PHIL102 ASSIGNMENT ONE: 500 WORD ANALYTICAL ESSAY

General Instructions

1. You are to write a 500 word essay on one of the following passages
2. Your central task is critically to analyse the passage.
The Analysis of the Argument:
a. First, identify clearly and precisely, and explain the conclusion the passage argues for.
b. Second, identify the premises which the passage appeals to in order to argue for the
conclusion.
c. You may have to explain or clarify the meaning of any special or technical terms used in the
argument. Be economical about this.
d. You may have to supply missing or assumed premises of the argument.
e. Third, identify and spell out the argument from the premises to the conclusion: try to bring
out the shape or form of the argument- HOW the premises provide proof or good reasons to
believe the conclusion.

Critical Discussion of the Argument:

a. Assess whether the argument is valid and where the argument’s strengths and weaknesses
are- which premises most require defence? Is the conclusion too strong and bold for the
premises to support? Might the argument be invalid?
b. State one or two objections to the argument of the passage
c. Discuss whether the argument can be defended against these objections:
a. How could one reply to the objections to defend the argument?
b. Or can the argument be restated to avoid the objections and still provide a good
argument for the conclusion? If so, how? If not, why not?
3. It is suggested that you use other sources- for instance to help you explain technical terms or to help
you with some helpful logical concepts. But your focus in the essay is to understand the passage you
choose to work on.
4. If you do use other sources, use some accepted form of referencing to acknowledge your debts to the
sources you use. I do not mind which system of referencing you use. All you are asked to do is to be
consistent in the system you use.
5. The essay is due in LW5 at the lecture. It is worth 25% of the grade for the unit.

CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING PASSAGES:

Passage One : ARISTOTLE (From On the Soul, bk iii, ch 4)

Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks (whether this is separable
from the others in definition only, or spatially as well) we have to inquire (1) what differentiates this
part, and (2) how thinking can take place.
If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is
capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the
soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be
potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to
what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to
dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to
its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature
of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by
mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.
For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire

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some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has
none. It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of forms’, though (1) this description holds only of
the intellective soul, and (2) even this is the forms only potentially, not actually.

Passage Two: AQUINAS (From Summa contra Gentiles, Bk II, ch 48)

[3] Also, “the free is that which is its own cause.” Hence, that which is not the cause of its own
acting is not free in acting. But things that do not move nor act unless they are moved by other
things are not the cause of their own acting. So, only things that move themselves act freely. And
these alone act by judgment. For the thing that moves itself is divided into mover and moved; and
the mover is the appetite moved by intellect, imagination, or sense, to which faculties judgment
belongs. Among these things, therefore, those alone judge freely which in judging move themselves.
But no judging power moves itself to judge unless it reflects on its own action; for, if it moves itself
to judge, it must know its own judgment; and this only an intellect can do. Thus, irrational animals
have in a certain way freedom of movement or action, but not of judgment, whereas inanimate
things, which are moved only by other things, have not even free action or movement. Intellectual
beings, on the other hand, enjoy freedom not only of action, but also of judgment; and this is to
have free choice.

[4] Then, too, the apprehended form is a moving principle according as it is apprehended under the
aspect of the good or the fitting; for the outward action in things that move themselves proceeds
from the judgment, made through that form, that something is good or fitting. Hence, if he who
judges moves himself to judge, he must do so in the light of a higher form apprehended by him. And
this form can be none other than the very intelligible essence of the good or the fitting, in the light
of which judgment is made of any determinate good or fitting thing; so that only those beings move
themselves to judge which apprehend the all-embracing essence of the good or the fitting. And
these are intellectual beings alone. Hence, none but intellectual beings move themselves not only to
act, but also to judge. They alone, therefore, are free in judging; and this is to have free choice.

......

[6] Furthermore, certain things lack liberty of judgment, either because they have no judgment at all,
as plants and stones, or because they have a judgment determined by nature to one thing, as do
irrational animals; the sheep, by natural estimation, judges the wolf to be harmful to it, and in
consequence of this judgment flees from the wolf; and so it is in other cases. Hence, so far as
matters of action are concerned, whatever things possess judgment that is not determined to one
thing by nature are of necessity endowed with freedom of choice. And such are all intellectual
beings. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself, as common to all
things. Now, the intellect, through the form apprehended, moves the will; and in all things mover
and moved must be proportionate to one another. It follows that the will of an intellectual
substance will not be determined by nature to anything except the good as common to all things. So
it is possible for the will to be inclined toward anything whatever that is presented to it under the
aspect of good, there being no natural determination to the contrary to prevent it. Therefore, all
intellectual beings have a free will, resulting from the judgment of the intellect. And this means that
they have freedom of choice, which is defined as the free judgment of reason.

