
balisong). Thereafter, they ran away. Balaktaw brought Basa to the police who in turn brought him to a
hospital where however Basa died. As a defense, Soliman stated that on several occasions Basa had assaulted
him, once he was punched and in another with a lead pipe, and on that occasion he was being extorted money.
Soliman during that incident stabbed him as Basa and three of his companions attacked him. Palin corroborated
that statement of Soliman. The TC convicted both men.
Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence convicting the two accused?
Held: Judgment affirmed.
The findings of fact particularly the character of the wounds inflicted and the admission made by Soliman that
he had inflicted the wounds support the testimony of Balaktaw as to what happened.
The defense points out that the TC erred in not allowing them a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
particularly the criminal record of Balaktaw. The court herein hled that the criminal record of Balaktaw cannot
be considered as newly discovered evidence because it was available to the defense much prior to the trial of the
case. Also, the fact that a person has been previously convicted for a crime does not necessarily disqualify him
as a witness for he amy still prove to be a truthful one.
The defense’s claim that the trial court also erred in not allowing the defense to prove that the deceased had a
violent, quarrelsome or provocative character. While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid
to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in a crime
of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may
only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the
mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.”
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (19sep1928) 28871
Facts: Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land who sold the land to Basilio Copreros with right of
repurchase. The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio Copreros took possession of said two parcels of
land, and on March 24, 1927, made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for the
registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros
leased said parcels to Severino Haro. Because of this, Babiera sued Copreros for the recovery of the possession
which was dismissed by the lower court. Babiera appealed but asked for its dismissal later then filed a
complaint for recovery of property.
Fermin Bruces who was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands, while tilling the land, was constantly
harassed by Justo Babiera accompanied by his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol.
On August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning to the town of Oton, and upon
their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his
mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro
received several wounds in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo.
Held: Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to
take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the
animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain
this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable.
With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and Severino Haro began the attack, inasmuch as it has
not been proved that they were the instigators, it cannot be conceived that they committed said unlawful
aggression, for he who has no reason to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully.
The defense also attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible,
and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it.
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased
to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation
in the community and not of isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as
the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting such proof.
But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless,
it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who
treacherously attacked the deceased.
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (13nov1913) L-8332
Facts: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Bulacan.
During the trial, the prosecution asked the witness for the defense how many times was he convicted of assault
upon other persons. To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question
was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying that he wish to demonstrate that he
(witness-defendant) has a pugnacious (aggressive) disposition.
Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the witness has an intimate
relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause. The objection was
overruled."
The defendants were convicted of the crime charged of which decision, the defendants appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused to the private prosecutor's
question referring to the character of the witness.
Held: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except
by showing:
1. that he has made contradictory statements: or
2. by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad.
The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory
statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the
credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the
witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act
No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that
term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its
ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied
and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and
should have been sustained. The question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of
the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof
brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime. then the question and answer
and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors
committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the
court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is
made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no
importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question
related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.
People vs Lee, 32SCRA596 (29may2002)139070
Facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the living
room of their house. The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their
house was an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people and
activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other was a store catering to customers. In
their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was seated on an
armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and window of
their house and the television was to his right. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her
son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph.
She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant
fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as
accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more— two hit the sofa and one hit the
cement floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue
sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and
shouted for help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital
where he later died.
Held: In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the
aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug
addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive
eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could have been killed by any one
of those from whom he had stolen from is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with
treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent,
quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court
disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:
"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in the crime
of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such
character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action
was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not
apply to cases of murder."
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident
premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching
television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the
head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker.
O. Hearsay Rule
1. Testimonial Knowledge
a. Rule 130, §36
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30 a)
b. Cases
People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992)
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 (30jan1971) L-28482
Facts: On 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the evening, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip
were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was making rope in the annex of their house,
while the wife, four meters away, and was applying candle wax to a flat iron. Silvino Daria was using a lamp
where he worked. Outside, the night was bright because of the moon overhead.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a
crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward in the direction of the house Silvino
Daria that was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs
and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two
detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife call for help, saying her husband had
been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow,
however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by
Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the
abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing
to the two accused as the killers (Exibits "B" and "C," respectively).
Held: We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife
that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an
ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the
seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of
impending death, considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (14aug1965) L-20986
Facts: In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose
Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with
homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of
Digos, Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the
accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the
offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to commit the offense, mentioning the name
of each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention
in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo
objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients
were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the
witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the
objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present
petition for certiorari praying that the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous
and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question in full.
Held: The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if
timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that
the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is
nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those
who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer
to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really
conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the witness was
proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his
answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually
conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant to
explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned and
investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (27feb1989) 74065
Facts: At about 5pm of December 11, 1981 Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto
Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his
drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender
to the police. After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what appellant told him.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo
Salamat arrested appellant. Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he killed the victim and where he buried the
body. Later, Pat. Jesus Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman and Barangay residents to where
the body was in a toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman. The policeman, with the help of the Barangay
residents, dug out the body. The body of the victim was Identified by Ernesto Guzman, his wife, and Jose
Esguerra, victim's brother. Pat. Patriarca took pictures of the body, noted the statements of Ernesto Guzman and
Jose Esguerra, and took down the confession of appellant. Later, the cadaver was subjected to autopsy.
A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red shorts, were recovered from the pit where the
body of the victim was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were identified by Ernesto Guzman as those worn by
appellant while he was drinking with the victim on December 11, 1981. A small table, rubber slipper, bottle of
wine and glass were likewise recovered from the same pit.
Defense version: Gaddi was asked by Guzman to buy gin. That it was Guzman who confessed the killing to him
but Guzman told the police that it was Gaddi who killed Esguerra.
Held: Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is
essential for the validity of such conviction that:
1) there be more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice
for any case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently satisfies the quantum of
proof necessary to uphold a judgment of conviction. The following circumstances proven by the prosecution
indubitably point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto Esguerra.
1. The fact that said victim was last seen on the day he was killed in the company of the accused, drinking gin at
the back of the house of Ernesto Guzman.
2. The fact that on the day after the drinking spree, the accused himself admitted to Ernesto Guzman that he
stabbed his drinking companion and that the latter was 'nadisgrasya niya" so he dumped the body of the victim
in a hole being dug out for a toilet, located at the yard of Ernesto Guzman
3. The fact that when he was turned over to Pat. Arturo Angeles and Pat. Rogelio Castillo of the Northern Police
District by the barangay people who apprehended him, be admitted the truth of the charge of the barangay
residents that he killed someone and that he dumped the body of the victim in a place being dug out as an
improvised toilet . At the time the barangay people started digging for the body of the victim, the appellant was
even instructing them as to the exact location where the body was buried
4. The fact that the place where be led the police officers and the barangay residents, i.e. the toilet pit in the
backyard of Ernesto Guzman, was indeed the site where he buried the victim as the body of the victim was
found there after the digging.
5. The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the accused was wearing during the drinking spree were later
recovered from the place where the victim was buried.
Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis
for his conviction. As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is entitled
to great weight and respect since it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of a witness while on the
witness stand and therefore can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not.
Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot
be given credence for being hearsay is unavailing. This Tribunal had previously declared that a confession
constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the
killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of
his own personal knowledge; that is, he was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed
Augusta Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.
The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as a witness considering his stature in the
community as a member of a religious movement participating in such activities as "mañanita" and procession
of the Fatima and Black Rosary [Rollo, p. 30.] In fact, on the day the killing took place, he left his house where
appellant and his companion, Esguerra were still drinking and went to the house of Junior Isla to attend a
"mañanita" and participate in the weekly activity of bringing down the crucifix and the image of the Fatima.
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
Facts: Leake and Hagert were engaged in a collision on Highway 3. It resulted in the damage of Hagert’s car
and Leake’s plow. The accident occurred at around 6:45 pm. Hagert hit the rear of Leake’s tractor which was
towing his plow. Leake claimed that it was Hagert’s negligence which caused the accident while Hagert claims
that because of the absence of lights and rear reflectors, she could not see Leake’s tractor and plow. During
trial, evidence was adduced and different testimonies of persons were presented.
One such testimony was that of Edward Gross, an adjuster who investigated the scene of the accident. He
stated in his testimony that while he was making his investigation, he talked to Leake’s son, who told him that
the lens in the small light had been missing from its frame for some time prior to the accident. Leake’s
contended that such statement was hearsay.
Issue: WON said statement was indeed hearsay
Held: Yes. Allen Leake contends that whether or not the red lens was out at the time of the accident is a
material question of fact, determinative as to the contributory negligence by Allen Leake.
Leake’s son did not testify in the present action; he was not a party to the action; his statement was not made
under oath; his statement was not subject to cross-examination; and he was not available as a witness at the time
of trial because he was in the army and overseas.
We find that it was error for the trial court to admit into evidence the testimony concerning what Leake’s son
said to Edward Gross; the son’s statements were hearsay and should have been excluded.
U.S. v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
Facts: While conducting a search of the premises of defendant Zenni, Ruby Humphrey, pursuant to a lawful
search warrant which authorized a search for evidence of bookmaking activity, government agents answered the
telephone several times. The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting
events. The government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the callers believed that the premises
were used in betting operations. The existence of such belief tends to prove that they were so used. The
defendants object on the ground of hearsay.
Issue: WON the utterances of the unknown callers fall within the operation of the hearsay rule, and thus
inadmissible
Held: The utterances were not within the operation of the hearsay rule.
The Federal Rules of Evidence state that:
Rule 801. “(a) Statement. – A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of
a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(c) Hearsay. ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trail or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Rule 802. “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress.’
Assertion is not defined in the rules, but has the connotation of a forceful or positive declaration.
The effect of the definition of ‘statement’ is to exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of
conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is that nothing is an
assertion unless intended to be one.
Conclusion: The utterances of the bettors telephoning in their bets were nonassertive verbal conduct, offered as
relevant for an implied assertion to be inferred from them, namely, that bets could be placed at the premises
being telephoned. The language is not an assertion on its face, and it is obvious these persons did not intend to
make an assertion about the fact sought to be proved or anything else.
As an implied assertion, the proferred evidence is expressly excluded from the operation of the hearsay rule by
Rule 801 of the federal Rules of Evidence, and the objection thereto must be overruled.
Estrada vs Desierto 356 SCRA 108 (03apr2001) 146710-15
Facts: The Supreme Court, in a prior decision, used the Angara Diary (“AD”) to establish Estrada’s intent to
resign.
Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence?
Held: No.
The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Estrada (E) cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the AD. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said diary
was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. E had all the opportunity to contest the use of the
diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the AD was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay
rule. The rules of exclusion do not cover admissions of a party and the AD belongs to this class. Although the
AD is not the diary of E, E is bound by it, in accordance with the doctrine of adoptive admission. Sec. Angara
acted for and in behalf of E in the crucial days before Pres. Arroyo took her oath as President. Admissions of an
agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (E).
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. It was also an
admission against interest, which could be considered an exception to the hearsay rule. The AD contains
statements of E which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign.
BOSS JOEL: this is a weird decision. Why did the SC talk about hearsay, res actos inter alia, and other rules
of evidence when there was neither trial nor hearing held? It should be noted that the Rules on Evidence will
only apply when there is a trial or a hearing. (Sec2, Rule128) When the SC relied on the “admission against
interest rule” they effectively excluded any chance that the best evidence rule and the hearsay rule could be
applied. Thus, if there would be objections on the ground of best evidence and/or hearsay, these would be
overruled because the basis for the offer of the AD is admission against interest. Besides, objections based on
best evidence would not be possible because there was no document presented.
2. Exceptions
Exceptions to the hearsay rule
1. waiver
2. independently relevant evidence
3. dying declaration
4. Declaration against interest
5. Act or declaration about pedigree
6. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
7. Common reputation
8. Part of the res gestae
9. Verbal acts
10. Entries in the course of business
11. Entries in official records
12. Commercial lists and the like
13. Learned treatises
14. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
a. Dying Declaration
1) Rule 130, §37
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31 a)
Requisites for admissibility of a dying declaration
1. declaration of a dying person
2. made under the consciousness of an impending death
3. his death is the subject of inquiry
4. as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death
2) Cases
People v. Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)
Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later, as the victim was about to be taken to the
hospital, a patrolman was able to get his statement as to the identity of the perpetrators. The victim was unable
to sign the statement and he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of the lapse of considerable time between the
commission of the offense and the taking of the statement. However, the statement amounts to a dying
declaration, as it is a statement coming from a seriously wounded person even if death occurs hours or days
after it was inflicted if there be showing that it was due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the
time he made his declaration until the end came. There is no need for proof that the declarant state "that he has
given up the hope of life.” It is enough if. from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such
must have been his state of mind. It is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the
conclusion that the time [of such statement] the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he
actually died. Its admissibility is not affected by death occurring hours or days afterwards.
People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (28feb1985) L-45470 
Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him lying on the sand at the bank of a river. Pablo’s
hands were tied on his back and he was lying face down. The barrio captain took Pablo’s ante-mortem
statement and learned that he was Pablo Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was not
sure if he would survive the gunshot wounds he suffered. Pablo died in the hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was
charged and convicted of Murder. Laquinon argues that the statement is not a dying declaration because it was
not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a dying declaration since the deceased
was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself
in extremis, at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting
this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as part of the res
gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no
sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was inferred from the extent of the injuries. In
Laquinon, the declarant expressly said that he was not sure that we was going to die. The moral of the story is,
in taking a dying declaration, don’t ask if the declarant thinks he will die. 
Facts:
People's version of the case is as follows:
On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy,
Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short while he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a
river some three hundred meters to the south of his house. Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told
him that a man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the barrio
councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was. His brother, Leocario and
the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the man lying on the sand and asked who he was.
The man answered, "I am Pablo Remonde." Remonde's two hands were tied on his back. He was lying face
down.
Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who he was to which he
answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot you" and Remonde said that it was
Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive
to which the victim answered "I do not know." After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality of
Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to
the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot by
Gregorio Laquinon. Pablo Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital. Pablo
Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso
Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body a slug was recovered. Pablo
Remonde died in the hospital on November 16, 1972 because of bullet wounds.
The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. The trial court summarized his defense, as
follows:
In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member; that he was ordered by one Noli Cabardo, then
their CO, to fetch Pablo Remonde; he requested one Cristino Nerosa to go with him, and matter of factly, they
brought Remonde to the place where said CO Cabardo with ten companions, was waiting at the riverbank; that
before reaching the place, Nerosa separated from him and he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo. There
Cabardo confronted Remonde why, having been commanded to buy some provisions in Matanao, he
(Remonde) never returned; to which Remonde answered that he spent the money 'in drinking and gambling;
when upon Cabardo got mad and as Remonde attempted to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which must have
been fired by Cabardo as he was holding a .38 Cal. revolver; that he (witness) also had that evening a Cal. 22
paltik; that after the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the ground, and then Cabardo ordered them to go to the
mountain as in fact they did; that two days later during the day, their mountain camp was raided by the PC and
Cabardo and two others were killed while he (witness) was able to escape and went to Magpet, North Cotabato,
and engaged in farming therein with his relatives; but believing that as a KM member he 'committed
something,' he surrendered to the Davao PC Barracks in May, 1975 (Exhibit '2'), where up to now he is being
confined.
Issue: May the Statements of Remonde be admissible as a dying declaration.
Held: The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration
since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the
deceased believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is
the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the
incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing as related by the accused for the following
reasons:
First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was already hand-tied at his back, that the
place of the shooting was "covered by thick bushes and beside the river", and that CO Cabardo was with ten
men excluding the accused; under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased, with all those
overwhelming handicap, would attempt to flee.
Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do would be to flee away from and not
towards Cabardo; in doing the former he would turn to his right or to his left or towards his back; if he fled to
his left or right, or towards his back, he would be exposing one side of his body, or his back, and when fired
upon in that position he would have been hit on one side of the body or at his back. The evidence — as testified
to by Dr. Llanos — however, shows that the deceased had only one wound a gunshot wound, in the abdomen;
this shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and through the intestines and lodged,
presumably in the bony portions of his back, that is why the slug (Exhibit "B") was recovered. The accused's
version, therefore, that the deceased tried to flee is hard to believe for being against the physical facts.
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (27jan1981) L-26193 
Facts: Catalino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and wounded. Espina asked for the
police. When police officers arrived, they asked Espina “who slashed and robbed” him. Espina answered that it
was Sabio. His declaration was taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and convicted of
robbery with homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was not made
under the consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to
his grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the
brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak unless his head was raised; the spontaneous
answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the
direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his
end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death, that renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact
that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness
of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the
authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial
and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away personality belonging to the
offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing objects
recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred nor presumed from the circumstance that the
accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash
amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the
house were in disarray. Nor can the dying declaration of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery.
The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or
murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof of Sabio’s guilt of robbery as a part of the res
gestae?
Facts: The 13-year old accused was charged with Robbery with Homicide for the death of Catalino Espina, an
octogenarian, owner of a small sari-sari store located in his house, who, in the early morning of October 5,
1965, was found on the second floor of his dwelling wounded on the forehead, from which injury he died three
days later. The merchandise in his store was in a state of disarray and the tin can containing the cash sales in the
amount of P8.00 was found empty. The accused was positively identified by JESUSA BIRONDO, a neighbor
of the victim who saw him running from the scene of the incident that fateful morning. CAMILO SEMILLA
saw the accused ran pass him about six meters away towards his (accused’s) house at about 5am while waiting
for someone to help him carry his banca to the shore. The victim in his ante-mortem statement taken by the
police in the presence of the victim's grandnephew also identified him. The accused was found guilty as
charged, with the attendant aggravating circumstances or disregard of respect due to the 80-year old victim and
recidivism, and without any mitigating circumstances. He was sentenced to death but in view of his youth, the
trial Court recommended that the penalty be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the dying declaration of the victim may be used to prove the crime of Robbery.
Held: The dying declaration of the victim which points to the accused as the one slashed and robbed him cannot
be admitted to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly
limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of death.
The arguments advanced are unavailing. The defense questions the admissibility of Exhibit "A" of the
prosecution as an antemortem statement arguing that there is no evidence showing that when the declaration
was uttered the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that, in fact, the victim had hopes
of recovery or his first word to Camilo Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police. Defense counsel argues
further that there are doubts as to when said Exhibit "A" was thumb-marked because, although it was already in
existence in the morning of October 5, 1965, as alleged by Patrolman Fuentes, the accused was never
confronted with the document when he was taken in to custody by the police for the first time from the morning
of October 5 to October 6, 1965, thereby implying that the document did not yet exist at that time.
The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain; his inability to speak until
his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death";
and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that
the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. The death did not ensue till three days after the
declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact,
that renders the dying declarations admissible.
Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo Semilla to fetch the police, does not negative the
victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to
disclose his assailant to the authorities. The mere failure of the police to confront the accused with the
antemortem declaration the first time the latter was arrested and incarcerated from, neither militates against the
fact of its execution considering that it was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.
People v. de Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin Valencia, came home and found her
wounded. He asked his grandmother "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After
uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya. De
Joya was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean
that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that
his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was
expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair of
the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it.
Thus, if an interruption cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person
wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the
whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the
statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able
to tell. Since the declarant was prevented from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been
qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore
entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. The words "Si Paqui" do not
constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question
asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" The
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The
trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer.
But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been
had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the
appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision. Under the context, what else could
have “Si Paqui” meant other than that he was responsible for the crime?
People v. Salison, G.R. No. L-115690, Feb. 20, 1996
Facts: At around 8PM 30Nov1990, witness Maria Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim,
Rolando Valmoria, who was then watching television in a store. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's
shoulder and brought him behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree. There, appellant Salison
boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles
suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia
Fernandez approached them that the three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind.
Fernandez was able to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused returned and started to
maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of wood and started to hit
Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding
a chance to do so, he stood up and ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed
Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house. During this
time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness
and pain in his head which was bleeding at that time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia
Alcoseba, the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident
explaining that if he should die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as
evidence.
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the
hospital. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However, at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he
started to convulse and was rushed to the hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died.
Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying declaration?
Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed
by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia
Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano
regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The appellant further
contends that the declaration was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the
defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. The declaration
can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on
his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances
thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants.
At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as
part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances,
the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
b. Declaration Against Interest
1) Rule 130, §38
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors
in interest and against third persons. (32 a)
Requirements for hearsay testimony on declaration against interest
1. declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
2. against the interest of the declarant
3. the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true
4. as evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons
cf Rule 130 Sec. 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. – Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter,
while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (211)

