Contrasts of Theology and Science

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UNIVERSITAS DIPONEGORO

Participants’ Number: 82112001719

Faculty: GRADUATE SCHOOL

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Study Program: EPIDEMIOLOGI S2

Participant Name: NIM

MAIGA AYUB HUSSEIN 30000221419041

SAID NTAMBI 30000221419035

Contrasts of Theology and Science


Methods of science and religion are radically different. Not only do their
content and subject matter have nothing in common, but their ways of
knowing are so dissimilar and neither can contribute positively to the
other.
What is of interest to theology is not of interest to science nor accessible
to it, and vice versa.
Past “conflicts” are attributed to failures in recognizing these
distinctions.
Varying accounts are given of the reasons for the discontinuity between
theological and scientific understanding.
 In neo-orthodoxy: Its the uniqueness of revelation that
distinguishes theology from all human discovery
 In existentialism: The dichotomy between personal existence and
impersonal objects is the ground of the contrast.
 Linguistic analysis: The difference in the functions of religious and
scientific language is the basis of the distinction.
The three interpretations of theology and science unite in the following
ways
 Contrasting theology and science
 Expressing reservations about the competency of reason in
reaching religious understanding
 Agree on the absence of metaphysical implications in scientific
theories
 Join in asserting that science yields only technical knowledge of
predictable regularities in nature and should not be expected to
provide the basis for a philosophy of life or a set of ethical norms
 Decline the services of metaphysics as a bridge between science
and religion
Neo-Orthodoxy (God’s Self-Revelation versus Man’s Discovery)
As stated by Karl Barth, claimed that God had become an immanent
force within the cosmic process, all—divine revelation had been
replaced by human attempts to discover God through philosophical
reflection, moral conscience, or religious experience
Barth insisted that God is always the “wholly other,” the transcendent
Lord, who can be known only when he chooses to reveal himself and is
radically distinct from the world, separated from sinful man by a gulf
which could be crossed only from the divine, not the human side.
Barth found discontinuity and dissimilarity between revelation and
natural reason, between God and the world, between Christ and other
men, between Christianity and other religions.
Theology must be radically theocentric and Christocentric, looking to
God and his act in Christ, not to human ideas and capacities and Faith is
not reasoned argument, but God’s gift and man’s obedience in personal
response to God’s initiative.
Barth maintains that the primary revelation was the person of Christ and
is not a set of propositions about God, but God himself present in
judgment and forgiveness.
For theology God is known only because he has revealed himself in
Christ, however science advances by human discovery contributes
nothing to a religious faith which depends entirely on divine initiative.
This new orthodoxy, or “neo-orthodoxy” as it came to be called,
influenced religion and the distinction between the methods of
theology and science, according to neo-orthodoxy is derived from
the difference between their objects of knowledge.
Theology deals with the transcendent and mysterious God, who is so
radically unlike the world which science studies that the same
methods cannot be expected to be used in both disciplines.
The gap between man and God cannot be bridged from the human
side. There are no points of contact between the ideas of science and
those of theology and thus neither contribute to nor conflict with
theology.
But according to neoorthodoxy, scripture tells us nothing
authoritative about scientific questions; the “scientific” ideas of the
biblical authors were the erroneous speculations of ancient times.
Thus, the scientist is free to carry out his work without interference from
the theologian, and vice versa, for their methods and their subject matter
are totally dissimilar.
Existentialism (Subjective Involvement versus Objective
Detachment)
In existentialism the divergence between methods in theology and
science arises primarily from the contrast between the sphere of personal
selfhood and the sphere of impersonal objects.
Existentialism is not a system of ideas but an attitude or orientation
finding very diverse expression among theistic and atheistic authors
(Kierkegaard, the intense Danish theologian) few existentialists have
criticized scientists for treating man deterministically as an object to be
manipulated and controlled, or for contributing to the depersonalization
which technology has inflicted on human culture.
But most existentialist authors have granted the usefulness of scientific
knowledge, claiming only that the central events in the life of personal
selfhood are beyond its scope.
They have maintained that the most significant facets of human
existence are understood only by decision, commitment, and
involvement in life, and never in the detached, rationalistic attitude of
the scientist.
The Jewish philosopher Martin Buber has given a widely quoted
difference between the way a person is related to an object and the way
he is related to another person.
 I-It, is the detached analysis and manipulative control of
impersonal things.
 I-Thou relationships, by contrast, are characterized by total
involvement and participation of the whole self, directness and
immediacy of apprehension
For Buber, man’s confrontation with God always has the immediacy and
involvement of an I-Thou relationship, whereas scientific inquiry occurs
in the domain of the I-It.
Bultmann calls “mythical” Today, he insists, that science spatiotemporal
events are governed by rigorous causal laws, and we know from
theological reflection that the transcendent God and his acts cannot be
“objectified” as if they were on the same plane as natural occurrences.
The key question is always: what does the mythical imagery say about
my personal existence and about my relationship to God? And indeed,
the doctrine of creation is not a statement about cosmological origins,
but a confession that I am totally dependent on God.
Theology, dealing with the realms of selfhood and transcendence, has no
points of contact with science, which investigates impersonal objects in
the external world without the personal involvement of the subject