Passage Three: DESCARTES (From Meditation II)

5. What then did I formerly think I was? Undoubtedly I judged that I was a man. But what is a man?
Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not; for it would be necessary forthwith to inquire into what
is meant by animal, and what by rational, and thus, from a single question, I should insensibly glide
into others, and these more difficult than the first; nor do I now possess enough of leisure to warrant
me in wasting my time amid subtleties of this sort. I prefer here to attend to the thoughts that

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sprung up of themselves in my mind, and were inspired by my own nature alone, when I applied
myself to the consideration of what I was. In the first place, then, I thought that I possessed a
countenance, hands, arms, and all the fabric of members that appears in a corpse, and which I called
by the name of body. It further occurred to me that I was nourished, that I walked, perceived, and
thought, and all those actions I referred to the soul; but what the soul itself was I either did not stay
to consider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtile, like wind, or
flame, or ether, spread through my grosser parts. As regarded the body, I did not even doubt of its
nature, but thought I distinctly knew it, and if I had wished to describe it according to the notions I
then entertained, I should have explained myself in this manner: By body I understand all that can be
terminated by a certain figure; that can be comprised in a certain place, and so fill a certain space as
therefrom to exclude every other body; that can be perceived either by touch, sight, hearing, taste,
or smell; that can be moved in different ways, not indeed of itself, but by something foreign to it by
which it is touched [and from which it receives the impression]; for the power of self-motion, as
likewise that of perceiving and thinking, I held as by no means pertaining to the nature of body; on
the contrary, I was somewhat astonished to find such faculties existing in some bodies.
6. But [as to myself, what can I now say that I am], since I suppose there exists an extremely
powerful, and, if I may so speak, malignant being, whose whole endeavors are directed toward
deceiving me ? Can I affirm that I possess any one of all those attributes of which I have lately
spoken as belonging to the nature of body ? After attentively considering them in my own mind, I
find none of them that can properly be said to belong to myself. To recount them were idle and
tedious. Let us pass, then, to the attributes of the soul. The first mentioned were the powers of
nutrition and walking; but, if it be true that I have no body, it is true likewise that I am capable
neither of walking nor of being nourished. Perception is another attribute of the soul; but perception
too is impossible without the body; besides, I have frequently, during sleep, believed that I perceived
objects which I afterward observed I did not in reality perceive. Thinking is another attribute of the
soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am--I
exist: this is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should
wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be. I now admit nothing
that is not necessarily true. I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind
(mens sive animus), understanding, or reason, terms whose signification was before unknown to me.
I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but what thing? The answer was, a thinking thing.
Passage Four: HUME (From Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, IV, vi)

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we
call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the
evidence of a demonstration, both o its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the
most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely,
and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a farther
proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be derived from any fact, of which we
are so intimately conscious; nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.
Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for
them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. For from what impression
coued this idea be derived? This question it is impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction
and absurdity; and yet it is a question, which must necessarily be answered, if we would have the
idea of self pass for clear and intelligible, It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every
real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and
ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that
impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is
supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and
pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same

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time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self
is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.
But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are
different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered,
and may exist separately, and have no Deed of tiny thing to support their existence. After what
manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I
enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or
other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any
time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my
perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may
truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and coued I neither think,
nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated,
nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious
and unprejudiced reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I call reason
no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are
essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued,
which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.
Passage Five: MARX (From Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844)

Till now we have been considering the estrangement, the alienation of the worker only in one of its
aspects , i.e., the worker’s relationship to the products of his labor. But the estrangement is
manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity, itself.
How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the
very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the
summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself
must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement of
the object of labor is merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labor
itself.
What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor?
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his
mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself.
He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home. His
labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a
need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the
fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague. External
labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the
external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone
else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in
religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human
heart, operates on the individual independently of him – that is, operates as an alien, divine or
diabolical activity – so is the worker’s activity not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is
the loss of his self.
As a result, therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions –
eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human
functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human
and what is human becomes animal.
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But taken
abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate
ends, they are animal functions.
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We have considered the act of estranging practical human activity, labor, in two of its aspects. (1)
The relation of the worker to the product of labor as an alien object exercising power over him. This
relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of 31
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. First Manuscript
nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to him. (2) The relation of labor to the act of production
within the labor process. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien
activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as
emasculating, the worker’s own physical and mental energy, his personal life – for what is life but
activity? – as an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him.
Here we have self-estrangement, as previously we had the estrangement of the thing.