Admission by privies Declaration against interest

One of 3 exceptions to res inter alios acta Exception to hearsay
Evidence against the successor in interest of the Evidence against even the declarant, his successor in
admitter interest, or 3rd persons
Admitter need not be dead or unable to testify Declarant is dead or unable to testify
Relates to title to property Relates to any interest
Admission need not be against the admitter’s Declaration must be against the interest of the declarant
interest

2) Cases
Viacrusis v. CA, 44 SCRA 176 (1972)
Previous recognition of ownership in another by a party in possession of property in dispute is admission
against interest which may be received even against 3rd persons.
Facts: It appears that the land of about 4 hectares involved in this case is part of a bigger lot of about 14.6303
hectares, covered Title in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that, on June 8, 1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit
B, selling said lot of 14.6303 hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on 1936, filed with the RD,
and recorded in the memorandum of incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July 7, 1941, or about
5 yrs later Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10, conveying the disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to
Balentin Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on 1945, to Guillermo Viacrucis (Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959,
Anastacio Orais — who claimed to have made oral demands — formally demanded from Viacrucis that he
vacate said portion and surrender its possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not heeded by Viacrucis
who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed, Exhibit 9, confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly
made by him, on January 12, 1954, in favor of his brother-in-law Claros Marquez; and that the deeds of sale,
Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not been registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.
The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs therein — respondent herein.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs. Marquez, said decision, against them and in favor
of Mr. and Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not there was admission by silence on the part of Orais.
Held: It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs. Castelo and this recognition by the now deceased
Pelagio Castelo — which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G — constitute a declaration of Mr.
and Mrs. Castelo adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to section 32 of said Rule
130. Petitioners have no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission,
the same having been made in 1936, more than five (5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest,
Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and Castelo were the only parties who had any interest
in the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission "may be received in
evidence," not only against the party who made it "or his successors in interest," but, also, "against third
persons."
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the bank refused to accept OCT No. 243 as
collateral for the loan applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land covered by said certificate of title was
not his property, there is no competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything in response to said
statement. Moreover, OCT No. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by the
latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in question as security for said loan, unless and until
OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued to Orais. This, however, could
not take place before the filing of his loan application, because the owner's duplicate of said certificate of title
— admittedly delivered by Sanchez to Orais — had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel, to whom
he (Orais) had turned it over in connection with a given criminal case.
People v. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825 (1928)
Declaration against interest, as an exception to the hearsay rule, covers not only pecuniary interest, but also
penal interest.
Facts: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in
the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men
happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a
fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously
wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the
municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that
only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds
received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether the
accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the
prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified
to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the
witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when
the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who
was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and
of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando
Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
Issue: Whether or not the verified declaration of Holgado was a statement of fact against penal interest.
Held: It is held that error was committed in not admitting the verified declaration of H as the statement of a fact
against penal interest.
One exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under
certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary
interest. But by a large preponderance of authority in the United States, the declarations of a person other than
accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of
the hearsay doctrine.
The general rule rejecting evidence of confessions of third parties made out of court intended to exonerate the
accused, examined in the light of its history and policy, and found to be unjustified. It should not be received in
the Philippine jurisdiction where the principles of the common law have never been followed blindly. A study
of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not controlling, for here the fact is that the
declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath, while they read in such a way as to ring with the
truth.
Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae for it was made by H on the same
morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration
fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the party talking about the facts. The modern
tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice
when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured.
People v. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
Facts: At or about 1PM of 28Jan1972, the accused was at the seashore of Calarian relaxing since he has just
arrived from Jolo, Sulu that particular day.
At that time, he was already running away from the authorities because he is an escapee from San Ramon
Prison and Penal Farm.
Later on, the accused proceeded to his father's house which is just near the seashore, Upon reaching the house,
he saw Nori Mohamad (Majuri’s common law wife?) but he had no time to talk to her because immediately
after seeing him, Nori ran away, going to the direction of the street.
Armed with the bolo which he had been carrying, he chased after Nori and he caught up with her at the street
where he started stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the different parts of the body.
When he saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, he hurriedly left the place and ran towards the far end
of Calarian.
On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide.
Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel. He admitted that he killed his
wife. He declared that after he was informed by his counsel that the penalty for parricide is death or life
imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the killing of his wife because that was the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by pleading guilty he could be
sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was not absolutely proved.
Held: Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the accused in this review, contends that the marriage of
Airol to Norija was not absolutely proven. That contention cannot be sustained. The testimony of the accused
that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the
maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the
deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison
and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.
Fuentes v. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)
Facts: At 4AM 24Jun1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto
Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and
placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a
short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the
ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping
wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July
1989, reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in length with extracavitation of
the small and large intestines."
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina;
that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard
that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from
that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;"
that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter
untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped
out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24Jun1989 while he
was in a store in the barangay.
The RTC of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty. CA affirmed the judgment.
Held: One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against
interest. The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant
must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in
the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead,
mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence
from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the
defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of
the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo
admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce
Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let
an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial
statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who
have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.
Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse.
c. Pedigree
1) Rule 130, §39
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. – The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to pedigree
1. act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify
2. in respect to the pedigree of another person
3. related to him by birth or marriage
4. where it occurred before the controversy
5. the relationship between the 2 persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
"Pedigree" – includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, the names of the relatives, and facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
2) Cases
Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967) 
Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School on 15Aug1964
when he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., of his separation from the
service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
A few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary
school.
On 31Aug1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the
ground that the date of his birth is not 26Nov1897 but 11Dec1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit of
Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes, in which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner
"was born on 11Dec1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros
Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and
AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born;
furthermore, we were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO
GRAVADOR."
On 13Apr1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental.
The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on 11Dec1901 accordingly granted his petition.
Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was reinstated.
The respondents appealed directly to this Court.
Held: It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent
reasons.
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he
may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an
assertion of a family tradition. Indeed, even in his application for back pay which he filed with the Department
of Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on 07Oct1948, the petitioner stated that the
date of his birth is 11Dec1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the
GSIS and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to 11Dec1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified pleading in a
cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored.
Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within
the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, 11Dec1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but
also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on 10Jun1898 and
who retired on 10Jun1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than
Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
Facts: The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against
herein private respondent before the RTC over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father,
Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on 05Mar1983 without any ascendant or descendant,
and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes,
died on 03Oct1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which
is covered by TCT #66886, as a consequence of which TCT #358074 was issued in the name of Martin
Guerrero. On 02Jan1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on 25Oct1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on
02Nov1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following
documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family
picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of
Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo
Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint
affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter rested
their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment was filed by herein private
respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the
Family Code.
On 03Dec1992, the RTC issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance.
In upholding the dismissal, respondent CA declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and
insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
Held: Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison,
the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture,
and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and
as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime
in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem
motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration,
but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third
element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent
proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and
not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement
on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.
Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other
preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity
of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an
absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration
and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. As held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another
person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact
which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence
unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are
however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise,
the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive.
d. Family Tradition
1) Rule 130, §40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. – The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (34 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
1. reputation or tradition existing in a family
2. previous to the controversy
3. in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members
4. the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree.
de Leon: note that in family tradition, the declarant must be dead or unable to testify. In family reputation or
tradition, there is not even a declarant to speak of; just a witness who was aware of an exiting family reputation
or tradition.
2) Case
People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991)
Testimony of a witness and the witness’ grandfather as to the date of birth and age of the witness is evidence on
family tradition which is admissible as an exception to hearsay.
Facts: On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, complainant was playing at the Freedom
Square inside the public market of San Carlos City when appellant, a 170-pound, 53 year old market watchman
at the time, held her by the hand and took her upstairs to the second floor of the public market building which
houses some government offices and which at the time was expectedly deserted. There, he told the complainant
to hold his penis and jack it off. Thereafter, appellant ordered complainant to lie down, and when she refused he
pushed her down on the floor. When complainant was lying flat on her back, appellant placed himself on top of
her while she was still wearing her pedal pusher shorts and panty. So, appellant forced her to take off her pedal
pushers and panty and thereupon he lay on top of her. Appellant then tried to insert his penis into her vagina
but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated. Complainant bled a little. Thereafter, appellant gave
complainant P 2.00 and left. Complainant stood up and went down the building but never told anybody about it
because she was afraid the appellant would kill her.
On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening complainant was sitting at the Freedom Square when
appellant approached her and told her to go with him upstairs to the second floor of the public market.
Complainant refused but appellant shoved her towards the stairs, held her by the left arm, and brought her to the
upper floor near the civic center. There, appellant succeeded in raping the complainant.
Complainant felt some liquid oozing out from appellant's organ and into her being. And after appellant had
withdrawn his sex organ, complainant discovered that her vagina was bleeding. Appellant then stood up and
told her not to tell anybody about it. Then appellant gave her P 2.00 and left.
As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the San
Carlos City INP assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the main entrance of the public market. Pat.
Alfaro knew appellant well because he was the public market watchman at the time. A minute later, Pat. Alfaro
saw complainant coming down the same. Pat. Alfaro noticed that complainant was pale, with blood flowing to
her thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy.
Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what happened to her. Complainant answered that she was taken
upstairs and raped by appellant. Immediately, Pat. Alfaro brought complainant to the city hospital where she
was examined by Dr. Oscar Jagdon in the presence of two medical technologists. Dr. Jagdon confirmed the
report that indeed complainant was raped. Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported the incident to the Station Guard by
phone then took complainant to the police station after the medical examination. When they reached the station,
appellant who had already been taken into custody was readily identified by complainant as the rapist.
Complainant was then investigated and she rendered her statement to the police.
Accused-appellant's version: Alibi; roamed around checking padlocks of stores then had a snack
The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape
was not established with certainty, hence, it was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-
appellant of statutory rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her
maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not
constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the
hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the
victim's age is beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely:
1. that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family;
2. that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy;
and
3. that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a
member of the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is
being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school
upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the
said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution's claim that the
victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape incidents under consideration, we
affirm the trial court's finding that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years of age.
It is axiomatic in rape cases that the slightest penetration of the female's private organ is sufficient to
consummate the crime.
Ferrer v. de Inchausti, 38 Phil 905 (1918) 
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, to be
admissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven to have been made at the same time as the
occurrence of the events documented.
e. Common Reputation
1) Rule 130, §41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. – Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting
facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character,
may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of
common reputation. (35)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Common reputation
1. Common reputation
2. existing previous to the controversy
3. respecting either
a. facts of public or general interest more than 30 years old, or
b. marriage or
c. moral character
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.
2) Cases
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil 227 (1905)
Facts: This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots described in the complaint, located in Calles
Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony of John R.
Wilson, Eduardo Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city
attorney. The first witness testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged
to the city (p. 11 of the bill of exceptions). The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and
that he did not know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and 13 of the bill of exceptions). It must be borne in mind
that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the
complaint. These lots abut (be adjacent to) upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either.
According to the complaint, they are building lots.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria,
and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of
the preceding witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega's testimony was
merely hearsay. It consisted of that he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city.
His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally
considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph
11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held: Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section
mentioned. "Common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of
this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality
and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained
Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the street on which the property abuts.
Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the "mayor of
the city of Manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written by him on the 9th of October, 1901, to
the Municipal Board of Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario, in his testimony, admitted the authenticity of both
documents which contain an offer to the municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo
del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first document under the misapprehension that the land belonged to
the city, but that he had been subsequently informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to
the municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second document because the
President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with the city.
His testimony in this respect was not contradicted. We accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the
Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is
not admissible in evidence.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in
overruling his motion to dismiss.
f. Res Gestae
1) Rule 130, §42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. xxx
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to res gestae
1. Statements made by a person either
a. while a startling occurrence is taking place or
b. immediately prior or
c. immediately subsequent thereto
2. with respect to the circumstances thereof