Linguistic Analysis (The Variety of Uses of Language)


In addition to the neo-orthodox emphasis on revelation, and the
existentialist insistence on personal involvement, a third development
which is Linguistic Analysis has contributed to the sharp differentiation
of science from religion.
According to Hume’s contention causality is simply a habit of
associating certain items of sense-data and to the positivist, a
scientific theory is not a representation of the world, but a
shorthand calculational device for summarizing sense-data that
provides thought in organizing observations and making
predictions.
Another influence in the formation of logical positivism was the
revolution in physics in the early twentieth century. In relativity theory,
the length of an object and the time between two events are not absolute
properties of objects in themselves, they are the results of particular
measuring processes and vary according to the frame of reference of the
observer
In the notorious “verification principle” it was asserted that only
empirical statements verifiable by sense-experience have meaning
(formal definitions or tautologies are also meaningful but convey no
factual information).
Most traditional sentences in philosophy, in metaphysics, ethics, and
theology, are said to be neither true nor false, but meaningless (that is,
“vacuous pseudo statements” devoid of any literal significance) having
no factual content, they state nothing and merely express the speaker’s
emotions or feelings.
Logical positivism holds that the task of the philosopher is not to assert
anything about the world (which only the scientist can do) but to clarify
the language and the concepts used in the various sciences.
Since various types of sentences reflect differing interests artistic, moral,
scientific, religious, and so forth each area of discourse must use the
categories and the logic it finds most appropriate for its purposes.
In the case of science, analysts often adopt an “instrumental” view in
which theories are said to be “useful” rather than true and the main
function of scientific language is said to be prediction and control.
A variety of functions of religious language have been delineated for
example the provision of a total life orientation in terms of an object of
ultimate concern and devotion.
Some authors emphasize the ethical aspects and take religious language
to be a recommendation of a way of life and an acknowledgment of
allegiance to a set of moral principles. Again, religious statements are
said to propose a distinctive self-understanding, engendering
characteristic attitudes toward human existence.
Other statements of religious language serve primarily to express and
evoke commitment and in the worshiping community and these
functions, which are very different from those served by scientific
language.
Scientific theories are useful tools for summarizing data, making
predictions, or controlling processes, and Science deals with
regularities among phenomena, and it has no wider metaphysical or
theological implications.
It is not uncommon today for neo-orthodox or existentialist theology
to be combined with a positivistic view of science, if science leads
only to technical knowledge of regularities in phenomena, and if in
addition philosophy is confined to the analysis of language, then
religious faith is outside the scope of possible scientific or philosophical
attack. Therefore, such total isolation of science and religion represents
the dominant attitude in recent decades.
REFERENCE
Barbour, I. G., & Bailey, J. M. (1968). Issues in Science and Religion.
American Journal of Physics, 36(6), 562–563.
https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1974993

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