Passage Six: SARTRE (From “Existentialism is a Humanism”)

If one considers an article of manufacture as, for example, a book or a paper-knife – one sees that it
has been made by an artisan who had a conception of it; and he has paid attention, equally, to the
conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existent technique of production which is a part of that
conception and is, at bottom, a formula. Thus the paper-knife is at the same time an article
producible in a certain manner and one which, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose, for one
cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper-knife without knowing what it was for. Let us
say, then, of the paperknife that its essence – that is to say the sum of the formulae and the
qualities which made its production and its definition possible – precedes its existence. The
presence of such-and-such a paper-knife or book is thus determined before my eyes. Here, then, we
are viewing the world from a technical standpoint, and we can say that production precedes
existence.
When we think of God as the creator, we are thinking of him, most of the time, as a supernal
artisan. Whatever doctrine we may be considering, whether it be a doctrine like that of Descartes,
or of Leibnitz himself, we always imply that the will follows, more or less, from the understanding or
at least accompanies it, so that when God creates he knows precisely what he is creating. Thus, the
conception of man in the mind of God is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind of the
artisan: God makes man according to a procedure and a conception, exactly as the artisan
manufactures a paper-knife, following a definition and a formula. Thus each individual man is the
realisation of a certain conception which dwells in the divine understanding. In the philosophic
atheism of the eighteenth century, the notion of God is suppressed, but not, for all that, the idea
that essence is prior to existence; something of that idea we still find everywhere, in Diderot, in
Voltaire and even in Kant. Man possesses a human nature; that “human nature,” which is the
conception of human being, is found in every man; which means that each man is a particular
example of a universal conception, the conception of Man. In Kant, this universality goes so far that
the wild man of the woods, man in the state of nature and the bourgeois are all contained in the
same definition and have the same fundamental qualities. Here again, the essence of man precedes
that historic existence which we confront in experience.
Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God
does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which
exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the
human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man
first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man
as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be
anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature,
because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he
conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing –

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as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of
himself.

Passage Seven: TURING (From “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”)

(4) The Argument from Consciousness

This argument is very, well expressed in Professor Jefferson's Lister Oration for 1949, from which I
quote. "Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and
emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain-that
is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely
artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be
warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed
when it cannot get what it wants."
This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form
of this view the only way by which one could be sure that machine thinks is to be the machine and
to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one
would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a
man thinks is to be that particular man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most
logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe "A thinks but
B does not" whilst B believes "B thinks but A does not." instead of arguing continually over this point
it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks.
I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist point of view.
Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test. The game (with the player
B omitted) is frequently used in practice under the name of viva voce to discover whether some one
really understands something or has "learnt it parrot fashion." Let us listen in to a part of such a viva
voce:
Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads "Shall I compare thee to a summer's day,"
would not "a spring day" do as well or better?
Witness: It wouldn't scan.
Interrogator: How about "a winter's day," That would scan all right.
Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day.
Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas?
Witness: In a way.
Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the
comparison.
Witness: I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day one means a typical winter's day, rather than
a special one like Christmas.
And so on, What would Professor Jefferson say if the sonnet-writing machine was able to answer
like this in the viva voce? I do not know whether he would regard the machine as "merely artificially
signalling" these answers, but if the answers were as satisfactory and sustained as in the above
passage I do not think he would describe it as "an easy contrivance." This phrase is, I think, intended
to cover such devices as the inclusion in the machine of a record of someone reading a sonnet, with
appropriate switching to turn it on from time to time.
In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness could be
persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into the solipsist position. They will then probably be
willing to accept our test.
I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. There is,
for instance, something of a paradox connected with any attempt to localise it. But I do not think
these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are
concerned in this paper.