2) Cases
People v. Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1976) 
A declaration made by a person immediately after being wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be
considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence. A statement was given sometime after the
stabbing while the declarant was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic, where he had no time to concoct a
falsehood or to fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive has been shown as to why he
would frame-up the accused would render the statement admissible as a part of the res gestae.
Facts: Appellant admits that on 22Nov1969 while Teodulo Panimdim was attending a dance, he (Panimdim)
was stabbed in the left groin. As a result of that assault, Panimdim died five days later at the provincial hospital.
The question is: Did Putian stab Panimdim?
According to the prosecution, in the evening of that day, while Patrolman Arturo Yap was passing Barrio Tabo-
o, he noticed a commotion at the back of the dance hall in that barrio. He was informed that someone had been
stabbed. He looked for the culprit. He found Guillermo Putian behind the municipal building with a dagger and
scabbard in his possession. Yap investigated Putian. The latter denied that he stabbed Panimdim. Yap arrested
Putian and surrendered him to Jesus Gomonit, the guard at the municipal hall.
Patrolman Yap then repaired to the clinic of Doctor Saceda where the victim, Teodulo Panimdim, alias Doling,
was brought for treatment. At the clinic, Yap wrote on a piece of paper the victim's declaration.
When that statement was taken, Panimdim was in a sitting position. Without anybody's help, he put on his
undershirt, pants and shirt. He went to his house without anyone's assistance.
Yap explained that Panimdim mentioned only a person named Guirmo and that he, Yap, was the one who added
the surname Putian in the statement Exhibit C. He clarified that he wrote that surname because he knew of no
other person called Guirmo in that locality except Guirmo Putian, an alleged gambler.
Issue: Whether or not the statements given by Panimdim was part of res gestae.
Held: The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts. The trial court admitted
Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after the commission of a felony.
Appellant Putian contends that Panimdim's statement was not spontaneous because it was "made several hours
after the incident". He claims that the requisite that the declarant gave the statement before he had time to devise
or contrive was not present in this case. Appellant further contends that because the statement is in narrative
form, it is not the statement contemplated in the rule.
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a part of the res gestae and as
proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him the stab wound that caused his death five days
later in the hospital.
"Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and
impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made
at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the
startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae."
Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at a medical
clinic. He had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious charge against Putian. No motive has
been shown as to why he would frame up Putian.
People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994)
Facts: Atanacia Ramos had a daughter Rosita. Rosita married Domiciano Peralta. They had a daughter Siony.
On morning, Siony came to Atanacia at her house frantically told her that Domiciano was strangling Rosita.
They went to the Peralta home and found Rosita dead. Domiciano was not there. They immediately reported the
matter to the police, who eventually arrested the Domiciano. At the preliminary investigation, Siony executed a
sworn statement implicating her father. Domiciano was charged with Parricide. At the trial Atanacia testified as
to Siony’s declaration. However, Siony testified for her father and said that though she saw someone strangling
her mother, she did not see who it was. After the defense rested, the prosecution presented the investigating
judge who testified as to the regularity of the conduct of the preliminary investigation. TC convicts.
Held: The statement Siony made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform her of her father's attack on her
mother was part of the res gestae. Res gestae means the "thing done." It refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or
immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. Siony rushed to Atanacia immediately upon
seeing her father strangling her mother to death. Her spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part of the res
gestae and is assumed to preclude the probability of premeditation of fabrication. Since the utterance was made
under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses rather than reason and reflection, and during the
brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be
taken as expressing Siony's real belief as to the facts just observed by her.
Besides, where a witness executes a statement for the prosecution and retracts his testimony and subsequently
testified for the defense, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence. Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. Siony testified during the preliminary examination conducted by Judge
Paano that the appellant choked her mother to death. Her subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no
probative value at all.
Furthermore, there are certain circumstances that may have persuaded the daughter to change her former
declaration and testify in favor of her father. First, the accused was her father after all, and she probably felt that
she should not be responsible for his incarceration for the rest of his life. Second, her testimony was given 7
years after the incident and therefore could not be expected to be as accurate as the statement she made in the
preliminary investigation only hours after the killing. Third, during all this time, her father had been under
detention and she must have believed that this was punishment enough for him. Lastly, she was, at the time she
testified in court, living with her father's sister, who may have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her
to recant her earlier statement.
g. Verbal acts
 1) Rule 130, §42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. – xxx So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (36 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to verbal acts
1. statements accompanying an equivocal act
2. material to the issue
3. giving it a legal significance
2) Case
Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919)
Facts: Tan Po Pik died in the Philippines intestate. After he died, Marta Torres, claiming to be his widow, took
possession of his estate and partitioned it between herself and her children by the deceased. Plaintiffs claim to
be the legal wife and children of the deceased from China. They now sue to recover their supposed share of the
estate. The SC found numerous inconsistencies as to the testimonial and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs
as to lead to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not who they claim to be. However, the plaintiff offered in
evidence a sworn declaration of the deceased that the plaintiffs were his children. Defendants offered letters
between the deceased and his brother showing that deceased’s sworn declaration was to deceive the customs
authorities to allow plaintiffs to enter the country. Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of such letters.
Held: The declaration was made in proceedings before customs authorities upon arrival of the plaintiffs from
China. The arrival and admission of these plaintiffs and the declaration of Tan Po Pik are isolated parts of an
event which is the voyage from China to the Philippines of these supposed children of the deceased. Their
preparations for the voyage and the plans conceived by them to obtain their sure entrance into this country are
also part of the voyage. In order to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs authorities,
the other acts, declarations, and events occurring before the said entrance into the country, which may have an
essential bearing or which have led to the realization of their entrance into the country are admissible in
evidence in this case on the ground that they constitute parts of the same transaction, or of the res gestae. A
word, an expression, or an act of a person, considered apart from the circumstances surrounding them, does not
signify anything, and in many cases it signifies the opposite of the true sense of the said word, expression, or
act. It is imprudent and illegal to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs authorities
separately from the circumstances which prompted him to make such a declaration. We must therefore inquire
into circumstances which surrounded the entrance of the plaintiffs and the declaration made by Tan Po Pik on
that occasion.
In this case, letters between Tan Po Pik and his brother in China contained an agreement that for plaintiffs to
enter the Philippines, Tan Po Pik was to declare before the customs authorities that plaintiffs were his children.
The names of the children whom Tan were supposed to declare as his children were the same as the names of
the plaintiffs, except that they now bear the surname Tan. The letters even refer to one of the plaintiffs as the
deceased’s nephew. If these plaintiffs were really children of Tan Po Pik, there would have been no necessity
for the above letters. Thus, Tan Po Pik’s declaration before the customs authorities is for the sole purpose of
allowing the children to enter the Philippines, and such a declaration is entirely false. All these letters formed an
essential part of the fact of the coming of these plaintiffs to Manila, because if these letters had not been
transmitted and received the plaintiffs could not have succeeded in entering the Philippines. Therefore, all the
statements and declarations-of Tan Po Ho in these documents relative to the prosecution of the object of the
conspiracy are admissible in evidence.
People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988) 
Facts: Complainant Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota, then 52 years old and a widow, was asleep inside the room
at their market stall located in the public market of barangay Oscariz, municipality of Ramon, Isabela, on the
evening of 20Jan1980. With her were her two married daughters, his son-in-law and grandchildren.
At about 10PM, the accused woke up the complainant to observe some people drinking at a stall in violation of
the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 o'clock in the evening. So they went.
They stood a few meters away from the said stall for ten minutes to observe the drinking session. Suddenly the
accused held her hands which made the complainant shout but was not heard due to the loud music.
The accused slapped her and brought out his gun which he pointed at her breast threatening to kill her if she
creates any noise. The accused then pulled her and she fell on the ground hitting her head on the pavement so
she lost consciousness, sustaining injuries on the palms of her hands.
When she regained consciousness after a short while, she was dragged by the accused towards the banana grove
near the market. She managed to stand and walk while being dragged. The accused then carried her body across
the canal and dropped her on the ground causing her to fall flat on her belly and her fingers were again injured
by the broken glasses on the ground. She could not free herself nor shout for help because of the threat to her
life.
After she fell flat on the ground, the accused held her and pressed her down and he proceeded to remove her
skirt and shorts and thereafter her blouse leaving her exposed naked with her back to the ground. She was not
wearing any panty or brassiere then. Besides pressing her down the accused stepped on her thigh with his left
foot as he went on top of her naked body. Then he stood up warning her not to make any noise and he removed
his pants and tee-shirt after which he again went on top of her naked body holding her hands. Pointing the gun
at her breast anew, the accused repeated his threat to kill her if she resisted. Then the accused started mashing
her breast and succeeded in having sexual congress with the complainant. She felt his penis penetrating her
vagina followed by a push and pull movement for less than an hour, until she felt semen emitting from his penis
and entering her body. When she reached home about 12:00 midnight, Silveria asked her what happened and
she revealed that the accused abused her. When Silveria pressed for details, the complainant replied that she
will tell her the following morning.
The next morning complainant told Silveria everything that happened to her and thereafter she proceeded to
Santiago town and reported the incident to Mr. Segundo Maylem, post commander and Executive Vice Chapter
Commander, VFP Southern Isabela, from whom she sought assistance. She was advised to submit herself to an
investigation and medical examination. After due investigation by the PC, a complaint for rape was filed signed
and sworn to by complainant in the MTC against the accused.
In appealing his conviction, the accused, through counsel assailed the credibility of complainant and interposed
the defense of denial and alibi. However, by way of rebuttal of the People's brief filed by another collaborating
counsel for appellant, the failure of the prosecution to establish involuntariness on the part of the victim was
emphasized.
Held: The appeal is impressed with merit.
Complainant was a widow, 52 years of age. She had been married three times. She was not that innocent about
the world. When appellant invited her at 10PM to step out of her house, she should have declined. Going out
alone with a man late in the evening is neither in good taste nor safe even if the one who invited her was the
barrio captain.
But obviously, the appellant was quite intimate with the complainant. When he knocked at her door and was
allowed entry, he proceeded into the bedroom of complainant and woke her up himself.
Complainant went with the appellant in her shorts. She took no precaution as any discreet woman would do by
at least putting on her panty and a brassiere instead of stepping out with the appellant in her shorts.
If she could not be heard as her voice was drowned by the blaring stereo player, she should have shouted louder
again and again. Better still, she should have run towards the canteen which was just two meters away or to her
residence which was one market stall away. After allegedly shouting once, she kept her peace.
She was allegedly dragged although she admits she willingly walked along. She was allegedly carried across the
canal by the appellant although she was taller and definitely bigger than appellant.
When she fell on the ground, the appellant removed her shorts and skirt without difficulty. She offered no
resistance. Even as he stood up to remove his pants she did not attempt to stand up to escape nor to shout for
help. There was no sign of struggle or resistance. Then the appellant put his penis into her vagina penetrating
her. They had sexual intercourse for almost one hour. She even felt the semen of appellant as it entered her
body. Not a whimper, not a sound from the complainant was heard. She claims she was afraid due to the gun of
appellant and his threats. She did not even describe the type of gun the appellant threatened her with several
times. Nor had the prosecution shown appellant ever had a gun. All indications show that she submitted to his
advances.
As the Court sees it, what actually happened in this case, is that when the complainant went out with the
appellant that evening, she was aware of the risk of going out alone with a man for a reason that is far from
unavoidable. They were close and side by side for sometime, allegedly watching the drinking session at Linda's
canteen. They must have succumbed to the temptation of the flesh. One thing led to the other until they had
sexual intercourse. Perhaps the complainant did not initiate or motivate the sexual interlude. In the least, she
must have abetted it if not willingly submitted to the advances of the appellant. Indeed, they were in ecstasy for
almost one hour. Such mutual and passionate lovemaking can certainly not be characterized as involuntary. It
was free and without any compulsion.
The appellant was 48 years old when the incident happened. To think that a younger man would rape an elderly
woman of 52 years, widow, three times married, would be quite unusual. It is more probable that it was
consensual.
The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of what happened to her
when she returned home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress that her statement must not only be
spontaneous. It must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her
own story. As the Court observed, the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She
took a walk. She spent some time thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on her
body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate
interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot
thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby
rendered ACQUITTING the appellant of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993) 
Facts: At around 7pm of 07Nov1983, Adelaida Lingad left her niece, Grace Paule and her three (3) children
namely: Geraldine (Irene), Glenly and Enrique, all minors, at home to attend the wake of her uncle in a house
200 meters away from her place. The children were the only ones left at home. Her husband was then working
abroad. At that time, Adelaida had P4,000.00 in cash which was wrapped in newspaper and kept hidden under
her bed. Before leaving the house, Adelaida instructed the kids to go to bed.
At around 1pm or 2pm of 08Nov1983, accused Tala, Tolentino, Matawaran and an unknown person whose face
was covered entered the house of Adelaida Lingad by forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room
and demanded to know from the children where their mother hid her money. Grace Paule knew Manolito
Tolentino alias Bong because he is both an uncle and a barriomate. She also knew Carlito Tala alias Boy who is
a relative of her mother and Rodolfo Matawaran who is a "barkada" of Carlito. She recognized all the accused
for the lights were on. When the man whose face was covered threatened to stab the kids, Geraldine got so
frighten that she revealed to the accused where her mother hid the money.
After Tolentino took the P4,000.00, he stabbed Grace Paule and the children. During the stabbing incident,
Grace Paule lost consciousness but was able to regain it back after about five (5) minutes and shouted for help.
Her mother and grandmother, who lived nearby, heard her and immediately proceeded to said house but the
four (4) accused had already left.
When accused Tolentino's brother informed Adelaida about the stabbing incident that took place in her house,
Adelaida immediately rushed to her house and saw all the children with stab wounds. Glenly was lying on the
bed already dead while her bloodied niece Grace was sitting down near the door looking pale and holding her
heart. Upon reaching Geraldine, who was lying at the porch, she asked her the identities of the person
responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering "Bong-Bong" and also mentioning the names of Tala
and Matawaran. However, when she asked her son Enrique the latter was not able to answer but merely made a
sign with his three (3) fingers. Thereafter, Adelaida lost consciousness and was brought to the house of her
mother.
Grace Paule was the only surviving victim.
Defense: Alibi, delivered water melons.
Held: We find Grace's testimony credible. There is no evidence on record to show why said witness would
falsely implicate the accused-appellant Tala who is a relative of her mother unless it is the truth. Moreover, her
testimony was corroborated by prosecution witness Adelaida Lingad when the latter testified that her deceased
daughter Geraldine mentioned the names of the accused-appellant Tala and accused Matawaran as the persons
who stabbed her before she died. As to accused-appellant's contention that the statement of Geraldine, naming
her assailant soon after she was stabbed is inadmissible as part of res gestae, We find said contention
fallacious.
The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine had named accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators in the commission of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.
h. Entries in the Course of Business
1) Rule 130, §43
 Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty. (37 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in the course of business
1. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer
2. by a person deceased, or unable to testify
3. who was in a position to know the facts therein stated
4. if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary
or regular course of business or duty.
Note that in business records, the person making the entry must be deceased or unable to testify. In official
records, the person making the entry need not be deceased or unable to testify (Rule 130, Sec. 44). Both official
and business records are only prima facie evidence.
If the person making the entry is still alive, use the record to refresh his memory. (Rule 132, Sec. 16)
2) Cases
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)
Facts: This case arose out of a grade crossing accident which occurred in Massachusetts.
The accident occurred on the night of 25Dec1940. On 27Dec1940, the engineer of the train, who died before the
trial, made a statement at a freight office of petitioners where he was interviewed by an assistant superintendent
of the road and by a representative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission. This statement was
offered in evidence by petitioners under the Act of 20Jun1936. They offered to prove (in the language of the
Act) that the statement was signed in the regular course of business, it being the regular course of such business
to make such a statement. Respondent's objection to its introduction was sustained.
Issue: Whether or not the statement made by the engineer was admissible as entries in the course of business.
Held: We agree with the majority view below that it was properly excluded.
We do not think that it was made 'in the regular course' of business within the meaning of the Act. The business
of the petitioners is the railroad business. That business like other enterprises entails the keeping of numerous
books and records essential to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation. Though such books and records
were considered reliable and trustworthy for major decisions in the industrial and business world, their use in
litigation was greatly circumscribed or hedged about by the hearsay rule-restrictions which greatly increased the
time and cost of making the proof where those who made the records were numerous.
An accident report may affect that business in the sense that it affords information on which the management
may act. It is not, however, typical of entries made systematically or as a matter of routine to record events or
occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal controls. The conduct of a business
commonly entails the payment of tort claims incurred by the negligence of its employees. But the fact that a
company makes a business out of recording its employees' versions of their accidents does not put those
statements in the class of records made 'in the regular course' of the business within the meaning of the Act.
In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a
railroad business. Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like these
reports are calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business. Their primary utility is in litigating,
not in railroading.
Philamlife v. Capital Assurance Corp., (CA) 72 O.G. 3941
Facts: Philam entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Capital Assurance and the Galang spouses. The
Galangs were agents of Philam.
Under the agreement, Capital and the Galangs, jointly and severally, agreed to pay Philam a certain sum with
interest in consideration of Philam’s issuance of a clearance in favor of the Galangs. The sum was paid in full
by Capital Life.
However, there appears to be a stipulation in the Agreement to the effect that Capital and the Galangs would
pay to Philam any and all obligations of the Galangs arising from the unremitted premium collections and such
other agency accounts.
Pursuant to this, Philam wrote a letter to Capital informing it that the Galangs had collected premium payments
from policy holders and failed to remit the same to it. Philam demanded payment therefore. The Galangs did
not admit that such amount was due and so Capital refused to pay. Philam sued for collection of the additional
amounts against Capital, the lone defendant.
During the trial, Philam had but one witness, Narciso Bacani, the chief of its Accounts Control Office. He
testified on a statement of account showing that the Galangs are indebted to Philam. He however, DID NOT
HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW THE ACCOUNT HAD RISEN AS HIS OFFICE
MERELY COMPUTED THE CHARGES BASED ON DEBIT MEMOS RECEIVED FROM OTHER
DEPARTMENTS OF PHILAM.
CFI ruled against Capital. Capital contends that Philam has not proven the alledged unremitted premium
payments. It contests the admissibility of the said statement of account (SOA).
Issue: WON the SOA is admissible.
Held: No. The witness could have had knowledge of the entries made as it was his office which made such
entries in the SOA, but certainly he did not have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries i.e., that
the Galangs had collected premiums and failed to remit them since by his own admission, he merely computed
the charges.
Moreover, he is not a “person deceased, outside of the Phils, or unable to testify” so that the entries made could
be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Consequently, the testimony of the witness here is
worthless as evidence and the SOA to which he testified is likewise bereft of probative value.
The entries in question being so far removed from the exceptions to the hearsay rule, cannot and should not
substitute for a witness’ personal knowledge of the transactions sought to be established. Complaint dismissed.
Dissenting (justice de Castro): Testifying on the SOA, the witness stated without controversion that he prepared
the same pursuant to his duties as a section chief of the account control office. As a matter of course, his
section compiles and computes unremitted premium collections based on data received from the other
departments. It is hard to see how the statement should be less trustworthy when the person who prepared it is
available and did precisely testify on it.
As for his knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, practical necessity makes it sufficient that he received the
information in the regular course of business, when the person giving such information gave it in compliance
with a duty.
It is not essential that the entrant should have personal knowledge of the fact entered by him if he made the
entry in the regular course of business, recording a report made to him by one or more other ersons in the
regular course of business lying in the personal knowledge of the latter, there is no objection of receiving the
entry provided that practical inconveniences of producing on the stand the numerous persons thus concerned
would in the particular case outweigh the probable utility of doing so.
The entrant may be said to have received the information on the regular course of business, when the person
giving such information gave it in compliance with his duty.
i. Official Records
1) Rule 130, §44
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in official records
1. made in the performance of his duty
2. by either
a. a public officer of the Philippines, or
b. by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
Note that in official records, the person making the entry need not be deceased or unable to testify, but he must
be a public officer or a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. In business records, the
person making the entry must be deceased or unable to testify. Both official and business records are only prima
facie evidence.
2) Cases
Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330 (1968)
Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She had only one child, Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta
predeceased her mother. Crisanta was married to Fermin Fortus. They had an only son, the Victorino Fortus.
Ciriaca died intestate. The property therefore passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino never caused
the OCT to be cancelled and to have another issued in his name. Ciriaca’s estate was therefore not yet closed.
Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were childless. Upon Victorino's death, Julia
executed an affidavit of extra-judicial summary settlement of Ciriaca’s estate and had it registered. Rosario
Novero, claiming to be an illegitimate child of Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings for
summary settlement of Ciriaca’s estate. Julia opposed, along with the Fortuses, who claim to be Victorino’s
half-brother and sisters. They claim to be the legitimate children of Fermin Fortus with Jacoba Aguil.
The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate of their alleged parents, but sought to present
secondary evidence. The SC found the testimonial evidence the Fortuses presented to lay the basis for
introduction of secondary evidence were inconsistent, incredible and insufficient to establish than an original
marriage contract was indeed executed. However, the Fortuses presented baptismal certificates of some of them
to prove the marriage of their parents. Note that they must prove marriage because otherwise, they would be
illegitimate relatives of Victorino which would disqualify them from inheriting from him.
Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated therein,
but not the truth of the statements therein made as to the parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the
baptismal certificates public documents or public writings, because the parochial records of baptisms are not
public or official records, as they are not kept by public officers, and are not proof of relationship or filiation of
the child baptized.
Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past 30 years their parents had deported themselves
in public as husband and wife and had been living under the same roof, the legal presumption is that they had
entered into a lawful marriage. This presumption, however, is only applicable where there is no clear and
concrete evidence showing otherwise. In this case, however, there is a certificate from the Division of Archives
to the effect that 'no copy of the marriage record of spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil supposed to have
been solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas had been received by said
office for file', and this certification is further strengthened by the affirmation of Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in
the office of the municipal treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of such marriage supposedly
contracted between the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil from 1902 and 1922 of the Municipality of
Rosario, Batangas. At most, the baptismal certificates were only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia
Fortus had overcome by satisfactory evidence to the effect that Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were never
married and hence all of their children are not legitimate brothers or half brothers and therefore have no right to
inherit from Victorino Fortus.
Escolin: Before, baptismal certificates were competent evidence to establish the parentage of the child. After
Act 3753, baptismal certificates were no longer competent.
Johnson v. Lutz, ()

Africa v. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 (31mar1966) L-12986 

Facts: It appears that in the afternoon of 18Mar1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner
of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside
them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the
first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of
both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
1. Police Department Report:-
"Investigation disclosed that at about 4PM 18Mar1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a
tank truck, plate No. T-5292 into underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal
Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match
stick near the main valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick
action of Leandio Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the underground tank
prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was
spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessories, and residences."
2. The Fire Department Report:-
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and
cigarette stand,) the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which
is submitted herewith. It appears in this picture that there is in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which
according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks."
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents
had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain
Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are admissible in evidence as entries in official records.
Held:
As to report of Detective Capacillo:
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in
the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers
who conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official
information? As to some facts the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo
Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station where the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the
tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to
respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of
the fire. To qualify their statements as "official information acquired by the officers who prepared the reports,
the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have
the duty to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule: the facts stated therein were not
acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of defendant’s failure to explain the cause of the
fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There
are many cases in which the doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
As to report by Captain Leoncio Mariano:
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of
his own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Those facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the
gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the
standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than
the statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon
who, alone and without assistance, was transfering the contents thereof into the underground storage when the
fire broke out. He said: "Before loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was
going on, there were people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from
the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank
truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he heard someone shout "fire."
Decision reversed.
People v. Leones, 117 SCRA 382 (30sep1982) L-48727 
Facts: Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Mr. & Mrs. Pepito Leona at San
Fernando, La Union where she resided.
On 22Apr1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in her room. Earlier that day, the members of the
Leones family, including the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, had gone to nearby
beach resort for a picnic.
At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their house. While there, the appellant and Elizabeth
entered the room where complainant was lying down and forced her to take three tablets dissolved in a spoon
which according to them were aspirin. The complainant refused to take the tablets but was forced to do so when
the appellant held her mouth while his sister pushed the medicine. Then the appellant and Elizabeth left the
room and after a while the complainant felt dizzy.
Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and took off her panty. Then the appellant went on top
of her. The complainant tried to push him but as she was weak and dizzy, the appellant succeeded in abusing
her.
At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the stepmother of the appellant, found the complainant
unconscious near her room without any panty on. She was then taken to the La Union Provincial Hospital by
the driver of the Leona family.
When admitted to the hospital at about 6PM of the same date, the complainant was semiconscious, incoherent
and hysterical. She refused to talk and to be examined by the doctors. She was irritated when approached by a
male figure. The complainant was first attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that she had vaginal
bleeding. The complainant was then referred to Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by Dr. Estioco that she might
have been a victim of rape. In the presence of the complainant's father, Dr. Cayao examined her on 26Apr1973
after which she issued a medical certificate with the following findings:
1. Presence of erythema (redness of the skin) of the vestibular portion of external genitalia;
2. Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2:00 o'clock and 10 o'clock;
3. Easily admit one finger with pain;
4. Unclotted blood at the vagina cavity;
5. Smear exam for sperm cell-negative; D'plococci-negative Florence test-reagent not available.'
Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was not able to make any examination to determine
whether drug was given to the complainant.
Defense: Alibi, at the beach.
Held: The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission in the hospital
on 22Apr1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and
10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in
official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law,
which is that of a physician in a government hospital. (Rule 130, Sec. 38, Rules of Court). In the case at bar, Dr.
Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a witness for the
government.
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which was then already healing
on 22Apr1973, it follows reasonably that the defloration occurred several days before, which may have
happened when Irene Dulay took a week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union (tsn, p. 10, June 27,
1975) and there is evidence that she had a suitor named Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La
Union. And when she returned to the house of her employer in San Fernando, La Union, she had already chest
and stomach pains and a headache.
From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay, was
having her menstrual period when she was supposedly raped for the Complaint indicated that she had vaginal
bleeding. She herself admitted in her testimony that on 22Apr1973, she was having her menstruation. (tsn, p. 9,
June 27, 1975).
It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior that a man would have
sexual intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual period, as was the admitted condition of the
complainant when she was allegedly abused by the accused. And because of this universal abhorrence, taboo
and distaste to have sexual contact with a menstruating female and this is so however passionate and lustful the
man may be unless he is depraved or demented, We cannot believe that the accused-appellant, a young fourth
year college student of civil engineering studying in Baguio City, would break or violate such a taboo by
drugging the complainant girl with the help of his sister and afterwards have sex relations with her in her
menstrual condition.
There are also proof that complainant was obsessed with the accused and that the complainant was “praning.”
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (16aug1956) L-8171
Facts: On 09Aug1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant appellant Company and driven by Edgardo
Hernandez its driver, collided with a passenger truck at Parañaque, Rizal. In the course of and as a result of the
accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which
resulted in his death several days later. Edgardo Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence and after trial was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to one year prision correccional, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P3,000, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay costs. Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity.
Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both writs were
returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal, in Hernandez' name could be
found.
On 17Feb1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of
Armando, filed the present action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability.
Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant Company to pay to plaintiffs damages.
The company appealed. To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiff presented evidences,
among them, the sheriff’s return of the writs of execution. Defendant company objected to CFI admitting the
sheriff’s return. CFI ruled against defendant company.
In their appeal, defendant contends that admitting the sheriff’s return without presenting the sheriff in court
deprived them of the opportunity to cross-examine the said sheriff.
Issue: Whether or not it is necessary that the sheriff testify in court on his return of the writs.
Held: A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law and forming part of official records, and is prima, facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The
sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents, an exception is made with
reference to the method of proving public documents executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal
of certain public officials. The courts and the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an
exception. The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which
the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public
officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official
sources. Were there no exception to official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting, the greater
part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. The work of
Administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence.
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several
trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances
of each case may appear to require.
Judgment affirmed.
People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (27jan1993) 103292 
Facts: While Evelyn de Vera and Maria Victoria Parana were walking home through an uninhabited place at
about 11PM on 14Oct1988, accused Cabuang and Matabang suddenly appeared from the surrounding rice
fields. Cabuang grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth, Evelyn ran away because she became terribly
frightened and Matabang followed in pursuit. Matabang lost sight of Evelyn along the road.
From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the road, Evelyn saw Maria Victoria pass by in a
tricycle with the accused Cabuang, Matabang and two (2) other men and heard Maria Victoria crying and
pleading for help. Evelyn clearly recognized Cabuang and Matabang, but not the other two (2).
Early the next morning, on 15Oct1988, the body of Maria Victoria was found in the barangay traversed by the
road on which Maria Victoria were walking the night before.
Issue: Whether or not the Police Blotter was conclusive.
Held: Appellants principally urge that the trial court had erred in finding that prosecution witness Evelyn de
Vera had positively identified Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as the assailants of Maria Victoria.
Appellants point to the entry in the Bayambang police blotter (Exhibit "I") which stated that the assailants were
"still unidentified" although the entry was made after prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera was questioned by the
police.
We consider this contention bereft or merit. Upon receiving the report that a dead body was found, members of
the Bayambang Police Station immediately proceeded to the reported crime scene on the morning of
15Oct1988. The police investigator, Pfc. Elegio Lopez, who initially questioned witness De Vera that morning,
noticed that she was in a state of shock. He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of
the same day when Evelyn had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police.
Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the police blotter at around 11AM, stating that the
assailants were still unidentified; there was, upon the other hand, Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement made and
completed in the afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identities of the men she had seen the night
before and who she believed were responsible for the rape and death of her cousin Maria Victoria. The failure
of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific rape, killing and robbery of Maria
Victoria the first time she was questioned by the police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly
settled case law that the delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a
crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief.
Entries in a police blotter though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive
proof of the truth of such entries, In People v. Santito, Jr., this Court held that entries in official records like a
police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter
could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly much more
lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings
on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the police
investigation and presented in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that Prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera
did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and
killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana.
People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-107735, Feb. 1, 1996
Facts: The evidence shows that at around 7pm of 26Nov1989, within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor
along Marcos Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San
Gabriel together with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified
the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed
weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed him in the
stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the
ground. He was then brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog even attempted to box him
but he parried his blow; Tonog continued walking but when he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without
provocation boxed and kicked Ramon; Ramon fought back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the
former ran towards the highway; when Tonog met a certain "Mando" he boxed the latter who however fought
back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he warned
Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on the belly;
when "Mando" saw what happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back;
Ramon and "Mando" then fled towards the highway.
The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim and called out the latter's companions to bring
him to the hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was
already taken to the hospital; that Brenda even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him to
testify; that his refusal coupled with the fact that he owed Gonzales some money earned him the ire of the latter
and that was why he was charged for the death of Tonog.
Held: The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did
not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat
the positive and candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of a
police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the
police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from
either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony
during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly,
the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court
below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court cannot consider any
evidence which has not been formally offered.
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after interviewing
Camba an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness.
The failure to exert the slightest effort to present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against his
cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. But to be
admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of
his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The
public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident.
Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as
official information because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. In
the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements.
j. Commercial Lists
1) Rule 130, §45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. – Evidence of statements of matters of interest, to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published
for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Commercial lists
a. statements of matters of interest
b. to persons engaged in an occupation
c. contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
d. as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated
e. the compilation is
i. published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
ii. generally used and relied upon by them therein.
e.g. NEDA reports, part of the newspaper which reports the prices of shares
2) Cases
State v. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)
Facts: Lungsford was arrested upon being found in possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner which was
stolen from James Wilton. He was charged with the crime of knowingly possessing a motor vehicle with an
altered serial number. The State unable to produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or to testify that it was
stolen. Lungsford testified at trial that he bought the car from James Law. Although he had title and
registration he couldn’t corroborate the hearsay nature of certain evidence admitted. The errors focus on the
way the police attempted to prove that the car in question was stolen.
Cars have distinguishing numbers which are placed in the cars at the point of production. The vehicle
identification number (VIN) indicates the year, type and make of the car. In the case at bar, the VIN was
riveted into the driver’s side of the dashboard. There was also a factory order number stamped under the hood
of stamped to the radiator brace on the driver’s side. There was also a packing slip number in the coils of the
back seat. A car can be traced through any of these numbers.
Since it appeared that the VIN wasn’t factory installed, the National Automobile Theft Bureau was requested to
trace the car through the factory order no. A factory trace provides the time of manufacture and reveals the
zone office where the car was sold, permitting the identification of the first owner. The VIN for the vehicle
may also be determined. The trace of the factory order number stamped on the radiator brace produced an
allegedly corresponding VIN.
Lungsford claimed that the windshield was smashed and the VIN tag was broken loose on one side, that he
bought new seats from a junkyard, replaced the engine and put in a new radiator and brace. No receipts were
presented. He re-registered the car due to a lost license plate.
The State relied on the NATB factory trace information to establish that the car was the same one Wilton
reported stolen. The judge didn’t allow the State to prove what NATB told the detective, but the entire tracing
process was crucial in the State’s attempt to link the car in Lungsford’s possession to the stolen Wilton vehicle
which it had allowed. The judge convicted Lungsford.
The NATB is a non-profit corporation, national in scope, financed by about 500 automobile insurance
companies representing 95% of the industry. Its purpose is to prevent and reduce theft and losses of
automobiles. It gathers and disseminates information on stolen automobiles and assists law enforcers in their
identification and recovery. It is the repository for all vehicle information and identification numbers on all
American and Foreign made cars, thus an informational warehouse & registry of the industry.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal investigation report of NATB be admissible in evidence?
Held: Conviction reversed.
Although Walsh was not permitted to tell the jury the contents of the information he received from NATB, his
whole process of tracing the identity of the said car was dependent thereon. This crucial link was evidential
against Lungsford. The record is devoid of any proof on the reliability of the NATB procedures and of any
evidential basis for admission of data derived therefrom. There must be compliance with Evid. R. 63 (30)
whereby the judge must be convinced that the compilation, list, register, periodical is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally considered useful or reliable. If such is met, then
statements from the compilation, etc. are admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated. The
rationale of this rule is that the use of such materials is necessary because it is too difficult to call the witness to
the stand all those who have participated in the preparation or compilation of such. The trustworthiness
requirement is satisfied by the requirement that a finding be made by the judge that the material is regularly
published for use by persons who rely on it. There is no reason to falsify such compilation etc. since it needs to
be accurate.
The trial judge erred in holding that this hearsay of Wilton was admissible under business records exception.
While police records may qualify as business records for certain purposes and in certain respects, they are not
vehicles by which substantive evidential status may be conferred upon the otherwise hearsay declarations of a
victim or witness to the crime, accident or other occurrence. If the declarant is unavailable to testify and if the
statement is not admissible under res gestae or dying declarations, it cannot be admitted predicated upon the
circumstance that the statement was made to a police officer who paraphrased its content in his report. The
rationale is that records made in the usual course of business “normally possess a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness.” The business record exception is predicated on the fact that the record itself is kept in the
usual course of business and that the recorded information is obtained from a declarant having a business duty
to communicate truthfully. Both have to be met. In this case, the 2 nd criteria was not met. A police record is
admissible to prove that a report of a crime was made by a member of the public and when it was made and
received. But it is not admissible to prove the truth of the contents of that report since members of the public,
whether targets of investigation, witnesses or victims, are not under a duty to make an honest and truthful
report. Citizen declarations are held to constitute hearsay in respect of otherwise admissible police reports.
PNOC Shipping vs. CA (299 SCRA 402)
Facts: In the morning of 21Sep1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by the Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp.,
collided with Luzon Stevedoring’s (LSC) vessel, Petroparcel near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas. After
an investigation was conducted, the Philippine Coast Guard found Petroparcel at fault. After an unsuccessful
demand by Maria Efigenia, they sued LSC and Cap’t Duruelo (captain of the boat) for damages. Since, LSC
had sold all of its boats, barges and ships to PNOC Shipping, PNOC assuming the obligations of LSC on the
boats replaced LSC as party defendant. The Lower Court ruled in favor of Maria Efigenia awarding
P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
In arriving at the above disposition, the LC cited the evidence presented by Maria Efigenia consisting the
testimony of its sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario, their general manager. He testified that Maria Efigenia XV
was wooden boat owned by the said corporation and, at the time it sank, it was then carrying 1,060 baneras of
assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also, lost were two Cummins engines (250 hp), radar,
pathometer and compass. Because of the loss of the ship, they had to hire a lawyer to litigate their claim in the
Baord of Marine Inquiry and here in the lower court. The lower court considered the following documentary
evidence: (1.) “Marine Protest” executed by Delfin Villarosa; (2.) a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer
trawler by Magalong Engineering costing P2,250,000; (3.) a pro forma invoice for the Cummins model engine
costing P1,160,000 each; (4.) a quotation for a compact daylight radar costing P145,000; (5.) quotation of prices
for nylon ropes, compass, floats; (6.) retainer agreement between del Rosario and F. Sumulong Law for
attorney’s fees and (7.) a quotation for nets and baneras (tubs). On the other hand, PNOC presented Lorenzo
Lazaro, its Senior Estimator at its shipyard, as an expert witness stating that the award was excessive but he
could not give a breakdown of the prices for the replacement of the boat. MR was denied. On appeal to the CA,
the award was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the documents presented by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp. as
in the nature of documents in a commercial lists, in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals,
trade circulars and price lists, exempt from the hearsay rule?
Held: Decision modified. Award of Actual Damages deleted and an award of P2,000,000 in Nominal Damages
is given.
To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof on the basis of available
evidence. Damages cannot be presumed and courts must point to specific facts as basis for the measure of the
award. In this case, actual damages was proven only by the sole testimony of the fishing corps. general
manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. PNOC had objected to the admission of such evidence on
the ground that these were not duly authenticated and that Del Rosario had no personal knowledge on the
contents of the writing and neither was an expert on the subject. This objection was ignored by the lower court.
The court herein held that the price quotations that became the basis of the award are ordinary private writings
which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proferred along with the testimony of the authors
thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was
the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Such a
testimony was hearsay. Also, any testimony he makes shall be considered self-serving interests.
The court also holds that the documents do not fall under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The CA had
considered said documents as part of one of the exception under the Commercial Lists and the Like Rule. In
order, to fall under such an exception, a document must be:
1. it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
2. such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
3. said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation; and
4. it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Therefore, applying ejusdem generis, the exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del
Rosario. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject
matter. Neither are these “market reports,” as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data
of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation. These are merely letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
Damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
Nevertheless, since the fishing corp. had been injured, nominal damages are awarded not as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of a technical injury.
Estrada vs. Noble, [C.A,] 49 O.G. 139
Facts: Maximino Noble conveyed a parcel of land he owned in Camarines Sur to Proculo, his son, on
22Jun1945 by means of a public deed.
The public deed stipulated that the sum of P2,600 in Japanese currency (P180 of which was paid to Francisco
Espiritu by Proculo as repurchase price in July 1944) and P500 Philippine currency, the total of P3,100 was paid
by Proculo to Maximino in 1944 & in June 1945. That this sale is being made subject to the condition that
Maximino preserves unto himself, his heirs and assigns, the right to repurchase or redeem the parcel of land for
P2,600 and P500 and within a 5-year period from the date of the instrument, provided that if Maximino, his
heirs and assigns fail to exercise the right of redemption within the time aforesaid, this sale shall be irrevocable
and unconditional without the necessity of executing any other instrument.
On 28Feb1948, by means of another public deed, conveyed the same parcel by way of absolute sale to Gregoria
Estrada for P3,000 Philippine currency. Only P2,300 was paid, the P700 to be invested in the redemption of the
property from Proculo. Gregoria offered to redeem, tendering P700 to Proculo, which he refused. Hence, this
action for conventional redemption to compel Proculo to reconvey the property to her. The trial court ruled in
favor of Gregoria. Proculo contends that the said court should not have applied the Ballantine Scale of Values
and should have fixed the redemption price at P3,100 which was the amount he paid therefore, under the case of
Rogers vs. Smith.
Issue: Whether or not the courts can simply take judicial notice of the Ballantine Scale of Values?
Held: Yes. Ballantine submitted a conversion table which recommended the adoption of measures which were
greatly needed to solve the problem created by transactions made during the Japanese occupation and to hasten
the economic recovery of the country. The SC, CA and the different CFIs in the country have repeatedly
applied its provisions in numerous cases. It is therefore an official document whose publication constituted a
leading event of general interest and whose provisions are widely known and have played an important part in
the contemporary political history of the country of which courts of justice could take judicial cognizance.
There can be no doubt of the propriety of the trial court’s action in applying the table to the transaction at bar.
No evidence of the rate of exchange between Japanese occupation currency and Philippine currency at the time
the transaction took place having been presented, the case is one which calls for the application of said
conversion table.
The doctrine laid down in Roger vs. Smith, Bell is inapplicable to the case at bar. The transaction in that case
was a debt which created the relation of debtor-creditor between the parties, and the instrument in which it is
recorded did not provide for the payment of the debt in any specific currency. Hence, the debt had to be paid in
legal tender at the time payment of the obligation was demanded, under the provision of the Act of the U.S.
Cognress.
However, in the case at bar, the transaction is distinct. It is a sale with the right of repurchase and it was
executed on 22Jun1945. It did not create a relation of debtor and creditor between the parties. It simply
conferred upon the vendor a legal right which he may or may not exercise.
k. Learned Treatises
1) Rule 130, §46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. – A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the treatise,
periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Learned treatises (used to prove unwritten foreign
law)
a. published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
b. on a subject of history, law, science or art
c. Either
i. the court takes judicial notice, or
ii. a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject
2) Cases
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)
Philippine courts can not take judicial notice of foreign law. Failure to prove foreign law whether unwritten
under Rule 130, Sec. 46 or written under Rule 132, Sec. 24, raises the presumption that the law is the same as
ours.
Escolin: This provision is useful to prove an unwritten law. E.g. learned treatises on unwritten law which the
court has taken judicial notice: Manresa, Sanchez-Roman. E.g. of writers of treatises acknowledged as experts:
Corpus juris, Corpus juris secundum, LRA
If it is a written law that is sought to be proven, cf Rule 132, Sec. 19
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxx
E.g. of written official acts: Judicial decisions, executive orders. Our courts take judicial notice of local laws.
However, there are certain instances when an official copy of the written official act is required to be presented.
cf Rule 132, Sec. 24
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
Ways to prove written foreign official acts
a. official publication, or
b. copy
 i. attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
ii. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1. accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a. a secretary of the embassy or legation
b. consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
c. by any Philippine officer in the foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept
2. and, authenticated by the seal of his office.
l. Prior Testimony
1) Rule 130, §47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41 a)
cf with the rules on admissions (Rule 130 Secs. 26-33, RoC) and interrogatories (Rule 24, RoC)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to prior testimony
a. testimony or deposition
b. of a witness deceased or unable to testify
c. given in a former case or proceeding
d. involving the same parties and subject matter
e. as evidence against the adverse party
f. adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him
2) Cases
Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 54 (1967)
Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify, their prior testimony is
inadmissible. Mere refusal to testify is does not amount to inability to testify. The party could have urged to
court to have these witnesses summoned, arrested, and punished for contempt in case of refusal to obey the
summons.
Facts: Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo thru their mother, Celestina Daldo, as guardian ad litem, filed a case
for recognition as illegitimate children and support against Francisco Tan. Oral evidence was presented by
them & as the plaintiff were about to rest, Celestina moved for dismissal because the parties have reached an
amicable settlement. Celestina she said in an affidavit submitted to the court, “Francisco is not the father of my
children . . .” So, the court dismissed the case. One year & eight months later, a similar case was instituted
with the grandmother as guardian. At first, the court held that the case is barred by res judicata because of the
previous civil case but on motion for reconsideration, support and recognition were granted. The CA reversed,
saying the evidence wasn’t enough to establish paternity. In the second case, the witnesses of the kids who
testified in the first case refused to testify, & the court did not admit the testimonies of these witnesses from the
former trial. Thus, this petition on certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal to testify fall under the “unable to testify” provision of Sec. 47, Rule 130?
Held: The SC affirmed the CA. The witnesses weren’t dead. Neither were they outside the RP. They simply
didn’t want to testify. This doesn’t amount to an inability to testify. Therefore, the prior testimony rule cannot
be applied in this case. Also, the plaintiff in this case could have asked the court to compel these witnesses to
come, but they didn’t do so. All in all, the evidence wasn’t enough to show paternity for the children in order to
be recognized by Tan.
People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976)
Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation
of this case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion
subject to the condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused. At the trial, the
witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were recalled and were again cross-
examined by counsel for the appellant.
Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of
witnesses taken down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the
accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion
of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the witnesses whose
testimony are sought to be reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand
during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of
the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
Facts: Defendant Herschel Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and
with possession of stolen credit cads belonging to the latter and his wife, Amy. At a preliminary hearing,
defendant’s appointed counsel called the victim’s daughter, Anita, as the defense’s only witness. Anita testified
that she had permitted defendant to use her apartment for several days while she was away. However, she
refused to admit that she had given defendant checks and the credit cards without informing him that she did not
have permission to use them. At the defendant’s subsequent credit cards with the understanding that he could
use them. The daughter did not appear at trial even though several subpoenas had been issued to her at her
parent’s residence. The State offered the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in rebuttal. The
defendant objected to this on the ground that it was violative of the Confrontation Clause. The mother testified
that Amy’s whereabouts were unknown to them. The TC admitted the transcript into evidence while the CA
reversed. The SC of Ohio ruled that the transcript was inadmissible because the mere opportunity to cross-
examine at the preliminary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial.
Issue: Whether or not the transcript of testimony is admissible?
Held: Yes, the introduction in evidence at defendant’s trial of the daughter’s preliminary hearing testimony was
constitutionally permissible.
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires a
showing of his unavailability. Even then his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of
reliability.” The daughter’s prior testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability afforded the trier of facts a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. Even though defense counsel’s questioning of
the witness occurred on direct examination defense counsel tested the testimony with the equivalent of
significant cross-examination. His questioning which was replete with leading questions and comporting with
the principal purpose of cross-examination which is to challenge the veracity of the daughter’s testimony,
clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form. This was so even though the witness was not
personally available for questioning at the trial and that the defendant had a different lawyer at trial from the
one at the preliminary hearing. It afforded substantial compliance with the purposes behind the Confrontation
Clause. The record disclosed that the witness was constitutionally unavailable for purposes of the defendant’s
trial. Case was reversed and remanded.
P. Opinion Rule
1. Rule 130, §48-50
Sec. 48. General rule. – The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following
sections. (42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. (43 a)
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may
be received in evidence regarding -
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person. (44 a)
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible.
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
a. a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence.
b. the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
c. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
d. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
e. his impressions of the
i. emotion
 ii. behavior
iii. condition or
iv. appearance of a person
2. Cases
Dilag & Co. v. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
Facts: Plaintiff was the owner of a truck which was entrusted to Pabo Dilag. On the night of December 31,
1944, during the Japanese occupation, the truck was stolen. After the liberation, Dilag saw the truck parked in
front of the City Lunch in San Pablo City. Recognizing that it was the same car owned by their company he
had seized the car with the aid of policemen. The plaintiff company filed a case for recovery against Merced its
present possessor and also against Lim Ben, Sy Pua and Sixto Zandueta, former alleged owners. In the course
of the trial in the lower court, Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public Works testified as to the tell tale marks of
alterations on the motor number of the truck. This testimony was impugned by the defendants on the ground
that Aguilar was not qualified as an expert on motor numbers.
Issue: Whether or not Aguilar qualified as an expert?
Held: Yes. It appears that Aguilar has been with the Bureau since 1930, having occupied the position of
inspector in charge of weighing and measuring trucks and verifying their motor numbers, chief of registration
division for 8 years and from 1938 to date of the trial, chief investigator of motor vehicles, charged with the
duty of investigating conflicting claims on motor vehicles. With such a background experience, a person who
has occupied those positions should be deemed amply qualified for the simple task of determining whether the
number appearing on the motor of a particular vehicle is genuine or not.
Although a witness, in order to be competent as an expert, must show himself to be skilled or experienced in the
business or profession to which the subject relates, there is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill
or experience shall have been acquired. Scientific training and study are not always essential to the competency
of the witness as an expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was
acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than scientific study or research. Generally,
speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired practical knowledge or experience may be
allowed to give in evidence his opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and skill relating to such business
or employment. Even where the problem presented is one which ordinarily requires some scientific knowledge
or training, one long experienced may testify as an expert, although he has pursued no special study of the
matter. Knowledge acquired by doing is no less valuable than that acquired by study.
U.S. v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
Facts: Benito Perez, Policarpio Guevara and Felipe Bautista were suspected of committing theft of a revolver.
They were arrested and taken by Valentin Trono, a sub-inspector of the municipal police and other policemen,
to Sapang-Angelo and beaten and ill-treated. Perez died the next morning.
Trono et al were charged with murder and convicted by the trial court. They are now contending on appeal that
Perez was not ill-treated but that the cause of death was hypertropic cirrhosis (whatever that means!) as certified
by the examining physician, Icasiana. The testimony of the physician was not given credence by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the court is bound by the testimony of a physician acting as an expert witness?
Held: No. Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not
exclusive, on questions of a professional character. The courts, however, are not bound to submit to such
testimony. They are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they
can even counterbalance such evidence with other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during
the trial.
In the present case, the court did not give credit to the testimony of the physician because:
 it appears that the physician was an intimate friend of one of the accused Angeles;
 the physician stated in the certificate that Perez died from cholera (not hypertropic cirrhosis) but the mom of
the deceased testified that her son was of a robust constitution and suffered no ailments whatever;
 the physician’s certificate stated that Perez’s body showed only two small bruises but other witnesses testified
that they saw more bruises in different parts of his body;
 the physician himself when he was testifying during the trial withdrew his statements made in the physician’s
certificate.
State v. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)

U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)

 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)

United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (1993)

People v. Adoviso GR# 116196-97 23jun1999

Facts: In this case, on the night of February 18, 1990, Emeterio and Rufino Vasquez were shot by five
assailants inside their house in Bula, Camarines Sur. During the incident, Bonifacio, son of Emetrio, saw Pablo
Adoviso and five other hooded persons shooting his father and his nephew being shot. He hid himself in the
dark and only rushed to the injured victims aide when the assailants left, accompanied by his son Elmer. Elmer
gave first aid to his grandfather and cousin by binding their wounds with diapers while Bonifacio went to the
municipal building to fetch the police. The police came and brought the two victims to the hospital. Both,
however, died the next morning. Adoviso was charged for the murder of the two victims. In his defense, he
alleged alibi and that he offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Lucena, a polygraph exminer of the NBI
in Manila. In a Polygraph report, Lucena opined that his polygrams revealed that there were no specific
reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevenat to the investigations of the crimes.
Nevertheless, the TC convicted him for murder.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in not considering the polygraph as having exculpated the accused from
the crime charged?
Held: Judgment affirmed. The witnesses were able to see and identify him clearly and thus his defense of alibi
couldn’t stick.
As to the polygraph test defense, a polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures
and records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily cause by an
examinee’s conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or a lie detector test is
that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing,
which will be recorded in the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of
polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused
of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction for the reason that the polygraph has
not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The
rule is no different here. In People vs. Daniel, the court stated that much faith and credit should not be vested
upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant had not advanced any reason why this rule should not
apply to him.
People v. Baid GR#129667 31jul2000
Facts: Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who was diagnosed as having suffered from schizophrenia
since 1988. In December 1996, she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic in Cubao, Quezon City because of a
relapse of her mental condition. On the other hand, accused-appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant sneaked into the patients' room. He woke the
complainant up and offered her a cigarette, at the same time touching her foot. Complainant took the cigarette.
As she smoked it, accused-appellant caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because she afterward
removed her pants. It turned out she was not wearing any underwear. Accused-appellant also removed his
pants and the two had sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they transferred under the bed and continued their sexual
intercourse. Complainant said she felt accused-appellant had an orgasm. A female patient who had been
awakened tried to separate the two, and, as she failed to do so, she went out to call the two nurses on duty. The
nurses responded but, when they arrived, accused-appellant had left, while complainant had already put on her
pants.
Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-legal examination. She
told him what happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her narration of the incident into writing and then gave her a
physical examination.
Dr. Reyes said the fresh abrasion, located at 6 o'clock posterior of the complainant's genitalia, could have been
recently caused by a hard blunt object, such as an erect penis during sexual intercourse, or by the insertion of a
finger. Dr. Reyes found that complainant was suffering from mental illness and that she had lapses in the
course of her interview.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the complainant who was “pra-pra” is admissible in evidence.
Held: Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she
could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. Her testimony indicates that she
could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them.
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim ("inappropriate affect") during
her testimony, such as by smiling when answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from
a person suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness and memory, it is
established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of
memory. It has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies between complainant's sworn statement and her testimony as to the
number of times she and accused-appellant had sexual intercourse and where they did the same, an examination
of the evidence for the prosecution, particularly complainant's sworn statement and her interview with the
examining medico-legal officer, shows that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her in different
positions at various places in the same room. When complainant testified, she stated that, aside from the fact
that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on her bed, he made her transfer later under the bed. Be
that as it may, complainant has consistently established in all of her statements that he had sexual intercourse
with her on her bed. Whether or not he had sex with her near the window and while facing him is of no
moment and does not negate the finding of rape. Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they
are minor and inconsequential. They show that complainant's testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than
diminish the probative value of her testimony, they reinforce it.
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room where other patients were sleeping. This
circumstance, it is argued, is antithetical to the possibility of the commission of rape. As this Court has
repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when the
malefactor and the victim are not alone.
The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses presented during the trial,
so much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly and credibly established the commission of the crime,
corroborative evidence would only be a mere surplusage.
Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant destroy the finding of rape since
ejaculation is never an element thereof. What consummates the felony is the contact of the penis of the
perpetrator, however slight, to the vagina of his victim without her consent. Neither is it required that
lacerations be found in the victim's hymen. We have held that a medical examination is not a requisite for a
rape charge to prosper as long as the victim categorically and consistently declares that she has been defiled. In
this case, aside from complainant's positive testimony, the medical examination of the complainant showed an
abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that she had recent sexual intercourse. That the deep healed lacerations
found on the complainant's genitalia may have been caused seven days prior to December 22, 1996 is
immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an expert witness. However, he
cannot do this now as he did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangad's qualifications in the trial court. On the
contrary, he even cross-examined her on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, §36,
objections not timely raised are deemed waived.
The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist did
not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been
said:
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left
to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
Q. Rule 130, §51: Character Evidence
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –
(a) In Criminal Cases:
 (1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent it to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it can not present evidence on the bad moral
character of the accused on its evidence in chief.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in
any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue
of character involved in the case.
This covers either party to the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14. (46 a, 47 a)
cf Rule 132, Sec. 14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. – Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such
character has been impeached. (17)
GR: Character evidence not generally admissible
Exceptions
a. In Criminal Cases:
i. accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged.
ii. In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the accused which is pertinent it
to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
iii. moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
b. In Civil Cases – only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
c. good character of an impeached witness
R. Rule 131, §1: Burden of Proof
Sec. 1. Burden of proof. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1 a, 2 a)
Burden of proof – the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law
1. Civil Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 1
Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining whether a contract is a sale or equitable mortgage, the evidence presented must be clear and
convincing, not merely a preponderance of evidence.
b. Cases
Pornellosa v. LTA, L-14040, 31 January 1986
Facts: The plaintiffs Pornellosa Spouses are claiming a parcel of land by virtue of a deed of sale by its former
occupant, Vicenta San Jose, who sold to them also the house located in the said property. However, the lot in
question happens to form part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through the
consent of its owner. This Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government by virtue of Commonwealth Act
no. 539, Sec. 1. There is no evidence showing that Vicenta San Jose owned the land. She merely owned the
house on it. This action by the spouse is to compel the Land Tenure Administration to sell the lot in question to
them in the amount of P1,505.00. All the spouses presented in support of their claim were documents of the
sale of the house to them by San Jose.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses Pornellosa have proven their claim to own the lot in question?
Held: A party’s claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. A
plaintiff is duty-bound to prove his allegations in the complaint. He must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.
The plaintiffs who want to compel the Director of Lands to sell them the lot of an expropriated landed estate
should prove their allegation that they acquired the rights of a bona fide occupant to said lot. A sale of a house
is not sufficient to convey title or any right to the lot on which the house stands.
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real
rights over immovable property, must appear in a public document.
IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)
Facts: Tobias bought an installment one Dodge truck from Leelin Motors. Tobias executed a promissory note in
favor of Leelin Motors, which note was secured by a chattel mortgage on the truck in favor of Leelin Motors.
The latter indorsed the note and assigned the mortgage to IFC. As a consequence, Tobias paid six installments
to IFC. On May 14, 1970, IFC’s counsel wrote to Tobias demanding him to pay or to surrender the truck
otherwise court action would be pursued. At the time the letter was written, Tobias was in arrear in the payment
of more than 2 installments. Tobias wrote back saying that he was surrendering the truck because the truck was
with Leelin Motors when it met an accident & because of the delay in its repairs. Upon learning of the accident,
IFC decided not to get the truck and sued for payment. The LC and CA dismissed the IFC’s complaint on the
ground that inasmuch as Tobias surrendered the truck, he complied with the IFC’s demands. Now, IFC claims
that it is an unpaid vendor who under Art. 1484 of the NCC may choose exacting fulfillment of the obligation,
canceling the sale or foreclosing the mortgage if any; and that it now chose the first option. Tobias claims that
IFC is now estopped to claim payment when it demanded the surrender to which demand Tobias acceded.
Held: The SC reversed the LC’s and CA’s rulings. Art. 1484 is clear in that an unpaid (in the payment of 2 or
more installments) vendor has the 3 options (alternative, not cumulative). IFC has not availed of cancellation
nor of foreclosure (which presupposes more than a mere demand to surrender possession). Thus, IFC is still
free to avail of the remedy of exacting fulfillment. As regards estoppel, to hold IFC in estoppel, it must be
shown that the latter knew of the accident when it gave Tobias its options to pay or to surrender. IFC claims it
had no such knowledge. Nobody in his right mind would give the options Tobias had, if the accident was
known. The more plausible thing to do is to ask for payment had IFC known. Besides, the allegation of IFC
that it had no knowledge is a negative allegation which needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential
part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. The burden of proof, therefore, is on
Tobias to disprove IFC’s lack of knowledge. Tobias failed.
2. Criminal Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 2
Rule 133, Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. – In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
For self-defense, the accused must show clear and convincing evidence.
b. Cases
People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970)
The prosecution has the burden of proving even the negative elements of a crime (e.g. lack of license to possess
a firearm).
Escolin: The remedy is to present the certification of the officer, who is in charge of issuing the licenses, that
the accused was not issued a license.
Facts: The LC found Pajenado guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. He appealed to the SC and
argued that there is no prima facie case in which to hold him guilty of illegal possession of firearm because the
prosecution failed to prove his lack of a license to carry a firearm.
Issue: Whether or not Pajenado should be found guilty of illegal possession of firearms?
Held: No. Under the provisions of Sec. 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, in criminal cases, the burden of
proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must
be proven if “it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged.” The burden of proof was with the prosecution
and in this case they must prove that the firearm used by Pajenado in committing the offense charged was not
properly licensed. It cannot be denied that the lack of or the absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. The information filed against Pajenado specifically alleged that he had
no license or permit to possess the said gun. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution’s duty not to merely
allege that negative fact but to prove it as well.
People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977)
The elements of self-defense must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
Facts: On the night of September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo Verzola in the
presence of Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was
subsequently carried by the two to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Verzola then went to his house,
changed his clothes and threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the piece of wood
be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal building and reported
to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident.
The police authorities went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. They found the body of the deceased
sprawled at the foot of the bamboo ladder. When questioned, Josefina revealed that Verzola was the assailant of
her husband.
She later gave a written statement narrating the incident, stating that Verzola went to their house, entered her
room where she was sleeping with her husband, woke her up and had carnal knowledge of her; that when
Bernardo woke up and attempted to rise Verzola clubbed Bernardo. This statement was sworn to by her before
Municipal Judge Valera.
At about 4:00 a.m., Verzola was picked up by the police and, in the municipal bldg., he executed a written
statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. He stated therein that, he went to Bernardo’s
house and went under their house pricking with a bamboo twig Josephina who was laying down. She came
down to my place, where they did “everything.” But before that in the night, Josephina told him 'THAT HER
HUSBAND WAS PLANNING TO KILL HIM and just after they were through, Josephina went upstairs inside
(the) house, and because he cannot withstand anymore the plan of her husband to kill him, he went upstairs and
in the room he saw Bernardo lying down. He clubbed him three times at the nape, and when he did not move
anymore that was the time when we both with Josephine Molina throw him downstairs of their house. After that
he went home. He further admitted that Josephina was his paramour. The said statement was sworn to in front
of Judge Valera. Verzola then guided the authorities to his house where, in their presence, he retrieved from the
toilet his bloodstained clothes as well as the piece of wood which he used in clubbing the deceased.
Dr. Luis P. Bringas Municipal Health Officer, who conducted the autopsy, testified that the deceased died
instantaneously as a result of cardio-respiratory failure caused by "cerebral compressions and hemorrhages".
The deceased sustained different lacerations on the head and back of the ear.
Versola, later, impugned his statement and claimed he did so in self-defense. Thus, he testified that while he
was feeding his two cows in front of his house, he heard cries for help coming from Bernardo’s house.
Recognizing it to be Josefina’s voice, he proceeded to the house. He armed himself with a pan of a plow upon
entering the yard because he feared an intruder had entered the Molina's residence. At the door of the room, he
heard the man say: 'Vulva of your mother, I will kill you." As he entered the room, he saw his Josefina in a
corner, being maltreated by Bernardo. After he noticed his presence, he said: "Vulva of your mother, I will kill
all of you." At that juncture, Bernardo stooped to pick up a bolo from the floor. As Bernardo was still bending
towards the bolo, he struck him twice with the piece of wood, hitting the head of the victim, causing him to fall.
After he had fallen, he tried to revive the victim by shaking the head of the latter on his lap while saying: "Hoy,
Hoy, Hoy". He explained that this was the reason why there were bloodstains on his clothes.
Josefina corroborated said new statement of Verzola. Both appellants contended that they were not aware of the
contents of their E-J confessions as they were made to sign them by the police w/o being able to read their
contents.
The trial court convicted Verzola as principal while Josefina as an accessory to murder.
Issue: Whether or not the accused’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Held: SC affirms Verzola conviction but acquits Josefina.
There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the burden is on him
to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing or at least attenuate the offense
committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative
allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that for the prosecution for even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the killing. It is evident that no such proof was adduced by Verzola. Verzola’s
conduct was incompatible with the reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense. Although he
claims that he brought the victim down the stairs in order to bring him to the hospital, yet when he was able to
get a jeep he did not utilize it for that purpose but instead used it in going to town. Moreover, he kept quiet
about the incident. It was only from Josefina Molina that the police learned for the first time that Verzola was
the assailant of the deceased. Verzola attempted to conceal his participation by hiding his bloodstained clothes
and the weapon he used.
The physical facts of the case, such as nature, character and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased
and the presence of the bloodstains on the beddings of the victim are undisputed. These facts and circumstances
belie the claim of the appellant that he clubbed the victim in self- defense. On the contrary, they sufficiently
indicate that the fatal injuries were inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying defenseless on the floor,
as he was either sleeping or was just beginning to wake up.
Although Josefina admitted in her extra-judicial statement that she was the paramour of Verzola for over a year,
there is no proof that she had knowledge of the criminal design of her co-appellant. Neither has she cooperated
with him by previous or simultaneous acts, much less is there any showing that she supplied the principal with
material or moral aid. Her only participation was in assisting her co-appellant in bringing the body of the
deceased to the ground. The question, therefore, is whether or not by said overt act she could be held criminally
responsible as an accessory.
An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but,
with knows of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from
the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its
discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with
abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life
of the Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. The main difference separating
accessories after the fact the responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to the consummation of the crime
and subordinate to that of the principal.
There was no proof also that the act of Josephina in bringing down the body was to destroy the body of the
crime or to make it appear that death of the victim was accidental. It must be noted that Josefina testified that
she helped her co- appellant bring the body of the deceased down the stairs because of fear.
U.S. v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975)

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 19 (1977)

3. Administrative Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 5
Rule 133, Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
substantial evidence – that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
b. Cases

S. Presumptions
1. Conclusive presumptions
a. Rule 131, §2
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3 a)
Instances of conclusive presumptions
a. a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
b. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them.
b. Arts. 1431-1439 NCC: Estoppel
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Art. 1439. Estoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their successors in interest.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later
the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1435. If a person in representation of another sells or alienates a thing, the former cannot
subsequently set up his own title as against the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as
against the lessor or bailor.
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning immovable property, one of them is
misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded
from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the party
estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation.
Art. 1438. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal property for the
purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a pledge has been
constituted, set up his own title to defeat the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who
received the same in good faith and for value.
Statutory instances of estoppel
a. non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes ownership to the transferee by operation of law (Art.
1434 NCC)
b. agent who alienates can not claim title against the transferee (Art. 1435 NCC)
c. a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or
bailor. (Art. 1436 NCC)
d. in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable property, one of them is misled by a person with
respect to the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal title
or interest therein, provided all these requisites are present:
i. fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the party estopped;
ii. party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as misrepresented;
iii. party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
iv. party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation. (Art. 1437 NCC)
e. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal property for the purpose of making
any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his own title
to defeat the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who received the same in good faith and
for value. (Art. 1438 NCC)
c. Cases
Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)
Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of Basilisa Manjon, informed her that some guerilla soldiers would arrest her
for investigation, because one Conchita Cuba complained to them against her for having illegally encroached on
her property. Afraid to be taken to the guerilla camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best for her to do. He
suggested that she execute a fictitious deed of sale in his favor for the portion in question which was the one
claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order that he could defend her rights in his name against the claim of Conchita
Cuba. Manjon accepted the suggestion and asked Molina to have the corresponding deed of sale prepared which
Manjon signed. However, Manjon made the Molina sign a statement in, which he expressly admitted that the
transaction was only a simulated sale. The Molina denied the whole story and asserted that the statement was a
forgery. Manjon sues Molina for recovery of possession of land.
TC ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have disposed the land because it was part of the
public domain, sales patent having been issued to plaintiff by the government only on 1948. CA affirms.
Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates
and delivers it and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the
buyer or grantee. Case remanded to determine whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994)
The juridical relation between petitioners and private respondents is that of lessee and lessor. Considering this
jural relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased the questioned lot from somebody else. A tenant
cannot, in an action involving the possession of the leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. Nor can
a tenant set up any inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his landlord, without
first delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves.
2. Disputable presumptions
a. Rule 131, §4
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of
anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by
it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were
laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and
at the place where the instrument is dated;
 (u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is
considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for
four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not
been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case
of disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances hereinabove provided, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage.
However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Family Code and in the rules for a declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law
or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and
who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other
and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rides shall govern in the absence of
proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was
so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of
the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
 (ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person
has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or
his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as
to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5 a)
b. Cases
People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 (1976)
Mere non-presentation of a written statement of a witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, does
not give rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case". The
presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of
both the defense and the prosecution through use of compulsory processes, e.g. subpoena duces tecum.
People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 (1992)
The presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the
testimony of the witness is merely corroborative. Neither does it apply in cases where the witness, as in this
case, is available to the accused because then, the evidence would have the same weight against one party as
against the other. Mere failure to present the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation is not suppression of
evidence.
Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
Facts: This is an action to recover possession of a tract of land, for payment of rent due (from 1899 to 1902)
damages and costs brought by Miguel Pascual against Macario Angeles. The land in question formerly
belonged to Ciriaca Pascual (sister of Miguel) who leased such to the defendant Angeles. Upon the death of
Ciriaca, it was inherited by the Miguel and Angeles recognized Miguel as heir and successor to his sister, and
that he had paid the rents due to the lessor (Ciriaca) to the Miguel since Ciriaca’s death in 1894, when in 1901
eventually decided to keep the land for himself and stopped paying rent. Angeles specifically denied the
genuineness and due execution of the lease agreement, and argues that he has been in adverse, quiet, peaceful,
public and continuous possession of the same lot for 30 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial alleging that it was not necessary to show that the land in
question had been allotted to the plaintiff in the partition of the estate of his sister since it satisfactorily appeared
that the defendant had been paying rent or the plaintiff under the questioned lease, thus recognizing him as the
lawful owner and successor to his sister. Also that he had sufficiently proved the identity of the land in
question. The motion for a new trial was denied thus he appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not Angeles or a tenant can deny the title of his landlord in a contract of lease?
Held: The SC held that since the action arose from a contract of lease which presuppose in the lessor a right to
the ownership or possession of the property, the lessor cannot be compelled to prove his title thereto. The
tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. Since Miguel was the testamentary successor of his sister, and that the lessee recognized
him as possessor and heir to the deceased by paying rent to him. Angeles is now barred from questioning the
right of Ciriaca and her successor Miguel to the land. Also the defendant cannot question the genuineness and
due execution of the lease which he himself recognized as it was admitted into evidence. He also cannot
question the identity of the land in question since in his answer, he stated that he had been in possession of the
lot in question and so both parties were in agreement as to the lot in question.
 Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
Facts: Manuel Ormachea Tin-Congco and Luis Vizmanos were engaged in business and that in the course
thereof Santiago Trillana (Defendant) purchased from them merchandise to the value of P4,000. In June or July
1901, the partnership was dissolved and the business was divided up between the partners. All accoutnes and
debts of the defendant were allotted to the plaintiff. On Jan. 15, 1904, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant to recover said amount. The indebtedness was proven by the documents (vales) signed by the
Defendant in favor of Plaintiff or of Vizmanos or Lawa (their agent).
In his answer, the defendant alleged that the had already settled his accounts and obligations contracted in the
business to which the complaint refers, by means of periodical payments in tuba. In evidence of this, while
testifying under oath, he introduced a document dated 19 November 1903, signed by the agent Lawa declaring
that the defendant had no outstanding debt with the partnership. The trial judge ruled in favor of the Plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay the said amount?
Held: Yes. When the agent Lawa executed the document, the business had already closed and he had ceased to
act in it administration and management. Therefore, he was not authorized to sign the document made out by
the debtor, extinguishing the latter’s liability. Since the vales existed, and were in possession of the creditor, it
was because the amounts they called for had not yet been paid, inasmuch as an obligation can only be presumed
to have been fulfilled when the proofs of its existence have been returned to the debtor.
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)

County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

[Note: Sec. 3, Disputable presumptions – (c.) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act.]
Facts: In this case, 18 yr. Old David Sandstorm confessed to the slaying of Annie Jessen. Based upon the
confession and corroborating evidence, David Sandstorm was charged with deliberate homicide in that he
“purposely or knowingly caused the death of Annie Jensen.” At trial, the jury was informed that although
Sandstorm admitted killing the victim, he did not do so “purposely or knowingly,” and therefore was not guilty
of “deliberate homicide” but of a lesser crime. They contended that 2 court-appointed health experts described
the mental state of Sandstorm as compounded by a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption.
The prosecution requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that “the law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequence of his voluntary acts.” Sandstorm’s counsel objected arguing that “the instruction has the
effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge to the defense and that is
impermissible under the Federal Constitution and due process of law. The objection was overruled and the jury
found petitioner guilty, sentencing him to 100 yrs. in prison. Sandstorm appealed to the Montana SC affirming
in toto. Thus, this petition on certiorari to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not such instructions given by the Trial judge shifted the of proof on criminal prosecution to
the defense?
Held: The SC reversed the Montana SC.
The Respondents contention was that the instruction was merely a permissive inference – that is, it allows but
did not require the jury to draw conclusions about defendants intent from his actions – and that such inferences
are constitutional. Nevertheless, the SC found that the jury was not told that they had a choice of inferring
intent but rather it can be seen that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as
mandatory.
Respondent argues further that even if viewed as a mandatory presumption rather than as a permissive
inference, the presumption did not conclusively establish intent but rather could be rebutted. The court pointed
out that, a reasonable jury could interpret the presumption as “conclusive” and not technically as a presumption
which could be an irrebutable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the
presumption (which is the voluntariness of the killing done by Sandstorm) – thus effectively shifting the burden
of persuasion on the element of intent. Montana’s own Rules of Evidence expressly state that the presumption
at issue here may be overcome only “by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption.” Such a
requirement shifts not only the burden of production but also the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of
intent.
A State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt and may not shift the burden of
proof to the defendant by means of such a presumption. Because Sandstorm’s jury may have interpreted the
instruction as either a burden shifting presumption or a conclusive presumption, either interpretation would
have deprived defendant his right to due process and thus render such instruction unconstitutional.
3. Rule 131, §4: Legitimacy or Illegitimacy
Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. – There is no presumption of legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the
separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his
allegation. (6)
T. Examination of Witnesses
1. Rule 132 §1-18
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. – The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally. (1 a)
Examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
a. done in open court
b. under oath or affirmation
c. answers of the witness shall be given orally, unless
i. the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
ii. the question calls for a different mode of answer
Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. – The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the
questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of
the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or
stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or
recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such
proceedings. (2 a)
The rules now require even the statements of the judge be recorded.
Requisites for transcript to be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the proceedings
a. made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
b. certified as correct by him
Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. – A witness must answer questions, although his answer
may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to the very fact at
issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of
his previous final conviction for an offense. (3 a, l9 a)
Obligation of a witness – answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against him
Rights of a witness
a. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
b. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
c. Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
d. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense, unless otherwise provided
by law; or
e. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to the fact
i. at issue or
 ii. from which the fact in issue would be presumed
iii. of his previous final conviction for an offense.
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. – The order in which an individual witness
may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5. Direct examination. – Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (3 a)
Direct examination – the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to
the issue.
Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the termination of the direct examination,
the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue. (8a)
Witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
a. as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith
b. with sufficient fullness and freedom
i. to test his
1. accuracy and
2. truthfulness and
3. freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse
ii. to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue
Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. – After the cross-examination of the witness has
been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers
given during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination, questions on matters not dealt with during
the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (12)
Re-direct examination
a. to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-examination
b. with leave of court, on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. – Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party
may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other
matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)
Re-cross-examination
a. on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and
b. with leave of court, other matters
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. – After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require. (14)
A witness can be recalled only with leave of the court.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. – A question which suggests to the witness the answer
which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On Preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant,
or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or
private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
 A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed. (5 a, 6 a, and 8 a)
Leading questions – a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires
GR: Leading questions not allowed.
Exceptions
a. cross examination;
b. Preliminary matters;
c. difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
i. ignorant, or
ii. a child of tender years, or
iii. feeble mind, or
iv. a deaf-mute;
d. unwilling or hostile witness (cf Rule 132, Sec. 12); or
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – xxx
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
e. witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of
a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Misleading question – one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that
which he has previously stated.
Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. – A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
Impeachment of adverse party's witness
a. contradictory evidence
b. evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad
c. evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony
d. evidence of conviction of an offense
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief. (6 a, 7
a)
GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except evidence of bad character)
a. an unwilling or hostile witness; or
b. a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile
a. adverse interest
b. unjustified reluctance to testify, or
c. misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse witness
a. may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of bad character
b. may also be impeached by the opponent
c. may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the subject matter of his direct examination
d. proponent may ask leading questions
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. – Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. (16)
Requisites for impeaching a witness by prior inconsistent statements
a. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.
b. the statements must be
i. related to him
ii. with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present
c. he must be asked whether he made such statements
d. if so, allowed to explain them
Escolin: if the witness refuses to acknowledge the prior inconsistent statement, present someone who can testify
that the recording of the prior statement was accurate (e.g. stenographer, in which case, the statement is prima
facie evidence of the fact stated therein).
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. – Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)
cf Rule 130, Sec. 51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –
xxx
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec(ion 14. (46 a, 47 a)
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached.
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. – On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from
the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another until all shall have been examined. (18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. – A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and
he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness
upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though
he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly
stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (10 a)
Requisites for a witness to refer to a memorandum
a. the memorandum must have been written or recorded by himself or under his direction
b. either
i. at the time when the fact occurred, or
ii. immediately thereafter, or
iii. at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
c. he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded
d. the memorandum must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses,
cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence.
e. if the witness retains no recollection of the particular facts, he must swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible. – When
part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of
the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. (11 a)
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of
the same subject may be inquired into by the other.
When a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
cf Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919) under Rule 130 Sec. 42
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to witness. – Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may
be inspected by the adverse party. (9 a)
2. Cases
a. Examination in Open Court
People v. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428 (1976)
Facts: In Crim. Case no. 289, People vs. Ojoy, of CFI of Iloilo, after the accused had testified in his defense, his
counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution on matters stated therein. Private prosecutors objected to the proposed
procedure but notwithstanding the Judge issued an order sustaining the proposed procedure. Contending that
the said order violates Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 of Rule 132 and Sec. 1 of Rule 133, the petitioners herein file this
petition on certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not said order is violative of the Rules of Court, requiring that the testimonies of witnesses
should be given orally in open court?
Held: The SC annuls said order.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the
adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent" demands confrontation for the purpose of
cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers.
Personal appearance of the witness before the judge, enables the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive
and incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is
produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his
countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. The
physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his
deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. The great weight given the findings of fact of
the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that
he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
Thus, if a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his
impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result
than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see,
hear and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.
Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly
dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony
which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be
propounded to the witness. A witness can testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge.
Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except or, preliminary matters, or when there is
difficult in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or
feebleminded, or a deaf mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of the
business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the
presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
Facts: Aug. 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was assassinated as he was about to disembark at the
tarmac of the Manila International Airport. Lying prostrate on the ground also was the dead body of Rolando
Galman, the supposed assassin.
PD 1886 was promulgated by then President Marcos creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Body which became
known as the Agrava Board (chaired by Justice Corazon Agrava). Pursuant to said decree various witnesses
testified and appeared before the said board and/or produced documentary and other evidence. Among the
witnesses where Gen. Fabian Ver, Gen. Prospero Olivas, and orther soldiers comprising Aquino’s security
detail.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to Pres. Marcos and which was referred to the
Tanodbayan. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2
informations for murder (one for Aquino, the other for Galman) against Ver et al either as accessories,
accomplices and several principles.
Upon arraignment, all accused pleaded guilty.
In the course of trial, the prosecution offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver et al
before the Agrava Board.
Ver filed a formal motion to exclude his testimony in said board contending that it is violative of his right
against self-incrimination and the immunity granted by PD 1886. Olivas and the other respondents followed
Ver’s motion with their own similar motion. The Tanodbayan opposed said motion contending that the
immunity could not be granted because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the
Agrava Board.
On June 13, 1985, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution admitting all the evidence except the testimonies
produced by Ver et al in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. MR was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies given by Ver et al can be admitted in evidence, being violative of their
right to self-incrimination?
Held: 9-5, Petition Dismissed.
LACK OF DUE PROCESS AND APPLICATION OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE
As to the argument that the fact-finding initiative of the Agrava Board did not constitute a custodial
investigation - The court herein held that the Agrava Board was created by PD 1886 not merely to determine
the facts surrounding Aquino’s death but also to identify the culprits for their consequent prosecution. As
pointed out PD 1886, sec. 12 provides that the Agrava Board if its findings warrant the prosecution of any
person the Board may file the initiatory complaint with the proper government agency. By its very nature, the
investigation and questioning made by the Agrava Board was in the nature of a custodial investigation requiring
that the accused be given counsel and that he be appraised of his rights under the Miranda doctrine.
The court found in review of the pleadings and annexes of the proceedings of the Agrava Board was
constitutionally infirm for not conforming with the specified constitutional standards thus they should be
excluded.
EFFECT OF IMMUNITY STATUTES
Use Immunity vs. Transactional Immunity - The Court further pointed out that PD 1886 denied to Ver et al the
right to remain silent because under Sec. 5, PD 1886 that they should answer all questions raised if not they
would be cited for contempt of court. Also, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves.
Nevertheless, PD 1886’s denial of such rights was based on the fact that the law provided immunity to the
persons who may testify in front of said board. Thereinafter, the court differentiated, “use immunity” from
“transactional immunity” as applied here and granted by law. “Use immunity” prohibits use of witness’
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution. “Transaction
Immunity” grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates.
PD 1886 grants “use immunity” only. – It makes only the witness immune from use of any statement given but
not immune from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying do not render the witness
immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of his right of self-incrimination. He is merely saved
from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-incrimination. Due process demands that the Agrava board
should have been informed of their Miranda rights.
Invocation of right to remain silent before giving testimony and to prevent its use is wrong. – The literal
interpretation of PD 1886 in such a way is repugnant to Article IV, Sec. 20 of the Constitution, which is the first
test of admissibility.
Dissents:
Teehankee – The right against self-incrimination in proceedings other than criminal is considered an option of
refusal to answer, not a prohibition of inquiry. The privilege must be invoked at the proper time and that time is
when the question is propounded. This has to be so because before a question is asked there would be no way
of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. A person who has
been summoned to testify ‘cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness’ and no claim
of privilege can be made until a question calling for incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and, generally
speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.
Melencio-Herrera - There should be no automatic “immunity bath” of the entire testimony before the Board for
immunity does not extend to such of the evidence as is not privileged.
Relova – Under PD 1886, testimony adduced before the Agrava Board may not be used against the witness only
after he has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, respondents cannot invoke the
immunity clause of PD 1886 since they did not claim the privilege to remain silent when being asked questions
at the Agrava Board hearing.
b. Cross-Examination
de la Paz, Jr. v. IAC, 154 S 65 (1987)
Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received
or allowed to remain in the record. Implied waiver of the right of cross-examine may take various forms, as
long as the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it reasons attributable to himself alone. Repeated absences, and/or unjustified motions for
postponement of the hearing in which the witness is scheduled to be cross-examined until the witness passed
away is a waiver of the right to cross-examine.
Facts: On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners with the RTC of Rizal for a
judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land in the name of Ponciano de la Paz with
damages
Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the properties adjudicated to her and her mother as a
result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and approved by the court. The subject matter
of Civil Case No. 1399 was Ponciano's testate estate.
In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was among the properties adjudicated to Loreto and
her mother. They claimed that the parcel of land was not accounted for in the probate proceedings but is
actually community property of the parties.
The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were admittedly compulsory heirs of Ponciano de la Paz
who died in 1916. Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano while: 1) Emilio de la Paz, Jr., is the son of
Emilio, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; 2) Manuela de la Paz is the recognized natural child of
Ponciano; 3) Natividad de la Paz is the daughter of Emilio, recognized natural child of Ponciano; 4) Margarita
de la Paz is the daughter of Wenceslao, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; and 5) Zenaida de la Paz, is the
daughter of Augusto, another recognized natural child of Ponciano. As regards petitioner Enrique de la Paz,
Loreto denied his claim that he is one of the heirs of Ponciano. The petitioners, however, allege that he is also a
compulsory heir of Ponciano, he being the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the eldest child of the decedent.
The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement during pre-trial. Hence, trial on the merits followed.
Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984.
On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was,
however, not completed. The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the continuance of the cross-
examination on the ground that he still had to conduct a lengthy cross-examination.
On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to some errors in the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto. The motion was granted.
This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners'' counsel to manifest that he would not be able to
undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. The trial was rescheduled three times.
During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners, nor their counsel appeared despite
due notice. Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed to present evidence ex parte before a
commissioner. The motion was granted and Loreto presented additional evidence ex parte in the afternoon of
the same day. On this same date, she finished the presentation of her evidence and submitted her case for
decision.
Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion were allowed to cross-examine Loreto.
On the scheduled hearing set on September 18, 1984, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and the cross-
examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth (4th) time.
Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed cross-examination of
Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, cut short and rescheduled again on motion of the petitioners'
counsel.
Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended complaint was filed for the purpose of
substituting the respondents, herein, they being the children and heirs of Loreto.
At the resumption of the trial on January 21, 1985, the petitioners moved verbally to strike off the record the
entire testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. A verbal motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
The petitioners filed a petition with the IAC to annul the lower court's orders dated January 24, 1985 and
February 11, 1985 and to prohibit the court from further proceeding.
This petition notwithstanding, the lower court continued the proceedings. Thus, on March 29, 1985, the lower
court promulgated a decision declaring the private respondents, the children and heirs of Loreto, as the true
owners of the subject parcel of land.
The IAC denied the petition and the MR.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Loreto should be stricken off the records.
Held: A motion to strike off testimony from the record is an interlocutory order. Well-settled is the rule that
interlocutory orders may not be subjects of a petition of certiorari unless issued in patent abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of the respondents. As
can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-examination from the time she finished her
direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to November 7, 1984, the last scheduled hearing of the case before her
death on December 1, 1984. The petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination but at times
failed to appear during scheduled hearings. The postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date duet o
the correction of the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same cannot be said for
the subsequent posponements requested by the petitioners. The scheduled trials before November 7, 1984, did
not push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be recalled that at the scheduled hearing on
September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared leading to the presentation of evidence ex
parte. And also during the scheduled hearing on September 18, 1984, when the petitioners were allowed to
cross-examine Loreto despite the fact that the case was already deemed submitted for decision, the petitioners
again failed to appear.
Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through
their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony stands.
Fulgado v. CA, 182 S 81 (1990)
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal,
civil, or administrative, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. The right is not to an actual, but a
mere opportunity to cross-examine. Failure of the adverse party to move to schedule the hearing for the cross-
examination of a witness before he died or migrated abroad (the imminence of which the adverse party was
aware) is a waiver of such right. The burden is on the party wishing to exercise the right to cross-examination,
not necessarily the plaintiff, to schedule the hearing.
Facts: On September 9,1967, Ruperto Fulgado, a man approaching the twilight of his life, undertook the
arduous task of filing an action in the CFI against herein respondents for the annulment of certain contracts of
sale and partition with accounting. The defendants (herein private respondents) filed their answer to the
complaint with special and affirmative defenses and a counterclaim.
After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was finally set for February 1, 1968 at 8:30 in the morning.
Private respondents and their counsel failed to appear on time at the pre-trial and were subsequently declared as
in default. Plaintiff Fulgado was then allowed to present his evidence ex parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court.
Meanwhile, upon learning of their predicament, private respondents immediately filed a motion to lift the order
of default on the same day that the order was issued. The trial court denied said motion in its order of February
16, 1972. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Persistently, respondents filed a petition for relief
from the default order. Once more, this was denied.
On April 24, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado. On appeal, however,
the CA found that private respondents had been deprived of their day in court by the unjust denial of their
motion to lift the order of default.
The Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on June 27,1974 and the records of the case were
remanded to the trial court.
The case was set for hearing but was rescheduled because the judge went on leave. In the meantime, Fulgado
died and was substituted by his heirs. Fulgado's witness, Jose Fulgado, referred to in the dispositive part of the
Appellate Court's judgment, had earlier migrated to the United States.
The respondents prayed for the sticking off from the records the testimonies of the petitioner’s witnesses which
the court allowed. As a consequence, the case was dismissed.
The CA affirmed the TC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the witnesses should be excluded.
Held: The appeal is well-taken.
The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has always been understood as
requiring, not necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-
examine if desired. Thus the resolution of the present case would hinge on whether or not this was an
opportunity for cross-examination.
From the records presented, it is manifest that private respondents had enough opportunity to cross-examine
plaintiff Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before his migration. When the Court of Appeals set aside
the default judgment and remanded the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits, "granting to the
defendants the opportunity to present their evidence." This was a positive signal for them to proceed with the
cross-examination of the two Fulgados. But despite knowledge of Ruperto's failing health (he was then 89 years
of age) and Jose's imminent travel to the United States, private respondents did not move swiftly and decisively.
They tarried for more than one year from the finality of the Appellate Court's decision on June 27, 1974 to ask
the trial court on July 3, 1975 to set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any date of August and
September ... ."
Razon v. CA, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)

Capital Subdivision v. Negros Occidental, 52 O.G. 4672 (1956)

U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)

U.S. v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)

c. Recalling Witnesses
People v. Rivera, 200 S 786 (1991)
The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's mere general
statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full
opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should have
been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for
recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but ministerial. Something more
than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's discretion
may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that
particularly identified material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described
vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was
conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, there would be
no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
Furthermore, failure of the recalled witness to be appear is not ground to strike out his testimony. There should
have been a showing of the indispensability of his further examination, what it was that would have been
elicited, and that such additional testimony would cause the evidence to become inadmissible. Lastly, striking
out of testimony must be upon motion. It can not be ordered motu propio.
Facts: Wilfredo Sembrao was charged with Arson for allegedly willfully causing the fire which destroyed the
2nd and 3rd floors of the “I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath” Owned by Juanito Tan and frequented by
Stanley Fabito. On December 8, 1987, prosecution witness Benjamin Lee testified on Sembrano’s act of
running from the VIP room where the fire started and his refusal to stop. On April 26, 1987, cross, re-direct and
re-cross examinations were conducted after which Lee was asked to step down. After the prosecution
completed its presentation of evidence but before it could rest its case, defendant’s original counsel withdrew
and was substituted by defendant’s original counsel withdrew and was substituted by atty. Rodriguez, who then
filed a motion to recall Lee for further examination on the ground that “there seems to be many points and
questions that should have been asked but were not profounded by the other defense counsel who conducted the
cross-examination.” The court granted the motion over objections of the prosecution. Lee failed to come since
he left his work and transferred somewhere else to dispense with the recall of Lee but the RTC denied this and
even ordered the testimony of Lee to be stricken of the record due to a lack of complete cross-examination.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC’s grant of leave to recall Lee was proper?
Held: No. Certiorari granted.
Although the Rules of Court gives the court discretion in granting leave for the recall of witnesses, such cannot
be exercised on the basis of applicant’s mere general statement that there is need to recall a witness “in the
interest of justice” or “in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case” or the reason invoked in the
present case. To regard these generalities as sufficient ground to recall a witness would make it ministerial
rather than discretionary. Thus, there must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for
the recall (e.g. that particularly identified material points were not covered in the cross, that particularly
described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, that the cross-
examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof). Here, the questions
that were supposedly not asked were not specified in the motion.
Moreover, the RTC acted whimsically when it ordered the striking out of Lee’s testimony. The court acted
unilaterally without any motion to this effect and without giving the prosecution opportunity to contest it. The
striking out was ordered without any showing that further cross was really indispensable. Here, Lee was
already subjected to both cross and re-cross so that the absence of cross can neither be invoked as a ground to
strike out Lee’ testimony.
People v. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA 716 (1968)
Facts: Estrada was one of several accused in kidnapping Elvira Principe. The CFI found Estrada guilty and was
sentenced to death. The case of the people was established thru the testimonies of 12 witnesses. Ceribo, one of
the witnesses who testified for the prosecution, testified that he was a surrendered Huk and he already knew
about the kidnapping because there was a conference in Barrio Biga where it was agreed to kidnap Elvira
because she was the one pointed to by Estrada. Estrada’s defense was that the charge against him was a pure
concoction. Estrada sought to recall Ceribo because it was claimed that he was to retract his previous testimony
from the prosecution and then testify for the defense. However, the court denied the defense the right to call
back Ceribo.
Issue: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in denying the defense the right to call back witness
Ceribo?
Held: The SC held that under Sec. 14, Rule 132 Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or
withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require. It was the better part
of discretion and caution on the part of the court to have denied it. The record is loaded with circumstances
tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Ong Su, 79 SCRA 207 (1977)

d. Leading Questions
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 (1994)
A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other
witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his
perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. In the case before us, the trial court noted
that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask her leading questions, "her
testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility.
State v. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)

e. Impeaching One's Own Witness

Becker v. Eisenstodt, 158 A.2d 706 (1960)

f. Impeachment By Bias
U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
 U.S. v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)

g. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement

Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 S 443 (1986)
A party may impeach a witness by introducing into evidence their previous testimony in his disbarment
proceedings which are inconsistent with their current testimony. An attorney may waive the confidential nature
of his own disbarment proceedings.
Facts: On May 16, 1979, a case for "Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Recovery of Possession and
Damages" was filed by private respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of the other private
respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. and his sons for the recovery
of a parcel of land located at Urbiztondo, San Juan. La Union.
The property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment Case previously filed on July 22, 1975 with this
Court by private respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner Villalon with falsification of a deed of
absolute sale of that property in his and his sons' favor, but which petitioner Villalon claimed to have been his
contingent fee for the professional services he had rendered to EBUIZA's parents. The Disbarment Case was
referred by this Court to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation where
testimonial evidence was received. The case still pends thereat.
In the course of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced in evidence the testimonies of some of the
private respondents, namely, NEVAL, EBUIZA, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et als.), in the
Disbarment Case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the Civil Case.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil Case all matters relating to the
proceedings in the Disbarment Case. Over petitioners' opposition, on September 20, 1985, the TC issued its
questioned Order granting the Motion to Strike. Their MR was denied so they filed a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and mandamus with the IAC which denied their petition.
Held: By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility
of their adverse parties' witnesses by proving that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent
with the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the
Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed
of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the said
deed of absolute sale is sought.
The offer of evidence, suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to petitioners, while
procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment. The broader interests
of justice would then require that petitioners be given sufficient latitude to present and prove their impeaching
evidence for judicial appreciation.
People v. Resabal, 50 Phil 780 (1927)
To impeach a witness by prior inconsistent statements, he must be given ample opportunity to explain the
discrepancies by a reading to him of such prior statement. Mere presentation of the statement, without said
declaration having been read to the witness while he testified, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
Escolin: Note that the accused now does not have the right to cross-examine the witness during the preliminary
investigation. He can only give questions to the investigating officer to be propounded to the witness.
Facts: The evidence shows, as an indisputable fact, that in the early morning of April 25, 1926, one Primo
Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte, form the effects of an internal
hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in the left lung, as appears from the death certificate.
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having been excluded from the
information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and, because, moreover, of the contradiction in his
testimony at the preliminary investigation and during the trial.
The TC convicted the accused of murder.
Counsel for the defense alleges that the trial court erred in not ignoring Glicerio Orit's testimony, and in not
acquitting the accused Alejo Resabal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Held: We are of the opinion that the mere fact of having been excluded from the information to be used as a
witness for the Government, does not prevent this witness from telling the truth in this case, especially in the
absence of proof showing the interest he might possibly have in testifying against the accused. Neither is the
apparent contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, and
before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for the simple reason that this witness was
not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace,
to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused. The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said
declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for
impeaching his testimony.
U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)

h. Impeachment By Other Means

U.S. v. Mercado, 20 Phil. 127 (1913)

Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 SW2d 679 (1967)

Coles v. Harsh, 276 P. 248 (1929)

U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services, 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)

Newton v. State, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)

State v. Oswalt, 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)

i. Exclusion of Witnesses
People v. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1930)
Facts: Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama and Pampang were charged and convicted for the murder of Eleno
Lamorena in the CFI of Lanao.
On appeal, said persons assigned as error the trial court’s refusal to admit a certain witness presented by the
defense on the ground that said witness had been present during a hearing despite the court’s order that all
witnesses leave the court.
Issue: Whether or not the exclusion of the witness was proper?
Held: Yes. Conviction affirmed.
Under the circumstances of the case, it lies within the discretion of the court to admit or reject the testimony of
the witness. Although the SC is of opinion that the lower court should have admitted the testimony of the
witness, especially when he said that he did not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is nothing to
show that this error has affected appellant’s defense especially since there is no indication whatsoever as to
what the witness would have stated in his testimony.
State v. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)
Facts: Joe Berry Bishop was convicted of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. When the case was called
for trial, defense counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. The prosecutor stated that most of his witnesses
were police officers. Counsel for the defendant argued that his client would be prejudiced by allowing the
officers to remain and moved for their exclusion. This motion was denied because the trial court wanted the
police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view the trail as an educational experience, and wanted
them to be able to see the fruits of their labor. Hence, this appeal to the CA of Oregon.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in not excluding the witnesses and was the defendant prejudiced by this
failure to exclude the witnesses?
Held: Yes, the trial court erred. A review of Oregon SC cases reveals that a motion to exclude witnesses is
normally granted. The practice of excluding witnesses from the courtroom except while each is testifying is to
be strongly recommended, particularly here the testimony of the witnesses is in any measure cumulative or
corroborative. However, these authorities mean that when one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other
party voices no objection, the motion should always be granted. When the motion is opposed, the trial court’s
discretion comes into play. The trail court must weigh the “good cause shown” for not excluding witnesses
against policy favoring exclusion. Thus, if the record contains some showing of good cause for not excluding
the witnesses and if the trial court made a reasonable choice between the good cause shown and the policy
favoring exclusion, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. But if the record contains no reason for not
excluding witnesses, or an insufficient reason, then the trial court has abused its discretion. In this case, the CA
found that the reasons advanced by the trial court were not relevant to the purpose of the trail, namely, the
determination of whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Balanced against the danger that the
witnesses memories might be confused by other testimony, and the other reasons for the rule of sequestration
(exclusion), the reasons advanced by the court were insufficient.
Yes, he was prejudiced. The State has the burden to prove the lack of prejudice from denial of defendant’s
motion to exclude witnesses, and when a trail court has abused its discretion by not excluding witnesses,
prejudice will be assumed unless the record affirmatively reflects the contrary.
j. Refreshing Recollection
State v. Peoples, 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)

U. Authentication and Proof of Documents

1. Rule 132 §19-33
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Public documents
a. written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b. notarized documents, except last wills and testaments; and
c. public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Public documents Private documents
Genuineness and authenticity presumed Must prove genuineness and due execution
Binding against the parties and 3rd persons Binds only parties to the document
Certain transactions are required to be in a public document (e.g.
donation of real property)

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. (cf with Rule 132,
Sec. 22)
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21 a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(23 a)
Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. – Where a private document
is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity
need be given. (22 a)
Requisites for admissibility of private document
a. offered as authentic – due execution and authenticity must be proved
i. either by
1. anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
2. evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
a. any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
1. upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
2. has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person
b. a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge
ii. Unless it is an ancient document; requisites
1. more than 30 years old
2. produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and
3. unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
b. not offered as authentic – identified as that which it is claimed to be
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter. (24 a)
Documents consisting of
a. entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer – prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
b. all other public documents – evidence, even against a 3 rd person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19 (official acts), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
The record of public documents of official acts may be evidenced by
a. an official publication thereof or
b. a copy
i. attested by
1. the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
2. his deputy, and
ii. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1. accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a. secretary of the embassy or legation
b. consul general
c. consul
d. vice consul, or
e. consular agent or
f. any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept
2. authenticated by the seal of his office.
Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts
a. get a copy from the legal custodian
b. have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct
c. have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is the legal custodian of a copy of official act
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (26 a)
Attestation of copy must
a. state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be
b. be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. – Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the
office in which it is kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. – An authorized public record of a private document may
be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with
an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
a. the original record, or
b. a copy thereof
i. attested by the legal custodian of the record
ii. with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Proof of lack of record
a. A written statement
i. signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
ii. that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office,
b. accompanied by a certificate that such officer is supposed to have custody
If a notarized document is lost, get certifications of loss from
a. notary public
b. bureau of archives
c. clerk of court who commissioned the notary public
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. – Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a)
want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the
party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30 a)
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of
a. want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer
b. collusion between the parties, or
c. fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. – Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified
as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31
a)
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law
 a. may be presented in evidence without further proof
b. the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. – The party producing a document as genuine which
has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without
his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32 a)
The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered
after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute
a. must account for the alteration, either as
i. made by another, without his concurrence, or
ii. made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or
iii. otherwise properly or innocently made, or
iv. the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument
b. If he fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence
Sec. 32. Seal. – There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as
their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33 a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. – Documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial. (34 a)
Documents written in an unofficial language
a. shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino
b. parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.
2. Cases
a. Proof of private documents
Buñag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299 (1988)
The authenticity and due execution of a private document is not proven by testimony that the party
thumbmarked it. The circumstances of the presence of the witness during the execution must be related. There
must be proof that the party understood it, considering he was illiterate (implied from the thumbmarking). There
must be showing that the document was duly read, explained and translated to the illiterate party.
Facts: These is a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Pampanga between Bunag and Bautista.
Bunag claims that the property in question was originally owned by his father Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown
by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for 1941 and 320 for 1960 (Exhs. B & E). They had transferred their residence to
Tarlac from Pampanga and Jose Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, was allowed by his father to erect a house
on said lot and lived therein on the condition that he would pay for the land taxes as compensation for the use of
the land. He admitted, however, that he only learned about this agreement from his father. On September
15,1962, and September 24,1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru his lawyer, to
vacate the lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs. A & B). On the other hand, Bautista testified that he is
the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio Bunag
with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but as the latter had no
money, he referred the matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the
P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his father and Bunag; that he
came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed there with his family until liberation when
they left the house and allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he planted bananas, chicos, trees,
calamansi, eggplants, thereon; that he had been paying the land taxes thereon (Exhs. 5 to 5-M); that the property
is declared in his name (Exh. 6); and he denies that her sister Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her
to stay on the property as her sister had a house of her own then. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother
bought the said property from Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when Bunag affixed Ms thumbmark on
the document (Exh. 1); that aside from this deed, there were other documents supporting the sale as the note
(Exh. 2) containing the consideration and the parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the property (Exh. 3) and the
letter of the assessor to Bunag in 1941 informing him of the revision of the assessment. (Rollo, pp. 15-18). The
trial court decided in favor of petitioner. The CA, finding the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) to have been validly
executed and rueld in favor of Bruno. MR  was denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was authentic and validly executed?
Held: Note here that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither are
there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in
English and over the similarly typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint. The deed of sale is
not notarized and is, therefore, a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before it
can be received in evidence.
Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section 21, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private writing may be
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
To support its conclusion as to the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale, the CA relied on the
testimony of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents. However, the TC had ruled otherwise since it
received the testimony of Brigida with caution, coming as it does from a sister of the defendants. The
circumstances other alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related. Neither does
she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the document. It should be noted that the deed was
written in English. Since it appears that said document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be
inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the circumstances, the minimum proof
necessary to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the document (Exhibit "1") was
duly read, explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented.
The SC also considered the lack of instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief that lurks behind
accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked. without any witnesses to it, and not
acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on
evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly executed and authenticated. The probative value of the
testimony of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of Exhibit "l,"
coming as it does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not, be overlook falling short the
minimum requirements of credibility. The testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution of a private
document must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is
subscribed thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the writing. More
so if the document was merely thumb-marked.
The Court adopts the TC's findings and its conclusion that the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale
(Exhibit 1) was not proved and thus such private document should be excluded.
b. Ancient documents
Bartolome v. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990)
Where the offeror’s witness testified that the document had a missing 4 th page, the document can not qualify as
an ancient document because it is blemished by alteration or circmstance of suspicion. An incomplete document
is akin to an altered document, more so if the missing page contains the signature of the parties to the document.
Proof of the document’s authenticity and due execution is therefore necessary.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)
Lack of signatures on the first pages of a document alone is not a blemish that would disqualify a document
from being an ancient document. Allegations that the pages had been substituted should be proven in order to
disqualify the document from being an ancient document, more so if the documents were shown to be exact
copies of the original on file with the Register of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and authenticity is no
longer required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record because it had been registered with the Registry
of Deeds. Therefore, the court did not have to determine whether the document was in fact an ancient document
because it was in the first place a public document whose authenticity and due execution need not be proven.
The problem with this case is it is now authority to say that private documents whose first pages are not signed
by the parties can qualify as ancient documents. Keep in mind that crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact
that the document presented matches the one on file in the Registry of Deeds. Had there been no matching copy
in the Registry of Deeds, I submit that the document can not qualify as an ancient document.
Facts: An action for recovery of possession was field by Songco and Doe alleging that Lacsa owed the disputed
piece of and by showing an OCT and that the respondent occupied the land by fraud. Respondents denied the
allegation and said that the OCT relied upon by the petitioners was superseded by a TCT by virtue of a
document (Exh. 3) and later by superseded by another document (Exh. 7). Petitioners submit that the
documents are not ancient documents for it must not only be 30 yrs. old but also found in the proper custody
and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion. They allege that the document cannot
be considered as such because the first 2 pages did not bear the signatures of the parties to the document.
Issue: Whether or not the documents are ancient documents?
Held: Yes, under the rule, the documents must be atleast 30 yrs. old and this was shown by the fact that exh. 3
was executed on April 7, 1923 and Exh. 7 on January 20, 1924. The next requisite that it be found or produced
from a custody in which it would naturally be found was shown when the document was found under the care of
the Register of Deeds as they certified that both documents are copies of the original. The petitioner’s
contention that the lack of signature on the first two apges cast doubt on the authenticity of the document was
answered by the SC saying that “we cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever.” As the
petitioner failed to show proof of the irregularity, the SC ruled that the document is valid. As a contract
appearing honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness must
present conclusive evidence of fabrication.
c. Proof of foreign judgments
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
To be enforceable, the foreign judgment must be proven as a public document of a written official act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. The offeror must submit an attestation issued by
the proper foreign official having legal custody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful reproduction
of the original, which attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer having jurisdiction in
that country.
Facts: Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor) as Radio
Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4)
months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and
inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the
services of Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to
insubordination.
Pascor filed a complaint against Rances with the POEA for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for “character
assassination.” Rances denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an
amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's
foreign principal. The POEA found Rances liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and
challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of
twelve (12) months suspension. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of Rances.
Later, Rances filed a complaint against Pascor where he sought to carry out and enforce the same award
obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in
the first POEA Case. Rances claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which
claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country,"
with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant
Rances doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] and that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given
to her, he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00." As evidence of this foreign award, Rances
submitted what purports to be an "original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and
language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter
dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." In its answer filed
on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: (1.) that the copy of the Dubai decision
relied upon by Rances could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated; (2.) that
Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; (3.) that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the
enforcement of foreign judgments; and (4.) that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-
09-848, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim.
In its decision, the POEA held Pascor liable to pay Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment." The POEA denied Pascor's appeal for having been filed out of time. On 29
May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the
NLRC. On 14 August 1986, NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as filed out of time.
Issue: (Related to evidence) Whether or not the Dubai decision was admissible in evidence as proven?
Held: The appeal should have been allowed by the NLRC because there was a real effort and legal cause for the
said appeal. In the end, the decision of the POEA was set aside. Ruling on the merits,
An examination of the complaint filed by Rances in the POEA shows that the cause of action pleaded by
Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by the Dubai Court which purported to award him, among
other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain circumstances. Petitioner argues vigorously
that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1,
Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all
cases 'involving employer employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon
the employer - employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's foreign
principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already
been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular
courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily applicable in
proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before the POEA.
Even assuming in arguendo that the POEA has jurisdiction, still Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision.
The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under
Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner
of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there
be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having
legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a
faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine
Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd
Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation
under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision
is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation
is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a
non-official language like Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into
English or Spanish or Filipino. In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation
of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not
purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai
Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages
has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation
of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and
faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court
decision, even on the basis of the English translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its
face to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent
Rances simply assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign principal. The Dubai
decision does not Identify the parties to the litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the
Dubai decision can scarcely be enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its
face purported to be rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly denied
that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court. Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the
Dubai Rules of Procedure governing acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Pascor's foreign principal — Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. — it still would not follow that Pascor
would automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited
in its reach to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with persons like
respondent Rances. Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East
Ship Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though
such a suit may involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993)
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere
testimony of a witness is not sufficient to prove foreign law.
Facts: Zalamea purchased two tickets from the Manila agent of TWA. Cesar and Suthira’s tickets were
purchased as a 75% discount, while Liana’s was a full fare ticket. They all had confirmed reservations. In NY,
on the appointed date, they checked in an hour earlier but they were placed in the wait-list. Eventually, only
Cesar was able to board while the 2 others had to book with American Airlines. Upon their arrival in Manila,
they filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage. The LC ruled in their favor, while
the CA modified it as regards moral damages, on the ground that there was no fraud or bad faith, since ‘. . .
overbooking of flights is specifically allowed by the Code of Federal Regulations” by the CAB.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith because it has a right to
overbook flights?
Held: The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not
prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must alleged and
prove. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers
having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony
of it customer service agent that the Code of the CAB allows overbooking. Aside from said statement no
official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
d. Documents in unofficial language
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
A document written in an unofficial language should be translated into either English or Filipino. The translator
should be identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or as a competent translator of both languages.
The translation should be either sworn to as an accurate translation of the original, or agreed upon by the
parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976)
Affidavits written in an unofficial language and not accompanied with a translation are inadmissible in
evidence.
Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which don’t have the required documentary stamp tax
will not be admitted in evidence.
Facts: One night, Monleon arrived at his house drunk. He inquired from Concordia, his wife, whether their
carabao had been fed by their ten-year old son, Marciano. She assured him that the carabao had been fed. He
repaired to the place where the carabao was tethered to check the veracity of her statement. He discovered that
the carabao had not been adequately fed. He became furious.
When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A violent quarrel ensued between them. He
placed himself astride his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed her head against a post, and kicked her in the
abdomen. He shouted: "What do I care if there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let
your brothers and sisters stand up and I will also include them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six children,
pulled away his father and stopped his assault on Concordia.
The following morning Concordia vomitted blood. She died at eleven o'clock on that morning of June 2. Death
was due to "acute abdomen" (Exh. B), a pathologic condition within the belly, requiring surgical intervention
Sixteen days after Concordia death, Monleon thumbmarked a confession, written in the Cebuano dialect and
sworn to before the town mayor (Exh. C). He admitted in that confession that he assaulted his wife and that he
had repented for the wrong which he had done to her. He orally admitted to Perfecto Bongo, a lieutenant in the
Cebu City police department and a relative of Concordia, that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife because he was
drunk and she was a nagger.
On July 31, 1970 or about two months after Concordia's death, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) exhumed her body. He found bluish-black discolorations on the sphenoid temporal bones of
her skull, on the atlas or cervical vertebra below the skull or at the base of the neck, and on the first ribs. The
discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage "caused by trauma or external violence." The doctor ventured
the opinion that the "acute abdomen" could have been caused "by external violence"
Monleon denied that he used violence against his wife. He testified that he and his wife had merely a verbal
quarrel and that Clemencia, the sister of Concordia and the wife of his elder brother, testified against him
because Clemencia and Monleon had a boundary dispute regarding the lands inherited by Clemencia and
Concordia from their father, Victor Bongo. Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo"
that he would take care of his children. He also said that some persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix
his thumbmark to his confession.
The trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel de oficio alleged that the trial court
erred in giving credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit of his son, Marciano, and the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and the NBI medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; in treating the alleged
declarations of Concordia Bongo to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae and in rejecting the
testimonies of Monleon and his two children, Marciano and Felicisima.
Held: TC’s judgment affirmed but lowered to reclusion perpetua. The court herein held that:
The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of which Concordia Bongo was the victim was
established by the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania Bongo. Hence, Monleon's
extrajudicial confession (Exh. C) was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133 and sec.
29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not destroy the probative value of the
confession nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of the
confession by reason of the improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity or
untrustworthiness.
The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not forced to affix his thumbmark to the
confession. There is no evidence that he was tortured or maltreated. Monleon could have complained to the
fiscal during the preliminary investigation that he was forced to execute his confession. He did not do so.
Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's affidavit which was
written in the Cebuano dialect (Exh. E) and which was not accompanied with the corresponding translation.
That confession is well-taken. The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's
counsel because section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English, Spanish or the
national language "To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial"
The trial court, also, erred in ruling that the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to the husband of
Clemencia Bongo Monleon, as to the violent acts inflicted upon her (Concordia) by appellant Monleon, are part
of the res gestae. That ruling was made in connection with Clemencia's testimony (not on direct examination
but in answer to the questions of the trial judge) that at eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, 1970, or about an
hour after Concordia was assaulted by Monleon, she (Concordia) left her house and went to Clemencia's house
three hundred meters away and recounted to Clemencia's husband (appellant Monleon's brother) how she was
beaten by Monleon. Appellants counsel observed that it was incredible that Concordia, after being severely
maltreated by Monleon (according to the prosecution's version), would still have the strength to go to
Clemencia's house which was located on a hill. Clemencia's testimony reveals that she must have been confused
in making that assertion, assuming that it was accurately translated and reported. A careful scrutiny of her entire
testimony reveals that what she really meant was that Concordia on the following day, June 2, recounted to her,
as Concordia recounted also to Epifania, how she was maltreated by Monleon. In all probability what happened
was that Clemencia, on arriving at her house at around eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised her
husband that she witnessed the assault made by Monleon on her sister, Concordia.
People v. Salison, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
Facts: At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990, witness Maria Magdalena Ayola saw
appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was then watching television in a store. Salison
placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder and brought him behind a neighbor's house where there was a
mango tree. There, appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles
suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia
Fernandez approached them that the three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind.
Fernandez was able to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused returned and started to
maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of wood and started to hit
Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding
a chance to do so, he stood up and ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed
Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house. During this
time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness
and pain in his head which was bleeding at that time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia
Alcoseba, the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident
explaining that if he should die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as
evidence.
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the
hospital. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However, at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he
started to convulse and was rushed to the hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died.
Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying declaration?
Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by
him right after the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia
Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano
regional language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The appellant further
contends that the declaration was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the
defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. The declaration
can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on
his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances
thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants.
At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of
the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had
no opportunity to contrive.
People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435 (1999)
Facts: The accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. To prove that the accused
was not a registered owner of a gun, the Prosecution introduced as evidence a certification dated August 20,
1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra, Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame.
The certification stated that accused-appellant is not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind or
caliber.
The defense objected saying that it was hearsay because the person certifying was not presented in court. The
TC however admitted the same.
The accused was found guilty by the TC.
Issue: Whether or not the certificate is admissible and if it is, was it sufficient.
Held: On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. Moreover, the
rule on hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44, Entries in official records.
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of the said document.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP-Firearm and Explosives
Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines, is competent and admissible
evidence to prove that accused-appellant is not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber.
Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified
tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as
his testimony on the stand to this effect would be.
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999

V. Offer and Objection

1. Rule 132 §34-40
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. – As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the
time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
a. testimony – the time the witness is called to testify
b. documentary and object – after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence
Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Offer of evidence Identification of evidence

Sec. 36. Objection. – Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made
as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless
a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.(36 a)
When objection to evidence offered must be made
a. orally – immediately after the offer is made.
b. in writing – within 3 days after notice of the offer, unless a different period is allowed by the court.
c. a question propounded in the course of the oral examination – as soon as the grounds therefor shall
become reasonably apparent.
The grounds for the objections should always be specified.
Grounds for objection
a. Hearsay
b. argumentative
c. leading
d. misleading
e. incompetent
f. irrelevant
g. best evidence rule
h. parole evidence rule
i. question has no basis
j.

Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. – When it becomes reasonably apparent in the
course of the examination of a witness that the questions being propounded are of the same class as those
to which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be
necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing
objection to such class of questions. (37 a)
Requisites for a proper continuing objection
a. in the course of the examination of a witness
b. objection has been made
c. reasonably apparent that the questions being propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made
d. adverse party records his continuing objection to such class of questions
Sec. 38. Ruling. – The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made,
unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the
ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is
made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection is
based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify the
ground or grounds relied upon. (38 a)
The ruling of the court on an objection
a. must be given immediately after the objection is made
b. unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the
ruling shall always be made
i. during the trial and
ii. at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling.
GR: The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
Exception: If the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some
of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
Escolin: The parties may ask for the ground for the ruling, even if the rules does not require the judge to so
state.
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. – Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the
opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the
court shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Requisites for Striking out an answer
a. witness answers the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection
b. objection is found to be meritorious
c. court order that the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or
otherwise improper.
 Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is
oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)
If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may
a. have the same attached to or made part of the record, if the evidence is object or documentary
b. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
i. the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
ii. the substance of the proposed testimony.
2. Cases
a. When evidence considered offered
People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997)
The court shall consider no evidence, even an extra-judicial confession, which has not been formally offered.
Mere fact that evidence has been identified and marked in the course of the examination of a witness, without
the contents being recited in his testimony, does not mean that it has been formally offered as evidence.
Identification of documentary evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of
the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is done only when the party rests its
case.
PB Com v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991)
Where the genuineness and due execution of documents of an instrument attached to a complaint are deemed
admitted by failure to specifically deny it under oath, such instruments are considered as evidence although they
were not formally offered.
Escolin: cf Rule 8, Sec. 8
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but
the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. (8a)
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991)
Mere fact that a document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has been offered as evidence. Marking at the
pre-trial was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. However, if an exhibit has been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and has itself been incorporated into the records (i.e. recital of the
contents of the exhibit).
b. When objection make
People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993)
Objection to testimony on the ground of lack of a formal offer of the testimony should be done when the
witness was called to testify.
Catuira v. CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994)
Failure to object upon the time a witness is called to testify on the ground that there was no formal offer of the
testimony is a waiver of the objection. Objection on such ground after the witness has testified is too late.
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990)
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e. when the party rests its
case) as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time (e.g. identification of the evidence) is premature.
Mere identification and marking is not equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may decide to not
offer evidence already identified and marked.
de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no continuing objection because continuing objections are
applicable when there is a single objection to a class of evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the
new rules on evidence is now clear that continuing objections are applicable only to testimonial evidence.
de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when inadmissible evidence is being identified and
marked, and then object when it is formally offered? Interpacific Transit was explicit when it said “What really
matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.”
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked, and its contents recited, the offeror decides not to
formally offer it into evidence. Is the court authorized to consider such exhibit on the strength of the ruling in
Tabuena? I would say “yes” because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of the testimony of the
witness which has been formally offered.
People v. Cariño, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)

De los Reyes v. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)

People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940 (1955)

PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)

Sheraton Palace v. Quijano, (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116

Vda. de Oñate v. CA, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

W.Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence

1. Rule 133
Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance
or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(1 a)
MEMORIZE!
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider
a. all the facts and circumstances of the case
b. the witnesses' manner of testifying
c. their intelligence
d. their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
e. the nature of the facts to which they testify
f. the probability or improbability of their testimony
g. their interest or want of interest
h. their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
i. number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
An cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. – In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2 a)
MEMORIZE!
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
a. does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
 b. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. – An extrajudicial confession
made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti. (3)
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
a. There is more than one circumstance
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
MEMORIZE!
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence – that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. – The court may stop the introduction of further
testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to
the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. (6)
Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. – When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
a. the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties
b. but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
2. Cases
People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA 512 (1985)
Facts: In a prosecution for arson committed in Davao City, there were no eyewitnesses. However, there was
evidence as to the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime before and at the time the fire started, that
he moved out hurriedly and running away from the burning premises, that he had previously manifested
resentment against the owner of the premises and even hinted that he would burn the owner’s house, that he
abandoned his job, left Davao City without leaving a word to anyone, and went into hiding in Manila, that he
concealed his identity by disguising himself with long hair, long moustache, and colored eyeglasses, that he
exhibited indifference and unperturbed attitude towards the fate suffered by the victims, that he did not even
condole with the bereaved family and relatives or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake or the
funeral, and that he had a serious misunderstanding and strained relationship with the owner of the burned
premises.
Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
Facts: Agapito Lasada, Santiago Lasada, Macario Lasada, and Panfilio clasa were charged with the crime of
murder (of Pedro Sopriengo, a Chinaman). The 2 principal witnesses for the prosecution, Moldes and Resardo,
positively identified the 4 defendants as the assailants. 3 other witnesses for the prosecution testified that they
saw Agapito Lasada carrying a stick or a club and dressed in cañamo and accompanied by 3 men walking
around the town. On the other hand, the defense sought to establish an alibi, and for this purpose presented
witnesses testifying that Agapito Lasada was sick with beri-beri and could hardly walk, and that at the time of
the incident he was at the house of Vicente Tuazon, the municipal president of the town of Abuyog.
Issue: Whether or not defendants are guilty? Whether or not the testimony of the defense’s witness should be
accepted?
Held: To determine whose testimony is to be accepted as true, an analysis of the proofs is necessary. There are
several modes of impeaching a witness. One mode is by cross-examination to involve the witness in
contradiction and discrepancies as to material facts stated by him. But if the conflicts cannot be reconciled, the
court must adopt that testimony which it believes to be true, and in reaching this conclusion it can take into
consideration the general character of the witness, his manner and demeanor on the stand, the consistency of his
statements, their probability and improbability, his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence,
his motive to speak the truth or swear a falsehood.
The SC believed the prosecution witnesses. (Although the dissent believed the defense witnesses.) Vicente
Tuazon the principal witness for the defense was deeply interested in the case because he had been directed to
confine the defendant in accordance with the decision of the court. Doctor Stallmen’s testimony provided that
Agapito could hardly walk but defendant could and in fact did walk around town and never was in a condition
that he could not travel. The testimony of Barbasan and Mundala wherein they stated that they, together with
Moldes and Resarda were invited to the house of Julia Sopriego and that Julia offered them P200 each on
condition that they would testify that the defendant and his brothers killed he father is so unreasonable that it
can not be believed.
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
Facts: Abendan was convicted in the CFI of Pangasinan for the murder of Doria. It was alleged that, during his
term as Chief of Police, the accused arrested Doria, took him to a cemetery, tried to bury him alive and then
finished him off. The prosecution presented three witnesses, Samson, Delfin and Arzadon who were allegedly
ith the accused when the incident happened.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the three witnesses is sufficient to convict the accused of murder?
Held: No. Acquitted.
The truthfulness of the witnesses is doubtful since they had every reason to be hostile to the accused appellant.
It is shown that the appellant had caused the arrest of Samson and Delfin because of certain criminal charges.
While Aazon had been investigated by the appellant for the theft of cement. It also appears that on one
occasion the appellant slapped and kicked Delfin because of the latter’s admission of illegal acts.
It is improbable that the appellant would have utilized the three witnesses in perpetrating a heinous crime
without a showing that they were of his confidence.
Dissent, J. Tuazon – The evidence is conclusive and airtight. The witnesses were all simple folks who gave
simple, flawless narration of the murder. None of them have been shown to have sufficient reason to lie.
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
Facts: SPO3 Jose Niño narrated that at about 9:00 p.m., July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr.
and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Bgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence
patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons there. From there, they proceeded to Bgy. Onion
where they met Nilo Solayao and four others. Niño became suspicious when they observed that the latter were
drunk and that Solayo was wearing a camouflage uniform. Solayao’s companions, upon seeing the government
agents, fled.
Niño introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the Solayao was
carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong."
When he asked Solayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm, Solayao answered that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal
possession of firearm.
Solayao, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was only given to
him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed
that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the
coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had
been used up. Solayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from
Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves.
On August 25, 1994, the TC found Solayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Sec. 1 of PD 1866. It
found that Solayao did not contest the fact that Niño confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit
or license to possess the same. It hardly found credible Solayao’s submission that he was in possession of the
firearm only by accident.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm?
Held: In People v. Lualhati, it was ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the elements thereof,:
 the existence of the subject firearm and
 the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same.
As to the argument that the subject firearm was the product of an unlawful warrantless search - In this case,
Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of Niño's group, as well as the fact that
he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It
should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed
persons were roaming around the bgys of Caibiran. This case is similar to Posadas v. CA being a "stop and
frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the absence of a license or permit
to possess the subject firearm, the SC pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that Solayao lacked the
necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm. It is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
lays such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an
offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the prosecution
was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that Solayao admitted before Niño that he did not have any
authority or license to carry the subject firearm. In other words, the prosecution relied on Solayao’s admission
to prove the second element.
The SC stated that this admission is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
illegal possession of firearm. An admission by the accused, in this case Solayao, can take the place of any
evidentiary means establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading
and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged. By its very nature, an "admission is the mere
acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the
speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt.” It is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts
pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which
is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction."
Said admission is extra-judicial in nature thus not covered by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court, “An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the
same case does not require proof.” Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a
prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of
absence or lack of a license.
The SC agrees with the argument of the Sol. Gen. that "while the prosecution was able to establish the fact that
the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of appellant, w/o the latter being able to present
any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully
authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to
establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a
certification from the government agency concerned."
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)
Facts: Agapito and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in Cagayan and among their neighbors are
Bgy Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and Robert Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse responded to a report that a there was a stabbing incident in
said Bgy 12.
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met PO1 Dolores, a policewoman of his
own Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him, "I killed
my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was and in front of the Bgy. Capt.’s store, Eclipse saw Agapito on the
ground w/ blood all over his body.
Eclipse called for Bgy Capt. Liban to come out of his house. In the presence and within the hearing of said
barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm surrendering because I killed my husband".
Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless body of Agapito to a funeral parlor while he and
Dolores went to the PNP Station. Policeman Eclipse turned over Dolores together with the bolo and knife to the
Desk Officer. Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the Police
Blotter.
The defense contended that it was not Dolores but a Robert Santos who killed Agapito. In the p.m. of July 30,
1990, Agapito and his neighbor Robert were in the former's house passing the time over a bottle of beer grande.
When Dolores arrived home from work, Agapito, in the presence of Robert Santos, met her with the following
intemperate questions: “Your mother's cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from?” Dolores
just kept quiet, and then went to the market. To buy something to cook for supper. Upon returning home, while
cooking in the kitchen, she heard an argument between them pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade w/c
the latter gave Santos. Dolores tried to pacify them but Santos was running out of the house with a bolo and
being chased by Agapito who was holding a knife and whose clothes were bloodied. A struggle ensued between
Agapito and Robert and, while wrestling, Agapito dropped the knife which Dolores picked up and tried to stab
Robert but she was so overwhelmed by nervousness, falling unconscious. When she regained consciousness,
found herself beside her dying husband, Dolores picked up the knife and bolo. It was at this precise time when
Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident. Dolores gave the knife and bolo to Eclipse. Eclipse invited her to
go with him to the Tuguegarao PNP Station and when they arrived there, Eclipse, in the presence of Dolores,
reported that she killed her husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her composure, she did
not say anything.
The TC convicted Dolores giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found
nothing on record which showed that their impartiality had been vitiated or compromised or that they had any
motive to falsely impute upon the appellant the commission of the crime. It further declared that when the
appellant surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she killed her
husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing more was needed to prove her culpability. The trial
court held that the confession was admissible for it was not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. The appellant was neither under police custody nor under investigation in
connection with the killing of her husband.
The trial court rejected the story of the defense.
First, she testified that she did not confess to Eclipse in the presence of Barangay Captain Liban. If her denial is
true, why did she not correct or even protest what Eclipse did or reported?
Second, she blamed Robert Santos who did her husband in. If this is true, why did she not tell it to Eclipse and
Bgy. Capt. Liban at the scene of the crime? Why did she withhold such a very vital information when she was
brought to the Tuguegarao PNP Station shortly after the incident?
Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the PI, since, it afforded the accused the best
opportunity to explain her innocence and to identify the "real killer" of her husband.
Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. How can a man injured be able to chase another man and wrestle
him to the ground?
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are at variance at a very vital point particularly the
wrestling of the bolo. Racheta said that when the two men caught up with one another Robert could no longer
run anywhere else, he turned around, faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed him many times. Such
inconsistency in the version of the two defense witnesses cannot but heighten one's conviction that the defense
theory is a conjured one.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Bgy. Capt. Liban and SPO1
Eclipse?
Held: SC held that the Ruling of the TC affirmed.
The TC held that prosecution witness Eclipse told the truth when he declared under oath that the appellant
surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him that she killed her husband.
If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of esprit de corps. Eclipse
did not allow that sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a peace officer. It is settled that the
absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with
the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused.
Liban's testimony does not have to corroborate Eclipse's testimony or the confession of the Dolores. What
must be corroborated is the EJ confession & not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, &
the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but the
evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by law, the testimony of a single person, if credible
and positive & if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to
convict. In determining the value & credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question its presence because
she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material
substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains
of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is
made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has
been burned, and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by independent
evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof
would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify
conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of
the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the TC’s characterization of the appellant's declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial
confession is wrong, it is only an admission. In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: “A confession is defined as an
acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which constitute the crime; but it is an admission
and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other
facts.” Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and,
having been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence was
shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove
that she was not guilty of killing her husband.
The circumstances described in the TC decision constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The
requirements then of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to
convict the appellant are present.
In appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.